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THE  MILITARY  UNPREPAREDNESS 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  •   DALI-AS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE 

MILITARY  UNPREPAREDNESS 

OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

A  History  of  American  Land  Forces  from 
Colonial  Times  until  June  1,  1915 

BY 
FREDERIC  LOUIS  HUIDEKOPER 

Author  of  "Military  Studies,"  etc.;  founder  of  the  Army 

League  of  the  United  States,  member  of  the 

Military  Service  Institution,  etc. 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

MAJOR  GENERAL  LEONARD  WOOD,   M.  H.  . 

Former  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  United  States  Army. 


Truth  is  the  highest  thing  that  man  may  keep. 
Chaucer,  The  Frankeleines  Tale,  11789. 
Sooner  or  later  the  truth  comes  to  light. 
Dutch  Proverb. 


BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBKAJKl 
CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 


N^m  fork 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1915 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright  1915 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  November,  1915 


To 

The  Memory  of 

MY  BELOVED  MOTHER 


AUTHOR'S  PEEFACE 

Upon  the  author's  return  from  Europe  at  the  end  of 
IN^ovember,  1914,  after  an  absence  of  two  and  a  half  months 
spent  in  France,  England,  Holland  and  Germany,  he  was 
gratified  to  see  an  awakening  of  the  interest  of  the  American 
public  in  the  necessity  for  adequate  national  defence, 
which  he  had  been  striving  for  nearly  nine  years  to  arouse. 
This  interest,  stimulated  by  the  w^ar  which  has  involved  a 
large  part  of  the  civilized  world,  gave  such  unmistakable 
evidences  of  being  more  than  superficial,  and  so  numerous 
and  earnest  w^ere  the  inquiries  which  he  received  from  all 
over  the  United  States  during  the  month  of  December,  1914, 
as  to  the  condition  of  our  land  forces  and  what  ought  to  be 
done  to  strengthen  them,  that  he  resolved,  during  January, 
1915,  to  set  forth  the  facts  concerning  the  military  policy 
pursued  by  the  United  States  since  Revolutionary  times. 
It  had  at  last  become  apparent  that  there  existed  a  need  for  a 
military  history  of  the  United  States  which  gave  the  un- 
varnished truth,  doubly  so  since  our  historians  have  painted 
in  glowing  colours  the  successes  of  our  former  wars  but  have 
suppressed  with  studied  care  the  blunders  which  have  charac- 
terised our  military  policy  throughout  the  past. 

Heretofore,  the  nearest  approach  to  such  a  history  was 
The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States  by  Brevet  llajor 
General  Emory  Upton,  United  States  Army,  one  of  the  most 
masterful  w^orks  of  its  sort  in  any  language.  General 
Upton's  book  only  covers  the  period  from  1775  to  the  end  of 
1862,  is  much  too  technical  for  the  average  reader  and,  more- 
over, is  not  available  to  the  general  public.  The  author  has 
taken  Upton  as  his  model  —  exactly  as  he  did  in  a  number  of 
articles  on  the  subject  of  national  defence  written  during  the 

vii 


viii  Author  ^s  Preface 

past  nine  years  * —  and  in  the  present  work  he  has  embodied, 
either  in  whole  or  in  part,  nearly  all  of  the  most  important 
paragraphs  of  that  magnum  opus.  He  has,  on  the  other  hand, 
corrected  a  number  of  errors  discovered  in  Upton  and  has 
incorporated  much  important  matter  pertaining  to  the  period 
from  1775  until  the  close  of  1862  which  had  completely 
escaped  that  writer.  The  data  from  the  first  of  January, 
1863,  down  to  the  present  day  have  been  collected  from  a 
multiplicity  of  sources  and  have  never  before  been  embodied 
in  a  single  work.  Furthermore,  the  opposing  forces  and 
losses  in  the  principal  battles  from  the  beginning  of  the 
Eevolution  to  the  end  of  the  Philippine  War  have  been  com- 
piled with  great  care  from  the  most  authoritative  statistics 

*  Of  these  articles  by  the  author  of  the  present  work  the  most  im- 
portant were: 

( 1 )  Is  the  United  States  Prepared  for  War?  Part  I  constituted  the 
leading  article  in  the  North  American  Review  for  February,  1906. 
Part  II  appeared  in  the  North  American  Review  for  March,  1906.  The 
entire  article  was  re-published  in  pamphlet  form  by  the  North  Am- 
erican Eeview  Company  in  May,  1907,  accompanied  by  an  introduction 
'by  the  Honorable  William  H.  Taft,  Secretary  of  War,  and  by  reviews 
from  the  Army  and  Navy  Register  of  March  24,  1906,  and  from  the 
Infantry  Journal  for  April,  1906. 

(2)  The  Truth  Concerning  the  United  States  Army,  which  was  pub- 
lished in  the  newspapers  affiliated  with  the  United  Press  Associations 
on  January  14,  1911,  et  seq.  This  article  formed  the  subject  of  debate 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  on  January  17,  1911  {vide  the  Con- 
gressional Record  for  Tuesday,  January  17,  1911,  vol.  46,  No.  26, 
Sixty-first  Congress,  third  session,  pp.  1047-1050),  and  also  appeared 
in  the  Congressional  Record  for  March  3,  1911,  vol.  26,  No.  70,  pp.  4228 
and  4229.  It  was  re-published  in  the  Infantry  Journal  for  May-June, 
1911,  pp.  848-863,  accompanied  by  authorities  for  every  statement  of 
fact  in  the  text  and  by  a  note  by  the  Editor.  It  was  reprinted  in 
pamphlet  form,  Washington,  June,  .1911. 

(3)  The  Army  Unprepared  for  War,  an  article  specially  prepared 
for,  and  published  in,  The  New  York  Times  for  Sunday,  February  19, 
1911,  and  other  newspapers  affiliated  with  the  Publishers'  Press.  It 
was  re-published,  under  the  title  of  The  United  States  Army  and  Or- 
ganized Militia  To-day,  in  The  Infantry  Journal  for  July- August,  1911, 
pp.  43-60,  accompanied  by  authorities  for  every  statement  of  fact  in 
the  text  and  by  a  note  by  the  Editor.  This  article  was  reprinted  in 
pamphlet  form,  Washington,  August,  1911. 

(4)  The  Lessons  of  Our  Past  Wars,  an  article,  with  illustrations 
and  a  map,  which  was  published  in  The  World's  Work  for  February, 
1915,  pp.  392-416. 


Author ^s  Preface  ix 

and  have  been  inserted  in  the  footnotes  as  a  useful  reference. 

In  the  present  history  there  is  scarcely  a  statement  of  ma- 
terial fact  in  the  text  for  which  the  authorities  are  not  given 
in  the  footnotes.  Since  nothing  is  more  irksome  to  the  aver- 
age reader  than  to  be  confronted  at  the  bottom  of  every  page 
by  a  long  array  of  citations,  most  of  these  footnotes  have  been 
relegated  to  appendices  at  the  back  of  the  book  and  subdivided 
according  to  the  chapters  to  which  they  refer.  The  authori- 
ties thus  quoted,  although  necessarily  explanatory  and  sup- 
plemental, contain  almost  as  much  information  as  the  text 
itself.  The  author  therefore  ventures  to  suggest  that  the 
reader,  who  is  genuinely  interested  in  the  subject,  should, 
upon  finishing  a  chapter,  turn  to  the  footnotes  under  that 
heading  and  glance  through  them,  even  if  he  does  not  care 
to  examine  them  in  detail. 

This  book  has  been  written  under  high  pressure  —  only 
five  months  having  elapsed  from  the  beginning  to  its  com- 
pletion. The  author  has,  however,  personally  verified  every 
single  reference  cited  —  an  amount  of  labour  so  herculean 
that  it  can  scarcely  be  appreciated  by  any  one  who  has  not 
attempted  a  similar  work.  All  italics  and  capitals  have  been 
inserted  by  the  present  author,  unless  otherwise  specifically 
stated.  In  many  instances  the  narrative  has  been  submitted 
to  officials  and  officers  who  have  played  important  roles  in  the 
events  described.  By  this  precaution  much  valuable  in- 
formation was  gained  which  could  not  be  gleaned  from  offi- 
cial documents,  and  the  side-lights  of  history  have  been 
thrown  upon  occurrences  by  those  who,  having  been  most 
intimately  connected  with  them,  were  best  qualified  to  inter- 
pret their  true  significance.  It  is  a  source  of  gratification  to 
be  able  to  record  that  in  no  case  was  any  desire  encountered 
to  do  more  than  to  illustrate  and  explain  the  facts  which  had 
previously,  although  at  times  somewhat  hazily,  been  set 
forth  in  official  documents. 

The  final  chapter,  w^hich  treats  of  the  land  forces  of  the 
United  States  as  they  ought  to  be  organized,  was  submitted, 


X  Author's  Preface 

by  kind  permission  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  to  the  Army  War 
College,  as  the  author's  purpose  was  to  prevent  the  views 
therein  expressed  from  being  too  greatly  at  variance  with  the 
scheme  of  organization  now  in  the  process  of  formulation  by 
the  War  Department.  Although  the  number  of  corrections 
made  in  that  chapter  was  gratifyingly  few,  the  author  desires 
to  state  emphatically  that  he  alone  assumes  entire  responsi- 
bility for  the  suggestions  made  and  that,  under  no  circum- 
stances, must  they  be  taken  to  represent  —  save  in  the  most 
general  way  possible  —  the  views  of  the  War  Department, 
the  Army  War  College  or  the  General  StaiF. 

If  the  author's  strictures  upon  the  militia  appear  to  be 
unduly  severe,  it  must  be  distinctly  borne  in  mind  that  he 
has  considered  that  force  purely  in  the  light  of  a  military 
asset  and  has  endeavoured  to  ascribe  the  proper  value  to  it  as 
such.  He  yields  to  no  one  in  his  appreciation  of  the  high 
motives  which  have  actuated  the  militia  and  volunteers  in 
our  past  history.  The  sacrifices  that  they  have  made  of 
business  and  family  interests  for  the  purpose  of  serving  their 
country,  and  the  unrivalled  personal  courage  which  they  have 
shown,  with  few  exceptions,  cannot  be  too  greatly  commended. 
If,  therefore,  they  have  fallen  short  of  the  requisite  standard 
that  the  United  States  has  a  right  to  demand  of  the  troops 
to  which  it  entrusts  its  national  destinies,  the  blame  must  not 
be  laid  at  the  door  of  these  patriotic  men  individually.  The 
fault  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  have  always  been,  and  still 
are,  the  victims  of  a  most  pernicious  system,  and  it  is  against 
that  system  that  the  author's  comments  are  directed. 

The  author  desires  to  express  his  thanks  and  appreciation 
to  the  following  officials  and  officers  who  have  been  extremely 
kind  in  rendering  him  valuable  assistance  in  the  preparation 
of  this  arduous  work,  namely,  the  Honorable  Lindley 
M.  Garrison,  Secretary  of  War;  the  Honorable  Henry  L. 
Stimson,  late  Secretary  of  War;  Brigadier  General 
Hugh  L.  Scott,  Chief  of  Staff,  and  his  assistant.  Captain 
Powell     Clayton;     Lieutenant-General     kelson    A.     Miles, 


Author's  Preface  xi 

M.  H.,*  formerly  commanding  the  Army;  Brigadier  General 
Montgomery  M.  Macomb,  President  of  the  Army  War  Col- 
lege ;  Brigadier  General  Erasmus  M.  Weaver,  Chief  of  Coast 
Artillery,  and  his  assistant,  Colonel  Richmond  P.  Davis; 
Brigadier  General  William  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  and 
his  assistant.  Colonel  Edwin  B.  Babbitt;  Brigadier  General 
Enoch  H.  Crowder,  Judge  Advocate  General;  Brigadier 
General  Albert  L.  Mills,  M.  H.,  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Mili- 
tia Affairs ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  H.  Johnston,  Major 
Charles  Crawford  and  Captain  William  Mitchell  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff;  and  to  Mr.  Graham  H.  Powell  of  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  and  Fortification. 

The  author's  heartiest  thanks  are  due  in  particular  to 
Major  General  Leonard  Wood,  M.  H.,*  former  Chief  of 
Staff,  not  only  for  the  introduction  to  this  work,  but  for  his 
never-failing  kindness  and  assistance  in  innumerable  other 
ways;  to  Brigadier  General  Henry  C.  McCain,  The  Adju- 
tant-General of  the  Army,  and  his  assistant,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  William  M.  Wright,  who  furnished  an  immense 
amount  of  material  from  the  records  of  The  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  without  which  this  history  could  not  have 
been  accurately  written;  to  Lieutenant-General  John  C. 
Bates,  retired,  former  Chief  of  Staff,  and  the  author's  uncle. 
Major  General  Henry  Shippen  Huidekoper,  M.  H.,  the 
ranking  retired  officer  of  the  ^National  Guard  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, both  of  whom  supplied  important  suggestions  about 
the  campaign  of  Gettysburg.  To  Major  General  Joseph  P. 
Sanger,  retired,  former  Inspector  General  of  the  Army,  the 
author  is  quite  unable  to  express  the  full  measure  of  his  ap- 
preciation for  the  invaluable  corrections  and  suggestions  in 
the  narrative  of  the  Spanish- American  War  and  its  lessons. 
To  Colonel  Henry  A.-du  Pont,  M.  H.,  the  senior  Senator 
from  Delaware  and  former  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate,  the  author  is  extremely  grate- 
ful for  important  material  relating  to  recent  military  legisla- 

*  Medal  of  Honor  —  the  American  Victoria  Cross. 


xii  Author  ^s  Preface 

tion  in  Congress.  To  the  Honorable  Chandler  P.  Ander- 
son, Special  Counsellor  of  the  Department  of  State,  and  to 
Mr.  Julian  Kennedy  of  Pittsburgh,  the  author  is  indebted 
for  authoritative  information  in  respect  to  the  manufacture 
of  war  materiel  in  case  the  United  States  were  cut  off  from 
certain  imports.  To  Major  John  E.  M.  Taylor,  retired,  the 
Librarian  of  the  Army  War  College,  and  his  assistant.  Miss 
!N"annie  C.  Barndollar,  the  author  returns  his  heartiest  thanks 
for  their  prompt  responses  to  his  frequent  requests  for  im- 
portant works  from  that  library.  To  the  law  firms  of 
Wilson,  Huidekoper  and  Lesh,  and  Clephane  and  Clephane, 
the  author  is  likewise  greatly  beholden  for  the  use  of  their 
law  libraries,  as  well  as  to  Mr.  John  T.  Loomis  of  W.  H. 
Lowdermilk  and  Company  for  the  loan  of  certain  rare  books 
treating  of  American  military  history.  Last,  but  not  least, 
the  author  desires  to  express  to  his  secretary,  William  O. 
Davis,  his  appreciation  of  the  valuable  services  rendered  in 
the  preparation  of  this  difficult  manuscript. 

If  the  information  contained  in  this  work  shall  assist  to 
arouse  the  American  people  to  a  realization  of  the  necessity 
for  adequate  national  defence  and  shall  contribute  to  bring 
about  the  proper  strength  and  organization  of  the  land  forces 
of  the  United  States,  the  author  will  consider  that  he  has 
been  amply  rewarded  for  the  many  arduous  hours  devoted 
to  this  labour  of  love. 

P.  L.  H. 
1614  Eighteenth  Street, 

Washington,  D.  C, 
June  9th,  1915. 


INTKODUCTION 

In  1907  Mr.  Taft,  then  Secretary  of  War,  said  in  speak- 
ing of  a  work  of  Mr.  Frederic  L.  Huidekoper,  entitled  Is  the 
United  States  Prepared  for  War?  —  that  every  American 
who  has  the  defense  of  his  country  at  heart  ought  to  read 
Mr.  Huidekoper's  article.  Every  one  who  has  read  this  con- 
densed and  able  statement  can  have  but  one  opinion  as  to 
its  value. 

Mr.  Huidekoper  has  just  completed  a  most  admirable  work 
dealing  with  our  military  history  and  policy  from  the  be- 
ginning of  our  national  history  up  to  the  present  day.  It 
follows  the  general  lines  of  that  able  presentation  of  these 
subjects  by  General  Emory  Upton  in  his  great  work  —  The 
Military  Policy  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Huidekoper  has 
endeavored  to  present  these  subjects  in  a  rather  more  con- 
densed form  with  reference  to  certain  portions  of  our  history, 
and  has  greatly  amplified  them  in  others  through  the  addi- 
tion of  much  new  and  valuable  material.  That  portion 
covering  the  period  from  the  end  of  the  Civil  War  to  the 
present  time  is  especially  valuable,  as  it  embodies  a  compila- 
tion of  data  not  heretofore  presented.  The  references  are 
well  arranged,  and  are  in  great  detail,  and  the  whole  work 
is  characterised  by  good  arrangement.  This  work  of  Mr. 
Huidekoper' s  is  one  which  should  be  read,  and  carefully 
read,  by  all  Americans  who  are  interested  in  the  military 
history  and  policy  of  their  country,  and  who  desire  to  replace 
our  past  haphazard  policy  by  one  which  will  be  adequate  to 
secure  a  reasonable  degree  of  preparedness  without  in  any 
way  building  up  a  condition  of  militarism.  Mr.  Huidekoper 
presents  with  such  effectiveness  the  folly  of  our  past  policy 

and  its  great  and  unnecessary  expense  in  life  and  treasure, 

xiii 


xiv  Introduction 

that  one  Avho  reads  with  an  average  degree  of  intelligence 
cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  a  continuance  of  the  policy 
of  unpreparedness,  blindly  trusting  to  chance,  which  has 
characterised  and  dominated  our  military  policy  in  the  past^ 
and  a  continuance  of  the  methods  employed  in  raising  and 
maintaining  armies,  can  have  but  one  end  —  national  dis- 
aster. Our  people  have  forgotten,  in  the  rush  and  turmoil 
incident  to  the  development  of  the  national  resources  and  the 
industries  of  our  great  country,  the  unnecessary  cost  both  in 
blood  and  treasure  of  our  past  wars,  and  remember  only  that 
somehow  or  other  we  emerged  from  them  successfully. 
Ignorance  concerning  our  military  history  is  universal  and 
profound.  Our  school  histories,  whatever  their  intent,  do 
not  give  a  correct  impression  of  our  military  history,  and  say 
little  or  nothing  about  the  methods  employed  in  the  building 
up  and  maintenance  of  our  armies  in  peace  and  war.  Our 
children  are  taught  nothing  about  the  dangers  of  trusting  to 
voluntary  service  in  war,  and  are  told  little  about  the  most 
pernicious  of  all  systems  —  the  bounty  system,  with  its  at- 
tendant demoralization,  desertions  and  resulting  degradation 
of  the  individual  sense  of  responsibility  for  military  service. 
If  there  is  anything  which  is  brought  out  with  special  em- 
phasis in  connection  wdth  modern  war  it  is  the  necessity  of 
thorough  preparation  —  of  a  preparation  .which  in  its  scope 
recognizes  the  necessity  for  the  organization  of  the  resources 
of  the  nation,  in  men,  money  and  material,  not  with  a  view 
to  having  them  always  ready  as  a  standing  army,  but  with  a 
view  to  having  them  ready  so  that  they  may  become  imme- 
diately available  in  case  of  war,  and  prepared  so  that  each 
element  of  the  fighting  machine  may  be  well  balanced  and 
ready  to  discharge  its  particular  function.  The  organization 
of  the  military  resources  of  a  nation  to-day  involves  the 
training  of  practically  the  entire  male  population,  through 
systems  of  varying  intensity  and  thoroughness,  all  having 
as  an  object  the  establishment  of  such  a  state  of  training  and 
or2:anization  as  will  render  it  possible  to  apply  the  full  mili- 


Introduction  xv 

tary  strength  of  the  nation  in  the  minimum  time.  This  may 
be  accomplished  under  the  systems  employed  by  Switzerland 
and  Australia,  which  I  believe  are  best  adapted  for  our  pur- 
poses and  most  in  accord  with  our  ideals,  or  under  such  a 
system  as  that  employed  by  France,  w^here  in  addition  to 
being  ready  it  is  necessary  to  maintain  actually  in  service 
a  very  considerable  army.  However  preparedness  is  to  be 
brought  about,  it  must  be  done  in  time  of  peace.  Not  only 
does  this  apply  to  the  training  of  men,  but  it  applies  with 
equal  force  to  the  preparation  of  material,  for  the  weapons 
of  to-day  are  infinitely  more  complicated  than  those  of  our 
fathers.  The  time  necessary  to  instruct  in  their  use  is  much 
greater^  and  improvements  in  transportation  have  enor- 
mously reduced  the  period  of  an  enemy's  approach,  so  that 
everything  now  is  in  the  favor,  to  an  extent  never  before 
known,  of  the  prepared  nation,  and  the  unprepared,  unready, 
pacific  country  has  less  chance  of  successful  resistance  than 
ever  before.  The  words  of  John  Adams  in  his  second  mes- 
sage — "  An  efficient  preparation  for  war  can  alone  secure 
peace  " —  may  well  be  heeded  by  the  people  of  to-day,  and 
those  who  have  their  country's  safety  at  heart  may  take  unto 
themselves  with  profit  the  words  of  Lord  Roberts  and  make 
the  sentiment  they  express  their  own  — "  Strive  to  stir  up, 
to  foster  and  develop,  the  manly  and  patriotic  spirit  in  the 
nation  —  the  spirit  which  will  induce  our  youth  to  realise 
that  they  must  be  not  only  ready  but  prepared  to  guard  the 
heritage  handed  down  to  them." 

Any  one  who  reads  Mr.  Huidekoper's  book  will,  I  am  sure, 
realize  the  necessity  of  following  this  advice. 

Our  people  must  remember  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
experience  of  the  past  or  in  the  conditions  of  to-day  which  in 
any  way  justifies  the  assumption  that  wars  are  past.  While 
we  should  strive  for  world  peace  and  endeavor  to  settle  our 
international  difficulties  by  arbitration,  we  cannot,  unless  we 
are  unworthy  of  the  trust  handed  down  to  us,  fail  to  make 
adequate  preparation  to  defend  our  heritage.     We  must  not 


XVI 


Introduction 


forget  that  there  is  many  a  peace  which  is  worse  than  war. 
We  have  never  yet  waged  war  single-handed  with  a  first  class 
nation  prepared  for  war.  Our  people  know  nothing  of  what 
such  a  struggle  means ;  they  have  no  conception  of  the  effect 
of  the  application  of  well  organized  and  thoroughly  prepared 
military  force.  A  careful  perusal  of  Mr.  Huidekoper's  work 
will  aid  them  in  reaching  sound  conclusions  as  to  our  needs 
in  the  way  of  military  preparedness,  and  give  them  many 
valuable  suggestions  as  to  the  methods  to  be  adopted  to  meet 
them. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Preface vii 

Introduction xiii 

I     Colonial  Period 1 

II     The  War  of  the  Revolution 7 

III  Lessons  of  the  Revolution 40 

IV  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States  from  the 

End  of  the  Revolution  Until  the  Beginning 

OF  THE  War  of  1812 43 

V     The  War  of  1812 53 

VI     Military  Policy  from  the  Close  of  the  War  of 

1812  TO  the  Beginning  of  the  Mexican  War  .  70 

VII    Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War  ...  79 

VIII    Military  Policy  from  the  Mexican  War  to  the 

War  of  the  Rebellion 92 

IX     Military  Unpreparedness  and  Policy  of  the  United 

States  During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion    .     94 

X    Military  Legislation  and  Events  in  1862   .      .      .   105 

XI    Military  Legislation   and  Events  During  1863     .   115 

XII    Military  Legislation  and  Events  During  1864     .   128 

XIII  Military  Legislation  and  Events  During  1865     .  139 

XIV  Lessons  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  and  Its  Cost 

♦  IN  Men  and  Money 145 

XV  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States  from  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  to  the  Spanish- 
American  War 151 

XVI  The  Spanish-American  War 153 

XVII  Lessons  of  the  Spanish-American  War  ....   202 

XVIII  The    Philippine    War 220 

XIX  The  Lessons  of  the  Philippine  War 265 


Contents 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

XX    The  Lessons  of  Our  Past  Wars 269 

XXI    Citizen-Soldiery 273 

XXII    Military  Policy,  Legislation  and  Events  from  1902 

TO  June  1,  1915 286 

XXIII  The  Condition  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United 

States  at  the  Beginning  of  1915       ....  466 

XXIV  The  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States  as  They 

Ought  to  Be   Organized 524 

Notes  and  Authorities 557 

Index 721 


MAPS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Early  Campaigns  of  the  Revolutionary  War 7 

AVashington's   Campaigns 15 

Northern  Campaigns  of  the  Revolutionary  War 19 

Southern  Campaigns  of  the  Revolutionary  War 25 

War  of  1812 53 

War  with  Mexico 79 

Campaigns  in  Virginia,  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania     .      .      .   101 

Grant's  Campaigns  in  the  West 109 

Campaigns  of  Buell  and  Bragg Ill 

Sherman's  March  to  the  Sea  and  Hood's  Retreat 133 

Cuba 155 

The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba 179 

The  Campaign  of  Porto  Rico 191 

The   Philippines 197 

The  Operations  in  Luzon,  1898-1901 199 

The  Peking  Relief  Expedition,  1900 243 


THE  MILITARY  UNPREPAREDNESS 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

CHAPTEE  I 
COLONIAL  PEKIOD 

IN  The  Seven  Seas,  by  Rudyard  Kipling,  there  is  a  poem 
entitled  "  An  American/'  which  contains  the  following 
stanza : 

^'  Enslaved,  illogical,  elate. 

He  greets  th'  embarrassed  Gods,  nor  fears 
To  shake  the  iron  hand  of  Fate 

Or  match  with  Destiny  for  beers.'' 

These  lines,  unconsciously  perhaps,  describe  to  perfection 
the  nonchalant  attitude  of  the  average  American  toward  the 
United  States  Army  and  anything  pertaining  to  the  military 
service.  The  fruit  of  this  indifference,  which  has  persisted 
from  the  beginning  of  our  national  career  until  to-day  — 
with  the  exception  of  a  spasmodic  interest  manifested  during 
threatened  or  actual  war  —  has  been  reaped  in  the  most 
short-sighted,  blundering  military  policy  ever  pursued  in 
modem  times  by  a  great  nation  of  supposedly  intelligent  peo- 
ple. As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  has  existed  no  real  military 
policy  in  this  country,  in  the  sense  of  the  term  as  understood 
elsewhere,  and,  as  a  result,  the  United  States  was  prevented 
by  its  weakness  from  attaining  the  front  rank  among  the 
Powers  of  the  world  until  the  autumn  of  1898.  Even  to-day, 
our  international  influence  is  largely  due  to  causes  other  than 
our  own  strength  —  causes  such  as  the  existing  alliances 
between  the  leading  nations  which  confer  upon  the  United 

1 


2     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

States  an  extraordinary  position  by  giving  it  control  of  the 
balance  of  power,  thus  investing  it  with  an  importance  in 
world  politics  all  out  of  proportion  to  the  role  to  which  it 
would  otherwise  be  entitled.  These  facts  the  ordinary 
American  in  nowise  realizes,  and  his  ignorance  is  not  in  the 
least  surprising.  As  a  child  he  is  taught  from  school-books, 
the  authors  of  which  have  extolled  to  the  skies  the  prowess 
of  our  "  citizen-soldiery "  and  have  painted  in  glowing 
colours  the  brilliancy  of  American  military  successes,  while 
they  have  glossed  over  or  suppressed  wdth  studied  care  the 
blunders  and  fearful  cost  in  life  and  money  which  have  char- 
acterised our  past  wars.  As  a  man,  his  chief  sources  of 
information  have  been  the  press  and  the  utterances  of  men 
in  public  life  and  so-called  orators,  all  feeding  him  to  the 
point  of  surfeit  with  intellectual  pabulum  on  the  subject  of 
American  invincibility.  It  is  only  natural  that  he  has  ac- 
cepted these  statements  as  absolutely  true  —  or  at  least  as 
w^ell-founded  in  view  of  the  fact  that  our  wars  have  all  been 
brought  to  a  victorious  issue  —  and  that  he  has  gone  on 
slumbering  under  a  false  security  in  the  belief  that  a  system 
which  has  been  successful  in  the  past  must  necessarily  pre- 
vail in  the  future. 

Only  those  who  have  delved  deep  into  the  subject  of  our 
military  history  and  who  have  studied  the  question  of  a 
military  policy  —  a  question  so  vital  to  our  very  national 
existence  —  know  the  truth ;  the  public  as  a  whole  has  been 
grossly  misinformed  and  therefore  indifferent  all  these  years 
to  our  military  needs.  Our  interest  has  at  last  been  quick- 
ened by  the  gigantic  war  which  has  involved  nearly  half  the 
world,  and  no  man  in  his  senses  w^ould  now  venture  to  argue 
that  Great  Britain  and  France  with  a  few  thousand  Eegular 
troops,  supplemented  by  a  force  of  "  citizen-soldiery  "  how- 
ever large,  could  have  withstood  the  onslaught  of  the  mighty 
German  army  and  driven  it  back  from  the  very  gates  of 
Paris  as  they  have  done.  Every  one  realizes  that  their  huge 
standing  armies  were  taxed  to  the  very  utmost  and  that,  had 


I 


Colonial  Period  3 

they  depended  upon  anything  except  Regular  troops  trained 
to  the  highest  possible  standard,  they  would  have  been  hope- 
lessly crushed  at  the  start,  so  that  all  their  volunteers  —  who 
require  six  months  of  training  to  render  them  fit  for  service 
in  the  field  —  would  have  availed  them  nothing.  Yet  our 
military  organization  since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution 
has  been  moulded  upon  just  such  specious  arguments  as  that 
of  placing  but  small  dependence  upon  our  Regular  army 
and  of  entrusting  our  destinies  in  time  of  war  to  an  un- 
trained "  citizenry.''  And,  what  is  more,  those  arguments 
still  persist.^ 

It  may,  therefore,  not  be  amiss  to  examine  briefly  our 
military  history  in  the  past,  taking  care,  as  one  of  the  great- 
est of  American  military  writers,  General  Upton,  has 
warned  us,^ 

"  to  bear  in  mind  the  respective  duties  and  responsibilities  of 
soldiers  and  statesmen.  The  latter  are  responsible  for  the  crea- 
tion and  organization  of  our  resources,  and,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  President,  may  further  be  responsible  for  their  management 
or  mismanagement.  Soldiers,  while  they  should  suggest  and  be 
consulted  on  all  the  details  of  organization  under  our  system, 
can  alone  be  held  responsible  for  the  control  and  direction  of  our 
armies  in  the  field.'' 

In  order  to  have  an  intelligent  understanding  of  the 
method  employed  during  the  Revolution  with  respect  to  the 
fighting  men,  it  must  be  recollected  that  the  American 
Colonies  possessed  no  Regular  military  force;  that  was  sup- 
plied by  England.  Each  colony  had  a  force  of  militia  of 
distinctly  uncertain  value  as  a  military  asset.  It  contained, 
however,  an  admirable  nucleus  in  the  shape  of  some  excel- 
lent ofiicers  and  men  who  had  received  a  thorough  schooling 
in  the  French  and  Indian  w^ars.  Many  of  these  had  partici- 
pated in  such  important  Colonial  operations  as  the  siege  of 
Louisbourg  in  1745,  the  struggle  between  the  French  and 
English  for  the  valley  of  the  Ohio  from  1749  to  1758,  and 
in  the  fighting  along  the  Canadian  border.     In  spite  of  their 


4    Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

repugnance  to  discipline,  they  were  first-class  soldiers,  but 
the  majority  of  the  Colonial  militia  by  no  means  attained 
such  a  standard,  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  the  frontier 
conditions  of  the  time  developed  men  who  were  good  shots 
and  unusually  self-reliant,  for  Indian  warfare  demanded  men 
of  special  training,  exceptional  hardiness  and*  extraordinary' 
qualifications.^  The  siege  of  Louisbourg  was  one  of  the  most 
astounding  feats  in  the  annals  of  war,  excelled  perhaps  only 
by  CiEsar's  capture  of  Alesia,  the  more  so  since  one  of  the 
mightiest  fortifications  ever  erected  capitulated  after  only 
six  weeks  of  siege  to  a  motley  band  of  I^ew  England  farmers 
and  fishermen  led  by  a  lumber  merchant.  The  moral  effect 
of  this  extraordinary  achievement  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can colonists  was  infinitely  more  far-reaching  that  at  first 
blush  would  appear.  Of  the  men  who  fought  at  Bunker 
Hill,  many  had  been  at  Louisbourg  and,  when  they  saw  the 
mud  walls  that  General  Gage  had  erected  on  Boston  N'eck 
and  compared  them  to  the  mighty  ramparts  of  the  French 
fortress  which  they  had  so  gallantly  captured,  they  laughed 
them  to  scorn.  The  annihilation  of  General  Braddock's 
regulars  at  Fort  Duquesne  was,  in  reality,  a  blessing  in  dis- 
guise for  the  colonists,  insomuch  as  it  shook  the  prevalent 
belief  in  the  invincibility  of  British  troops,  bred  in  them  a 
contempt  —  by  no  means  wholly  warranted  —  for  the  Euro- 
pean method  of  fighting  in  close  formation,  and  compelled 
them  to  rely  entirely  upon  their  own  power  of  fighting  in- 
stead of  trusting  supinely  to  the  protecting  wgis  of  Eng- 
land, as  they  otherwise  would  unquestionably  have  done. 
Indeed,  too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  upon  the  influence  of 
these  factors  in  strengthening  the  morale  of  the  American 
colonists  and  in  confirming  them  in  the  belief  that  they  could 
make  a  successful  opposition  to  the  regulars  of  Great 
Britain.^ 

These  facts  and  the  absence  of  a  permanent  force  of 
Regular  troops  left  the  revolting  colonies  no  alternative  except 
to  have  recourse  to  such  militia  as  they  already  possessed, 


Colonial  Period  5 

supplemented  by  whatever  recruits  presented  themselves. 
The  beginning  of  the  Revolutionary  War  thus  inaugurated 
the  system  of  depending  largely  upon  raw  untrained  troops, 
for  the  very  good  reason  that  none  others  were  available, 
except  in  paltry  numbers. 

As  early  as  1745  there  existed  in  England  a  suspicion  — 
and  in  some  cases  a  conviction  —  that  the  American  colonies 
were  aspiring  to  independence.^  The  development  of  this 
desire  for  separation  from  the  mother-country  need  not  be 
traced  here.  Suffice  to  say  that,  in  1774,  several  of  the 
colonies  began  preparations  for  an  armed  conflict.  The 
First  Continental  Congress,  proposed  the  year  before  by 
Benjamin  Franklin,  convened  at  Philadelphia  on  September 
5th,  drew  up  "  The  Declaration  of  Rights,"  concluded  "  The 
Association,"  an  agreement  to  refrain  from  all  trade  with 
England  until  the  various  objectionable  Royal  acts  had  been 
repealed,^  prepared  addresses  ''  to  the  People  of  Great  Brit- 
ain "  and  "  to  the  Inhabitants  of  Canada,"  and  ended  by 
issuing  ^'  The  Petition  to  the  King,"  in  w^hich  it  rejected  all 
allegiance  to  Parliament,  but  expressed  its  willingness  to 
accept  him  as  the  general  head  of  the  British  Empire,  and 
implored  him  to  protect  them  from  the  usurpations  of 
Parliament  and  the  Ministry.  On  October  26th,  it  ad- 
journed after  passing  a  resolution  to  meet  in  1775  if  the 
justice  sought  had  not  been  granted. '^  On  that  same  day, 
the  Colonial  Assembly  of  Massachusetts,  which  had  been 
dissolved  by  the  Governor  on  September  28th,  met,  voted 
themselves  a  Provincial  Congress,  adopted  a  scheme  for  the 
militia,  appointed  several  general  officers,  as  w^ell  as  a  Com- 
mittee of  Safety  to  organize  the  militia,  commission  the 
officers  and  direct  their  operations  in  the  field,  and  a  Com- 
mittee of  Supplies  to  procure  arms  and  ammunition.^ 

In  1775  the  Committee  of  Safety  appointed  by  the  Second 
Provincial  Congress  was  composed  of  eleven  members,  with 
authority  to  raise  and  support  such  a  military  force  as  was 
deemed  necessary  to  resist  the  executions  of  the   Acts  of 


6    Military  Unpreparedness .of  the  United  States 

Parliament.  In  compliance  with  the  powers  so  conferred, 
the  committee  proceeded  to  organize  companies  and  regi- 
ments throughout  the  Massachusetts  Bay  Colony,  and  one- 
third  of  the  militia,  classed  as  "  minute  men,"  agreed  to  hold 
themselves  in  readiness  to  respond  at  a  minute's  notice.^ 
These  crude  preparations  were  interrupted  by  the  engage- 
ments at  Concord  and  Lexington,  which  ushered  in  the 
American  Revolution. 


THE  EARLY  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 


Reproduced  by  permission  of  Rand,  McXally  and  Company  from  E.   G.  Foster's  Illustrative 

Historical  Maps. 


CHAPTEE  II 
THE  WAE  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

ON  April  19,  1775,  800  British,  sent  to  destroy  the 
stores  at  Concord,  Mass.,  were  fired  upon  by  some 
provincials  at  Lexington,  but  succeeded  in  carrying  out  their 
mission.  A  fight  at  the  bridge  at  Concord  ensued,  ending  in 
the  retreat  of  the  British  which  developed  into  a  rout,  but  at 
Lexington  some  semblance  of  order  was  restored  by  Lord 
Percy,  who  had  hurried  up  with  re-enforcements.  The 
British  then  fell  back  twenty  miles  to  Boston,  their  retreat 
much  hampered  by  the  increasing  number  of  Colonial 
minute-men.  The  latter  lost  but  93  men,  whereas  their  ad- 
versaries counted  273  men  out  of  action.^ 

Three  days  later,  April  22nd,  the  initial  step  was  taken 
to  organize  a  combined  defence  against  England,  w^hen  the 
Massachusetts  Assembly  passed  a  unanimous  resolution  that 
a  force  of  30,000  men  was  needed  for  the  defence  of  that 
colony,  and  decided  that  13,000  men  should  be  raised  at 
once,  trusting  that  the  remainder  would  be  furnished  by  the 
other  New  England  colonies.^  The  organization  of  these 
hasty  levies  was  accomplished  by  giving  a  captain's  com- 
mission to  any  one  enrolling  a  company  of  fifty-nine  men  and 
a  colonel's  commission  for  a  regiment  composed  of  ten  such 
companies.  This  system,  which  made  the  ability  to  raise 
men  the  sole  qualification  for  command,  is  emphasized  for 
the  reason  that  it  has  persisted  until  recent  times,  and  was 
invariably  employed  at  the  beginning  of  all  our  wars  down 
to  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.^ 

The  engagement  at  Concord  and  Lexington  was  the  signal 
for  the  assembling  near  Boston  of  the  militia  and  minute- 
men  of  all  the  New  England  colonies,  and  on  June  I7th  these 

7 


8     Militarif  Ihiprcparcdnrss  of  I  he  United  States 

[1775 

linlf-(>ri;'jniiz(Ml  troops  iiih1(M'  0(Miorjil  Ai'lcmns  Ward  foni;'ht 
lli('  halllc  of  r»mik(M'  Hill,  nndi^r  a  coimnoii  coiimunulor  whom 
\\\r\  f('i'omii/o(l  l>v  coimiioii  courtosy  only.  Tiiroo  aasjiults 
wvvc  niiulo  on  (ho  hronstworka  and  rodonbt  lu^ld  by  tlio 
oolonisls,'  rosnhini;-  in  a  loss  to  tlu*  British  of  SD  oflicors  and 
lU)r>  nion,  a  total  in  kill(»(l  and  wonnch^l  nearly  50  por  cent, 
groator  than  in  any  snksoipuMit  action  of  tho  war.  The 
AnuM'ii'au  casnaltiivs  w(M'o  continod  to  i  1 1)  in  all,  and  occnrrod, 
for  (ho  major  j^art,  dnrin*;'  tho  nMroat  across  Cluirlostown 
Nock  after  thoir  anunnnition  had  ii'wvu  ont/' 

'The  i^allantry  oi'  d(*f(Mico  was  duo  to  the  fact  that  tlio  en- 
trenchnients  were  constructed  under  the  supervision  of,  and 
tho  AnuM-ican  troops  connnandcMl  by,  veteran  otlicers  in  whom 
tho  men  had  the  utmost  contidenco.  It  rendered  (Jago's 
victory  so  costly  and  proved  such  a  surprise  that  tho  British 
wore  reduced  to  tho  defonsivo  for  nearly  a  year.*^  As  Gen- 
eral Upton  pertinently  renuirks, 


«  rpi 


Tho  lesson  (o  be  learned  from  this  reniarkable  conflict  is  the 
value  of  trained  otlicers  in  coiuiuand  of  i-aw  troo|)s,  a  lesson 
which  neither  our  statesmen  nor  our  historians  have  ever  been 
able  to  a[)[>rci'in(e," 

and  ho  goes  on  to  say  that 

"  without  pausing  to  discover  the  secret  of  the  defense  of  Bunker 
TTill,  ilie  mistaken  conviction  seized  the  public  mind  that  the 
militia  were  invincible  and  that  patriotism  was  the  sole  (pialilica- 
tiou  for  a  soldier's  calling  —  a  fallacy  which  ]>an\lyzed  the  mili- 
tary legislation  of  the  devolution  and  constantly  jeopardized 
our  liberties  by  inducing  the  political  leaders  of  the  time  to 
rely  ioo  contldeutly  upon  raw  and  undisciplined  levies."^ 

^Meanwhile,  on  ^fay  10th,  the  fort  at  Ticonderoga  had  been 
captured  by  a  force  of  Colonials  under  Ethan  Allen,  and  on 
the  sanu^  day  the  Second  Continental  Congress  assembled  at 
Philadelphia.  The  Eevolution  had  then  assumed  such  head- 
Avay  as  to  force  that  body  to  exercise  the  functions  of  civil 
government,  and  it  })r(unptly  assununl  not  only  legislative  but 
exet'utive  omvers.      Kindimj;  itself  not  clothed  with  authority 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  9 

1775] 

to  levy  taxes  or  raise  revenue,  it  was  obliged  to  emit  bills  of 
credit,  the  redemption  of  which  was  pledged  by  the  twelve 
"  United  Colonies.''  The  financial  system  thus  inaugurated, 
having  no  other  basis  than  public  faith  in  the  eventual  suc- 
cess of  the  American  cause,  virtually  neutralized  the  power 
to  create  and  support  armies.  Local  interests,  passions,  and 
prejudices  soon  became  paramount  and,  as  a  result  of  the 
feeble  and  exhaustive  military  policy  followed.  Congress 
was  finally  reduced  to  the  helplessness  of  an  advisory  body, 
bereft  of  power  to  call  out  or  support  a  single  soldier  save 
with  the  assistance  and  concurrence  of  the  colonies  —  all  of 
which  could  have  been  prevented  had  Congress  been  clothed 
with  sovereign  authority  to  utilize  the  entire  resources  of  the 
country.^  Military  legislation  was  thus  made  from  the  very 
start  to  depend  mainly  upon  the  collective  wisdom  of  an  as- 
sembly of  men  who,  as  far  as  their  individual  experience  was 
concerned,  were  wholly  devoid  of  military  knowledge  —  a 
state  of  affairs  which,  in  many  instances,  has  prevailed  in 
Congress  until  the  present  day. 

Shortly  after  the  troops  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Boston 
prior  to  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  it  became  evident  that  the 
struggle  would  not  be  confined  to  the  Xew  England  colonies 
alone,  and  that,  in  order  to  prevent  the  disintegration  and 
dispersal  of  the  force  already  collected,  it  would  have  to  be 
adopted  as  a  Continental  Army  owing  allegiance  to  the  United 
Colonies  exclusively.*  Accordingly,  on  June  14,  1775, 
Congress  authorized  the  raising  of  te^  companies  of  riflemen 

*  Early  in  June,  1775,  General  Nathanael  Greene  made  certain  recom- 
mendations respecting  this  new  army,  the  wisdom  of  which  was  fully 
confirmed  by  subsequent  events.  The  six  conditions  which  he  de- 
clared indispensable  for  immediate  success  were:  (1)  there  should 
be  one  commander-in-chief;  (2)  the  ^rmy  should  be  enlisted  "during 
the  war  " ;  ( 3 )  a  system  of  bounties  should  be  established  in  order  to 
provide  for  the  families  of  soldiers  in  the  field;  (4)  the  troops  should 
serve  wherever  required  throughout  the  c-olonies;  (5)  funds  for  the 
complete  equipment  and  support  of  the  army  according  to  the  demands 
of  the  war  should  be  borrowed;  and  (6)  independence  should  be  de- 
clared at  once  and  every  resource  of  every  colony  pledged  to  its  sup« 
port. —  Greene,  The  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,  I,  pp.  123,  124,  127-129. 


10     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1775 

in  Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and  Virginia,  the  term  of  enlist- 
ment being  fixed  at  one  year.  These  were  the  first  troops 
raised  under  the  authority  of  the  United  Colonies  with  the 
title  of  The  American  Continental  Army,  and  they  formed 
the  nucleus  of  the  forces  which  eventually  achieved  American 
independence.  On  the  following  day,  George  Washington 
was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief,  and  on  July  3rd  he  as- 
sumed command  at  Cambridge,  Mass.,  of  the  army  investing 
Boston,  numbering  17,000  men,  every  one  of  whose  enlist- 
ments was  to  expire  before  the  end  of  the  year.  On  July 
18th,  Congress  recommended 

^^to  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  English  Colonies  that  all 
ablebodied,  effective '  men,  between  16  and  50  years  of  age,  be 
formed  into  companies  of  militia  ^  .  .  .  That  the  officers  of  each 
company  be  chosen  by  the  respective  companies/^ 

and,  imitating  the  action  of  the  Provincial  Congress  of 
Massachusetts,  passed  the  following  resolution: 

'^  That  one-fourth  part  of  the  militia  be  selected  as  minute- 
men  of  such  men  as  are  willing  to  enter  into  this  necessary  serv- 
ice, formed  into  companies  and  battalions,  and  their  officers 
chosen  and  commissioned  as  aforesaid,  to  be  ready  at  shortest 
notice  to  march  to  any  place  where  their  assistance  may  be  re- 
quired for  the  defense  of  their  own  or  neighboring  colony."  ^^ 

This  measure  is  of  special  interest  in  that  it  was  our  first 
scheme  of  mobilization.  ^■'^ 

Three  days  later,  July  21st,  Congress  authorized  Wash- 
ington to  maintain  in  the  vicinity  of  Boston  such  a  force  as  he 
thought  necessary,  provided  it  did  not  exceed  22,000  men, 
and  on  July  25th  it  fixed  the  number  of  troops  for  the  North- 
ern Department,  New  York,  at  5,000.  In  organizing  these 
troops  on  a  Continental  basis,  commissions  signed  in  blank 
by  the  President  of  Congress  were  sent  to  the  various  colonies 
to  be  filled  out  with  the  necessary  names.  ^^  During  the 
course  of  the  year  Congress  gradually  increased  the  size  of  the 
Continental  Army,  but,  nourishing  hopes  for  an  early  peace, 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  11 

1775] 

could  not  be  induced  to  prolong  the  term  of  enlistment  be- 
yond 1776. 

Notwithstanding  the  power  vested  in  him,  Washington 
found  himself  compelled,  on  account  of  the  slowness  with 
which  the  recruits  presented  themselves,^^  to  call  for  5,000 
militia  and  minute-men  to  replace  the  troops  whose  enlist- 
ments would  expire  on  December  first. -^^     General  Schuyler 
in  New  York  experienced  great  difficulty  in  this  respect  with 
the  New  England  troops,^  ^  while  Washington  had  his  pa- 
tience sorely  tried  by  the  Connecticut  contingent  which  de- 
camped the  instant  its  service  expired. -"^^     "  Those  who  are 
familiar  with  our  military  history  will  not  be  surprised  at 
the  conduct  of  these  Connecticut  troops.     Each  succeeding 
year  of  the  Revolutionary  struggle  found  American  soldiers 
behaving  in  like  manner ;  and  during  the  War  of  the  Rebel- 
lion a  similar  course  was  followed  by  the  regiments  whose 
terms  of  service  expired  on  the  morning  of  the  first  battle  of 
Bull  Run."^'^     The  officers  too  gave  Washington  an  im- 
mense deal  of  unnecessary  trouble,  ^^   and   Congress  found 
itself  compelled  to  provide  new  troops  to  replace  those  whose 
terms  would  expire  before  the  year  was  out,-^^  as  well  as  to 
recommend  to  the  various  colonial  legislatures  that  punish- 
ment be  inflicted  upon  persons  harbouring  deserters,  whose 
number  was  rapidly  augmenting.^^     Desertion  is  an  evil  in- 
separable from  the  method  of  bounties  which  was  then  be- 
ginning to  be  introduced,  and  it  must  be  distinctly  remem- 
bered that  "  any  system  of  voluntary  enlistments  necessarily 
places  a  government  in  the  position  of  a  suppliant,  and  when 
patriotism  and  popular  enthusiasm  no  longer  suffice  to  fill  the 
ranks,  resort  must  be  had  to  the  vicious  practice  of  giving 
bounties  to  recruits.''     Recognizing  the  danger  of  admitting 
such  a  principle.  Congress  passed  a  resolution  on  December 
6,  1775,  "  That  the  charge  of  bounty  in  the  account  exhib- 
ited by  Rhode  Island  against  the  United  Colonies  be  not  al- 
lowed."    Yet  in  spite  of  this  disapproval,  bounties  were  paid 
throughout  the  Revolution,  producing  both  endless  trouble 


12     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1775 

and  discontent  just  as  they  did  during  the  War  of  the  Re- 
bellion.^^ 

Irrespective  of  the  necessity,  however  great,  of  employing 
untrained  troops,  history  demonstrates  that  needless  extrava- 
gance, frequently  attended  by  inaction  and  disaster,  is  the 
inevitable  result.  This  was  the  case  during  the  Campaign 
of  1775.  The  only  military  operations  of  the  army  about 
Boston  that  year  were  confined  to  the  battles  of  Concord, 
Lexington  and  Bunker  Hill,  all  fought  before  any  of  the 
troops  were  taken  into  Continental  pay.  As  Upton  points 
out:  22 

"When  Washington  took  command  his  army  numbered  17,000 
men,  but  the  number  fit  for  duty  did  not  exceed  14,500.  The 
strength  of  the  enemy  was  estimated  by  the  council  of  war  at 
11,500;  but  after  deducting  the  sick  and  wounded  his  real  effec- 
tive strength  was  not  over  6,500.  Notwithstanding  this  dispar- 
ity in  numbers  neither  Washington  nor  his  generals  deemed  it 
prudent  to  attack,  and  the  year  passed  away  in  hopeless  in- 
activity." 

The  only  important  offensive  operation  was  the  invasion 
of  Canada  by  two  distinct  forces;  one,  composed  of  3,000 
troops  under  Generals  Schuyler  and  Montgomery,  assembled 
at  Ticonderoga  in  August,  but  the  former's  ill-health  com- 
pelled him  to  relinquish  his  command,  while  the  latter,  after 
spending  weeks  in  reducing  the  fort  at  St.  John's,  eventually 
occupied  Montreal  on  November  12th.2^  The  other  expedi- 
tion, undertaken  at  the  instigation  of  a  Congressional  com- 
mittee, was  composed  of  1,100  men  under  General  Benedict 
Arnold.  Leaving  Cambridge  on  September  I7th,  it  em- 
barked at  Newport  on  the  19th,  reached  Gardner,  Maine,  on 
the  20th  and  started  for  Quebec  three  days  later.  After 
untold  hardships  during  the  march  through  the  Maine 
wilderness,  Arnold  arrived  at  Port  Levis,  opposite  Quebec,  on 
November  9th,  with  his  force  reduced  to  750  men.  A  storm 
lasting  three  days  suspended  further  operations,  but.  on  the 
14th,  spurred  on  by  the  necessity  of  action,  largely  because 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  13 

1775] 

of  the  approaching  expiration  of  the  terms  of  enlistment  of 
nearly  all  his  menj^"^  Arnold  repeated  Wolfe's  feat  in  climb- 
ing the  steep  ascent  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  city. 
The  British  garrison  had  meanwhile  been  re-enforced  to  2,000 
and  the  Americans  were  compelled  on  the  19th  to  retire  to 
Point-aux-Trembles,  where  they  were  joined  by  Montgomery 
on  December  first,  the  combined  forces  not  exceeding  1,000 
men.  A  second  demand  for  surrender  (December  6th)  and 
a  feeble  bombardment  proving  equally  ineifectual,  it  was  re- 
solved on  the  16th  to  assault  the  place,  "  but  it  was  not  until 
the  night  of  the  thirtieth,  when  but  one  day  of  legal  service 
remained  for  a  large  portion  of  the  troops,  that  the  prepara- 
tions were  complete."  ^^  On  the  last  day  of  the  year  a 
desperate  attack  was  made;  Montgoniery  was  killed,  Arnold 
badly  wounded,  60  men  were  dead  or  hors  de  combat  and 
426  were  captured.  The  invasion  of  Canada  thus  ended  in 
a  hopeless  disaster  ^^  and,  except  for  Bunker  Hill,  virtually 
nothing  had  been  achieved  by  the  Americans. 

"  The  total  number  of  troops  in  Continental  pay  during  the 
campaign  of  1775,  as  appears  from  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Henry  Knox,  submitted  to  Congress  in  1790,  was  27,443. 
In  addition  to  the  above,  it  is  estimated  that  the  colonies  of 
Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  fur- 
nished 10,180  militia,  making  the  whole  American  Army  37,623. 
For  the  most  part  this  force,  from  want  of  supplies,  organization, 
and  discipline,  was  maintained  at  public  expense  in  a  state  of 
demoralizing  inactivity.^^ 


27 


The  events  of  the  year  1775  have  been  dwelt  upon  at  con- 
siderable length  for  the  reason  that  they,  like  those  of  the 
entire  Eevolution,  are  necessary  for  an  intelligent  under- 
standing of  our  subsequent  military  history.  The  seeds  of 
the  vicious  military  policy  sown  in  those  years  have  been 
reaped  during  every  succeeding  generation.  We  shall  also 
have  occasion  to  make  frequent  quotations  from  Washington's 
correspondence  because  he,  as  the  commander-in-chief  and 
the  principal  figure  of  the  Revolution,  was  called  upon  to 


14     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1775-1776 

combat  every  single  mistake  in  the  military  policy  of  that 
time.  1^0  other  person  was  in  a  better  position  than  he  to 
pass  judgment  upon  this  all-important  subject,  and  his  com- 
ments are  to-day  quite  as  worthy  of  legislative  consideration 
as  when  they  were  originally  written. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1776 

Up  to  January  14,  1776,  out  of  the  20,370  troops  author- 
ized by  Congress  three  months  before,  only  10,500  had  been 
enlisted  and  many  of  these  had  not  joined. ^^  Washington, 
despairing  of  raising  the  army  by  voluntary  enlistments,  wrote 
to  the  General  Court  of  Massachusetts  on  January  16th  sug- 
gesting the  employment  of  "  coercive  measures  "  to  maintain 
the  regiments  at  their  proper  strength.  On  the  same  day  he 
proposed  to  the  council  of  war  an  attack  on  the  British  at 
Boston  before  they  could  be  re-enforced  and,  upon  the  council 
of  war's  agreeing,  it  was  recommended  that  13  regiments  of 
militia  be  called  into  service  until  April  first. ^^  On  Febru- 
ary 9th,  he  wrote  a  remarkable  letter  to  Congress  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  evils,  dangers  and  extravagance  of  short  enlist- 
ments, in  which  he  said : 

"  The  disadvantages  attending  the  limited  enlistment  of  troops 
are  too  apparent  to  those  who  are  eyewitnesses  of  them  to  render 
any  animadversions  necessary,  but  to  gentlemen  at  a  distance 
whose  attention  is  engrossed  by  a  thousand  important  objects 
the  case  may  be  otherwise.  That  this  cause  precipitated  the 
fate  of  the  brave  and  much  to  be  lamented  General  Montgomery, 
and  brought  on  the  defeat  which  followed  thereupon,  I  have  not 
the  most  distant  doubt,  for,  had  he  not  been  apprehensive  of  the 
troops  leaving  him  at  so  important  a  crisis,  but  continued  to 
blockade  Quebec,  a  capitulation,  from  the  best  accounts  I  have 
been  able  to  collect,  must  inevitably  have  followed  .  .  . 

'^The  instance  of  General  Montgomery  (I  mention  it  because 
it  is  a  striking  one,  for  a  number  of  others  might  be  adduced) 
proves  that  instead  of  having  men  to  take  advantage  of  circum- 
stances you  are  in  a  manner  compelled,  right  or  wrong,  to  make 
circumstances  yield  to  a  secondary  consideration  .  .  . 

"  To  bring  men  to  he  well  acquainted  with  the  duties  of  a 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  15 

1776] 

soldier  requires  time.  To  'bring  them  under  proper  discipline 
and  subordination  not  only  requires  time,  but  it  is  a  work  of 
great  difficulty,  and  in  this  army,  where  there  is  so  little  dis- 
tinction between  the  officers  and  soldiers,  requires  an  uncommon 
degree  of  attention.     To  expect,  then,  the  same  service  from 

RAW  AND  UNDISCIPLmED  RECRUITS  AS  FROM  VETERAN  SOLDIERS 
IS  TO  EXPECT  WHAT  NEVER  DID  AND  PERHAPS  NEVER  WILL  HAP- 


PEN 


^y  30 


Washington,  re-enforced  by  certain  militia,  occupied  Dor- 
chester Heights  on  March  4th,  threw  up  two  redoubts  and 
took  steps  which  brought  about  the  evacuation  of  Boston  by 
the  British  on  the  lYth.^^  Appreciating  that  ]^ew  York 
would  be  the  next  objective  point,  he  hastened  to  send  five 
regiments  to  its  defence  and  on  April  13th  arrived  there  him- 
self with  nearly  all  his  army.  Congress  immediately  re- 
quired him  to  send  four,  and  later  six,  additional  regiments 
—  3,000  men  —  to  Canada  to  re-enforce  the  troops  near 
Quebec.  His  army,  thus  scattered  and  divided,  was  reduced 
to  5,300  Continentals,^^  leaving  him  no  alternative  except  to 
depend  upon  militia  enlisted  for  short  periods  only.  Such 
was  the  force  with  which  he  was  expected  to  confront  a  dis- 
ciplined British  army  numbering  from  20,000  to  30,000. 

Congress  at  last  awoke  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation  in 
June,  called  out  6,000  militia  to  re-enforce  the  troops  in 
Canada,^^  authorized  13,800  to  strengthen  Washington,^^  and 
created  a  "  flying  camp  "  to  be  located  in  New  Jersey ;  ^^ 
but  in  spite  of  Washington's  reiterated  recommendations,  the 
enlistments  of  all  these  troops  was  to  expire  on  December 
first.     As  General  Upton  aptly  remarks,^^ 

"  The  slow  increase  of  the  Continental  Army  shows  that  Con- 
gress was  committed  to  a  dual  military  establishment,  one  class 
of  troops  being  Continental  or  regular,  the  other  militia.  In  the 
former  the  gradual  extension  of  enlistments  to  two  and  three 
years  enabled  the  men  to  acquire  the  discipline  which  ultimately 
proved  the  salvation  of  our  cause.  The  natural  disposition  of 
men  to  seek  the  easiest  and  shortest  service  prompted  them  to 
enlist  in  the  militia  in  preference  to  the  Continental  regiments. 


16      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1776 

and  thus  the  only  force  which  could  be  depended  upon  to  cope 
with  the  British,  both  offensively  and  defensively,  was  always 
from  one-third  to  one-half  below  its  prescribed  strength." 

On  July  4th  ^^  the  Declaration  of  Independence  was 
adopted  and  the  time  for  speedy  action  in  expelling  the 
British  had  come,  but  the  lesson  that  rav^  troops  cannot  pre- 
vail against  disciplined  regulars  had  apparently  not  been 
learned.  On  August  27th  was  fought  the  battle  of  Long 
Island  between  Lord  Howe's  force  of  fully  20,000  men  ^^  and 
about  8,000  under  Washington,  all  that  he  could  muster  out 
of  an  army  whose  paper  strength  was  27,000.^^  The  logical 
result  followed ;  the  Americans  were  badly  beaten  and  on  the 
30th  retreated  to  New  York,^^  where  Washington  wrote  on 
September  2nd  to  the  President  of  Congress  that 

'^  no  dependence  could  he  put  in  a  militia  or  other  troops  than 
those  enlisted  and  embodied  for  a  longer  period  than  our  regula- 
tions heretofore  have  prescribed.  I  am  persuaded,  and  as  fully 
convinced  as  I  am  of  any  one  fact  that  has  happened,  that  our 
liberties  must  of  necessity  be  greatly  hazarded,  if  not  entirely 
lost,  if  their  defense  is  left  to  any  but  a  permanent  standing 
army;  I  mean  one  to  exist  during  the  war.  Nor  woidd  the  ex- 
pense incident  to  the  support  of  such  a  body  of  troops  as  would 
be  competent  to  almost  every  exigency  far  exceed  that  which  is 
daily  incurred  by  calling  in  succor  and  new  enlistments,  which 
when  effected  are  not  attended  with  any  good  consequences''  *^ 

On  September  15th  the  British  occupied  !N"ew  York,  after 
a  spirited  engagement  ending  in  the  retreat  of  the  Americans 
to  Harlem  Heights,  the  brigades  of  Parsons  and  Pellows 
running  away  in  the  most  disgraceful  fashion.*^  On  the 
24th  Washington  wrote  some  plain  truths  to  the  President  of 
Congress,  declaring  that 

''  To  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  assuredly  resting 
upon  a  brol^en  staff.  Men  just  dragged  from  the  tender  scenes 
of  domestic  life,  unaccustomed  to  the  din  of  arms,  totally  un- 
acquainted with  every  kind  of  military  skill  (which  is  followed 
by  want  of  confidence  in  themselves  when  opposed  by  troops 
regularly  trained,  disciplined,  and  appointed,  superior  in  knowl- 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  17 

1776] 

edge  and  superior  in  arms),  are  timid  and  ready  to  fly  from 
their  own  shadows. 

"  Besides,  the  sudden  change  in  their  manner  of  living,  par- 
ticularly in  their  lodgings,  brings  on  sickness  in  many,  impa- 
tience in  all,  and  such  an  unconquerable  desire  of  returning  to 
their  respective  homes  that  it  not  only  produces  shameful  and 
scandalous  desertions  among  themselves,  but  infuses  the  like 
spirit  in  others.*  Again,  men  accustomed  to  unbounded  freedom 
and  no  control  can  not  brook  the  restraint  which  is  in- 
dispensably necessary  to  the  good  order  and  government  of  an 
army,  without  which  licentiousness  and  every  kind  of  disorder 
triumphantly  reign.  To  bring  men  to  a  proper  degree  of  sub- 
ordination is  not  the  worlc  of  a  day,  a  month,  or  even  a  year .  .  . 
Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  heep  50,000  to 
100,000  in  constant  pay  than  to  depend  upon  half  the  number 
and  supply  the  other  half  occasionally  by  militia.f  The  time  the 
latter  are  in  pay  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assembling 
and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the  consumption  of 
stores,  which,  in  spite  of  every  resolution  or  requisition  of  Con- 
gress, they  must  be  furnished  with  or  sent  home,  added  to  other 
incidental  expenses  consequent  upon  their  coming  and  conduct  in 
camp,  surpass  all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind  of  regularity  and 
economy  which  you  could  establish  among  fixed  and  settled  troops, 
and  will,  in  my  opinion,  prove,  if  the  scheme  is  adliered  to,  the 
ruin  of  our  cause."  *^ 

The  bugbear  of  militarism  which  had  already  taken  posses- 
sion of  Congress,  Washington  dismissed  by  continuing  thus : 

"  The  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  and  the  evils  to  be  appre- 
hended from  one,  are  remote,  and,  in  my  judgment,  situated  as 
we  are,  not  at  all  to  be  dreaded;  but  the  consequence  of  wanting 
one,  according  to  my  ideas  formed  from  the  present  view  of 
things,  is  certain  and  inevitable  ruin.     For,  if  I  luas  called  upon 


*  On  September  5,  1776,  General  Knox  wrote  to  his  wife : 

"  It  is  Misfortune  that  must  raise  us  to  the  character  of  a  great 
people.  We  must  have  a  standing  army.  The  militia  get  sick,  or  think 
themselves  so,  and  run  home." — The  Centennial  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy,  I,  pp.  201-202. 

t  General  Greene,  next  to  Washington  the  most  distinguished  officer 
in  the  army,  wrote  on  October  28,  1776,  to  a  friend: 

"  There  must  be  a  good  army  established ;  men  engaged  for  the 
war ;  a  proper  corps  of  officers.  .  .  .  The  Congress  goes  upon  a  penurious 
plan." — Greene,  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,  I,  p.  221. 


18      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1776 

to  declare  upon  oath  whether  the  militia  had  heen  most  service- 
able or  hurtful,  upon  the  whole  I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter. 
.  .  .  Experience,  which  is  the  best  criterion  to  work  by,  so  fully, 
clearly,  and  decisively  reprobates  the  practice  of  trusting  to 
militia  that  no  man  who  regards  order,  regularity,  and  economy, 
or  who  has  any  regard  for  his  own  honor,  character,  or  peace  of 
mind,  will  risk  them  upon  this  issue." 


44 


Congress  had  at  last  begun  to  realize  that  there  existed  a 
good  and  sufficient  ground  for  the  complaints  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, and  several  resolutions  passed  that  year 
showed  that  it  appreciated  the  importance  of  enlisting  men 
"  FOR  THE  war/'  ^^  but,  upou  ascertaining  that  the  un- 
certainty as  to  its  duration  was  having  a  detrimental  effect, 
it  modified  its  terms  so  as  to  permit  enlistments  to  be  "  for 
three  years  "  or  "  for  the  war,"  at  the  discretion  of  the  re- 
cruit.^^  In  the  former  case,  a  bounty  of  $20  was  given;  in 
the  latter  $20  and  100  acres  of  land  —  a  procedure  quite  in 
keeping  with  other  legislative  enactments  on  that  score  during 
1776,^"^  which  resulted  in  the  States  bidding  against  Congress 
for  men  and  ended  by  creating  an  enormous  and  most  un- 
necessary debt.*  In  the  case  of  the  officers,  too,  this  rivalry 
wrought  incalculable  harm  by  depriving  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  anything  except  a  nominal  control  over  them.^^ 

The  military  events  subsequent  to  the  occupation  of  Har- 
lem Heights  can  be  quickly  told.  On  October  12thj  General 
Howe  began  his  operations  to  cut  Washington  off  from  'New 
England  and  upper  I^ew  York.^^  The  latter  for  want  of 
good  troops  retreated  to  White  Plains,  where  an  action  was 
fought  on  the  28th  to  the  advantage  of  the  British.  Wash- 
ington then  fell  back  to  ISTorth  Castle  Heights,  from  which  he 
could  not  be  dislodged,  and  the  British  returned  to  New 
York,  capturing  Fort  Washington  and  2,000  prisoners  on 
November  16th,  and  caused  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Lee  four 


*  "  It  is  needless  to  add  that  short  enlistments,  and  a  mistaken  de- 
pendence upon  militia,  have  been  the  origin  of  all  our  misfortunes  and 
the  great  accumulation  of  our  debt," —  Washington  to  the  President  of 
Congress,  December  20,  1776.     Sparks,  IV,  p.  234. 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  19 

1776-1777] 

days  later.  Howe  than  resumed  the  offensive  in  New  Jer- 
sey, and  by  December  8th  not  an  American  soldier  remained 
in  the  State,  Washington,  with  his  army  reduced  to  3,305,^^ 
being  "  powerless  to  make  even  a  show  of  resistance,  while 
the  militia  and  other  troops  of  the  flying  camp  were  disband- 
ing." ^^  On  the  26th  he  surprised  the  Hessians  at  Trenton, 
captured  about  1,000,  losing  only  five  men  himself, ^^  and  two 
days  later  occupied  the  town. 

With  the  exception  of  the  repulse  of  the  British  under 
Clinton  at  Fort  Moultrie,  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  on 
June  28th,  this  brilliant  action  at  Trenton  was  the  only  vie- 
tory  of  which  the  Americans  could  boast  during  1776,  not- 
withstanding 46,901  Continental  or  Regular  troops  and 
42,760  militia,  a  total  of  89,661,  w^ere  called  out  during  the 
year  ^^  to  oppose  a  British  force  which  never  equalled  half 
that  number.^*  Congress  in  its  alarm  over  the  almost  total 
dissolution  of  the  army,  the  rapid  advance  of  the  British 
through  New  Jersey  and  the  capture  of  the  capital,  Phila- 
delphia, which  was  momentarily  expected,  not  only  voted  an 
increase  of  110  battalions, ^^  but  vested  in  Washington  com- 
plete power  for  a  period  of  six  months  to  raise  16  additional 
battalions  of  infantry,  3,000  light  horse,  3  regiments  of  ar- 
tillery and  a  corps  of  engineers,  as  well  as  certain  other  ex- 
traordinary authority.  ^^  That  the  sovereign  body  was  will- 
ing —  indeed  eager  —  to  pass  a  resolution  so  fraught  with 
danger  to  the  future  liberties  of  the  States  and  to  clothe  even 
a  Washington  with  the  absolute  power  of  a  dictator  affords 
ample  proof  that  the  blundering  policy  pursued  since  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution  was  recognised  after  nearly  two 
years  to  be  utterly  inadequate  and  worthless  under  the  stress 
of  military  crisis. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777 

After  a  victory  at  Princeton  on  January  3rd,  Washington's 
army  took  up  its  winter  quarters  at  Morristown,  its  strength 
on  March  14th  being  "  under  3,000,''  ^^  while  the  British 


20     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1777 

had  more  than  20,000  veterans  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York. 
The  operations  ending  in  June,  when  the  enemy  evacuated 
New  Jersey,  were  little  more  than  skirmishes,  since  Wash- 
ington did  not  dare  to  give  or  receive  battle. ^^  The  army 
was  in  a  sorry  plight  and  payments  were  made  in  paper 
money,  which  rapidly  depreciated.  Again  Congress  resorted 
to  raw  levies, ^^  found  itself  greatly  embarrassed  by  the 
bounty  system  which  it  had  inaugurated,^^  was  obliged  to 
introduce  territorial  recruitment  ^^  and  to  grant  dictatorial 
powers  to  Washington  for  a  second  time.^^  So  apparent  did 
the  insufficiency  of  Congressional  measures  ^^  become  that, 
before  the  year  was  out,  Virginia  and  Massachusetts  had  to 
set  the  example  of  drafting  —  a  method  which  Washington 
recommended  to  the  President  of  Pennsylvania  as  the  only 
certain  way  of  obtaining  Continental  troops.^  ^ 

The  arrival  of  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,  who  was  com- 
missioned a  Major  General  on  July  31st,  afforded  the  strug- 
gling colonies  some  temporary  encouragement,  but  early  in 
that  month  General  Howe  transported  the  British  forces  at 
New  York  ^^  to  the  Chesapeake  and,  moving  north,  reached 
Elkton,  54  miles  from  Philadelphia,  on  August  28th.  On 
September  11th  Washington  was  defeated  at  the  battle  of  the 
Brandywine,^^  and  sixteen  days  later  Howe  occupied  Phila- 
delphia. On  October  4th  he  endeavoured  to  surprise  the 
camp  at  Germantown,  but  without  success,  and  after  some 
minor  actions  withdrew  to  winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge.^^ 
Meanwhile  a  splendid  success  had  crowned  the  American 
arms  at  Saratoga,  where  Burgoyne  and  his  force  ^^  surren- 
dered to  General  Gates^^  on  October  I7th,^^  but  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  and  Perpetual  Union  creating  the  United 
States  of  America,  which  had  been  in  force  since  July  but 
were  not  definitely  agreed  upon  until  November  15th,  did 
not  augur  well  for  the  future  from  a  military  standpoint  since 

*^  instead  of  resting  the  war  power  in  a  central  government,  which 
alone  could  insure  its  vigorous  exercise,  Congress  was  reduced  to 
a  mere  consultative  body  or  congress  of  diplomats,  with  authority 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  21 

1777-1778] 

to  concert  only  such  measures  for  common  defense  as  might  re- 
ceive the  sanction  of  the  allied  sovereignties  they  repre- 
sented. .  .  /^ 

"  Weak  as  had  been  our  military  policy  under  the  government 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  it  was  to  become  still  more  im- 
becile through  the  inherent  defects  of  the  new  system.  To  the 
indecision  and  delays  of  a  single  Congress  were  now  superadded 
the  indecisions  and  delays  of  at  least  nine  more  deliberative 
bodies."  "^^ 

Small  wonder  that  in  spite  of  the  employment  of  34,820 
Continentals  and  at  least  33,900  militia,  a  total  of  68,720,'^^ 
the  results  achieved  during  1777  should  have  been  so  meagre, 
and  the  straits  to  which  Washington  and  his  slender  force  of 
half-clad,  half-starved  men  at  Valley  Forge  were  reduced 
were  an  indelible  blot  upon  American  history. 

THE  CAMPAIGN"  OF  1778 

The  winter  spent  at  Valley  Forge  was  the  acme  of  human 
misery  and  discouragement,  relieved  only  by  the  historic 
spirit  manifested  by  officers  and  men  alike  and  by  the  much- 
needed  reforms  in  tactics,  regulations  and  discipline  intro- 
duced by  Baron  von  Steuben,  a  veteran  of  the  wars  of 
Frederick  the  Great,"^^  who  had  been  appointed  Inspector 
General.  The  army  numbered  less  than  10,000,  but,  as  none 
of  the  battalions  during  the  preceding  year  had  been  recruited 
to  much  more  than  one-third  of  their  proper  strength.  Con- 
gress, in  consequence  of  the  report  of  a  committee  sent  in 
January  to  examine  into  the  conditions  at  Valley  Forge, ^^ 
recommended  on  February  6th  that  the  States  draft  men  for 
nine  months,  with  the  proviso  that  they  could  be  replaced  as 
fast  as  men  enlisting  for  three  years  were  received. '^^  ]N^ot- 
withstanding  this  drastic  measure,"^^  the  entire  Continental 
force  at  the  beginning  of  May  numbered  only  about  15,000,'^^ 
whereas  the  British  had  more  than  33,000  effectives. '^^  On 
May  7th  the  tattered  troops  were  assembled  on  parade  and 
the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France  was  read  amid  wild  en- 


22      Military  Vnpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1778 

thusiasm.*  On  the  following  day  the  council  of  war  unani- 
mously decided,  in  view  of  the  slenderness  of  the  force  and 
the  expectation  of  assistance,  to  remain  on  the  defensive  and 
to  let  events  take  their  course. 

Even  before  that  time  the  officers  had  begun  to  resign 
their  commissions  in  disgust,^^  and  this  state  of  affairs  rapidly 
progressed  to  such  an  alarming  extent  that  Congress  was 
compelled  on  May  15th  to  pass  a  resolution  giving  to  all  offi- 
cers serving  to  the  end  of  the  war  half  pay  for  seven  years 
and  a  gratuity  of  $80  to  non-commissioned  officers  and  men. 
The  enlistment  of  deserters,  in  order  to  fill  the  quotas  re- 
quired by  the  resolution  of  February  6th,  became  so  preva- 
lent that  Congress  was  obliged  to  denounce  it,  but  the  desire 
to  get  men  so  as  to  avoid  the  draft  led  to  another  expedient, 
and  in  Rhode  Island  the  proposal  was  made  to  enlist  a  bat- 
talion of  slaves.  ^^  Another  difficulty,  almost  as  grave  as  the 
non-enlistment  of  recruits,  militated  against  the  maintenance 
of  a  proper  army.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution 
paper  money  had  been  steadily  issued,  but  by  1778  it  had  so 
depreciated  in  value  that  it  had  become  literally  impossible 
for  officers  to  support  themselves  and  their  families  on  their 
pay  —  indeed,  as  Washington  declared,  they  were  "  sinking 
by  sure  degrees  into  beggary  and  want."  ^^  ^NTations  col- 
lectively are  fully  equal  to  keeping  up  a  protracted  struggle. 


*  "  On  the  seventh  of  May,  at  nine  o'clock,  a.  m,,  the  American  army 
was  on  parade.  Drums  beat  and  cannon  were  fired,  as  if  for  some  vic- 
tory. It  was  a  day  of  jubilee,  a  rare  occurrence  for  the  times  and 
place. 

"  The  brigades  were  steady,  but  not  brilliant  in  their  formation.  Uni- 
forms were  scarce.  Many  feet  were  bare.  Many  had  no  coats.  Some 
wore  coats  made  of  the  remnants  of  their  winter  blankets.  The  pomp 
and  circiimstance  of  war  were  wanting.  .  .  . 

"  There  was  no  review  by  general  officers,  with  a  well  appointed 
staff.  Few  matrons  and  few  maidens  looked  on.  .  .  .  The  Treaty  of 
Alliance  was  read,  and  in  solemn  silence  the  American  army  at  Valley 
Forge  united  in  Thanksgiving  to  Almighty  God  that  He  had  given 
them  one  friend  on  earth.  .  .  . 

"  Huzzas  for  the  king  of  France,  for  Washington  and  the  Republic, 
with  caps  tossed  high  in  air,  and  a  rattling  fire  through  the  whole 
line,  terminated  the  humble  pageant." —  Carrington,  pp.  404-405. 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  23 

1778] 

but  individuals  often  shirk  the  privations  and  dangers  of 
war.*  The  bounties  first  offered  by  Congress  and  the  States 
were  tantamount  to  a  confession  of  this  truth,  which  was 
only  too  palpably  confirmed  by  each  subsequent  campaign. 
Unable  to  check  this  calamity,  Congress  now  endeavoured 
to  conceal  it  and  on  September  18th  it  resolved 

"  That  General  Washington  be  authorized,  if  he  shall  judge  it 
for  the  interest  of  the  United  States,  to  augment  the  Continental 
bounty  to  recruits,  enlisting  for  three  years  or  during  the  war, 
to  a  sum  not  exceeding  ten  dollars;  and  that  he  use  his  discretion 
in  keeping  the  ^natter  secret  as  long  as  he  shall  deem  neces- 
sary/' ^^ 

The  story  of  the  military  operations  that  year  can  be  told 
in  a  few  words.  Too  weak  to  take  the  offensive,  the  Ameri- 
can army  cooled  its  heels  in  inactivity  at  Valley  Forge  until 
General  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  learning  of  the  approach  toward 
the  Chesapeake  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing's  fleet  with  French 
troops,^ ^  evacuated  Philadelphia  on  June  18th  and  withdrew 
in  the  direction  of  'New  York.  Washington  instantly  started 
in  pursuit,  intercepted  his  march  and,  ten  days  later,  at  the 
battle  of  Monmouth  by  his  skill  turned  the  retreat  begun  by 
General  Charles  Lee  into  a  substantial  victory.®^  Clinton 
made  his  escape  and  reached  his  destination  two  days  later,^® 
followed  to  White  Plains  by  Washington,^ ''^  but  active  opera- 
tions between  these  armies  terminated  with  this  engagement, 
and  forces  on  both  sides  were  transferred  east  of  the  Hudson. 

Agreeably  to  Washington's  plan  to  capture   l^ewport  ^^ 

*  "  Men  may  speculate  as  they  toill;  they  may  talk  of  patriotism; 
they  may  draw  a  few  exam/ples  from,  ancient  story,  of  great  achieve- 
ments  performed  hy  its  influence;  hut  whoever  builds  upon  them,  as  a 
sufficient  basis  for  conducting  a  long  and  bloody  icar,  will  find  him- 
self deceived  in  the  end.  ...  I  do  not  mean  to  exclude  altogether  the 
idea  of  patriotism.  I  know  it  exists.  .  .  .  But  I  will  venture  to  assert 
that  a  great  and  lasting  icar  can  never  be  supported  on  this  principle 
alone.  It  must  be  aided  by  a  prospect  of  interest,  or  some  reward. 
For  a  time  it  may,  of  itself,  push  men  to  action,  to  bear  much,  to  en- 
coimter  difficulties;  but  it  will  not  endure  unassisted  by  interest." — 
Washington  to  John  Bannister,  April  21,  1778.     Sparks,  V,  p.  323. 


24     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1778-1779 

while  the  French  fleet  remained  in  American  waters,  d'Estaing 
appeared  off  that  place  on  July  29th  and  that  same  day 
General  Sullivan  occupied  the  northern  end  of  Rhode 
Island,^^  but  it  was  not  until  August  15th  ^^  that  the  bulk 
of  his  command  advanced  to  the  siege.^^  A  week  earlier 
Admiral  Howe  had  set  sail  from  New  York,  but  a  "  tre- 
mendous storm ''  ^^  dispersed  both  fleets  and  prevented  any 
general  action,  the  British  barely  getting  back  to  New  York, 
while  the  French  returned  to  Newport  badly  crippled.  In 
conformity  with  the  explicit  instructions  received  before  leav- 
ing France,^^  d'Estaing  sailed  away  to  Boston  on  the  22nd 
to  refit,  his  departure  greatly  discouraging  Sullivan's  troops 
and  causing  the  militia  to  desert  in  large  numbers.^*  The 
capture  of  Quaker  and  Turkey  Hills  on  the  29th  was  but  a 
momentary  success,  and  the  retreat  begun  next  day  was  has- 
tened by  the  arrival  of  100  British  ships  bringing  Clinton's 
army  to  the  rescue  of  the  garrison.  Howe  promptly  sailed 
for  Boston,^^  but,  being  unable  to  force  d'Estaing  into  an 
engagement,  returned  to  New  York.  A  similar  attempt  by 
Admiral  Byron  a  month  later  was  frustrated  by  a  severe 
storm.  On  November  3rd,  d'Estaing  set  sail  for  the  West 
Indies  and  the  scene  of  land  operations  was  transferred  to 
South  Carolina,  where  a  British  force  ^^  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Campbell  captured  Savannah  on  December  29th.^^ 

Thus  ended  a  year  in  which  the  only  tangible  success 
gained  by  the  Americans  was  at  Monmouth,  in  spite  of  their 
having  more  than  51,000  troops  under  arms,^^  opposed  to  a 
British  force  which  never  exceeded  34,000.  ^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1779 

Not  a  month  had  elapsed  before  Congress,  in  its  anxiety 
over  the  diminishing  number  of  recruits,  empowered  Wash- 
ington ^^^  to  give  a  bounty  not  to  exceed  $200  to  each  able- 
bodied  veteran  who  would  re-enlist  and  to  each  new  recruit 
who  joined  "  for  the  war."  Within  two  months  ^^^  it  reiter- 
ated this  resolution  and  transferred  the  bounty  to  the  State 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  25 

1779] 

for  whose  contingent  the  recruit  was  enlisted.  On  March 
29th,  it  fixed  the  Continental  establishment  at  88  battalions/ ^^ 
recommending  that  Virginia  and  i^orth  Carolina  raise  as 
many  battalions  of  regulars  as  possible  for  the  defence  of  the 
Southern  States,  with  the  proviso  that  their  term  was  to  be 
limited  to  one  year  and  that  they  were  not  to  be  forced  to 
serve  north  of  Virginia.  On  top  of  these  concessions,  it 
granted  a  bounty  of  $200  to  these  one-year  troops}^^  The 
States  promptly  outbid  Congress,  ^ew  Jersey  offering  $250 
to  each  recruit  in  addition  to  the  $200,  the  clothing  and  land 
allowed  by  Congress,  while  Virginia  ^^*  made  the  bounty 
$750,  one  suit  a  year  and  100  acres  of  land,  incidentally  con- 
fiscating the  bounty  and  clothing  given  by  Congress. -^^^ 
These  enormous  bounties  to  new  recruits  produced  such  in- 
tense dissatisfaction  among  the  soldiers  who  had  already 
done  considerable  service  that  Washington's  suggestion  that 
they  be  given  a  gratuity  of  $100  ^^^  was  promptly  complied 
with  by  a  resolution  of  Congress.  ^^^ 

The  continued  depreciation  of  the  Continental  currency 
wrought  increasing  distress  among  the  ofiicers^^^  and,  as  the 
half-pay  for  seven  years  to  those  who  served  until  the  end  of 
the  war-^^^  was  manifestly  insufficient,  a  recommendation 
w^as  made  to  the  States  to  grant  half-pay  for  life  to  officers 
remaining  in  service  until  the  conclusion  of  hostilities,  as 
well  as  proper  rewards  to  the  soldiers.  ^^'^  In  other  words, 
in  order  to  have  sufficient  officers  to  command  the  troops. 
Congress  found  itself  forced  to  advocate  that  they  too  be 
given  a  bounty  in  the  shape  of  half -pay  for  life.^^^  The 
claim  of  the  officers  was  ignored  by  the  States, ^^^  but  in  pro- 
portion as  the  bounties  for  the  soldiers  was  augmented  the 
character  of  the  recruits  obtained  became  increasingly  in- 
ferior, until  Washington  declared  in  disgust  that,  in  any 
operation  against  the  enemy's  force  in  New  York  and  Rhode 
Island,  "  double  the  number  is  the  least  it  could  be  under- 
taken with,  and  this  would  be  far  from  giving  a  certainty  of 

??  113 


success. 


26     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1779 

Abundant  proof  of  the  utter  futility  of  the  system  in  which 
Congress  persisted  is  to  be  found,  not  only  in  his  judgment, 
but  in  the  number  of  troops  under  arms  that  year.  They 
amounted  to  26,790  Continentals  and  17,485  militia,  a  total 
of  44,275,^^^  as  against  less  than  35,000  British,^^^  and  the 
results  achieved  were  virtually  nil.  In  the  K'orth,  the 
Americans  were  restricted  through  weakness  to  a  defence  al- 
most purely  passive.  New  Haven  and  other  towns  in  Con- 
necticut were  sacked  by  a  force  under  General  Tryon,^^*^  but 
this  loss  was  recouped  by  the  storming  of  Stony  Point  by 
''  Mad  Anthony "  Wayne  ten  days  later, ^^"^  the  seizure  of 
valuable  stores  and  the  destruction  of  the  fortifications 
erected  there  by  the  enemy,  followed  by  the  capture  of  Paulus 
Hook  in  August. ^^^  In  the  South  the  fall  of  Savannah  ^^^ 
was  but  the  precursor  of  the  complete  evacuation  of  Georgia 
and  the  restoration  of  the  Royal  government. -^^^  On  March 
3rd,  General  Ashe  and  his  1,500  North  Carolina  militia  were 
soundly  beaten  at  Briar  Creek,  and  the  next  two  months  were 
confined  to  unimportant  movements  and  skirmishes  on  the 
part  of  General  Lincoln  and  the  British  commander,  Gen- 
eral Prevost.  In  May  an  expedition  under  General  Mat- 
thews plundered  the  coast  of  Virginia,  laid  waste  both  Nor- 
folk and  Portsmouth,  destroyed  100  vessels  and  returned 
within  a  month  with  abundant  booty. ^^^  Congress  was  ap- 
parently blind  to  the  desolation  entailed  by  a  strong  invasion 
of  the  Southern  States,  while  Washington  was  powerless  to 
furnish  any  assistance  so  long  as  Clinton  continued  to  oc- 
cupy New  York.  General  Greene  applied  for  command  in 
the  South,  but,  in  spite  of  Washington's  approval.  Congress 
refused  to  grant  it,  and  Lafayette,  seeing  no  active  service  in 
prospect,  returned  to  France.^ ^^ 

During  the  latter  part  of  the  summer  a  plan  was  formu- 
lated to  re-take  Savannah,  and  Comte  d'Estaing,  who  had 
meanwhile  captured  New  Grenada  and  fought  a  successful 
action  with  Admiral  Byron,  concurred  in  the  scheme  and  on 
September  8th  appeared  off  Savannah  with  a  fleet  of  33  ships 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  27 

1779-1780] 

and  6,000  troops.  Eight  days  later  the  British  garrison  ^^^ 
was  summoned  "  to  surrender  to  the  arms  of  the  King  of 
France  "  and  the  place  was  invested.  D'Estaing,  in  trepida- 
tion over  the  approaching  stormy  season  and  the  rumours  of 
the  coming  of  the  British  fleet,  urged  immediate  action  and 
on  October  9th  a  vigorous  assault  was  made,  but  Prevost  had 
gained  sufficient  time  to  strengthen  the  defences  -^^^  and  the 
allied  forces  ^^^  suffered  a  costly  repulse.  The  Erench  Ad- 
miral sailed  away,-^^^  and  Lincoln  was  compelled  to  abandon 
the  siege.  Two  months  later  Sir  Henry  Clinton  retaliated 
by  leaving  a  small  garrison  in  New  York  and  by  sailing  ^^'^ 
for  Charleston  with  over  7,500  men.^^^  Washington,  upon 
learning  that  Clinton  was  embarking  a  large  force  of  troops 
and  believing  that  their  destination  was  either  South  Caro- 
lina or  Georgia,  promptly  ordered  the  Virginia  and  I^orth 
Carolina  troops  of  the  Continental  Army  to  march  south, 
while  he  went  into  winter  quarters,  for  the  main  part  in 
New  Jersey,  the  headquarters  being  established  at  Morris- 
town  for  the  second  time.-^^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGISr  OF  1780 

As  in  the  previous  years,  1780  witnessed  a  diminution  in 
the  number  of  enlistments  ^  ^^  and  the  increase  in  the  size 
of  the  bounties  offered,  New  Jersey  paying  $1,000  in  ex- 
cess of  the  continental  allowances.  The  depreciation  in  the 
currency  ^^^  caused  the  utmost  distress  among  the  officers, -^^^ 
but  Congress  confined  itself  to  reiterating  ^^^  its  previous 
resolution  -^^^  that  they  be  offered  half -pay  for  life  to  remain 
in  service  until  the  close  of  the  war.  Notwithstanding  an 
almost  uninterrupted  succession  of  defeats,  and  the  urgent 
need  for  more  and  better  troops.  Congress  resolved  on  a  re- 
duction of  the  army  to  take  effect  the  first  of  January  fol- 
lowing.-^^^  This  was  quite  in  keeping  with  the  unwise  legis- 
lation which  made  no  attempt  to  check  the  corruption  among 
Government  agents  that  had  arisen  as  a  result  of  increasing 
prices  and  commissions,  ^^^  which  legalized  violence  and  ex- 


28     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1780 

posed  unprotected  persons  to  cruelty  and  outrage  until  the 
summary  execution  of  soldiers  without  trial  —  even  by  order 
of  Washington, —  the  plundering  of  citizens  and  the  seizure 
of  their  property  without  payment  became  matters  of  fre- 
quent occurrence.  ^^"^  The  States  likewise  took  a  hand  in  leg- 
islation andj  toward  the  close  of  the  war,  the  seizure  of  sup- 
plies for  the  army  was  made  a  penal  offence  by  more  than 
one  of  them,  quite  regardless  of  national  welfare  and  the 
detriment  to  the  land  forces.  ^^^ 

After  a  bitter  experience  of  five  years  of  war,  during  which 
he  had  had  ample  opportunity  to  test  fully  the  military  pol- 
icy pursued  by  Congress,  Washington  laid  bare  its  follies  and 
inadequacy  in  a  letter  to  the  President  of  that  body,  dated 
August  20,  1780,  in  which  he  declared  that 

^^  it  is  the  true  policy  of  America  not  to  content  herself  with 
temporary  expedients,  hut  to  endeavour,  if  possible,  to  give  con- 
sistence and  solidity  to  her  measures.  .  .  .^^^  Experience  has 
shown  that  a  peremptory  draft  will  be  the  only  effectual  one.  .  .  . 
To  one,  who  has  been  witness  to  the  evils  brought  upon  us  by  short 
enlistments,  the  system  appears  to  have  been  pernicious  beyond 
description,  and  a  crowd  of  motives  present  themselves  to  dictate 
a  change.  It  may  be  easily  shown  that  all  the  misfortunes  we  have 
met  with  in  the  military  line  are  to  be  attributed  to  this  cause. 
"  Had  we  formed  a  permanent  army  in  the  beginning,  which  by 
the  continuance  of  the  same  men  in  service,  had  been  capable  of 
discipline,  we  never  should  have  had  to  retreat  with  a  handful 
of  men  across  the  Delaware  in  1776,  trembling  for  the  fate  of 
America,  which  nothing  but  the  infatuation  of  the  enemy  could 
have  saved;  we  should  not  have  remained  all  the  succeeding 
winter  at  their  mercy,  with  sometimes  scarcely  a  sufficient  body 
of  men  to  mount  the  ordinary  guards,  liable  at  every  moment  to 
be  dissipated,  if  they  had  only  thought  proper  to  march  against 
us;  we  should  not  have  been  under  the  necessity  of  fighting  at 
Brandywine,  with  an  unequal  number  of  raw  troops,  and  after- 
wards of  seeing  Philadelphia  fall  a  prey  to  a  victorious  army; 
we  should  not  have  been  at  Valley  Forge  with  less  than  half  the 
force  of  the  enemy ;  destitute  of  everything,  in  a  situation  neither 
to  resist  nor  to  retire;  we  should  not  have  seen  New  York  left 
with  a  handful  of  men,  yet  an  overmatch  for  the  main  army  of 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  29 

1780] 

these  States,  while  the  principal  part  of  their  force  was  de- 
tached for  the  reduction  of  two  of  them;  we  should  not  have 
found  ourselves  this  spring  so  weak,  as  to  be  insulted  by  five  thou- 
sand men,  unable  to  protect  our  baggage  and  magazines,  their 
security  depending  on  a  good  countenance,  and  a  want  of  enter- 
prise in  the  enemy ;  we  should  not  have  been  the  greatest  part  of 
the  war  inferior  to  the  enemy,  indebted  for  our  safety  to  their  in- 
activity, enduring  frequently  the  mortification  of  seeing  inviting 
opportunities  to  ruin  them  pass  unimproved  for  want  of  a  force, 
which  the  country  was  completely  able  to  afford;  and  of  seeing 
the  country  ravaged,  our  towns  burnt,  the  inhabitants  plun- 
dered, abused,  murdered  with  impunity  from  the  same  cause. 
"  Nor  have  the  ill  effects  been  confined  to  the  military  line.  A 
great  part  of  the  embarrassments  in  the  civil  departments  flow 
from  the  same  source.  The  derangement  of  our  finances  is 
essentially  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  The  expenses  of  the  war,  and 
the  paper  emissions,  have  been  greatly  multiplied  by  it.  We 
have  had,  a  great  part  of  the  time,  two  sets  of  men  to  feed  and 
pay,  the  discharged  men  going  home  and  the  levies  coming  in. 
This  was  more  remarkably  the  case  in  1775  and  1776.  The 
difficulty  and  cost  of  engaging  men  have  increased  at  every  suc- 
cessive attempt,  till  among  the  present  levies  we  find  there  are 
some  who  have  received  a  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  in  specie  for 
five  months'  service,  while  our  officers  are  reduced  to  the  dis- 
agreeable necessity  of  performing  the  duties  of  drill  sergeants  to 
them,  with  this  mortifying  reflection  annexed  to  the  business, 
that,  by  the  time  they  have  taught  those  men  the  rudiments  of  a 
soldier's  duty,  their  service  will  have  expired,  and  the  work 
recommence  with  a  new  set.  The  consumption  of  provision, 
arms,  accoutrements,  and  stores  of  every  kind,  has  been  doubled 
in  spite  of  every  precaution  I  could  use,  not  only  from  the  cause 
just  mentioned,  but  from  the  carelessness  and  licentiousness  in- 
cident to  militia  and  irregular  troops.  Our  discipline  also  has 
been  much  hurt,  if  not  ruined,  by  such  constant  changes.  The 
frequent  calls  upon  the  militia  have  interrupted  the  cultivation 
of  the  land,  and  of  course  have  lessened  the  quantity  of  its 
produce,  occasioned  a  scarcity,  and  enhanced  the  prices.  In  an 
army  so  unstable  as  ours,  order  and  economy  have  been  im- 
practicable. Xo  person,  who  has  been  a  close  observer  of  the 
progress  of  our  affairs,  can  doubt  that  our  currency  has  de- 
preciated without  comparison  more  rapidly  from  the  system  of 
short  enlistments,  than  it  would  have  done  otherwise. 


30     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1780 

"  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  war  has  been  pro- 
tracted on  this  account.  Our  opposition  being  less,  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  enemy  have  been  greater.  The  fluctuation  of 
the  army  kept  alive  their  hopes,  and  at  every  period  of  the  dis- 
solution of  a  considerable  part  of  it,  they  have  flattered  them- 
selves with  some  decisive  advantages.  Had  we  kept  a  'permanent 
army  on  foot,  the  enemy  could  have  had  nothing  to  hope  for, 
and  would  in  all  probability  have  listened  to  terms  long  since. 

"  If  the  army  is  left  in  its  present  situation,  it  must  continue 
an  encouragement  to  the  efforts  of  the  enemy;  if  it  is  put  upon 
a  respectable  one,  it  must  have  a  contrary  effect,  and  nothing, 
I  believe,  will  tend  more  to  give  us  peace  the  ensuing  winter. 
It  will  be  an  interesting  winter.  Many  circumstances  will 
contribute  to  a  negotiation.  An  army  on  foot  not  only  for  an- 
other campaign,  but  for  several  campaigns,  would  determine  the 
enemy  to  pacific  measures,  and  enable  us  to  insist  upon  favourable 
terms  in  forcible  language;  an  army  insignificant  in  numbers, 
dissatisfied,  and  crumbling  to  pieces,  would  be  the  strongest 
temptation  they  could  have  to  try  the  experiment  a  little  longer. 
It  is  an  old  maxim,  that  the  surest  way  to  make  a  good  peace  is 
to  be  well  prepared  for  war/'  ^^^ 

IsTearly  four  weeks  later -^^^  the  commander-in-chief,  in 
writing  to  the  President  of  Congress  about  General  Gates' 
defeat  at  Camden,  summed  up  the  whole  question  in  a  nut- 
shell by  declaring  that 

"  This  event,  however,  adds  itself  to  many  others,  to  exemplify 
the  necessity  of  an  army,  and  the  fatal  consequences  of  depend- 
ing on  militia.     Eegular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the 

EXIGENCIES  OF  MODERN  WAR,  AS  AVELL  FOR  DEFENSE  AS  OFFENCE  ; 
AND  WHENEVER  A  SUBSTITUTE  IS  ATTEMPTED,  IT  MUST  PROVE 
ILLUSORY  AND  RUINOUS.  No  MILITIA  WILL  EVER  ACQUIRE  THE 
HABITS  NECESSARY  TO  RESIST  A  REGULAR  FORCE.  .  .  .  ThE 
FIRMNESS  REQUISITE  FOR  THE  REAL  BUSINESS  OF  FIGHTING  IS 
ONLY    TO    BE   ATTAINED    BY   A   CONSTANT    COURSE    OF    DISCIPLINE 

AND  SERVICE.  I  have  never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single  instance 
that  can  justify  a  different  opinion ;  and  it  is  most  earnestly 

TO  BE  WISHED,  THAT  THE  LIBERTIES  OF  AMERICA  MAY  NO 
LONGER  BE  TRUSTED,  IN  ANY  MATERIAL  DEGREE,  TO  SO  PRECARI- 
OUS  A  DEPENDENCE.''  ^^^ 

The  Campaign  of  1780  was  virtually  a  repetition  of  the 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  31 

1780] 

experiences  of  1775  and  1776.  Clinton's  voyage  from  ISTew 
York  ^^^  was  beset  with  storms  and  it  was  not  until  February 
11th  that  his  troops  were  landed  on  St.  John's  Island,  30 
miles  below  Charleston.  After  a  delay  of  six  weeks/ *^  the 
city  was  invested  ^^^  and  a  siege/ ^^  ending  on  May  12th, 
resulted  in  the  capitulation  of  General  Lincoln,  the  garri- 
son ^^^  and  all  the  male  inhabitants  of  Charleston  ^^^  upon 
honourable  terms. ^^^  Within  a  month  General  Clinton  re- 
turned to  N'ew  York,^  ^^  leaving  Lord  Cornwallis  in  command, 
and  that  officer  promptly  set  to  work  to  reduce  South  Caro- 
lina to  submission,  but  encountered  considerable  resistance 
in  the  partisan  warfare  waged  by  Colonels  Thomas  Sumter 
and  Francis  Marion,  ^^^  seconded  by  a  small  force  under 
Baron  de  Kalb.^^^  On  July  25th,  General  Gates  ^^^  ar- 
rived, assumed  command  ^^*  and  set  "  the  Grand  Armv  " — 
as  he  termed  it  —  in  motion  for  Camden,  South  Carolina, 
where  on  August  16th,  notwithstanding  his  superiority  in 
numbers,  ^^^  he  was  overwhelmingly  defeated  by  Cornwallis. -^^^ 
Some  of  the  militia  ran  away  in  the  most  disgraceful  man- 
ner *  while  Gates  himself  covered  180  miles  in  four  days, 
reaching  Hillsborough,  I^orth  Carolina,  on  the  20th,  "  with- 
out gathering  a  sufficient  force  of  the  fugitives  to  form  even 
an  escort."  ^^^  Cornwallis  promptly  followed  up  his  victory, 
and  on  the  18th  Colonel  Tarleton  nearly  annihilated  Sum- 
ter's force  at  Fishing  Creek.^^^  South  Carolina  had  been 
completely  subjugated  and  the  British  commander  addressed 
himself  to  the  invasion  of  I^orth  Carolina  but,  on  October  7th, 


*  General  Henry  Lee,  Memoirs  of  the  War  in  the  Southern  Department 
of  the  United  States,  I,  pp.  178-183;  Tarleton,  Campaign  in  North 
Carolina,  pp.  106-109. 

The  culprits  were  the  brigades  of  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  militia. 
The  only  regiment  out  of  these  two  commands  which  did  not  behave  in 
this  ignominious  fashion  was  composed  of  North  Carolinians  under 
Colonel  Dixon  and  greatly  distinguished  itself.  It  was  apropos  of  them 
that  General  Henry  Lee  wrote  in  his  memoirs  (I,  p.  97)  that 

"  A  GOVERNMENT  IS  THE  MURDERER  OF  ITS  CITIZENS  WHICH  SENDS  THEM 
TO  THE  FIELD  UNINFORMED  AND  UNTAUGHT,  WHERE  THEY  ARE  TO  MEET 
MEN  OF  THE  SAME  AGE  AND  STRENGTH,  MECHANIZED  BY  EDUCATION  AND 
DISCIPLINE  FOR  BATTLE." 


32      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1780 

one  of  his  detachments  under  Major  Fergusson  ^^^  was  sur- 
prised at  King's  Mountain  by  a  force  of  American  volun- 
teers ^^^  and  defeated  with  heavy  loss.^*^^  Marion  and  Sum- 
ter continued  to  harass  the  enemy  until  the  latter  was  dis- 
abled by  a  wound.  ^^^  Cornwallis,  realizing  that  he  had  not 
adopted  the  best  method  of  invasion,  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters at  Winnsborough,  North  Carolina,  and  the  interest  in 
the  southern  theatre  of  war  terminates  with  the  arrival  on 
December  3rd  of  General  Greene,  who  superseded  Gates  in 
command  of  a  sorry  force  of  less  than  2,400  men.^^^ 

In  the  ISTorth,  the  winter  of  1779-1780  had  been  unusually 
severe  and  the  army  at  Morristown  suffered  correspond- 
ingly.^^* Washington,  harassed  beyond  endurance  by  the 
dearth  of  supplies,  the  absence  of  money  to  pay  the  troops  ^^^ 
—  whose  disgust  and  desperation  culminated  in  mutiny  ^^^ — 
and  by  the  inability  to  lend  assistance  in  the  South  so  long 
as  a  superior  force  of  British,^  ^''^  supported  by  a  fleet,  re- 
mained in  occupation  of  ^NTew  York,  began  to  despair  of  the 
result. -^^^  A  gleam  of  hope  was  received  upon  the  arrival 
of  Lafayette  ^^^  with  the  news  that  the  Comte  de  Rochambeau 
was  coming  with  a  large  army  and  that  the  first  division  was 
already  en  route;  but  the  month  of  June  witnessed  two  in- 
vasions of  l^ew  Jersey  by  the  British,^  ^^  merely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  Americans  occupied.  On  July  10th, 
Bochambeau  arrived  at  I^ewport  with  6,000  troops  and 
Washington  proposed  the  capture  of  I^ew  York,  but  three 
days  later  Admiral  Graves  reached  there,  thus  giving  the 
British  fleet  a  decided  superiority,  and  the  enterprise  had  to 
be  postponed  until  the  arrival  of  the  second  French  divi- 
sion.^ ^^  Clinton  retorted  by  an  expedition  destined  to  oper- 
ate against  Rhode  Island  and  8,000  troops  were  sent  for- 
ward to  Huntington,  Long  Island,  but  Washington's  prompt 
movement  and  information  as  to  Bochambeau's  strength 
caused  him  to  relinquish  his  project  and  to  confine  himself 
to  blockading  ^N'ewport  with  his  fleet.  ^"^^  This  ended  the  im- 
portant operations  for  the  year,  although  mention  must  be 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  33 

1780-1781] 

made  of  the  capture  and  execution  of  Major  Andre, ^^^  the 
attempted  betrayal  of  West  Point  and  the  flight  of  Benedict 
Arnold,^  ^^  and  the  declaration  of  war  against  Holland  by 
Great  Britain  on  December  2nd.  The  French  second  divi- 
sion, reported  as  blockaded  in  Brest,  did  not  arrive;  the 
American  army  rapidly  dwindled  as  the  cold  weather  ap- 
proached ;  and  on  November  28th  Washington  announced  the 
winter  quarters  for  his  troops,  selecting  ]^ew  Windsor,  New 
Jersey,  for  his  own  ^^^  and  being  compelled  to  discharge  the 
militia  for  fear  the  entire  army  would  disband. -^^^ 

Thus  terminated  a  campaign  during  which  the  United 
States  had  over  43,000  men  under  arms  -^^^  and  won  only  one 
victory  of  any  consequence. 

•THE  CAMPAIGX  OF  1781 

The  jealousy  against  standing  armies  manifested  by  Con- 
gress since  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution  —  a  jealousy  so 
studiously  fostered  as  to  wring  from  Washington  the  reluc- 
tant acknowledgment  that  "  it  is  our  policy  to  be  prejudiced 
against  them  in  time  of  war  "  '^'^^ —  bore  fruit  in  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  Continental  forces,  which  took  place  on  January 
1,  1781.^^^  The  failure  to  provide  pay,  clothing  and  often 
food  —  largely  attributable  to  the  unwillingness  of  Congress 
to  comprehend  military  necessities  owing  to  its  fear  of  '^  mili- 
tarism '' —  took  a  form  that  the  legislators  had  not  contem- 
plated. The  mutiny  of  the  Connecticut  regiments  in  the 
preceding  May  ^^^  w^as  caused  by  starvation;  ^^^  equally  well 
justified  were  the  complaints  which  culminated  in  an  open 
mutiny  of  the  Pennsylvania  line  ^^^  at  Morristown  on  Jan- 
uary first.  In  spite  of  the  efforts  to  restore  order  made  by 
their  officers  —  several  of  whom  were  killed  or  wounded  in 
the  attempt  —  the  mutineers,-^  ^^  under  the  command  of  their 
non-commissioned  officers,  started  for  Princeton  next  day, 
with  the  avowed  determination  of  marching  to  Philadelphia 
to  obtain  a  redress  of  their  grievances,  their  demands  being 
for  clothing,  the  residue  of  their  bounty  and  the  full  arrears 


34     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1781 

of  their  pay.  Congress,  in  a  panic  lest  tlie  remainder  of  tlie 
army  should  become  similarly  disaffected,  despatched  a  com- 
mittee to  make  terms  with  the  malcontents.  The  conditions 
proposed  ^^^  were  accepted  substantially  in  the  form  of- 
fered ^^^  and  were  tantamount  to  an  absolute  capitulation  of 
the  civil  authority,  not  to  the  Army,  but  to  a  band  of  muti- 
neers.^ ^^  A  similar  uprising  on  the  part  of  the  New  Jersey 
troops  toward  the  end  of  the  month  -"^^^  was,  however,  sup- 
pressed with  a  strong  hand.-^^^  These  mutinies,  regrettable 
as  they  were  owing  to  the  impairment  of  discipline  and  dis- 
regard of  authority,  in  nowise  affected  the  loyalty  of  the 
troops.  Their  revolt  was  against  unbearable  conditions  * 
and  contained  many  of  the  elements  of  lawful  revolution  to 
justify  it  on  the  ground  that  the  Government  had  failed  to- 
tally in  its  duty  to  its  defenders. -^^^ 

The  opening  of  the  year  did  not  presage  success  to  the 
American  cause.  Washington's  army  was  reduced  to  about 
5,000  effective  men,  the  number  of  enlistments  was  woefully 
small,  the  French  fleet  was  closely  blockaded  in  Newport, 
the  Indians  were  becoming  very  troublesome  in  western  New 
York  and  on  the  Canadian  frontier,  the  American  navy  had 
practically  disappeared,  the  British  in  New  York  w^ere  a 
constant  menace  ^^^  and  the  scarcity  of  money  prevented  full 
advantage  being  taken  of  the  presence  of  the  allied  forces. 
The  prospect  was  anything  but  encouraging. 

The  principal  interest  centres  in  the  southern  theatre  of 
war^^-*^  where  Cornwallis,-^^^  deeming  an  invasion  of  North 
Carolina  unwise  so  long  as  the  Americans  threatened  both 
of  his  flanks,  determined  to  defeat  Morgan  and  Greene  in 
detail.     On  January  1st  he  sent  Tarleton  to  pursue  Morgan 


*  On  February  2,  1781,  Lafayette  wrote  from.  New  Windsor  to  the 
Marquise : 

"  That  only  proves  that  human  patience  has  its  limits,  and,  as  no 
European  army  would  suflfer  the  tenth  part  of  it,  that  it  requires 
citizens  to  endure  nakedness,  hunger,  toil,  and  the  absolute  want  of  pay 
which  constitute  the  condition  of  our  soldiers,  the  hardiest,  I  believe, 
and  the  most  patient  that  there  are  in  the  world." — Memoires,  corre- 
spondance  et  manuscrits  du  General  Lafayette,  I,  p.  408. 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  35 

1781] 

and  to  drive  him  across  the  Broad  River.  Sixteen  days  later 
they  met  at  Cowpens/^^  where  the  American,  who  understood 
from  past  experience  how  to  handle  his  militia,*  inflicted  a 
crushing  defeat  on  the  British. ^^^  Tarleton  fell  back  and 
joined  Comwallis  next  day  but,  notwithstanding  a  re-enforce- 
ment,-^^^ the  latter  permitted  Morgan  to  escape,  whereupon 
he  turned  his  attention  to  General  Greene's  sorry  force,^^^ 
and  a  series  of  manoeuvres  and  skirmishes  ensued,  lasting  for 
nearly  two  months  without  decisive  action. 

Meanwhile  Benedict  Arnold  with  a  force  of  1,600  men  had 
sailed  from  J^ew  York^^^  and,  landing  at  Westover  on  the 
James  Biver  on  January  4th,  marched  on  Richmond  and 
burned  as  much  of  the  city  as  time  permitted  but,  threatened 
by  the  troops  under  Baron  von  Steuben  at  Petersburg,  beat 
a  hasty  retreat  to  Portsmouth  which  he  proceeded  to  for- 
tify.^ ^« 

On  March  12th,  General  Greene,  having  been  joined  by 
considerable  re-enforcements,^^''  determined  to  engage  Com- 


*  On  a  slight  eminence  Morgan  posted  a  battalion  of  Maryland  regu- 
lars, their  right  prolonged  by  two  companies  of  Virginia  militia  under 
Majors  Triplett  and  Tate,  the  extreme  left  being  formed  by  150  Georgia 
piilitia  under  Captain  Beatty.  One  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in  front 
were  270  militia  in  open  order  under  Colonel  Pickens,  preceded  at 
about  the  same  distance  by  a  picked  force  of  150  men  under  Majors  Cim- 
ninghara  and  McDowell.  Within  6  miles,  the  Broad  River  ran  round 
Morgan's  left  and  parallel  to  his  rear,  so  that  there  was  no  possibility 
of  escape  in  the  event  of  defeat. 

Morgan's  injunction  to  his  militia  was:  "Just  hold  up  your  heads, 
boys  —  three  fires  and  you  are  free."  He  thus  apologises  for  his  choice 
of  position: 

"  /  would  not  have  a  swamp  in  view  of  my  militia  on  any  considera- 
tion; they  icould  have  made  for  it,  and  nothing  could  have  detained 
thenh  from  it.  And  as  to  covering  my  wings,  I  knew  my  adversary, 
and  was  perfectly  sure  I  should  have  nothing  but  downright  fighting. 
As  to  retreat,  it  teas  the  very  thing  I  wished  to  cut  off  all  hope  of. 
I  would  have  thanked  Tarleton  had  he  surrounded  me  with  his  cavalry. 
It  would  have  been  better  than  placing  my  own  men  in  the  rear  to 
shoot  down  those  who  broke  from  the  ranks.  When  men  are  forced  to 
fight,  they  will  sell  their  lives  dearly;  and  I  knew  that  the  dread  of 
Tarleton's  cavalry  would  give  due  weight  to  the  protection  of  my 
bayonets,  and  keep  my  troops  from  breaking  as  Buford's  regiment  did. 
Had  I  crossed  the  river,  one-half  of  the  militia  would  immediately 
have  abandoned  me." —  Carrington,  p.  543. 


36     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1781 

wallis.  On  the  15th  the  battle  was  joined  at  Guilford  Court 
House,  where  the  British  ^^^  fought  superbly  ^^^  and  won  a 
bloody  victory.^^^  Although  some  of  the  American  militia 
ran  away,*  it  proved  so  costly  ^^^  as  to  nullify  Cornwallis' 
success  and  to  cause  Fox  to  exclaim  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons that  "  another  such  victory  would  ruin  the  British 
army."  ^^*  Greene  then  proceeded  to  move  directly  against 
his  adversary's  posts  in  South  Carolina  but,  after  capturing 
one  of  the  most  important,  ^^^  was  attacked  by  Lord  Bawdon 
at  Hobkirk's  HilP^^  on  April  25th  and  again  defeated,^^^ 
notwithstanding  his  superiority  in  numbers.^ ^^  This  Brit- 
ish success  was  of  little  avail  how^ever,^^^  for  Rawdon  was 
obliged  to  evacuate  Camden,  three  forts  fell  in  quick  succes- 
sion to  the  Americans,^^^  and  on  June  5th  Augusta  surren- 
dered after  a  siege  of  seven  weeks.^-^^  A  fortnight  later  Gen- 
eral Greene,  who  had  invested  Ninety-Six,  was  compelled  to 
raise  the  siege  ^^^  and  to  withdraw  northward  but,  learning 
that  Rawdon  had  abandoned  the  place  and  divided  his  forces 
so  as  to  cover  Charleston,  marched  his  troops  to  the  High 
Hills  of  the  Santee  in  order  to  rest  them  during  the  intense 
heat  of  the  summer.  The  subsequent  operations  were  little 
more  than  partisan  skirmishes  but  were  kept  up  unceasingly 
and  with  the  utmost  bitterness  until  late  in  August  when 
Greene,  considerably  re-enforced,^  ^^  resumed  the  offensive.^^* 
On  September  8th  was  fought  the  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs, 
where  Greene  suffered  another  defeat. ^^^  A  series  of  minor 
engagements  ensued,  but  the  armies  did  not  meet  again,  and 
the  Southern  campaign  terminated  with  the  British  still  in 
possession  of  Charleston. 

*  The  North  Carolina  militia  under  Generals  Butler  and  Eaton,  and 
the  2d  Maryland  regiment  under  Lieut.-Colonel  Ford. —  Greene,  III,  pp. 
196-197;  Carington,  ihid.;  Lossing,  II,  pp.  609-612;  Marshall,  IV,  pp. 
370  and  373. 

Trevelyan  says,  I  (Part  II),  p.  183,  footnote,  that  "as  soon  as  Lord 
Cornwallis  sent  his  people  forward,  the  militia  broke  and  ran,  and 
never  stopped  retreating  until  (to  use  the  words  of  their  disgusted 
General)  they  had  gone  home  to  kiss  their  wives  and  sweethearts.'* 
Also  Greene,  III,  p.  205. 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  37 

1781] 

Meanwhile,  Cornwallis  liad  decided,  almost  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  Guilford  Court  House,  to  join  General 
Phillips  ^-^^  and,  by  occupying  Virginia  and  controlling  the 
Chesapeake,  to  intercept  all  communication  with  the  Allies 
and  thus  effectually  reduce  the  South  to  submission.^ ^'^  On 
April  25th  he  started  from  Wilmington,  North  Carolina, 
reaching  Petersburg,  Virginia,  within  a  month,^^^  but  he 
found  himself  opposed  by  a  combined  force  of  regulars  and 
militia  under  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,^ ^^  who  subsequently 
assumed  command  of  all  the  American  troops  in  Virginia.^^^ 
This  general,  having  prevented  the  capture  of  Richmond,^ ^^ 
rallied  Wayne  ^^^  to  him  and  for  three  months  the  respective 
forces  indulged  in  manoeuvering  and  skirmishing  without 
any  notable  encounter  save  at  Jamestown.^  ^^ 

In  the  North  Washington  and  Eochambeau  had  conferred 
at  Wethersfield,  Connecticut,  on  May  22nd  and  a  junction 
of  the  allied  armies  was  agreed  upon  as  a  preliminary  to 
an  attack  upon  New  York,^^^  but  the  operation  was  not 
actually  undertaken  in  force  until  nearly  two  months  later.  ^^^ 
On  July  14th  Washington  received  a  letter  from  the  Comte 
de  Grasse  announcing  his  intention  to  sail  from  Saint  Do- 
mingo on  August  3rd  for  the  Chesapeake.^^^  In  view  of 
this  information  it  was  decided  to  abandon  the  attack  on  New 
York,*  and  on  August  21st  the  allied  army  was  set  in  motion 
for  Virginia.  The  following  day  Cornwallis  concentrated 
his  entire  command  ^^^  at  Yorktown  and  on  the  30th  the  fleet 
under  de  Grasse  reached  the  Chesapeake,^^^  3,200  French 
troops  being  landed  at  Jamestown  Island  on  September  3rd 
and  Williamsburg  occupied  by  the  joint  forces  of  the  Comte 
de  Saint-Simon  and  Lafayette  two  days  subsequently. 

Meanwhile  the  British  had  made  desperate  efforts  to  inter- 
cept the  two  French  fleets  but  —  luckily  for  the  allies  — 


*  "  The  supreme  moment  of  Washington's  military  career  had  come  — 
the  moment  for  realizing  a  conception  which  had  nothing  of  a  Fabian 
character  about  it,  for  it  was  a  conception  of  the  same  order  as  those 
in  which  Ccesar  and  Napoleon  dealt.  He  decided  at  once  to  transfer 
his  army  to  Virginia  and  overwhelm  Cornwallis." —  Fiske,  II,  p.  275. 


38     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1781 

their  plans  had  miscarried.  ^^^  On  September  5th,  Admiral 
Graves  entered  the  Chesapeake,  but  de  Grasse,  slipping  out, 
drew  him  off  to  the  southward  and  manoeuvered  with  such 
skill  that  for  ^ve  days  the  English  were  unable  to  bring 
on  a  decisive  action.  De  Grasse  then-  put  back  into  the  bay 
and  found  the  squadron  under  de  Barras  safely  at  anchor.^  ^^ 
He  was  followed  by  Graves  but  that  Admiral,  finding  him- 
self completely  outnumbered,  renounced  his  attempts  and  set 
sail  for  'New  York.^^^ 

On  the  14th  Washington  and  Eochambeau  reached  La- 
fayette's headquarters  at  Williamsburg,  where  the  entire 
Allied  armies  were  concentrated  eleven  days  later,^^^  their 
march  in  nowise  slackened  by  Clinton's  counterstroke  in  the 
shape  of  an  invasion  of  Connecticut  conducted  by  Benedict 
Arnold,^ ^^  which  accomplished  nothing  except  the  destruc- 
tion of  New  London.^^^  On  September  28th  the  Allied 
armies  advanced  to  a  position  within  two  miles  of  Yorktown 
and  on  the  following  day  began  the  investment  of  the  place. 
A  week  later  the  siege  guns  began  their  work  with  such  effect 
that  on  October  17th  Cornwallis  offered  to  capitulate,  and  on 
the  19th  his  8,000  men  ^^^  defiled  between  the  French  and 
American  armies  to  the  tune  of  ''  The  World  Turned  Up- 
side Down/'  ^^^  surrendered  their  colours  and  laid  down  their 
arms.^^^  This  crowning  success  came  none  too  soon,  for  on 
that  memorable  day  Clinton  sailed  from  New  York  with  a 
powerful  fleet  and  7,000  of  his  best  troops  to  relieve  Corn- 
wallis, arriving  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  ^ve  days 
later,  only  to  have  to  turn  back  from  his  fruitless  mission.^ ^^ 

Without  the  timely  assistance  of  Eochambeau,  de  Grasse 
and  de  Barras,  it  is  doubtful  that  the  struggling  colonies 
would  ever  have  achieved  their  independence.  As  the  war 
progressed  the  response  to  the  military  necessities  dimin- 
ished,^^^  and  in  1781  not  30,000  troops  were  furnished  by 
the  States,^  ^^  whereas  at  the  most  critical  moment  the  Brit- 
ish had  over  38,000  effective  men.^^^  The  service  thus  ren- 
dered bv  France  was  incalculable.^ ^^ 


The  War  of  the  Revolution  39 

1781-1783] 

Although  the  war  was  virtually  terminated  with  the  sur- 
render of  Comwallis,  the  cessation  of  arms  did  not  officially 
occur  until  fourteen  months  later,^^^  so  that  Washington 
wisely  prepared  for  further  operations  ^^^  but  without  the 
necessary  troops  being  forthcoming.  ^^^  On  April  19, 
1783,  Washington,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Congress,^^^ 
proclaimed  the  cessation  of  hostilities,^^'''  on  September  3rd 
the  definitive  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Paris,^^^  on  I^o- 
vember  2nd,  he  delivered  his  farewell  address  to  the  army  ^^^ 
which  was  disbanded  next  day,^^^  and  on  December  23rd  he 
resigned  his  commission.^ ^^ 


CHAPTER  III 

LESSONS  OE  THE  REVOLUTION 

AS  a  result  of  the  blundering  military  policy  pursued, 
tlie  maximum  number  of  troops  raised  in  any  year  ^ 
was  89,661,  of  whom  42,700  were  militia.^  Owing  to  the 
principal  dependence  being  placed  upon  untrained  men,  the 
largest  force  that  Washington  was  able  to  assemble  for  battle 
was  less  than  17,000 ;  at  Trenton  and  Princeton,  when  the 
fate  of  the  cause  trembled  in  the  balance,  his  effective 
strength  was  less  than  4,000.^  A  careful  study  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  regular  or  Continental  troops  throughout  the 
Revolution  will  abundantly  demonstrate  that  a  standing  army 
is  one  of  the  least  dangers  to  which  American  freedom  can 
be  expose(Lly  The  fear  of  "  militarism ''  caused  the  wise 
plan  suggested  by  Greene  ^  and  the  reiterated  recommenda- 
tions of  Washington  to  go  unheeded  and,  as  a  logical  conse- 
quence, our  first  war  was  attended  by  an  extravagance  in 
men  and  money  utterly  unjustifiable.  Of  regulars  or  Con- 
tinental troops  231,771  ^  and  no  less  than  164,087  militia  '^ 
saw  service,  a  total  of  395,858,  whereas  the  entire  British 
force  from  first  to  last  was  only  about  150,605  ^ —  in  other 
words  the  Americans  used  nearly  three  men  to  their  enemy's 
one.  The  war  cost  the  United  States  $370,000,000,^  and 
pensions  to  the  amount  of  $70,000,000  have  been  paid  in  con- 
sequence of  it.-^^ 

Unflattering  though  it  be  to  American  pride,  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that,  notwithstanding  our  employment  of  over 
395,000  men,  only  two  military  events  had  a  direct  bearing 
tupon  the  ultimate  expulsion  of  the  British.  The  first  was 
the  capture  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga  in  1777,  the  second  the 
surrender  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  in   1781  —  and  the 

40 


Lessons  of  the  Revolution  41 

latter  was  only  rendered  possible  by  the  timely  assistance  of  a 
French  army  and  a  French  fleet. -^^ 

From  a  military  standpoint  the  errors  in  the  policy  fol- 
lowed during  the  Eevolution  may  be  summarized  under 
twelve  headings,  namely: 

(1)  The  total  inability  to  comprehend  that  the  military- 
resources  can  only  be  utilized  to  best  advantage  by  a 
central  government  to  which  the  entire  nation  owes 
paramount  allegiance,  and  that  any  delegation  of  that 
power  to  the  States  must  obviously  weaken  the  national 
military  strength  and  correspondingly  increase  the  na- 
tional expenditures; 

(2)  the  failure  to  realize  that,  in  a  military  system  which 
combines  the  use  of  regulars  and  volunteers  or  militia, 
men  in  the  absence  of  compulsion  or  strong  inducement 
will  invariably  enlist  in  the  organization  most  lax  in 
discipline ; 

(3)  the  enlisting  of  troops  for  too  short  periods  of  serv- 
ice; 

(4)  entirely  too  great  dependence  placed  upon  militia,  in- 
stead of 

(5)  maintaining  an  adequate  force  of  trained  officers  and 
soldiers;  the  substituting  for  the  armies  in  the  field, 
and  the  increasing  of  them  by  new  and  untrained  or- 
ganizations in  place  of  keeping  the  former  up  to  their 
full  strength  at  all  times; 

(6)  the  pernicious  use  of  bounties,  both  State  and  National 
—  the  logical  result  of  short  enlistments,  the  dearth 
of  proper  provisions  for  recruiting,  and  the  failure  to 
recruit  '''  for  the  war  '^  only ; 

(7)  the  depriving  of  organizations  of  their  officers  by  de- 
tailing them  on  detached  duty,  owing  to  the  failure  to 
provide  the  requisite  number  of  officers  for  staff  duty, 
recruiting,  etc.; 

(8)  the  neglect  to  make  full  use  of  drafting  when  all  other 
methods  had  failed  to  obtain  the  men  needed; 

(9)  the  enormously  increased  expense  caused  by  the  un- 
necessarily large  number  of  troops  under  pay,  the  wan- 
ton waste  resulting  from  lack  of  discipline  and  the 
heavy  losses  from  sickness  which  is  inevitable  among 
raw  troops ; 


42      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

(10)  the  needless  protraction  of  the  war  owing  to  the  in- 
efficiency of  the  troops  employed; 

(11)  the  absolute  lack  of  a  definite  military  policy  by  Con- 
gress at  any  time  during  the  war  —  the  consequent  in- 
ability of  the  commander-in-chief  to  formulate  any  sound 
plan  of  campaign  and  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  in- 
adequate and  costly  makeshifts; 

(12)  unnecessary  increase  in  the  pension  list."  ^^ 


CHAPTER  IV 

MILITARY    POLICY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES 

FROM  THE  END  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

UNTIL  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE 

WAR  OF  1812 

WASHINGTON'S  solicitude  for  our  national  military 
welfare  did  not  terminate  with  the  Revolution,  but 
even  before  resigning  his  commission  he  thus  set  forth  his 
views  as  to  a  proper  peace  establishment  for  the  defence  of 
the  republic/  expressing  a  belief  that 

"  due  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  importance  of  placing  the 
militia  of  the  Union  upon  a  regular  and  respectable  footing. 
...  It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  the  same  system  should 
pervade  the  whole;  that  the  formation  and  discipline  of  the 
militia  of  the  continent  should  be  absolutely  uniform,  and  that 
the  same  species  of  arms,  accoutrements,  and  military  apparatus, 
should  be  introduced  in  every  part  of  the  United  States.  No 
one,  who  has  not  learned  it  from  experience,  can  conceive  the 
difficulty,  expense,  and  confusion,  which  result  from  a  contrary 
system,  or  the  vague  arrangements  which  have  hitherto  prevailed.'^ 

Notwithstanding  this  sound  advice,  the  moment  that  inde- 
pendence was  an  accomplished  fact,  the  States  all  hastened  to 
arrogate  to  themselves  almost  every  attribute  of  sovereignty. 
In  the  midst  of  the  most  critical  period  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States,  when  the  national  credit  at  home  and  abroad 
was  completely  exhausted  and  when  the  country  was  rapidly 
drifting  into  a  state  of  anarchy,  Congress  saw  fit  to  disband 
all  that  remained  of  the  Continental  Army  except  80  soldiers 
destined  to  guard  public  stores  ^ —  its  action  being  tanta- 
mount to  a  declaration  that  a  Regular  Army  would  be  dis- 
pensed with  at  the  outset  of  the  republic.^     Throwing  to  the 

43 


44     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1784-1787 

winds  the  lessons  of  the  Revolution,  it  promptly  proceeded  to 
raise  a  mixed  regiment  of  700  infantry  and  artillery  drawn 
from  the  militia  of  four  States  to  protect  the  northwestern 
frontiers  and  to  garrison  the  posts  about  to  be  evacuated  by 
the  British.^  Within  a  year,  however,  the  need  of  a  certain 
amount  of  regular  troops  was  recognized  and  a  regiment  of 
equal  numbers  was  authorized  for  the  same  purpose,  the  en- 
listment being  for  three  years.  ^  Eighteen  months  later  "^  a 
further  increase  was  made  ^  and  the  two  organizations  merged 
into  a  "  legionary  corps  "  ^  but,  although  the  States  were 
urged  to  '^  use  their  utmost  efforts  to  raise  the  quotas  of 
troops  respectively  assigned  them  ^  with  all  possible  expedi- 
tion,'' their  response  was  so  meagre  that  only  two  companies 
of  artillery  were  forthcoming. 

The  pygmy  army  just  created  had  scarcely  got  ensconced 
on  the  frontiers  than  Shays'  rebellion  took  place  in  Massa- 
chusetts, and  the  Government  arsenal  at  Springfield  narrowly 
escaped  capture  by  the  malcontents.^^  Eight  months  later  ^^ 
another  body  of  700  men,  enlisted  for  three  years,  was  raised 
by  resolution  of  Congress  "  in  order  to  save  the  great  expense 
of  transporting  new  levies  to  the  distant  frontiers,"  ^'  to  avail 
the  public  of  the  discipline  and  knowledge  of  the  country  " 
and  in  the  hope  of  persuading  the  soldiers  already  in  service 
to  re-enlist.  ^^ 

The  feeble,  ineffective  and  chaotic  administration  both  of 
civil  and  military  affairs  under  the  existing  system  of  gov- 
ernment had  produced  a  general  conviction  that  a  change  was 
imperative,  and  Congress  had  recommended  a  convention  of 
delegates  from  the  States  in  order  to  revise  the  Articles  of 
Confederation.^^  This  convention  met  at  Philadelphia  on 
May  25,  1787,  and  on  September  I7th  the  new  constitu- 
tion was  signed  and  submitted  to  the  States  for  ratification.  ^"^ 
The  preamble  recites  that  among  other  reasons  it  was  insti- 
tuted to  "  insure  domestic  tranquillity "  and  to  "  provide 
for  the  common  defense."  Several  portions  have  a  direct 
bearing  upon  military  affairs,  ^^   and  a   comparison  of  the 


From  the  Revolution  to  the  War  of  1812       45 

1787-1789] 

war  powers  of  Congress  under  the  Confederation  with  those 
granted  by  the  Constitution  will  suffice  to  show  how  radical 
was  the  change  effected  in  the  form  of  government.  As  Up- 
ton very  pertinently  remarks :  ^^ 

"  Up  to  this  time  Congress  could  justly  claim  that  its  feeble 
and  exhausting  military  policy  was  largely  due  to  the  inadequate 
powers  conferred  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  Under  the 
Constitution,  however,  the  authority  ^  to  raise  and  support 
armies/  ^  to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy/  ^  to  levy  and  collect 
taxes/  and  ^  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States ' 
was  unqualified  and  gave  every  war  power  that  the  most  despotic 
ruler  could  ask. 

"  Henceforth  there  could  be  no  division  of  responsibility  be- 
tween the  General  Government  and  the  States.  If  disasters 
should  happen  in  the  future  .  .  .  the  AA^hole  responsibility  must 
lie  at  the  doors  of  a  President  and  a  Congress  clothed  with  un- 
limited power  to  meet  every  emergency. 

"  Our  liberties  and  independence,  our  country's  honor  and 
credit  were  thus  all  committed  to  one  General  Government,  it 
BEING  FULLY  EXPECTED  by  a  gcuerous  and  confiding  people  that 

EACH  REPRESENTATIVE  IN  THE  DISCHARGE  OF  THIS  SACRED 
TRUST  SHOULD  REGARD  THE  NATIONAL  DEFENSE  AS  ^  ONE  OF 
THE    CARDINAL    DUTIES    OF    A    STATESMAN.'  " 

In  consequence  of  the  adoption  and  ratification  of  the  Con- 
stitution, the  military  as  well  as  the  civil  affairs  required  an 
extensive  overhauling,  and  the  first  act  of  importance  per- 
taining to  the  former  '^'^  created  a  War  Department,  presided 
over  by  a  Secretary  of  War  who  was  made  responsible  to  the 
President  instead  of  to  Congress.-^  ^  The  Act  of  September 
29,  1789,  laid  the  foundations  of  our  present  Army  by 
recognizing  '^  the  establishment  for  the  troops  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,"  by  requiring  all  officers  and  men  to 
take  an  oath  of  allegiance  and  by  vesting  the  power  to  ap- 
point officers  in  the  President  alone. -^^  By  virtue  of  the  fifth 
section  the  President  was  authorized,  whenever  it  might  be 
necessary  to  protect  the  frontiers  against  Indians,  to  call  into 
service  such  militia  as  he  should  deem  necessary,  such  militia 
when  in  service  to  have  the  same  pay  and  subsistence  as  the 


46      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1789-1791 

Regulars  —  a  procedure  which  furnishes  the  key  to  our  en- 
tire policy  in  respect  to  subsequent  hostilities  with  the  In- 
dians.^^ 

The  first  general  organization  of  the  Army  under  the  Con- 
stitution was  effected  by  the  Act  of  April  30,  1790,  which 
fixed  the  strength  of  the  Eegular  establishment  at  one  regi- 
ment of  infantry  and  one  battalion  of  artillery,^^  but  no 
provision  was  made  for  a  General  Staff  beyond  permitting 
the  President  in  his  discretion  to  appoint  one  or  two  in- 
spectors. General  Harmar's  expedition  against  the  Miamis 
again  demonstrated  the  folly  of  depending  upon  newly- 
formed  militia  ^^  and  forced  Congress  to  add  another  regi- 
ment of  regulars  to  be  enlisted  for  three  years.^^  By  vir- 
tue of  the  8th  section  of  this  Act,  the  President  was  em- 
powered to  employ,  "  for  a  term  not  exceeding  six  months,'' 
a  corps  of  2,000  non-commissioned  officers,  privates  and 
musicians  in  addition  to,  or  in  place  of,  the  militia  and,  if 
such  a  corps  should  not  be  raised  in  time  for  active  opera- 
tions, to  make  good  the  deficiency  by  raising  additional 
levies  or  by  calling  into  service  an  equal  number  of  militia ;  ^^ 
while  the  9th  section  authorized  him  "  to  organize  the  said 
levies,  and  alone  to  appoint  the  commissioned  officers  thereof, 
in  the  manner  he  may  judge  proper."  ^^  As  Upton  points 
out -.26 

"  The  above  legislation  merits  our  closest  scrutiny.  Here 
was  laid  the  foundation  of  the  volunteer  system,  which  attained 
its  fullest  development  during  our  long  civil  war.  The  '  levies' 
knotun  later  as  '  volunteers,'  were  authorized  under  the  plenary 
power  of  Congress  to  ^  raise  and  support  armies/  and  the  power 
of  appointing  their  officers  was  given  the  President,  to  whom  it 
obviously  belonged,  as  the  ^  levies '  were  wholly  distinct  from  the 
militia  or  State  troops. 

"  The  subsequent  transfer  of  this  power  from  the  President  to 
the  governors  of  the  States  ^'  was  a  voluntary  return  to  the 
practice  under  the  Confederation  and  a  surrender  of  the  preroga- 
tives of  the  General  Government  under  the  Constitution." 


The  disastrous  rout  of  General  St.   Clair's  expedition 


28 


From  the  Revolution  to  the  War  of  1812       47 

1791-1812] 

furnished  another  proof  that  the  lessons  which  ought  to  have 
been  taught  by  the  Revolution  and  by  Harmar's  defeat  had 
been  wasted  upon  the  Government,  but  it  had  the  salutary 
effect  of  inducing  Congress  to  complement  the  artillery  and 
infantry  then  in  service  to  their  maximum  strength  and  to 
add  three  new  regiments  of  infantry, ^^  thus  bringing  the 
strength  of  the  Army  up  to  258  officers  and  5,156  men.^^ 
During  the  succeeding  twenty  years  the  legislative  enact- 
ments, depending  largely  upon  our  foreign  relations  and 
upon  troubles  with  the  Indians,  caused  the  size  of  the  Regular 
forces  to  vary  greatly,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  folloAving 
table : 

STRENGTH   OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  AS   AUTHOR- 
IZED BY  CONGRESS  ^^ 


Date 

Officers 

Men 

Total 

1792  to  1796 

258 

5,156 

5,414  32 

1796  to  1798 

233 

3,126 

3,359  33 

1798 

783 

13,638 

14,421 3* 

1799 

2,447 

49,244 

51,691 35 

1800  to  1801 

318 

4,118 

4,436  3« 

1802  to  1808 

241 

3,046 

3,287  37 

1808  to  1812 

774 

9,147 

9,921 38 

The  various  acts  of  Congress  affecting  the  military  and 
militia  establishments  are  too  numerous  and  complex  to  re- 
quire insertion  here,  but  a  few  of  them  are  of  sufficient  im- 
portance to  demand  a  cursory  examination. 

The  diminutive  size  and  temporary  character  of  the  mili- 
tary force  created  by  the  early  American  legislators  demon- 
strate that  their  intention  was  to  dispense  with  a  standing 
army  entirely;  but  as  time  wore  on  Shays'  rebellion,  the 
Whiskey  rebellion,  the  continual  trouble  with  the  Indians 
and  the  complications  with  France,  Spain  and  England,  en- 
gendered a  universal  belief  that  national  defence  must  not 
be  disregarded.  After  considerable  discussion.  Congress  in- 
clined to  its  usual  favourite  and  sought  to  appease  public 
opinion  by  the  organic  law  of  May  8,  1792,  entitled  ^'  An 


48      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1792 

act  more  effectually  to  provide  for  the  national  defense,  by 
establishing  an  uniform  militia  throughout  the  United 
States."  The  opening  section  of  this  law  prescribed  that  all 
able-bodied  white  men  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45  shall 
be  enrolled  in  the  militia,  with  the  obligation  to  provide 
themselves  with  certain  specified  arms  and  accoutrements, 
as  well  as  to  appear  equipped  therewith  when  called  out  for 
duty  or  drill.^^  Section  2  exempted  certain  persons  from 
military  duty,^^  and  Section  3  indicated  the  proper  military 
organization  and  ventured  the  suggestion  as  to  the  composi- 
tion of  each  brigade,  '^  if  the  same  be  convenient,"  to  the 
States,*^  while  the  fourth  section  required  at  least  one  com- 
pany of  artillery  and  a  troop  of  horse,  exacting  that  all  offi- 
cers, privates  and  troops  furnish  their  own  arms  and  equip- 
ment as  well  as  all  necessary  mounts  for  the  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry.*^ A  mere  glance  at  the  military  edifice  erected  by 
this  law  shows  that  it  was  founded  upon  the  sands,  and  that 
Congress  thus  substantially  handed  over  its  war  powers  to  the 
States,  placing  itself  at  their  mercy  as  completely  as  during 
the  darkest  days  of  the  Revolution.  An  admirable  analysis 
of  this  far-reaching  measure  is  thus  given  by  Upton :  **^ 

"  During  the  Eevolution  the  Government  shifted  upon  the 
States  the  responsibility  of  providing  men,  arms,  and  even  daily 
supplies  for  the  troops ;  but  under  the  provisions  of  this  law  the 
Government  and  States  went  one  step  further,  and  shifted  upon 
individual  citizens  the  responsibility  of  providing  their  own 
arms,  horses  and  equipments.  No  penalty  was  enacted  for  a 
failure  to  procure  such  supplies,  Congress  having  no  power  to 
enforce  it,  and  the  States  were  therefore  left  to  apply  such 
penalties  by  way  of  fines  as  their  legislatures  might  see  fit  to 
impose.  Even  had  the  citizen  been  willing  to  furnish  at  his 
own  cost  that  which  it  was  the  unmistakable  duty  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  provide,  the  further  execution  of  the  law  depended 
wholly  on  the  voluntary  and  concurrent  action  of  the  States, 
without  which  a  ^  uniform  militia  throughout  the  United 
States '  would  be  impossible.  .  .  . 

'^  Aside,  however,  from  the  military  defects  of  the  system,  it 
is  only  when  we  examine  it  from  the  standpoint  of  the  taxpayer 


From  the  Revolution  to  the  War  of  1812       49 

1792-1799] 

that  its  fundamental  errors  become  fully  apparent.  For  one 
National  Army  were  substituted  thirteen  or  more  State  armies. 
In  place  of  having  a  small  but  efficient  force  of  regulars,  sup- 
ported by  indirect  taxation,  the  citizens  of  each  State  were  called 
upon  to  pay  over  their  hard-earned  dollars  to  maintain  undis- 
ciplined bodies  of  militia,  totally  ignorant  of  the  first  principles 
of  the  military  art.  Even  had  all  the  States  with  patriotic  re- 
gard for  the  welfare  of  the  whole  country  maintained  their 
quotas  of  militia  during  the  long  intervals  of  peace,  they  would 
have  been  at  the  expense  of  a  large  military  force  for  the  benefit 
of  the  General  Government,  and  that,  too,  without  compensation 
except  in  time  of  war.  If,  on  the  contrary,  as  has  since  hap- 
pened, certain  States  should  fail  to  keep  up  a  militia,  the  burden 
of  their  shortcomings  would  be  unjustly  borne  by  the  remainder. 
"  View  it  in  whatever  light  we  may,  the  conversion  of  the 
militia  into  an  army  of  the  first  line,  as  designated  by  the  law, 
was   a  wild    and   impracticable   scheme."  ** 

In  1798  ^^  the  serious  complications  with  England  and 
France,  especially  the  latter,  caused  an  increase  in  the 
Corps  of  Artillerists  and  Engineers,^^  an  appropriation  of 
$1,200,000  was  made  for  fortifications,  arms  and  munitions  of 
war,*^  and  an  authorization  to  the  President  "  in  the  event 
of  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  United  States,  or  of  our 
imminent  danger  of  such  invasion,  ...  to  raise  a  force  of 
10,000  noncommissioned  officers  and  men,  to  be  enlisted  for 
the  period  of  three  years."  ^^  Washington  was  appointed 
commander-in-chief  with  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-General  but, 
although  this  army  was  never  called  into  service,  it  is  mani- 
fest that  the  intention  was  to  eliminate  the  militia,  to  place 
all  dependence  upon  regulars  and  volunteers  and,  so  far  as 
the  former  were  concerned,  not  to  repeat  the  blunder  of 
short  enlistments.^^ 

Ten  months  had  not  elapsed  before  Congress,  still  in 
dread  of  war,  sanctioned  ^^  a  large  increase  in  the  military 
establishment,^^  authorized  the  President  to  accept  the  ser- 
vices of  75,000  volunteers,  with  power  to  organize  them  into 
regiments,  brigades  and  divisions,  as  well  as  to  appoint  all 
necessary  officers.     Then  having  done  an  excellent  piece  of 


50     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1799-1812 

work,  Congress  proceeded  to  nullify  a  large  measure  of  it  by 
inserting  a  fatal  proviso  that  "  the  said  volunteers  shall  not 
be  compelled  to  serve  out  of  the  State  in  which  they  reside, 
or  for  a  longer  time  than  three  months  after  their  arrival  at 
the  place  of  rendezvous."  On  the  other  hand,  it  incorpo- 
rated a  section  authorizing  the  President  to  make  use  of  these 
volunteers  in  all  cases  where  he  was  empowered  to  call  out 
the  militia.^- 

"  Thus,  in  addition  to  the  Eegular  Army,  the  military  legisla- 
tion of  that  period,  profiting  by  our  Eevolutionary  experience, 
had  provided  a  body  of  national  volunteers,  officered  by  the 
President,  to  take  the  place  of  the  State  militia  troops.  Had 
this  organization  come  down  to  the  beginning  of  our  late  war,^^ 
or  even  had  the  companies  only  been  raised  by  the  State  au- 
thorities, leaving  it  to  the  President  to  organize  them  into 
battalions  and  regiments  with  a  professional  soldier  at  the  head 
of  each,^*  it  is  more  than  probable  that  in  one-half  the  time 
300,000  men  would  have  done  the  work  finally  accomplished  by 
little  less  than  3,000,000."  ^'^ 

The  complications  with  France  having  been  adjusted  with- 
out war,  the  additional  force  was  disbanded  by  the  Act  of 
May  14,  1800.^^ 

During  this  entire  period,  by  far  the  most  important 
measure  was  the  Act  of  March  16,  1802,  in  which  the 
reiterated  urgings  of  Washington,  Hamilton,  Knox  and  Pick- 
ering were  heeded  by  the  creation  of  a  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point,^^  and  second  in  its  beneficial  effects  was  that 
of  April  29,  1812,  increasing  the  number  of  cadets  to  250,^^ 
thus  vitalizing  it  ^^  and  enabling  it  to  furnish  most  of  the 
officers  needed  by  the  Army  in  time  of  peace. 

From  1802  to  1808,  all  Congressional  measures,  whether 
offensive  or  defensive,  were  directed  toward  the  almost  ex- 
clusive use  of  the  militia  and  volunteers.  The  advent  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  who  was  thoroughly  imbued  with  demo- 
cratic ideas  and  to  whom  anything  that  smacked  of  a  domi- 
nant central  Gpvernment  or  the  augmentation  of  its  existing 
powers  was  strongly  repugnant,^ *^  doubtless  exercised  its  in- 


From  the  Revolution  to  the  War  of  1812       51 

1803-1808] 

fluence.  Indeed,  in  his  first  annual  message  to  Congress,^^ 
he  deprecated  the  superfluous  size  of  the  army  ^^  and  its 
maintenance  in  time  of  peace  as  a  defence  against  invasion 
in  war,  declaring  that  the  only  dependable  force  is  "  the 
body  of  neighboring  citizens  as  formed  into  a  militia "  ^^ 
and  emphasizing  the  necessity  of  rectifying  the  militia  laws 
"  until  they  are  sufficiently  perfect."  ^^  Throughout  his  ut- 
terances as  President  is  the  underlying  principle  of  depen- 
dence upon  a  citizen-soldiery,^^  which  he  suggested  should 
be  raised  to  the  number  of  300,000  ^^  and  classified.^ ^  As 
the  founder  and  leader  of  democracy  in  America,  his  views 
are  of  special  significance,  doubly  so  since  they  have  per- 
sisted to  a  greater  or  less  degree  until  to-day. ^^  It  is  there- 
fore particularly  interesting  to  see  the  reversal  of  opinion 
on  his  part  in  subsequent  years  when  his  doctrines  as  to  na- 
tional defence  were  put  to  the  test  of  war.^^ 

Within  thirteen  months  of  Jefferson's  first  inauguration 
the  army  was  further  reduced  and  re-organized,'^^  and  one 
year  later,  when  war  was  impending  with  Spain,  no  at- 
tempt was  made  to  increase  it,  but  the  President  was  author- 
ized to  require  such  State  governors  as  he  selected  "  to  hold 
in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice  a  detachment  of 
80,000,  officers  included."  "^^  The  third  section  of  this  law 
remanded  the  appointment  of  volunteer  officers  to  the  States 
and,  most  unfortunately  for  our  military  welfare,  became  the 
basis  of  the  system  used  throughout  the  Mexican  War  and  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion. "^^  In  1807  there  were  unmistakable 
evidences  that  a  war  with  England  was  brewing,  but  again 
resort  was  had  to  volunteers  limited  to  twelve  months'  ser- 
vice,''^^  with  the  proviso  that  all  militia  which  volunteered  as 
organizations  "  shall  continue  to  be  commanded  by  the  offi- 
cers holding  commissions  in  the  same  "^"^  at  the  time  of  such 
tender."  The  indications  of  war  becoming  stronger  in  the 
spring  of  1808,  an  increase  was  at  last  made  in  the  Regular 
Army  ^^  to  an  authorized  strength  of  9,921,  but  two  years 
later,  when  the  war  was  recognized  to  be  unavoidable,  Con- 


52      Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

L1810-1812 

gress  remained  supine,  and  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  1811 
that  further  action  was  taken  in  the  shape  of  a  bounty  of  $16 
to  all  new  recruits  enlisting  for  five  years  or  former  soldiers 
re-enlisting  for  the  same  term."^^  At  the  beginning  of  1812, 
on  the  eve  of  war,  a  succession  of  six  acts  sought  too  late  to 
raise  the  necessary  forces  '^'^  and  to  effect  the  organization 
which  can  only  be  done  in  time  of  profound  peace.  Short 
enlistments  were 'again  resorted  to,  and  the  distressing  fact  be- 
came apparent  that,  after  twenty-five  years  of  independence, 
the  nation  was  about  to  embark  upon  a  war  against  a  great 
Power  with  officers  scarcely  more  efficient  than  those  who 
led  the  Continental  Army  at  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution. 
The  outbreak  of  hostilities  found  the  entire  military  estab- 
lishment in  the  utmost  chaos,  and  no  better  evidence  of  the 
confusion  that  is  inevitable  at  the  commencement  of  war, 
just  so  long  as  Congress  in  time  of  peace  neglects  to  make 
suitable  provision  for  national  defence,  could  be  adduced  than 
the  military  legislation  of  this  period. '^^ 


THE  WAE  OF  1812 


Reproduced  hy  permission  of  Rand,  McNally  and  Company  from  E.  G.  Foster's 

Illustrative  Historical  Maps. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  WAE  OF  1812 

THE  declaration  of  war  against  Great  Britain  occurred 
on  June  ISth,  at  which  time  our  entire  standing  army 
was  only  6,744,  while  the  British  regulars  in  Canada  num- 
bered less  than  4,500  effectives.^  Before  any  active  opera- 
tions could  be  undertaken,  the  conflicting  organizations  of 
our  military  establishment  ^  had  to  be  rectified,^  and  a  modi- 
fication in  the  law  respecting  the  30,000  volunteers  ^  was 
made  to  permit  the  President  to  appoint  all  the  company,  field 
and  general  officers  thereof.^  The  United  States  was  ac- 
cordingly deprived  of  the  advantage  which  ought  to  have 
been  taken  of  the  enemy's  weakness,  and  military  action  had 
to  be  superseded  ad  interim  by  military  legislation.^ 

The  wisdom  of  the  Constitution  in  vesting  in  Congress 
the  sole  power  to  raise  and  support  armies  was  strikingly 
demonstrated  at  the  opening  of  hostilities,  when  the  governors 
both  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  refused  to  furnish 
their  quotas  of  militia.  The  former  denied  the  right  of  the 
President  or  Congress  to  determine  when  such  exigencies 
arise  as  to  require  the  militia  to  be  called  out  and  claimed  that 
"  this  right  is  vested  in  the  commanders  in  chief  of  the 
militia  of  the  several  States."  '^  The  latter  used  virtually  the 
same  contention,  and  both  raised  the  question  as  to  whether 
the  President  had  the  right,  even  after  the  militia  was  or- 
dered into  the  United  States'  service,  to  assign  Army  officers 
to  command  it.^ 

"  As  every  citizen  fit  for  military  duty  was  incorporated  in 
the  militia,  it  is  evident  that  Congress  could  not  avail  itself  of 

53 


54     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1812 

the  services  of  any  militia  organization,  in  opposition  to  the 
commands  of  the  governor,  without  forcing  its  members  to  dis- 
obey orders.  Nor  could  Congress  accept  the  services  of  in- 
dividuals, either  as  volunteers  or  regulars,  without  encouraging 
the  crime  of  desertion,  for  the  law  made  no  exceptions  in  favor 
of  citizens  belonging  to  the  military  force  of  the  United  States. 

"  A  partial  repeal  of  the  act  of  1792  ®  was  the  only  way  in 
which  Congress  could  have  extricated  itself  from  this  dilemma. 
Such  a  course,  however,  would  have  amounted  to .  a  confession 
of  the  failure  of  that  elaborate  system  of  national  defense,  based 
upon  the  conversion  of  our  people  into  a  vast  array  of  citizen 
soldiers.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  system  under  which  any  State 
or  States  not  in  sympathy  with  the  purposes  of  the  General 
Government,  could  successfully  thwart  the  will  of  the  nation. 

"  Under  one  particular  form  of  government,  and  in  a  coun- 
try of  such  vast  extent,  the  possible  lukewarmness  or  opposition 
of  one  or  more  of  the  States,  makes  it  the  more  important  that 
the  whole  war  power  of  the  nation  should  be  wielded  exclusively 
by  the  direct  representatives  of  the  States  and  of  the  people,  in 
Congress  assembled.'^  ^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN"  OF  1812 

With  the  outbreak  of  war  came  the  cry  throughout  the 
country  of  "  On  to  Canada,"  and  General  Hull  with  a  mixed 
force  of  regulars  and  volunteers  and  militia  crossed  the  Ste. 
Marie  River  from  Detroit  ^^  in  July,  but  soon  withdrew  and 
permitted  the  British  to  invest  them  in  Detroit.  At  the 
end  of  eight  days  the  entire  American  garrison,^  ^  without 
so  much  as  firing  a  shot,  surrendered  to  a  force  numbering 
about  320  regulars,  400  militia  and  600  Indians.^ ^  Within 
a  month  the  control  of  the  entire  Northwest  was  lost  and  the 
initiative  passed  to  the  enemy,  who  was  promptly  joined  by 
nearly  all  the  Indians  in  that  region. 

The  ignominious  fiasco  of  Hull  served  only  to  stiffen  the 
American  determination  to  expel  the  British,  to  invade  Can- 
ada and  to  punish  the  Indian  tribes  in  Ohio,  Indiana  and 
Illinois.  One  expedition  of  4,000  Kentucky  mounted  militia 
tinder  General  Hopkins  started  from  Fort  Harrison,  Indiana, 
on  October  14th,  for  the  Wabash  and  Illinois  Rivers,  but  five 


The  War  of  1812  55 

1812] 

days  later  the  troops  mutinied,  deserted  their  officers  and 
dispersed  to  their  homes.  ^*  A  similar  fate  attended  the 
expedition  to  the  rapids  of  the  Maumee  River  under  General 
William  Henry  Harrison  during  the  same  month.  ^^ 

The  operations  on  Niagara  frontier  were  equally  unsuc- 
cessful. A  sorry  body  of  New  York  militia  under  General 
Van  Eensselaer  ^^  was  re-enforced  by  900  regulars  and  addi- 
tional militia,  under  General  Wadsworth/^  attacked  the  Brit- 
ish at  Queenstown  on  October  13th  and  got  a  sound  beating/^ 
the  militia  —  except  one  detachment  —  mutinying  and  re- 
fusing to  cross  the  river  to  the  support  of  the  troops  already 
on  the  other  side  who  successfully  stormed  and  captured  the 
enemy's  batteries. ^^  Nearly  seven  weeks  later  ^^  a  second 
attempt  was  made  to  invade  Canada  by  a  force  of  4,500  under 
General  Smyth  who,  notwithstanding  a  bombastic  proclama- 
tion,^^ lost  heart  and  ordered  the  troops  already  embarked 
back  to  the  American  side.  A  second  embarkation  ^^  three 
days  later  was  likewise  recalled  and  the  expedition  aban- 
doned, much  to  the  anger  of  the  troops  who  had  at  first  been 
opposed  to  the  invasion.^ ^ 

Meanwhile  a  force  of  5,737  troops  under  General  Dear- 
born had  been  assembled  in  the  vicinity  of  Lake  Champlain 
for  the  purpose  of  invading  Canada  by  way  of  Montreal.  In 
November  the  advance  began  but,  upon  reaching  the  frontier, 
"  of  the  3,000  militia  .  .  .  nearly  all  refused  to  cross  the 
line  .  .  .  but  halted  at  the  very  border."  ^*  A  reconnais- 
sance to  the  La  Colle  River  and  the  capture  of  a  block-house 
constituted  the  extent  of  its  exploits  which  ended  in  winter 
quarters.  ^^ 

Such  were  the  achievements  of  the  American  forces,  which 
numbered  not  less  than  65,000  men,^^  in  the  face  of  an  enemy 
never  estimated  to  exceed  1,450  ^^  and  in  reality  even  less.^^ 
The  utter  worthlessness  of  the  new  system  inaugurated  by  the 
pernicious  Act  of  1792  ^^  was  demonstrated  in  the  succession 
of  failures  and  disasters  which  characterized  this  cam- 
paign.^^ 


56     Military  Unp  re  par  edit  ess  of  the  United  States 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1813 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  Congress  realized  that  some- 
thing must  be  done  immediately  or  the  disasters  of  the 
previous  campaign  would  be  irretrievable.  It  therefore 
granted  a  bounty  in  the  shape  of  $24  advanced  pay  to 
every  soldier  enlisting,  after  February  1st,  for  five  years  or 
during  the  war,^^  its  object  being  "  to  complete  the  present 
military  establishment  to  the  full  number  authorized  by  lav7, 
with  the  greatest  possible  despatch."  ^^  The  sixth  section  of 
this  act  wisely  rectified  the  most  glaring  defect  in  the  law  of 
1792  ^^  by  permitting  militia  to  enlist  in  the  United  States 
Army.  !Nine  days  later,  apprehensive  lest  the  inducements 
already  made  would  fail  to  secure  sufficient  men.  Congress 
reverted  to  short  enlistments,  and  authorized  the  President 
to  increase  the  Regular  infantry  by  twenty  regiments,  ag- 
gregating 57,351  men,  who  were  to  be  enlisted  for  one  year 
only.^^  The  other  legislation  during  the  year  was  princi- 
pally concerned  with  the  increase  of  the  staff,  which  w^as  ef- 
fected in  the  lower  grades  by  detailing  officers  from  the  line. 
As  usual,  these  measures  contained  fundamental  defects,  for 
the  saving  in  staff  officers'  pay  was  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  depriving  many  of  the  companies  and  battalions  of  their 
proper  quota  of  officers.  ^^ 

In  view  of  the  immense  number  of  militia  employed  in 
1812  without  commensurate  results,  the  Government  limited 
the  army  under  General  Harrison  to  7,000  men,^^  being 
driven  to  the  use  of  regulars  by  public  opinion  clamouring 
for  a  more  vigorous  and  efficient  prosecution  of  the  war. 
The  campaign,  like  that  of  the  preceding  year,  began  disas- 
trously. The  advanced-guard  of  the  army,  under  General 
Winchester, ^"^  moved  forward  into  Michigan  in  response  to 
an  appeal  from  the  settlers  on  the  River  Raisin  but  was  an- 
nihilated by  the  British  General  Proctor,^  ^  the  Kentucky 
militia  running  away  ignominiously.^^  On  February  1st, 
Winchester  with  a  new  force  of  2,000  started  back  to  the 


The  War  of  1812  57 

1813] 

Miami  and  constructed  an  entrenched  post  at  Fort  Meigs, 
but  was  besieged  there  *^  bj  Proctor,*^  who  routed  a  reliev- 
ing force  of  Kentucky  militia  under  General  Clay  ^^  but  was 
unable  to  take  the  fort.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  so  heavy  were 
the  American  losses  ^^  that  the  prestige,  if  not  the  actual 
fruits,  of  a  victory  inured  to  the  British.*^  Again  in  July 
Proctor  appeared  at  Fort  Meigs,  left  a  force  of  Indians  under 
Tecumseh  to  blockade  the  place  and  moved  against  Port 
Stephenson  on  the  lower  Sandusky  River.  His  summons  for 
surrender  being  refused  by  Major  Croghan,  he  assaulted  the 
fort  ^^  but  met  with  a  repulse  ^^  and,  assembling  his  troops,  re- 
treated to  Canada  for  the  third  time.  Meanwhile  additional 
militia  had  been  called  out  in  Ohio  and  Kentucky  and  had 
joined  General  Harrison,  who  crossed  Lake  Erie  ^"^  with  more 
than  7,000  men,  landed  at  Amherstburg  on  September  27th, 
pursued  Proctor,  overtook  him  and  totally  defeated  him  at 
the  battle  of  the  Thames  ^^  on  October  5th. ^^  This  success 
prompted  the  Indians  of  the  Northwest  to  desert  the  British 
cause  forthwith  and  restored  to  the  Americans  the  territory 
lost.  The  usual  blunder  was  then  committed.  Instead  of 
the  victory  being  followed  up,  the  army  was  disbanded,  the 
militia  and  twelve  months'  volunteers  discharged,  while  Gen- 
eral Harrison  took  his  1,300  Regulars  by  water  from  Detroit 
to  Buffalo. 

'^  The  cost  of  dispersing  the  800  British  regulars,  who  from 
the  first  to  last  had  made  prisoners  of  HulFs  army  at  Detroit, 
let  loose  the  Northwestern  Indians,  defeated  and  captured  "Win- 
chester's command  at  Frenchtown,  besieged  the  Northwestern 
army  at  Fort  Meigs,  and  twice  invaded  Ohio,  having  experienced 
but  one  rebuff,  at  the  hands  of  a  stripling  in  command  of  160 
regulars  at  Fort  Stephenson — teaches  a  lesson  well  worth  the 
attention  of  any  statesman  or  financier. 

"  Not  counting  the  hastily  organized  and  half -filled  regiments 
of  regulars,  sent  to  the  West,  the  records  of  the  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral's  Office  show  that  about  50,000  militia  were  called  out  in 
1813  and  1813,  from  the  States  of  Ohio,  Kentucky,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Virginia,  for  service  against  Proctor's  command.''  ^^ 


58      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1813 

"  As  further  evidence  that  the  keys  of  the  Treasury  were 
turned  over  to  the  States  with  no  check,  save  the  honesty  of  the 
officers  who  made  out  the  muster-rolls,  it  need  only  be  stated  that 
up  to  x\pril  14,  1813,  '  no  return  of  any  description '  from 
General  Harrison's  division  of  the  Army  had  ever  been  received 
at  the  Adjutant-GeneraPs  Office.^^ 

"  The  above  facts  would  seem  to  offer  conclusive  proof  that 
the  same  mistake  in  statesmanship  which,  in  time  of 
peace,  gives  us  a  nonexpansive  military  establishment, 
is  certain  to  bring  about,  in  time  of  war,  useless  sacrifice 
of  human  life,  unlimited  waste  of  money,  and  national 
humiliation/'  ^2 

Military  operations  in  the  centre.^^ 

On  April  27th  a  successful  attack  was  made  on  York  — 
now  Toronto  —  followed  by  the  capture  of  Fort  George  by 
General  Dearborn  just  a  month  later,  and  subsequently  of 
all  the  forts  on  the  Niagara  frontier. ^^  On  May  29th  the 
British  under  Sir  George  Prevost  ^^  attacked  the  garrison  at 
Sackett's  Harbor,  N.  Y.,^^  but  were  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss  ^^  by  the  Regulars  under  Colonel  Backus,  while  General 
Brown's  militia  turned  tail  and  ran,  despite  his  efforts. ^^ 

The  retreat  of  Hampton  and  Wilkinson  from  Canada  — 
to  which  allusion  will  presently  be  made  —  compelled  a  with- 
drawal of  the  regular  garrison  from  Fort  George,  the  defence 
of  which  was  left  to  some  New  York  militia  under  General 
McClure.  Upon  the  approach  of  the  British,  this  inexper- 
ienced officer  evacuated  the  place  on  December  10th,  burned 
the  village  of  Newark  ^^  and  retreated  to  the  American  shore, 
his  troops  mutinying  en  route.^^  Although  he  called  out  all 
the  militia  of  the  counties  of  Genesee,  Niagara  and  Chau- 
tauqua, the  British  held  these  raw  levies  in  such  contempt 
that  they  determined  upon  a  counter-invasion,  crossed  the 
Niagara  Biver  to  Black  Bock  on  December  19th,  captured 
Fort  Niagara  "  through  the  criminal  negligence  of  its  com- 
mander," and,  in  revenge  for  the  destruction  of  Newark, 
burned  Buffalo,  'Lewistown  and  several  other  places,^  ^  while 
the  militia  ran  away  quite  as  fast  as  did  the  inhabitants.^^ 


The  War  of  1812  59 

1813] 

Military  operations  in  the  North. 

Shameful  as  were  the  fiascos  in  the  central  zone,  they  were 
insignificant  as  compared  with  the  fate  of  the  two  columns 
which  undertook  to  invade  Canada  from  the  northern  fron- 
tier. General  Hampton  with  about  5,000  new-recruited 
regulars  ^^  started  from  Lake  Champlain,  crossed  the  border, 
was  repulsed  at  Chateauguay  on  October  26th  by  a  paltry 
force  of  800  Canadian  militia  and  Indians,^*  and  ignomini- 
ously  retreated  to  Plattsburg.  General  Wilkinson,  with 
8,000  regulars,*^  ^  assembled  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Ontario  and 
advanced  down  the  St.  Lawrence.  On  !N^ovember  11th,  his 
advanced-guard,  composed  of  about  1,700  men,  encountered 
800  British  regulars  at  Chrystler's  Fields,  and,  after  a  fight 
of  two  hours,  being  unable  to  dislodge  the  enemy  and  having 
lost  338  men,  it  fell  back  to  its  boats.  A  council  of  war 
then  decided  to  abandon  the  attack  on  Montreal,  the  troops 
retreated  to  the  American  shore  and  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters. ^^  In  a  word,  two  American  columns  numbering  fully 
13,000  and  composed  for  the  most  part  of  regulars,  faltered 
and  recoiled  before  an  enemy  of  only  2,000 ! 

"  Want  of  cooperation,  superannuated  and  incompetent  com- 
manders, newly  enlisted  and  undisciplined  men,  inexperienced 
officers  —  all  the  fruits  of  a  bad  military  policy  —  were  the 
causes  of  these  humiliating  defeats. 

"  The  story  of  Ham])ton's  nerveless  campaign  affords  perhaps 
the  most  satisfactory  demonstration  of  the  great  importance 
OF,  once  and  for  all,  doing  away  with  a  military  system 
WHICH,  as  under  the  Confederation,  still  based  itself  upon 
the  support  and  cooperation  of  the  States.''  ^^ 

That  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  defied  the  United 
States  Government  by  refusing  to  furnish  their  militia  to 
its  service  has  already  been  seen.^^  In  Vermont  Governor 
Chittenden,  being  bitterly  opposed  to  the  war,  sought  to  em- 
barrass the  Government  by  a  proclamation,  dated  E^ovember 
10,  1813,  whereby  he  commanded  a  brigade  of  Vermont 
militia  ^^  to  return  to  their  homes  "  within  the  territorial 


60      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1813 

limits  of  their  own  brigade,  there  to  repel  if  need  be,  the 
enemy's  invasion,  either  in  co-operation  with  troops  of  the 
United  States  or  separately,  as  might  be  necessary,"  declar- 
ing 

"that,  in  his  Opinion,  the  military  strength  and  resources  of 
the  State  must  be  reserved  for  its  own  defense  and  protection 
exclusively."  ^^ 

Some  of  the  officers  refused  to  be  parties  to  any  such  attempt 
to  produce  insubordination  and  mutiny, '^^  but  the  governor 
persisted  in  his  stand  and  in  the  following  year  went  even  to 
greater  lengths. 

Military  operations  on  the  Chesapeake. 

After  two  declarations  by  the  British  Government  of  a 
state  of  blockade  embracing  the  entire  Atlantic  coast  ^^ — 
with  the  notable  exception  of  Massachusetts,  New  Hamp- 
shire and  Ehode  Island  '^^ —  a  fleet  under  Admiral  Cockburn 
entered  the  Chesapeake  on  March  4th  and,  being  joined  by 
Admiral  Warren  and  a  force  from  Bermuda,  spent  the  next 
two  months  burning  and  destroying  towns.  ^^  The  inhabi- 
tants, to  whom  more  than  66,000  militia  afforded  no  pro- 
tection,"^^ sought  to  defend  their  property  themselves,  but 
this  disregard  for  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  entailed  re- 
prisals, until  the  unhappy  people  were  glad  to  throw  them- 
selves on  the  mercy  of  their  enemies.  In  June,  Admiral 
Warren,  who  had  gone  back  to  Bermuda,  returned  with  re- 
enforcements  amounting  to  2,650  infantry  and  marines, 
attacked  JSTorfolk  "^^  on  the  20th  and  was  repulsed,  but  cap- 
tured and  destroyed  Hampton  on  the  25th.'^'^  The  re- 
mainder of  the  year  the  British  devoted  to  maintaining  the 
blockade. 

The  CreeJc  War. 

On  August  30th,  one  thousand  Creek  warriors  surprised 
Fort  Mims  in  southern  Alabama  and  massacred  the  garri- 
son. Tennessee  promptly  authorized  the  raising  of  3,500 
volunteers  and,  on  October  11th,  2,500  were  concentrated  at 


The  War  of  1812  61 

1813] 

Huntsville  under  General  Andrew  Jackson.  A  fortnight 
later  he  began  his  march,  and  on  November  3rd  and  9th  at 
Tallasahatchee  and  Talladega  he  inflicted  crushing  defeats 
upon  the  Indians. ^^  The  war  would  doubtless  have  come  to 
a  sudden  end  but  a  dearth  of  supplies  — "  due  in  large  de- 
gree to  the  failure  of  the  Government  to  properly  organize 
the  staif  departments,  until  hostilities  with  Great  Britain 
became  imminent ''  "^^ —  forced  Jackson  to  withdraw  to  Fort 
Strother,  where  he  spent  ten  days  in  argument  with  his  hun- 
gry and  insubordinate  troops.  This  furnished  a  very  amus- 
ing incident ;  first,  the  militia  mutinied  but  were  suppressed 
by  the  volunteers,  then  the  volunteers  revolted  but  were 
brought  to  order  by  the  militia,  with  the  aid  of  the  guns. 
Jackson,  realizing  that  no  good  could  be  derived  from  the 
volunteers,  permitted  them  to  return  to  Nashville,  where 
they  were  disbanded;  but  no  sooner  was  this  difficulty  over- 
come than  his  militia,  as  well  as  the  2,000  under  General 
Cocke  sent  to  re-enforce  him,  again  became  disaffected  and 
deserted  him  almost  to  a  man.^^ 

Troops  employed  in  1813. 

Exclusive  of  rangers  and  volunteers,^^  the  troops  called 
out  in  that  year  amounted  to  149,148,  only  19,036  being 
regulars  and  the  rest  —  130,112  —  militia.^^  Of  the  latter 
66,376  from  Delaware,  Maryland,  the  District  of  Columbia, 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina  spent  their  time  in  observing 
the  2,600  regulars  and  marines  on  the  British  fleets,  their 
assistance  to  the  despoiled  inhabitants  or  their  resistance  to 
the  enemy  being  virtually  nil.     As  Upton  remarks, ^^ 

^^  The  only  compensation  for  the  employment  of  so  many 
troops  during  the  campaign,  was  the  destruction  of  Proctor^s 
force  of  800  regulars,  a  feat  that  would  have  been  impossible, 
but  for  the  victory  of  Commodore  Perry  on  Lake  Erie." 

Far  from  realizing  the  cherished  dream  of  a  conquest  of 
Canada,  the  second  year  of  this  war  witnessed  the  expulsion 
of  the  Americans  from  the  enemy's  territory,  followed  by  a 


62      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1813-1814 

counter-invasion  and  the  destruction  of  the  towns  along  the 
entire  IS^iagara  frontier,  while  farther  south  the  British 
plundered  our  coasts  at  will. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1814 

The  urgency  for  expediting  enlistments  caused  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  law  of  January  20,  1813,^^  and  offered  each  man 
enlisting  for  five  years  a  bounty  of  $124  in  lieu  of  the  $16 
and  three  months'  pay  previously  granted.  The  amount  of 
cash  thus  obtained  upon  enlistment  was  more  than  tripled, ^^ 
much  to  the  detriment  of  the  national  exchequer, ^^  but  even 
this  increase  was  rendered  nugatory  by  the  sums  paid  by 
many  of  the  militia  for  substitutes.^^  The  Act  of  February 
10th  added  five  regiments  of  rifles  enlisted  for  ^ve  years  or 
^'  during  the  war,''  and  the  Act  of  March  30th,  re-organized 
the  Army  ^^ —  all  of  these  measures  being  taken  too  late,  as 
usual,  for  the  men  secured  to  be  of  any  use  during  the  cam- 
paign.^^ 

^^  Although  the  paper  aggregate  reached  62,773,^^  an  increase 
of  more  than  5,000  over  the  previous  year,  despite  the  actual 

■  tripling  of  the  bounty,  the  strength  of  the  Army  in  September 
was  but  38,186  men.  In  December  the  grant  in  land,  due 
after  the  soldier's  discharge,  was  doubled,  making  it  320  acres; 
yet,  notwithstanding  this  encouragement,  the  Army  dwindled 

.  away  until  it  was  only  33,424  strong  in  Februar}^,  1815.  This 
falling  off  was  largely  due  to  desertion,  which,  as  was  the  case 
during  the  Revolution,  every  increase  of  the  bounty  seemed  to 
stimulate. 

**  The  figures  just  given  are  but  another  proof  that  voluntary 

ENLISTMENTS,  EVEN  WHEN  AIDED  BY  EXTRAVAGANT  BOUNTIES, 
CAN    NOT    BE    DEPENDED    UPON    IN    A    WAR    OF    ANY    DURATION. 

Forced  to  devise  various  schemes  for  raising  men,  the  Govern- 
ment, in  this  instance,  was  only  able  to  avoid  a  draft  by  the 
speedy  termination  .of  the  war."  ^^ 

Military  operations  on  the  Niagara  frontier. 

The  Regulars  at  Buffalo  spent  the  winter  and  spring  in 
drill  and  instruction,  the  effect  of  which  was  shortly  evi- 


The  War  of  1812  63 

1814] 

dent.  On  July  3rd  the  army  crossed  the  N'iagara,  captured 
Fort  Erie  that  same  day,  Avon  the  battle  of  Chippewa  on  the 
5th,^^  and  fought  a  drawn  battle  at  Lundy's  Lane  twenty 
days  later. ^^  General  Brown  then  fell  back  to  Fort  Erie, 
which  he  proceeded  to  strengthen  immediately,  and  on 
August  2nd  the  enemy  under  General  Drummond  appeared 
and  invested  the  place.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th 
he  endeavoured  to  carry  the  fort  by  storm  but  met  with  a 
bloody  repulse.  The  siege  w^as  continued,  how^ever,  until  a 
successful  sortie  was  made  and  the  fort  demolished  by  the 
Americans,  who  crossed  to  the  New  York  side  and  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  Buffalo.  ^^ 

Military  operations  on  the  northern  frontier. 

The  opening  invasion  of  Canada  in  1814  was  planned  to 
begin  from  the  northern  theatre,  and  on  March  30th  General 
Wilkinson,  notwithstanding  a  grandiloquent  exhortation  to 
his  troops  the  day  before,^^  permitted  his  force  of  nearly 
4,000  regulars  to  be  checked  at  La  Colle  Mill  ^^  by  180  men 
in  a  stone  building,  and  his  invasion  came  to  an  abrupt 
end.^^ 

Wilkinson  w^as  succeeded  by  General  Izard  but,  just  when 
the  Governor-General  of  Canada,  General  Sir  George  Pro- 
vost, w^as  preparing  to  advance  up  Lake  Champlain  wdth 
11,000  veterans,  mostly  from  Wellington's  Peninsular  army, 
he  w^as  ordered  to  march  to  Sackett's  Harbor  with  4,000 
troops,  thus  reducing  the  American  force  at  Plattsburg  to 
1,500  effectives  under  General  Macomb.^^  On  September 
11th  Prevost  began  his  attack,^^  but  the  total  destruction  of 
his  fleet  by  Commodore  Macdonough  that  day  sent  him 
packing  back  to  Canada  and  saved  the  American  land  forces 
from  annihilation.  ^^^  At  the  beginning  of  the  month  Ma- 
comb had  appealed  to  Governor  Chittenden  "  for  aid,  not  to 
invade  Canada,  but  defend  Vermont."  A  second  appeal 
met  with  equally  small  success,  his  answer  being  ''  that  he 
had  no  authority  to  order  the  militia  to  leave  the  state."  ^^^ 


64      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1814 

While  the  governor  skulked  in  his  house  at  Jericho,  many 
of  the  Vermont  militia,  hearing  the  cannonade  at  Platts- 
burg,  crossed  the  lake  without  orders,  joined  Macomb  in  the 
fight  and  were  rewarded  by  a  share  in  the  booty  captured 
during  the  British  retreat.^ ^^ 

The  capture  of  Washington. 

In  spite  of  the  presence  of  a  British  fleet  with  3,000 
troops  on  board  in  the  Chesapeake  for  nearly  a  year,  no  at- 
tention was  paid  by  President  Madison  and  his  cabinet  to 
the  danger  that  threatened  the  capital.  It  was  not  until 
July  first  that  any  steps  were  taken  for  defence.  A  succes- 
sion of  measures  followed,  ^^^  almost  childlike  in  their  feeble- 
ness and  all  looking  to  raw  troops,  but  on  August  20th  ap- 
proval was  given  to  a  call  of  the  militia  en  masse  made  by 
General  Winder.  On  the  following  day  the  troops  -^^^  were 
assembled  and  the  articles  of  war  read  to  them.  On  August 
22nd  this  so-called  army,  which  its  commander  described  as 
"  suddenly  assembled  without  organization,"  devoid  of  dis- 
cipline and  of  ofiicers  with  any  knowledge  of  service, -^^^  was 
reviewed  in  state  by  the  President  and  his  Cabinet.  Two 
days  later,  in  the  presence  of  the  same  high  officials,  it  w^as 
hopelessly  routed  at  Bladensburg,  Maryland,  by  less  than 
1,500  British, ^^^  the  militia  fleeing  ignominiously  and  so 
rapidly  that  the  American  loss  was  only  8  killed  and  ll 
wounded. -^^^  The  British  occupied  Washington  that  even- 
ing, burned  many  public  buildings,  decamped  next  day  and 
on  the  29th  were  safely  back  on  board  their  warships. -^^^ 
The  President  and  his  officials  fled  into  Maryland  and  Vir- 
ginia ;  the  Secretary  of  War,  General  John  Armstrong,  whose 
obstinacy  and  inefficiency  were  held  to  be  responsible  for  the 
disaster, ^^^  was  forced  to  take  refuge  in  Baltimore  where  he 
resigned  his  portfolio, -^-^^  and  chaos  reigned  generally.  The 
British  made  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack  on  Baltimore 
on  September  13th  and  14th  but  were  repulsed,^ ^^  and  in 
October  their  fleet  sailed  for  Jamaica.     The  new  Secretary 


The  War  of  1812  65 

1813] 

of  War,  James  Monroe,  proposed  to  raise  men  by  drafting,  a 
measure  which  would  have  been  inevitable  had  not  a  treaty  of 
peace  been  signed  at  Ghent  on  December  24th.^^^ 

Creek  War.^^^ 

Meanw^hile,  a  levy  of  three  months'  militia  had  been  or- 
dered by  the  governor  of  Tennessee,  thus  producing  2,500 
men.  General  Jackson  had  been  joined  by  the  39th  United 
States  Infantry  and  by  the  end  of  February  he  found  him- 
self at  the  head  of  nearly  5,000  assembled  at  Fort  Strother. 
Advancing  with  3,000  men,  he  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat 
upon  the  Indians  at  the  Horse  Shoe  Bend  of  the  Tallapoosa 
Hiver  on  March  27th,  thus  terminating  a  war  which  would 
have  been  ended  long  before  had  it  not  been  for  the  use  of 
raw  troops  enlisted  for  too  short  service. ^^* 

Troops  employed  in  181Jf. 

"  The  troops  called  out  in  this  fruitless  campaign  num- 
bered : 

Eegulars    38,186 

Militia     197,653 

"  Total     235,839  ^^ 

''  Of  the  militia  46A69  from  the  State  of  New  Yorh  were  em- 
ployed on  the  Canadian  frontier,  while  more  than  100,000  from 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  Virginia  tvere  called  out  to  repel 
the  incursions  of  the  3,500  British  along  the  shores  of  the 
Chesapeake. 

"  Notiuithstanding  these  enormous  drafts,  such  were  the  faults 
of  our  organization  and  recruitments,  that  the  utmost  strength 
we  could  put  forth  on  the  field  of  battle  ivas  represented  at  Lun- 
dy's  Lane  hy  less  than  3,000  men.  Nor  was  this  evidence  of 
national  iveakness  our  only  cause  of  reproach.  Boasting  at  the 
outset  of  the  contest  that  Canada  could  he  'captured  without 
soldiers,  that  a  few  volunteers  and  militia  could  do  the  business,' 
our  statesmen,  after  nearly  three  years  of  war,  had  the  humilia- 
tion of  seeing  their  plans  of  conquest  vanish  in  the  smoke  of  a 
burning   capital  f  '^^^ 

In  marked  contrast  to  the  continual  disasters  on  land  was 


66     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1814 

the  almost  unbroken  succession  of  splendid  victories  achieved 
at  sea/-^'^  thus  affording  abundant  proof  of  the  merit  of  the 
system  used  with  respect  to  the  ^avy  and  the  folly  of  the 
method  employed  for  our  land  forces.  Indeed  even  Jeffer- 
son who,  as  governor  of  Virginia  in  the  Revolution,  had  ut- 
terly failed  to  offer  the  slightest  opposition  to  the  capture 
and  burning  of  Richmond  by  Benedict  Arnold,^  ^^  and  who 
throughout  his  public  career  had  continually  advocated  de- 
pendence upon  a  citizen-soldiery/^^  became  so  disgusted  with 
the  inefficiency  of  the  militia  during  the  first  two  years  of  this 
war  that,  fourteen  months  before  the  climax  was  reached  in 
the  disgraceful  rout  at  Bladensburg,  he  wrote  to  James  Mon- 
roe that 

''It  proves  mo7'e  forcibly  the  necessity  of  ohiiging  every  citizen 
to  he  a  soldier.  This  was  the  case  with  the  Greeks  and  Romans, 
and  must  he  that  of  every  free  state.  Where  there  is  no  op- 
pression there  will  be  no  pauper  hirelings.     We  must  tkaii'^ 

AND  CLASSIFY  THE  WHOLE  OF  OUR  MALE  CITIZENS,  AND  MAKE 
MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  A  REGULAR  PART  OF  COLLEGIATE  EDUCA- 
TION.     We    can   NEVER  BE   SAFE   TILL   THIS   IS   DONE.''  ^^^ 

Drastic  as  was  the  measure  proposed,  his  assertion  was 
quite  in  harmony  with  a  similar  outburst  on  his  part  thirty- 
two  years  previously  when  he,  as  governor  of  Virginia, 
found  himself  at  his  wit's  end  owing  to  his  inability  to  pro- 
cure the  necessary  militia  to  check  the  British  inroads,  and 
so  harassed  by  their  refusal  to  respond  to  his  calls,  their  in- 
subordination, mutinies,  desertions  and  utter  worthless- 
ness,^^^  that  he  had  vented  his  spleen  in  a  letter  dated 
March  1,  1781,  to  Richard  Henry  Lee,  the  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Delegates,  in  which  he  said : 

"  Whether  it  he  practicable  to  raise  and  maintain  a  sufficient 
number  of  regulars  to  carry  on  the  war  is  a  question.  That  it 
would  be  burdensome  is  undoubted  yet  it  is  perhaps  as  certain 
that  no  possible  mode  of  carrying  it  on  can  be  so  expensive  to  the 
public,  so  distressing  and  disgusting  to  individuals  as  the 
militia.^'  ^^^ 


The  War  of  1812  67 

1814-1815] 

In  view  of  two  such  candid  statements,  both  made  under 
the  stress  of  war,  it  is  surprising  that  in  the  years  which  in- 
tervened he  should  have  advocated  such  dependence  as  he 
did  ^^^  upon  the  very  class  of  troops  that  he  condemned  so 
unreservedly. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1815 

The  military  operations  of  the  last  year  of  the  war  were 
short  and  decisive.  The  British  expedition  up  the  Chesa- 
peake, which  ended  in  the  destruction  of  Washington  and 
the  attack  on  Baltimore  in  1814,  was  originally  intended  as 
a  feint  to  draw  both  attention  and  the  American  forces  away 
from  Louisiana,  which  the  English  purposed  to  invade  pre- 
paratory to  taking  possession  of  the  valley  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. ^^^  Pursuant  to  this  plan,  a  force  of  7,000  troops  ^^^ 
—  which  had  assembled  at  Jamaica  in  November,  1814,  but 
whose  departure  ^^^  was  delayed  for  ten  days  until  the  arrival 
of  Commodore  Lloyd's  squadron  from  Fayal  ^^^ —  reached  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  on  December  9th,  and  disembarked 
at  Isle  des  Pois  below  New  Orleans  between  the  16th  and 
20th,  but  was  surprised  to  find  that  General  Jackson  had  al- 
ready begun  preparations  to  meet  them.^^^  Some  prelimi-. 
nary  engagements  and  two  spirited  attacks  ^^^  convinced 
General  Pakenham  ^^^  that  the  task  was  more  than  had  been 
bargained  for,  and  he  resolved,  now  that  additional  re-en- 
forcements had  reached  him,^^^  to  carry  the  American  en- 
trenchments on  both  sides  of  the  river  by  storm  on  January 
8th.  Meanwhile,  through  Jackson's  indomitable  energy  and 
perseverance,  the  lines  had  been  strengthened  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  be  extremely  formidable,^  ^^  and  by  the  morning  of 
the  battle  he  had  succeeded  in  collecting  a  force  of  5,698 
men,  only  a  small  fraction  being  regulars. ^^^  The  bulk  of 
his  army  was  stationed  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  in 
three  lines,  while  on  the  west  side  was  General  Morgan  '^  with 
only  eight  hundred  men,  all  militia,  and  indifferently 
armed."  ^^^ 


68      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1815 

At  dawn  on  January  8th,  General  Pakenham  with  8,000 
veteran  troops  —  the  flower  of  Wellington's  Peninsular  army 
—  advanced  to  the  attack,  his  columns  in  solid  formation  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  the  ground  was  almost  perfectly 
level  and  as  smooth  as  a  glacis.  Upon  their  reaching  a 
point  200  yards  from  the  first  line  of  entrenchments,  the 
American  fire  rang  out.  In  less  than  half  an  hour  the  battle 
was  over,  after  frightful  carnage  among  the  British  who  fled 
in  wildest  confusion. ^^^  On  the  west  bank,  however,  the 
scene  was  reversed.  The  troops  under  Colonel  Thornton,  ^^^ 
after  many  difficulties  and  being  retarded  by  the  strong  cur- 
rent, disembarked  with  half  of  their  original  forces  and  came 
into  action  against  Morgan's  militia.^ ^^  Just  when  the 
Americans  across  the  river  were  cheering  over  a  victory  still 
unexampled  in  our  history,  just  when  the  advance  of  a  skir- 
mish line  might  have  brought  about  the  capture  of  the  Brit- 
ish army,  Jackson  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the  Ken- 
tuckians  "  abandon  their  position  and  run  in  headlong  flight 
toward  the  city."  ^^^  Driving  the  Louisianians  out  of  their 
entrenchments  and  gaining  possession  of  Morgan's  line, 
Thornton  routed  Patterson's  battery,  but  the  debacle  of  the 
British  on  the  other  bank  and  orders  to  rejoin  the  main  army 
compelled  him  to  fall  back  and  to  re-embark  his  troops  at  the 
close  of  the  day.-^^^ 

On  the  19th  the  British  withdrew  from  the  Mississippi 
and  on  the  29th  returned  to  their  fleet,  but  it  was  not  until 
March  6th  that  news  was  received  of  the  treaty  which  had 
been  signed  at  Ghent  fifteen  days  before  the  battle  had  been 
fought.  1^^ 

"While  the  nation  had  reason  to  exult  over  so  signal  a  vic- 
tory, the  battle  in  no  sense  vindicated  a  dependence  on  raw 
troops.  It  only  proved,  as  at  Bunker  Hill,  that  with  trained 
officers  to  command  them,  with  an  effective  artillery  and  regular 
troops  to  support  and  encourage  them  —  above  all,  when  pro- 
tected by  works  so  formidable  that  nothing  but  a  regular  siege 
should  have  dislodged  them  —  advantages  of  position  may  com- 
pensate for  an  utter  lack  of  instruction  and  discipline. 


The  War  of  1812  69 

1815] 

"  Agreeable  as  it  might  be  to  give  the  entire  credit  of  this 
battle  to  raw  troops,  their  heroic  commander  knew  so  well  the 
uncertainty  of  their  conduct  in  the  open  field  that  he  was 
obliged  to  accept  the  advantages  of  a  mere  passive  defense."  ^*^ 

Troops  employed  during  the  War  of  1812. 

The  number  of  troops  under  arms  at  various  times  during 
this  war  was: 

Eegulars      (including     about     5,000     sailors     and 

marines)     56,032 

Volunteers     10,110 

Eangers 3,049 

Militia     458,463 

Total    527,654 '" 

Opposed  to  them  was  an  enemy's  force  which,  so  far  as  can 
be  estimated,  did  not  exceed  67,000  all  told,^^^  yet  that  war 
cost  the  United  States  $86,627,009,^^*  and  no  less  than 
$45,950,546  have  already  been  paid  in  pensions  on  its  ae- 
count.-^*^ 

The  Revolution  lasted  seven  years,  the  War  of  1812  two 
and  a  half.  In  the  former  more  than  four  times  as  many 
regulars,  but  only  about  one-third  as  many  militia,  were  em- 
ployed as  in  the  latter.  ^^^  In  the  Revolution,  aside  from 
such  victories  as  Trenton,  Princeton,  Monmouth,  Stony 
Point,  and  King's  Mountain,  Burgoyne's  force  of  5,763  was 
captured  in  1777,  and  four  years  later,  with  the  aid  of  the 
French,  Cornwallis  was  forced  to  capitulate  with  nearly 
8,000.^*^  Yet  few  of  us  realize  that  ^^  the  only  decisive  vic- 
tory of  the  War  of  1812  before  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  was  at  the  battle  of  the  Thames,  where  the  force  of 
British  regulars  dispersed  or  captured  ^"^^  numbered  but 
little  more  than  800/'  ^^^  The  results  speak  for  them- 
selves. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MILITARY  POLICY  FROM   THE   CLOSE   OE   THE 
WAR  OE  1812  TO  THE  BEGINNING 
OE  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

HOSTILITIES  were  no  sooner  over  than  the  policy  of 
retrenchment  was  again  resorted  to  and  the  peace 
establishment  was  fixed  at  10,000  men/  but  the  organization 
of  the  Army  was  still  defective.^  The  Act  of  April  24,  1816, 
imperfect  as  it  was  in  many  respects,^  created  the  first  per- 
manent peace  establishment  in  which  both  the  line  and  the 
staff  were  duly  represented.^  A  vigorous  protest  from 
General  Jackson  in  1817  put  an  end  to  the  issuance  of  orders 
from  the  War  Department  directly  to  officers  without  being 
transmitted  through  the  division  commanders.^ 

SEMINOLE  WAR 

In  1817  began  this  war  which  originated  in  a  massacre  of 
a  detachment  ^  on  the  Apalachicola  River,  Elorida,  on  No- 
vember 30th,  followed  a  fortnight  later  by  an  attack  by  the 
Indians  on  Fort  Scott,  Georgia.  In  March,  1818,  General 
Jackson  advanced  into  Elorida  with  1,800  men  and,  being 
joined  in  April  by  General  Mcintosh  with  1,500  Creeks,  de- 
stroyed the  Mikasuky  villages,  captured  the  Spanish  gar- 
rison at  St.  Marks,  burned  a  large  Indian  village,  invested 
the  Spanish  Fort  Barrancas,  bombarded  it  and  forced  it  to 
surrender  after  two  days,  on  May  27th. 

The  management  of  this  war  was  quite  in  keeping  with 
the  policy  followed  during  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of 
1812.  For  lack  of  sufficient  regulars.  Generals  Jackson  and 
Gaines,  in  defiance  of  statutory  law  and  orders,  undertook  to 
organize  volunteers  and  Indians  and  mustered  them  into  the 

70 


Close  of  the  War  of  1812  to  the  Mexican  War     71 

1817-1821] 

United  States'  service.  Although  Jackson  finished  in  three 
months  this  war  against  a  ''  miserable,  undisciplined  ban- 
ditti of  deluded  Indians  and  fugitive  slaves,  their  whole 
strength  when  combined  not  exceeding  1,000  men,''  '^  no  less 
a  force  than  6,911  had  to  be  called  into  service.^  As  Upton 
remarks :  ^ 

"  Needless  extravagance  is  not  the  valuable  lesson  to  be  drawn 
from  this  war.  It  lies  in  the  proof,  recorded  by  a  committee  of 
the  Senate,  that  the  greatest  dangers  to  which  our  liberties  have 
thus  far  been  exposed  have  occurred  in  time  of  war,  not  through 
the  presence,  but  for  the  want  of,  a  sufficient  disciplined  army.^^ 

KEOEGANIZATION  OF  1821 

Pursuant  to  a  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
on  May  11,  1820,  instructing  the  Secretary  of  War  to  bring 
forward  at  the  next  session 

'^  a  plan  for  the  reduction  of  the  Army  to  6,000  noncommissioned 
officers  and  privates,  and  preserving  such  parts  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  as,  in  his  opinion,  without  regard  to  that  number,  it 
may  be  for  the  public  interest  to  retain," 

Mr.  Calhoun  complied  with  a  project  worthy  of  the  most 
careful  study  even  at  the  present  time.  It  is  a  very  remark- 
able document,  insomuch  as  he  traced  the  general  scheme  for 
an  expansive  organization  such  as  almost  every  army  in  the 
world  has  now  found  it  necessary  to  adopt.  In  his  report  to 
Congress,  made  in  December,  1821,  Mr.  Calhoun  wrote: 

*'  If  our  liberty  should  ever  he  endangered  by  the  military 
power  gaining  the  ascendency,  it  will  he  from  the  necessity  of 
making  those  mighty  and  irregular  efforts  to  retrieve  our  af- 
fairs, after  a  series  of  disasters,  caused  hy  the  want  of  adequate 
military  knowledge,  just  as  in  our  physical  system  a  state  of  the 
most  dangerous  excitement  and  paroxysm  follows  that  of  the 
greatest  debility  and  prostration.  To  avoid  these  dangerous 
consequences,  and  to  prepare  the  country  to  meet  a  slate  of  war, 
particularly  at  its  commencement,  with  honor  and  safety,  much 
must  depend  on  the  organization  of  our  military  peace  establish- 
w,ent,  and  I  have  accordingly,  in  a  plan  about  to  be  proposed 


72     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1821-1829 

for  the  reduction  of  the  Army,  directed  my  attention  mainly  to 
that  point,  believing  it  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance. 

''  To  give  such  an  organization,  the  leading  principles  in  its 
formation  ought  to  he,  that  at  the  commencement  of  hos- 
tilities THERE  SHOULD  BE  NOTHING  EITHER  TO  NEW  MODEL  OR 

TO  CREATE.  The  ouhj  difference,  consequenihj,  between  the 
peace  and  war  formations  of  the  Army,  ought  to  he  in  the  in- 
creased magnitude  of  the  latter,  and  the  only  change  in  passing 
from  the  former  to  the  latter  should  consist  in  giving  to  it  the 
aug7nentation  which  will   then  he   necessary}^ 

"  It  is  thus,  and  thus  only,  the  dangerous  transition  from 
peace  to  war  may  he  made  without  confusion  or  disorder,  and 
the  weakness  and  danger  which  otherwise  would  he  inevitahle, 
he  avoided.  Two  consequences  result  from  this  principle: 
First,  the  organization  of  the  staff  in  a  peace  estahlishment  ought 
to  he  such  that  every  hranch  of  it  should  he  completely  formed, 
with  such  extension  as  the  numher  of  troops  and  posts  occupied 
may  render  necessary;  and,  secondly,  that  the  organization  of 
the  line  ought,  as  far  as  practicahle,  to  he  such  that  in  passing 
from  the  peace  to  the  war  formation,  the  force  may  he  sufficiently 
augmented  without  adding  new  regiments  or  hattalions,  thus 
raising  the  war,  on  the  hasis  of  the  peace  estahlishment,  instead 
of  creating  a  new  army  to  he  added  to  the  old,  as  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  late  war."  ^^ 

Irrespective  of  certain  defects,^ ^  Mr.  Calhoun's  plan  was 
fundamentally  sound  ^^  and  would  have  given  the  Army  all 
the  benefits  derived  from  the  most  modern  staff  organization ; 
but,  as  usual,  Congress  eliminated  the  most  important  fea- 
tures and  proceeded  by  the  Act  of  March  2,  1821,  to  reduce 
the  Army  from  12,664  officers  and  men  to  6,183,^*  made  the 
staff  efficient  to  the  detriment  of  the  line  and  prevented  the 
President  from  adding  an  enlisted  man,^^  although  it  per- 
mitted him  in » the  event  of  Indian  wars  to  authorize  gov- 
ernors and  generals  to  call  out  militia  in  unlimited  numbers. 
The  Ordnance  department  ^^  was  merged  into  the  artillery, 
but  this  arrangement  proved  so  unsatisfactory  that  eleven 
years  later  it  had  to  be  restored.-^ ''^ 

During  1828  and  1829  the  question  of  abolishing  the 
grade  of  Major  General  was  much  mooted,  and  out  of  it 


Close  of  the  War  of  1812  to  the  Mexican  War     73 

1829-1835] 

arose  a  prolonged  discussion  as  to  the  officer  upon  whom 
would  devolve  the  command  of  the  Army  in  that  case.  The 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives expressed  its  opinion  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  general- 
in-chief,  "  the  Army  would  virtually  be  commanded  by  the 
staff  officers  who  surround  the  Secretary  of  War,"  ^^  and 
subsequent  years  amply  proved  the  correctness  of  its  pre- 
diction.^^ 

BLACK  HAWK  WAR 

This  war,  begun  in  March,  1832,  was  marked  by  two  en- 
gagements only.  The  first,  fought  by  Illinois  volunteers, 
took  place  on  the  Wisconsin  River  on  July  21st;  ^^  the  sec- 
ond at  the  Bad  Ax  River  near  its  junction  with  the  Missis- 
sippi on  August  2nd,^^  when  the  Indians  under  Black  Hawk 
were  totally  defeated  and  dispersed.^^  The  Government 
acted  with  more  than  customary  despatch  in  this  instance,^^ 
but,  even  so,  nearly  6,000  troops  ^^  were  required  to  conquer 
a  force  of  Indians  estimated  to  be  between  800  and  1,000.^^ 

During  these  operations  the  defencelessness  of  the  fron- 
tiers caused  the  creation  of  a  battalion  of  600  mounted  rang- 
ers,^^  who  were  enlisted  for  one  year  only,  required  to 
arm  and  equip  themselves  and  to  furnish  their  own  horses,^  ^ 
and  nine  months  later  a  regiment  of  dragoons  was  added  to 
the  Army.  2^ 

FLORIDA  OR  SECOND  SEMINOLE  WAR 

This  struggle,  which  began  in  December,  1835,  and 
dragged  out  until  August,  1842,  found  the  Government  to- 
tally unprepared  to  meet  the  situation  ^^  in  spite  of  months 
of  warning.  ^^  The  Governor  of  Florida,  finding  himself 
forced  to  look  to  his  own  resources,  called  out  500  hasty 
levies,^^  his  action  being  the  signal  for  the  massacre  of  Major 
Dade  and  his  command  on  December  28th.^^  Three  days 
after^  General  Clinch  with  200  regulars  and  about  500  Florida 
militia  crossed  the  Withlacoochee  River,  was  attacked  by  the 


74     Military  JJnpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1835-1836 

Seminoles  but  repulsed  them  after  a  lively  fight.  The  war 
would  probably  have  ended  then  and  there  had  not  the  mili- 
tia mutinied  and  refused  to  take  part  in  the  action.^ ^  Dur- 
ing January,  1836,  the  Government  authorized  the  calling 
out  of  militia  from  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Alabama 
"  to  serve  for  at  least  three  months  after  arriving  at  the 
place  of  rendezvous,''  and  ordered  General  Scott  to  assume 
command  of  all  the  troops.  ^^  The  operations  began  in  Feb- 
ruary by  an  unauthorized  advance  of  a  mixed  force  under 
General  Gaines  which  was  besieged  by  the  Indians,^  ^  but  it 
was  not  until  March  22nd  that  General  Scott,  after  many 
delays  in  equipping  and  supplying  his  militia,  took  the 
field. ^^  The  Indians,  who  did  not  number  2,000,^^  avoided 
being  drawn  into  a  decisive  engagement,  took  refuge  in  the 
Everglades  and  other  impenetrable  swamps,  and  continued  to 
harass  the  country  until  the  following  March.  The  mention 
in  General  Scott's  report  of  "  3,000  good  troops  (not  volun- 
teers) "  ^^  evoked  such  a  storm  of  indignation  from  the 
State  levies  that  he  was  superseded  by  General  Clinch  and 
sent  to  Georgia  to  take  command  against  the  Creek  Indians 
who  had  risen  in  open  warfare. 

In  place  of  expanding  the  Regular  Army  as  suggested  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,^^  Congress  on  May  23rd  authorized  the 
President  to  accept  the  services  of  10,000  volunteers  for  six 
or  twelve  months,*^  requiring  them  to  furnish  their  own 
clothes  and  horses  —  just  as  was  done  under  the  mischievous 
Act  of  1792  *^ —  and,  although  these  troops  were  to  consti- 
tute a  national  force,  their  organization  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  officers  were  vested  in  the  governors.  ^^ 

In  Georgia  General  Scott  was  confronted  with  conditions 
similar  to  those  in  Florida,  the  militia  of  Alabama  and 
Georgia  being  without  adequate  arms  or  supplies,  and  it  was 
not  until  June  21st  that  he  was  ready  to  move.^^  Nine  days 
earlier  General  Jesup  with  a  force  of  2,300  had  advanced 
against  the  Creeks  ^*  in  Alabama,  who  promptly  rendered 
their  submission  without  fighting.     Jesup' s  movement  being 


Close  of  the  War  of  1812  to  the  Mexican  War     75 

1836-1838] 

contrary  to  Scott's  instructions,  a  quarrel  arose,  which  re- 
sulted early  in  June  in  orders  to  General  Scott  to  proceed  to 
Washington  to  answer  before  a  Court  of  Inquiry  for  "  the 
unaccountable  delay  in  prosecuting  the  Creek  war  and  the 
failure  of  the  campaign  in  Florida."  ^^ 

Such  was  the  fiasco  entailed  by  the  Government's  policy, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  no  less  than  27,842  troops  were 
put  into  the  field  during  the  year.^^ 

During  the  winter  of  1836-1837  the  military  operations 
in  Florida  achieved  nothing  except  to  keep  the  Seminoles  on 
the  move,  but  on  March  6th  their  chiefs  agreed  to  capitulate 
and  to  transfer  the  entire  tribe  west  of  the  Mississippi.  This 
proved  nothing  short  of  a  ruse  to  gain  time,  and  on  June  2nd 
Micanopy  and  some  other  chiefs  were  spirited  away  from 
Tampa  where  they  were  to  embark.  The  Indians  rose  again 
and  resorted  to  the  same  tactics  as  in  the  previous  year,  with 
the  result  that  up  to  October  21st  only  30  had  been  killed 
and  500  captured.  On  Christmas  day  General  Zachary  Tay- 
lor was  successful  in  forcing  them  into  an  engagement  at 
Lake  Okeechobee  and  in  inflicting  a  severe  defeat  upon 
them,^"^  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Missouri  volunteers  and 
spies  bolted  to  a  nearby  sw^amp  and  could  not  be  induced  to 
return  to  the  fight.  ^^ 

Before  the  year  was  out  public  opinion  was  aroused  by  the 
extravagance  of  the  war  in  men  and  money  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  felt  called  upon  to  make  explana- 
tions and  to  urge  an  increase  in  the  regular  establishment,  as 
well  as  in  the  staff  corps, ^^  but  it  was  not  until  July  5,  1838, 
that  his  recommendations  were  heeded.  By  the  act  of  that 
date  the  army  was  considerably  increased, ^^  the  departments 
of  the  Adjutant,  Quartermaster  and  Commissary-Generals, 
and  Ordnance  being  augmented,  the  principle  of  expansion 
recognized  in  respect  to  the  pay  corps  —  cadets  required  upon 
entrance  to  bind  themselves  to  eight  years'  service,  three 
months'  extra  pay  given  to  each  soldier  re-enlisting  and  a 
bounty  of  160  acres  of  land  for  ten  years'  faithful  service. 


76     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1838-1839 

Two  days  later  it  was  found  necessary  to  make  certain  modi- 
fications and  to  repeal  the  land  bounty,^^  but  these  two  laws 
gave  the  Army  an  authorized  strength  of  12,539  officers  and 
men.^^ 

"  The  ills  springing  from  detached  service  were  but  partly 
cured.  In  failing  to  provide  supernumeraries  in  the  Quarter- 
master's and  Commissary's  Departments,  two  of  the  most 
important  branches  of  the  staff,  as  in  the  past,  could  only  be 
made  efficient  at  the  expense  of  the  line. 

''  To  the  prejudice  of  true  economy,  the  other  great  defect 
of  the  law  of  1821,  the  nonexpansion  of  the  rank  and  ffie,  was 
also  only  remedied  in  part.  Instead  of  authorizing  the  President 
to  expand  the  Army  to  a  given  limit,  with  like  power  to  reduce 
it  by  mere  Executive  order,  the  moment  the  public  interest  would 
permit.  Congress  prescribed  a  war  maximum  which  might  con- 
tinue months  after  the  emergency  had  ceased  and  could  only  be 
lessened  by  the  slow  and  uncertain  process  of  legislation." 


53 


During  1838  and  1839  serious  complications  occurred  on 
the  Northern  frontier,  which  threatened  to  bring  about  a 
third  war  with  England.  As  the  bulk  of  the  Eegular  Army 
was  occupied  in  Florida  and  the  Southwest,^^  the  President 
was  authorized 

"  to  resist  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  enforce, 
by  arms,  her  claim  to  jurisdiction  over  that  part  of  the  State  of 
Maine  which  is  in  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain." 

Aside  from  the  employment  of  the  Regular  military  and 
naval  forces  and  of  such  militia  as  he  deemed  advisable  to 
call  into  service,  the  President  was  empowered  to  accept  vol- 
unteers up  to  the  number  of  50,000  —  who  were  required  to 
supply  their  own  clothing  and  horses,  and  to  serv^e  for  a 
period  of  six  to  twelve  months  after  reaching  the  rendezvous 
—  and  $10,000,000  were  placed  at  his  disposal.^^ 

"  A  glance  at  this  law,  for  the  passage  of  which  General  Scott 
claimed  special  credit,^®  shows  that  on  its  face  there  was  no  in- 
dication that  Congress  had  either  appreciated  or  been  able  to 
profit  by  the  losses  of  the  Revolution,  the  "War  of  1812,  or  even 


Close  of  the  War  of  1812  to  the  Mexican  War     77 

1838-1842] 

by  its  own  two  years'  experience  with  the  Florida  AYar.  For- 
tunately for  the  country,  a  repetition  of  the  disasters  which 
marked  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  1812  was  averted  by  a  peace- 
ful settlement."  ^^ 

From  1838  to  1842  the  operations  in  the  Florida  war  were 
conducted  bj  the  successive  commanders  with  small  detach- 
ments rarely  exceeding  100  men.  In  May,  1839,  General 
Macomb  made  a  treaty  with  the  leading  chief  of  the  Semi- 
noles,  whereby  hostilities  were  to  cease, ^^  but  after  a  lapse  of 
two  months  another  massacre  ^^  lighted  the  conflagration  for 
the  third  time.  The  Indians  took  to  their  fastnesses  in  in- 
accessible swamps,^^  and  it  was  only  the  system  of  summer 
campaigns  instituted  by  Colonel  Worth,  which  destroyed  the 
crops  and  other  subsistence,  that  eventually  compelled  them 
to  sue  for  peace.  On  August  14,  1842,  official  announce- 
ment was  made  that  "  hostilities  with  the  Indians  in  Florida 
have  ceased.'' 

During  this  war  the  efforts  of  the  Government  to  econo- 
mise were  defeated  by  the  persistency  with  which  State  militia 
was  forced  upon  it,  sometimes  without  authority  of  law.^^ 
Suffice  to  say  that  from  1835  to  1842  no  less  than  48,152 
volunteers  and  militia  were  in  service,^^  apart  from  12,539 
regulars,^^  thus  making  a  total  of  60,091,  and  the  war  ex- 
penditures during  those  seven  years  for  the  land  forces 
amounted  to  no  less  than  $69,751,611.50.^* 

To  appreciate  properly  the  excessive  cost  of  short-sighted 
military  legislation,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  war 
teaches  some  valuable  lessons,  viz. :  — 

"  First.  That  its  expense  was  tripled,  if  not  quadrupled,  by 
that  feature  of  the  law  of  1821  which  gave  the  President,  in 
times  of  emergency,  no  discretion  to  increase  the  enlisted  men  of 
the  Army. 

"  Second.  That,  as  in  every  previous  war,  after  successfully 
employing  for  short  periods  of  service  militia  and  volunteers, 
and  exhausting  their  enthusiasm,  Congress  found  it  more  hu- 
mane and  economical  to  continue  hostilities  with  regular  troops, 
enlisted  for  the  period  of  five  years. 


78     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1842 

"  Third.  That  for  want  of  a  well-defined  peace  organization, 
a  nation  of  17,000,000  of  people  contended  for  seven  years  with 
1,200  warriors  and  finally  closed  the  struggle  without  accom- 
plishing the  forcible  emigration  of  the  Indians,  which  was  the 
original  and  sole  cause  of  the  war."  ®^ 

'Nine  days  after  the  termination  of  hostilities  the  Army 
was  forthwith  reduced  from  12,539  officers  and  men  to 
8,613  ^^  without  disbanding  any  of  the  regiments.^'^  Had 
Congress  applied  the  same  wise  method  to  the  expansion  of 
the  Army  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  which  it  did  to  its  re- 
duction at  the  end,  the  struggle  would  never  have  been  pro- 
tracted for  seven  years  and  the  loss  in  lives  and  money  would 
have  been  many  times  less. 


CHAPTEE  VII 

MILITAEY  POLICY  DURING  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

A  SERIES  of  continuous  victories  such  as  preceded  the 
entry  of  the  American  forces  into  the  City  of  Mexico 
would  ordinarily  be  indicative  of  a  faultless  military  policy. 
In  this  instance,  however, 

"  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  official  documents  establish  the 
fact  that  they  were  achieved  under  the  very  same  system  of  laws 
and  executive  orders  which  in  the  preceding  foreign  war  had 
led  to  a  series  of  disasters  culminating  in  the  capture  and  de- 
struction of  our  capital. 

"  The  explanation  of  this  paradox  is  to  be  found  partly  in  the 
difference  of  character  of  our  adversaries,  but  more  especially  in 
the  quality  of  the  Regular  Army  with  which  we  began  the  two 
wars.  For  the  Mexican  War,  as  for  the  War  of  1812,  the  Gov- 
ernment had  ample  time  to  prepare."  ^ 

The  secession  of  Texas  from  the  Mexican  federation,^  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  republic,^  and  its  overtures 
for  admittance  to  the  American  Union  ended  in  President 
Tyler's  submitting  a  treaty  of  annexation  to  the  Senate  in 
April,  1844.  It  was  decisively  rejected  on  the  ground  that 
public  opinion  did  not  relish  such  clandestine  negotiations, 
but  the  matter  became  a  leading  political  issue  and,  on  March 
3,  1845,  Texas  was  definitely  annexed  to  the  United  States, 
ratification  ^  following  on  July  4th.  ^  The  question  of 
boundary  and  extent  of  territory  being  in  dispute,  this  Gov- 
ernment undertook  to  ^x  upon  the  Rio  Grande  as  the  legiti- 
mate frontier  ^  and  during  August  orders  were  sent,  by  direc- 
tion of  President  Polk,  to  General  Taylor  ^  to  "  defend  Texas 
from  invasion  "  which,  if  it  occurred,  was  to  be  considered 
*^  as  an  invasion  of  the  United  States  and  the  commencement 
of  hostilities.''     In  the  event  of  the  latter  he  was  empowered 

79 


80      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1845-1846 

to  muster  into  the  United  States  service  such  Texan  vohm- 
teers  as  were  required,  and  to  "  cross  the  Rio  Grande,  dis- 
perse or  capture  the  forces  assembling  to  invade  Texas."  ^ 
Instructions  were  likewise  sent  to  the  governors  of  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,^  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  ^^  to  fur- 
nish such  militia  for  the  ''  army  of  occupation  "  as  General 
Taylor  might  specify. 

These  orders  were  extremely  significant  in  that  they  con- 
templated, not  only  an  invasion  of  Mexico,  but  an  aggressive 
war  to  be  waged  by  the  same  sort  of  troops  as  were  used  at 
the  commencement  of  the  War  of  1812.  Furthermore,  de- 
spite the  Constitutional  limitation  as  to  the  use  of  the  mi- 
litia,-^^  General  Taylor's  instructions  sanctioned  his  entry  into 
foreign  territory  with  such  State  troops  as  had  responded  to 
his  call.  The  Government  officials  were  apparently  oblivious 
to  the  conduct  of  the  Vermont  militia  in  1813  and  1814  ^^  and 
the  possibility  of  such  a  recurrence. 

On  October  4th,  Taylor  suggested  that  the  vexing  question 
as  to  the  boundary  would  be  brought  nearer  a  solution  by 
taking  possession  of  some  point  on  or  near  the  Rio  Grande  ^^ 
and,  the  Administration  having  concurred,  orders  Avere  given 
him  accordingly  on  January  13,  1846.  On  March  8th  he 
left  Corpus  Christi,  reaching  the  river  at  a  point  opposite 
Matamoras  twenty  days  later,  where  he  found  the  Mexicans 
"  decidedly  hostile."  His  own  regulars  numbered  at  most 
3,554^^  and,  finding  himself  none  too  strong  and  very  much 
isolated,  he  promptly  wrote  ^^  to  the  Adjutant-General: 

'^  Under  this  state  of  things  I  must  again  and  urgently  call 
your  attention  to  the  necessity  of  speedily  sending  recimits  to 
this  army.  The  militia  of  Texas  are  so  remote  from  the  border 
.  .  .  that  we  can  not  depend  upon  their  aid.  The  strength 
gained  by  filling  up  the  regiments  here,  even  to  the  present 
feeble  establishment,  would  be  of  very  great  importance/'  ^^ 

Taylor's  suggestions  were  in  harmony  with  those  contained 
in  the  reports  of  General  Scott  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
nearly  four  months  previously.  ^^     These  reports  were  trans- 


Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       81 

1846] 

mitted  to  Congress  by  the  President  when  he  sent  his  annual 
message  on  December  2,  1845,  but,  as  usual,  that  body  saw 
fit  to  disregard  their  wise  recommendations,  and  in  the  four 
and  a  half  months  which  elapsed  between  its  convening  and 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  it  took  no  action  whatsoever. 

On  April  25th  occurred  the  first  encounter,  in  which  Thorn- 
ton's dragoons  were  worsted,  l^ext  day  General  Taylor 
called  upon  the  governors  of  Texas  and  Louisiana  for  5,000 
volunteers,  ^^  but  obviously  it  was  too  late.  The  Mexicans  in 
large  force  threatened  his  line  of  communications,  forcing  him 
to  fall  back  to  Point  Isabel,^  ^  but  on  May  7th  he  resumed  his 
advance,  encountered  the  enemy  ^^  at  Palo  Alto,  defeated  him 
and  repeated  his  success  next  day  at  Eesaca  de  la  Palma.^^ 
As  Upton  remarks :  ^^ 

"  The  effect  of  this  brilliant  initiative  was  felt  to  the  end  of 
the  war.  It  gave  our  troops  courage  to  fight  against  overwhelm- 
ing numbers,  demoralized  the  enem}',  and  afforded  a  striking 
proof  of  the  truth  of  the  maxim,  ^  That  in  war,  moral  force  is 
to  physical  as  three  is  to  one.'  ^^  In  all  of  the  subsequent  battles 
our  troops  were  outnumbered  two  or  three  to  one,  yet  they 
marched  steadily  forward  to  victory,  and  for  the  first  time  in 
our  history  temporarily  convinced  our  statesmen,  if  not  the  peo- 
ple, of  the  value  of  professional  education  and  military  disci- 
pline." 

The  news  of  these  two  engagements  spread  rapidly  and 
created  such  alarm  lest  Taylor's  small  force  should  be  over- 
whelmed that  volunteers  presented  themselves  far  in  excess 
of  the  numbers  for  which  he  had  called.  General  Gaines, 
who  in  almost  every  disturbance  since  1815  had  called  out 
troops  without  sanction  of  the  Government,  proceeded  on  his 
own  initiative  to  organize  and  equip  an  army  enlisted  for  six 
months,  and  so  energetic  was  he  that  more  than  8,000  men 
were  sent  to  Taylor  before  the  Government  put  a  quietus  on 
Gaines  by  relieving  him  from  his  command. ^^  Two  days 
after  the  news  reached  Washington,  President  Polk  sent  a 
message  to  Congress,  ^^  in  w^hich  he  said : 


82     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1846 

"  I  invoke  the  prompt  action  of  Congress  to  recognize  the  ex- 
istence of  the  war,  and  to  place  at  the  disposition  of  the  Execu- 
tive the  means  of  prosecuting  the  war  with  vigor,  and  thus  has- 
tening the  restoration  of  peace.  To  this  end  I  recommend  that 
authority  should  be  given  to  call  into  the  public  service  a  large 
body  of  volunteers,  to  serve  for  not  less  than  six  or  twelve  months, 
unless  sooner  discharged.  ^^  A  volunteer  force  is  beyond  ques- 
tion more  efficient  than  any  other  description  of  citizen  soldiers; 
and  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  a  number  far  beyond  that  re- 
quired would  readily  rush  to  the  field  upon  the  call  of  their 
country.  I  further  recommend  that  a  liberal  provision  be  made 
for  sustaining  our  entire  military  force  and  furnishing  it  with 
supplies  and  munitions  of  war."  ^^ 

In  this  message  are  to  be  found  the  germs  to  which  the 
subsequent  delays  and  extravagance  characteristic  of  this  war 
are  directly  traceable.  Oblivious  to  the  experience  of  three 
wars  and  without  taking  into  account  the  length  of  time  re- 
quired to  convey  troops  to  the  distant  Rio  Grande  without 
railways,  the  President  expressed  his  conviction  that  raw 
troops  could  successfully  terminate  a  foreign  war  in  a  year  — 
a  thing  that  never  has  happened  and  in  all  likelihood  never 
will  happen  under  our  present  system.  But  Congress  fell  in 
with  his  suggestions  with  extraordinary  promptness,  author- 
ized a  call  for  50,000  volunteers  and  voted  $10,000,000,2^ 
but  it  manifested  a  better  grasp  of  the  situation  than  did 
the  Executive  by  requiring  the  volunteers  "  to  serve  the  twelve 
months  after  they  shall  have  arrived  at  the  place  of  ren- 
dezvous, or  to  the  end  of  the  war."  ^^  The  sequel  demon- 
strated once  again  the  necessity  for  wise  and  comprehensive 
legislation,  for  the  President,  instead  of  exercising  his  pre- 
rogative, issued  his  call  ^^  in  the  exact  letter  of  the  law  and 
thus  left  it  to  the  discretion  of  each  volunteer  to  decide  at 
the  expiration  of  a  year  whether  he  should  demand  his  dis- 
charge or  continue  in  service  "  to  the  end  of  the  war.''  ^^ 

On  that  same  day  Congress  empowered  the  President  to 
increase  the  number  of  privates  in  the  companies  of  dragoons, 
artillery  and  infantry  of  the  Regular  Army  to  not  exceed  100, 


Military/  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       83 

1846] 

with  the  proviso  that  it  should  be  reduced  to  64  when  the 
emergency  had  passed.  ^^ 

"  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  while  during  peace  all  discretion 
to  increase  the  Army  wus  withheld  from  the  President  through 
motives  of  economy,  or  of  jealousy  of  the  Army,  the  moment 
war  was  declared  the  power  of  expanding  it  ivas  freely  committed 
to  his  trust,  a  power  that  enabled  him,  without  adding  an  officer 
to  the  line,  to  raise  the  enlisted  strength  from  7,580  to  15,540. 

''  Had  this  discretion  been  granted  to  the  President  by  the  law 
of  18J^2,^^  the  army  of  occupation  need  not  have  been  exposed  to 
an  attach  by  an  army  three  times  its  numbers;  neither  would 
there  have  been  any  occasion  to  expose  to  the  ravages  of  disease 
the  thousands  of  three  months'  men  ^^  who  rushed  to  its  res- 
cue/' ^^ 

The  remaining  military  legislation  during  the  year  ^^  was 
devoted  to  the  increase  of  the  staff  departments  during  the 
war,  the  exception  being  the  Act  of  May  19th  which  added  a 
regiment  of  riflemen  destined  for  service  in  Oregon.  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  so  prompt  had  been  the  response  to  the  Presi- 
dent's call  that  General  Taylor,  who  had  occupied  Matamoras, 
had  been  joined  by  so  many  volunteers  ^^  as  to  be  at  his  wit's 
end  how  to  supply  them,  but  he  put  them  through  such  a 
course  of  drill  and  instruction  that  he  succeeded  in  developing 
a  good  second  line  army  out  of  them.^^  As  not  a  wagon  had 
reached  him,^^  he  was  compelled  to  leave  6,000  volunteers  be- 
hind when  he  began  his  advance  from  Camargo  ^^  to  Monterey 
at  the  end  of  August. "^^  A  march  of  180  miles  through  a 
dreary  desert  and  under  a  tropical  sun  brought  the  army  to 
the  outskirts  of  Monterey  on  September  19th.  The  following 
day  was  spent  in  dispositions  for  the  attack,  and  on  the  21st 
began  the  battle  of  Monterey  which  raged  for  three  days.  A 
brilliant  assault  upon  Fort  Independence  by  General  Worth  *^ 
placed  the  Americans  in  possession  of  the  dominating  heights 
and  the  city,  with  the  exception  of  the  citadel,  and  forced 
General  Ampudia  to  propose  a  capitulation  on  the  24th.** 
By  virtue  of  the  terms  granted,  the  place  was  to  be  evacuated 
within  seven  days  and  a  cessation  of  hostilities  to  continue 


84     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1846-1847 

for  six  weeks. ^^  The  Mexicans  withdrew  through  Saltillo 
to  San  Luis  Potosi,  300  miles  from  Monterey,  but  it  was  not 
until  December  that  Taylor  pushed  forward  to  the  former 
and,  re-enforced  by  General  Wool's  conamand,^^*  inaugurated 
the  operations  which  put  him  in  possession  of  the  provinces 
of  Coahuila,  E'uevo  Leon  and  Tamaulipas  w^ithin  a  few  weeks. 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1847 

On  January  12th  Congress,  acting  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  passed  a  measure  permitting  recruits 
to  join  the  Regular  Army  for  ^'  five  years  "  or  '^  during  the 
war,"  and  granted  a  bounty  of  $12.^^  Had  this  been  done 
nine  months  earlier  the  existing  difficulty  in  securing  re- 
cruits ^^  would  have  been  largely  obviated.  On  February 
11th,  the  Army  was  increased  by  ten  regiments,^^  to  be  en- 
listed "  for  the  war,"  a  major  added  to  each  regiment,^^ 
a  bounty  given  to  all  soldiers,  regular  or  volunteer,  upon 
honourable  discharge  at  the  expiration  of  one  year's  service, ^^ 
and  the  Quartermaster  and  Pay  corps  augmented. ^^  Like  its 
predecessor,  this  act  was  passed  too  late  to  secure  the  results 
desired,  and  the  new  regiments  were  consequently  unable  to 
reach  the  front  until  the  summer  was  nearly  over.  The 
dearth  of  officers  caused  an  increase  to  be  made  ^^  to  corre- 
spond with  the  number  of  new  regiments,  as  well  as  adding 
some  artillery  companies.^*  The  endeavour  was  likewise 
made  to  rectify  the  mistake  of  short  enlistments,^^  and  Con- 
gress wisely  reverted  to  the  correct  principle  of  having  the 
President  commission  all  volunteer  officers.  ^'^  These  three 
measures  completed  the  military  legislation  for  the  year. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1847 

Meanwhile  General  Taylor  ^^  had  reached  Victoria  where, 
much  to  his  astonishment,  he  received  a  despatch  on  January 
14th  notifying  him  that  he  was  to  be  stripped  of  nearly  all 
his  regulars  and  the  best  of  his  volunteers,  who  were  to  be 
sent  to  Brazos  San  lago  to  participate  in  the  expedition  which 


Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       85 

1847] 

General  Scott  was  about  to  undertake  against  the  City  of 
Mexico.  ^^  These  troops  ^^  were  forthwith  set  en  route  for 
Tampico,  but  with  much  reluctance  on  the  part  of  Taylor,  who 
very  rightly  complained  that  he  was  left  '^  with  less  than  a 
thousand  regulars  and  a  volunteer  force,  partly  new  levies, 
to  hold  a  defensive  line  "  in  the  face  of  20,000  Mexicans.^^ 
^Nevertheless  he  advanced  on  February  5th  to  Agua  Nueva,^^ 
where  he  effected  his  junction  with  General  Wool  and  secured 
possession  of  the  important  passes  and  the  road  to  San  Luis 
Potosi.  Sixteen  days  later,  realizing  that  he  was  on  the 
verge  of  being  attacked  by  the  entire  Mexican  army  under 
General  Santa  Anna,^^  he  fell  back  12  miles  to  Buena  Vista, 
a  position  of  great  defensive  strength.^ ^  On  February  22nd 
was  fought  the  celebrated  battle,"^  the  most  desperate  of  the 
war,  in  which  Taylor's  troops,^ ^ —  regulars  and  volunteers 
alike,^^ —  covered  themselves  with  glory.  Santa  Anna  was 
compelled  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat,  his  command  so  thoroughly 
demoralised  by  its  defeat  and  losses  ^^  that  he  was  obliged  to 
raise  a  new  force,  and  the  time  thus  gained  proved  invaluable 
to  the  other  American  army,  which  was  additionally  freed  of 
all  danger  from  the  north  by  General  Taylor's  complete  con- 
quest of  those  provinces. 

During  the  month  of  February  transports  had  arrived  at 
Brazos  San  lago,  and  by  the  27th  the  last  of  General  Scott's 
troops  had  been  embarked  and  had  sailed  for  Lobos,  an  island 
60  miles  south  of  Tampico,  which  had  been  indicated  as  the 
rendezvous.  On  March  2nd  the  fleet  and  its  convoys  started 
for  Anton  Lizardo  and,  after  a  reconnaissance  of  Vera  Cruz 
made  by  Scott  and  Commodore  Conner  on  the  7th,  the  troops 
landed  on  the  9th  and  in  three  days  had  completed  the  in- 


*  At  11  A.  M.  General  Santa  Anna  sent  a  flag  of  truce  with  a  demand 
for  surrender  by  the  Americans.  When  the  interpreter  had  finished 
reading  it  to  General  Taylor,  "  the  old  man  with  his  characteristic  readi- 
ness and  brusqueness,  said :  *  Tell  him  to  go  to  hell.'  "  The  formal 
reply  in  writing  was  of  course  couched  in  perfectly  proper  language. — 
The  Centennial  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  I,  pp.  66-67;  Senate 
Executive  Document,  No.  1,  Twenty-ninth  Congress,  First  Session,  p.  98. 


86     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1847 

vestment  of  the  city.  Oli  the  10th  began  the  bombardment, 
which  continued  until  the  26th  when  General  Landero  ^^  made 
overtures  for  a  capitulation,^^  and  three  days  later  the  garri- 
son marched  out  with  the  honours  of  war  and  surrendered 
their  arms,  colours  and  equipments.^ ^ 

The  fall  of  Vera  Cruz  spread  consternation  throughout 
Mexico,  but  Santa  Anna,  having  gathered  a  new  army,"^^ 
sought  to  check  the  advance  of  the  invaders  '^^  who  had  begun 
their  march  toward  the  capital  on  April  8th.  Ten  days  later 
the  opposing  forces  met  at  Cerro  Gordo/^  where  Scott  gained 
such  a  decisive  victory  '^^  that,  as  he  expressed  it,  "  Mexico 
has  no  longer  an  army."  ^^  On  the  19th  Jalapa  was  cap- 
tured, and  three  days  after  the  town  and  castle  of  Perote  on 
the  summit  of  the  eastern  Cordilleras,  reputed  the  strongest 
fortress  in  Mexico  except  Vera  Cruz,  capitulated  without 
resistance  and  put  the  Americans  in  possession  of  a  large 
amount  of  war  materieU^  The  road  to  the  capital  lay  open 
and  its  occupation  was  synonymous  with  the  collapse  of  re- 
sistance on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  With  the  goal  in  sight, 
Scott's  progress  came  to  a  sudden  halt  at  Puebla  on  May  15th, 
through  no  fault  of  his  own ;  and  once  again  was  demonstrated 
one  of  the  fundamental  defects  in  our  military  policy,  at  a 
time  and  in  a  manner  which  might  readily  have  proved  dis- 
astrous to  American  arms. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  blunder  of  Congress 
in  failing  to  specify  absolutely  the  length  of  enlistment  for 
the  50,000  volunteers  authorized  on  May  15,  1846,  and  the 
neglect  of  the  President  to  fix  the  term  "  to  the  end  of  the 
war,"  as  he  was  given  latitude  to  do.*^^  The  result  of  these 
mistakes  now  became  apparent.  Months  of  training  had  con- 
sumed most  of  the  year  for  which  the  majority  of  the  volun- 
teers had  bound  themselves,  and  General  Scott  found  himself 
in  the  unenviable  predicament  of  discovering  that  nearly 
every  man  intended  to  exercise  the  alternative  offered  him 
upon  enlistment  and  to  terminate  his  service  at  the  end  of 
twelve  months. ^^     As  many  of  the  enlistments  were  on  the 


Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       87 

1847] 

eve  of  expiration,  General  Scott  did  not  wish  to  expose  these 
men  needlessly  to  the  deadly  climate,  and  on  May  4th  he 
was  forced  to  part  with  seven  out  of  his  eleven  volunteer  regi- 
ments, amounting  to  4,000  men,  who  were  despatched  to  Vera 
Cruz,  whence  they  were  to  be  conveyed  to  Xew  Orleans  and 
discharged.  As  a  result  of  this  loss,  coupled  with  the  detach- 
ments necessary  to  guard  the  line  of  communications  and  a 
large  number  of  sick,  his  army  was  reduced  to  5,820  effective 
troops. "^^  In  the  midst  of  a  hostile  country  and  only  three 
days'  march  from  the  capital,  with  virtually  no  enemy  to 
oppose  him,  Scott  found  himself  unable  to  budge  for  more 
than  three  months.  Had  Santa  Anna  at  that  juncture  pos- 
sessed any  army  worthy  of  the  name  and  had  he  fallen  in 
force  either  upon  Scott  or  Taylor,  the  American  Government 
would  have  had  abundant  cause  to  regret  both  its  defective 
legislation  and  a  most  faulty  plan  of  campaign  '^^ —  blunders 
which  could  not  have  been  retrieved  by  many  thousand  new 
but  raw  troops.  It  was  only  incredible  good  fortune  which 
averted  a  calamity  and  spared  the  American  people  the  mor- 
tification of  seeing  their  formidable  preparations  collapse  like 
a  house  of  cards  —  all  because  Congress  and  the  President 
had  been  oblivious  to  the  lessons  of  past  wars  and  had  been. 
too  shortsighted  to  take  advantage  of  the  enthusiasm  which 
invariably  marks  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  under  its 
stimulus  to  obtain  enlistments  "  for  the  war."  ^^ 

Although  Santa  Anna  was  precluded  by  circumstances  be- 
yond his  control  from  crushing  Scott's  slender  force  out  of 
existence,  the  Mexican  guerillas  harassed  the  Americans  un- 
ceasingly, and  prevented  detachments  from  Vera  Cruz  from 
joining  the  army  in  considerable  strength.  It  was  not  until 
July  8th  that  the  first  re-enforcement  was  received  in  the 
shape  of  4,500  men,^^  followed  nearly  a  month  later  by 
2,249,^^  which  brought  the  total  of  Scott's  command  up  to 
about  13,500  troops,  of  whom  3,000  were  on  the  sick  list.^^ 
On  August  7th  —  after  three  months  of  enforced  inactivity  — 
the  American  commander  was  at  last  able  to  resume  his  ad- 


88      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1847 

vance  with  10,738  troops,^*  "  nearly  one-half  of  whom  were 
new  and  untried  soldiers,  fresh  from  the  pursuits  of  civil 
life,  except  for  the  discipline  to  which  they  had  for  a  few 
months  been  subjected  at  Pueblo."  ^^  The  Mexicans  in  the 
meanwhile  had  gained  sufficient  time  to  raise  a  new  army 
which,  according  to  their  own  estimates,  numbered  at  least 
36,000  men  and  100  guns,  and,  having  strongly  fortified  the 
capital,  had  every  reason  to  be  confident  of  the  outcome. ^^ 

On  August  10th  the  leading  troops  descended  from  the 
mountains  into  the  basin  where  the  City  of  Mexico  is  situated 
at  the  end  of  long  causeways  guarded  by  strong  fortifications. 
After  several  reconnaissances,  General  Scott  determined  to 
approach  the  place  from  the  south  and  accordingly  concen- 
trated his  divisions  near  San  Augustine  on  the  18th.^^  The 
resumption  of  his  advance  was  marked  by  a  series  of  san- 
guinary encounters.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  and  the 
following  morning  was  fought  the  battle  of  Contreras.^^  The 
20th  also  was  memorable  for  the  capture  of  the  important 
fortification  of  San  Antonio  and  for  another  victory  gained  at 
Churubusco.^^  In  a  single  day  8,500  Americans  ^^  had  over- 
whelmed 32,000  Mexicans. ^-"^  The  enemy's  army  was  com- 
pletely demoralized  and  rendered  incapable  of  further  resist- 
ance, while  the  inhabitants  of  the  capital  were  in  consterna- 
tion over  the  enemy's  presence  at  their  very  gates.  Just  at 
the  moment  when  nothing  remained  to  be  done  but  to  crown 
his  brilliant  campaign  by  the  immediate  occupation  of  the 
city,  Scott  suddenly  forgot  his  military  training,^^  became 
timid  and  permitted  himself  to  be  wheedled  into  a  truce  pend- 
ing negotiations  for  peace.^^  On  August  23rd  hostilities 
ceased  ad  interim,  but  within  a  fortnight  the  American  com- 
mander awoke  to  the  fact  that  Santa  Anna  had  made  a  cats- 
paw  of  him  in  order  to  gain  time.^^  On  September  7th  the 
armistice  was  declared  at  an  end,  and  on  the  following  day 
the  American  troops  attacked  the  enemy  at  Molino  del  Eey. 
A  desperate  fight  ensued,^^  with  no  results  commensurate 


Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       89 

1847-1848] 

with  the  loss  suffered,^^  and  Scott  was  obliged  to  transfer  his 
operations  to  the  western  side  of  the  city.  On  September 
12th  the  formidable  heights  of  Chapultepec  were  subjected  to 
a  vigorous  bombardment  and  on  the  following  morning  they 
were  stormed,  but  the  Mexicans  fought  like  fiends  and  it  was 
not  until  noon  that  success  crowned  the  American  efforts  ^^ 
after  heavy  losses. ^^  The  troops,  now  thoroughly  aroused, 
determined  to  capture  the  city  in  spite  of  General  Scott,  who 
sought  to  restrain  them,^^  and  by  2  p.  m.  General  Quitman's 
division  had  effected  a  lodgment  within  the  walls,  hoisted 
the  American  colours  over  the  national  palace  and  sturdily 
held  its  ground  until  nightfall  put  an  end  to  the  fighting. 
On  the  morning  of  September  14th  a  deputation  announced 
the  evacuation  of  the  city  by  Santa  Anna  and  the  American 
Army  made  its  triumphal  entry,  but  twenty-four  hours  of 
desperate  house-to-house  fighting  were  still  necessary  before 
General  Scott  was  left  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  place. -^^^ 
The  resourceful  Santa  Anna  made  determined  efforts  to 
cut  the  American  line  of  communications  with  Vera  Cruz 
and  to  arouse  further  resistance  to  the  invaders, -^^^  but  the 
re-enforcements  sent  to  Scott,^^^  small  and  tardy  as  they 
were,-^^^  rendered  his  attempts  abortive.  On  February  2, 
1848,  was  concluded  the  Treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo,^^^  and 
on  June  12th  the  last  of  the  American  troops  evacuated  the 
City  of  Mexico.  1^^ 

TEOOPS  EMPLOYED  DURING  THE  MEXICAN  WAE 
The  forces  in  service  during  this  war  numbered : 

Eegulars     31,024 

Volunteers  and  rangers 60,659 

Militia 12,601 


Total    104,284 


106 


The  maximum  number  of  Mexican  troops  was  only  about 
46,000.1^^     The    cost    of    the    war    to    the    United    States 


90     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1846-1848 

amounted  to  $88,500,208.38,^^^  and  np  to  June  30,  1914,  no 
less  than  $48,693,102.18  had  been  paid  in  pensions  on  its 
account. -^^^ 

This  war  is  principally  notable  for  the  marked  change 
in  the  military  policy  as  evinced  by  the  abandonment  of  the 
militia  as  the  "  great  bulwark  of  national  defense  "  and  the 
increased  use  of  regulars  and  volunteers,  especially  the  lat- 
ter. ^^^  When  it  is  remembered  that  the  military  organization 
and  operations  were  conducted  under  laws  almost  identical 
with  those  prevailing  in  the  War  of  1812,-^^^  it  is  the  more 
surprising  that  such  remarkable  successes  should  have  char- 
acterised the  later  war  in  contrast  to  the  ignominious  failures 
of  the  earlier  struggle. ^^^  The  solution  is  to  be  found  in 
the  different  quality  of  the  troops  as  a  whole,  in  the  better 
discipline  and  training,  and  in  the  employment  of  a  larger 
number  of  professional  officers.  Indeed  General  Scott  him- 
self attributed  the  shortness  of  the  war  to  the  last  cause.  ^^  ^ 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  distinctly  borne  in  mind  that 
the  failure  of  Congress  and  the  President  to  'Q.x  the  term  of 
enlistment  "  for  the  war  "  narrowly  escaped  being  fatal  to 
Scott's  ultimate  success,^ ^^  and  it  involved  the  totally  unnec- 
essary death  and  wounding  of  nearly  2,000  men,^^^  for  both 
of  which  the  Government  was  alone  to  blame.  Moreover,  for 
lack  of  an  organization  which  could  be  expanded  at  the  begin- 
ning of  war,  General  Taylor  was  forced  to  fight  his  first  bat- 
tles with  only  2,300  regular  troops,  whereas  under  an  expan- 
sive system  he  could  have  had  8,000.  Scott's  army  at  Vera 
Cruz  could  have  been  augmented  to  15,000  and,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  expiring  enlistments,  he  could  have  entered  the 
enemy's  capital  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cerro 
Gordo.  ^-^^  At  no  time  did  his  maximum  strength  exceed 
13,500  ^-^^  and,  when  he  did  actually  fight  his  way  into  the 
city,  his  army  was  reduced  to  about  6,000  men.^^^  In  view 
of  his  isolation  in  the  midst  of  a  hostile  country,  the  slowness 
with  which  re-enforcements  were  sent  him  ^^^  was  little  short 
of  criminal.     Viewed  from  any  angle,  the  success  of  the  war 


Military  Policy  During  the  Mexican  War       91 

1846-1848] 

was  in  nowise  attributable  to  the  legislative  or  executive 
wisdom  of  the  Government,  and  what  business  man  would 
venture  to  claim  tbat  the  manager  of  a  company  or  corpora- 
tion could,  or  ought  to,  be  retained,  who  was  unable  to  keep 
more  than  21,000  men  at  work  at  any  given  time  in  spite  of 
his  having  over  91,000  at  his  disposal?  Yet  such  was  the 
way  that  our  Government  managed  the  Mexican  War.^^^ 


CHAPTER  VIII 

MILITARY  POLICY  FROM   THE   MEXICAN  WAR 
TO  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION 

THE  American  troops  had  scarcely  evacuated  Mexico 
before  Congress  reduced  the  Regular  Army  from 
30,890  to  10,317/  thus  removing  virtually  all  influence  which 
the  v^ar  had  exercised  over  the  military  establishment  ^ —  just 
as  was  done  after  the  Florida  War  —  and  leaving  the  organi- 
zation both  defective  and  unprovided  for  future  emergencies.^ 
The  last  imperfection  was  remedied  by  the  Act  of  June  17, 
1850,  in  which  the  principle  of  expansion  was  wisely  em- 
bodied.* It  was  not  until  the  trouble  with  the  Indians  be- 
came very  grave  in  1853  and  1854  that  President  Pierce 
availed  himself  of  the  power  thus  vested  in  him  and,  by  aug- 
menting the  123  companies  west  of  the  Mississippi  to  their 
full  authorized  strength,  increased  the  Army  to  13,821. 
However,  as  this  feeble  increment  of  3,489  men  was  palpably 
insufficient  to  guard  the  vast  extent  of  territory  in  which  the 
Indian  tribes  were  none  too  friendly,  a  further  increase  of 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  and  tv/o  of  infantry  was  made  by 
the  Act  of  March  3,  1855.^ 

In  the  six  ensuing  years  the  only  military  legislation  merit- 
ing particular  attention  was  the  Act  of  April  7,  1858,  which 
authorized  the  President  to  receive  into  the  United  States 
service  a  regiment  of  mounted  Texas  volunteers  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defending  the  frontier  of  that  State,  as  well  as  to 
call  out  and  accept  volunteers  to  the  extent  of  two  regiments 
to  be  organized,  if  he  saw  fit,  as  mounted  infantry  and  used 
to  quell  "  disturbances  in  the  Territory  of  Utah,  for  the  pro- 
tection of  supply  and  emigrant  trains,  and  the  suppression  of 
Indian  hostilities  on  the  frontier."  ^     Eighteen  months  were 

92 


I 


The  Mexican  War  to  the  War  of  the  Rebellion      93 

1859-1861] 

fixed  as  their  term  of  service,  and,  reverting  to  the  vicious 
principle  enunciated  in  1792,''^  the  men  were  required  to  fur- 
nish their  own  horses  and  equipment,  at  a  compensation  of 
forty  cents  per  diem;  and  the  officers  to  be  appointed  by  their 
respective  States  and  Territories,  with  the  exception  of  the 
commissaries  and  quartermasters  who  were  to  be  assigned 
from  the  Regular  Army.  As  General  Upton  pertinently  re- 
marks :  ^ 

"  This  effort  to  secure  economy  was  undoubtedly  a  wise  step 
in  the  right  direction,  but  like  so  much  of  our  hasty  and  ill- 
digested  military  legislation  it  began  at  the  wrong  end.  Had 
the  President  been  allowed  to  call  for  the  volunteers  by  com- 
panies, Avith  authority  to  select  the  field  officers,  adjutants,  and 
quartermasters  from  the  Eegular  Army,  not  only  the  economy 
but  the  discipline  and  instruction  of  the  regiments  con  Id  have 
been  controlled  by  trusted  officers  of  the  Government." 

The  military  operations  between  1848  and  1861  were  con- 
fined to  Indian  wars  ^  and  the  Utah  expedition  which  took 
place  in  1858.  The  latter,  although  free  from  bloodshed,  re- 
sulted in  transferring  almost  all  of  the  Army  to  stations  west 
of  the  Mississippi. 


CHAPTER  IX 

MILITAEY  U]SrPEEPARED:N'ESS  A:N^D  POLICY  OE 

THE  UNITED  STATES  DUEING  THE  WAR 

OF  THE  REBELLION 

HOW  little  heed  had  been  paid  by.  Congress  to  the  les- 
sons of  the  past  was  thus  admirably  summarized  by 
Upton :  ^ 

*^  At  the  close  of  the  year  1860  we  presented  to  the  tvorld  the 
spectacle  of  a  great  nation  nearly  destitute  of  military  force. 
Our  territory  from  ocean  to  ocean  exceeded  3,000,000  square 
miles;  our  population  numbered  31,000,000  people. 

""  The  Regular  Army  as  organized  consisted  of  18,093  officers 
and  men,^  but  according  to  the  returns  it  numbered  only  16,867.^ 

"  The  line  of  the  Army  was  composed  of  198  companies,  of 
which  183  were  stationed  on  the  frontier  or  were  en  route  to 
distant  posts  west  of  the  Mississippi.  The  remaining  15  com- 
panies were  stationed  along  the  Canadian  frontier  and  on  the 
Atlantic  coast  from  Maine  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
.  ^'  As  a  guard  for  the  national  frontiers,  the  Army  could  not 
furnish  two  soldiers,  per  mile;  for  protecting  the  settlements  in 
the  States  and  Territories  west  of  the  Mississippi  hut  one  soldier 
was  available  for  every  120  square  miles;  to  aid  in  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  laws  in  the  remaining  States  of  the  Union  ive  had 
hut  one  soldier  for  every  1,300  squure  miles. 

"  The  militia  for  a  sudden  emergency  were  scarcely  more  avail- 
able than  the  Army.  Nominally  they  numbered  more  than 
3,000,000,  hut  mostly  unorganized.  So  destitute  were  they  of 
instruction  and  training  that  —  a  few  regiments  in  the  large 
cities  excepted  —  they  did  not  merit  the  name  of  a  military  force. 

"  Such  was  the  condition  of  the  national  defense  when,  on 
the  20th  of  December,  1860,  South  Carolina  in  convention  passed 
the  ordinance  of  secession." 

By  February  1,  1861,  seven  states  had  seceded,*  and  on 
the  4th  the  delegates  of  six  met  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
formed  a  union,  adopted  a  provisional  constitution,  and  elected 

94 


During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  95 

1861] 

a  President  and  Vice-President.^  'No  less  daring  and  force- 
ful were  the  measures  that  followed.  The  inauguration  of 
Jefferson  Davis  and  Alexander  H.  Stephens  on  the  18th  was 
succeeded  ten  days  later  by  authorization  to  their  President 
to  assume  control  of  "  all  military  operations  between  the 
Confederate  States  "  and  to  accept  for  a  period  not  to  exceed 
twelve  months  as  many  volunteers  as  were  required.  On 
March  6th  he  issued  a  call  for  100,000  men,  who  were  to  be 
mustered  into  service  under  his  sole  and  supreme  command.^ 

These  formidable  preparations  '^  were  in  marked  contrast  to 
the  feeble  condition  of  the  United  States  Army,  defective  in 
organization  and  so  disseminated  that,  on  December  15,  1860, 
the  nine  fortifications  along  the  southern  coast  were  garri- 
soned by  only  ^ve  inexpansive  companies,  and  it  was  not  un- 
til six  weeks  later  that  they  were  augmented  by  some  600 
recruits.  The  other  regular  troops  were  scattered  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  too  remote  to  participate  in  the  first 
encounters  or  even  to  afford  an  adequate  defence  for  Wash- 
ington. 

Events  progressed  faster  than  the  Government  had  bar- 
gained for,  and  the  contemplated  assistance  to  the  garrison  in 
Charleston  harbour  was  forestalled  by  the  first  overt  act  of 
war  on  the  part  of  the  insurgents,  who  bombarded  Fort  Sum- 
ter on  April  12th  and  compelled  it  to  surrender  two  days  later. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  in  alarm  over  the  threatening  conditions,  turned 
—  as  so  many  Presidents  had  done  before  him  —  to  the  mili- 
tia, and  on  April  9th  called  for  ten  companies  from  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia;  but  some  refused  to  be  sworn,  others  to 
serve  outside  the  District,  so  that  the  Government  was  obliged 
to  accept  this  militia  on  its  own  terms.  ^  By  contrast,  the 
Confederacy  by  the  middle  of  that  month  had  equipped 
35,000  men,  seized  the  arsenals  within  reach  and  had  begun 
the  siege  of  the  forts  in  the  Southern  States.^ 

*"'  In  every  stage  of  their  prosecution  the  wars  of  the  Revolu- 
tion and  of  1812  gave  evidence  that  a  system  of  national  defense, 


96      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1861 

hosed  on  the  consent  and  cooperation  of  the  States,  possessed 
none  of  the  elements  of  certainty  or  of  strength. 

"  Nevertheless^  for  the  want  of  an  expansive  regular  army  or 
a  system  of  national  volunteers,  the  President  was  again  com- 
pelled to  look  to  the  States,  and  therefore  on  the  15th  of  April, 
issued  his  proclamation  calling  for  75,000  militia  for  the  period 
of  three  months. 

^^  The  teiTQs  of  the  proclamation  show  that  the  President  and 
Cabinet  began  the  war  with  the  same  confidence  in  raw  troops 
as  was  manifested  by  their  predecessors  in  1812. 

"  The  militia  was  not  summoned  for  the  defense  of  the  capi- 
tal, but  to  suppress  '  combinations  and  to  cause  the  laws  to  be 
duly  executed.^  ^^ 

"  In  explanation  of  the  call,  the  President  further  stated : 

"  *  I  deem  it  proper  to  say  that  the  first  service  assigned  to 
the  forces  hereby  called  forth,  will  probably  be  to  repossess  the 
forts,  places  and  property  which  have  been  seized  from  the 
Union.' 

"  Language  so  unmistakable,  and  which  had  the  sanction  of 
our  most  distinguished  statesmen,  leads  only  to  the  conclusion 
that  with  raw  troops,  it  was  believed  that  a  formidable  rebellion, 
already  covering  560,000  square  miles,  could  be  subdued  within 
the  brief  space  of  three  months." 


11 


Obviously  the  governors  of  the  Southern  States  defied  the 
Government  and  refused  to  furnish  their  militia,  their  action 
being  taken  solely  on  their  own  responsibility.^^  Once  again 
was  demonstrated  the  futility  of  a  military  system  founded 
upon  the  theory  of  a  confederation  —  such  as  that  followed  by 
the  United  States  —  whereas  the  Confederacy  rid  itself  of 
all  such  useless  shackles,  assumed  the  necessary  responsibility 
and  appealed  directly  to  the  people.  ^^  The  spread  of  the 
rebellion  ^^  afforded  sufficient  strength  to  the  Confederate 
officials  so  that  on  May  27th  the  capital  ^vas  transferred  to 
Richmond,  and  the  Confederate  troops  advanced  to  Fairfax 
and  even  Alexandria,  within  plain  sight  of  Washington.  ^^ 

"  The  advantage  so  far  as  related  to  the  forces  in  the  field 
was,  at  the  time,  decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates.  The 
Government  had  called  for  75,000  militia  for  the  period  of 
tl  ree  months;  the  Confederates  had  called  for  100,000  volunteers 


During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  97 

1861] 

for  the  period  of  one  year.  Both  had  repeated  the  blunder  of 
short  enlistments.  The  President,  hy  a  laiv  more  than  sixty 
years  old,  was  obliged  to  limit  the  service  to  three  months;  ^® 
the  Confederate  Congress,  with  no  appreciation  of  past  history, 
adopted  the  identical  policy  which  had  led  to  the  protraction 
of  all  our  previous  wars.  Nevertheless,  in  default  of  further 
measures,  on  the  part  of  the  President,  the  Government  at  the 
end  of  three  months  would  see  the  forces  dissolved,  while  the 
Confederate  army,  constantly  improving  in  discipline,  would 
still  he  available  for  nine  months  of  field  service/'  ^^ 

The  outbreak  in  Baltimore  on  April  19th,  in  conjunction 
with  the  proximity  of  the  enemy's  troops,  virtually  isolated 
Washington  and  its  capture  appeared  imminent.  In  the 
face  of  such  a  calamity,  which  threatened  the  overthrow  of  the 
Government,  the  President  promptly  assumed  and  exercised 
the  war  powers  which  under  the  Constitution  belong  to  Con- 
gress alone.  On  May  3rd  he  decreed  by  proclamation  that  the 
Regular  Army  be  increased  by  22,714  officers  and  men,  the 
Navy  by  18,000  sailors,  and  additionally  called  for  42,034 
volunteers  to  serve  for  three  years.^^  No  usurpation  could 
have  been  more  absolute,  but  it  was  fully  justified  by  the  cir- 
cumstances and,  when  Congress  convened  on  July  4th  for  the 
extra  session  called  by  the  President,  so  universal  was  the  ap- 
proval and  gratitude  of  the  people  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  course 
was  completely  sanctioned.-^  ^ 

Meanwhile  the  Secretary  of  War  was  so  overwhelmed  with 
the  work  of  equipping  the  50,000  volunteers  called  out  on  May 
3rd  that  their  organization  and  that  of  the  regulars  was 
"  tossed  over "  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Fortu- 
nately, three  experienced  officers  ^^  were  detailed  to  assist 
him,  but  the  final  decision  rested  with  Mr.  Chase  alone,  who 
eventually  agreed  to  the  three-battalion  system  ^  ^  for  the  regu- 
lars but  rejected  it  for  the  volunteers  because  of  their  unfa- 
miliarity  with  it  —  thus  adhering  to  an  organization  which 
had  descended  from  the  days  of  the  Pevolution,  This  scheme 
was  embodied  in  the  General  Orders  ^^  issued  by  the  War 
Department  on  May  4th,  was  adopted  by  Congress  and  formed 


98      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1861 

the  basis  upon  which  all  the  national  forces  were  organized.  ^^ 

"  Novel  as  were  the  duties  imposed  upon  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  he  and  his  assistants  deserved  the  gratitude  of 
the  nation.  By  simply  fixing  the  term  of  enlistment  at  three 
years,  thus  giving  the  volunteers  time  to  become  veterans,  they 
insured  us  against  a  series  of  disasters  sucli  as  under  the  system 
of  1812,  or  that  adopted  for  the  volunteers  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Mexican  war,^*  must  inevitably  have  terminated  in  the 
dissolution  of  the  Union."  -^ 

Congress  lost  no  time  in  getting  down  to  business  and,  by 
the  Act  of  July  22nd,  authorized  the  President  to  accept 
500,000  volunteers  for  service  "  not  exceeding  three  years 
nor  less  than  six  months/'  to  organize  them  into  regiments, 
brigades  and  divisions,  their  pay  and  allowances  to  be  similar 
to  that  of  the  Regular  Army.^^  Again  was  committed  one 
of  the  many  legislative  blunders  whose  effect  might  readily 
have  been  as  far-reaching  as  a  similar  mistake  in  1846,^~  and 
in  at  least  two  other  respects  this  law  was  most  defective.^ ^ 

The  Act  of  July  25th  permitted  the  President  to  call  out  an 
additional  half  a  million  men  but  wisely  required  their  enlist- 
ment to  continue  '^'^  during  the  war/'  ^^ 

The  next  law,  that  of  July  29th,  provided  an  increase  of 
the  Regular  Army,^^  on  condition  that  within  one  year  after 
the  termination  of  "  the  existing  insurrection  and  rebellion  " 
it  might  be  reduced  to  25,000.^^  The  enlistments  made  dur- 
ing 1861  and  1862  were  limited  to  three  years,  those  after 
January  1,  1863,  to  be  for  five  years.^^  The  last  section 
voiced  the  desire  of  Congress  that  professional  officers  should 
be,  employed  with  the  volunteer  regiments  ^'  for  the  purpose 
of  imparting  to  them  military  instruction  and  efficiency  '^  ^^ 
—  a  very  wise  provision  which  most  unfortunately  was  com- 
pletely nullified  by  the  previous  mistake  of  giving  the  gov- 
ernors the  right  to  appoint  the  volunteer  officers  without  per- 
mitting the  President  to  designate  at  least  one  field  officer  in 
every  regiment.^ ^ 

Another  act  approved  the  same  day,  looking  to  the  en- 


During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  99 

1861] 

forcement  of  law  and  the  suppression  of  rebellion,  authorized 
the  employment  of  militia  with  the  wise  provision  that  it  was 
to  continue  in  service  until  discharged,  on  condition  that  such 
term  was  not  prolonged  more  than  sixty  days  after  the  begin- 
ning of  the  next  regular  session  of  Congress. 

The  Acts  of  August  3rd  and  5th  related  principally  to  the 
staff,  although  the  appointment  of  an  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War  was  provided  for,^^  certain  increases  authorised,  the  dra- 
goons and  mounted  rifles  merged  into  the  cavalry,^^  and  a  re- 
tiring board  to  deal  with  officers  "  incapacitated  for  service  '' 
prescribed.  ^^ 

On  August  6th  four  acts  were  approved.  Two  of  these 
were  concerned  with  the  increase  of  the  Engineer  and  Topo- 
graphical Engineer  Corps,  and  heed  was  paid  to  the  popular 
clamour  against  the  vicious  system  of  permitting  the  election 
of  volunteer  officers  ^^  by  an  amendment  providing  that  such 
vacancies  should  be  filled  by  the  governors  of  the  States,  as  in 
the  case  of  original  appointments.^^  The  evil  was  thus  recti- 
fied, but  not  until  after  250,000  men  had  been  accepted  under 
this  demoralizing  scheme.  The  third  act  increased  the  pay  of 
the  privates  in  the  Regular  Army  and  volunteers  from  twelve 
to  thirteen  dollars  a  month  and  —  what  was  most  important 
—  sanctioned  all  of  the  actions  of  President  Lincoln.  ^^ 

At  the  end  of  the  year  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  Sen- 
ate "  to  abolish  all  distinction  between  the  regular  and  vol- 
unteer forces  of  the  United  States,"  but  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs  very  properly  killed  it  then  and  there.  ^^ 

In  four  weeks  and  a  half  Congress  had  assuredly  worked 
like  a  Trojan  and  deserved  credit  accordingly.  In  that  short 
space  of  time  it  had  enacted  a  military  system  under  which 
one  of  the  greatest  wars  of  modern  times  was  to  be  prosecuted, 
its  haste  being  in  marked  contrast  to  the  laborious  slowness 
of  the  Prussians  who,  after  the  annihilation  of  their  army  by 
Napoleon  at  Jena  —  October  14,  1806  —  took  years  to  build 
up  the  fabric  of  a  system  under  which  they  humiliated  Aus- 
tria in  a  few  weeks  in  1866,  crushed  Erance  in  1870  and  are 


100     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1861 

fighting  to-day.  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them,"  and 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  the  consequences  of  the  delusion 
of  Congress  that,  once  it  had  passed  a  series  of  laws  —  be  they 
good,  bad  or  indifferent  —  creating  a  military  system  how- 
ever defective,  almost  over-night,  its  duty  had  been  discharged 
and  that  all  future  mistakes  were  none  of  its  concern. ^^  We 
shall  see  how  its  virtual  rejection  of  trained  troops  —  upon 
which  all  other  nations  depend  —  and  the  reliance  which  it 
placed  in  untrained  volunteers,^^  most  of  whose  officers  were 
necessarily  devoid  of  military  experience,  was  destined  to  pro- 
long for  four  years  a  struggle  which  witnessed  the  repetition 
of  almost  every  blunder  of  our  past  wars  and  which  caused 
bloodshed  and  expenditures  nothing  short  of  appalling. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1861 

Although  by  July  first  more  than  200,000  volunteers  had 
been  mustered  into  service  for  three  years,**  the  Government 
could  not  withstand  the  temptation  to  repeat  anew  the  folly  of 
short  enlistments.  Forgetful  of  the  fact  that  numbers  and 
military  strength  are  by  no  means  synonymous,  that  the  repu- 
tation acquired  by  the  militia  at  Bunker  Hill  and  ^NTew  Or- 
leans was  gained  behind  formidable  entrenchments,  the  entire 
country  —  Congress,  the  Cabinet,  the  press  and  people  — 
began  to  clamour  that,  before  the  75,000  men  called  out  for 
three  months  *^  were  discharged,  they  should  be  led  to  bat- 
tle.*^ 

The  first  real  encounter  of  the  war  took  place  on  June  10th 
at  Big  Bethel,  a  few  miles  up  the  Virginia  peninsula  from 
Fortress  Monroe,  when  the  ^Northern  volunteers  under  Gen- 
eral Pierce  were  repulsed,*^  and  this  fiasco,  magnified  into  a 
great  victory  by  the  South,  produced  deep  mortification  on 
one  side  of  the  Potomac  and  corresponding  elation  on  the 
other.*^ 

The  victories  of  Eich  Mountain  and  Carrick's  Ford,  West 
Virginia,  on  July  11th  and  14th,  resulted  in  the  capture  and 


During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  101 

1861] 

dispersal  of  the  Confederate  troops  in  that  section,  and  a  week 
later  General  Patterson's  force  near  Harper's  Ferry  had  so 
disintegrated  as  a  result  of  its  repulse  at  Winchester  and  the 
expiring  enlistments  that,  notwithstanding  his  efforts  to  re- 
tain the  men,  he  was  reduced  to  absolute  impotency.^^ 

On  July  21st  the  main  armies  met  — "  two  armed  mobs  " 
was  the  very  apt  description  given  them  by  Count  von  Moltke. 
The  forces  were  approximately  of  equal  strength,^^  but  the 
elements  of  weakness  were,  if  anything,  more  apparent  in 
General  McDowell's  command  than  in  General  Beaure- 
gard's.^-^ The  battle  of  Bull  Bun  ^^  ended  in  an  overwhelm- 
ing victory  for  the  Confederates,^^  the  JSTorthern  troops  being 
thoroughly  routed  and  —  with  the  exception  of  the  regu- 
lars ^* —  ran  away  in  a  panic,  which  could  not  be  checked 
until  they  reached  the  Potomac.  ^^ 

Although  the  Confederate  "  army  was  more  disorganized 
by  victory  than  the  United  States  was  by  defeat,"  ^^  there  is 
no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  "  the  North  richly  deserved  its 
punishment."  ^^     Of  the  causes  of  this  disaster, 

"  First  among  them  was  the  popular  but  mistaken  belief  that 
because  our  citizens  individually  possess  courage,  fortitude,  and 
self-reliance,  they  must  necessarily  possess  the  same  qualities 
when  aggregated  as  soldiers.  And  next  to  this  error  was  the 
fatal  delusion,  that  an  army  animated  by  patriotism  needed 
neither  instruction  nor  discipline  to  prepare  it  for  battle."  ^ 


58 


As  Swinton  aptly  declares :  ^^ 

"  So  far  as  regards  the  mere  physical  fact  of  fighting,  which 
was  at  the  time  the  all-important  question,  there  was  nothing 
of  which  the  Union  soldiers  had  to  be  ashamed  —  they  stood 
up  to  it  with  the  blood  of  their  race.  The  fault  lay  in  the  in- 
herent vicious  organization  of  the  force  —  in  the  great  number 
of  miserable  subordinate  officers,  which  in  turn  was  the  natural 
result  of  the  method  of  raising  regiments.  .  .  . 

"  When  the  army  that  so  lately  had  gone  forth  with  such  high 
hopes  returned  from  Manassas  shattered  and  discomfited  to  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac,  wise  men  saw  there  was  that  [which  ?] 
had  suffered  worse  defeat  than  the  army  —  it  was  the  sijstem 


102     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1861 

under  which  Bull  Eun  had  been  fought  and  lost.  The  lesson  was 
a  severe  one ;  but  if  it  was  needed  to  demonstrate  the  legitimate 
result  of  the  crude  experimentalism  under  which  the  war  had 
been  conducted  —  when  campaigns  were  planned  by  ignorant 
politicians,  and  battles,  precipitated  by  the  pressure  of  sanguine 
journalists,  were  fought  by  three  months'  levies  —  the  price  paid 
was  perhaps  not  too  high.  The  Bull  Eun  experiment  taught 
the  country  it  was  a  real  war  it  had  undertaken,  and  that  suc- 
cess could  only  be  hoped  for  by  a  strict  conformity  to  military 
principles." 

The  remaining  operations  of  the  year  ^^  can  scarcely  be 
dignified  by  any  other  title  than  skirmishes  —  with  the  pos- 
sible exception  of  Wilson's  Creek  —  but  popular  imagination 
invested  them  with  all  the  importance  of  pitched  battles. 
The  sequel  of  Bull  Run  is  thus  admirably  described  by  that 
gallant  and  distinguished  French  officer,^^  the  Comte  de  Paris, 
long  attached  to  the  staff  of  General  McClellan  who  super- 
seded Scott  in  command  of  the  Union  armies  on  November 
first:  ^2 

'^  Its  immediate  effect  upon  military  operations  was  to  pro- 
duce a  sudden  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  belligerents.  The 
possession  of  Virginia,  with  the  exception  of  that  portion  which 
had  been  recaptured  by  McClellan,  was  secured  to  the  Con- 
federates. Eichmond  was  beyond  danger  of  any  attack,  and 
Washington  was  threatened  anew.  We  shall  see  the  Federal 
government  organize  a  powerful  army  within  its  capital;  but 
its  opponents,  also  taking  advantage  of  the  respite  which  the 
victory  gave  them,  will  increase  their  forces  almost  as  rapidly, 
so  as  to  keep  those  of  the  enemy  constantly  in  check;  and  they 
remained  quiet  during  a  period  of  nine  months  on  the  field  of 
battle  conquered  on  the  21st  of  July. 

"  But  it  was  chiefly  through  its  moral  effect  that  this  first 
encounter  was  to  exercise  a  powerful  influence  upon  the  war 
of  which  it  was  only  the  prelude.  ...  In  short,  this  victory 
inspired  the  South  with  unlimited  confidence  in  her  own  re- 
sources and  the  conviction  that  she  could  never  be  vanquished. 
At  the  outset  this  conviction  was  a  great  element  of  success;  it 
inspired  her  soldiers,  already  impressed  with  a  sense  of  their 
superiority  over  their  adversaries,  with  that  daring  which  fre- 
quently determined  the  fate  of  battles.     But  at  the  same  time 


During  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  103 

1861] 

it  also  rendered  her  improvident,  and  made  her  neglect  many- 
details  the  importance  of  which  she  felt  too  late;  it  prevented 
her,  at  this  critical  hour,  from  availing  herself  of  all  resources, 
from  calling  together  all  able-bodied  men,  from  organizing  the 
interior  defence  of  the  States,  which  she  thought  could  never 
be  invaded;  and,  in  this  manner,  it  prepared  the  way  for  the 
disasters  she  met  with  in  the  West  the  following  year.  ... 

"  This  disaster,  which  might  have  discouraged  the  North, 
proved,  on  the  contrary,  a  salutary  lesson.  Far  from  dividing 
the  States  faithful  to  the  Union,  as  the  Confederate  leaders  had 
anticipated,  it  only  had  the  effect  of  stimulating  their  patriotism 
and  of  rendering  them  more  clear-sighted.  At  the  news  of  the 
defeat,  they  appreciated  at  last  the  difficulty  of  the  task  they 
had  undertaken,  but  they  never  shrank  from  it.  They  under- 
stood that  in  order  to  obtain  success  in  a  great  war,  it  is 

NOT    SUFFICIENT   TO    HAVE    A   GREAT    NUMBER    OF    SOLDIERS IT 

IS  NECESSARY  THAT  THEY  SHOULD  BE  WELL  TRAINED;  that 
ARMIES  ARE  COMPLICATED  MACHINES  WHICH  REQUIRE  AS  MUCH 
SCIENCE  AS  CARE  IN  THEIR  CONSTRUCTION,  AND  THAT  if  popular 

enthusiasm  and  personal  courage  supply  the  materials,  it  re- 
quires DISCIPLINE  TO  COMBINE  THEM.  From  that  day  the 
North  submitted  patiently  and  with  determination  of  purpose 
to  all  that  was  required  to  organize  her  forces  and  to  put  them 
in  a  condition  to  undertake  long  and  fatiguing  compaigns.  Al- 
though the  soldiers  composing  the  national  armies  still  bear  the 
name  of  volunteers,  the  aim  of  all  their  efforts  will  henceforth 
be  to  acquire  that  instruction  and  that  experience  which 

CAUSE  the  superiority  OF  REGULAR  TROOPS. 

"  The  improvised  generals  will  give  place  to  those  who  are 
brought  up  in  the  military  career  ;^^  the  officers  who  seriously 
try  to  learn  their  profession  will  be  greatly  encouraged  by  the 
confidence  of  the  public  and  of  the  army.  It  is  not,  therefore, 
to  this  American  democracy,  which  is  essentially  practical  and 
profits  by  experience,^*  that  the  partisans  of  levies  en  masse  and 
improvised  armies  must  look  for  confirmation  of  their  theories.'^ 


TROOPS  EMPLOYED  IN  1861 

The  false  economy  which  in  "  piping  peace  "  discounte- 
nances preparation  for  war  became  manifest  before  the  end 
of  1861.     A  few  paltry  successes  and  one  distinct  disaster 


104     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1861 

constituted  all  there  was  to  show,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
there  were  mustered  into  service  during  the  year: 

Under  the  President's  call  of  April  15th  for  75,000 
militia 93,326 

Under  the  call  of  May  3rd  and  the  Acts  of  July  22nd 

and  25th 714,231 


Total   807,557 

The  number  of  troops  in  the  field  on  January  1,  1862,  was: 

Regulars    22,425 

Volunteers 553,492 


Total   575,917 

Adding  the  militia 93,326 


Grand  total  of  troops  under  pay  in  1861   669,243  ^^ 

The  Confederate  forces  in  January,  1862,  did  not  ex- 
ceed       232,138  «« 


Excess  of  Federal  over  Confederate  troops 437,105 

The  maintenance  of  these  vast  numbers  of  troops  for  eight 
months  cost  the  United  States  no  less  than  $238,392,488.77.^^ 


CHAPTER  X 

MILITARY  LEGISLATIO:^r  AND  EVENTS  IN  1862 

THE  first  measure  dealing  with  military  m.atters  passed 
in  1862  ^  made  it  manifest  that  Congress  had  awak- 
ened to  the  necessity  for  Government  control  of  telegraph 
lines  and  railways,^  and  it  wisely  took  occasion  to  exercise  to 
the  limit  the  war  powers  vested  in  it  by  the  Constitution.  A 
fortnight  later  $150,000  were  appropriated  for  the  defences 
of  Washington,  and  one  section  of  this  law  of  February  13th 
forbade  the  acceptance  of  volunteers  or  militia  ^^  on  any  terms 
or  conditions  confining  their  services  to  the  limits  of  any  state 
or  territory  ''  ^ —  thus  preventing  a  repetition  of  the  inability 
to  utilize  troops  outside  of  their  own  jurisdiction,  such  as  hap- 
pened in  the  preceding  year.^ 

On  April  16th  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Army  received  a 
much-needed  increase,^  and  a  month  later  a  distinctly  faulty 
measure  ^  was  passed  which  permitted  any  medical  inspector 
to  discharge  men  for  disability  —  actual  or  alleged  —  on  his 
own  certificate  but  without  the  approval  of  his  superiors. 
The  next  important  law  '^  provided  for  the  appointment  of  ad- 
ditional medical  officers  in  the  volunteer  service  —  part  of 
which  was  admirable  in  that  it  insured  the  best  of  medical 
attention  to  the  sick  and  wounded,  but  the  other  part  placed 
a  premium  on  suffering  by  failing  to  set  a  proper  standard  for 
the  assistant  surgeons  to  be  appointed  by  the  state  governors.^ 

On  July  2,  1862,  an  important  measure  was  approved. 
It  was  entitled  "  An  Act  Donating  public  lands  to  the  several 
States  and  Territories  which  may  provide  colleges  for  the 
benefit  of  agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts,''  *  and  is  gen- 
erally known  as  "  the  Morrill  act."     It  provided  in  Section  4 

*  12  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  503. 

105 


106     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1862 

that  the  interest  on  all  moneys  derived  from  the  sales  of 
land  authorized  by  this  act  "  shall  be  inviolably  appropriated 
by  each  State  ...  to  the  endowment,  support,  and  main- 
tenance of  at  least  one  college  where  the  leading  object  shall 
be,  without  excluding  other  scientific  and  classical  studies, 
and  including  military  tactics,  to  teach  such  branches  of 
learning  as  are  related  to  agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts.'' 
The  inclusion  of  military  instruction  was  rendered  necessary 
by  the  dearth  of  officers  in  the  Union  armies  —  a  shortage 
which  had  already  made  itself  strongly  felt  and  one  that 
•West  Point  was  quite  inadequate  to  overcome.  The  law  in 
question  founded  the  system  of  military  schools,  which  was 
given  further  extension  by  subsequent  Congressional  legisla- 
tion *  and  which  has  spread  all  over  the  United  States. 

The  Act  of  July  5th  permitted  the  President  to  appoint 
not  more  than  forty  Major  Generals  nor  more  than  tw^o  hun- 
dred Brigadier  Generals,  and  appropriated  $7,500,000  so  as 
to  allow  $25  "  to  be  paid  immediately  after  enlistment  to 
every  soldier  of  the  regular  and  volunteer  forces  hereafter  en- 
listed, during  the  continuance  of  the  existing  war."  ^  The 
next  act  ^^  dealt  with  pensions,  and  three  days  later  several 
important  measures  were  approved,  of  w^hich  only  three  con- 
cern us  here.  One  of  these  was  designed  "  to  suppress  insur- 
rection, to  punish  treason  and  rebellion,  to  seize  and  confiscate 
the  property  of  rebels."  ^^  The  second,  which  defined  the 
pay  and  emoluments  of  certain  officers  of  the  Army,  provided 
that  the  President  might  retire  any  officer  who  had  been  in 
service  for  45  years  or  who  had  reached  the  age  of  sixty- 
two.^^     The  third,^^  as  Upton  says,^^  ^'  reads  like  a  chapter 


*  Amendments  to  the  Morrill  act  were  made  by  two  measures,  one 
approved  July  23,  1866  (14  Stat.  L.,  208),  the  other  approved  March 
3,  1883  (22  Stat.  L.,  484).  Further  endowments  of  agricultural  col- 
leges were  affected  by  the  second  Morrill  act,  approved  August  30,  1890 
(26  Stat.  L.,  417),  and  by  the  Nelson  amendment,  approved  March  4, 
1907  (34  Stat.  L.,  1256,  1281).  Vide  also  the  circular  issued  by  the 
U.  S.  Department  of  Agriculture  on  October  31,  1914,  and  entitled 
"  Federal  Legislation,  Regulations  and  Rulings  affecting  agricultural 
colleges  and  experiment  stations." 


During  1862  107 

from  the  Journal  of  the  Continental  Congress  during  the 
darkest  days  of  the  Revolution.''  To  analyse  this  measure  in 
detail  would  serve  no  useful  purpose;  suffice  to  say  that  it 
demonstrated  that  every  lesson  of  the  past  had  been  cast  to  the 
winds.  The  President  was  empowered  to  call  out  militia 
for  service  "  not  exceeding  nine  months  "  ;  this  militia  was  to 
be  organized  in  the  same  manner  as  the  volunteers  —  in  other 
words,  the  officers  to  be  appointed  by  the  States ;  100,000  vol- 
unteers, in  addition  to  the  1,000,000  already  in  service,^  ^ 
could  be  called  out  for  nine  months,  with  a  bonus  of  one 
month's  pay  and  a  bounty  of  $25.  In  order  to  get  men  to 
join  the  Regular  Army,  volunteers  could  be  accepted  for 
twelve  months  and  were  to  be  given  a  bounty  of  $50  ^^ —  this 
greater  inducement  being  necessary  to  offset  the  very  natural 
inclination  of  men  to  join  the  volunteers,  where  the  term  of 
service  was  shorter  and  the  discipline  less  severe.  Certain 
other  provisions  were  made,-^^  the  most  important  being  for 
the  creation  of  army  corps  ^^  which,  obviously,  ought  to  have 
been  instituted  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 

Aside  from  the  statutory  acts,  there  were  three  resolutions 
passed  that  year  worthy  of  passing  notice.  One  of  these 
wisely  provided 

"  That  whenever  military  operations  may  require  the  presence 
of  two  or  more  officers  of  the  same  grade  in  the  same  field  or 
department,  the  President  may  assign  the  command  of  the  forces 
in  such  field  or  department,  without  regard  to  seniority  of 
rank/'  ^« 

thus  establishing  the  principle  of  selection.  Another  granted 
a  premium  of  $2  to  any  one  producing  a  recruit  accepted  for 
the  Regular  Army,^^  and  the  last  appropriated  $10,000  for 
the  preparation  of  "  medals  of  honor "  to  ^'  be  presented, 
in  the  name  of  Congress,  to  such  non-commissioned  officers 
and  privates  as  shall  most  distinguish  themselves  by  gallantry 
in  action,  and  other  soldier-like  qualities."  ^^  This  consti- 
tuted the  creation  of  the  "  American  Victoria  Cross  "  ^^ —  an 


108     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1862 

order  of  which  our  average  citizen  is  even  to-day  colossally 
ignorant. 

*'  Save  the  one  law  authorizing  the  President  to  seize  the  rail- 
roads and  telegraphs,  the  military  legislation  of  1862,  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  1861,  shows  little  or  no  increase  of  wisdom. 
Congress  had  not  3'et  discovered  the  value  of  military  training. 
It  exercised  the  power  to  support  armies,  but  the  power  to  raise 
them  it  conferred  on  the  governors.  To  its  mind  the  volunteer 
and  State  systems  meant  one  and  the  same  thing.  The  idea 
still  prevailed  that  the  Union  could  be  saved  by  the  voluntary 
service  of  its  citizens.  Patriotism,  notwithstanding  the  lesson 
of  Bull  Eun,  was  esteemed  above  discipline.  There  was  no  need 
of  careful  instruction.  The  war  would  soon  be  over ;  and  strong 
in  this  delusion  the  views  of  Congress,  more  than  a  year  after 
the  fall  of  Fort  Sumter,  found  expression  in  a  law  which,  could 
the  President  have  executed  it,  would  again  have  intrusted  the 
destiny  of  the  nation  to  raw  troops  raised  by  the  States  for  the 
brief  period  of  nine  and  twelve  months." 


23 


CALLS  FOR  TROOPS  IN  1862 

During  the  months  of  May  and  June  special  authority 
was  given  the  States  of  l^ew  York,  Indiana  and  Illinois  to 
furnish  men  for  three  months'  service,  and  their  response 
yielded  15,007.^^  The  numerical  losses  of  the  troops  at  the 
front  had  been  such  that,  on  June  28th,  eighteen  governors 
petitioned  the  President  to  call  upon  the  States  for  sufficient 
men  to  fill  the  armies  in  the  field  up  to  their  proper  comple- 
ment, as  well  as  "to  garrison  and  hold  all  the  numerous 
cities  and  military  positions  that  have  been  captured  by  our 
armies,  and  to  speedily  crush  the  rebellion."  ^^  Mr.  Lincoln 
complied  by  issuing  a  call  on  July  2nd  for  300,000  volunteers 
for  three  years,  and  the  states  generously  exceeded  their  quo- 
tas by  fully  33  per  cent.^^ 

"  The  great  depletion  of  the  old  regiments  by  the  campaigns 
of  1862  induced  special  efforts  during  the  summer  and  fall  of 
that  year  to  secure  recruits  for  them.  It  was,  however,  per- 
ceived early  in  August  that  these  efforts  would  not  meet  with 
success,  and  that  the  call  of  July  2,  where  filled  at  all,  would 


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During  1862  109 

be  filled  mainly  by  new  organizations.  These  the  governors  of 
the  States  authorized  partly  from  a  misapprehension  of  the  real 
needs  of  the  service/^  and  partly  from  a  more  or  less  well- 
founded  belief  that,  without  the  stimulus  of  commissions  in 
new  regiments,  individual  efforts,  heretofore  so  successful  in 
raising  men,  would  not  be  made  by  influential  parties  in  different 
localities.  In  view  of  this  failure  and  the  pressing  want  of 
troops,  a  draft  for  three  hundred  thousand  (300,000)  militia, 
to  serve  for  a  term  of  nine  months,  was  ordered  by  the  President 
on  the  4th  of  August,  1862.  The  order  directed  that  if  any 
State  failed  to  furnish  its  quota  of  men  under  the  preceding 
call  for  volunteers,  the  deficiency  should  be  made  up  by  a  special 
draft  from  the  militia  by  the  15th  of  August.  It  also  announced 
that  steps  would  be  taken  for  the  promotion  of  officers  for 
meritorious  services,  for  preventing  the  appointment  of  incom- 
petent persons  as  officers  in  the  volunteer  and  regular  forces, 
and  for  ridding  the  service  of  the  unworthy  ones  already  com- 
missioned. 

"  This  order  was  the  first  step  taken  by  the  government  towards 
carrvdng  out  the  maxim  upon  which  the  security  of  the  republican 
governments  mainly  depends,  viz :  that  every  citizen  owes 
HIS  COUNTRY  MILITARY  SERVICE. ^^  To  its  adoption,  and  the 
subsequent  rigorous  resort  to  conscription,  the  salvation  of  the 
Union  is  due,  more  than  to  any  other  cause. 

"  The  draft  under  this  order  commenced  on  the  3rd  of  Septem- 
ber, 1862,  and  was  conducted  by  the  State  authorities.  Of  the 
three  hundred  thousand  (300,000)  men  called  for,  about  eighty- 
seven  thousand  were  credited  as  having  been  drafted  into  the 
service  under  the  call.^^  This  number  was  much  reduced  by 
desertion  before  the  men  could  be  got  out  of  their  respective 
States,  and  but  a  small  portion  of  them  actually  joined  the  ranks 
of  the  army. 

^^  This  draft  constituted  the  last  demand  of  the  general  gov- 
ernment for  men  previous  to  the  inauguration  of  the  system  of 
conscription  in  the  following  spring."  ^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862  ^^ 

The  military  operations  of  1862  fall  naturally  into  three 
distinct  periods ;  in  the  first  and  third  the  Union  armies  acted 
on  the  offensive,  in  the  second  on  the  defensive. ^^ 

On  February  6th  General  Grant,  who  had  moved  from 


110     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Cairo  up  the  Tennessee  Eiver,  captured  Fort  Henry  with 
the  assistance  of  the  gunboat  flotilla  under  Commodore 
Foote,^^  and  ten  days  later  Fort  Donelson  capitulated  to  him 
in  response  to  his  demand  for  "  unconditional  surrender."  ^^ 
In  the  East  General  Burnside  took  Eoanoke  Island,  North 
Carolina,  on  the  8th;  ^^  a  month  later  the  Merrimac  sank  the 
Congress  and  the  Cumberland,  but  was  defeated  next  day  by 
the  Monitor. ^^  On  March  11th  General  McClellan  was  re- 
lieved of  command  as  generalissimo,^^  on  the  14th  'New 
Berne,  I^orth  Carolina,  fell  to  Bumside,^^  and  on  the  23rd 
General  Shields  was  victorious  at  Winchester. ^^ 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  took  place  on  April  6th  and  7th,  end- 
ing with  the  retreat  of  Johnston's  army  before  Grant,^^  and 
the  following  day  General  Pope  and  the  gunboats  captured 
the  important  Island  No.  10,  thus  opening  the  upper  part  of 
the  Mississippi.*^  On  the  24th  Rear-Admiral  Farragut  de- 
stroyed the  Confederate  fleet  and  ran  the  gauntlet  of  Forts 
St.  Philip  and  Jackson.  Anchoring  off  New  Orleans  next 
day,  he  made  a  demand  for  its  surrender  and  on  May  1st 
the  city  complied.  Steaming  up  the  river,  he  took  Baton 
Houge  and  Natchez,  and  on  June  27th  his  mortar  boats  bom- 
barded Vicksburg  but,  being  unable  to  reduce  this  stronghold, 
he  ran  past  the  batteries  and  joined  Foote's  gunboats  which 
had  descended  from  Cairo. *^ 

On  March  I7th  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  began  its  em- 
barkation at  Alexandria,  Virginia,  its  destination  being  the 
peninsula,  up  which  its  advance  was  commenced  on  April 
4th.  Yorktown  was  besieged  from  the  5th  until  May  4th,  fol- 
lowed in  quick  succession  by  the  battles  of  Williamsburg, 
West  Point,  Hanover  Court  House  and  Seven  Pines  or  Fair 
Oaks.*^  On  that  day,  June  first,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
with  a  fighting  strength  of  100,000  was  astride  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  River  within  six  miles  of  Richmond.** 

Second  Period. 
"  During  this  period  the  Government  and  the  Confederates 


During  1862  111 

conducted  the  war  on  contrary  principles.  The  Government 
sought  to  save  the  Union  hy  -fighting  as  a  Confederacy;  the  Con- 
federates sought  to  destroy  it  by  fighting  as  a  nation.  The  Gov- 
ernment recognized  the  States,  appealed  to  them  for  troops, 
adhered  to  voluntary  enlistments,  gave  the  governors  power  to 
appoint  all  commissioned  officers  and  encouraged  them  to  or- 
ganize new  regiments.  The  Confederates  abandoned  State  sover- 
eignty, appealed  directly  to  the  people,  took  away  from  them  the 
power  to  appoint  commissioned  officers,  vested  their  appointment 
in  the  Confederate  President,  refused  to  organize  war  regiments, 
abandoned  voluntary  enlistments,  and,  adopting  the  republican 
principle  that  every  citizen  oives  his  country  military  service, 
called  into  the  army  every  white  man  between  the  ages  of  18 
and  35/'  *^ 

f.  On  June  first  General  Robert  E.  Lee  assumed  command 
^f  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  then  in  the  vicinity  of 
Richmond, ^^  but  he  waited  until  a  series  of  successes  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  ^^  permitted  General  "  Stonewall  "  Jack- 
son to  join  him  with  some  18,500  men  ^^  and,  in  conjunction 
with  other  re-enforcements  that  reached  him  during  the 
month,  enabled  him  to  concentrate  about  90,000  troops  ^^  be- 
hind entrenched  lines  between  the  James  and  Chickahominy 
rivers,  in  close  proximity  to  McClellan  whose  army  numbered 
105,445.^^  On  June  26th  Lee  assumed  the  offensive  and  the- 
^^  Seven  Days'  Campaign "  began.  A  succession  of  hard- 
fought  battles  ^^  ended  in  a  bloody  repulse  of  the  Confederates 
at  Malvern  Hill  on  July  1st,  after  which  McClellan  with- 
drew his  army  from  Richmond. ^^ 

The  Federal  Government  then  endeavoured  to  unite  at 
Aquia  Creek  ^^  the  scattered  armies  under  McjClellan,  Burn- 
side  and  Pope,^^  but  Lee  had  meanwhile  begun  his  advance 
toward  Washington.  ^^  On  August  9th,  his  van  under  Jack- 
son attacked  General  Banks  at  Cedar  Mountain,^^  but  a 
spirited  engagement  ^'^  compelled  the  former  to  fall  back 
across  the  Rapidan  and  to  await  re-enforcements.  On  the 
29th  and  30th  Bull  Run  witnessed  a  second  victory  for  the 
South, ^^  which  drove  Pope  within  the  fortifications  of  Wash- 


112     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ington.^^  On  September  4th  the  Confederate  army  crossed 
the  Potomac  near  Leesburg,^^  and  four  days  later  General 
Lee  issued  at  Frederick  a  proclamation  inviting  the  people  of 
Maryland  to  join  the  Southern  cause.^^ 

In  the  West  the  Confederates  were  equally  successful. 
General  Bragg's  army  was  increased  to  50,000  men  by  con- 
scription, turned  BuelFs  flank,  threatened  Nashville,  captured 
the  garrison  of  2,100  men  at  Mumfordsville  on  September 
I7th,  menaced  Louisville  and  marched  to  Frankfort,  Ken- 
tucky, where  he  was  joined  by  the  3rd  Corps  under  General 
Kirby  Smith  which  had  defeated  Nelson  at  Richmond,  Ky., 
on  August  29th  and  had  advanced  within  50  miles  of  Cin- 
cinnati. On  September  13th  General  Price  captured  luka, 
Mississippi,  and  on  October  4th  General  Eosecrans  inflicted 
a  severe  repulse  on  a  Confederate  force  of  22,000  under  Van 
Dorn  and  Price,  which  attempted  to  drive  him  out  of  his  en- 
trenchments at  Corinth,  Mississippi.^^ 

"  With  the  exception  of  the  victories  of  luka  and  Corinth  an 
unbroken  chain  of  disasters  marked  the  second  period  of  1862.^^ 
The  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  James 
Eiver  to  Washington  and  Alexandria,  the  invasion  of  Maryland, 
and  the  retreat  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  Louisville/*  pro- 
duced a  depression  in  the  public  mind  nearly  as  great  as  that 
which  succeeded  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun."  ^^ 

Third  Period, 

Upon  the  retreat  of  the  Northern  armies  to  Washington 
after  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Pun,  General  Pope  was  re- 
lieved at  his  own  request  and  ordered  to  the  West.^^  Mc- 
Clellan,  now  in  command  of  the  forces  near  Washington,^  ^ 
advanced  to  Frederick,  Maryland,  on  September  12th,  occu- 
pied Turner's  Gap  and  Crampton's  Gap  on  the  14th  after  a 
lively  fight, ^^  and  three  days  later  the  opposing  armies  ^^  met 
in  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  war.*^^  Antietam  ter- 
minated in  the  retreat  of  Lee  across  the  Potomac,  ^^  but  Mc- 
Clellan  failed  to  follow  up  his  advantage,  and  it  was  not  until 
nearly  a  week  later  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  again  en- 


During  1862  113 

tered  Virginia  '^^  and  marched  for  Warrenton  and  Cul- 
peper.''^^  On  November  7th,  McClellan  was  relieved  of  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  superseded  by 
General  Burnside.''^*  On  ISTovember  15th  the  new  commander 
set  his  troops  in  movement  en  route  to  Richmond, ^^  and 
on  December  13th  he  launched  them  against  Lee's  en- 
trenchments at  Fredericksburg,  only  to  suffer  a  fearful 
repulse.  "^^ 

In  the  West,  Buell,  who  had  been  considerably  re-enforced, 
started  from  Louisville  on  October  1st  in  pursuit  of  Bragg. 
The  latter  accepted  the  challenge  at  Perryville,  Kentucky,  on 
the  8th  but  was  beaten,^*^  retreated  to  Chattanooga  but  again 
resumed  the  offensive  and  advanced  to  Murfreesborough, 
some  thirty  miles  south  of  Xashville.  On  October  30th  Buell 
was  relieved  by  General  Rosecrans  and  the  title  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  changed  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  After 
nearly  two  months  spent  in  schooling  the  new  recruits,  Rose- 
crans began  his  movement  on  December  26th  and  five  days 
later  the  opposing  forces  met  at  Murfreesborough.  The  at- 
tacks were  suspended  on  January  1st ;  next  day  Bragg  resumed 
his  assaults  but  was  repulsed,  and  on  the  3rd  abandoned  the 
battlefield  and  retreated  to  Tullahoma.'^^ 

On  IN^ovember  24th,  General  Grant  —  who  had  been  as- 
signed to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee  '^^ 
—  ordered  all  his  forces  to  the  Tallahatchee  Riv^r  and  began 
the  Vicksburg  campaign,  with  the  assistance  of  Admiral  Por- 
ter's gunboats  and  a  force  of  20,000  under  General  W.  T. 
Sherman.  The  latter  therefore  started  from  Memphis,  ral- 
lied to  him  12,000  troops  at  Helena,  reached  the  mouth  of 
Chickasaw  Bayou  on  December  27th,  and  two  days  later  de- 
livered an  assault  against  General  Pemberton's  formidable  en- 
trenchments on  the  bluffs  at  that  place,  but  was  driven  back 
with  considerable  loss.^^ 

The  year  1862  was  characterised  by  the  mismanagement 
of  military  legislation  by  Congress  and  the  mismanagement 
of  the  armies  in  the  field  by  the  Union  commanders,  who  sue- 


114     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ceeded  each  other  in  rapid  succession  and  none  of  whom  had 
the  experience  necessary  to  command  large  forces. 

"  The  military  situation  at  the  close  of  1862  was  far  more 
favorable  for  the  Southern  Confederacy  than  any  one  could  have 
predicted  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  Great  opportunities 
had  been  thrown  away  by  the  generals  on  the  Union  side. 

"  Twice  during  the  year  might  the  Confederate  army  of  the 
West  have  been  attacked  under  exceptionally  favorable  circum- 
stances by  a  much  more  powerful  force,  but  Grant  atfter  Shiloh 
and  Halleck  after  Corinth  threw  away  their  chances.  No  simi- 
lar opportunities  were  offered  to  Buell  or  to  Rosecrans.  Hence, 
at  the  close  of  the  year  we  find  the  army  of  Bragg  resolutely  con- 
fronting its  antagonist  on  the  field  of  Murfreesborough. 

"  In  the  East,  by  the  interference  of  President  Lincoln  and 
Secretary  Stanton  with  McClellan's  plan  of  uniting  the  force 
under  McDowell  to  the  army  near  Eichmond,  tbe  best  chance 
of  success  was  thrown  away;  while  McClellan  by  not  attacking 
Lee  at  Sharpsburg  ^^  on  September  16,  failed  to  improve  the 
most  promising  opportunity  for  destroying  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virginia  which  up  to  that  time  had  been  presented. 

"  The  task  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  certainly  not  been 
lightened  by  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  nor  had  that  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  by  the  battle  of  Murfreesborough." 


82 


The  results  achieved  were  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  strength 
of  the  opposing  forces,  as  the  Northern  armies  uniformly  out- 
numbered their  adversaries. 


CHAPTEE  XI 
MILITAKY  LEGISLATION  DURIlNTG  1863 

THE  Act  of  January  6th  "  to  improve  the  organization 
of  the  cavalry  forces  "  ^  was  followed  a  month  later 
by  authorization  to  the  Governor  of  Kentucky  ^^  to  raise  and 
organize  into  regiments  a  volunteer  force  not  exceeding  twenty 
thousand,  rank  and  file  "  ^^  for  the  term  of  twelve  months." 
These  troops  were  to  be  used  for  the  defence  of  that  State 
and,  as  usual,  Congress  vested  the  appointment  of  the  officers 
in  the  governor.^  Two  days  later  a  "  commissary  general 
of  subsistence  '^  was  created,^  and  the  following  week  a 
measure  w^as  passed  '^  to  secure  to  the  officers  and  men  actu- 
ally employed  in  the  western  department,  or  department  of 
Missouri,  their  pay,  bounty,  and  pension  "  ^  which  had  pre- 
viously been  suspended.^  The  Act  of  March  2nd  provided 
for  the  appointment  of  thirty  Major  Generals  and  seventy- 
five  Brigadier  Generals  in  addition  to  those  already  author- 
ized ^  or  in  the  regular  service,*^  with  the  very  wise  stipula-  • 
tion  "  that  the  officers  to  be  appointed  under  this  act  shall  be 
selected  from  those  who  have  been  conspicuous  for  gallant  or 
meritorious  conduct  in  the  line  of  duty."  ^ 

On  March  3rd  three  important  measures  w^ere  approved. 
The  first  was  framed  in  order  '^  to  promote  the  efficiency  of 
the  corps  of  engineers  and  of  the  ordnance  department  "  and 
effected  some  notable  changes,^  but  it  likewise  contained  a 
serious  defect  in  the  bounty  given  for  new  enlistments  for 
•comparatively  short  periods. -^^  The  second  law  prescribed  the 
organization  of  the  Signal  Corps  during  the  war,-^^  while  the 
third  w^as,  by  all  odds,  the  most  far-reaching  military  legis- 
lation passed  during  the  war. 

"  During  the  latter  part  of  1862  the  necessity  for  a  radical 
•change  in  the  method  of  raising  troops  in  order  to  prosecute  the 

115 


116     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

war  to  a  successful  issue  became  more  and  more  apparent.  The 
demand  for  reenforcements  for  the  various  armies  in  the  field 
steadily  and  largely  exceeded  the  current  supply  of  men.  The  old 
agencies  for  filling  the  ranks  proved  more  and  more  ineffective. 
It  was  evident  that  the  efforts  of  the  government  for  the  sup- 
pression of  the  rebellion  would  fail  without  resort  to  the  un- 
popular,  BUT   NEVERTHELESS   TRULY   REPUBLICAN,   MEASURE  OF 

CONSCRIPTION.  The  national  authorities,  no  less  than  the  pur- 
est and  wisest  minds  in  Congress,  and  intelligent  and  patriotic 
citizens  throughout  the  country,  perceived  that,  besides  a  more 
reliable,  regular,  and  abundant  supply  of  men,  other  substantial 
benefits  would  be  derived  from  the  adoption  and  enforcement 

of  THE  PRINCIPLE  THAT  EVERY  CITIZEN,  NOT  INCAPACITATED  BY 
PHYSICAL  OR  MENTAL  DISABILITY,  OWES  MILITARY  SERVICE  TO 
THE  COUNTRY  IN  THE  HOUR  OF  EXTREMITY.  It  WOuld  effec- 
tually do  away  with  the  unjust  and  burdensome  disproportion 
in  the  number  of  men  furnished  by  different  States  and  localities. 

'^  But  it  was  not  easy  to  convince  the  public  mind  at  once 
of  the  justice  and  wisdom  of  conscription.  It  was  a  novelty, 
contrary  to  the  traditional  military  policy  of  the  nation.  The 
people  had  become  more  accustomed  to  the  enjoyment  of  privi- 
leges than  to  the  fulfilment  of  duties  under  the  general  govern- 
ment, and  hence  beheld  the  prospect  of  compulsory  service  in 
the  army  with  an  unreasonable  dread.  Among  the  laboring 
classes  especially  it  produced  great  uneasiness.  Fortunately,  the 
loyal  political  leaders  and  press  early  realized  the  urgency  of 
conscription,  and,  by  judicious  agitation,  gradually  reconciled 
the  public  to  it.  When  the  enrolment  act  was  introduced  in 
Congress  in  the  following  winter,  the  patriotic  people  of  the 
north  were  willing  to  see  it  become  a  law. 

"  After  a  protracted,  searching,  and  animated  discussion,  ex- 
tending through  nearly  the  whole  of  the  short  session  of  the 
thirty-seventh  Congress,  the  enrolment  act  was  passed,  and  be- 
came a  law  on  the  3d  of  March,  1863.  It  was  the  first  law 
enacted  by  congress  by  which  the  government  of  the 
United  States  appealed  directly  to  the  nation  to  create 

LARGE  armies  WITHOUT  THE  INTERVENTION  OF  THE  AUTHORI- 
TIES OF  THE  SEVERAL  StATES.    .    .    . 

*'  The  public  safety  would  have  been  risked  by  longer  delay 
in  the  enactment  of  this  law.  A  general  apathy  prevailed 
throughout  the  country  on  the  subject  of  volunteering.  Re- 
cruiting had  subsided,  while  desertion  had  greatly  increased  and 


During  1863  117 

had  grown  into  a  formidable  and  widespread  evil.  The  result 
of  the  important  military  operations  during  the  first  months 
of  1863  had  been  unfavorable  and  exercised  a  depressing  effect 
on  the  public  mind.  .  .  .  The  rebel  army  was  stronger  in  num- 
bers than  at  any  other  period  of  the  war.  And  last,  not  least, 
a  powerful  party  in  the  north,  encouraged  by  these  events,  op- 
posed the  raising  of  the  new  levies,  and  especially  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  new  conscription  law/'  ^^ 

The  measure  in  question  was  entitled  "  An  Act  for  enrol- 
ing and  calling  out  the  national  forces,  and  for  other  pur- 
poses,'' and  "  the  main  objects  of  the  law  were,  in  general 
terms:  first,  to  enroll  and  hold  liable  to  military  duty  all 
citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms  not  exempted  therefrom  by 
its  provisions;  second,  to  call  forth  the  national  forces  by 
draft  when  required;  third,  to  arrest  deserters  and  return 
them  to  their  proper  commands.''  ^^ 

The  basis  of  this  legislation  was  another  law  which  went 
into  effect  more  than  seventy  years  before,^*  and  the  open- 
ing section  enunciated  the  same  cardinal  principle,  with  the 
single  difference  that  the  minimum  age  was  raised  from  18 
to  20  years.^^  The  earlier  law  required  all  persons  enrolled 
in  the  militia  to  provide  themselves  with  certain  equipment 
which  the  law  of  1863  by  inference  obliged  the  Government 
to  furnish,  and  the  execution  of  the  later  law  was  insured  by 
prescribing  ^^ 

'*  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  hereby  author- 
ized and  empowered,  during  the  present  rebellion,  to  call  forth 
the  national  forces  by  draft,  in  the  manner  provided  for  in 
this  act." 

In  all  its  military  legislation  Congress  has  rarely,  or  never, 
produced  a  rose  without  the  accompaniment  of  a  thorn,  and 
the  present  instance  was  no  exception  to  the  general  rule. 
Having  declared  that  every  male,  with  certain  exceptions,  was 
amenable  to  military  duty,  it  proceeded  to  undo  part  of  its 
excellent  work  by  permitting  substitutes  or  the  payment  of 
$300  in  lieu  thereof,  ^"^  and  on  top  of  that  granted  large  boun- 


118     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ties  for  duty  which  the  law  specifically  exacted. ^^  The  evils 
thus  unloosed  far  exceeded  those  which  emanated  from  Pan- 
dora's notorious  box. 

The  first  step  in  the  execution  of  this  law  was  to  enroll  all 
males  not  exempted.  As  the  report  of  the  Provost  Marshal 
General  declared:  ^^ 

"  Numerous  and  weighty  obstacles  were  encountered  in  mak- 
ing this  enrolment.  The  large  floating  population  of  the 
country,  and  the  disposition  and  right  of  our  people  to  go  from 
place  to  place  without  let  or  hindrance,  rendered  it  exceedingly 
difficulty  to  perfect  it.  Most  of  the  embarrassments  resulted, 
however,  from  the  opposition  encountered  in  almost  every  house, 
if  not  to  the  act  itself,  at  least  to  its  application  of  the  particular 
persons  whose  names  were  sought  for  enrolment.  The  law  made 
it  the  duty  of  this  bureau  to  take,  but  did  not  make  it  the  duty 
of  any  one  to  give,  the  names  of  those  liable  to  draft.  Every 
imaginable  artifice  was  adopted  to  deceive  and  defeat  the  en- 
roling officers.  Open  violence  was  sometimes  met  with.  Several 
enrolers  lost  their  lives.  Some  were  crippled.  The  property  of 
others  was  destroyed  to  intimidate  them,  and  prevent  the  enrol- 
ment. In  certain  mining  regions  organized  bodies  of  men  openly 
opposed  the  enrolment,  rendering  it  necessary  that  the  United 
States  authorities  should  send  troops  to  overcome  their  opposition. 
There  were  secret  societies,  newspapers,  and  politicians  who 
fostered   and  encouraged  this   widespread   opposition." 

The  sequel  is  thus  interestingly  told  by  Morse  in  his 
biography  of  Abraham  Lincoln :  ^^ 

"  The  fact  confronted  Mr.  Lincoln  that  he  must  institute  en- 
rolment and  drafting.  The  machinery  was  arranged  and  the 
very  disagreeable  task  was  entered  upon  early  in  the  summer 
of  1863.  If  it  was  painful  in  the  first  instance  for  the  President 
to  order  this,  the  process  was  immediately  made  as  hateful  as 
possible  for  him.  Even  the  loyal  and  hearty  ^  war-governors ' 
seemed  at  once  to  accept  as  their  chief  object  the  protection  of 
the  people  of  their  respective  States  from  the  operation  of  the 
odious  law.  The  mercantile  element  was  instantly  and  fully 
accepted  by  them.  The  most  patriotic  did  not  hesitate  to  make 
every   effort   to   have   the   assigned   quotas   reduced;   they   drew 


During  1863  119 

jealous  comparisons  to  show  inequalities;  and  they  concocted  all 
sorts  of  schemes  for  obtaining  credits.  Not  marshalling  recruits 
in  the  field,  but  filling  quotas  on  paper,  seemed  a  legitimate  pur- 
pose; for  the  matter- had  become  one  of  figures,  of  business,  of 
competition,  and  all  the  shrewdness  of  the  Yankee  mind  was  at 
once  aroused  to  gain  for  one's  self,  though  at  the  expense  of 
one's  neighbors.  Especially  the  Democratic  officials  were  vi- 
ciously fertile  in  creating  obstacles.  .  .  . 

"  In  a  word  Mr.  Lincoln  was  confronted  by  every  difliculty 
that  Eepublican  inventiveness  and  Democratic  disaffection  could 
devise.  Yet  the  draft  must  go  on,  or  the  war  must  stop.  .  .  . 
But  in  the  main  business  he  was  inflexible;  and  at  last  it  came 
to  a  direct  issue  between  himself  and  the  malcontents,  whether 
the  draft  should  go  on  or  stop.  In  the  middle  of  July  the 
mob  in  N'ew  York  City  tested  the  question.  The  drafting  be- 
gan there  on  Saturday  morning,  July  11.  On  Monday  morn- 
ing, July  13,  the  famous  riot  broke  out.  It  was  an  appalling 
storm  of  rage  on  the  part  of  the  lower  classes;  during  three 
days  terror  and  barbarism  controlled  the  great  city,  and  in  its 
streets  countless  bloody  and  hideous  massacres  were  perpetrated. 
Negroes  especially  were  hanged  and  otherwise  slain  most  cruelly. 
The  governor  was  so  inefficient  that  he  was  charged,  of  course 
extravagantl}',  with  being  secretly  in  league  with  the  ringleaders. 
A  thousand  or  more  lives,  as  it  was  roughly  estimated,  were 
lost  in  this  mad  and  brutal  fury,  before  order  was  again  re- 
stored. The  government  gave  the  populace  a  short  time  to  cool, 
and  then  sent  10,000  troops  into  the  city  and  proceeded  with 
the  business  without  further  interruption.  A  smaller  outbreak 
took  place  in  Boston,  but  was  promptly  suppressed.  In  other 
places  it  was  threatened,  but  did  not  occur.  In  spite  of  it  all, 
the  President  continued  to  execute  the  law.  Yet  although  by 
this  means  the  armies  might  be  kept  full,  the  new  men  were 
very,  inferior  to  those  who  had  responded  voluntarily  to  the  earlier 
calls.  Every  knave  in  the  country  adopted  the  lucrative  and 
tolerably  safe  occupation  of  ^  bounty-jumping,'  and  every  worth- 
less loafer  was  sent  to  the  front,  whence  he  escaped  at  the  first 
opportunity  to  sell  himself  anew  and  to  be  counted  again.  The 
material  of  the  army  suffered  great  depreciation,  which  was  only 
imperfectly  offset  by  the  improvement  of  the  military  machine, 
whereby  a  more  effective  discipline,  resembling  that  of  European 
professionalism,  was  enforced." 


120     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  efforts  to  evade  the  law  came  to  such  a  pass  that  on 
September  15th  President  Lincoln  found  himself  obliged  to 
proclaim  a  suspension  of  the  constitutional  privilege  of  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus j,^^  since  the  courts  had  continually 
overridden  the  specific  provision  of  the  law  making  the  de- 
cision of  the  board  of  enrolment  final.^^  The  difficulties 
encountered  by  the  Government  in  the  attempt  to  secure  men 
were  never-ending.  On  June  15th  the  President  had  called 
for  100,000  militia  to  serve  for  six  months  but  only  16,361 
were  furnished.  ^^  Such  was  the  opposition  to  the  draft 
that  not  more  than  35,882  men  were  secured,  and  of  this 
number  no  less  than  26,002  were  substitutes.  Of  the 
292,441  drafted,^*  52,288  paid  their  $300  to  escape  duty, 
and  the  Government  was  thus  enabled  to  utilize  these  sums 
amounting  to  $15,686,400  to  obtain  others. ^^ 

"  This  draft,  though  not  directly  fruitful  in  producing  men, 
served  the  essential  purpose  of  substituting  the  realit}'  for  the 
semblance  of  conscription,  and  of  establishing  the  power  and 
determination  of  the  government  to  proceed  in  the  reenforce- 
ment  of  its  armies.  When  it  was  resorted  to,  volunteering  had 
stopped,  and  would  not  have  been  again  started  without  the 
spur  of  the  draft.''  ^^ 

After  applying  it  and  increasing  "  the  bounties  to  the 
largest  practicable  limit,"  the  paucity  of  men  was  still  so  far 
from  sufficient  to  complement  the  armies  in  the  field  that,  on 
October  I7th,  Mr.  Lincoln  called  for  300,000  volunteers  for 
three  years,  but  was  compelled  to  announce  in  his  proclama- 
tion that  the  draft  for  these  troops  would  be  deferred  until 
January  5,  1864,  in  order  to  give  Congress  time  to  make 
certain  much-needed  amendments  in  the  Enrolment  Act.^^ 

Early  in  December  Congress  assembled  for  its  usual  regu- 
lar session,  but  the  only  legislation  enacted  during  that  month 
with  respect  to  the  military  service  ^^  was  an  appropriation 
of  $23,000,000  "  for  the  payment  of  bounties  and  advance 
pay,"  ^^  in  which  it  was  specified  that  commutation  money 
^^  shall  be  kept  in  the  treasury  as  a  special  deposit,  applicable 


During  1863  121 

only  to  the  expenses  of  draft  and  for  the  procuration  of  sub- 
stitutes." 3^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1863 

On  January  25th  President  Lincoln  appointed  General 
Joseph  Hooker  commander  of  the  Union  armies  in  succession 
to  Burnside,^^  and  "  Fighting  Joe  "  addressed  himself  to  a 
complete  re-organization  of  the  army  which,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, was  decidedly  needed. ^^     The  winter  had  been  spent 
in  quarters  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  near 
Fredericksburg  and  opposite  Lee's  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, which  was  only  about  half  as  strong.^ ^     Each  com- 
mander had  planned  to  take  the  initiative  in  April  but,  in 
the  case  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  obligation  to  strike 
quickly  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  superior  numbers  was 
the  greater  insomuch  as  the  service  of  the  men  enlisted  for 
nine  months  and  two  years  were  both  on  the  eve  of  expira- 
tion.^^    On  April  13th  the  campaign  opened  by  Hooker's 
sending  his  cavalry  corps  to  make  a  raid  in  Lee's  rear,  and 
on  the  27th  he  set  his  army  in  motion.      On  the  night  of  the 
30th  Hooker  had  covered  about  45  miles,  crossed  two  rivers 
and  had  established  some  54,000  infantry  and  artillery  on  his 
adversary's  left  flank  at  Chancellorsville.^^     He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  issue  one  of  those  bombastic  proclamations  ^^  which 
—  with  the  exception  of  ISTapoleon  —  have  nearly  always  been 
a  precursor  of  disaster.     Although  Hooker's  position  was  one 
of  great  strength,^ ''^  nearly  all  of  his  cavalry  was  absent,  his 
right  flank  was  ^^  in  the  air  "  and  his  army  was  divided.     A 
retrograde  movement  was  closely  followed  by  Lee  who,  not- 
withstanding   his    inferiority,    was    bent    upon    attacking. 
Thrusting  Jackson  forward  against  Hooker's  exposed  right, 
the  battle  was  joined  on  May  3rd  and,  although  Lee  suffered 
an  irreparable  loss  in  the  death  of  Jackson, ^^  Chancellors- 
ville  terminated  in  a  bloody  victory  ^^  and  forced  Hooker  to 
retreat  northward.  ^^ 

In  one  aspect  this  campaign  recalls  Arnold  at  Quebec  in 


122     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ITTS."*^  In  both  instances  the  commanders  were  impelled 
to  strike  lest  the  expiring  enlistments  should  reduce  their 
forces  to  inactivity,  and  each  suffered  a  severe  repulse. 

A  lull  of  four  weeks  after  Chancellorsville  afforded  Lee  an 
opportunity  to  prepare  for  the  counter-stroke  in  the  shape  of 
an  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  upon  which  he  resolved  in  spite 
of  his  unsuccess  at  Antietam  the  year  before.  During  May 
the  Army  of  JSTorthern  Virginia  was  re-organized,^^  and  on 
June  3rd  Lee  began  the  delicate  operation  of  manoeuvering 
Hooker  out  of  his  position  behind  the  Rappahannock.  A 
week  later  E well's  corps  was  set  in  motion  for  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  followed  at  intervals  by  the  rest  of  the  army 
whose  withdrawal  was  masked  in  a  most  masterful  manner 
by  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  cavalry.  Hooker  started  to  interpose 
himself  between  Lee's  flanks  but  was  held  back  by  Secretary 
Stanton  and  General  Halleck^  who  had  made  up  their  minds 
not  to  permit  him  to  command  in  another  battle.  Hooker 
did  however  continue  to  approach  Lee  and,  when  the  leading 
Confederate  corps  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown 
and  Williamsport  on  June  23rd  and  24th,^^  he  followed  them 
over  the  river  ^^  during  the  ensuing  forty-eight  hours  and 
marched  for  Frederick.  On  the  night  of  the  27th  Stuart's 
cavalry  likewise  crossed  at  Rowser's  Ford  and,  after  captur- 
ing a  Union  wagon-train  eight  miles  long  at  Eockville  next 
day,  started  on  the  raid  around  Hooker's  army,  which  he  had 
suggested  and  to  which  Lee  had  consented.  This  brilliant 
feat  achieved  nothing,  as  Stuart  was  impeded  by  the  wagons 
which  he  persisted  in  taking  with  him,  lost  all  touch  with  the 
main  army  and  did  not  rejoin  it  until  July  2nd.^^  Lee  was 
thus  deprived  —  largely  through  his  own  fault  —  of  "  the 
eyes  of  the  army  "  which  are  so  essential  to  successful  opera- 
tions, and  found  himself  tremendously  handicapped  in  con- 
sequence.^^ It  was  not  until  midnight  on  the  28th  that  he 
learned  through  a  scout  that  his  adversary  was  north  of  the 
Potomac,  with  three  corps  near  Frederick  and  two  at  the 
base  of  South  Mountain.     That  night  Lee  issued  orders  for 


During  1863  123 

a  concentration  of  his  forces  at  Cashtown,  eight  miles  west 
of  Gettysburg,  whence  he  could  threaten  Washington,  Balti- 
more and  Philadelphia  equally.*'^ 

Meanwhile  Hooker  had  penetrated  his  adversary's  design 
and  sought  permission  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  in  Lee's  rear, 
but,  being  refused,  he  tendered  his  resignation  on  June  27th 
and  Meade,  in  spite  of  his  protest, ^^  was  appointed  to  suc- 
ceed him  —  a  procedure  which  might  have  entailed  disaster 
considering  the  time  and  occasion  when  it  occurred.*  The 
new  commander  assumed  his  functions  next  day  and,  having 
selected  Parr's  Eidge  behind  Pipe  Creek  as  an  advantageous 
position  for  a  defensive  action,  issued  his  orders  accordingly. 
On  the  30th  his  leading  troops  ^^  reached  Gettysburg  but, 
finding  that  Lee  was  withdrawing  in  the  direction  of  Cash- 
town,  a  further  advance  was  ordered  with  the  design  of 
securing  the  position  selected  and  gaining  time  for  the  con- 
centration of  his  corps.  Both  he  and  Lee  cautioned  their 
lieutenants  not  to  bring  on  a  battle  but  the  Fates  saw  other- 
Avise,  Llill  taking  the  initiative  and  Reynolds  accepting  the 
challenge  with  alacrity. ^^ 

At  10  A.  M.  on  July  1st  began  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  ^^ 
which  marked  the  zenith  and  decline  of  the  Confederate  star. 
Three  days  of  the  most  desperate  fighting,  attended  by  some 
of  the  heaviest  losses  incurred  in  modern  war,f  ended  in  the 
retreat  of  Lee  on  the  4th.  ^^  The  failure  of  Meade  to  follow 
up  his  splendid  victory  alone  saved  the  Confederates  from 
annihilation,  and  permitted  them  to  fall  back  to  the  Potomac, 
w^hich  was  swollen  by  heavy  rains,  and  to  remain  there  until 
the  13th,  when  the  last  troops  effected  their  crossing  without 

*  Although  President  Lincoln  was  not  one  of  the  active  dramatis 
personcB  in  this  plot  to  force  Hooker  to  resign,  he  evidently  forgot  his 
own  motto :     "  Never  swap  horses  when  you  are  crossing  a  stream." 

t  The  losses  of  the  Union  army  were  3,072  killed,  14,497  wounded 
and  5,434  captured  or  missing,  a  total  of  23,003. 

The  Confederate  casualties  were  2,592  killed,  12,709  wounded  and 
5,150  missing  or  taken  prisoner,  making  a  total  of  20,451. —  Battles 
and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  437  and  439;  Alexander,  pp.  443-446. 

"  At  Balaklava  the  Light  Brigade  lost  37  per  cent,  of  its  men,  and 
at  Inkerman  the  Guards  lost  45  per  cent.,  and  both  go  down  in  history. 


124     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

serious  opposition,  in  spite  of  Meade's  arrival  on  the  llth.^^ 
Irrespective  of  the  incredible  sloth  of  the  Union  commander 
when  his  adversary's  fate  lay  in  his  hands,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed that  even  under  the  circumstances  "  Lee's  escape  was 
exceedingly  narrow."  ^* 

The  Confederate  army  continued  to  Culpeper,  rested  a 
week  and  crossed  the  Rapidan  to  Orange  Court  House,  fol- 
lowed by  Meade,  but  the  remaining  operations  in  Virginia 
that  year  were  confined  to  manoeuvering  unmarked  by  any 
action  of  major  importance. ^^ 

In  the  West  the  Union  successes  were  even  more  notable 
than  in  the  eastern  theatre  of  war.  Allusion  has  already 
been  made  to  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  against  Yicks- 
burg  by  Grant  in  November,  1862,  and  to  Sherman's  defeat 
at  Chickasaw  Bluffs  at  the  end  of  that  year.^^  The  winter 
was  unprecedented  for  the  continuous  high  water  in  the 
Mississippi,  which  rendered  ineffectual  all  attempts  to  ap- 
proach the  Confederate  stronghold,^^  but  in  April  the  re- 
ceding of  the  waters  made  land  operations  possible.  ^^     On 


in  verse  and  prose,  as  having  been  annihilated.    At  Gettysburg,  on  July 
1st, 

The  16th  Maine   lost  84  per  cent. 

The  2nd    Wisconsin    

The  149th    Penna 

The  24th    Michigan    

The  151st  Penna 

The  147th  N.  Y 

The  107th    N.    Y 

The  150th  Penna 

The  107th  Penna 

The  75th  Penna.*    

The  142nd  Penna 

The  76th  N.  Y " 

The  157th  N.  Y.*    

*  In  the  11th  Corps. 

In  the  150th  Pennsylvania,  out  of  17  officers  who  went  into  action, 
only  one  escaped  death,  wounding  or  capture." —  Henry  S.  Huidekoper, 
A  Short  Story  of  the  First  Day's  Fight  at  Gettsburg,  p.  12.  Also  The 
Military  Order  of  the  Congress  Medal  of  Honor  Legion  of  the  United 
States,  p.  264. 


"  77 

"  74 

"  73 

"  71 

"  70 

"  70 

"  66 

"  65 

"  63 

"  62 

"  62 

"  61 

During  1863  125 

the  night  of  April  16th  part  of  Admiral  Porter's  ironclad 
fleet  and  several  transports  ran  past  Vicksburg,  and  thirteen 
days  later  performed  a  similar  operation  at  Grand  Gulf. 
Thus  supplied  and  protected,  Grant's  troops  were  ferried 
across  to  Bruinsburg,  nine  miles  lower  down,  on  the  30th 
and  that  general  found  himself  with  only  20,000  men  in  the 
midst  of  an  enemy's  country,  separated  from  his  base  by  a 
vast  river  and  a  powerful  enemy  who  occupied  Haines  Bluff, 
Vicksburg,  Grand  Gulf  and  Jackson,  fifty  miles  to  the  east. 
His  energy  was  in  keeping  with  the  situation.  On  May 
1st  the  opening  engagement  took  place  at  Port  Gibson, 
Grand  Gulf  w^as  occupied  next  day,  Sherman  with  13,000 
men  joined  him  on  the  7th,  five  days  later  a  Confederate 
force  was  driven  back  from  Raymond,  and  on  the  14th  Grant 
compelled  Johnston  to  evacuate  Jackson. ^^  Turning  toward 
Vicksburg,  he  encountered  Pemberton  at  Champion's  Hill 
on  the  16th  and  was  again  successful,  repeating  his  feat  next 
day  at  Black  Biver  Bridge.  On  the  18th  began  the  invest- 
ment of  Vicksburg,  but  two  assaults  ^^  convinced  Grant  that 
the  stronghold  could  not  be  taken  by  storm  and  he  therefore 
sat  down  to  a  regular  siege.  Six  weeks  exhausted  Pember- 
ton's  resistance  and  on  July  3rd  he  made  overtures  to  sur- 
render. The  terms  were  soon  arranged  and  on  the  4th 
Grant  marched  into  the  place. ^^ 

This  notable  achievement,^^  coupled  —  to  use  Grant's  own 
words  — 

"  with  the  victory  at  Gettysburg  won  the  same  day,  lifted  a 
great  load  of  anxiety  from  the  minds  of  the  President,  his 
Cabinet  and  the  loyal  people  all  over  the  North.  The  fate  of 
the  Confederacy  was  sealed  when  Vicksburg  fell.  Much  hard 
fighting  was  to  be  done  afterwards  and  many  precious  lives 
were  to  be  sacrificed;  but  the  morale  was  with  the  supporters  of 
the  Union  ever  after."  ®^ 

The  operations  which  terminated  with  the  capitulation  of 
this  important  fortress  bear  marked  similarity  to  those  of 
^N'apoleon    during    the    campaign    of    Ulm.     Had    Grant's 


126     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

career  ended  then  and  there,  he  would  still  be  entitled  to 
fame,^^  for  none  but  a  great  general  could  have  taken  the 
resolution  to  cut  loose  from  his  base  of  supplies  under  such 
circumstances  as  confronted  Grant.  Like  other  Union  com- 
manders he  was  made  to  feel  the  sinister  influence  of  defective 
military  legislation,  and  he  candidly  confessed  that 

'''  The  campaign  of  Yicksburg  was  suggested  and  developed 
hy  circumstances.  The  elections  of  1862  had  gone  against  the 
prosecution  of  the  ivar.  Voluntary  enlistments  had  nearly 
ceased  and  the  draft  had  been  resorted  to;  this  was  resisted,  and 
a  defeat  or  backward  movement  would  have  made  its  execution 
impossible.  A  foriuard  movement  to  a  decisive  victory  luas  neces- 
sary. Accordingly  I  resolved  to  get  below  Vicksbnrg,  unite  with 
Banks  against  Port  Hudson^  make  New  Orleans  a  base  and,  with 
that  base  and  Grand  Gulf  as  a  starting  point,  move  our  com- 
bined forces  against  Vicksburg.  Upon  reaching  Grand  Gulf, 
after  running  its  batteries  and  fighting  a  battle,  I  received  a 
letter  from  Banks  informing  me  that  he  could  not  be  at  Port 
Hudson  under  ten  days,  and  then  with  only  fifteen  thousand 
men.  The  time  was  worth  more  than  the  reenforcements ;  I 
therefore  determined  to  push  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's 
country. 

"  With  a  large  river  behind  us,  held  above  and  below  by  the 
enemy,  rapid  movements  were  essential  to  success.  Jackson  Avas 
captured  the  day  after  a  new  commander  had  arrived,  and  only 
a  few  days  before  large  reenforcements  were  expected.  A  rapid 
movement  west  was  made ;  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg  was  met 
in  two  engagements  and  badly  defeated,  and  driven  back  into 
its  stronghold  and  there  successfully  besieged.  It  looks  now  as 
though  Providence  had  directed  the  course  of  the  campaign  while 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  executed  the  decree."  ®' 

The  modest  victor  was  promptly  rewarded  by  having  the 
bulk  of  his  army  taken  away  from  him  by  the  wiseacre  Hal- 
leck,  who  ruled  the  military  councils  at  Washington,  vetoed 
Grant's  suggestion  for  a  campaign  against  Mobile  and  com- 
pelled him  to  detach  the  bulk  of  his  troops  in  order  to  re- 
enforce  General  Eosecrans  and  relieve  Chattanooga.^^  Early 
in  October  Grant  himself  was  summoned  I^orth  ^^  to  take  the 
general  command  of  the  troops  drawn  from  the  West,^^  as 


During  1863  127 

Rosecrans  had  meanwhile  been  badly  defeated  by  Bragg  at 
Chickamauga,^^  "  the  hardest  fought  and  bloodiest  battle  of 
the  Rebellion "  "^^  considering  the  number  of  forces  en- 
gaged. ^-"^  This  victory  so  crippled  the  Confederates  that  no 
benefits  inured  to  them/^  although  Rosecrans  found  himself 
at  Chattanooga  practically  in  a  state  of  siege,  hemmed  in  be- 
tween his  adversary  in  front  and  the  mountains  in  his  rear."^^ 

On  October  16th  Grant,  having  reached  Cairo,  was  in- 
vested with  command  of  the  newly-created  Military  Division 
of  the  Mississippi.'^*  Arriving  at  Chattanooga  on  fhe 
23rd, ^^  he  began  to  concentrate  the  armies  under  Sherman  '^^ 
and  Thomas,  the  latter  of  whom  had  superseded  Rosecrans  ^'^ 
and  had  been  re-enforced  by  Hooker's  two  corps  which  had 
been  sent  by  rail  from  the  East."^^  On  November  24th  and 
25th  Grant  fought  the  battle  of  Chattanooga  M^hich,  in  real- 
ity, consisted  of  three  detached  actions  at  Lookout  Mountain, 
the  valley  of  the  Chattanooga  and  Missionary  Ridge,  all 
strongly  fortified  by  Bragg.  Hooker  assaulted  the  first  ^^ 
and  swept  the  valley  clear,  while  Sherman  after  desperate 
fighting  on  the  left  was  re-enforced  by  Thomas  and  carried 
the  ridge  by  storm,  and  a  prompt  pursuit  by  Sheridan  ^^ 
completed  the  success  by  capturing  most  of  the  prisoners 
taken.  ^^ 

Considering  the  strength  of  Bragg's  position,  "  the  victory 
of  Chattanooga  ^^  was  won  against  great  odds,"  ^^  although 
it  must  be  confessed  that  the  blunders  of  the  Confederate 
commander  contributed  largely  to  his  adversary's  success.^* 
Grant  immediately  started  for  Knoxville  where  Burnside 
had  been  blockaded  since  ISTovember  l7th,  and  his  approach 
forced  Longstreet,  who  had  attempted  to  carry  the  place  by 
assault, ^^  to  raise  the  siege  on  December  4th.  ^^  Shortly 
afterward  the  opposing  armies  went  into  winter  quarters. 
Grant's  headquarters  being  established  at  Nashville  on  the 
20th.s^ 


CHAPTER  XII 
MILITARY  LEGISLATIOI^  m  1864 

OX  January  16tli  an  amendment  was  made  to  tlie  reso- 
lution of  December  23,  1863/  with  respect  to  the 
money  paid  in  by  men  seeking  to  escape  service  under  the 
draft.^  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  postpone- 
ment until  January  5,  1864,  of  the  draft  for  the  300,000 
men  demanded  in  the  President's  call  of  October  17,  1863, 
in  order  to  permit  Congress  to  make  some  necessary  amend- 
ments to  the  Enrolment  Act.^  The  plan  contemplated  was, 
as  the  Provost  Marshal  General  pointed  out :  ^ 

"  1st,  to  offer  a  large  bounty  to  the  man  presenting  himself 
as  a  recruit,  this  bounty  being  divided  into  instalments  and 
distributed  through  the  period  of  his  enlistment;  2nd,  to  se- 
cure the  services  of  active  and  reliable  men  as  recruiting  agents, 
who,  liberally  remunerated  by  the  premium  allowed  for  each 
man  the}^  presented,  would  devote  themselves  wholly  to  the  bus- 
iness, be  under  the  control  of  the  government,  and  held  respon- 
sible for  their  behavior. 

"  A  dread  of  the  draft  on  the  part  of  some,  and  a  commendable 
pride  in  having  their  localities  escape  compulsory  service  on  the 
part  of  others,  resulted  in  defeating  these  two  main  objects. 
To  fill  their  respective  quotas  and  avoid  the  draft,  towns, 
counties,  and  States  offered  bounties  and  premiums  so  greatly 
in  excess  of  those  offered  by  the  government  as  to  make  the 
latter  of  inappreciable  effect,'  especially  as  the  local  bounties 
were  generally  paid  in  full  at  the  time  of  enlistment. 

"In  the  anxiety  of  towns  and  States  to  iill  quotas,  useful 
regulations  and  wholesome  restraints  upon  fraud  and  abuse  were, 
in  some  instances,  pronounced  by  the  public  to  be  unnecessary 
and  vexatious  obstacles  to  success  in  recruiting,  and  were  con- 
sequently defeated  or  disregarded.  .  .  . 

"  The  opportunities  for  fraud  and  gain,  in  connection  with 
the  increase  of  local  bounties,  grew  rapidly,  and  Avith  the  bus- 

128 


During  1864  129 

iness  open  to  the  bad  as  well  as  the  good,  very  soon  produced 
the  class  of  men  known  as  bounty  and  substitute  brokers.  Tlie 
network  with  which  they  covered  the  country  was  so  well  con- 
trived and  so  skilfully  managed,  that  it  was  difficult  for  re- 
cruits or  substitutes  to  get  into  the  service  without  passing 
through  their  hands.  .  .  . 

"  The  wrongs  to  individuals,  and  the  injury  to  the  re- 
cruiting SERVICE  and  the  CAUSE  OF  THE  COUNTRY,  RESULTING 
FROM  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THESE  SUBSTITUTE  AND  BOUNTY  BROK- 
ERS, AND  FROM  THE  LARGE  LOCAL  BOUNTIES  .  .  .  ARE  OF  SUCH 
A   CHARACTER  AND  EXTENT   AS  TO   PROVE  THE   NECESSITY,   Under 

similar   circumstances,   if   they   should   arise  hereafter,   of   an 

ENTIRE    SUPPRESSION    OF    SUBSTITUTE    BROKERAGE,    aS    practised 

during  the  late  war." 

A  long  discussion  in  Congress  ended  in  a  number  of 
amendments  to  the  Enrolment  Act  and  the  new  law  was  ap- 
proved on  February  24th.  The  first  section  Vv-ent  straight  to 
the  point  by  declaring 

"  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall  be  authorized, 
whenever  he  shall  deem  it  necessary  during  the  present  war,  to 
call  for  such  number  of  men  for  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States  as  the  public  exigencies  may  require." 

That  Congress  was  in  earnest  this  time  is  manifest  from 
the  provisions  of  this  act.  The  quotas  to  be  furnished  by 
any  subdivision  ^  were  to  be  proportioned  to  the  resident 
males  liable  to  military  duty,  including  those  already  sup- 
plied, and  in  the  event  of  deficiency  repeated  drafts  were  to 
be  made  until  the  entire  quota  was  filled.^  In  case  a  sub- 
stitute were  furnished,  the  immunity  of  the  original  was 
made  wholly  dependent  upon  the  immunity  of  the  substi- 
tute; and  if  the  substitute  were,  or  became,  subject  to  draft, 
the  name  of  the  original  was  to  be  restored  to  the  list  pf  those 
enroled  as  liable  for  service,  and  even  the  payment  of  money 
was  to  afford  no  exemption  beyond  a  year  at  the  outside.^ 
The  most  drastic  provision  of  all  limited  the  persons  ex- 
empted from  enrolment  and  draft  to 

"  Such  as  are  rejected  as  physically  and  mentally  unfit  for 


130     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

service,  all  persons  actually  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of 
the  United  States  at  the  time  of  the  draft,  and  all  persons  who 
have  served  in  the  military  or  naval  service  two  years  during 
the  present  war,  and  been  honorably  discharged  therefrom."  ^ 

Eesistance  to  enrolment  or  to  the  arrest  of  any  spy  or  de- 
serter was  made  punishable  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  $5,000  or 
-Q.ve  years'  imprisonment.^^  Fines  were  also  imposed  for 
false  statements/^  and  fines  or  imprisonment  for  false  re- 
ports/^ fees  in  excess  of  those  prescribed  by  law,^^  and  for 
the  procuring  of  substitutes  by  enroling  ofiicers,  provost 
marshals  or  surgeons  or  any  of  their  employees.  ^^  All  able- 
bodied  male  negroes  were  to  be  enroled  in,  and  form  part  of, 
the  national  forces.  In  the  case  of  a  slave  drafted  into 
service,  his  master  was  to  receive  the  usual  bounty  of  $100.^^ 
The  power  of  provost  marshals  and  boards  of  enrolment  w^as 
properly  enlarged,  and  certified  copies  of  their  records  were 
declared  to  be  valid  "  evidence  in  any  civil  or  military 
court."  ^^  The  fact  that  a  person  of  foreign  birth  had  voted 
w^as  declared  "  conclusive  evidence  that  he  is  not  entitled  to 
exemption  from  military  service,''  and  all  claims  for  exemp- 
tion were  to  be  verified  under  oath  or  affirmation.^'^  Men 
w^ho  were  "  conscientiously  opposed  to  the  bearing  of  arms  " 
or  prohibited  from  so  doing  by  their  religion  were  to  "  be  con- 
sidered as  non-combatants  "  and  assigned  to  duty  in  hos- 
pitals or  might  be  exempted  on  the  payment  of  $300  "  to  be 
applied  to  the  benefit  of  the  sick  and  wounded  soldiers,"  but 
any  declaration  of  conscientious  scruples  was  to  be  supported 
by  evidence  showing  that  the  man's  "  deportment  has  been 
uniformly  consistent  with  such  a  declaration."  ^^ 

In  a  word,  the  former  law  was  recast  virtually  m  toto 
and  a  genuine  effort  made  to  eradicate  the  existing  de- 
fects.-^ ^ 

On  May  20th  ^^  an  act  was  approved  which  organized  a 
regiment  of  veteran  volunteer  engineers  from  men  in  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The  term  of  service  was  fixed 
^^  for  three  years  or  during  the  w^ar,"  and  all  officers  were  to 


During  1864  131 

be  appointed  and  commissioned  by  the  President  ^^ — both 
very  wise  provisions. 

The  Act  of  June  15th  stipulated  that  all  coloured  men 
mustered  into  the  military  service  should  receive  from  and 
after  January  1,  1861,  the  same  equipments,  emoluments, 
etc.,  as  other  regular  or  volunteer  soldiers;  while  those  who 
joined  after  the  act  went  into  effect  were  entitled  to  bounties 
to  the  amount  of  $100,  the  same  provision  being  made  for 
every  volunteer,  irrespective  of  colour,  who  was  mustered  in 
under  the  call  of  October  17,  1863.  l^egroes  who  were  free 
and  in  the  military  service  on  April  19,  1861,  were  declared 
to  be  entitled  to  pay,  bounty  and  clothing  allowed  by  the  laws 
existing  at  the  time  of  their  enlistment.  The  5th  and  last 
section  provided 

^^  That  all  enlistments  hereafter  made  in  the  regular  army 
of  the  United  States,  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  re- 
bellion, may  be  for  the  term  of  three  years/'  ^^ 

The  Act  of  February  24th  had  not  been  in  operation  for 
four  months  before  it  was  found  to  contain  certain  objec- 
tions which  it  was  sought  to  overcome  by  an  amendatory 
Act  of  July  4th.^^  That  great  difficulty  had  been  encoun- 
tered in  securing  men  even  under  such  a  drastic  measure  as 
drafting  is  evident  from  the  opening  sections.  The  first 
provided 

"  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  may,  at  his  dis- 
cretion, at  any  time  hereafter,  call  for  any  number  of  men  as 
volunteers,  for  the  respective  terms  of  one,  two,  and  three  years, 
for  military  service  .  .  .  and  every  volunteer  who  is  accepted 
and  mustered  into  service  for- a  term  of  one  year,  unless  sooner 
discharged,  shall  receive,  and  be  paid  by  the  United  States,  a 
bounty  of  one  hundred  dollars;  and  if  for  a  term  of  two  years, 
...  a  bounty  of  two  hundred  dollars ;  and  if  for  a  term  of  three 
years,  ...  a  bounty  of  three  hundred  dollars ;  one-third  of 
which  bounty  shall  be  paid  to  the  soldier  at  the  time  of  his 
being  mustered  into  service,  one-third  at  the  expiration  of  one- 
half  of  his  term  of  service,  and  one-third  at  the  expiration  of 
his  term  of  office.  .  .  .''  ^* 


132     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  second  section,  not  content  with  the  former  mandate 
that,  in  the  event  of  a  deficiency  in  any  district,  drafts  were 
to  be  continued  until  the  shortage  had  been  made  good,  went 
to  the  length  of  ordering  '^  a  draft  for  one  hundred  per 
centum  in  addition  to  the  number  required  to  fill  quota  of 
any  district."  ^^  Surely  no  force  bill  could  have  been 
harsher,  and  Congress  had  apparently  awakened  to  a  reali- 
zation of  the  truth  of  Washington's  declaration  that  a  long 
and  bloody  war  cannot  be  prosecuted  on  patriotism  alone  but 
"  must  be  aided  by  a  prospect  of  interest  or  some  reward," 
and  that  '^  a  peremptory  draft "  is  the  only  effectual  solu- 
tion. ^^ 

CALLS  FOR  TROOPS  DURING  1864 

The  folly  of  enlisting  troops  during  hostilities  for  any 
period  less  than  ^'^  for  the  war ''  was  demonstrated  anew  and 
in  a  most  conclusive  manner  during  this  year.  The  expira- 
tion of  the  terms  of  service  of  the  officers  and  men  called  out 
during  1861  for  three  years,  and  during  1863  for  six 
months,^  ^  necessitated  the  raising  of  new  armies,  doubly  so 
since  the  draft  during  the  latter  year  had  fallen  short  of 
producing  the  number  of  men  required  to  carry  on  the  war 
successfully.^^ 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  President's  call  on 
October  17,  1863,  for  300,00  men.^^  This  was  supplemented 
by  another  issued  on  February  1,  1864,  for  200,000,  but,  al- 
though those  raised  by  the  draft  in  1863  w^ere  embraced  in 
these  calls, ^^  the  response  fell  below  the  requirements,  inso- 
much as  only  631/^  per  cent,  of  the  500,000  were  fumished.^^ 
On  March  14th  an  additional  call  was  made  for  200,000 
men  for  three  years,  but  in  this  case  the  number  who  came 
forward  far  exceeded  the  quota  fixed.  ^^  Once  again  re- 
course was  had  to  militia  and,  by  a  call  dated  April  23rd, 
85,000  were  summoned  for  service  limited  to  one  hundred 
days.^^ 

On  July  18th  a  fourth  call  was  made,  the  number  asked 


During  1864  133 

for  being  500,000,  but  in  view  of  the  excess  on  previous  calls 
the  quotas  were  considerably  reduced, ^^  and  in  this  instance 
the  384,882  men  furnished  surpassed  the  number  required. 
J^otwdthstanding  the  enormous  outpouring  of  men  already 
made  in  response  to  the  Government's  demands,  it  was  found 
urgent  to  issue  another  call  on  December  19th  for  300,000 
men,  for  service  ranging  from  one  to  three  years.  Only 
70  per  cent,  were  supplied,^  ^  but  fortunately  without  detri- 
ment to  the  cause  as  the  necessity  for  more  troops  ceased  to 
exist  before  the  majority  of  States  had  furnished  their  full 
quotas. ^^  As  it  was,  the  Government  had  called  for  no  less 
than  1,585,000  troops  in  fourteen  months  and  had  met  with 
responses  to  the  amount  of  1,249,709. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

On  March  2nd  the  Senate  confirmed  the  nomination  of 
Ulysses  S.  Grant  as  Lieutenant-General,  and  a  week  later 
his  commission  was  handed  him  at  Washington  by  President 
Lincoln  in  person.  On  the  12th  he  was  officially  placed  in 
supreme  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  and 
a  fortnight  afterward  he  established  his  headquarters  at  Cul- 
peper,  Virginia.^  ^  The  importance  of  this  appointment  can 
scarcely  be  over-estimated.^^  The  chaotic  mismanagement 
of  arnaies  which  had  characterised  Halleck's  regime  became 
a  thing  of  the  past,  and  thenceforth  a  definite  military  policy 
was  inaugurated  and  consistently  followed. ^^ 

Grant's  initial  step  was  to  concentrate  all  possible  Union 
forces,  which  had  been  greatly  disseminated,  and  to  have 
Sheridan  placed  in  command  of  the  cavalry,  which  had  here- 
tofore accomplished  but  little  by  comparison  with  its  capa- 
bilities under  a  really  skilful  leader.**^  Before  April  9th 
Grant  had  matured  his  plans.  Sherman,  who  had  succeeded 
him  in  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
was  to  move  from  Chattanooga  directly  against  Johnston's 
army  ^^  and  Atlanta,  while  Meade  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  —  which     Grant     would     accompany  —  advanced 


134     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

against  Lee  and  Richmond. ^^  These  were  the  principal  ob- 
jectives, and  the  operations  of  the  other  Union  forces  ^^  were 
necessarily  secondary  and  merely  intended  to  supplement  and 
support  the  main  armies.  In  a  word,  Grant  purposed  to 
make  a  united  eifort  with  the  maximum  force  against  the 
two  Confederate  armies,  to  engage  them  simultaneously  and 
to  subject  them  to  continuous  hammering  until  their  resist- 
ance was  overcome  and  their  destruction  achieved.* 

Pursuant  to  this  plan  Meade  crossed  the  Rapidan  on  May 
4th  ^*  and  on  the  5th  came  into  collision  with  Ewell's  corps 
near  Wilderness  Tavern.  ^^  The  battle  raged  furiously  all 
day  "  and  throughout  the  6th,^^  but  on  the  morning  of  the 
7th  Lee  had  fallen  back  within  his  entrenched  lines.  That 
night  Grant  resumed  his  advance,  and  next  day  General 
Warren  —  commanding  the  5th  Corps  which  formed  the  van 
—  was  again  engaged  wdth  Ewell,  who  sought  to  delay  his 
movement  in  order  to  permit  the  line  at  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  to  be  fortified.  The  ensuing  three  days  were  spent 
in  manoeuvering  and  fighting,  Sheridan  meanwhile  starting 
on  the  9th  on  a  raid  against  Lee's  communications  with 
Richmond.'**^  The  battle  of  Spottsylvania  terminated  on 
May  18th,  and  on  the  night  of  the  21st  Grant  began  to 
transfer  his  army  to  the  !N^orth  Anna  River  but  found  him- 
self again  anticipated  by  Lee.  From  the  23rd  to  the  night 
of  the  26th  ^"  the  fighting  continued  unabated,  but  the  Union 
commander  withdrew  to  the  north  bank  and  set  his  army  in 
motion  to  Hanover  Court  House  ^^  in  the  hope  of  turning 
his  adversary's  right  flank.     But  Lee  had  fathomed  his  pur- 

*  "  I  therefore  determined,  first,  to  use  the  greatest  number  of  troops 
practicable  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy;  preventing  him  from 
using  the  same  force  at  different  seasons  against  first  one  and  then  an- 
other of  our  armies,  and  the  possibility  of  repose  for  refitting  and  pro- 
ducing necessary  supplies  for  carrying  on  resistance.  Second,  to  ham- 
mer continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy  and  his  re- 
sources, until  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way,  there  should  be 
nothing  left  to  him  but  an  equal  submission  with  the  loyal  section  of 
our  common  country  to  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  land." — 
Grant's  Official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  July  22,  1865, 
and  quoted  in  his  Memoirs,  II,  p.  556. 


During  1864  135 

pose,  and  from  the  28th  to  the  30th  the  struggle  was  re- 
newed at  that  point.  On  June  1st  the  battle  of  Cold  Har- 
bor opened  with  an  attack  on  the  Confederate  entrench- 
ments; next  day  there  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting  but  on  the 
3rd  it  was  resumed  with  the  utmost  fury.^^  Four  days  later 
Sheridan  was  sent  on  another  raid,^^  and  on  the  12th  Grant 
was  forced  to  relinquish  his  attempts  to  drive  his  opponents 
from  their  fortified  lines,  his  own  tremendous  losses  being  in 
nowise  commensurate  with  the  results  achieved.  ^^  That 
night,  moving  again  by  his  left  flank  and  changing  his  base 
of  operations,  he  started  across  the  James  for  Petersburg, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  15th  and  at  once  attacked.  On  the 
17th  and  18th  his  assaults  were  renewed  with  great  vigour 
"  but  only  resulted  in  forcing  the  enemy  into  an  interior  line, 
from  which  he  could  not  be  dislodged."  ^^  I^ext  day  he  sat 
down  to  a  regular  siege  of  Beauregard's  forces  ^^  "  and 
penned  Lee  and  his  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  within  the 
intrenchments  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  for  ten  long 
months  ^^  on  the  pure  defensive,  to  remain  almost  passive 
observers  of  local  events,^^  while  Grant's  other  armies  were 
absolutely  annihilating  the  Southern  Confederacy."  ^^ 

The  operations  of  the  secondary  armies  in  Virginia  had 
their  effect,  although  they  were  not  attended  with  conspicu- 
ous success,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Hunter,  who  was 
however  driven  back  from  Lynchburg  to  the  Kanawha  Val- 
ley by  Early.^'  The  latter  then  continued  up  the  Shenan- 
doah, crossed  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown  on  July  5th  and 
6th,  defeated  General  Lew  Wallace  at  Monocacy  ^^  and 
moved  against  Washington,  in  accordance  with  Lee's  plan  to 
force  Grant  to  withdraw  from  the  vicinity  of  Richmond. 
On  the  12th  Early,  having  —  to  use  his  own  words  — r^^  given 
the  Federal  authorities  a  terrible  fright,"  ^^  began  his 
retrograde  movement  to  Strasburg,  where  he  arrived  ten  days 
later.  Learning  that  Wright's  corps  had  been  withdrawn 
from  Washington,  Early  attacked  and  defeated  Crook  at 
Kernstown,   recrossed  the  Potomac   into  Maryland,  burned 


136     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Chambersbiirg,  levied  contributions  upon  other  towns  and 
threw  the  whole  country  into  consternation  but,  in  spite  of 
the  efforts  to  catch  him,  succeeded  in  getting  back  into  Vir- 
ginia, although  two  of  his  brigades  were  badly  cut  up  by 
Averell  at  Moorefield  on  August  7th.^^ 

On  that  same  day  General  Sheridan  ^^  assumed  command 
of  the  Middle  Military  Division,^^  and  on  August  10th,  hav- 
ing massed  his  entire  command  ^^  near  Harper's  Ferry,  he 
began  his  advance  against  Early,  who  had  concentrated  at 
Martinsburg,  West  Virginia.^*  After  five  wrecks  ^^  spent 
largely  in  manoeuvering,^^  the  opposing  forces  met  at  Ope- 
quon  —  better  known  as  the  battle  of  Winchester  —  v;here 
Sheridan  won  a  notable  victory  on  September  19th.^^  Fol- 
lowing up  his  adversary,  he  inflicted  a  second  defeat  upon 
him  at  Fisher's  Hill  three  days  later,^^  and  on  October  19th 
a  rout  at  Cedar  Creek  was  transformed  into  a  splendid  suc- 
cess by  Sheridan  who  had  galloped  up  from  Winchester.^ ^ 
Early's  army  was  so  demoralised  by  its  defeat  that  it  did  not 
attempt  again  to  take  the  offensive,  and  the  operations  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  ended  that  year  with  Sheridan  in  winter 
quarters  at  Kernstown  and  Early  at  Staunton. '^*^  This  cam- 
paign had  cost  the  Union  forces  16,952  men,  '^  but  these 
losses  are  no  just  measure  of  the  results  of  that  victory, 
which  made  it  impossible  to  use  the  Valley  of  Virginia  as  a 
Confederate  base  of  supplies  and  as  an  easy  route  for  raids 
within  the  Union  lines."  ^^ 

Meanwhile  Sherman  had  distinguished  himself  by  a  cam- 
paign which  was  one  of  the  most  important  achievements 
during  the  war.  Starting  from  Chattanooga  on  May  4th 
with  98,707  troops  and  254  guns,'^^  he  defeated  Johnston  '^^ 
at  Eesaca  on  the  13th  to  16th,  forced  him  to  retreat,  worsted 
him  again  at  IN'ew  Hope  Church  on  May  25th  to  28th,  but 
was  repulsed  at  Kenesaw  Mountain  on.  June  27th.'^^  Within 
three  days  Johnston  abandoned  his  position  and  retreated 
across  the  Chattahoochee,  and  the  Confederate  government, 
dissatisfied  with  his  Fabian  policy,  superseded  him  by  Gen- 


During  ^1864  137 

eral  John  B.  Hood,  much  to  Sherman's  content.  On  July 
20th  the  new  commander  attacked  the  Union  army  but,  after 
desperate  fighting,  was  driven  within  his  entrenchments,  his 
efforts  on  the  22nd  and  28th  being  equally  unsuccessful.'^^ 
"  Thereafter  the  Confederate  army  in  Atlanta  clung  to  its 
parapets,"  "^^  but  Sherman  kept  ^'  hammering  away  all  the 
time ''  ^^  and  on  August  25th  began  his  advance  to  Jones- 
boro  —  26  miles  below  the  city  —  which  compelled  Hood 
to  evacuate  Atlanta  and  permitted  its  occupation  by  the 
Union  army  on  September  2nd.'^^  On  the  21st  Hood  moved 
to  Palmetto  Station  '^^  and  commenced  an  aggressive  move- 
ment against  Sherman's  communications,  thus  forcing  the  lat- 
ter to  send  General  Thomas  back  to  ISTashville  and  Schofield  to 
Knoxville,  while  he  remained  in  Atlanta  and  took  precau- 
tions to  frustate  his  adversary's  plan.  Crossing  the  Chatta- 
hoochee on  October  1st,  Hood  advanced  to  Dallas  ^^  and 
thence  by  a  detour  to  Eesaca,  destroying  the  railway  to 
Dalton  and  capturing  the  garrison  there.  Sherman  ^^  fol- 
lowed to  Eesaca  and  turned  west  to  intercept  his  retreat  by 
the  valley  of  the  Chattanooga,  but  so  rapid  was  Hood's  march 
that  he  reached  Gadsden  without  obstacle,  Avhile  Sherman 
halted  at  Gaylesville.  Hood  then  marched  in  a  northwest- 
wardly direction  across  the  mountains  to  Florence  on  the 
Tennessee  Eiver,^^  and  Sherman,  realizing  his  purpose, 
promptly  despatched  General  Schofield  and  two  corps  by  rail 
to  Nashville  to  re-enforce  Thomas  in  the  defence  of  Tennes- 
see. He  then  addressed  himself  to  the  necessary  prepara- 
tions, with  the  object  of  resuming  his  offensive  operations  in 
Georgia,  and  on  November  4th  he  assembled  60,598  troops 
in  Atlanta.  ^^  Convinced  that  Thomas  would  be  equal  to  the 
task  of  containing  Hood,  Sherman,  being  under  the  necessity 
of  establishing  a  new  base  for  future  operations,  selected  the 
seacoast,  with  Savannah  as  the  nearest  point. ^^  On  Novem- 
ber 15th  his  celebrated  "march  to  the  sea"  began;  on  De- 
cember 10th  the  intervening  300  miles  had  been  covered,  but 
it  was  not  until  the  22nd  that  the  city  had  been  captured  and 


138     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Sherman  had  made  his  triumphal  entry  into  Savannah.^^ 
Meanwhile  Hood,  having  completely  re-organized  and  sup- 
plied his  army  at  Florence, ^^  resumed  his  advance  against 
^Nashville.  At  Franklin  he  encountered  Schofield  on  jN^o- 
vember  30th  and  sustained  a  severe  check  ^^  but,  nothing 
daunted,  pushed  on  and  invested  isTashville  on  December  2nd. 
Thomas  coolly  bided  his  time,  but  on  the  15th  sallied  forth 
from  his  entrenchments,  attacked  Hood  in  a  strongly  fortified 
position  and  on  the  following  day  utterly  annihilated  his 
army.^^ 

Hood  thus  ceased  to  be  a  factor  and  ^'  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1864  the  conflict  at  the  West  was  concluded,  leaving 
nothing  to  be  considered  in  the. grand  game  of  war  but  Lee's 
army,  held  by  Grant  in  Richmond,  and  the  Confederate  de- 
tachments at  Mobile  and  along  the  seaboard  north  of  Savan- 
nah." * 


*  Sherman  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  258. 

General  Wilson  gives  a  most  interesting  account  of  a  discussion  with 
General  Sherman  at  Gaylesville  on  October  22nd,  and  relates  ( Under  the 
Old  Flag,  II,  p,  17)  that  Sherman  "commented  freely  on  the  strong 
as  well  as  the  weak  points  of  Grant's  character  and  in  the  midst  of  the 
conversation  looked  up  suddenly,  with  the  glow  of  the  camp  fire  on  his 
deeply  marked  features  and  exclaimed :  *  Wilson,  I  am  a  damned  sight 
smarter  man  than  Grant;  I  know  a  great  deal  more  about  war,  military 
history,  strategy,  and  grand  tactics  than  he  does;  I  know  more  about 
organization,  supply  and  administration  and  about  everything  else  than 
he  does;  but  I'll  tell  you  where  he  beats  me  and  where  he  beats  the 
world.  He  don't  care  a  damn  for  what  the  enemy  does  out  of  his  sight, 
but  it  scares  me  like  hell !  '  He  added :  '  I  am  more  nervous  than  he 
is.  I  am  more  likely  to  change  my  orders  or  to  countermarch  my  com- 
mand than  he  is.  He  uses  such  information  as  he  has  according  to  his 
best  judgment;  he  issues  his  orders  and  does  his  level  best  to  carry  them 
out  without  much  reference  to  what  is  going  on  about  him  and,  so  far, 
experience  seems  to  have  fully  justified  him.'  " 


CHAPTER  XIII 

MILITAEY  LEGISLATION  IN  1865 

ASIDE  from  a  comparatively  unimportant  measure  fix- 
ing the  pay  of  medical  directors/  the  principal  legisla- 
tion came  at  the  end  of  the  short  session  of  Congress.  On 
March  3rd,  four  important  acts  were  approved.  One  of  these 
made  it  illegal  to  offer  for  military  or  naval  service  any  one 
charged  with  a  criminal  offence  within  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia ;  ^  another  provided  for  the  appointment  of  a  Chief  of 
Staff  to  the  Lieutenant-General ;  and  a  third  permitted  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  appoint  certain  commissary  officers  to 
each  geographical  military  division,  separate  army  corps,  de- 
partment or  principal  subsistence  depot.^ 

The -remaining  law  was  by  all  odds  the  most  important, 
and  its  27  sections  were  intended  to  supplement  or  "  to 
amend  the  several  acts  heretofore  passed  for  the  enroling 
and  calling  out  of  the  national  forces.''  ^  The  most  essen- 
tial features  of  this  measure  were: 

(1)  The  payment  of  bounties  due  to  a  deceased  soldier  to 
his  widow,  children  or  relatives ;  '^ 

(2)  the  payment  of  the  full  bounty  to  any  soldier  disabled  in 
the  line  of  duty ;  ^ 

(3)  the  organization  of  six  regiments  of  volunteer  engineers 
and  the  increase  of  the  existing  regiment  by  two  companies ; '' 

(4)  the  stipulation  that  no  officer  was  to  be  appointed  to  a 
regular  regiment  if  reduced  below  the  legal  minimum,  "  beyond 
those  necessary  for  the  command  of  such  a  reduced  number  " ;  ^ 

(5)  no  brevet  officers  in  the  Eegular  army  to  receive  pay  and 
allowances  in  excess  of  "  brevet  officers  of  the  same  grade  in  the 
volunteer  service  " ;  ^ 

(6)  the  exoneration  of  an  officer  upon  re-trial  or  the  failure 
of  the  court-martial  to  convene  within  six  months  after  the 
application  of  the  accused  shall  quash  the  original  order  of  dis- 
missal ;  ^° 

139 


140     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

(7)  persons  who  have  been  drafted  and  who  have  furnished 
•acceptable  substitutes  for  three  years  shall  be  exempt  during  the 
immunity  from  service  of  the  substitute ;  ^^ 

(8)  the  enlistment  of  those  non  compos  mentis,  intoxicated 
or  incapacitated,  of  minors  or  deserters,  by  recruiting  agents, 
substitutes,  brokers  or  others,  for  pay  or  profit  was  to  be  pun- 
ished by  fines  ranging  from  $200  to  $1,000  or  by  imprisonment 
from  3  months  to  2  years,  or  both.  In  the  event  the  offender 
was  an  officer  of  the  Eegular  army,  the  penalty  was  dismissal 
from  the  service.  In  case  the  culprit  were  a  drafted  man,  his 
name  was  to  "be  again  placed  on  the  list  and  he  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  draft  thereafter  as  though  no  such  substitute  had  been 
furnished  by  him,"  and,  if  the  substitute  had  been  mustered 
into  service,  the  man  originally  drafted  was  to  be  "  held  to  serv- 
ice in  the  place  of  such  substitute,  and  he  shall  stand  in  the 
same  relation  and  be  subject  to  the  same  liability  as  before  the 
furnishing  of  such  substitute";  ^^ 

(9)  "in  case  any  substitute  shall  desert  from  the  army, 
and  .  .  .  that  the  party  furnishing  such  substitute  shall  have, 
in  any  way,  directly  or  indirectly,  aided  or  abetted  such  deser- 
tion .  .  .  then  such  person  shall  be  immediately  placed  in  the 
army,  and  shall  serve  for  the  period  for  which  he  was  liable  to 
draft,  such  service  to  commence  at  the  date  of  the  desertion  of 
the  substitute  " ;  ^^ 

(10)  the  President  was  required  to  issue  a  proclamation  in 
order  "  to  notify  all  deserters  returning  within  sixty  days  .  .  . 
that  they  shall  be  pardoned  on  condition  of  returning  to  their 
regiments  and  companies,  or  to  such  organizations  as  they  may 
be  assigned  to,  until  they  have  served  for  a  period  of  time  equal 
to  their  original  term  of  enlistment."  Upon  failure  to  comply, 
they  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  to  have  voluntarily  relinquished 
and  forfeited  their  rights  of  citizenship  and  their  rights  to 
become  citizens ;  and  "  such  deserters  shall  be  forever  in- 
capable OF  holding  any.  office  of  trust  or  profit  under 
THE  United  States,  or  of  exercising  any  rights  of  citizens 
thereof."  All  deserters  and  persons  enrolled  leaving  their  dis- 
trict or  the  country  "  with  the  intent  to  avoid  any  draft  into 
the  military  or  naval  service,  duly  ordered,  shall  be  liable  to 
the  penalties  of  this  section  " ;  ^* 

(11)  recruits  procured  prior  to  the  operation  of  a  draft  shall 
be  credited  to,  and  be  substitutes  for,  the  persons  obtaining 
them ;  ^^ 


During  1865  141 

(12)  employes  of  the  War  Department  were  permitted  to  ad- 
minister oaths  for  the  settlement  of  officers'  accounts  with  the 
same  force  and  effect  as  if  administered  by  magistrates  or  justices 
of  the  peace  but  without  any  expense  to  the  officer ;  ^^  and 

(13)  "acting  assistant  surgeons,  contract  surgeons,  and  sur- 
geons and  commissioners  on  the  enrolling  boards,  while  in  the 
military  service  of  the  United  States,  shall  hereafter  be  exempt 
from  all  liability  to  be  drafted."  ^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1865 

The  winter  of  1864—1865  was  of  unusual  severity  and  its 
effects  were  obviously  felt  more  by  Lee's  famished  troops, — 
who  were  in  dire  want  of  almost  everything  and  who  deserted 
by  the  hundreds, —  than  by  Grant's  better-provided  army.^^ 
On  February  1st  Sherman  started  north  from  Savannah  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  his  junction  with  Grant,  and  on 
March  7th  entered  North  Carolina  between  Cheraw  and 
Fayetteville.^^  By  all  the  rules  of  strategy  Lee  should  have 
united  with  Johnston  —  who  had  been  restored  to  his  former 
command  ^^ —  to  crush  Sherman  before  he  could  unite  wdth 
the  Union  army  before  Richmond,  but  so  deficient  were  his 
means  of  transport  that  such  an  operation  was  out  of  the 
question.^  ^  He  resolved  however  to  make  a  final  effort  to- 
overw^helm  Grant,  notwithstanding  the  strength  of  the  lat- 
ter's  fortified  position  in  his  front.  On  March  25th  Fort 
Stedman  on  the  Union  right  was  assaulted,  but  in  spite  of 
the  most  strenuous  attempts  the  attacks  failed  signally.^^ 
Two  days  later  Sheridan  joined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
having  left  Winchester  just  one  month  before,^ ^  destroyed 
and  captured  most  of  Early's  force  at  Waynesboro'  on  March 
2nd,  and  permanently  crippled  both  the  Virginia  Central 
railway  and  the  James  Hiver  canal. ^*  Grant  then  deter- 
mined upon  a  counter-stroke  ^^  and  concentrated  a  large  force 
against  his  adversary's  right.^^  A  forward  thrust  begun  on 
March  29th  had  to  be  suspended  during  the  next  two  days, 
owing  to  the  flood  of  rain  which  rendered  the  roads  impas- 
sable, although  it  did  not  prevent  Lee  from  springing  like  a 


142     Militartf  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

cornered  tiger  upon  Warren  on  the  31st  or  from  attacking 
Sheridan,  who  had  been  sent  to  threaten  his  right  and  rear  ^^ 
and  who  had  ensconced  himself  on  his  flank  at  Dinwiddie 
Court  House. ^^  Sheridan  w^as  promptly  re-enforced  as 
agreed,  and  on  April  1st  won  the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  a  vic- 
tory which  routed  Lee's  right,  wrenched  it  from  his  centre 
and  left  him  no  alternative  except  to  abandon  Richmond  and 
Petersburg.2^  To  prevent  his  throwing  his  w^hole  w^eight 
against  Sheridan,  Grant  bombarded  his  adversary's  position 
all  night,  and  at  daylight  on  the  2nd  delivered  a  general  as- 
sault upon  the  Confederate  entrenchments,  which  was  almost 
uniformly  successful.  Petersburg  was  to  be  subjected  to 
similar  treatment  next  day  but  Lee,  having  but  one  line  of 
retreat  leading  anywhere  except  to  destruction,  evacuated 
both  places  during  the  night  of  the  2nd-3rd  and  took  the  only 
road  still  open  to  him,  which  ran  westward  up  the  Appomat- 
tox Eiver.  After  occupying  both  Richmond  and  Petersburg, 
Grant  immediately  started  his  army  in  pursuit,^ ^  his  object 
being  to  anticipate  Lee  before  he  could  reach  Danville. ^^ 
Next  day  Sheridan  learned  at  Jetersville  that  Lee  was  at 
Amelia  Court  House,^^  but  had  to  entrench  and  await 
Meade's  infantry  which  did  not  overtake  him  until  the  fol- 
lowing afternoon.  The  combined  pressure  of  the  Union  col- 
umns forced  the  Confederates  to  abandon  some  guns  and 
several  hundred  wagons,^ ^  and  that  afternoon  Sheridan,  sup- 
ported by  the  6th  Corps  (Wright),  isolated  Ewell  from 
Longstreet  and  Gordon,  and  captured  his  entire  command 
with  the  exception  of  250  men  at  Sailor's  Creek,^^  while  the 
2nd  Corps  (Humphreys)  indulged  in  a  running  fight  with 
Gordon's  corps,  from  which  it  took  1,700  prisoners.^ ^  On 
the  7th  the  pursuit  was  continued  ^^  with  relentless  vigour, 
but,  although  Humphreys,  after  preventing  the  destruction 
of  the  important  High  Bridge,  suffered  a  check  at  Farm- 
ville,  he  was  successful  in  detaining  Lee  near  that  point 
from  midday  until  night,^"^  and  that  too  at  a  critical  time 
>vhen  the  very  minutes  were  equal  to  days.     That  evening 


During  :1865  143 

Grant  sent  a  flag  of  truce  with  a  letter  to  Lee  emphasizing 
"  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance."  The  latter  re- 
plied by  asking  for  terms,  and  additional  correspondence  took 
place  on  the  8th,^^  while  the  wretched  Confederates  continued 
their  retreat,^  ^  unmolested  ^^  except  for  rear-guard  actions.  ^^ 
Late  that  evening  Sheridan  drove  Lee's  advanced  guard  from 
Appomattox  station,  capturing  25  guns,  a  hospital-train  and 
four  railway  trains  loaded  with  supplies,  but  he  was  'having 
a  lively  fight  on  the  morning  of  April  9th  with  Gordon's 
corps  —  which  was  making  desperate  efforts  to  cut  its  way 
through  to  escape  —  when  Generals  Ord  and  Griflin  appeared 
on  the  scene.  "^^  The  arrival  of  these  two  corps  caused  the 
Confederates  to  desist  from  their  attempts,  and  Sheridan 
was  about  to  make  a  counter-attack  when  he  received  news 
that  Lee  had  surrendered.^^  The  Confederate  commander 
had  in  fact  sent  a  flag  of  truce  with  a  request  for  a  suspension 
of  hostilities  and  an  interview  with  General  Grant. ^^  This 
conference  took  place  that  afternoon  in  the  McLean  house  at 
Appomattox,^^  Grant  embodying  his  terms  in  a  letter  written 
by  himself  "^^  and  Lee  accepting  them  in  his  own  handwrit- 
ing. ^''^  By  4  o'clock  the  interview  had  terminated  ^^  and  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  passed  into  history.  The 
surrender  comprised  28,356  officers  and  men  who  were  duly 
paroled,^^  while  19,132  —  in  addition  to  those  killed  and 
wounded  —  had  been  captured  in  the  twelve  preceding 
days.^^  In  this  crowning  success  is  to  be  found  complete 
vindication  of  Grant's  plan  of  continuous  hammering  until 
his  adversary  through  sheer  attrition  was  reduced  to  submis- 
sion,^^ and  the  surrender  of  General  Lee,  who  had  fought 
seven  campaigns, ^^  "  prolonged  the  struggle  for  a  thousand 
days,  and  put  out  of  action,  in  the  meantime,  more  than 
three  of  the  enemy  for  every  man  of  his  own  army  at  its 
maximum  strength  "  ^^ — a  record  scarcely  paralleled  by  ]N^a- 
poleon  in  twenty  years  of  fighting  —  marked  the  virtual 
close  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Sherman,  after  his  interview  with  Grant,^^  rejoined  his 


144     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

army  at  Goldsboro',  l^ortli  Carolina,  and  resumed  his  opera- 
tions against  Johnston,  who  retreated  and  permitted  th^ 
former  to  occupy  Raleigh  on  April  13th.  Having  learned 
of  Lee's  surrender,  Johnston  on  that  same  day  proposed  ^'  sl 
temporary  suspension  of  active  operations  ''  with  a  view  to 
surrender  and,  after  an  unfortunate  contretemps,  eventually 
capitulated  on  the  26th  under  substantially  the  same  terms 
as  had  been  given  Lee.^^  Mobile  was  occupied  by  the  Fed- 
erals on  April  12thj  and  on  the  20th  Cobb  surrendered  at 
Macon  to  General  James  Harrison  Wilson,  who  had  wrought 
tremendous  destruction  to  the  Southern  cause  by  an  extraor- 
dinary campaign  and  capped  the  climax  by  capturing  Jef- 
ferson Davis  at  Irwinsville,  Georgia,  on  May  10th. ^^  Six 
days  earlier  Taylor  and  all  that  remained  of  the  Confederate 
forces  east  of  the  Mississippi  had  been  taken  prisoners  by 
General  Canby,  who  repeated  his  feat  on  May  26th  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river  by  capturing  Kirby  Smith  and  his  en- 
tire command, ^^  and  the  curtain  descended  upon  the  military 
operations  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

LESSOISTS    OF    THE    WAE    OF    THE    REBELLION 
AND  ITS  COST  m  MEN  AND  MONEY 

THE  short-sighted  military  policy  pursued  by  the 
United  States,  in  failing  to  maintain  in  time  of  peace 
a  Regular  Army  of  sufficient  size  and  expansiveness  to  fur- 
nish an  adequate  trained  force  to  suppress  the  rebellion  at 
its  inception,^  had  its  logical  outcome  in  the  prolongation 
of  the  war  for  four  years  and  in  a  most  unnecessary  loss  of 
life  ^ —  quite  apart  from  that  which  can  justly  be  charged 
to  the  mistakes  of  the  Union  generals  in  the  field.  Indeed 
it  is  highly  doubtful  whether  it  could  have  been  brought  to 
a  successful  conclusion  even  then  had  it  not  been  for  the  iron 
blockade  which  the  Navy  drew  about  the  coasts  of  the  Confed- 
eracy. The  dependence  placed  upon  untrained  volunteers 
and  militia,  virtually  to  the  exclusion  of  trained  regulars,^ 
necessitated  the  improvising  of  new  armies  which  were 
obliged  to  learn  the  duties  of  a  soldier  from  the  very  begin- 
ning in  the  hardest  of  all  schools  —  that  of  actual  war.  As 
might  be  expected,  blunder  after  blunder  was  committed  by 
these  volunteer  officers,  whose  ignorance  was  only  exceeded  by 
their  courage,  while  the  lack  of  discipline  among  the  troops, 
coupled  with  their  ignorance  of  how  to  take  care  of  themselves, 
produced  a  degree  of  sickness  out  of  all  proportion  to  that 
which  prevails  among  trained  soldiers  ^  who  have  been  taught 
military  hygiene.^  Inordinate  waste  and  expense  were  the 
natural  consequences,  and  these  conditions  are  in  nowise  sur- 
prising considering  that  they  have  inevitably  existed  among 
raw  troops. 

The  organizations  in  the  field,  instead  of  being  maintained 
at  the  proper  strength,  were  permitted  to  waste  away  until 

145 


146     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

the  officers  who  had  at  last  learned  how  to  lead,  found  them- 
selves without  troops  to  command,  although  hundreds  of  new 
and  untrained  regiments  were  hurried  to  the  front,  only  to 
undergo  the  same  process  of  learning  the  trade  of  a  soldier 
from  the  beginning,  with  the  obvious  result  that  for  months 
they  were  useless  as  a  military  asset.  Indeed,  in  some  cases, 
they  were  not  available  for  hard  campaigning  until  their  term 
of  service  was  about  to  expire.* 

The  folly  of  short  enlistments  was  again  committed,  and  all 
the  evils  attendant  in  its  train  were  once  more  made  appar- 
ent.    Aside  from  the  depletion  of  the  armies  in  the  field, f 


*  Ropes,  II,  pp.  219-220,  paints  the  following  admirable  picture  of 
the  military  situation  in  the  North  in  1862: 

"  While  the  Confederate  authorities  had  adopted  a  system  of  con- 
scription for  filling  the  gaps  in  their  wasted  battalions,  the  Northern 
Government  with  inexcusable  fatuity  had  in  April  actually  stopped 
recruiting,  and  nothing  was  thought  of,  at  least  in  the  Eastern  States, 
in  the  summer  of  1862,  hut  raising  neio  organizations.  Nothing  could 
exceed  the  infatuation  of  the  people  on  this  subject.  The  old  regiments, 
which  had  acquired  military  discipline  and  knowledge  of  warfare  by 
arduous  experiences  of  the  camp,  the  march,  and  the  battlefield,  were 
actually  allowed  to  waste  away;  the  invaluable  schools  of  the  soldier 
which  they  furnished  for  the  raw  recruits  were  almost  entirely  neg- 
lected ;  few  were  the  accessions  of  fresh  men  received  by  their  diminished 
ranks;  popula/r  enthusiasm  wa^  mainly  directed  to  the  raising  and 
equipment  of  brand-new  regiments,  none  of  ichich  could  possibly  be  of 
much  service  until  months  had  been  passed  in  learning  the  elements  of 
military  life  and  conduct.  In  some  of  the  Western  States  a  healthier 
standard  prevailed;  in  several  of  them  the  efforts  of  the  authorities 
were  chiefly  directed  to  the  reinforcement  of  the  existing  organizations; 
and  the  young  men  who  filled  the  gaps  in  the  lines  of  the  veteran  bat- 
talions of  Illinois  and  Wisconsin  learned  their  trade  in  half  the  time 
which  was  required  to  make  the  new  regiments  of  Pennsylvania  and 
Massachusetts  of  efficient  service  in  the  field. 

"  Nor  was  this  the  only  mistake  made  by  the  Federal  Government  in 
the  summer  of  1862.  Levies  of  troops  engaged  to  serve  only  for  nine 
months  were  accepted;  and  several  of  the  Eastern  States  were  unwise 
enough  to  adopt  this  shalloio  scheme,  and  to  send  the  flower  of  their 
fighting  men  into  organizations  ichich  from,  the  necessity  of  the  case 
could  hardly  be  made  fit  for  active  service  until  the  day  of  their  dis- 
bandment  wa^s  plainly  within  sight." 

■f  General  Sherman  devoted  the  final  chapter  of  his  Memoirs  to  Mili- 
tary Lessons  of  the  War  and  in  it  he  declared  (II,  pp.  387-388)  that 

"  The  greatest  mistake  made  in  our  civil  war  was  in  the  mode  of  re- 
cruitment and  promotion.  When  a  regiment  became  reduced  by  the 
necessary  wear  and  tear  of  service,  instead  of  being  filled  up  at  the 


Lessons  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion         147 

—  which  often  handicapped  their  commanders  at  crucial  pe- 
riods '^ —  the  approaching  discharge  of  large  numbers  of 
troops  forced  the  Union  generals  on  more  than  one  occasion 
to  act  precipitately,  and  sometimes  with  disastrous  results^ 
Even  before  the  initial  enthusiasm  for  the  war  had  sub- 
sided —  as  it  invariably  does  —  and  long  before  voluntary 
enlistments  had  practically  ceased,^  Congress,  pursued  by  its 
historical  infatuation,  sought  to  stimulate  recruiting  by  offer- 
ing bounties.  Beginning  with  $100  in  July,  1861,^  the  in- 
crease reached  $300  within  sixteen  months, ^^  while  the 
anxiety  to  get  trained  men  caused  as  much  as  $400  to  be 
offered  to  all  veterans  who  enlisted  or  re-enlisted  for  three 
years  or  "  for  the  war."  ^^  As  has  been  remarked,  the  States 
promptly  outbid  the  Government,  paying  exorbitant  boun- 
ties -^^  and  —  what  is  more  important  —  paying  them  almost 
uniformly  in  advance.  As  ^'  a  bird  in  the  hand  is  worth  two 
in  the  bush,"  men  naturally  sought  to  enlist  for  a  moderate 
bounty  paid  in  advance  in  preference  to  a  larger  amount  paid 
in  instalments.  As  the  officer  whose  experience  made  him 
the  most  competent  authority  on  the  subject  declared:  ^^ 

''  A  plan  of  recruitment,  based  upon  the  bounty/  system,  luill 
necessarily  he  more  expensive  than  any  other,  and,  as  a  rule, 
produce  soldiers  of  an  inferior  class;  and  although  bounty  is 
unquestionably  calculated  to  stimulate  recruiting,  it  does  not 
always  accomplish  that  object  at  the  proper  time.     For  when  it 


bottom,  and  the  vacancies  among  the  officers  filled  from  the  best  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men,  the  habit  was  to  raise  new  regiments, 
with  new  colonels,  captains,  and  men,  leaving  the  old  and  experienced 
battalions  to  dwindle  away  into  mere  skeleton  organizations.  I  believe 
with  the  volunteers  this  matter  was  left  to  the  States  exclusively,  and 
I  remember  that  Wisconsin  kept  her  regiments  filled  with  recruits, 
whereas  other  States  generally  filled  their  quotas  by  new  regiments,  and 
the  result  was  that  we  estimated  a  Wisconsin  regiment  equal  to  an  or- 
dinary brigade,  /  believe  that  "five  hundred  new  men  added  to  an  old 
and  experienced  regiment  tcere  more  valuable  than  a  thousand  men  in 
the  form  of  a  new  regiment,  for  the  former  by  association  loith  good, 
experienced  captains,  lieutenants,  and  non-commissioned  officers,  soon 
becam^e  veterans,  ivhereas  the  latter  were  generally  unavailable  for  a 
year.  The  German  method  of  recruitment  is  simply  perfect,  and  there 
is  no  good  reason  why  we  should  not  follow  it  substantially." 


148     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

is  visible,  as  it  was  during  the  late  war,  that  in  the  anxiety  to 
obtain  recruits  the  bounties  offered  constantly  increased,  the 
men  who  intend  to  enlist  at  one  time  or  another  are  induced 
to  hold  back,  with  the  hope  at  a  later  day  of  receiving  a  higher 
compensation,  and  having  to  serve  for  a  shorter  period. 

"  In  time  of  peace  a  sufficient  number  of  recruits  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  service  can  usually  be  obtained  without  the 
aid  of  bounty ;  and  in  time  of  war  the  country  can  least  afford 
the  cost,  besides  needing  the  ser\"ices  of  better  men  than  those 
who  enter  the  army  simply  from  mercenary  motives."  * 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  endless  chain  of 
evils  whichj  like  ''  bounty-jumping/'  sprang  from,  such  a 
vicious  system  ^^  and  which  ought  to  be  sufficient  to  prevent 
Congress  from  enacting  any  legislation  that  would  render 
possible  the  repetition  of  such  abuses  as  occurred  during  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Bounties  not  only  failed  to  procure  the  men  desired,  but 
the  system  possessed  another  and  greater  inherent  evil  — - 
namely,  that  of  stimulating  desertion.  As  the  authority 
just  quoted,  being  charged  to  arrest  these  culprits,  discovered 
from  bitter  experience, 


*  General  Sherman  declared  (II,  pp.  386-387)  that  "  the  real  difficulty 
was,  and  will  be  again,  to  obtain  an  adequate  number  of  good  soldiers. 
We  tried  almost  every  system  known  to  modern  nations,  all  with  more 
or  less  success  —  voluntary  enlistments,  the  draft,  and  bought  sub- 
stitutes — ■  and  I  think  that  all  officers  of  experience  will  confirm  my 
assertion  that  the  men  who  voluntm'ily  enlisted  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
loar  icere  the  best,  better  than  the  conscript,  and  far  better  than  the 
bought  substitute.  .  .  .  Once  organized,  the  regiment  should  be  kept  full 
by  recruits,  and  ichen  it  becomes  difficult  to  obtain  more  recruits  the 
pay  should  be  raised  by  Congress,  instead  of  tempting  men  by  exag- 
gerated bounties.  I  believe  it  would  have  been  more  economical  to  have 
raised  the  pay  of  the  soldier  to  thirty  or  even  fifty  dollars  a  month 
than  to  have  held  out  the  promise  of  three  hundred  and  even  six  hun- 
dred dollars  in  the  form  of  bounty.  Toward  the  close  of  the  war,  I 
have  often  heard  the  soldiers  complain  that  the  '  stay-at-home '  men 
got  better  pay,  bounties,  and  food,  than  they  who  were  exposed  to  all 
the  dangers  and  vicissitudes  of  the  battles  and  marches  at  the  front. 
The  feeling  of  the  soldier  should  be  that,  in  every  event,  the  sympathy 
and  preference  of  his  government  is  for  him  who  fights,  rather  than  for 
him  who  is  on  provost  or  guard  duty  to  the  rear,  and,  like  most  men, 
he  measures  this  by  the  amount  of  pay." 


•  Lessons  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion         149 

"  In  general,  those  States  which  gave  the  highest  local  bounties 
are  marked  by  the  largest  proportion  of  deserters.  The  bounty 
was  meant  to  be  an  inducement  to  enlistment ;  it  became,  in 
fact,  an  inducement  to  desertion  and  fraudulent  re-enlistment/'  ^^ 

Desertion  grew  to  such  an  extent  that  it  developed  into  a 
serious  problem,  as  must  necessarily  be  the  case  when  it  in- 
volves a  number  so  large  as  199,105  men,^^  and  in  this  respect 
two  of  the  New  England  States  were  among  the  worst  offend- 
ers.^^ 

When  all  the  measures  devised  by  Congress  had  failed  to 
secure  the  desired  result,  the  draft  was  resorted  to ;  but  even 
that  drastic  step  fell  short  of  obtaining  the  necessary  recruits, 
and  it  was  not  until  the  very  end  of  the  war  and  after  several 
amendments  that  a  sufficiently  comprehensive  law  was  put 
into  operation  ^^ —  too  late  as  usual.  The  necessity  of  thor- 
ough military  legislation  and  the  inadequacy  of  hasty  meas- 
ures were  thus  again  made  manifest. 

In  the  long  list  of  blunders  in  respect  to  military  laws  and 
organization,  one  scheme  is  conspicuous  for  its  merits.  At 
the  suggestion  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  certain  in- 
ducements were  given  for  the  re-enlistment  of  officers  and  men 
already  in  service.^ ^  The  ^'  veteran  volunteers  "  thus  secured 
bore  close  analogy  to  modern  reserves  called  to  the  colours, 
and 

"  By  this  expedient  over  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  thousand 
(136,000)  tried  soldiers,  whose  services  would  otherwise  have 
been  lost,  were  secured,  and  capable  and  experienced  officers  con- 
tinued in  command.  The  exact  value  of  the  services  rendered 
by  any  particular  part  of  the  military  forces  may  not  be  ascer- 
tained, but  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  the  veterans  thus  re- 
organized and  retained  performed,  in  the  closely  contested  cam- 
paigns subsequent  to  their  re-enlistment,  a  part  essential  to  the 
final  success  which  attended  our  arms.  In  his  official  report  of 
1864  the  Secretary  of  War  says  in  relation  to  this  subject,  ^  I 
know  of  no  operation  connected  with  the  recruitment  of  the 
army  which  has  resulted  in  more  advantage  to  the  service  than 
the  one  referred  to.'  "  ^^ 


150     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  value  of  such  a  force  was  incalculable,  doubly  so  since 

''where  the  leaders  themselves  are  untrained  and  where  officers 
and  men  must  alike  stumble  toward  efficiency  ivithout  intelligent 
guidance,  the  formation  of  an  efficient  army  is  a  question  of 
years.  Indeed,  such  a  force  can  not  become  an  army  at  all 
within  the  period  of  duration  of  modern  war.  .4s  the  American 
War  of  1861-1865  presents  the  singular  phenomenon  of  two  ex- 
temporized armies  gradually  developing  while  in  conflict  with 
each  other,  it  is  a  most  remarkable  record  of  the  evolution  of 
such  forces.  In  the  conflicts  of  1861  both  officers  and  men  were 
untrained  for  the  duties  demanded  of  them.  Even  the  com- 
panies were  imperfectly  organized  as  units  of  the  regiment,  and 
the  lack  of  cohesion  was  still  more  apparent  in  the  higher  units. 
Bull  Run  disorganized  both  armies.  One  was  demoralized  by 
defeat  and  the  other  by  victory.  By  1862  elfective  regiments, 
brigades,  and  divisions  had  come  into  being,  but  the  conduct  and 
leading  of  higher  units  as  a  rule  was  still  imperfect.  It  ivas  not 
until  1863  that  the  armies  confronted  eacji  other  as  complete 
and  effective  military  teams.  But  even  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  war  the  influence  of  trained  and  able  leaders  was  apparent. 
The  time  required  to  make  an  effective  soldier  depends  very 
largely  on  the  organization  in  which  the  recruit  is  enrolled.  The 
recruit  of  1861  could  not  become  a  good  private  until  his  cap- 
tain became  a  good  captain,  but  the  recruit  of  1863  was  absorbed 
in  a  team  already  trained,  and  therefore  became  a  trained  sol- 
dier in  a  few  months  of  active  service."  ^^ 

At  the  end  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  the  volunteers 
had  acquired  a  training  which  made  them  comparable  to  any 
armies  that  have  ever  existed  —  veteran  regulars  in  every- 
thing but  name  —  but  at  what  an  appalling  cost !  ]^o  less 
than  67,000  regulars  ^^  and  2,606,341  volunteers  and  militia 
had  had  to  be  employed  by  the  United  States  ^^  to  conquer 
the  military  forces  of  the  Confederacy  which  have  never  been 
estimated  to  exceed  1,500,000  and  which  were  probably 
nearer  1,000,000.^^  The  four  years'  struggle  cost  the  United 
States  the  enormous  amount  of  $5,371,079,778.28,2^  and  on 
June  30,  1914,  $4,457,974,496.00  had  already  been  paid  out 
in  pensions  on  account  of  this  war,^^  with  the  end  not  yet  in 
sight. 


CHAPTER  XV 

MILITARY    POLICY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES 
FROM  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLIO]^  TO 

THE  spa:nish-american  war 

WHE]^  the  Confederacy  had  at  last  been  crushed  and 
the  great  armies  of  veteran  volunteers  disbanded/ 
the  disturbed  condition  of  the  South  ^  and  the  violation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  Allied  invasion  of  Mexico  ^  compelled 
Congress  to  increase  the  Regular  Army  from  39,273  ^  to 
54,641  by  the  Act  of  July  28,  1866,^  and  the  grade  of  General 
was  revived  three  days  earlier  ^  and  bestowed  on  Lieutenant- 
General  Grant.  In  1867  the  French  forces  were  withdrawn 
from  Mexico  and  the  Emperor  Maximilian,  being  left  in  the 
lurch,  was  captured  and  shot,  but  it  was  not  until  March  3, 
1869,  that  the  Army  was  reduced  to  37,313."^  Seventeen 
months  later  the  grades  of  General  and  Lieutenant-General 
were  both  abolished,  the  number  of  general  officers  reduced, 
the  pay  of  the  Army  fixed  and  provision  made  for  a  board  to 
select  the  officers  to  be  mustered  out  of  service.^  During 
1874, 1875  and  1876  five  acts  ^  effected  a  further  reduction  in 
the  strength  of  the  Army  to  27,472,^^  the  maximum  of  en- 
listed men  being  definitely  fixed  at  25,000  ^^  in  conformity 
with  the  suggestion  contained  in  the  Act  of  July  29,  1861.-^^ 
For  the  ensuing  twenty-two  years  ^^  the  actual  strength  of  the 
military  establishment  never  exceeded  28,000  ^*  until  the 
Act  of  March  8,  1898,^^  added  two  regiments  of  artillery, 
thus  bringing  its  paper  strength  up  to  28,747.-^^ 

Throughout  the  period  from  the  close  of  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  until  April,  1898,  the  Army  was  principally  oc- 
cupied with  garrison  and  constabulary  duties  and  with  almost 
uninterrupted  campaigns  against  the  Indians.^  ^ 

151 


152     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

During  the  seventeen  years  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  with  Spain  three  most  important  institutions  were  in- 
augurated. The  first  was  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School, 
which  was  established  at  Forth  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  by  Gen- 
eral William  T.  Sherman's  General  Order,  Iso.  42,  dated 
May  7,  1881,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  special  and  supple- 
mentary training  to  those  arms.  Since  that  time  the  name 
has  been  changed  several  times  and  certain  other  schools 
amalgamated  with  it.^^  The  consolidated  institution  now 
bears  the  title  of  the  Army  School  of  the  Line  and  furnishes 
an  admirable  course  for  officers  in  the  higher  branches  of  their 
profession. 

The  second  was  the  Board  on  Fortifications  and  Other  De- 
fenses —  better  known  as  '^  the  Endicott  Board  '' —  created 
by  Act  of  Congress  approved  March  3,  1885.^^  The  abso- 
lute lack  of  systematic  fortification  or  modern  armament  ren- 
dered such  an  organization  imperative.  Its  report,  submitted 
to  the  Hon.  William  C.  Endicott,  then  Secretary  of  War,  on 
January  3,  1886,  marked  the  inauguration  of  the  present 
scheme  of  coast  defence  which  was  further  developed  by  an- 
other board  appointed  twenty  years  later.  ^*^ 

The  third  was  "  a  School  of  instruction  for  drill  and  prac- 
tice for  Cavalry  and  Light  x\rtillery,"  which  was  authorized 
by  the  Act  of  Congress  of  January  29,  1887,  and  promulgated 
by  General  Order  Xo.  9,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Adju- 
tant-General's Office,  under  date  of  February  9,  1887.  Its 
establishment  at  Fort  Hiley,  Kansas,  took  place  in  conse- 
quence of  General  Order  ISTo.  17  from  the  same  source,  dated 
March  14,  1892.  In  War  Department  General  Order  'No. 
191,  dated  September  13,  1907,  it  received  its  present  title  of 
"  the  Mounted  Service  School  at  Fort  Riley,  Kansas,"  and 
affords  a  thorough  course  of  instruction  to  officers  of  the 
Cavalry  arm.^^ 


I 


CHAPTEE  XVI 
THE  SPANISH-AMEEICAN  WAE 

x^  spite  of  all  the  lessons  of  the  past 


"  The  war  with  Spain,  declared  from  the  21st  of  April,  1898, 
found  "US  with  the  smallest  Eegular  Army,  in  proportion  to 
population,  that  we  have  had  at  the  beginning  of  any  of  our 
wars.  It  consisted  of  but  2,143  oflScers  and  26,040  enlisted 
men,^'  ^ 

in  other  words,  of  less  than  four  one-hundredths  of  one  per 
cent,  of  our  estimated  population;  ^  an  army  too  small  and 
widely  scattered  to  serve  as  a  school  of  application ;  ^  too 
small  for  a  nucleus  in  case  of  needed  expansion,  and,  with 
only  the  militia  behind  it,  too  small  for  serious  military  con- 
sideration by  any  of  the  great  Powers  with  which  the  United 
States  is  bound  to  rank.*  It  might  be  supposed  that,  having 
insisted  for  years  on  a  mobile  army  of  pigmy  dimensions, 
with  no  organized  reserve,  Congress  would  have  paid  some  at- 
tention to  our  coast  defences,  yet  so  feebly  did  it  respond  to 
the  recommendations  of  the  Endicott  Board  *  on  that  subject 
that,  twelve  years  after  the  plans  of  the  board  had  been 
adopted,  only  151  guns  had  been  placed  in  position,^  out  of 
2,362  considered  as  the  necessary  armament  of  our  fortifica- 
tions. The  militia  law  had  been  permitted  to  stand  with  the 
same  defects  which  characterised  it  nearly  one  hundred  years 
before.^  ^o  provision  had  been  made  for  national  reserves, 
and  the  desire  of  the  various  staff  departments  to  accumulate 
an  adequate  reserve  of  war   supplies  had  been  repeatedly 


*  In  1898  the  Russian  army  on  a  peace  footing  numbered  approxi- 
mately 1,000,000  officers  and  men;  the  French  army,  602,720;  the  Ger- 
man army,  580,612;  the  Austrian  army,  349,205i;  and  the  British  army 
(the  Home  army),  173,730.     See  Statesman's  Year  Book  for  1898. 

153 


154     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

frowned  upon.  Thirty  years  of  peace  had  wrought  such 
enervation  in  the  business  methods  of  the  War  Department 
that  it  was  sadly  afflicted  with  dry-rot,  so  much  so  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  to  confess  that  '^  the  governmental 
machinery  was  altogether  inadequate  to  immediately  meet  the 
emergency  "  of  actual  war."^  As  Captain  Rhodes  pertinently 
observed :  ^ 

"  If  the  beginning  of  the  war  with  Spain  —  a  second-rate 
military  power,  .  .  .  found  our  country  without  accurate  maps 
and  statistical  information  of  our  adversary's  military  re- 
sources; *  lacking  in  carefully  formulated  plans  of  mobilization, 
concentration  and  operation;  without  magazine  rifles,®  smokeless 
powder,  and  breech-loading  cannon  for  our  reserves,  and  with 
reserves  themselves  —  the  peers  of  any  soldiers  on  earth  in  in- 
telligence, bravery  and  military  initiative,  but  absolutely  igno- 
rant of  the  more  serious  phases  of  war;  if,  we  repeat,  this  com- 
paratively petty  war  found  us  more  or  less  unprepared,  what 
must  have  been  our  loss  in  lives,  treasure  and  national  prestige 
had  we  been  pitted  against  a  first-class  power/' 

^NTot  alone  in  the  preposterously  small  size  of  its  army  was 
the  United  States  unready  for  war,  but,  as  previously  stated, 
the  coast  defences  were  totally  insufficient  and  supplied  with 
only  a  fraction  of  the  guns,  ammunition  ^^  and  troops  re- 
quired. 'No  munitions  of  war  existed  to  arm  and  equip  any 
force  larger  than  the  liliputian  Regular  Army.  To  meet 
the  land  forces  of  Spain  with  any  fair  chance  of  success  in- 
volved the  raising  of  large  numbers  of  raw  troops  which  had 
then  to  be  organized,  equipped  and  trained  as  best  they  could 


*  The  Anuario  Militar  de  Espana  for  1898  gave  the  strength  of  the 
Spanish  army,  including  irregular  troops,  at  492,067,  "but  these  figures 
are  unquestionably  much  too  high.  In  April,  1898,  there  were,  however, 
196,820  Spanish  soldiers  in  Cuba  —  viz:  155,302  regulars  and  41,518 
volunteers  —  and  about  9,000  regulars  in  Porto  Rico  —  facts  that  the 
American  authorities  did  not  even  know  approximately.  On  April  12th, 
General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  then  Consul-General  in  Cuba,  testified  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  that  there  were  97,000  to  98,000 
Spanish  troops  in  Cuba.  General  Miles  estimated  their  strength  at 
150,000,  which,  although  much  nearer  the  truth,  fell  far  short  of  the 
actual  numbers. — Sargent,  The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  I,  pp. 
79-80;    III,  pp.    164-167. 


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The  Spanish- American  War  155 

before  being  rushed  into  active  campaigning,  while  work  on 
the  coast  defences  and  in  the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war 
was  too  hurried  to  be  scientifically  or  thoroughly  done.  Once 
again  —  for  the  nth  time  in  our  history  —  the  responsibility 
for  our  unpreparedness  could  be  justly  laid  at  the  door  of 
that  branch  of  our  Government  in  which  the  Constitution 
has  vested  the  power  ^^  to  provide  for  the  coromon  defense '' 
and  to  "raise  and  support  armies."  ^^  In  numbers  the 
personnel  of  the  great  supply  corps  of  the  Army  was  pre- 
posterously inadequate.  "  On  April  23rd  there  were  only 
22  trained  commissary  officers  in  the  service.  In  the  Quar- 
termaster Department  the  number  of  officers  was  limited  by 
law  to  57.  Congress  allowed  192  medical  officers,  but  when 
the  war  came  only  179  were  ready  for  active  service.  .  .  . 
The  hospital  corps  consisted  of  723  men  —  a  mere  hand- 
ful." ^^  Such  were  the  consequences  entailed  by  dilatory 
and  grudging  legislation ;  indeed,  one  might  search  —  and 
search  in  vain  —  for  one  sins'le  instance  in  our  entire  historv 
when  Congress  has  done  its  whole  duty  to  the  country  with 
respect  to  thorough  and  adequate  national  defence. 

"  Coming  events  cast  their  shadows  before  "  and  the  ap- 
proach of  the  Spanish- American  War  was  heralded  for  some 
time  prior  to  its  outbreak.  On  October  9,  1897,  the  Spanish 
Government  recalled  Captain-General  Weyler  from  Cuba  and 
appointed  Ramon  Blanco  as  his  successor.  The  latter 
promptly  proceeded  to  put  the  new  policy  into  effect,  re- 
voked Weyler's  order  for  the  detention  of  Cubans  in  "  recon- 
centration  camps  "  and  offered  amnesty  to  all  political  offend- 
ers. These  conciliatory  measures  were  instituted  too  late  to 
restore  the  faith  of  the  Cubans  in  the  promises  of  the  mother- 
country.^^  The  offer  of  autonomy  was  rejected,  and  it  became 
evident  that  nothing  short  of  independence  would  be  accept- 
able to  the  islanders.  The  Spanish  resented  the  interference 
of  the  Americans,  real  or  alleged,  to  such  a  point  that  hostile 
demonstrations  broke  out  in  Havana  from  January  15  th  to 
20th,  and  Blanco  deemed  it  advisable  to  place  a  guard  at  the 


156     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

American  Consulate-General.  On  the  25tli  the  battleship 
Maine  arrived  in  the  harbour;  on  February  9th  there  was 
published  in  the  American  press  a  letter  from  Dupuy  de 
Lome,  the  Spanish  Minister  at  Washington,  in  which  he 
spoke  of  President  McKinley  in  very  disparaging  terms;  -^^ 
the  following  day  the  Senate  discussed  intervention  in  Cuba ; 
and  five  days  later  the  President  was  directed  to  transmit  to 
Congress  all  information  relative  to  the  situation  in  Cuba. 
On  February  15th  the  Maine  was  blown  up  in  Havana  har- 
bour, with  the  loss  of  264  lives,  but,  although  Spain  officially 
expressed  regret  for  the  Maine  ''  incident  "  next  day,  a  naval 
court  of  inquiry  was  appointed  by  the  President  on  the  17th, 
and  three  days  later  began  its  investigations  at  Havana.  On 
March  5th  Spain  demanded  the  recall  of  Consul-General  Lee, 
which  the  United  States  absolutely  refused  to  entertain.  Al- 
though the  American  public  had  been  clamouring  for  war 
since  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  it  was  not  until  March  8th 
that  the  House  of  Pepresentatives  voted  $50,000,000  for 
"  national  defense."  The  Senate  followed  suit  next  day  and 
the  bill  was  promptly  signed  by  the  President. -^^ 

Two  days  later,  March  11th,  the  War  Department  began 
the  mobilization  of  the  Regular  Army  w^hich,  as  has  been 
seen,^^  numbered  only  28,183  officers  and  men,  was  scattered 
over  vast  areas  of  country  and,  thanks  to  the  indifference  of 
Congress  for  years  past,  was  most  defective  in  organization. 
Regiments  supposed  to  have  ten  companies  possessed  only 
eight,  and  those  companies  were  reduced  to  only  60  enlisted 
men.  There  were  no  brigades,  no  divisions  and,  worst  of  all, 
no  plans,^"^  nor  could  any  be  formulated  for  the  very  excellent 
reason  that  Congress,  with  its  usual  short-sightedness,  had  re- 
stricted its  appropriation  to  national  defence  and  to  that  one 
object  alone.  IN'o  money  was  available  for  offensive  opera- 
tions—  the  only  kind  which  could  possibly  be  used  against 
the  Spanish  possessions  in  both  hemispheres —  ;  no  indica- 
tion was  given  of  the  number  of  troops  eventually  to  be  called 


The  Spanish- American  War  157 

out ;  and  the  War  Department,  which  ought  to  have  been  or- 
dering and  purchasing  clothing,  tents,  supplies,  etc.,  and 
accumulating  the  material  and  equipments  needed,  was 
obliged  to  w^ait  supinely  with  folded  hands  until  Congress 
had  done  its  part.-^^  Truly,  the  history  of  our  military  legis- 
lation from  start  to  finish  tempts  one  to  wonder  why  that 
body  has  not  long  ago  adopted  the  title  of  the  States  General 
of  Holland  —  '^^  Their  High  Mightinesses/' 

The  failure  of  Congress  to  act  on  the  recommendations  of 
the  Endicott  Board  during  the  twelve  years  which  preceded 
the  appropriation  of  $50,000,000  just  mentioned,  and  its 
usual  procrastination  until  the  last  moment  involved  a  tre- 
mendous amount  of  labour  and  energy  to  accomplish  within 
a  few  weeks  the  work  on  our  coast  defences  which  ought  to 
have  been  spread  over  a  period  of  years.  ^^  Although  by  April 
21st  a  number  of  emplacements  and  carriages  had  been  con- 
structed for  the  heavy  guns  already  made  but  still  unmounted, 
and  although  a  number  of  these  guns  had  been  placed  in  posi- 
tion, either  permanently  or  temporarily,  the  deficiency  had  to 
be  made  up  by  using  many  obsolete  guns  "  of  multifarious 
pattern,  and  mounted  on  carriages  of  every  variety  and 
age."  ^^  Within  a  few  days  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
1,535  torpedoes  and  mines,  together  with  their  electrical  con- 
nections, were  installed  ^^  in  twenty-eight  harbours ;  by  June 
30th,  114  guns  and  71  mortars  were  mounted  in  the  various 
forts, ^^  and  permanent  defences  of  a  modern  type  were  in  the 
course  of  construction  in  twenty-five  different  localities. ^^ 
Gratifying  as  w^ere  the  results  achieved  under  such  pressure, 
no  less  than  2,026  guns  still  remained  to  be  provided  under 
the  scheme  of  coast  defence  formulated  in  1886.^"^  As  it  was, 
the  Flying  Squadron  under  Commodore  Schley  had  to  be 
retained  at  Hampton  Roads  ^^  in  order  to  afford  additional 
security  until  the  work  of  strengthening  the  fortifications  on 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  had  made  substantial  progress.^^  This 
delay  —  for  which  Congress  was  alone  to  blame  in  failing  to 


158     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

act  on  the  repeated  recommendations  of  qualified  officers  ^"^ — 
not  only  weakened  us  on  land  but  was  a  distinct  handicap  in 
the  execution  of  proper  strategical  movements  by  the  Navy, 
insomuch  as  it  prevented  that  concentrated  effort,  that  unity 
of  purpose  which  is  the  fundamental  basis  of  every  military 
and  naval  success.  It  was  nothing  but  sheer  good  fortune 
and  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  navy  which  saved  some  of 
our  unprotected  cities  on  the  Atlantic  coast  from  great  dam- 
age. Had  we  been  pitted  against  a  strong  naval  Power,  we 
should  have  learned  by  the  most  bitter  experience  the  neces- 
sity of  thorough  and  timely  preparation  for  war.^^ 

Aside  from  the  Regular  Army  and  the  coast  defences,  the 
principal  source  from  which  additional  means  could  be  de- 
rived for  the  prosecution  of  war  was  the  State  militia.  There 
was  of  course  a  small  number  of  men  who  had  served  in  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  but  age  necessarily  limited  their  capa- 
bilities. Many  of  the  men  who  had  done  duty  in  the  Regular 
Army  could  be  expected  to  offer  their  services,  but  the  bulk 
of  volunteers  who  had  any  training  whatsoever  had  to  be 
looked  for  in  the  militia  or,  to  a  lesser  degree,  in  the  various 
military  schools  where  the  students  were  under  the  age  of  18 
years.  The  conditions  of  our  land  forces  at  the  time  have 
been  thus  admirably  summarized  by  Lieutenant-General 
Miles:  29 

''  The  army,  of  25,000  men,  .  .  .  was  not  even  sufficient  to 
have  properly  guarded  our  sea-coasts,  in  the  event  of  a  ivar  ivith 
a  strong  naval  power. 

''  The  m.ilitia,  composed  of  the  national  guards  of  the  several 
States,  was,  as  a  rule,  inefficient,  and,  as  a  body,  could  he  prac- 
tically disregarded.  Its  arms  and  equipment  were  obsolete  and 
unfit  for  use  hy  troops  fighting  an  army  properly  organized  and 
equipped.  Never  in  the  history  of  the  country  was  the  necessity 
so  obvious  to  the  people  for  proper  legislation  for  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  regular  army,  as  well  as  of  the  national  guard. 
Small  arms  using  smokeless  powder  had  been  manufactured  for 
the  use  of  the  regular  troops,  but  there  was  not  a  sufficient  suppl}^ 
of  these  arms  to  equip  even  the  small  army  called  into  service 


The  Spanish- American  War  159 

at  the  time  of  its  mobilization.^^  Our  field  artillery,  our  siege- 
guns,  and  all  our  heavier  guns  were  constructed  for,  and  used, 
black  powder.  This  in  time  of  action  proved  to  be  a  great  dis- 
advantage; and,  in  fact,  the  regiments  of  volunteers  which  were 
present  with  our  army  in  Cuba  had  to  be  withdrawn  from  the 
firing-line  on  account  of  the  obsolete  fire-arms  with  which  they 
were  armed,  Avhile  the  field  artillery  was  subject  to  the  same 
disadvantage.  Had  our  field  artillery  been  of  modern  type, 
using  smokeless  powder,  there  is  no  question  that  its  proper  em- 
plovment  would  have  produced  much  more  effective  results.  .  .  . 
"  It  is  safe  to  say  that,  with  an  army  of  75,000  men  properly 
equipped,  at  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war,  peace  could  have 
been  secured  without  requiring  a  single  volunteer  to  leave  the 
country,  and  thus  the  necessity  of  the  enormous  volunteer  army, 
and  the  expense  and  inconvenience  incident  to  its  organization 
and  maintenance,  could  have  been  avoided." 

Meanwhile  events  had  crowded  thick  and  fast  upon  each 
other.  On  March  19th  ^^  the  Court  of  Inquiry  completed  its 
investigation  of  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  its  report  was 
submitted  to  the  President  on  the  25th  and  three  days  later 
transmitted  by  him  to  Congress.  On  April  5th  the  American 
consuls  in  Cuba  were  recalled ;  on  the  9th  General  Lee  and 
many  Americans  left  Havana;  and  on  the  11th  President 
McKinley  sent  a  message  to  Congress  in  w^hich  he  described 
the  situation,  declared  that  intervention  was  necessary,  ad- 
vised against  the  recognition  of  the  Cuban  government  and 
requested  Congress  to  take  action.  Eight  days  were  con- 
sumed before  that  august  body  finally  adopted  resolutions 
declaring  Cuba  independent  and  authorizing  the  President  to 
employ  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  to  put  an  end 
to  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba.  ISText  day  these  resolutions  received 
the  President's  signature  ^^  and  General  Woodford,  the 
American  Minister  at  Madrid,  was  instructed  by  cable  to  de- 
liver the  ultimatum  of  this  Government.  The  Spanish  Cortes 
convened  that  same  day,  and  on  April  21st  Woodford  was 
handed  his  passports,  which  was  tantamount  to  a  declaration 
of  war. 


160     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  AND   CALLS   FOR   TROOPS 

DURING  1898 

To  offer  any  excuse  for  the  supineness  of  Congress,  which, 
with  the  solitary  exception  of  the  appropriation  made  on 
March  9th,^^  had  done  absolutely  nothing  to  prepare  for  war, 
is  little  short  of  ridiculous.  The  emergency  had  not  suddenly 
arisen  —  any  school  boy  could  have  foreseen  the  approaching 
conflict.  ^^  For  months  prior  to  the  destruction  of  the  Maine 
the  indications  pointed  unmistakably  to  war  with  Spain; 
after  that  fateful  February  15th  it  was  inevitable  within  a 
short  time.^^  After  priceless  weeks  had  been  wasted  by  Con- 
gress in  '^  masterful  inactivity  " —  the  War  Department,  un- 
able to  stomach  any  further  delay,  issued  orders  on  April 
15th  for  the  concentration  of  the  infantry  of  the  Regular 
Army  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile  and  Tampa  as  a  preliminary 
to  despatching  it  to  Cuba  on  the  outbreak  of  war.^^  It  was 
not  until  a  week  later  that  Congress  at  last  awoke  to  the  fact 
that  the  country  was  then  actually  at  war  and  that  a  paltry 
force  of  28,000  regulars  constituted  the  total  number  of 
troops  at  its  disposal.  By  the  Act  of  April  22,  1898,^^  it 
provided  for  a  temporary  increase  in  the  military  establish- 
ment,^^ which  was  divided  into  two  branches,  namely:  the 
Regular  Army  and  the  militia,  the  latter  upon  being  called 
into  service  in  time  of  war  to  be  designated  "  the  Volunteer 
Army  of  the  United  States."  ^^  In  many  respects  this  law 
marked  an  advance  over  similar  legislation  enacted  in  haste 
on  the  eve  of  war,  and  the  majority  of  its  provisions  were, 
taken  all  in  all,  distinctly  good.^^  On  the  other  hand,  Con- 
gress once  again  evinced  its  imwillingness  to  do  its  whole 
duty  to  the  country  in  the  matter  of  military  measures.  In- 
stead of  fixing  the  terms  of  enlistment  "  FOR  THE  WAR  "  ^^ 
or  for  not  less  than  three  years  —  w^hich  the  past  had  so 
often  demonstrated  as  the  only  safe  course  to  pursue  —  it 
made  the  mistake  of  limiting  it  to  two  years.  On  top  of  that 
it  specified  that  all  volunteers  should  be  discharged  ^^  when 
the  purposes  for  which  they  were  called  into  service  shall 


The  Spanish- American  War  161 

have  been  accomplished,  or  on  the  conclusion  of  hostilities."  *^ 
We  have  had  occasion  to  conmient  upon  the  blunder  commit- 
ted at  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War  in  failing  to  define 
the  term  of  enlistment  without  any  '^  ifs  "  and  ''  ors,"  ^^  and 
we  shall  presently  see  that  this  similar  laxness  in  phraseology 
was  destined  to  be  given  an  interpretation  in  nowise  intended 
and,  as  a  consequence,  to  cause  the  Government  no  little  em- 
barrassment.^'* To  cap  the  climax  Congress  once  more 
showed  that  it  had  not  yet  shaken  off  the  pernicious  influence 
of  the  past  and,  notwithstanding  that  the  volunteer  army  was 
a  Government  force  beyond  peradventure,  it  pandered  to  the 
States  by  stipulating  that  "  all  the  regimental  and  company 
officers  shall  be  appointed  by  the  governors  of  the  States  in 
which  their  respective  organizations  are  raised."  ^^  As  Cap- 
tain Rhodes  very  aptly  pointed  out :  ^^ 

"  A  not  unexpected  deduction  from  our  experiences  in  the 
Mexican  and  Civil  Wars  was  that  the  efficiency  of  American 
Tolunteers  was  to  be  measured  by  the  previous  training,  profes- 
sional zeal,  and  soldierly  discipline  of  their  officers.  The  en- 
listed personnel  has  ever  been  of  splendid  natural  quality,  and 
has  not  varied  considerably  in  different  regiments.  Trained 
officers  have  by  no  means  been  numerous. 

"  The  Spanish  War  was  no  exception  in  this  respect,  because 
the  same  obsolete  system  of  selection  of  officers  was  followed 
as  in  former  wars,  and  naturally  the  same  results  followed.  .  .  . 

"  Such,  a  method  of  selection  was  justified  at  the  outbreak 
•of  the  Civil  War  on  the  ground  that  volunteers  were  militia, 
and  by  the  Constitution  the  appointments  were  reserved  to  the 
States.  That  volunteers  are  not  militia  has  now  long  been  held. 
But  in  both  the  Civil  and  Spanish  Wars  the  main  reason  for 
following  the  old  system  appears  to  have  been  that  no  better 
system-  had  ever  been  carefully  thought  out,  which  tvas  acceptable 
to  the  States.  In  such  emergencies  as  ever  follow  a  declaration 
of  war,  there  is  no  time  for  new  systems  to  be  prepared;  *^ 
State  patronage  demands  the  appointment  of  officers  regardless 
of  qualifications,  and  so  urgent  are  the  necessity  and  straits  of 
the  national  government  in  such  crises,  for  the  rapid  mobiliza- 
'tion  of  troops,  that  all  other  considerations  give  way  to  it.  .  .  . 

"Volunteer  regiments  organized  under  the  Act  of  April  22, 


162     Military  TJnpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

1898^  differed  very  widely  in  efficiency  and  discipline,  as  was 
to  be  expected.  Some  States  had  given  extraordinary  encourage- 
ment to  the  training  of  their  militia  along  practical  lines ;  others, 
as  we  all  know,  were  mostly  a  paper  force  without  any  real  value 
as  a  national  asset.  In  such  regiments  as  included  a  regular 
officer  in  its  personnel  —  limited  by  law  to  one  —  there  was 
greater  progress  made,  other  things  being  equal,  than  in  regi- 
ments officered  entirely  by  volunteers.  Some  regiments  were  mus- 
tered in  well  equipped  with  uniforms,  arms  and  accouterments, 
and  under  excellent  control  by  their  officers;  others  reported  for 
muster  in  such  a  state  of  disorganization  as  to  be  equally  dan- 
gerous to  friend  and  f oe."^*  There  were  many  excellent  volunteer 
regiments,  but  they  became  so  in  spite  of  the  system  then  in 
operation,  and  not  in  any  way  by  reason  of  it. 

"  T'here  can  be  no  possible  doubt  that  in  due  time,  with 
patient  labor  and  unceasing  training,  such  volunteers  as  were 
concentrated  in  the  great  camps  during  the  year  1898,  could, 
as  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  McClellan,  have  been 
gradually  molded  into  a  dependable  force.  But  bearing  in  mind 
the  suddenness  of  modern  wars,  as  well  as  their  comparative 
shortness  of  duration,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  thirty  per  cent,  of 
the  volunteer  forces  mustered  in  during  the  war  with  Spain 
became  entirely  dependable  for  service  against  the  regular  army 
of  a  foreign  power  during  the  entire  period  of  their  service." 

On  April  23rd  President  McKinley  issued  a  call  for 
125,000  volunteers/^  and  two  days  later  Congress  officially 
announced  that  war  had  begun  on  the  21st,  as  well  as  author- 
izing the  use  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  and  the  militia  for 
the  necessary  operations.  ^^  On  the  following  day  the  Presi- 
dent approved  ^^  An  Act  for  the  better  organization  of  the 
line  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States,"  ^^  by  virtue  of  which 
the  authorized  strength  of  the  Eegular  Army  was  raised  from 
28,747  officers  and  men  ^^  to  64,719.^^  This  increase,  ad- 
mirable as  it  was,  occurred  weeks  too  late  to  produce  the  bene- 
ficial effect  intended  and  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  four 
months  later  found  the  Army  considerably  below  its  author- 
ized strength, ^^  the  majority  of  recruits  naturally  preferring 
service  with  the  volunteers  as  they  had  always  done.^^  The 
law  taken  as  a  whole  contained  some  excellent  provisions. 


The  Spanish- American  War  163 

particularly  in  the  organization  of  the  peace  establishment  ^^ 
and  in  the  power  conferred  upon  the  President  in  time  of 
war  to  expand  the  infantry  regiments  by  adding  a  third  bat- 
talion,^"^ as  well  as  to  increase  the  companies  of  all  the  arms 
to  war  strength.  ^^  He  was  also  authorized  to  add  one  second 
lieutenant  to  each  battery  of  artillery, ^^  which  were  to  be 
organized  as  heavy  or  field  artillery  according  to  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  service.^^  Not  the  least  important  was  the  sixth 
section  which  provided  "  that  in  time  of  war  the  pay  proper 
of  enlisted  men  shall  be  increased  twenty  per  centum  over 
and  above  the  rates  of  pay  as  fixed  by  law."  ^'^  This  wise 
step  obviated  the  use  of  bounties  and  was  quite  in  harmony 
with  the  suggestion  made  by  General  Sherman  as  a  result  of 
his  experience  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.^^ 

The  next  Congressional  measure  was  the  Act  of  May  11, 
1898,^^  which  authorized  the  organization  of  a  volunteer  bri- 
gade of  engineers  ^^  and  an  additional  force  of  10,000  en- 
listed men  who  were  immune  to  tropical  diseases.^  ^  The 
officers  of  both  these  forces,  it  is  to  be  noted  with  satisfaction, 
were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President.^^  On  the  following 
day  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Army  was  increased  by  fifteen 
assistant  surgeons  "  to  be  appointed  after  examination  by  an 
army  medical  examining  board,"  and  provision  was  made  for 
as  many  contract  surgeons  as  might  be  required.  ^^ 

On  May  18th  two  other  acts  went  into  effect ;  one  authoriz- 
ing the  organization  of  a  volunteer  signal  corps  for  service 
during  the  existing  war,^^  the  other  providing  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  two  additional  Assistant  Adjutants-General,  owing  to 
the  extra  work  entailed  on  that  department  by  the  calling  out 
of  volunteers  and  the  increase  in  the  Regular  Army.^^ 

On  May  25th  President  McKinley  issued  his  second  call 
for  troops,  specifying  75,000  as  the  number  required. "^^ 
These  volunteers,  like  the  125,000  called  out  on  April  23rd,^^ 
were  "  to  serve  for  two  years,  unless  sooner  discharged." 

On  the  following  day  a  bill  was  approved  declaring  that  the 
pay  and  allowance  of  volunteers  "  shall  be  deemed  to  com- 


164     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

mence  from  the  day  on  which  they  joined  for  duty  and  are 
enrolled."  The  Secretary  of  War  was  permitted  in  his  dis- 
cretion to  pay  one  month's  wages  in  advance  to  '^  troops  about 
to  embark  for  service  in  the  Philippine  Islands."  ^^  The  Act 
of  May  28,  1898,'^3  amended  that  of  April  22nd  "^^  so  as  to 
make  Eegular  officers  eligible  for  staff  appointments  in  the 
volunteers  without  vacating  their  rank  and  number  in  the 
Army/^  and  a  similar  proviso  was  made  in  respect  to  those 
appointed  to  the  grades  of  field  officers  either  in  the  Volunteer 
Army  or  ''in  the  regiments  possessing  special  qualifica- 
tions." '^^ 

The  next  military  legislation  '^''  that  requires  our  attention 
was  the  Act  of  June  18,  1898/^  providing  for  summary 
courts  for  the  trial  of  enlisted  men  for  certain  offences  which 
were  specified.  The  composition  of  such  courts  and  their 
powers  w^ere  defined,  together  with  such  other  details  as  were 
necessary  to  insure  a  better  administration  of  justice  in  the 
Army. 

After  authorizing  the  appointment  of  a  military  store- 
keeper in  the  Quartermaster's  department  '^^  and  fixing  the 
organization  of  the  Engineer  Corps, ^^  Congress  wound  up  its 
session  by  a  number  of  military  measures.  On  July  7th, 
aside  from  a  deficiency  appropriation,^^  it  increased  both  the 
Inspector-General's  department  ^^  and  the  Ordnance  depart- 
ment,^^ authorized  the  enlistment  of  cooks  and  declared  that 
the  pay  and  allowances  of  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the 
volunteers  w^ere  to  commence  from  the  day  of  enrollment 
and  joining  for  duty.^^  On  the  following  day  it  authorized 
the  appointment  of  an  additional  twenty-five  post  quarter- 
master-sergeants,^^ voted  "  that  all  chaplains  in  the  volunteer 
service  shall  have  the  pay  and  allowances  of  a  captain 
mounted,"  ^^  and  ended  by  authorizing  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury 

"  to  pay  to  the  governor  of  any  State  or  Territory,  or  to  his 
duly  authorized  agents,  the  reasonable  costs,  charges,  and  ex- 
penses that  have  been  incurred  by  him  in  aiding  the  United 


The  Spanish- American  War  165 

States  to  raise  the  Volunteer  Army  in  the  existing  war  with 
Spain,  by  subsisting,  clothing,  supplying,  equipping,  paying,  and 
transporting  men  of  his  State  or  Territory  who  were  afterwards 
accepted  into  the  Volunteer  Army  of  the  United  States."  ^^ 

The  military  legislation  at  the  beginning  of  the  Spanish- 
American  War  demonstrated  an  apparent  effort  on  the  part 
of  Congress  to  profit  by  some  of  the  lessons  of  the  past,  al- 
though further  effort  might  have  been  made  to  the  distinct 
advantage  of  our  military  service.  The  merits  of  the  Con- 
gressional enactments  were  embodied  in  the  following  facts : 

(1)  A  genuine  attempt  was  made  to  retrieve  the  former  neg- 
ligence in  the  appropriations  requisite  for  adequate  sea- 
coast  fortifications ; 

(2)  Militia  per  se  was  virtually  discarded  and  use  made  of 
it  only  as  volunteers  mustered  into  Government  service ; 

(3)  The  folly  of  permitting  enlistments  for  a  period  shorter 
than  two  years  was  not  repeated ; 

(4)  An  unnecessary  number  of  troops  was  not  called  out; 

(5)  Every  effort  was  made  to  keep  the  organizations  in  service 
up  to  their  full  complement  of  officers  and  men  in  order 
to  insure  their  ability  to  fight; 

(6)  ^0  bounties  were  granted ; 

(7)  The  effort  was  made  to  have  a  definite  plan  of  organiza- 
tion and  campaign; 

(8)  The  appointment  of  Eegular  officers  to  the  command  of 
volunteer  regiments,  brigades  and  divisions. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  were  certain  marked  demerits 
which  may  be  thus  summarized : 

(1)  All  the  military  legislation  in  1898  was  enacted  too  late 
to  have  the  full  effect  contemplated ; 

(2)  The  Eegular  Army  was  not  sufficiently  increased; 

(3)  The  coast  defenses  ought  to  have  been  finished  long  be- 
fore the  war  began ; 

(4)  Congress  once  again  failed  to  realize  that,  in  a  military 
system  combining  the  use  of  regulars  and  volunteers, 
men  in  the  absence  of  compulsion  or  strong  inducement, 
will  invariably  enlist  in  the  organization  most  lax  in 
discipline  —  in  other  words,  not  in  the  Eegular  Army ; 


166     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

(5)  The  delegation  to  the  governors  of  the  States  and  Ter- 
ritories of  the  power  to  appoint  officers  of  their  militia 
or  National  Guard  when  these  organizations  were  destined 
to  be  almost  immediately  mustered  into  United  States 
service  was  nothing  more  or  less  than  an  adherence  to 
the  pernicious  system  which  had  prevailed  since  the  War 
of  the  Eevolution. 

PREPAEATIONS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  CUBA 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  order  issued  to  the 
Regulars  to  concentrate  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile  and  Tampa 
preparatory  to  an  invasion  of  Cuba  ^^  but,  before  this  could 
be  effected,  it  was  decided  to  establish  at  Chickamauga  Park, 
Georgia,  a  camp  entitled  ^'  Camp  George  H.  Thomas,"  where 
the  American  forces  were  to  be  mobilized  and  instructed.^^ 
During  the  latter  part  of  April  and  the  first  part  of  May 
large  numbers  of  the  Regular  and  volunteer  troops  were  as- 
sembled at  that  point,  from  which  they  were  hurried  forward 
to  Tampa,  Jacksonville  and  Fernandina,  Florida,  in  order 
to  have  them  in  convenient  locations  for  embarking.  Dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  war  twelve  other  camps  were  also  estab- 
lished,^^ for  a  like  purpose  of  mobilization  and  instruction, 
the  most  important  being  Camp  Alger,  at  Falls  Church,  Vir- 
ginia,^^   eight  miles  from  Washington. 

So  prompt  was  the  response  to  the  President's  calls  for  vol- 
unteers that,  by  the  end  of  May,  no  less  than  124,704  officers 
and  men  had  offered  themselves  and  been  mustered  into  ser- 
vice —  indeed  two  months  later  the  number  exceeded  those 
called  for.^^  On  April  23rd  the  few  troops  assembled  at 
Camp  Thomas  were  constituted  a  provisional  army  corps  un- 
der the  command  of  General  John  R.  Brooke  and,  on  May 
Yth,  in  compliance  with  the  President's  directions,  seven  army 
corps  were  established,  viz: 

First  Corps^  Major  General  John  R.  Brooke,  organized  at  Camp 

Thomas. 
Third  Corps,  Major  General  James  F.  Wade,  organized  at  Camp 

Thomas. 


The  Spanish- American  War  167 

Second  Corps,  Major  General  AVilliam  M.  Graham,  organized  at 

Camp  Alger. 
Fourth  Corps,  Major  General  John  J.  Coppinger,  organized  at 

Mobile,  Alabama. 
Fifth  Corps,  Major  General  William  E.  Shafter,  organized  at 

Tampa,  Florida. 
Sixth  Corps,  Major  General  James  H.  Wilson   (unorganized), 

at  Camp  Thomas. 
Seventh    Corps,    Major    General    Fitzhugh    Lee,    organized    at 

Tampa,  Fla.,  and  later  at  Jacksonville.^^ 

Some  six  w^eeks  later,  on  June  21st,  the  forces,  which  were 
concentrated  at  San  Francisco  and  forwarded  to  the  Philip- 
pines,^* were  formed  into  the  Eighth  Corps  under  the  com- 
mand of  Major  General  Wesley  Merritt.^^ 

All  offensive  operations  against  Spain  were  of  necessity 
dependent  upon  the  control  of  the  sea,^^  but  the  American 
l^avy  acted  with  utmost  promptness.  On  April  25th  Com- 
modore Dewey  with  the  Asiatic  squadron  sailed  from  Hong- 
kong and  on  the  morning  of  May  1st  annihilated  Admiral 
Montijo's  fleet  in  the  harbour  of  Manila,  without  the  loss 
of  an  American  sailor.  The  day  before  Admiral  Cervera's 
fleet  left  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands  and  on  May  11th  ap- 
peared off  Martinique.  On  the  12th  a  squadron  under  Act- 
ing Eear  Admiral  Sampson  bombarded  San  Juan  de  Porto 
Rico ;  two  days  later  the  Flying  Squadron  under  Commodore 
Schley  left  Hampton  Roads;  on  the  19th  Cervera  entered 
the  harbour  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  was  shortly  afterward 
blockaded  by  Schley,  who  was  re-enforced  on  May  30th  by  the 
entire  American  fleet. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  a  movement  against  Havana  w^as 
contemplated,  as  it  was  believed  that  the  city  could  be  stormed 
and  captured  before  the  rainy  season  began.  ^''^  As  a  prelimi- 
nary thereto  two  officers  w^ere  sent  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico 
to  ascertain  the  existing  conditions  there,  ^^  but  all  idea  of 
investing  Havana  had  to  be  relinquished  because  the  volun- 
teers were  raw  and  untrained,  there  was  every  indication  that 
the  necessary  forces  would  not  be  forthcoming  for  at  least  two 


168     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

months  and,  moreover,  the  dearth  of  ammunition  and  proper 
equipment  would  have  rendered  such  an  attempt  suicidal.  As 
the  Northern  public  in  June,  1861,  clamoured  that  its  troops 
should  be  rushed  "  On  to  Eichmond,"  so  the  American  peo- 
ple in  May,  1898,  were  impatient  to  push  "  On  to  Havana," 
but  fortunately  the  military  councils  w^ere  ruled  by  men  who 
could  not  be  stampeded.  ^^  In  default  of  an  invasion  by  the 
combined  land  forces,  several  small  expeditions  were  sent  to 
supply  the  Cubans  with  arms  and  other  war  materiel,^^^ 
and  it  Avas  decided  that  5,000  troops  under  General  Shafter, 
the  senior  officer  at  Tampa,  should  be  despatched  to  Tunas  on 
the  south  coast  of  Cuba  under  convoy  of  the  E^avy.  Its  role 
was  to  be  that  of  a  reconnaissance  in  force  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  information  and  of  furnishing  the  Cuban  insur- 
gents with  arms,  ammunition  and  supplies.  After  accom- 
plishing its  mission  it  was  to  re-embark  and  proceed  to  the 
northwest  coast  for  a  similar  object  but,  in  case  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Spanish  fleet  rendered  the  second  movement  too 
hazardous,  the  expedition  was  to  return  to  Florida.  On 
April  29th  the  necessary  orders  were  issued,  but  next  day  the 
news  of  Cervera's  departure  from  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands 
made  the  Navy  officials  unwilling  to  detach  the  necessary 
ships  to  convoy  the  troops,  and  Shafter's  expedition  had  to  be 
deferred. -^^-^  On  May  8th  the  Major  General  commanding 
the  Army  *'  was  directed  to  take  an  army  of  70,000  men  and 
capture  Havana."  -^^^  The  sequel  is  thus  related  by  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Miles  himself:  ^^^ 

"  I  appreciated  in  the  highest  degree  the  command  of  an 
army  to  invade  a  foreign  country  in  a  just  cause,  yet,  my  sense 
of  duty,  not  only  to  my  country,  but  to  the  brave  men  who 
composed  that  army,  prompted  me  to  sacrifice  every  personal 
consideration  and  explain  to  the  President  the  real  military 
conditions,  as  he  had  evidently  been  misinformed.  I  told  him 
that  there  were  within  a  short  distance  of  Havana  J  25,000 
Spanish  troops  with  over  100  field  guns,  besides  the  125  heavy 
guns  in  strong,  fortified  positions;  that  the  Spanish  troops  had 
approximately  1,000  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man ;  that  while 


The  S panish- American  War  169 

I  was  very  anxious  to  go  and  while  the  morale  of  the  army  was 
most  excellent,  the  most  serious  difficulty  was  that  there  was  not 
enough  ammunition  in  the  country,  outside  of  the  amount  then 
being  sent  to  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  a  small  amount  re- 
quired for  coast  defense,  available  for  an  army  of  70,000  men 
to  fight  one  battle,  and  that  our  cartridge  factories  could  not 
manufacture  an  adequate  amount  in  eight  weeks'  time;  that 
placing  an  army  in  such  condition  on  a  foreign  island  in  mid- 
summer, with  the  possibility  of  the  enemy  controlling  the  seas 
behind  it,  would  be  extremely  hazardous;  that  the  policy  of 
storming  heavily  fortified  positions  had  long  since  become  obso- 
lete, and  that  strateg}'  was  far  more  advisable  than  the  useless 
sacrifice  of  life.  Upon  this  information  the  President  suspended 
the  order,  and  thereby  saved  many  thousands  of  lives,  and  pos- 
sibly a  national  disaster,  by  adopting  more  judicious  measures/' 

i 

On  May  9th  General  Shafter  had  received  orders  to  em- 
bark and  proceed  to  Mariel,  on  the  north  coast  of  Cuba, 
where  he  was  to  establish  himself  in  a  solid  position  and  to  be 
re-enforced  by  other  troops  as  fast  as  they  could  be  sent  him.^^^ 
Next  day  it  was  discovered  that  the  Navy  could  not  furnish 
the  requisite  convoy  for  some  days  and  the  movement  was 
postponed  until  the  16th.^^^  Orders  were  given  that  12,000 
of  the  troops  should  be  transported  to  Key  West/^^  but  this 
plan  had  likewise  to  be  abandoned  owing  to  the  dearth  of 
water  supply  at  that  place.^^^  It  w^as  not  until  May  30th 
that  it  was  definitely  known  that  Cervera's  fl.eet  had  taken 
refuge  in  the  harbour  of  Santiago  and  was  bottled  up  by  the 
American  warships^  but  the  interim  had  been  spent  to  good 
purpose  in  organizing  and  instructing  the  troops,  and  in  col- 
lecting a  fleet  of  thirty-six  transports. -^^^ 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO 

On  May  30th  General  Miles  telegraphed  Shafter  to  proceed 
with  all  his  '^  force  to  capture  garrison  at  Santiago  and  assist 
in  capturing  harbor  and  fleet,"  and  that  same  night  he  left 
for  Tampa  to  superintend  operations.  ■'^^^  Arriving  on  June 
1st,  he  reported  next  day  that  the  working  force  at  Tampa 
had  been  divided  into  three  reliefs  of  eight  hours  each  and 


170      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

that  nine  transports  were  being  loaded  simultaneously.^  ^^ 
Although  every  possible  effort  was  bent  to  embarking  the 
troops  and  their  materiel  with  all  despatch/ ^^  and  although 
the  pressure  of  public  opinion  spurred  the  work  to  the  limit 
of  human  endurance/ ^^  the  utter  absence  of  anvthino:  resem- 
bling  systematic  management  afforded  a  spectacle  of  military 
unpreparedness  sufficient  to  make  the  most  boastful  American 
blush  for  shame.  The  conditions  have  been  thus  admirably 
described :  ^-^^ 

^'  Affairs  at  Tampa  were  in  such  great  confusion  that  many 
difficulties  were  encountered  in  getting  the  expedition  ready  to 
sail.  When  the  regiments  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  were  to 
compose  the  expedition,  arrived  at  Tampa,  the  lack  of  an  ade- 
quate supply  of  water  and  other  sanitary  requirements  necessi- 
tated their  being  assigned  to  camps  at  a  considerable  distance 
from  each  other,  and  from  Port  Tampa,  where  the  embarkation 
was  to  take  place.  Not  only  was  ^  the  capacity  of  the  place 
greatly  exceeded,'  but  the  facilities  for  embarking  the  troops 
were  inadequate.  Only  a  single  line  of  railroad  connected 
Tampa  with  Port  Tampa,  nine  miles  away.  The  switching 
facilities  were  entirely  too  limited,  and  for  miles  the  line  was 
choked  with  freight-cars  which  could  not  be  unloaded  near  the 
places  where  the  regiments  were  encamped  and  the  supplies 
needed.  As  the  cars  had  no  labels  indicating  their  contents, 
consignments  could  not  be  found  when  wanted,  and  as  the  little 
local  post-office  could  not  properly  handle  the  mail,  bills  of 
lading  were  not  promptly  distributed.  Thus  it  became  impos- 
sible for  receiving  officers  to  supply  and  equip  the  troops  ex- 
peditiously. The  equipment  and  supplies  needed  were  nearly 
all  there,  but  to  find  them  was  the  difficulty.  An  officer  seeking 
clothing  would  open  a  car  only  to  find  cannon,  or  seeking  bacon 
and  beans  would  find  shirts  and  shoes.  The  docking  space,  too, 
was  inadequate.  There  was  wharfage  for  only  eight  or  nine  of 
the  thirty-five  or  more  vessels  that  had  to  be  loaded,  and  no 
storage  facilities  had  been  provided."* 

"  j^aturally,  in  the  midst  of  such  a  chaotic  condition  of  affairs, 
delays  were  unavoidable  and  mistakes  frequently  made.  .  .  ."•" 

"  The  delay  in  the  departure  of  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Tampa 
was  of  much  concern  to  the  people  and  government  of  the 
United  States.     But  under  the  conditions  existing  at  the  time, 


The  Spanish- American  War  171 

this  delay  was  practically  unavoidable;  not  because  there  was 
any  lack  of  energ}^  and  soldierly  qualities  on  the  part  of  General 
Shafter  and  his  officers,  but  because  the  facilities  at  Tampa  for 
the  embarkation  of  such  a  large  number  of  troops  were  totally 
inadequate.  As  Tampa  lies  on  the  west  coast  of  Florida  only 
two  hundred  and  seventy  miles  from  the  naval  base  of  operations 
at  Ke}^  West,  and  is  nearer  Cuba  than  any  other  gulf  port  of 
importance,  it  was  most  favourably  situated  strategically  for 
a  base  of  operations  for  the  invading  land  forces.  And.  as  no 
other  gulf  port  offered  any  better  facilities  for  the  encampment 
and  embarkation  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  it  is  evident  that  the  only 
way  confusion  and  delay  at  Tampa  could  have  been  avoided 
would  have  been  for  the  United  States  government  to  have  antici- 
pated events  and  made  the  necessary  preparations  beforehand 
for  the  proper  encampment  and  speedy  embarkation  of  an  army 
at  that  place.  .  .  .^^^ 

"  In  this  connection  it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  remark  that 
a  government  ought  to  profit  by  past  mistakes,  and  thereby 
•strengthen  itself  for  future  conflicts.  The  lessons  of  history 
should  be  the  lessons  of  wisdom.  Such  confusion  and  delay  as 
occurred  at  Tampa  in  the  Spring  of  1898  should  not  be  allowed 
to  occur  again.  One  of  the  greatest  military  needs  of  this  coun- 
try to-day  is  a  port  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  with  ample  facilities 
for  the  speedy  embarkation  of  a  corps  of  twenty  or  twenty- five 
thousand  soldiers;  for  at  any  moment  the  need  of  troops  in 
Panama,  in  Central  or  South  America,  or  in  the  West  Indies, 
may  become  a  pressing  necessity.^' 

As  a  result  of  this  seething  chaos 

■"'  the  vessels  were  not  loaded  systematically.  A  battery  with 
its  guns  and  horses  would  be  placed  on  one  vessel  and  its  am- 
munition on  another.  The  Second,  Seventh,  and  Seventeenth 
Eegular  Infantry  were  each  divided  up  and  portions  in  each  case 
•sent  on  three  different  vessels.  .  .  .  Medicines,  stores,  and  hos- 
pital furniture  were  often  put  in  the  holds  of  transports  for 
Cuba  .  .  .  under  all  sorts  of  freight/'  ^^^ 

The  instances  of  disorder  might  be  multiplied  almost  in- 
definitely and,  moreover, 

"  The  great  difficultv  in  the  way  of  a  prompt  movement  was 
the  procurement  of  the  necessary  transports  for  that  service, 
the  Government  having  none  of  its  own.  .  .  . 


172     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

"  Thirty-six  transports  were  gathered  at  Port  Tampa,  few 
of  them  fitted  for  such  service  on  account  of  their  lack  of 
sufficient  ventilation  and  space  to  carry  as  large  a  force  as  was 
required. 

''  They  were,  however,  the  best  and  all  that  could  be  had ; 
and  Avhile  the  description  of  them  furnished  prior  to  their  char- 
ter showed  that  they  could  transport  about  23,000  men,  with 
transportation,  artiller}^,  horses,  quartermaster,  commissary,  and 
medical  supplies,  yet  it  was  found  that  even  the  number 
shipped  —  about  16,000  —  was  greater  than  should  have  been 
carried/^  ^^^ 

On  June  7th  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  General 
Shafter  that  "  the  President  directs  you  to  sail  at  once  with 
what  force  you  have  ready/'  ^^^  but  it  was  not  until  that 
morning  that  the  last  troops  arrived  from  Camp  Thomas  and 
that  the  final  orders  were  issued  for  the  embarkation.  ^^^  A 
fair  sample  of  the  experiences  undergone  by  many  of  the 
regiments  in  their  effort  to  obey  promptly  ^^^  may  be  gained 
from  the  following  graphic  account  given  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Roosevelt  of  the  First  Volunteer  Cavalry :  ^^^ 

'^  It  was  the  evening  of  June  7  when  we  suddenly  received 
orders  that  the  expedition  was  to  start  from  Port  Tampa,  nine 
miles  distant  by  rail,  at  daybreak  the  following  morning;  and 
that  if  we  were  not  aboard  our  transport  by  that  time  we  could 
not  go.  We  had  no  intention  of  getting  left,  and  prepared  at 
once  for  the  scramble  which  was  evidently  about  to  take  place. 
As  the  number  and  capacity  of  the  transports  were  known,  or 
ought  to  have  been  known,  and  as  the  number  and  size  of  the 
regiments  to  go  were  also  known,  the  task  of  allotting  each  regi- 
ment or  fraction  of  a  regiment  to  its  proper  transport,  and  ar- 
ranging that  the  regiments  and  the  transports  should  meet  in 
due  order  on  the  dock,  ought  not  to  have  been  difficult.  How- 
ever, no  arrangements  were  made  in  advance ;  and  we  were  al- 
lowed to  shove  and  hustle  for  ourselves  as  best  we  could,  on 
much  the  same  principles  that  had  governed  our  preparations 
hitherto. 

"  We  were  ordered  to  be  at  a  certain  track  with  all  our  bag- 
gage at  midnight,  there  to  take  a  train  for  ?ort  Tampa.  At  the 
appointed  time  we  turned  up,  but  the  train  did  not.  The  men 
slept  heavily,  while  Wood  and  I  and  various  other  officers  wan- 


The  Spanish- American  War  173 

dered  about  in  search  of  information  which  no  one  could  give. 
We  now  and  then  came  across  a  Brigadier-General,  or  even  a 
Major-General;  but  nobody  knew  anything.  Some  regiments  got 
aboard  the  trains  and  some  did  not,  but  as  none  of  the  trains 
started,  this  made  little  difference.  At  three  o'clock  we  re- 
ceived orders  to  march  to  an  entirely  different  track,  and  away 
we  went.  No  train  appeared  on  this  track  either;  but  at  six 
o'clock  some  coal-cars  came  by,  and  these  we  seized.  By  various 
arguments  we  persuaded  the  engineer  in  charge  of  the  train  to 
back  us  down  the  nine  miles  to  Port  Tampa,  where  we  arrived 
covered  with  coal-dust,  but  with  all  our  belongings. 

*^  The  railway  tracks  ran  out  on  the  quay,  and  the  transports, 
which  had  been  anchored  in  mid-stream,  were  gradually  being 
brought  up  alongside  the  quay  and  loaded.  The  trains  were 
unloading  wherever  they  happened  to  be,  no  attention  whatever 
being  paid  to  the  possible  position  of  the  transport  on  which  the 
soldiers  were  to  go.  Colonel  Wood  and  I  jumped  off  and  started 
on  a  hunt,  which  soon  convinced  us  that  we  had  our  work  cut 
out  if  we  were  to  get  a  transport  at  all.  From  the  highest  Gen- 
eral down,  nobody  could  tell  where  to  go  to  find  out  what  trans- 
port we  were  to  have.  At  last  we  were  informed  that  we  were 
to  hunt  up  the  depot  quartermaster.  Colonel  Humphrey.  We 
found  his  office,  where  his  assistant  informed  us  that  he  didn't 
know  where  the  Colonel  was,  but  believed  him  to  be  asleep  upon 
one  of  the  transports.  This  seemed  odd  at  such  a  time;  but  so 
many  of  the  methods  in  vogue  were  odd,  that  we  were  quite 
prepared  to  accept  it  as  a  fact.  However,  it  proved  not  to  be 
such;  but  for  an  hour  Colonel  Humphrey  might  just  as  well 
have  been  asleep,  as  nobody  knew  where  he  was  and  nobody 
could  find  him,  and  the  quay  was  crammed  with  some  ten  thou- 
sand men,  most  of  whom  were  working  at  cross  purposes. 

"  At  last,  however,  after  over  an  hour's  industrious  and  rapid 
search  through  this  swarming  ant-heap  of  humanity,  Wood  and 
I,  who  had  separated,  found  Colonel  Humphrey  at  nearly  the 
same  time  and  were  allotted  a  transport  —  the  Yucatan.  She 
was  out  in  mid-stream,  so  AVood  seized  a  stray  launch  and 
boarded  her.  At  the  same  time  I  happened  to  find  out  that 
she  had  previously  been  allotted  to  two  other  regiments  —  the 
Second  Regular  Infantry  and  the  Seventy-first  New  York  Volun- 
teers, which  latter  regiment  alone  contained  more  men  than 
could  be  put  aboard  her.  Accordingly,  I  ran  at  full  speed  to 
our  train ;  and  leaving  a  strong  guard  with  the  baggage,  I  double- 
quicked  the  rest  of  the  regiment  up  to  the  boat,  just  in  time  to 


174     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

board  her  as  she  came  into  the  quay,  and  then  to  hold  her 
against  the  Second  Eegnlars  and  the  Seventy-first,  who  had 
arrived  a  little  too  late,  being  a  shade  less  ready  than  we  were 
in  the  matter  of  individual  initiative.  There  was  a  good  deal 
of  expostulation,  but  we  had  possession;  and  as  the  ship  could 
not  contain  half  of  the  men  who  had  been  told  to  go  aboard  of 
her,  the  Seventy-first  went  awa}^,  as  did  all  but  four  companies  of 
the  Second.  These  latter  we  took  aboard.  Meanwhile  a  Gen- 
eral had  caused  our  train  to  be  unloaded  at  the  end  of  the 
quay  farthest  from  where  the  ship  was;  and  the  hungry,  tired 
men  spent  most  of  the  day  in  the  labor  of  bringing  down  their 
baggage  and  the  food  and  ammunition. 

"  The  officers'  horses  were  on  another  boat,  my  own  being  ac- 
companied by  my  colored  body-servant,  Marshall,  the  most 
faithful  and  loyal  of  men,  himself  an  old  soldier  of  the  Ninth 
Cavalry.  .  .  . 

"  By  the  time  that  night  fell,  and  our  transport  pulled  off  and 
anchored  in  midstream,  we  felt  that  we  had  spent  thirty-six  tol- 
erably active  hours.  The  transport  was  overloaded,  the  men 
being  packed  like  sardines,  not  only  below  but  upon  the  decks; 
so  that  at  night  it  was  only  possible  to  walk  about  by  continually 
stepping  over  the  bodies  of  the  sleepers.  The  travel  rations 
which  had  been  issued  to  the  men  for  the  voyage  were  not  suf- 
ficient, because  the  meat  was  very  bad  indeed;  and  when  a  ra- 
tion consists  of  only  four  or  five  items,  which  taken  together 
just  meet  the  requirements  of  a  strong  and  healthy  man,  the 
loss  of  one  item  is  a  serious  thing.  If  we  had  been  given  canned 
corn-beef  we  would  have  been  all  right,  but  instead  of  this  the 
soldiers  were  issued  horrible  stuff  called  ^  canned  fresh  beef.' 
There  was  no  salt  in  it.  At  the  best  it  was  stringy  and  taste- 
less; at  the  worst  it  was  nauseating.  Not  one-fourth  of  it  was 
ever  eaten  at  all,  even  when  the  men  became  very  hungry. 
There  were  no  facilities  for  the  men  to  cook  anything.  There 
was  no  ice  for  them;  the  water  was  not  good;  and  they  had  no 
fresh  meat  or  fresh  vegetables. 

"  However,  all  these  things  seemed  of  small  importance  com- 
pared with  the  fact  that  we  were  really  embarked,  and  were  with 
the  first  expedition  to  leave  our  shores."  ^^^ 

By  mid-afternoon  of  June  8th  the  transports  were  all  un- 
derway-^^^  after  an  embarkation  which  for  chaos  and  in- 
efficiency has  scarcely  its  counterpart  in  history.     As  chasten- 


The  Spanish- American  War  175 

ing  is  reputed  to  be  good  for  the  soul,  American  pride  might 
benefit  by  comparing  soberly  this  opera  bouffe  with  the  re- 
markable system  evolved  by  Napoleon  while  his  "  Grand 
Army,"  which  later  so  distinguished  itself  at  Austerlitz,  Jena, 
Friedland  and  Wagram,  lay  encamped  on  the  heights  of  Bou- 
logne awaiting  a  favourable  opportunity  to  invade  England. 
After  many  trials  he  found  that  v  he  could  embark  an  army 
of  130,000  troops  within  three  hours, ^^^  and,  even  if  it  be 
impossible  to  duplicate  his  astounding  feat,  it  nevertheless 
teaches  that,  with  previous  preparation  and  frequent  prac- 
tice, there  is  no  excuse  for  a  fraction  of  the  confusion  and 
delay  which  attended  the  American  operation  at  Tampa  and 
which  might  readily  have  entailed  disastrous  consequences 
had  we  been  pitted  against  any  but  a  third-rate  military 
Power. 

N^o  sooner  were  the  transports  en  route  to  the  Gulf  than 
orders  were  received  to  countermand  the  departure,  because 
it  had  been  reported  that  a  Spanish  cruiser  and  torpedo-boat 
had  been  sighted  in  the  Nicholas  Channel. ^^^  The  transports 
were  recalled, -^^"^  and  for  five  days  the  impatient  troops  had 
to  make  the  best  of  a  situation  caused  by  the  consternation  at 
Washington  over  what  was  subsequently  discovered  to  be  •  a 
delusion.^  ^^  The  conditions  of  the  men  during  this  enforced 
delay  are  thus  depicted  by  the  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the 
Eough  Riders:  ^^^ 

"  Meanwhile  the  troop-ships,  packed  tight  with  their  living 
freight,  sweltered  in  the  burning  heat  of  Tampa  Harbor.  There 
was  nothing  whatever  for  the  men  to  do,  space  being  too 
cramped  for  amusement  or  for  more  drill  than  was  implied  in 
the  manual  of  arms.  In  this  we  drilled  them  assiduously,  and 
we  also  continued  to  hold  school  for  both  the  officers  and  non- 
•commissioned  officers.  Each  troop  commander  was  regarded  as 
responsible  for  his  own  non-commissioned  officers.  .  .  . 

"  The  heat,  the  steaming  discomfort,  and  the  confinement,  to- 
gether with  the  forced  inaction,  were  very  irksome;  but  every 
one  made  the  best  of  it,  and  there  was  little  or  no  grumbling 
even  among  the  men.     All,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  were 


176     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

bent  upon  perfecting  themselves  according  to  their  slender  op- 
portunities. Ever}^  book  of  tactics  in  the  regiment  was  in  use 
from  morning  until  night,  and  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  were  always  studying  the  problems  presented  at  the 
schools.  About  the  only  amusement  was  bathing  over  the  side, 
in  which  we  indulged  both  in  the  morning  and  evening.  .  .  . 
So  we  lay  for  nearly  a  week,  the  vessels  swinging  around  on  their 
anchor  chains,  while  the  hot  water  of  the  bay  flowed  to  and  fro 
around  them  and  the  sun  burned  overhead." 

At  last,  on  June  12th,  General  Shafter  received  telegraphic 
instructions  that  the  warships  '^  forming  the  convoy  will 
meet  transports  at  Rebecca  Shoal  and  proceed  together  to 
destination,"  ^^^  and  next  day  his  fleet  ^^^  sailed  from 
Tampa,^^^  the  thirty-two  troop-ships  crammed  to  their  fullest 
capacity  by  the  addition  of  the  independent  brigade  ^^^  which 
General  Bates  had  brought  from  Mobile.  The  total  forces 
numbered  815  officers  and  16,072  enlisted  men,^^*  but  some 
10,000  troops  had  to  be  left  behind  for  lack  of  sufficient  trans- 
portation.^^^ The  commanding  General  of  the  Army  had  ap- 
plied to  accompany  the  expedition,  but  his  request  ^vas  quietly 
ignored  and  he  had  been  ordered  to  organize  this  latter  force 
for  another  expedition  destined  to  be  sent  to  Porto  Rico.-^^^ 
Although  Shafter's  command  contained  but  three  volunteer 
organizations  —  the  71st  ^N^ew  York,  the  Rough  Riders  and 
the  2nd  Massachusetts  —  it  comprised  one  half  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  was  expected  to  oppose  a  Spanish  force  of  veterans 
inured  to  tropical  climate  and  numbering  196,820,  of  which 
36,582  were  in  the  province  of  Santiago  ■^^'^  where  Shafter 
had  been  ordered  to  land  and  where,  after  a  smooth  and  un- 
eventful voyage,  he  put  his  first  troops  ashore  on  June 
22nd.-^^^  The  trip  and  the  operation  in  question  are  thus 
admirably  described:  ^^^ 

"  On  the  14th  of  June,  after  several  false  alarms  of  attack 
by  Spanish  torpedo  boats,  the  United  States  fleet  got  under  way, 
and  crept  toward  its  destination  at  about  eight  knots  an  hour 
—  the  limit  of  speed  of  many  of  the  old  steamers  which  had  been 
chartered   as   transports.     On   arrival   at   Daiquiri,   which    had 


The  Spanish- American  War  111 

been  selected  as  a  landing-place,  it  was  discovered  that  the  trans- 
ports were  provided  with  one  lighter  only  for  the  disembarkation 
of  horses  and  guns/*°  and  no  launches.  The  one  available  land- 
ing-stage was  but  partially  floored,  and  there  were  no  materials 
•or  tools  available  for  its  repair  or  for  the  construction  of  other 
stages. 

"  Every  boat  and  launch,  even  from  the  iron-clads  blockading 
Santiago  Harbour,  was  requisitioned  for  the  service,  and  by  the 
splendid  efforts  of  the  American  blue-jackets,  greatly  aided  by  a 
spell  of  exceptionally  fine  weather,  the  infantry  were  got  on 
shore  during  the  first  day  of  the  disembarkation,^ "^^  two  men, 
however,  being  drowned.  In  the  absence  of  lighters  or  flats, 
horses  and  mules  had  to  swim  to  shore,  being  simply  hoisted  out 
•of  the  transports  and  lowered  into  the  ocean ;  moreover,  as  there 
were  no  ordinary  boats  available  to  guide  them  to  land,  some 
fifty  animals  swam  out  to  sea  in  the  confusion  and  were  drowned. 
Under  the  circumstances  it  is  not  remarkable  that  the  dis- 
embarkation of  horses,  guns,  and  stores  was  not  completed  for 
many  days.  The  number  of  animals  was  very  limited,  as  owing 
to  the  omission  to  fit  up  a  sufficient  number  of  vessels  for  their 
transport,  most  of  the  cavalry  horses  had  to  be  left  behind  at 
Tampa.  The  landing  of  provisions  was  effected  with  such  slow- 
ness that  tlie  troops  from  the  outset  had  to  be  placed  on  reduced 
rations ;  and  throughout  the  disembarkation  there  was  great 
confusion  on  the  landing-place,  which  was  congested  with  men 
and  stores,  as  no  officer  had  been  detailed  to  assume  control  there, 
or  act  as  base  commandant. 

"  The  disembarkation  was  practically  unopposed,  as  the  few 
Spaniards  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Daiquiri  appear  tp  have  fled 
:as  soon  as  the  American  men-of-war  opened  fire.  German  au- 
thorities, however,  are  of  the  opinion  that  as  the  rocks  reached 
•close  to  the  sea,  and  afforded  many  places  screened  from  the  fire 
of  the  war-ships,  300  determined  men,  although  they  might  not 
have  been  able  to  frustrate  the  landing  entirely,  could  certainly 
have  inflicted  very  severe  loss  on  the  invaders. ^*^  Great  fric- 
tion appears  to  have  arisen  between  the  military  authorities  and 
the  officers  of  the  transport  steamers.  '  The  latter  had  only 
their  own  advantage  and  that  of  the  ships'  owners  in  view,  and 
did  not  pay  the  least  attention  to  the  wishes  and  plans  of  the 
officers  of  the  troops.  The  greater  part  of  the  time  they  kept  at 
a  distance  of  from  3  to  20  miles  from  shore  .  .  .  and  if  at  times 
they  did  assist  in  unloading  their  cargoes,  they  would  return  to 


178     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

sea  as  fast  as  possible  as  soon  as  fire  was  opened  ashore ! '  Even 
when  the  landing  had  at  last  been  completed,  the  Army  was 
wanting  in  mobility  through  the  deficiency  of  land  transport. 

"  Bearing  in  mind  that  the  force  engaged  had  been  sent  forth 
by  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  most  enlightened  nations  in  the 
world,  and  that  the  descent  took  place  at  the  close  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  it  would  certainly  appear  that  the  landing  at 
Daiquiri  is  a  unique  illustration  of  the  fact  that  even  the  most 
splendid  resources  cannot  compensate  for  the  absence  of  a  well- 
established  organization  carefully  prepared  and  tested  in  time  of 
peace. 

"  The  miscalculations  and  errors,  which  resulted  not  only 
from  individual  incapacity  —  for  all  accounts  bear  testimony  to 
the  zeal  and  enthusiasm  of  American  sailors  and  soldiers  —  but 
from  an  entire  lack  of  pre-existing  and  established  system, 
would  have  brought  disaster  to  the  very  gates  of  the  Great  Re- 
public if  its  forces  had  been  pitted  against  an  enterprising  foe. 
The  forces  of  the  United  States  have  been  without  the  school- 
ing of  war  for  thirty-four  (sic)  years;  but  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  the  state  of  affairs  depicted  could  not  possibly  have 
arisen  if  the  theory  and  practice  of  the  combined  action  of 
fleets  and  armies  had  been  established  before  the  encounter  with 
Spain  as  a  recognized  branch  of  naval  and  military  arts." 

By  the  night  of  June  22nd  about  6,000  troops  had  been 
landed,  and  General  Lawton  was  sent  forward  to  seize  and 
hold  Siboney.  During  the  23rd  another  6,000  men  were 
put  ashore,  the  disembarkation  being  shifted  that  afternoon 
to  Siboney,-"^^^  eight  miles  nearer  Santiago,  and  continuing 
throughout  the  night. ^"^^  It  was  not  until  the  25th  that  the 
entire  command  was  finally  established  on  Cuban  soil,-^^^  and 
"  it  was  not  until  nearly  two  weeks  after  the  army  landed  that 
it  was  possible  to  place  on  shore  three  days'  supplies  in  ex- 
cess of  those  required  for  daily  consumption."  ^^^ 

By  comparison  with  the  bungling  which  characterised  this 
operation,  the  clock-like  precision  of  the  disembarkation  at 
Chemulpo  in  February,  1904,  of  a  Japanese  army  of  20,000 
men,  2,500  horses,  several  field  batteries  and  fully  100,000 
tons  of  stores,  stands  out  in  strong  contrast.  The  reader  who 
is  interested  to  compare  the  two  operations  will  find  a  com- 


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The  Spanish- American  War  179 

prehensive  account  of  the  Japanese  landing  in  the  Appendix 
to  this  chapter,  on  pages  649—651.-^^'^ 

The  orders  issued  by  General  Shafter  on  June  23rd  con- 
templated the  assumption  of  a  strong  defensive  position  near 
Siboney  by  General  Lawton's  division  which  was  to  be  sup- 
ported by  General  Bates'  brigade,  while  General  Kent's  divi- 
sion was  to  be  retained  near  Siboney  and  General  Wheeler's 
cavalry  to  remain  in  the  rear  on  the  road  from  Siboney  to 
Daiquiri,  pending  the  landing  of  the  entire  force  and  a  reason- 
able amount  of  the  necessary  supplies.  ^^^  Wheeler,  who  had 
been  joined  that  evening  at  Siboney  by  his  2nd  brigade  un- 
der General  Young  and  who  thus  had  964  troops  available, ^*^ 
learned  that  the  enemy  was  entrenched  near  Sevilla  and,  being 
anxious  to  get  to  the  front,  determined  to  attack,  supported  by 
800  Cubans  whose  participation  General  Castillo  had  prom- 
ised. At  5.45  A.  M.,  on  the  24th,  Young's  brigade  began  its 
advance  in  two  columns.  Colonel  Wood  with  the  First  Vol- 
unteer Cavalry  (Rough  Riders)  following  a  trail  west  of  the 
main  road.  Two  hours  later  General  Rubin's  force  of  Span- 
ish troops  was  encountered  on  the  ridge  at  Las  Guasimas  ^  ^^ 
and  Young's  Hotchkiss  guns  opened  against  their  position, 
but  so  hot  was  their  fire  that,  at  8.30  a.  m.,  Wheeler  sent  to 
Lawton  for  re-enforcements,  declaring  that  he  had  encountered 
^^  a  bigger  force  of  the  enemy  than  he  had  anticipated."  ^^^ 
Meanwhile  the  Rough  Riders  had  come  into  action  on  the  left 
of  the  Regulars,  both  columns  pressed  forward  through  the 
dense  tropical  jungle  and,  while  Young's  troops  made  a  fron- 
tal attack.  Wood  struck  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy 
on  the  heights,  the  combined  advance  driving  the  Spanish 
from  their  entrenchments.  The  withering  heat  and  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  troops  prevented  a  vigorous  pursuit  by  Wheeler 
which,  had  it  occurred,  must  necessarily  have  been  checked 
four  miles  beyond,  as  General  Linares  had  moved  out  from 
Santiago  to  El  Pozo  with  his  artillery  and  retained  that  posi- 
tion until  Rubin  had  retreated  past  it.  The  losses  were  com- 
paratively trifling,^  ^^  but  the  action  was  important  in  that  it 


180     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

secured  to  Shafter's  forces  a  well-watered  district  for  their 
camps,  which  additionally  afforded  an  unimpaired  view  of 
Santiago  and  the  surrounding  country.  Moreover,  this  initial 
success  was  distinctly  encouraging  to  the  Americans  while 
it  exercised  a  dispiriting  effect  upon  the  Spanish. ^^^ 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  fight  General  Lawton  appeared  on 
the  scene  with  his  1st  brigade  (General  Chaffee),  and  General 
Shafter  ordered  a  concentration  of  his  troops  at  Sevilla  under 
General  Wheeler,  the  senior  officer  at  the  front,-^^^  while  the 
commander-in-chief  remained  at  Siboney  on  board  the  Se- 
guranga  to  superintend  the  organization  of  the  supply  de- 
partments which  were  in  a  state  of  chaos. -^^^  It  was  not  until 
eight  days  later  that  the  advance  was  resumed,  and  the  condi- 
tions during  a  large  part  of  that  invaluable  time,  which  had 
been  wasted  in  inactivity  owing  to  the  failure  to  make  ade- 
quate preparations  beforehand,  are  thus  depicted  by  Senator 
Lodge,  who  declares  that  the  success  achieved  at  Las  Guasimas 

^^  also  encouraged  the  mistaken  idea  which  Admiral  Sampson 
had  expressed  at  first,  and  which  General  Shafter  apparently 
held  to  firmly,  that  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States  had  noth- 
ing to  do  but  to  press  forward,  drive  the  Spaniards  from  them, 
and  take  the  town  in  forty-eight  hours.  If  the  Americans  had 
gone  on  at  once,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  they  might 
have  gone  through  successfully  to  the  city  itself.  But  to  take 
the  town  in  forty-eight  hours  in  the  first  advance  was  one  thing, 
and  to  attempt  to  take  it  on  the  forty-eight  hours  plan  after 
a  week's  delay  was  another  and  widely  different  business.  In  a 
short  time  it  was  to  be  proved  that  a  strong  lines  of  defences, 
constructed  for  the  most  part  while  the  advance  begun  at  Las 
Guasimas  was  halted,  lay  between  the  Americans  and  Santiago, 
and  that  tlie  Spaniards,  after  their  fashion,  would  fight  hard 
and  stubbornly  under  cover  of  entrenchments  and  block-houses. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  with  such  views  prevailing  that  the  army 
finally  moved  forward.  Lawton's  and  Chaffee's  brigades  came 
up  to  the  front  the  day  of  the  fight  at  Las  Guasimas,  and  the 
other  troops  advanced  during  the  following  days  to  the  high 
ground  around  Sevilla,  which  the  victory  of  the  cavalry  division 
had  brought  within  American  control.  During  three  days  there 
seems  to  have  been  great  confusion  in  the  movement  of  troops. 


The  S panish- American  War  181 

and  still  more  in  the  transportation  of  supplies. ^'^^  The  nar- 
row trails,  bad  at  the  best,  were  soon  torn  up  by  wagons,  and 
were  choaked  by  the  advancing  regiments,  which  moved  slowly 
and  with  difficulty.^'^^  The  army  stretched  back  for  three  miles 
from  El  Pozo,  where  an  outpost  was  stationed,  and  whence  the 
Spaniards  could  be  seen  hard  at  work,  the  line  of  entrenchments 
and  rifle-pits  lengthening  continually  along  the  hills  of  San 
Juan,  and  the  defences  of  El  Caney  constantly  growing  stronger. 
Yet  during  these  days  of  waiting  no  battery  was  brought  to 
El  Pozo  to  open  on  the  Spanish  works,  no  effort  was  made  to 
interfere  with  the  enemy  in  strengthening  his  position,  which 
meant  the  sacrifice  of  just  so  many  more  lives  by  every  hour  that 
it  went  on  unimpeded.  There  was  no  attempt  during  these 
comparatively  unoccupied  days  to  make  new  roads  through  the 
forests  and  undergrowth,  so  that  the  troops  could  emerge  all 
along  the  line  of  woods  instead  of  in  dense  narrow  masses  from 
the  two  existing  trails.  There  were  officers  who  saw,  knew,  and 
suggested  all  these  things,  but  they  were  not  done."  ^^^ 

On  June  27th  part  of  General  Duffield's  brigade  from  Camp 
Alger  joined  the  army,  and  next  day  Shafter  learned  that 
8,000  Spanish  regulars  under  General  Pando  were  advancing 
from  Manzanillo  and  were  expected  to  reach  Santiago  within 
a  few  days.-^^^  Despite  the  deficiency  in  the  equipment  of  his 
command  and  the  dearth  of  provisions  at  the  front,  he  deter- 
mined to  attack  without  further  delay.  On  the  29th  he 
established  his  headquarters  ashore  about  a  mile  from  El  Pozo, 
on  the  30th  made  a  reconnaissance  and,  after  a  consultation 
with  Lawton  and  Chaffee,  assembled  his  division  command- 
ers and  communicated  his  plan  to  them.^^^ 

At  6.15  A.  M.,  on  July  first  the  artillery  opened  fire  against 
the  Spanish, ^^^  thus  ushering  in  the  battle  of  Santiago,  which 
consisted  of  two  separate  and  distinct  actions.  The  first  was 
that  of  El  Caney,  where  General  Vara  de  Key  with  only  520 
troops  -^^^  occupied  a  position  that  "  was  naturally  strong,  and 
was  rendered  more  so  by  blockhouses,  a  stone  fort,  and  en- 
trenchments cut  in  solid  rock,  and  the  loopholing  of  a  solidly 
built  stone  church."  ^^^  To  Lawton's  division  —  which  was 
re-enforced  during  the  morning  by  Bates'  independent  bri- 


182     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

gade  ^^* —  was  assigned  the  task  of  taking  this  position  ^^^  and 
about  6.30  its  solitary  battery  opened  fire.  For  nine  long 
hours  a  desperate  struggle  raged  about  the  village  of  El 
Caney.  Never  in  its  history  did  the  Spanish  infantry  fight 
more  superbly  ^^^  and  never  did  American  troops  show 
greater  heroism.  It  was  not  until  4.30  that  afternoon  that 
success  crowned  Lawton's  efforts,  when  the  place  was  carried 
by  storm  and  the  garrison  driven  out  of  the  village  after  heavy 
losses  on  both  sides. ■^^'^ 

From  a  military  standpoint  the  assault  at  El  Caney  was 
most  unnecessary.  Although  the  place  was  of  great  impor- 
tance strategically  speaking,  once  it  was  discovered  that  it 
could  not  be  captured  without  prolonged  struggle,  a  sufficient 
force  should  have  been  left  to  mask  it  and  to  contain  the 
garrison.*  Lawton  and  Bates  would  thus  have  been  enabled 
to  push  on  and  to  join  in  the  main  attack  upon  the  San  Juan 
ridge  which  was  by  all  odds  the  most  important  point  on  the 
battlefield.  Instead  of  participating  in  the  major  operation 
where  every  available  regiment  should  have  been  concen- 
trated in  order  to  gain  possession  of  the  position  constituting 
the  key  to  Santiago,  f  the  main  army  was  deprived  of  their 
much-needed  support,  while  hours  and  lives  were  needlessly 
wasted  in  a  secondary  operation  directed  against  a  place 
which  was  nothing  more  or  less  than  an  isolated  outpost  sit- 
uated three  miles  away,  on  the  flank  of  the  principal  line  of 
advance.     It  should  have  been  self-evident  that  a  success 


*  General  Shafter  seems  to  have  appreciated  this  fact  since  about 
2  P.  M.  he  wrote  to  Lawton : 

"  I  would  not  bother  with  little  blockhouses.  They  can't  harm  us. 
Bates'  brigade  and  your  division  and  Garcia  should  move  on  the  city 
and  form  the  right  of  the  line  going  on  the  Sevilla  road.  Line  is  now 
hotly  engaged." 

The  fighting  at  El  Caney  had  then  been  in  progress  since  6 :  30  a.  m. 
and  this  note,  which  ought  to  have  been  sent  hours  before,  did  not 
reach  Lawton  until  he  was  making  his  final  assault. 

t  Shortly  after  2  p.  m.  General  Shafter  sent  a  despatch  to  Lawton 
saying,  "  You  miust  proceed  with  the  remainder  of  your  force  and  join 
on  immediately  upon  Sumner's  right.  If  you  do  not,  the  battle  is  lost." 
—  Bonsai,  p.  11 G,  footnote. 


The  Spanish- American  War  183 

gained  on  the  San  Juan  heights  necessarily  neutralized  any 
importance  possessed  by,  as  well  as  entailing  the  fall  of,  El 
Caney,  and  in  other  respects  the  conduct  of  the  battle  that 
day  was  marked  by  a  notable  disregard  of  certain  fundamen- 
tal rules  of  war  as  laid  down  by  Napoleon,  namely : 

(1)  ''The  art  of  war  consists  in  not  dividing  one's  forces''; 
(2)  ''It  is  a  fundamental  rule  in  war  to  know  how  to  sacrifice 
secondary  to  primary  points";  and  (8)  "Do  not  attack  in  front 
positions  which  you  can  obtain  hy  turning  them." 

Senator  Lodge,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  Ameri- 
can statesmen  and  historical  writers,  makes  the  following  crit- 
icism: ^^^ 

"  To  take  a  strongly  fortified  town  with  infantry  quickly  and 
without  needless  loss  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  clear  the  way 
by  a  powerful  and  destructive  artillery  fire.  For  this  all-im- 
portant object  the  division  had  only  Capron's  battery  of  four 
guns,  so  absurdly  inadequate  to  its  task  that  the  fact  needs  only 
to  be  stated.  This  meagre  battery  opened  on  the  Fort  at  El 
Caney  with  a  deliberate  fire  at  half  past  six,  producing  little  more 
effect  than  to  very  slowly  crumble  the  walls.  Moreover,  the  bat- 
tery was  not  grossly  inadequate,  but  it  used  black  powder,  and 
immediately  established  a  flaring  target  for  an  enemy  concealed 
and  perfectly  familiar  with  the  ranges.  Why  were  there  no 
more  guns  ?  Why  were  they  left  at  Tampa  or  in  the  transports  ? 
The  fact  requires  no  committee  of  investigation  to  prove  it,  and 
somebody  was  responsible  for  the  scores  of  men  shot  at  El  Caney 
because  there  were  only  four  guns  to  open  the  way.^^^  Why  was 
the  powder  black,  so  that  a  target  of  smoke  hung  over  the  Ameri- 
can position  after  every  discharge?  Any  smokeless  powder  was 
better  than  none.  Even  poor,  broken-down  Spain  had  smokeless 
powder  for  her  artillery.  Why  did  we  not  have  it?  While  the 
War  Department  had  been  passing  years  in  trying  to  find  a  patent 
powder  just  to  its  liking,  our  artillery  was  provided  with  black 
powder  and  went  to  war  with  it,  and  men  died  needlessly  because 
of  it.  No  need  of  a  committee  to  establish  this  fact,  either.  Who 
was  responsible  ?  One  thing  is  certain  —  a  system  of  adminis- 
tration WHICH  IS  CAPABLE  OF  SUCH  PROTRACTED  INEFFICIENCY 
IS  LITTLE  SHORT  OF  CRIMINAL,  AND  THE  CONGRESS  AND  THE  PEO- 
PLE WHO  PERMIT  SUCH  A  SYSTEM  TO  EXIST,  uow  that  it  has  bccu 


184     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

found  out,  WILL  SHARE  IN  THE  HEAVY  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  A 
NEGLECT  FOR  WHICH  MEN^S  LIVES  HAVE  DEARLY  PAID  IF  THEY 
DO   NOT   PROMPTLY   REMEDY   IT.    .    .    /' 

In  speaking  of  the  attack  on  El  Caney  he  says :  ^  ^^ 

"  The  force  was  composed  entirely  of  regulars,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Second  Massachusetts  Eegiment,  in  Ludlow's  bri- 
gade. These  volunteers,  never  in  action  before,  behaved  ex- 
tremely well,  coming  up  steadily  under  fire,  and  taking  their 
place  in  the  firing-line.  But  the  moment  they  opened  with  their 
archaic  Springfields  and  black  powder,  which  they  owed  to  the 
narrow  parsimony  of  Congress,  and  to  the  lack  of  energy  and 
efficiency  in  the  system  of  the  War  Department,  they  became  not 
only  an  easy  mark  for  the  Spanish  Mausers,  but  made  the  posi- 
tion of  more  peril  to  all  other  troops.  In  consequence  of  this 
they  had  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  firing-line,  but  not  until 
they  had  suffered  severely  and  displayed  an  excellent  courage. 
The  lack  of  artillery  and  the  black  powder  made  the  assault  on 
El  Caney  a  work  to  which  infantry  should  not  have  been  forced. 
Yet  they  were  forced  to  it,  and  supported  by  only  four  guns." 

Similar  handicaps  were  experienced  by  the  other  troops  in 
the  main  attack  upon  the  San  Juan  heights.  The  smoke 
from  Grimes'  battery  at  El  Pozo  quickly  gave  the  range  to 
the  Spanish  guns  and  several  Americans  were  killed  and 
wounded. -^^^  The  advance  of  the  Cavalry  division  —  tempo- 
rarily under  Sumner  as  General  Wheeler  had  been  ill  ^^^ — 
followed  by  Kent's  division  from  El  Pozo  across  the  San 
Juan  river,  preparatory  to  deploying  to  the  right  and  left  for 
a  general  attack,  was  disclosed  to  the  enemy  by  a  captive  war 
balloon,  and  a  withering  fire  was  concentrated  upon  the  troops 
while  in  their  densest  formation  near  the  branching  of  the 
roads,  a  few  hundred  yards  beyond  the  fords.  For  nearly  an 
hour  the  troops  were  huddled  together  without  orders  from 
the  commander  of  the  army  ^^^  whose  "  own  health  was  im- 
paired by  overexertion  in  the  sun  and  intense  heat  of  the  day 
before"  and  who  remained  in  the  rear.^'^^  At  last  the  de- 
ployment was  effected  after  tremendous  efforts  on  the  part  of 
the  officers, ^^^  though  not  without  heavy  losses  and  one  in- 
stance of  slight  panic  in  a  volunteer  battalion.  ^''^^     But  "  still 


The  Spanish- American  War  185 

no  orders,  and  at  last  the  division,  brigade  and  regimental 
commanders  acted  and  ordered  for  themselves,"  ■^'''^  having 
grown  sick  and  tired  of  waiting  for  Lawton,  who  was  to  as- 
sume a  position  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line.  General 
Sumner  then  directed  his  1st  brigade  under  Colonel  Wood  to 
assault  Kettle  Hill,  which  was  soon  taken.  Part  of  the  cav- 
alry division  bore  to  the  left  and  joined  Hawkins'  attack  on 
San  Juan  Hill  which  was  crowned  by  a  blockhouse  and  en- 
trenchments. Sumner's  men  then  crossed  the  intervening 
valley  and  charged  up  the  heights  to  the  north  of  the  road  to 
Santiago,  reaching  the  crest  shortly  after  Hawkins,  while  on 
the  left  Kent's  2nd  brigade  carried  the  heights  immediately 
south  of  San  Juan  Hill.  At  1.30  p.  m.,  this  initial  success 
had  been  achieved,  the  Spanish  driven  from  their  first  and 
strongest  line  of  entrenchments  back  to  their  second  line,  and 
the  Americans  began  to  strengthen  their  position  as  best  they 
could.  From  that  time  until  nightfall  the  fighting  continued 
at  intervals  between  the  opposing  forces,  at  distances  varying 
from  300  to  800  yards  only,  and  the  one  attempt  of  the 
Spanish  to  take  the  offensive  was  vigorously  repulsed.  Gen- 
eral Linares  having  been  wounded  at  2  p.  m.,  the  command 
of  the  garrison  devolved  upon  General  Jose  Toral.-^^^ 

Although  the  day  had  brought  a  notable  success  in  the  cap- 
ture of  San  Juan  Hill,  the  situation  of  the  Americans  was 
precarious  in  the  extreme.  Out  of  the  8,412  troops  who  had 
participated  in  this  victory,  no  less  than  1,018  were  killed, 
wounded  or  missing, ^'''^  every  one  was  greatly  exhausted  by 
the  terrific  heat  which  caused  them  to  throw  away  all  im- 
pedimenta except  their  rifies  and  ammunition, -^^^  the  line  was 
painfully  slim,  there  were  no  reserves  to  fall  back  upon  for 
support  and  three  ambulances  were  all  there  was  to  carry  the 
wounded  to  the  rear.*  At  the  end  of  the  fight  General 
Wheeler  ordered  the  construction  of  breastworks  -^^-^  and  the 


*  "  The  richest  government  in  the  world  had  only  three  ambulances 
there  to  carry  its  wounded  sons  to  the  dressing-stations." —  Bonsai,  p. 
141. 


186     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

American  positions  were  considerably  strengthened,  but  it  was 
not  until  midnight  that  General  Bates'  brigade,  which  had 
left  El  Caney  at  4.30  p.  m.,  reached  the  extreme  left,  after  hav- 
ing marched  or  fought  continuously  for  twenty-one  hours  out 
of  the  preceding  twenty-seven  and  a  half.-^^^  Lawton,  who 
started  shortly  after  Bates,  ran  into  some  Spanish  pickets  in 
the  darkness,  had  to  halt  pending  instructions  from  General 
Shafter  and  his  entire  division  did  not  assume  position  on 
the  right  of  the  line  until  about  noon  next  day.-^^^ 

"  All  day  on  the  2d  the  battle  raged  with  more  or  less 
fury,"  ^^*  but  the  much-needed  re-enforcement  of  Bates  and 
Lawton  ^^^  enabled  the  Americans  to  hold  their  position  with- 
out great  difficulty. 

About  6  p.  M.^  Shafter  summoned  Generals  Wheeler,  Kent, 
Lawton  and  Bates  to  his  headquarters  and  proposed  to  them  to 
withdraw  ^ve  miles  to  the  plateau  between  the  San  Juan  Biver 
and  Siboney  but,  meeting  with  stout  opposition  on  their  part, 
he  decided,  after  a  discussion  lasting  two  hours,  to  retain  his 
position  for  the  next  twenty-four  hours  "  and  at  the  end  of 
that  time  he  would  again  summon  the  generals  for  a  second 
conference."  ^^^  At  10  p.  m.,  the  Spanish  opened  "  a  terrific 
musketry  fire  which  lasted  about  an  hour,"  but  no  actual  at- 
tempt was  made  to  break  through  the  American  lines,  al- 
though such  was  thought  to  be  their  intention.^  ^'^ 

On  the  morning  of  July  3rd  General  Shafter  cabled  the 
Secretary  of  War  that,  although  Santiago  was  invested  on 
the  north  and  east,  the  line  was  "  very  thin  " ;  that  the  de- 
fences were  too  strong  to  carry  by  storm  with  his  present 
forces ;  and  that  he  was  ''  seriously  considering  "  the  with- 
drawal to  which  allusion  has  just  been  made.^^^  He  did, 
however,  write  a  note  to  the  Spanish  commander  demanding 
his  surrender,*  and  the  desultory  firing  which  began  at  day- 


*  Headquarters  United  Forces, 
Near  San  Juan  River,  July  3,  1898  —  8:30  a.m. 
The  Commanding  General  of  the  Spanish  Forces, 
Santiago  de  Cuba. 
Sir:     I  shall  be  obliged,  unless  you  surrender,  to  shell  Santiago  de 


The  Spanish- American  War  187 

break  was  interrupted  about  12.30  p.  m.,  by  the  flag  of  truce 
bearing  this  summons  to  the  city.^^^  This  marked  the  ter- 
mination of  the  battle  of  Santiago  and  the  operations  were 
shortly  transformed  into  those  of  a  siege.  General  Toral  re- 
fused to  entertain  any  suggestion  for  capitulation  ^^^  and  that 
night  he  was  joined  by  Escario's  column  from  Manzanillo,^^^ 
which  the  Cuban  army  had  permitted  to  slip  past  them  with- 
out much  opposition.^  ^^  Upon  the  request  of  several  of  the 
foreign  consuls,  Shafter  agreed  to  extend  the  time  for  the 
departure  of  the  women  and  children  until  noon  of  the  5th.  ^^^ 
Shafter's  correspondence  with  Washington  appears  to  have 
raised  no  little  consternation  there.  The  Secretary  of  War 
had  waited  at  the  White  House  with  the  President  until  4 
A.  M.,  but  it  was  not  until  11.44  that  his  cable  announcing 
his  intention  of  withdrawing  was  received. -^^^  General  Alger 
thereupon  cabled  him,  at  12.10  p.  m.  : 

"  Your  first  dispatch  received.  Of  course,  you  can  judge  the 
situation  better  than  we  can  at  this  end  of  the  line.  If,  however, 
you  could  hold  your  present  position,  especially  San  Juan 
heights,  the  effect  upon  the  country  would  be  much  better  than 
falling  back.  However,  we  leave  all  that  matter  to  you.  This 
is  only  a  suggestion.  We  shall  send  you  reinforcements  at 
once." 

To  this  Shafter  replied,  "  I  shall  hold  my  present  position,'' 
but,  in  the  meantime,  he  had  telegraphed  that 

.  .  .  ."  Cervera's  fleet  was  in  full  view  until  nearly  10  o'clock 
this  morning,  when  it  proceeded  down  the  bay,  and  shortly  after- 
wards heavy  firing  was  heard.  Duffield,  at  Siboney,  has  just 
telephoned  me  that  Captain  Cotton  of  the  Harvard  just  sent 
him  word  that  Admiral  Sampson  had  signaled  Cervera  had  come 
out  and  had  escaped  and  that  he  was  in  pursuit.  .  .  ."  ^^^ 

Small  wonder  that  the  Secretary  of  War  declared  that 

Cuba.  Please  inform  the  citizens  of  foreign  countries,  and  all  women 
and  children,  that  they  should  leave  the  city  before  10  o'clock  to-morrow 
morning. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

William  R.  Shafter, 
Major-General,  U.  8.  Volunteers. 


188     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

^'  Sunday,  the  3rd  of  July,  was  the  darkest  day  of  the  war,"  ^^^ 
and  it  was  not  until  the  following  day  that  the  astounding 
victory  of  the  American  fleet  was  known  and  the  anxiety  of 
the  officials  dispelled. 

An  exchange  of  letters  followed  between  Shafter  and 
Toral,^^^  which  need  not  be  chronicled  here,  but  at  4  p.  m.,  on 
the  10th  the  truce  w^as  broken  by  a  bombardment  of  the  city  ^^^ 
that  continued  until  noon  next  day.-^^^  On  the  11th  General 
Miles  arrived  at  Siboney  with  the  transports  Yale  and  Co- 
luTYibia,  arranged  with  Admiral  Sampson  for  the  fleet  to  cover 
the  disembarking  of  the  troops  at  Cabanas,  two  and  one-half 
miles  west  of  the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbour,  reached  Shaf- 
ter's  headquarters  next  morning  and  assumed  charge  of  the 
negotiations. ^^^  At  12  o'clock  on  the  13th  he  had  a  confer- 
ence with  General  Toral,  offered  him  liberal  terms  and  gave 
him  until  noon  of  the  following  day  to  surrender  or  to  sub- 
mit to  an  assault.^^-^  On  the  morning  of  the  14th  it  was  re- 
ported to  Toral  that  fifty-seven  American  ships,  part  of  them 
loaded  with  troops,  were  menacing  his  lines  on  the  west,  and 
this  demonstration  produced  the  desired  effect.  At  noon  that 
day  he  again  met  General  Miles  and  forthwith  announced 
his  readiness  to  surrender  all  the  troops  in  the  Province  of 
Santiago,  Avhich  was  accepted  "  under  the  condition  that  the 
Spanish  troops  should  be  repatriated  by  the  United  States." 
Shafter  was  then  authorized  to  appoint  commissioners  to  draw 
up  the  articles  of  capitulation,^^ ^  instructions  were  given  him 
with  respect  to  the  precautions  to  be  taken  against  yellow 
fever  which  had  then  made  its  appearance,  ^^^  and  General 
Miles  returned  to  Siboney  and  moved  his  transports  to  Guan- 
tanamo  in  order  to  prevent  these  troops  from  becoming  in- 
fected also.^^^ 

The  surrender  was  then  a  fait  accompli  and,  after  some 
haggling  over  the  terms  which  necessitated  several  conferences 
during  the  ensuing  forty-eight  hours,^^^  an  agreement  for  the 
capitulation  of  the  garrison  ^^^  was  finally  signed  by  the  six 
commissioners  ^^^  on  July  16th  at  6  p.  m.^^^     On  the  follow- 


The  Spanish- American  War  189 

ing  morning  at  9.30  the  ceremony  of  surrendering  occurred 
between  the  lines,^^^  at  the  termination  of  which  Generals 
Shafter  and  Toral,  accompanied  by  their  staffs  and  escorts, 
rode  into  the  city,  and  punctually  at  noon  the  American  flag 
was  hoisted  over  the  Governor's  palace.^-^^ 

Thus  ended  the  campaign  of  Santiago,^  ^^  for  the  successful 
issue  of  which  Americans  had  abundant  reason  to  be  thankful. 
Shafter's  corps  was  composed  of  the  flower  of  the  American 
army  ^^^  and  obviously  all  that  regular  soldiers  could  be  taught 
of  military  sanitation  and  hygiene  had  been  learned  by  them. 
^Rotwdthstanding  this,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  directly 
after  the  capitulation  the  regiments  were  moved  every  few 
days  to  new  camping  grounds  and  all  possible  precautions 
taken,  the  diseases  incident  to  the  tropics  ^^^  spread  with 
alarming  rapidity  until  no  less  than  seventy-five  per  cent,  of 
the  troops  were  on  the  sick  list.^^*  Yet  it  was  absolutely 
imperative  to  retain  the  Fifth  Corps  at. Santiago,  not  only  to 
guard  the  prisoners  until  they  had  been  transported  to  Spain, 
but  to  prevent  clashes  with  the  Cubans,  between  whom  and 
the  Spanish  intense  animosity  prevailed.  ^^^  Moreover,  pru- 
dence dictated  that  an  army  infected  with  yellow  fever  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  return  to  the  United  States  until  the 
disease  was  thoroughly  under  control.  On  August  1st  the 
epidemic  had  progressed  to  such  a  point  that  no  less  than  4,255 
men  were  ill,^^^  and,  as  Lieutenant  Miley  states :  ^^"^ 

"  The  Commanding  General  was  now  directed  to  move  the 
entire  command  into  the  mountains  to  the  end  of  the  San  Luis 
railroad,  where  the  troops  would  be  above  the  yellow-fever 
limit ;  ^^^  but  this  was  a  physical  impossibility,  as  the  troops 
were  too  weak  and  sick  to  march,  and  the  work  of  repairing  the 
bridges  on  the  railroad  had  not  yet  been  completed.  Even  after 
this  was  done  the  rolling  stock  was  so  insufficient  that  only  a 
comparatively  small  number  could  be  transported  in  a  day,  and 
when  once  San  Luis  was  reached  the  camps  would  have  been 
less  comfortable  than  those  around  Santiago. 

^^  The  situation  was  desperate;  the  yellow-fever  cases  were  in- 
creasing in  number,  and  the  month  of  August,  the  period  in 


190     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

which  it  is  epidemic,  was  at  hand.  It  was  with  these  conditions 
staring  them  in  the  face,  that  the  officers  commanding  divisions 
and  brigades  and  the  Chief  Surgeon  were  invited  by  General 
Shafter  to  discuss  the  situation." 

As  a  result  of  this  conference,  General  Shafter  sent  a  long 
cable  on  August  3rd,  setting  forth  the  alarming  conditions  and 
accompanying  it  by  two  so-called  "  round  robins,"  one  signed 
by  the  surgeons  of  the  corps,  the  other  by  the  brigade  and 
division  commanders.^  ^^  On  the  following  day  authorization 
was  given  to  ship  the  troops  to  Montauk  Point,^^^  which  had 
been  selected  for  their  reception ;  ^^^  on  the  7th  the  first  troops 
were  embarked ;  and  on  the  25th  General  Shafter  and  the  last 
of  his  command  sailed  for  Montauk  Point,  arriving  at  their 
destination  on  September  1st.*  Major  General  Lawton  was 
left  in  command  of  the  Province  of  Santiago  with  a  force  of 
four  ^^  immune  "  regiments,  and  Brigadier  General  Leonard 
Wood  was  placed  in  command  of  the  city.^^^  The  shipment 
of  the  prisoners  back  to  Spain  began  on  August  9th  and  ter- 
minated on  September  I7th.^^^  Meanwhile,  negotiations  had 
been  instituted  by  Spain  on  July  26th  and  were  conducted 
through  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington. The  publication  of  the  '^  round  robin  "  occurred  at 
the  most  delicate  stage  in  the  pourparlers,  but  most  fortu- 
nately its  detrimental  influence  was  overcome  ^^^  and  the 
negotiations  culminated  in  a  peace  protocol  for  the  suspension 
of  hostilities,  which  was  signed  at  Washington  on  August 
12th.225 


*  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  1898,  p.  5;  Miley,  p.  228. 

The  physical  condition  of  the  Army  brought  from  Cuba  may  best  be 
judged  from  General  Wheeler's  repvrt  of  September  26th  (in  Report  of 
the  Major  General,  commanding,  for  1898,  p.  244),  which  states  that 
between  August  13th  and  September  13,  1898,  there  arrived  at  Montauk 
Point  22,221  troops  from  Santiago;  that  3,252  were  sick  and  that  87 
had  died  on  the  voyage.  General  Wheeler  moreover  declares  that 
"  While  only  3,252  were  reported  sick  when  the  ships  landed,  the  great 
bulk  of  the  troops  that  were  at  Santiago  were  by  no  means  well,  and 
many  of  them,  fully  5,000  to  6,000,  developed  sickness  after  their  ar- 
rival." 


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The  S panish- American  War  191 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  POliTO  RICO 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  refusal  of  the  mili- 
tary authorities  to  grant  the  request  of  the  Major  General 
commanding  the  Army  to  accompany  Shafter's  expedition  and 
to  the  orders  sent  him  to  organize  another  expedition  destined 
for  Porto  Rico,^^^  which  General  Miles  stated  "  could  be 
ready  in  ten  days.''  ^^^  On  June  15th  he  was  ordered  back 
to  Washington  and,  after  repeated  conferences, ^^^  w^as  given 
specific  instructions  as  to  the  composition  and  purpose  of  his 
force.^^^  On  July  5th  he  suggested  that  in  view  of  the  de- 
struction of  the  Spanish  fleet  the  time  had  come  ^'  for  pro- 
ceeding immediately  to  Puerto  Rico/'  but  Shafter's  urgent 
request  for  ^'  15,000  troops  speedily  "  ^^^  brought  about  a  de- 
cision on  the  part  of  the  authorities  that  he  should  first  pro- 
ceed to  Santiago.  On  July  9th  he  sailed  from  Charleston 
with  the  Yale  and  Columbia  with  some  3,400  troops,  reaching 
Siboney  on  the  llth.^^-^  His  participation  in  the  negotiations 
for  the  surrender  of  Santiago  and  his  departure  for  Guanta- 
namo  have  already  been  chronicled.^ ^^  As  every  single  regi- 
ment in  Shafter's  command  was  then  infected  with  yellow 
fever,  none  of  these  troops  could  be  utilized  and,  on  July  21st, 
General  Miles  set  sail  for  Porto  Rico  with  nine  transports 
containing  only  3,415  infantry  and  artillery,  under  convoy 
of  the  battleship  Massachusetts  and  two  smaller  vessels. ^^^ 
In  spite  of  the  flotilla  of  tugs,  launches  and  lighters  which 
had  been  ordered,  none  put  in  an  appearance  and,  as  it  had 
been  ascertained  that  the  Spanish  commander  in  Porto  Rico, 
who  had  no  less  than  8,233  regulars  and  9,107  volunteers, 
was  concentrating  and  entrenching  his  forces  at  Porto  Fa- 
jardo  near  San  Juan,  where  it  had  been  planned  to  disem- 
bark, the  landing  place  was  changed  to  Guanica,  only  a  short 
distance  from  Ponce,  on  the  southwest  coast.  Arriving  at 
daylight  on  July  25th,  a  landing  was  effected  under  cover  of 
the  guns  of  the  Gloucester  and  after  a  brief  skirmish  the 
Spanish  were  driven  off.^^^ 


192      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

On  the  following  day  General  Garretson  with  seven  com- 
panies ^^^  attacked  the  Spaniards  near  Yauco,  defeated  them 
after  a  spirited  engagement,  and  gained  possession  of  the  rail- 
way and  highroad  leading  to  Ponce.^^^  That  night  the 
transports  Ohdam,  La  Grande  Duchesse  and  the  Mobile, 
carrying  General  Ernst's  brigade,^^^  arrived  at  the  anchorage, 
and  the  landing  is  thus  described  by  Major  General  James 
Harrison  Wilson,  commanding  this  force :  ^^^ 

"  Early  the  next  morning  we  entered  the  harbor  and  re- 
ported to  General  Miles,  whom  we  found  there  with  one  bri- 
gade, but  the  little  bay  was  utterly  out  of  the  way  and  the 
roads  entirely  inadequate  for  effective  operations  in  any  direc- 
tion. Accordingly,  Miles  changed  his  plans  and  decided  to 
disembark  sixteen  miles  farther  east  at  Ponee,^^^  the  second  city 
of  the  island,  connected  with  San  Juan  on  the  north  coast  by  a 
broad  macadamized  highway,  said  to  be  at  that  time  the  best 
road  in  the  West  Indies. 

"  The  harbor  of  Guanica  which  we  had  entered  head  on,  al- 
though sufficiently  deep,  was  almost  land-locked  and  so  crowded 
with  transports  that  our  steamer  could  not  turn  about  in  it. 
This  made  it  necessary  for  us  to  back  out  for  over  a  mile  through 
a  narrow  crooked  channel,  but  the  maneuver,  although  hitherto 
unheard  of  for  a  long,  ocean-going  steamer,  was  successfully 
managed  by  the  captain,  who  was  a  bold  and  skilful  navigator. 
Had  the  weather  been  rough  this  fortunate  result  could  not  have 
been  attained,  and  our  withdrawal  as  well  as  our  further  move- 
ments would  have  been  correspondingly  delayed.  But  fortune 
favored  us.  We  found  that  Ponce  had  been  abandoned  early 
that  morning  and  was  already  occupied  by  a  small  detachment 
of  marines  from  our  blockading  ships.  My  whole  command 
was  at  hand,  but  as  the  beach,  or  play  a,  two  miles  in  front  of  the 
city,  was  shallow  and  shelving  for  a  half  mile  out,  and  my  re- 
quisitions for  flats  and  motor  boats  had  not  been  filled,  the  land- 
ing of  our  animals  and  supplies  was  a  long  and  tedious  operation. 
Had  our  movement  into  the  interior  depended  upon  a  prompt 
advance  after  our  first  appearance,  it  would  have  been  seriously 
endangered  by  the  failure  of  the  War  Department  to  fill  my 
requisitions,  and  by  its  perfectly  inadequate  preparation  to  meet 
perfectly  well-known  conditions. ^*^  With  our  transports  an- 
chored more  than  half  a  mile  from  the  shore,  with  no  wharf 


The  S panish- American  War  193 

or  landing  facilities,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  disembark 
the  transportation  and  supplies  of  the  command  without  the 
assistance  rendered  by  the  navy,  and  especially  by  Captain  Hig- 
ginson,  of  the  battleship  Massachusetts.  The  troops  got  ashore 
that  day,  but  with  all  we  could  do  our  impedimenta  were  seri- 
ously delayed  and  our  preparations  to  advance  were  not  com- 
plete for  fully  a  week  longer  than  would  otherwise  have  been 
necessary. 

"  As  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  toward  the  interior  and  made 
no  sort  of  effort  to  resist  or  embarrass  us,  I  had  ample  time  in 
which  to  restore  order,  establish  a  military  administration  and 
reconnoiter  the  country  along  the  great  highway  toward  Caorao. 
Notwithstanding  the  improvements  in  infantry  firearms,  my 
command  had  been  supplied  with  Springfield  rifles  and  cartridges 
of  black  powder  on  the  theory  of  the  Ordnance  Department  that 
these  would  be  good  enough  for  fighting  the  Spaniards,  but  under 
my  earnest  protest  the  new  standard  rifle,  of  which  a  supply  was 
on  hand  in  the  States,  was  furnished  and  issued  to  the  command 
on  the  third  day  of  August  on  foreign  soil  only  four  days  before 
we  began  our  forward  movement.  With  any  men  less  intelligent 
than  the  American  soldier  this  might  have  been  a  costly  if  not  a 
fatal  change,  but  the  volunteers  readily  adapted  themselves  to 
the  new  rifle  and  used  it  in  their  first  and  only  action  with 
great  effect."  ^41 

Wilson  was  joined  that  afternoon  at  Ponce  by  Henry ,^^^ 
but  it  was  not  until  four  days  later  ^^^  that  Major  General 
Brooke,  the  commander  of  the  First  Army  Corps,^**  and 
Brigadier  General  Schwan  arrived,^ ^^  the  former  being  in- 
structed to  disembark  at  Arroyo  ^^^ —  forty-three  miles  east 
of  Ponce  —  where  he  was  joined  three  days  later  by  Brigadier 
General  Hains,^*^  and  to  march  on  Cayei.  Schwan  was  di- 
rected to  land  the  11th  Infantry  at  Guanica  and  to  move  to 
Yauco,  where  he  was  re-enforced  ^^^  and  received  orders  to 
"  drive  out  or  capture  all  Spanish  troops  in  the  western  por- 
tion of  Porto  Rico."  ^49 

Upon  the  arrival  of  these  commands,  the  total  number  of 
American  troops  in  the  island  amounted  to  15,199  and  106 
pieces  of  artillery  of  various  sorts.  General  Miles'  plan  of 
campaign  contemplated  convergent  movements   against  the 


194     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

strongholds  of  Coamo  and  Aibonito  by  the  columns  under 
Generals  Brooke  and  Wilson,  and  a  concerted  advance  by 
Generals  Henry  and  Schwan  through  the  western  part  of  the 
island  and  northward  to  Arecibo,  a  town  on  the  north  coast 
about  thirty-five  miles  west  of  San  Juan,  with  which  it  was 
connected  by  a  railway.  To  that  end  the  army  was  divided 
into  four  columns,^^^  while  the  necessary  troops  were  retained 
in  the  rear  to  garrison  Ponce  and  other  places  in  that  vicin- 
ity.2  51 

On  August  5th  General  Brooke  had  a  lively  fight  near 
Guayama  but  ended  by  occupying  the  town,  and  three  days 
later  a  second  encounter  drove  the  enemy  in  the  direction  of 
Cayei.  This  reconnaissance  developed  the  fact  that  the  Span- 
ish were  in  force  in  strong  positions  north  of  Guayama  but, 
although  Brooke  determined  to  turn  the  position,  he  deemed  it 
advisable  to  await  the  arrival  of  four  light  batteries  and  two 

troops  of  cavalry  which  would  be  of  great  use  in  such  an  opera- 
tion.2^2 

Starting  on  August  9th,  from  Yauco,  General  Schwan  ad- 
vanced rapidly  through  Sabana  Grande  and  San  German, 
routed  the  enemy  on  August  10th  near  Hormigueros,^^^  occu- 
pied Mayaguez  early  on  the  11th,  and  continued  his  pursuit 
in  a  northwestwardly  direction  toward  Lares.^^^ 

In  the  centre  General  Wilson  moved  forward  from  Juana 
Diaz  to  within  three  miles  of  Coamo  and,  on  the  evening  of 
the  8th,  divided  his  forces,  sending  the  IGtli  Pennsylvania 
under  Colonel  Hulings  to  make  a  detour  to  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  guided  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Biddle  and  Captain 
Gardner.  On  the  morning  of  the  9th  the  rest  of  General 
Ernst's  brigade,  supported  by  his  gims  and  Troop  C,  New 
York  Volunteer  Cavalry,  advanced  directly  against  Coamo, 
while  Hulings  fell  upon  their  rear,  and  the  Spanish  were 
thoroughly  routed,  their  two  commanding  officers  being  killed 
and  167  captured.^^^ 

Although  the  victory  w^as  instantly  followed  up  by  a  vigor- 
ous pursuit,  part  of  the  Spanish  forces  succeeded  in  taking 


The  Spanish- American  War  195 

refuge  in  the  stronghold  of  Aibonito,  five  miles  beyond. 
Perched  on  the  summit  of  a  lofty  ridge  with  eraglike  slopes 
and  protected  by  powerful  batteries  at  Asomanta  and  El 
Penon,  it  defied  all  attempts  to  capture  it  by  a  frontal  attack^ 
and  two  days  were  consumed  in  a  cautious  approach.  At  1.25 
p.  M.  on  the  12th  Wilson's  guns  opened  on  the  Spanish  posi- 
tion at  Asomanta,  but  the  black  powder  afforded  a  perfect 
target  for  the  enemy  and  seven  men  were  put  hors  de  combat. 
A  demand  for  surrender  was  curtly  refused,  and  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  13th  General  Ernst's  brigade  was  in  movement  to 
turn  the  position  when  a  courier  reached  General  Wilson's 
headquarters  Avith  the  announcement  that  an  armistice  had 
been  concluded  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  that  all 
military  operations  were  to  cease,  and  that  the  troops  were  to 
retain  their  positions  until  further  orders. ^^^ 

In  a  similar  fashion  this  news  arrested  the  advance  of 
General  Brooke  from  Guayama,  just  as  he  was  on  the  point  of 
turning  and  attacking  the  Spanish  near  Cayei,^'^^  as  well  as 
that  of  the  two  western  columns.  General  Stone  had  success- 
fullv  constructed  a  road  over  what  was  considered  to  be  an 
impassable  trail  leading  through  Adjuntas  and  Utado,  thus 
enabling  General  Henry  to  push  on  with  Garretson's  brigade 
in  the  hope  of  intercepting  the  enemy  retreating  before 
Schwan,  and  his  advanced-guard  was  approaching  Arecibo, 
where  he  purposed  to  effect  a  junction  with  his  confrere, 
when  the  news  of  the  armistice  ended  his  movement.^  ^^  On 
the  extreme  west  General  Schwan  had  continued  his  advance 
from  Mayaguez  through  Las  Marias,  had  routed  the  enemy 
at  the  Rio  Prietoat  beyond  Las  Marias,  on  the  13th,^^^  and 
was  on  the  verge  of  entering  Lares  when  the  information  of 
the  signing  of  the  protocol  reached  him.  There  was  no 
alternative  but  to  call  a  halt  just  at  the  moment  when  the 
country  had  been  beaten  up  most  effectually  and  when  his 
quarry  lay  within  his  grasp ;  ^^^  truth  to  tell,  "  no  troops  ever 
suspended  hostilities  with  worse  grace."  ^^^ 

As  Senator  Lodge  very  pertinently  obsen^es :  ^^^ 


196     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

"  There  has  been  an  impression  that  the  Puerto-Eican  cam- 
paign was  little  more  than  a  parade,  and  it  has  even  been  spoken 
of  contemptuously  as  a  '  picnic/  owing  probably  to  the  too  prev- 
alent notion  that  military  operations  must  be  estimated  solely 
by  the  losses,  or  as  a  British  admiral  of  the  last  century  is  said 
to  have  put  it  in  somewhat  brutal  phrase,  *  by  the  butcher's  bills.' 
.  .  .  But  a  campaign  as  a  whole  must  be  judged,  if  it  is  to  be 
judged  fairl}^,  by  larger  and  different  standards.  .  .  .^^^  The 
success  of  the  American  troops  was  so  rapid  and  complete,  and 
their  future  was  so  clearly  assured,  that  a  claim  to  the  island  had 
been  established  of  such  an  undeniable  character  that,  when  it 
came  to  signing  the  protocol,  there  was  no  possibility  of  with- 
holding from  the  United  States  the  cession  of  Puerto  Kico. 
Thus  the  object  of  the  campaign  was  completely  achieved,  which, 
after  all,  will  always  weigh  heavily  in  making  up  the  final  judg- 
ment of  history  .  .  .  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  carried 
forward  through  many  difficulties  reflects  the  highest  credit  on 
the  generals  who  commanded,^^*  and  upon  the  discipline,  quality, 
and  courage  of  the  soldiers,  both  regulars  and  volunteers.'^ 

On  August  30th  General  Miles  turned  over  the  command 
to  General  Brooke  and  sailed  for  the  United  States.  On 
October  18th  Porto  Rico  was  evacuated  by  the  last  of  the 
Spanish  troops  and  the  American  forces  officially  took  pos- 


session. ^^^ 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES 

The  general  plan  of  campaign  for  the  war  contemplated 
the  occupation  of  the  Philippines,  and  the  receipt  on  May  7th 
of  the  news  of  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  squadron  at 
Manila  on  the  first  by  Commodore  Dewey  hastened  the 
preparations  to  that  end.^^^  To  follow  up  the  advantage 
gained  by  the  Navy  by  the  capture  of  the  capital  of  the 
archipelago,  seven  expeditions  were  organized,  the  combined 
strength  of  which  amounted  to  641  officers  and  15,058  en- 
listed men.  The  first,  under  Brigadier  General  T.  M.  An- 
derson, sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  May  25th,  reaching 
Manila  on  June  30th;  the  second,  under  Brigadier  General 
Prancis  Y.  Greene,  followed  on  June  15th;  and  the  third 


THE  PHILIPPINES 


The  Spanish- American  War  197 

under  Generals  Wesley  Merritt  and  MacArthur  —  the  former 
having  on  May  28th  received  command  of  all  the  forces 
destined  for  the  Philippines  ^^^  which  were  constituted  into 
the  Eighth  Army  Corps  on  June  21st  ^^^ —  departed  on  June 
27th  and  29th.  These  three  expeditions,  numbering  470. 
officers  and  10,464  men,  alone  participated  in  the  operations 
prior  to  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  the  other  four  arriving 
after  August  13th. 2^9 

Upon  reaching  Cavite  on  July  25th,  General  Merritt 
found  that  place  occupied  by  Anderson's  command.  Admiral 
Dewey's  ships  anchored  off  the  town  and  Greene's  brigade 
near  the  village  of  Paranaque,  his  left  or  north  flank  resting 
on  the  Calle  Real,  less  than  two  miles  from  the  outer  line  of 
defences  of  Manila.  Between  the  Americans  and  the  Span- 
iards were  the  Philippine  insurgents,  some  14,000  strong, 
under  General  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  who  had  proclaimed  an 
independent  republic  with  himself  as  president,^  ^^  but  who 
neither  visited  General  Merritt  nor  offered  the  assistance  of 
his  forces.  Preparations  were  promptly  made  to  attack  the 
city  and,  by  the  exercise  of  tact,  General  Greene  persuaded 
the  commander  of  the  insurgent  brigade  adjacent  to  him  to 
vacate  his  position  so  as  to  give  the  former  an  unimpeded  ad- 
vance. A  strong  line  of  outposts  was  thrown  forward  along 
the  Calle  Real  and  the  shore  of  the  bay,  and  a  trench  con- 
structed in  which  some  of  the  Utah  guns  were  placed.  ^^^ 

These  preparations  did  not  escape  the  Spanish,  and  on  the 
night  of  July  31st  a  vicious  attack  was  made  upon  the  Ameri- 
can positions  by  their  infantry  and  guns,  but  was  successfully 
repulsed  after  some  hard  fighting  in  a  howling  storm  of  wind 
and  rain.  A  new  line  of  trenches  was  opened,  the  position 
extended  and  strengthened,  and  less  difficulty  experienced  in 
beating  off  the  constant  night  attacks,  the  heaviest  of  which 
occurred  on  August  5th.^^^ 

Greene's  situation  being  none  too  secure,  he  was  re-en- 
forced by  MacArthur's  brigade  which  had  arrived  on  July 
31st  and  was  disembarked,  after  infinite  difficulty,  in  native 


198     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

lighters  and  small  steamboats,  which  were  landed  through  a 
raging  surf  to  the  accompaniment  of  squalls  and  incessant 
deluges  of  rain.^^^  The  American  forces  now  numbered  over 
8,500  ^^^  and,  being  in  readiness  to  attack,  an  official  notifica- 
tion was  sent  to  the  Spanish  commander  that  land  and  naval 
operations  ^^^  might  begin  at  any  time  within  forty-eight 
hours  and  that  he  was  "  to  remove  all  noncombatants  from 
the  city/'  *  General  Jaudenes  promptly  replied  that  he  was 
*^  without  places  of  refuge  for  the  increased  number  of 
wounded,  sick,  women  and  children  who  are  now  lodged 
within  the  walls.''  Two  days  later  a  joint  demand,  signed 
by  General  Merritt  and  Admiral  Dewey,  was  made  for  the 
surrender  of  Manila,  to  which  he  responded  by  asking  for 
time  to  communicate  via  Hongkong  with  his  Government,  a 
request  that  they  declined  to  grant.^^^ 

On  August  12th  General  Merritt  issued  his  orders  for  an 
attack  upon  the  city  next  day  to  be  made  in  conjunction  with 
the  warships,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  the  troops 
were  in  the  positions  assigned  them.  At  9  a.  m.  Admiral 
Dewey  steamed  forward  from  Cavite  and  within  an  hour  had 
opened  fire  against  the  sea  flank  of  the  Spanish  entrench- 
ments at  the  powder  magazine  fort,f  the  Utah  batteries  join- 


*  Headquarters  U.  S.  Land  and  Naval  Forces, 
Manila  Bay,  Philippine  Islands,  August  7,  1898. 
The  General  in  Chief  Commanding  Spanish  forces  in  Manila. 

Sir:  We  have  the  honor  to  notify  your  excellency  that  operations 
of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  against  the  defenses 
of  Manila  may  begin  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  forty-eight 
hours  from  the  hour  of  receipt  by  you  of  this  communication,  or  sooner 
if  made  necessary  by  an  attack  on  your  part. 

This  notice  is  given  in  order  to  afford  you  an  opportunity  to  remove 
all  noncombatants  from  the  city. 

Very  respectfully, 

Wesley  Merritt, 
Major-General,  United  States  Army, 
Commanding  land  forces  of  the  United  States. 

George  Dewey, 
Rear-Admiral,  United  States  Navy, 
Commanding  United  States  naval  force  on  Asiatic  station. 
J  Lodge  relates,  pp.  215-216,  that  as  the  ships  "  got  under  way  and 
the  Olympia  moved  oflF,  the  English  band  on  the  Im/niortalitS  struck  up 


THE  OPERATIONS  IN  LUZON 
1898-1901 


The  S panish- American  War  199 

ing  in  from  the  trenches  near  the  Calle  Real.  At  10.25, 
upon  a  pre-arranged  signal,  the  ships  withheld  their  fire  and 
the  1st  Colorado  charged,  captured  the  fort  and  pushed  on 
through  Malate  to  Binondo  and  San  Miguel.  On  Greene's 
right,  MacArthur  advanced  by  the  Pasay  road,  encountered 
considerable  resistance  from  the  enemy  in  the  block-houses, 
trenches  and  woods  but,  notwithstanding  their  heavy  fire  and 
the  handicap  of  marshy  ground  and  thick  undergrowth,  car- 
ried these  positions,  seized  and  occupied  the  bridges  and  the 
town  of  Malate. 

Manila  was  then  in  possession  of  the  Americans,  with  the 
•exception  of  the  walled  portion  of  the  city,  but  shortly  after 
the  troops  entered  Malate  a  white  flag  was  displayed  by  the 
Spanish.^  ^^  Preceded  by  two  officers.  General  Merritt  be- 
took himself  to  the  palace  of  the  Governor-General,  where  a 
preliminary  agreement  for  surrender  was  signed  by  the  op- 
posing commanders,  the  final  capitulation  being  arranged  by 
a  commission  ^'^^  and  concluded  the  following  day.^^^  The 
walled  town  was  immediately  occupied  and  no  opposition 
was  experienced  in  disarming  the  troops  comprised  in  the 
surrender.^  ^^ 

Remarkable  indeed  were  the  results  achieved  by  this  com- 
bined attack  which  put  an  end  to  Spanish  domination  in  the 
Philippines.^  ^-^  The  assault  upon  the  city  cost  the  lives  of 
only  ^ve  Americans  and  the  wounding  of  forty-three, ^^^ 
while  the  entire  operations  beginning  on  July  30th  and  cul- 


*  See,  the  Conquering  Hero  Comes,'  and  then,  as  the  battle-flags  broke 
out  on  the  fighting  fleet,  the  English  band  played  the  '  Star  Spangled 
Banner,'  and  the  cheers  of  the  American  seamen  rang  strong  and  clear 
across  the  water.  As  the  American  ships  drew  away,  the  English  fol- 
lowed them  a  little  further  out,  and  when  they  came  to  their  old 
anchorage  near  the  Pasig  river,  the  French  and  Germans  got  under 
way,  too.  The  German  flag-ship  steamed  down  behind  the  Concord,  so 
that  a  high  shot  from  Manila  aimed  at  the  latter  might  easily  have 
struck  her,  and  thereupon  the  Immortalite  came  in  between  the  German 
and  the  American,  and  stopped.  The  hint  was  not  lost.  The  Germans 
and  French  remained  near  Manila,  while  the  English  and  Japanese 
were  grouped  on  the  American  side;  and  with  this  arrangement  the 
closing  act  of  the  drama  went  forward." 


200     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

minating  in  the  capture  of  Manila  were  accomplished  with 
the  loss  of  no  more  than  seventeen  men  killed,  and  ten  of- 
ficers and  ninety-six  men  wounded.^ ^^  The  Spanish  had 
some  14,000  good  troops,^ ^^  nearly  all  regulars,  and  their 
losses,  although  impossible  to  determine  accurately,  were 
much  heavier.^^^  The  trophies  of  this  victory  were  "  nearly 
$900,000,  13,000  prisoners,  and  22,000  arms."  ^se 

"  In  not  a  few  features  the  siege  and  capture  of  Manila  is  com- 
parable to  the  Santiago  campaign:  The  landing  of  10,000 
troops  was  made  under  great  natural  difficulties,  resulting  from 
a  high  and  dangerous  surf,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  actually  pre- 
vented for  eight  days  the  disembarkation  of  the  troops  accom- 
panying General  MacArthur,  and  numbering  nearly  5,000. 
Part  of  General  Merritt's  army  was  in  the  trenches  from  July 
20th  to  August  13th  —  fourteen  days  —  practically  as  long  as 
General  Shafter's  army  occupied  the  trenches  before  Santiago. 
In  Manila,  however,  the  heat  was  greater  and  the  rains  heavier 
than  in  Cuba,  and  at  times  the  trenches  had  no  less  than  two 
feet  of  water  in  them.  Here,  under  the  constant  strain  of 
four  night  attacks  and  many  other  threatened  assaults,  the 
American  regulars  and  volunteers  endured  the  trying  hardships 
without  shelter  or  protection  and  without  complaint.  The  nerv- 
ous tension  during  this  period  was  certainly  as  great  as,  if  not 
greater  than,  at  Santiago,  where  the  trenches  were  occupied  for 
much  of  the  time  of  the  siege  under  flag  of  truce.  The  Span- 
ish army  of  regular  veterans  exceeded  our  own  in  numbers.  A 
third  of  the  circumference  of  the  globe  separated  our  little  array 
from  its  base  of  supplies.  Moreover,  the  attitude  of  the  native 
forces  during  this  period  was  so  uncertain  and  at  times  so 
hostile  that  it  was  even  feared  that  the  Filipinos  might  be  in- 
cluded among  our  enemies.  Our  landing  was  made  during  the 
season  of  the  highest  temperature,  but,  for  the  same  reasons  that 
applied  to  the  Santiago  campaign,  all  the  troops  in  the  Philip- 
pines could  not  be  furnished  with  khald  uniforms  before  leav- 
ing the  United  States.  And,  for  these  same  reasons  that  ap- 
plied to  the  Santiago  campaign,  only  the  simplest  components 
of  the  army  ration  could  be  placed  on  shore  or  furnished  the 
army  before  Manila  fell.  Although  the  full  allowance  of  every 
component  of  the  ration  was  on  the  ships,  only  sugar  and 
coffee,  bacon  and  hardtack  could  be  landed,  and  once,  when  the 


The  S panish- American  War  201 

surf  was  unusually  heavy,  the  troops  ashore  were  twenty-four 
hours  without  food.  The  watchful  vigil  in  the  flooded  trenches 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  many  pairs  of  shoes,  and  300  men 
of  General  Merritt's  army  marched  into  Manila  barefooted. 
Conceive  the  remarks  of  the  yellow  press  had  this  incident,  so 
common  in  war,  occurred  at  Santiago  instead  of  at  Manila! 

"  Yet  there  were  no  complaints  from  those  sturdy  heroes. 
Every  general  officer  who  has  written  of  the  battle  and  the  try- 
ing period  preceding  has  highly  commended  their  fortitude,  their 
cheerfulness,  and  their  patience  under  all  conditions."  ^^^ 

On  August  16th  the  news  of  the  signing  of  the  peace  pro- 
tocol reached  Manila,  and  on  the  28th  General  Merritt  re- 
ceived orders  to  relinquish  his  command  to  General  Otis  ^^^ 
and  to  proceed  to  Paris  to  confer  with  the  American  Com- 
missioners.^ ^^  On  December  10th  there  was  signed  in  the 
French  capital  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace,  whereby  Spain 
withdrew  from  Cuba  and  ceded  to  the  United  States  Porto 
Pico,  Guam  and  the  Philippines,  receiving  $20,000,000  for 
her  Asiatic  colonies  ^^^ — which  were  already  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  Americans  by  right  of  conquest. 

Thus  ended  the  Spanish-American  War,  in  which  the 
United  States  had  employed  58,688  regular  troops,^^^  and 
223,235  volunteers,^ ^^  to  oppose  Spanish  forces  numbering, 
about  228,160,293  at  a  cost  of  $321,833,254.76,29^  and  the 
pensions  for  this  war,  taken  in  conjunction  with  those  paid 
out  for  the  Philippine  insurrection,  have  already  amounted 
to  no  less  than  $46,092,740.47.295 


CHAPTER  XVII 

LESSOIN'S  OF  THE  SPAI^ISH-AMEEICAIN^  WAR 

HOW  short  and  decisive  a  modern  war  can  be  is  demon- 
strated by  this  struggle  which  lasted  only  109  days 
from  the  official  declaration  of  hostilities  to  the  signing  of 
the  peace  protocol.^  In  certain  aspects  it  was  well-nigh 
unique,  and  the  commander  of  the  American  land  forces  had 
abundant  reason  to  declare  ^  that 

"  It  is  gratifying  to  record  that  during  the  war  not  a  single 
defeat  has  been  met,  and  not  a  prisoner,  color,  gun  or  rifle  has 
been  captured  by  the  enemy.  In  this  respect  the  war  has  been 
most  remarkable,   and,  perhaps,   unparalleled.  .  .  . 

"  While  but  a  small  portion  of  the  available  forces  of  the 
United  States  —  approximately  52,000  men  —  has  been  on  for- 
eign soil  and  engaged  in  fighting  a  foreign  foe,  those  that  have 
been  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  have  fairly  demonstrated  the 
character  and  fortitude  of  the  military  forces  of  the  United 
States." 

That  a  mighty  empire  in  both  hemispheres  should  have 
been  wrested  from  Spain  after  four  centuries  of  domination 
with  a  loss  so  infinitesimal  on  the  part  of  the  victorious  na- 
tion ^  is  almost  incredible.  This  was  mainly  due  to  the 
employment  by  the  United  States  of  such  a  large  percentage 
of  Regular  troops,^  to  the  failure  of  the  Spanish  commander 
at  Santiago  to  concentrate  his  army,  and  to  the  sudden  col- 
lapse of  the  war  in  consequence  of  the  destruction  of  the 
Spanish  fleets.  Credit  should  also  be  given  to  General  Gar- 
cia and  the  Cubans  who  rendered  important  services. 

The  principal  resistance  to  our  land  forces  was  encoun- 
tered in  Cuba,  where  the  success  was  achieved  by  the  flower 
of  the  American  Regular  Army.     That  such  a  mere  handful 

202 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       203 

of  trained  soldiers  was  able  within  twenty-four  days  and 
during  the  worst  season  of  the  year  to  win  three  actions,^  to 
force  Admiral  Cervera  out  of  the  harbour  and  into  certain 
destruction,  to  capture  Santiago  and  some  23,000  Spanish 
troops  —  a  number  considerably  in  excess  of  their  own  ^ — 
and  thus  in  so  short  a  time  to  end  the  war,  is  little  less  than 
miraculous.  !None  but  an  army  of  highly  trained  regulars 
could  have  accomplished  such  a  result,  and  the  credit  belongs 
rightfully  and  almost  exclusively  to  them.''^ 

History  is  replete  with  inaccuracies  and  omissions,  and 
the  campaign  of  Santiago  affords  another  instance  of  this 
fact.  Although  the  role  played  by  General  Garcia  and  the 
Cuban  forces  after  the  landing  of  the  American  army 
scarcely  redounded  to  their  credit,  the  fact  none  the  less  re- 
mains that,  prior  to  General  Shafter's  arrival,  they  rendered 
invaluable  assistance  by  virtually  isolating  the  Spanish  in  the 
vicinity  of  Santiago  from  those  in  the  rest  of  the  province. 
With  the  suggestions  made  by  General  Miles  on  June  2nd  ^ 
Garcia  complied  to  such  an  extent  that,  out  of  36,582  Span- 
ish troops  in  the  province  of  Santiago,^  General  Linares  was 
reduced  to  12,096  soldiers  and  1,000  sailors  ^^  with  which 
to  oppose  Shafter.^^  That  he  failed  to  utilize  them  as  a 
good  general  would  have  done  was  extremely  lucky  for  the 
Americans.  Thus  far  historians,  almost  without  exception, 
have  neglected  to  give  to  Garcia  and  his  Cubans  the  proper 
recognition  due  for  the  important  services  which  they  ren- 
dered in  the  initial  stages  of  the  campaign  in  Cuba. 

The  Spanish-American  War  is  notable,  not  only  for  the 
greater  percentage  of  regulars  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
troops  actually  used  in  active  operations  than  in  most  of  our 
wars,  but  for  the  large  number  of  Regular  Army  officers  em- 
ployed in  the  volunteers,  no  less  than  387  serving  in  the  vari- 
ous grades  of  this  force. -^^  With  the  exception  of  Miles, 
Wilson  and  Merritt,  none  of  the  general  officers  had  com- 
manded army  corps  or  independent  armies  during  the  War 
of  the  Rebellion.     The  first  two  of  these  generals  were  sent 


204     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

to  Porto  Rico,  the  last  to  Manila.  General  Shafter,  while 
not  a  hrilliant  soldier,  was  by  no  means  devoid  of  ability  — 
an  incompetent  commander  could  not  have  concentrated  83  per 
cent,  of  his  available  forces  for  the  decisive  battles  as  he  did 
on  July  1st  ^^ —  but  he  was  physically  unfitted  for  campaign- 
ing in  the  tropics  and  therefore  incapable  of  giving  that  per- 
sonal supervision  to  the  operations  of  his  troops  which  is  in- 
dispensable to  efficient  control.^* 

Congress,  having  neglected  to  carry  out  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  Endicott  Board, -^^  found  itself  in  the  usual 
dilemma  and  sought  by  an  appropriation  of  $50,000,000  to 
make  reparation,  but  neither  money  nor  the  most  strenuous 
efforts  could  place  our  fortifications  in  an  effective  state  dur- 
ing the  short  time  available.  Yet,  owing  to  an  absurd  con- 
struction of  the  law,  the  money  appropriated  could  be  used 
for  very  little  else,  and  preparations  indispensable  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  several  supply  departments  were  much  de- 
layed. Once  the  legal  difficulty  was  overcome  and  expendi- 
tures by  the  various  departments  began,  one  of  the  most  glar- 
ing evils  of  our  supply  system  was  carried  to  its  utmost  limit, 
and  the  duplication  of  purchases  resulted  in  an  enormous  sur- 
plus of  supplies  for  which  there  existed  no  demand  and  which 
were  disposed  of  for  a  trifle  by  condemnation  shortly  after 
the  close  of  the  war. 

Since  we  have  no  general  supply  department  for  the  Army, 
and  as  the  supplies  of  the  Engineer,  Ordnance,  Medical  and 
Signal  corps  are  bought  by  each  one  independently  of  the 
others  and  of  the  Quartermaster  Department,  and,  moreover, 
as  many  of  the  supplies  are  of  the  same  kind  in  all  the  de- 
partments, this  sort  of  extravagance  will  no  doubt  occur  again 
should  the  United  States  be  suddenly  plunged  into  war.  The 
consolidation  of  the  Quartermaster,  Commissary  and  Pay 
departments  -^  ^  has  to  some  extent  mitigated  the  evil,  but  it 
will  not  be  wholly  eradicated  until  all  manufactured  articles 
and  raw  materials  in  common  use  in  the  Army  are  provided 
by  a  general  supply  department,  fully  conversant  with  the 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       205 

needs  of  all  the  branches  of  the  service  and  how  far  they  can 
be  met  by  the  stores  on  hand.  Until  such  a  change  in  ad- 
ministration is  made,  waste  and  extravagance  will  inevitably 
continue  to  disgrace  our  absurdly  administered  Army. 

What  the  supply  departments  were  subjected  to  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  dilatory  action  of  Congress,  waiting  as  usual  until 
the  eleventh  hour,  and  what  they  achieved  in  spite  of  their 
handicap  is  admirably  set  forth  in  that  part  of  Captain 
Rhodes'  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay  which  will  be  found  in  the 
appendix  to  this  chapter  on  pages  668—671.-'^'^ 

In  the  Spanish-American  War  the  same  piecemeal  and 
hand-to-mouth  policy  which  has  marked  the  military  legisla- 
tion from  the  beginning  of  our  national  career  was  again  ap- 
parent. No  expansive  organization  had  been  instituted  in 
the  long  years  of  peace  following  the  close  of  the  War  of  the 
Eebellion  and,  as  usual,  the  increase  of  the  Regular  Army 
occurred  after  the  outbreak  of  war,  with  the  result  that  the 
maximum  authorized  strength  was  not  attained  even  at  the 
cessation  of  hostilities.  As  this  increase  came  after  the  crea- 
tion of  the  Volunteer  Army,  the  recruits  naturally  preferred 
service  with  the  volunteers,  just  as  they  have  always  done-^^ 
and  always  will  do.  Moreover,  as  the  governors  of  the  States 
were  empowered  to  appoint  the  company  and  regimental  offi- 
cers, many  commissions  were  obtained  in  the  volunteers  by 
men  who  were  in  no  respect  qualified  to  lead  troops,  and  the 
authorities  were  well-nigh  swamped  by  the  applications  which 
poured  in  upon  them.^^  The  lack  of  adequate  training  on 
the  part  of  the  volunteers  rendered  them  of  comparatively 
small  value  from  the  standpoint  of  a  military  asset,  doubly 
so  since  Congress  expressly  forbade  that  more  than  one  regu- 
lar officer  should  be  appointed  in  any  one  volunteer  regi- 
ment.^^  Even  so,  nearly  one-fifth  of  the  regular  officers  were 
given  volunteer  commissions,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
Regular  Army  had  been  more  than  doubled  in  size  and  that 
TQany  of  these  officers  were  needed  for  recruiting  service.  ^^ 

The  dearth  of  trained  officers,  arising  out  of  the  neglect  of 


206      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Congress  to  make  provision  beforehand  for  such  an  emer- 
gency, proved  a  tremendous  handicap.  At  the  battle  of 
Waterloo  Marshal  Ney  appealed  to  Napoleon  for  more  in- 
fantry, which  caused  the  Emperor  to  retort  to  Colonel 
Heymes,  who  brought  the  request :  '^  Where  does  he  want  me 
to  get  them  from  ?  Does  he  expect  me  to  make  them  ?  "  22 
Congress  evidently  laboured  under  the  delusion  that  a  suf- 
ficiency of  trained  officers  would  spring  up  overnight,  but  the 
military  authorities  knew  differently  and  therefore 

"  The  War  Department  requested  of  Congress  authority  to 
issue  commissions  for  active  service  to  retired  army  officers. 
This  authority  Congress  denied.  From  the  regular  army  was 
taken  the  maximum  number  of  officers  consistent  with  its  ef- 
ficiency— an  efficiency  that  is  the  rock  upon  which  this  coun- 
try must  build  its  hope  for  effective  operations  during  the  first 
few  months  of  any  war  in  which  it  may  be  engaged."  ^^ 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  dearth  of  trained  officers  forced 
the  employment  of  volunteer  officers  with  little  or  no  experi- 
ence, and  the  confusion  and  mismanagement  during  the  course 
of  this  war  were  directly  attributable  to  this  cause.^^ 

Once  again  Congress  neglected  to  take  full  advantage  of 
the  national  enthusiasm  which  invariably  accompanies  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities.  Instead  of  requiring  all  enlistments 
to  be  '^  FOR  THE  WAE,"  it  indulged  its  customary  habit  of  mak- 
ing them  too  short  and  limited  them  to  two  years.  Unless 
all  signs  fail,  there  were  unmistakable  indications  during  the 
summer  that,  had  the  war  been  prolonged  until  the  following 
year,  great  difficulty  w^ould  have  been  experienced  in  obtain- 
ing the  necessary  recruits.  As  Captain  Rhodes  very  trench- 
antly declares: 

"  The  duration  of  the  Spanish  War  was  so  short  as  to  afford 
little  data  on  which  to  base  a  system  of  recruiting  suitable  for 
our  form  of  government,  and  designated  to  keep  the  ranks  of 
both  regulars  and  volunteers  filled  to  the  maximum  in  a  long, 
severe,  or  unpopular  war.  Bnt  taken  in  connection  with  some 
of  the  serious  mistakes  of  the  Civil  War,  and  with  certain  ex- 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       207 

periments  in  recruiting  for  the  Philippine  insurrection  ...  it 
must  be  very  evident  to  all  who  have  seriously  considered  the 
conditions  prevailing  in  the  month  of  September,  1898,  that  in 
the  matter  of  army  depletion  and  recruitment  we  were  on  the 
high  road  to  the  same  grave  state  of  affairs  that  virtually  pro- 
longed the  War  of  the  Eebellion.'^ 

To  cap  the  climax  Congress  expressly  stipulated  that  all 
volunteers    '^  shall   be   discharged   from   the   service   of   the 
United  States  when  the  purposes  for  which  they  were  called 
into  service  shall  have  been  accomplished,  or  on  the  conclu- 
sion of  hostilities."  ^^     This  was  tantamount  to  leaving  the 
question  to  the  adjudication  of  the  volunteers,  and  scarcely 
had  the  Peace  Protocol  been  signed  on  August  12th  than  they 
proceeded  to  avail  themselves  of  what  they  deemed  to  be  their 
privilege.     On  the  18th  of  that  month  an  order  was  issued 
by  the  War  Department  for  the  mustering  out  of  100,000  vol- 
unteers^^ but,  as  this  embraced  less  than  half  of  that  force, 
any  number  of  officers  and  men  began  to  clamour  for  their 
discharge,  using  every  possible  influence  to  procure  it,  quite 
regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  Government  was  in  nowise 
obligated  to  grant  it  until  the  Treaty  of  Peace  had  been 
definitely  signed  and  ratified.^ ^     In  many  cases  their  de- 
mands were  complied  with  in  order  to  reduce  military  expen- 
ditures but,  when  the  regulars  were  withdrawn  from  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico,  the  Government  found  itself  greatly  em- 
barrassed by  the  demands  of  the  volunteers  who  had  to  be 
sent  to  replace  them  in  order  to  hold  those  islands.     By  the 
time  the  Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed,  the  volunteers  had  in 
turn  been  superseded  by  other  regulars,  had  been  brought 
home  and  mustered  out,  so  that  the  terms  of  the  enlistment 
contracts  had  been  complied  with.     The  exigencies  in  the 
Philippines   rendered   such   a   course   impossible.     Allusion 
has  already  been  made  to  the  declaration  of  independence  by 
the  Filipinos,  who  were  not  permitted  to  participate  in  the 
operations  culminating  in  the  capture  of  Manila. ^^     Having 
formed  a  government,  they  demanded  recognition  of  it,  but 


208     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

this  was  refused,  although  no  steps  were  taken  to  prevent 
their  acquiring  control  over  substantially  the  rest  of  the 
archipelago,  partly  owing  to  the  paucity  of  our  troops  and 
partly  owing  to  the  policy  laid  down  by  our  Government. ^*^ 
This  attitude,  coupled  with  a  fear  that  the  United  States  was 
about  to  seize  the  islands,  engendered  such  distrust  and  enmity 
that  in  October  the  Filipinos  began  to  concentrate  their  forces, 
to  the  number  of  some  40,000,  around  Manila  ^^  and  virtually 
shut  up  the  American  army  under  General  Otis  in  the  city, 
where,  apart  from  guarding  13,000  Spanish  prisoners,  it  was 
compelled  to  maintain  order  among  the  300,000  hostile  in- 
habitants.^^ Bj  January,  1899,  Otis  received  a  paltry  re-en- 
forcement of  6,500  men,^^  thus  bringing  his  command  up  to 
20,481,^^  the  regulars  armed  with  the  Krag-Jorgensen  rifle 
being  only  5,372  strong,  while  the  other  15,400  were  State 
volunteers  supplied  with  the  obsolete  Springfield.^^  On  Feb- 
ruary 4,  1899,  began  the  Philippine  insurrection,^^  which  was 
not  finally  quelled  until  more  than  three  years  later.  Con- 
gress had  not  only  committed  an  egregious  blunder  in  the 
wording  of  the  law  of  April  22,  1898,  instituting  the  Volun- 
teer Army,^"^  but  it  neglected  until  March  2,  1899,  to  create 
other  forces  to  replace  it.  In  consequence  of  this  failure,  not 
until  June  14,  1899  —  ten  months  after  the  necessity  had 
ceased  for  the  use  of  volunteers  called  out  under  the  act  of 
1898  —  did  a  sufficiency  of  regulars  reach  the  Philippines  to 
permit  Otis  to  send  home  any  of  his  volunteer  troops,^  ^  and 
not  until  October  11th  did  the  first  of  the  newly-created  force 
join  him.^^  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  last  of  these  regiments 
—  the  48th  Volunteer  Infantry  —  did  not  arrive  at  Manila 
until  January  25,  1900. "^^  Owing  to  the  lack  of  a 
Regular  Army  large  enough  to  respond  to  the  increased 
demands  in  the  two  hemispheres,  the  Government  was 
confronted  by  two  alternatives,  namely:  either  to  abandon 
the  Philippines  entirely  or  to  endeavour  to  hold  them  by 
retaining  in  service  such  troops  as  were  available.  Hav- 
ing  determined   upon  the   latter  course,   it   was   compelled 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War        209 

to  break  its  contract  and  to  hold  the  men,  who  had  volunteered 
for  the  war  with  Spain  only,*^  through  a  succession  of  active 
operations  lasting  for  six  months  after  the  period  when  their 
term  of  enlistment  had  legally  expired.^^  ^  i^Q^h  instance 
was  thus  afforded  of  the  folly  of  short  enlistments  to  which 
the  United  States  has  persistently  adhered  since  the  beginning 
of  the  Revolutionary  War. 

The  causes  which  brought  about  these  conditions  were 
twofold :  first,  as  we  have  seen,  a  conditional  enlistment  con- 
tract —  one  of  the  worst  blunders  from  a  military  standpoint 
ivhich  can  he  committed  —  and,  second,  the  failure  to  provide 
for  adequate  trained  reserves  —  a  defect  that  has  prolonged 
every  one  of  our  wars.  Illustrative  of  the  latter  are  two 
facts  worthy  of  careful  attention.  In  the  haste  to  get  the 
regular  regiments  to  the  front  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  suffi- 
cient time  was  not  given  to  recruit  them  up  to  war  strength 
and,  moreover,  the  new  material  was  so  raw  and  untrained 
that  many  regimental  commanders  preferred  to  leave  the  new 
recruits  behind.*^  As  a  result,  the  returns  show  that  the  in- 
fantry regiments  participating  in  the  attack  on  San  Juan  on 
July  first  averaged  only  556  enlisted  men  each,  whereas  their 
strength  should  have  been  1,272.  When  it  is  recollected  that 
the  Spanish  troops  in  the  province  of  Santiago  numbered 
over  36,000,  the  hazardous  nature  of  such  a  course  needs  no 
other  commentary.  Furthermore,  aside  from  the  killed  and 
wounded,  the  loss  by  disease  in  the  regulars  was  such  that 
many  of  the  regiments  were  reduced  to  about  300  enlisted 
men.  It  thus  became  necessary  to  recruit  them  up  to  1,500 
and  to  equip  each  one  anew.  "  'No  consideration  was  given 
to  training,  for  there  was  no  time  for  this,  only  to  send  the 
raw  material  forward  as  soon  as  possible,  thanking  God  for  the 
character  of  our  foe."  **  What  such  a  harum-scarum  pro- 
ceeding would  have  entailed  had  we  been  pitted  against  a 
great  military  Power  the  reader  can  judge  for  himself. 

The  Spanish-American  War  demonstrated,  perhaps  as 
much  as  in  any  other  respect,  the  necessity  for  a  General 


210     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Staff.  Had  the  first  plan  contemplating  an  attack  upon  Ha- 
vana —  which  was  favoured  by  the  Administration  —  been 
carried  out,  the  result  could  not  have  failed  to  end  in  over- 
whelming disaster.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Spanish  fondly 
hoped  that  such  an  attempt  would  be  made.^^  The  plan  ac- 
tually executed  —  which  originated  with  General  Miles  — 
was  sound  in  that  it  was  based  upon  the  well-known  princi- 
ple of  strategy  prescribing  that  the  enemy's  force  should 
be  broken  asunder  and  the  weaker  part  first  overpowered. 
Cuba,  being  nearly  800  miles  long  and  from  30  to  120  miles 
in  width,  lent  itself  in  an  unusually  favourable  manner  to 
just  such  an  operation.  Cervera's  entrance  into  the  harbour 
of  Santiago  definitely  fixed  the  exact  point  at  w^hich  the  first 
stroke  should  be  made,  and  the  fact  that  it  accomplished  the 
desired  result  is  ample  proof  that  in  overseas  expeditions  in 
time  of  war  the  combined  efforts  of  naval  and  land  forces  can 
alone  insure  decisive  success.  The  method  by  which  Shaf- 
ter's  army  eventually  achieved  victory  was  haphazard  in  the 
extreme,  and  we  have  had  occasion  to  glean  from  the  com- 
ments on  pages  176-178  how  readily  the  lack  of  proper  organ- 
ization, thoroughly  prepared  and  tested  in  time  of  peace,  and 
the  absence  of  a  pre-arranged  and  comprehensive  plan  for 
such  an  expedition  might  have  ended  in  irretrievable  dis- 
aster had  we  been  opposed  by  an  enterprising  and  powerful 
foe.  Such  organization  and  plans  as  would  obviate  the  chaos 
and  blunders  that  characterised  Shafter's  expedition  are  the 
function  of  a  General  Staff,  *^  which  this  great  country  did 
not  possess  in  1898. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  Spanish  troops  in  Cuba  numbered 
198,820  and  those  in  the  Province  of  Santiago  36,582,  while 
Havana  was  one  of  the  most  strongly  fortified  places  in  the 
western  hemisphere.  Under  ordinary  circumstances,  the 
chances  were  not  one  in  a  hundred  that  an  army  of  17,000, 
even  though  its  quality  were  superb,  could  bring  to  a  success- 
ful conclusion  all  the  fighting  that  might  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected   before   the    Spanish  —  who   outnumbered   it   nearly 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       211 

twelve  to  one  —  were  overcome.  Indeed,  that  so  paltry  a 
force  was  sent  on  such  a  mission  seems  like  "  flying  in  the 
face  of  Providence."  Thanks  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  Span- 
ish commanders  in  Cuba,  the  only  re-enforcement  which 
reached  Santiago  was  a  meagre  column  of  3,660  under  Escario 
from  Manzanillo,  and  at  the  crucial  moment  of  the  campaign 
the  heights  which  formed  the  key  to  the  city  were  held  by  a  few 
thousand  men  upon  whom  fell  the  brunt  of  the  American  at- 
tacks.*^ The  apathy  and  incapacity  of  Linares,  let  alone 
Blanco,  were  simply  incredible.  Although  the  Cubans  Had 
isolated  the  12,096  troops  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  San- 
tiago ^^  from  those  in  the  rest  of  the  province,  Garcia' s  force 
about  the  city  numbered  only  some  5,000  ^^  and  could  easily 
have  been  brushed  aside.  The  destination  of  ^Shafter's  ex- 
pedition was  published  all  over  the  world  for  weeks  before  it 
reached  Siboney  and,  irrespective  of  the  distances  and  diffi- 
culties of  transport,  an  abler  commander  would  have  had  am- 
ple time  to  concentrate  the  bulk  of  his  forces  within  striking 
distance.  Had  Linares  attacked  with  half  his  troops  during 
the  American  disembarkation,  Shaf ter  would  have  been  driven 
into  the  sea.  Had  he  assembled  18,000  on  the  heights  of 
Santiago  at  any  time  within  nine  days  after  the  Americans 
landed,  the  outcome  —  in  the  light  of  the  difficulty  experi- 
enced by  our  army  against  only  part  of  that  number  —  can 
readily  be  imagined.  ^NTapoleon  declared  that  ''  In  war  men 
are  nothing  —  it  is  a  man  who  is  everything."  ^^  Luckily 
for  us,  the  Spanish  did  not  possess  a  man  in  Cuba,  but  we 
must  carefully  refrain  from  blinding  ourselves  to  the  fact 
that  rare  indeed  in  history  are  the  instances  in  which  enor- 
mous superiority  in  numbers  have  availed  a  nation  so  little 
as  was  the  case  in  Cuba  in  1898.  We  have  already  seen  that 
yellow  fever  made  its  appearance  on  July  4th;  by  August 
first  the  usefulness  of  the  American  army  as  a  fighting  force 
had  been  greatly  impaired  by  the  ravages  of  that  fearful  dis- 
ease, and  there  was,  consequently,  grave  apprehension  among 
our  generals   lest   Toral  would   not   capitulate   promptly.  ^^ 


212     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Had  the  negotiations  been  prolonged  until  the  Spanish  com- 
mander learned  of  the  conditions  in  our  army,  he  would  un- 
questionably have  refused  to  surrender  and  thereby  forced  an 
assault  which,  it  was  realized,  would  necessarily  have  cost 
more  men  than  General  Shafter  dared  to  lose.^^  Under  such 
circumstances,  there  is  every  indication  that  the  Americans 
would  have  been  compelled  to  relinquish  their  position  and  to 
abandon  Cuba,  for  the  time  being  at  least. 

Even  after  Toral  did  capitulate,  there  were  more  than 
163,000  Spanish  troops  in  Cuba,  and  Havana  still  defied 
capture.  ^Notwithstanding  the  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet 
cut  ofT  all  possibility  of  re-enforcements,  a  competent  general 
w^ould  have  experienced  little  difficulty  in  keeping  the  Ameri- 
cans at  bay  for  months,  but  difficulties  which  to  a  really  able 
commander  would  have  been  comparative  trifles  proved  insur- 
mountable to  such  incapables  as  Blanco  and  Linares.  And 
back  of  them  was  the  weakness,  internally  as  well  as  exter- 
nally, of  Spain,  whose  resistance  collapsed  like  a  house  of 
cards.  Her  feebleness  is  the  more  incredible  if  it  be  com- 
pared with  another  nation,  the  situation  of  which  is  in  many 
respects  analogous  to  that  of  Spain  in  1898.  What  would 
have  happened  had  the  United  States  found  itself  opposed 
in  Cuba  by  generals  and  troops  in  anywise  like  those  of  Ger- 
many at  the  present  time,  the  reader  can  deduce  for  himself. 

One  of  the  most  important  lessons  to  be  derived  from  the 
Spanish- American  War  is  the  necessity  of  such  a  system  as 
will  minimize  the  length  of  stay  in  permanent  or  semi-per- 
manent camps  and  will  get  the  troops  to  the  front  in  the  short- 
est possible  space  of  time.  This  was  fully  demonstrated  by 
the  fact  that  out  of  223,235  volunteers  enlisted  during  the 
war,  only  289  were  killed  or  died  of  wounds  received  in  action, 
whereas  no  less  than  3,848  died  of  disease;  ^^  and  it  must  be 
distinctly  remembered  that  the  majority  of  these  volunteers 
never  got  into  action  at  all.  On  April  26th  General  Miles 
suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  it  was 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       213 

"  of  the  highest  importance  that  the  troops  called  into  service  by 
the  President's  proclamation  be  thoroughly  equipped,  organized, 
and  disciplined  for  field  service.  In  order  that  this  may  be 
done  with  the  least  delay,  they  ought  to  be  in  camp  approxi- 
mately sixty  days  in  their  States,  as  so  many  of  the  States  have 
made  no  provision  for  their  State  militia,  and  not  one  is  fully 
equipped  for  field  service.  After  being  assembled,  organized, 
and  sworn  into  service  of  the  United  States,  they  will  require 
uniforms,  tentage,  complete  camp  equipage,  arms,  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  a  full  supply  of  stationery,  including  blank  books  and 
reports  for  the  Quarterraaster^s,  Commissar}^,  Medical,  and 
Ordnance  Departments.  They  will  also  require  complete  equip- 
ment of  ordnance,  quartermaster's,  commissary,  and  medical  sup- 
plies, hospital  appliances,  transportation,  including  ambulances, 
stretchers,  etc.  The  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  will 
have  to  be  appointed  and  properly  instructed  in  their  duties  and 
responsibilities,  and  have  some  instruction  in  tactical  exercises, 
guard  duties,  etc.,  all  of  which  is  of  the  highest  importance  to 
the  efficiency  and  health  of  the  command.  While  this  is  being 
done,  the  general  officers  and  staff  officers  can  be  appointed  and 
properly  instructed,  large  camps  of  instruction  can  be  judiciously 
selected,  ground  rented,  and  stores  collected.  At  the  end  of 
sixty  days  the  regiments^  batteries,  and  troops  can  be  brigaded 
and  formed  into  divisions  and  corps,  and  proper  commanding 
generals  assigned,  and  this  great  force  may  be  properly 
equipped,  molded,  and.  organized  into  an  effective  army  with 
the  least  possible  delay."  ^* 

However,  as  the  Commission  appointed  by  President  Mc- 
Kinley  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in 
the  war  with  Spain  found,  "  the  War  Department  had  not 
the  officers  to  send  to  each  State  to  organize,  muster,  feed, 
and  equip  them,  nor  had  it  officers  of  sufficient  rank  to  com- 
mand, drill,  and  discipline  the  troops  while  in  State  camps."  ^^ 

This  insufficiency  of  officers  —  for  which  Congress  was  re- 
sponsible —  resulted,  faute  de  mieux,  in  the  militia  and  vol- 
unteers being  concentrated  in  various  camps  to  w^hich  allusion 
has  already  been  made.^^  During  seven  and  a  half  months 
the  Quartermaster  department  was  called  upon  to  transport 
by  rail  no  less  than  "17,863  officers  and  435,569  enlisted 


214     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

men/'  ^^  a  good  deal  of  a  tax  considering  that  this  particular 

"  department  consisted  of  fifty-seven  officers.  It  was  provided 
with  all  necessary  clothing,  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  for 
the  Regular  Army  of  25,000  men;  it  was  prepared  to  equip 
and  move  an  army  at  least  double  that  size  under  peace  condi- 
tions, but  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  furnish  within  a  short 
period  all  that  was  required  to  fit  out  an  army  of  275,000  men 
for  probable  operations  in  an  enemy's  country." 

Moreover,  there  existed  certain  statutes,  ^^ — the  legality  of 
which  could  not  be  questioned  —  prohibiting  it  from  making 
any  contract  ^^  in  excess  of  the  appropriations  made  by  Con- 
gress for  that  fiscal  year/'  and  that  sovereign  body  saw  fit  to 
defer  until  the  beginning  of  hostilities  any  appropriation 
which  would  permit  the  approaching  situation  to  be  met  with 
any  degree  of  preparedness.  Small  wonder  that  the  commis- 
sion reported  '^  that  the  declaration  of  war  threw  upon  the 
Quartermaster's  Department  an  amount  of  labor  and  re- 
sponsibility for  which  it  was  neither  physically  nor  financially 
prepared."  ^^ 

Substantially  the  same  criticism  was  applied  to  the  Subsis- 
tence ^^  and  Medical  departments,  the  capacities  of  which 
were  stretched  beyond  all  reason.  In  the  case  of  the  latter, 
the  short-sightedness  of  Congress  resulted  in 

*^  the  almost  absolute  lack  of  any  supplies  in  store  when  the  war 
broke  out.  Medicines  could  be  purchased  in  any  quantity  and 
without  delay,  as  could  bedding  and  certain  articles  of  hospital 
furniture,  but  other  articles  of  adopted  pattern,  as  surgical  in- 
struments or  cots  of  special  design,  could  not.  Time  was  lost 
in  having  manufactured  standard  chests  of  various  kinds  to 
contain  drugs,  stores,  dressings,  furniture,  etc.,  and  the  making 
of  these  articles  never  kept  up  with  the  demand  for  them."  ^^ 

It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  the  Commission  found 
^^  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  War  the  Medical  Department 
was,  in  men  and  materials,  altogether  unprepared  to  meet  the 
necessities  of  the  army  called  out,"  and  "  that  the  shortcom- 
ings in  administration  and  operation  may  justly  be  attributed, 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       215 

in  large  measure,  to  the  hurry  and  confusion  incident  to  the 
assembling  of  an  army  of  untrained  officers  and  men,  ten 
times  larger  than  before,  for  which  no  preparations  in  ad- 
vance had  been  or  could  be  made  because  of  existing  rules 
and  regulations."  ^^  In  the  light  of  what  occurred  there  was 
abundant  justification  for  the  recommendation  of  the  Com- 
mission that  this  department  needed  ^'  a  larger  force  of  com- 
missioned medical  officers  ''  and,  even  more  so, 

"  a  year's  supply  for  an  army  of  at  least  four  times  the  actual 
strength  of  all  such  medicines,  hospital  furniture,  and  stores  as 
are  not  materially  damaged  by  keeping,  to  be  held  constantly 
on  hand  in  the  medical  supply  depots."  ^^ 

Whatever  difficulties  were  experienced  by  the  Regular 
troops  in  the  field  in  consequence  of  the  shortcomings  and  the 
deficiency  in  the  matter  of  supply  on  the  part  of  these  ad- 
ministrative departments,  they  were  obviously  felt  to  a  much 
greater  degree  by  the  volunteers,  who  had  none  of  the  training 
which  would  have  rendered  them  sufficiently  resourceful  to 
overcome  some  of  these  disadvantages.  As  the  largest  num- 
ber of  troops  in  any  command  throughout  the  war  was  con- 
centrated in  certain  camps  —  notably  in  Camp  Thomas  at 
Chickamauga,  which  was  not  suitable  to  "  accommodate  more 
than  20,000  troops  at  once  for  any  great  length  of  time  "  but 
where  7,283  regulars  and  69,459  volunteers  were  neverthe- 
less sent,  and  in  Camp  Alger,  which  "  was  very  undesirable  " 
but  where  31,195  troops  were  lodged  ^'^ —  these  conditions  ran 
rampant  to  a  degree  that  gave  rise  to  a  distinctly  justifiable 
scandal.  Congress  was  apparently  oblivious  to  the  fact  that, 
although  it  had  set  the  example  by  permitting  the  outbreak  of 
war  to  find  '^  the  country  unprepared  with  any  large  stock  of 
arms,  ammunition,  clothing,  supplies  and  equipments,"  ^^ 
the  States  would  undoubtedly  follow  in  its  lead.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  State  legislatures  had  been  even  more  remiss  — 
as  was  to  be  expected  —  and  many  of  the  volunteer  regiments 
reported  in  a  condition  positively  ludicrous  from  a  military 


216     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

standpoint,  being  without  proper  arms,  ammunition,  uniforms 
or  equipment.^^  "  Many  sets  of  such  equipments  had  been 
issued  to  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States.  These 
were  reported  as  serviceable,  and  when  the  National  Guard 
was  called  out  as  volunteers  it  was  presumed  that  they  would 
be  properly  equipped  from  the  stores  in  the  hands  of  the  State 
authorities.  It  was  found,  however,  that  a  large  proportion 
of  these  stores  were  not  in  fit  condition  for  field  service,, 
and  they  had  to  be  replaced."  ^^ 

The  instances  could  be  multiplied  ad  infinitum  and  cer- 
tainly ad  nauseam,  as  is  always  the  case  with  raw  troops. 
Sickness,  culminating  in  typhoid  fever,  soon  prevailed,  espe- 
cially at  Camp  Thomas,  where  the  sanitary  conditions  were 
^^  very  imperfect  and  at  times  decidedly  bad.''  ^^  The  un- 
varnished truth  is  that 

^^  Large  bodies  of  men  who  are  not  soldiers,  under  officers  who 
have  had  little  or  no  military  training,  can  not  be  brought  to- 
gether and  held  for  many  weeks  in  camp  and  remain  healthy. 
If  the  water  supply  is  not  abundant  or  is  not  good;  if  the 
thoroughly  well-established  rules  of  sanitation  are  not  observed; 
if  the  discipline  of  the  camp  puts  little  restriction  on  drunken- 
ness and  immorality;  if  the  soldier  does  not  know  how  to  live 
and  his  officers  do  not  watch  him  and  teach  him;  if  his  food  is 
poorly  cared  for  and  badly  cooked,  and  he  is  permitted  to  eat 
and  drink  anything  and  everything  he  can  find,  sickness  will 
certainly  prevail.  If,  as  at  Camp  Thomas,  a  regiment  can  go 
for  ten  days  without  digging  sinks ;  if  the  sinks  dug  are  not  used 
or  they  quickly  overflow  and  pollute  the  ground ;  if  practically 
no  protection  is  afforded  against  the  liquor  sellers  and  prostitutes 
of  neighboring  places;  if  commands  are  crowded  together  and 
tents  seldom  struck,  or  even  never  during  the  occupation  of  the 
camp ;  if  no  one  is  called  to  account  for  repeated  violation  of 
sanitary  orders,  it  can  not  be  but  that  typhoid  fever  once  intro- 
duced will  spread,  rapidly,  widely. 

"  How  much  may  be  accomplished  by  intelligent  and  watchful 
supervision  on  the  part  of  surgeons  and  regimental  officers  and 
the  observance  of  the  well-established  rules  of  camp  sanitation 
is  shown  by  the  record  of  the  Eighth  Massachusetts  Volunteer 
Infantry  at  Camp  Thomas.     This  regiment  was  for  many  weeks 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       217 

Tery  healthy,^^  while  much  sickness  was  occurring  in  regiments 
near  by,  though  the  conditions  of  camp  site,  of  water,  and  of 
•drill  were  practically  the  same.  .  .  ."  ^^ 

"  In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  impossible  to  bring 
together  a  regiment  of  1,300  men  whose  lives  and  habits  have  all 
been  different  and  place  them  in  camp,  subject  them  to  its  dis- 
•cipline,  diet,  and  duties,  without  much  complaint.  They  must 
become  acclimated  and  accustomed  to  camp  life  before  sickness 
can  be  prevented;  and  until  the  individual  soldier  appreciates 
the  necessity  of  complying  fully  with  the  regulations  and  con- 
fines himself  to  the  regular  food  —  and  this  the  soldier  never 
does  until  experience  teaches  him  the  necessity  —  he  will  drink 
polluted  water,  eat  noxious  food  that  disturbs  his  digestive  or- 
gans, and  will  not  take  care  of  himself,  and  no  discipline  or 
watching  will  prevent  it.  The  imprudent  acts  of  the  soldiers 
are  the  first  and  greatest  cause  of  sickness  in  camps. 

"  Another  great  cause  of  complaint  was  the  inexperience  of 
officers  and  surgeons  as  to  proper  sanitation,  necessity  of  daily 
exercises,  the  camping  too  long  in  one  place,  lack  of  exercise  by 
marches  and  other  methods  to  take  up  the  soldier's  thoughts. 
This  occurs  to  all  volunteers." '^^ 

As  one  war  correspondent  aptly  put  the  case, 

"  AVhat  the  country  needs  to  know  now  is  that  in  actiial  war- 
fare the  volunteer  is  a  nuisance,  that  it  always  takes  one  regular 
to  offset  his  mistakes,  to  help  him  cook  his  rations,  and  to  teach 
Tiim  to  shelter  himself  and  to  keep  himself  clean.''  "^^ 

By  far  the  most  important  lesson  to  be  learned  from  the 
Spanish-American  War  is  the  necessity  for  a  larger  Regular 
Army  than  we  then  possessed.  The  dearth  of  trained  soldiers 
prevented  a  force  proportioned  to  the  task  that  it  was  ex- 
pected to  accomplish  from  being  sent  to  Cuba ;  the  same  rea- 
son caused  the  retention  in  the  Philippines  of  the  volunteers 
long  after  their  term  of  service  had  legally  expired ;  and  a 
similar  cause  resulted  in  our  fortifications  being  most  in- 
adequately manned.  The  strength  of  the  Regular  establish- 
ment must  indispensably  be  determined  by  the  role  which  it 
may  be  called  upon  to  play  in  the  defence  of  the  country  or 
to  insure  the  success  of  such  overseas  expeditions  as  the  Gov- 


218     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ernment  may  deem  it  expedient  to  undertake.  Under  any 
circumstances,  it  ought  to  be  of  sufficient  size  that  the  odds 
that  it  can  accomplish  its  mission  may  be  on  the  side  of  the 
United  States  and  not  overwhelmingly  in  favour  of  its  enemy, 
as  was  the  case  in  1898.  Notwithstanding  that  General 
Shafter's  command  comprised  ^^  the  finest  body  of  men  the 
country  had  ever  assembled,"  ^^  his  expedition  to  Cuba  is  al- 
most a  by-word  among  military  men.     The  plain  truth  is  that 

"  The  aemy  was  simply  disorganized  by  the  working  of 
a  system  which  the  very  officers  who  were  now  called 
upon  to  enforce  it  had  time  and  again  endeavored  to 

MODERNIZE  AND  BRING  ABREAST  OF  THE  TIMES.  AnD  THE  ARMY 
BILLS,  WHICH  THE  PAPERS  AND  THE  POLITICAL  DEMAGOGUES  HAD 
COMBATED  AND  DEFEATED,  HAD  BEEN  DRAWN  UP  WITH  A  VIEW  TO 
PREVENTING  THE  OCCURRENCE  OF  SUCH  A  DISGRACEFUL  SPEC- 
TACLE, WHICH  THESE  SAME  PAPERS  AND  DEMAGOGUES  NOW  DE- 
SCRIBED IN  SUCH  GRAPHIC  TERMS  AND  WITH  SUCH  INDIGNATION, 
BUT,  OF  COURSE,  WITHOUT  ASSIGNING  THE  BLAME  WHERE  IT  BE- 
LONGED —  AT  THEIR  OWN  DOORS."  ^* 

As  the  Commission  appointed  to  investigate  the  conduct  of 
the  War  Department  declared:  ''^ 

''  One  of  the  lessons  taught  by  the  war  is  that  the  country 
should  hereafter  he  in  a  better  state  of  preparation  for  war. 
Testimony  has  been  taken  on  this  subject,  and  suggestions  have 
been  made  that  large  supplies  of  all  the  material  not  liable  to 
deterioration  should  be  kept  on  hand,  to  be  continuously  issued 
and  renewed,  so  that  in  any  emergency  they  might  be  available. 
Especially  should  this  be  the  case  with  such  supplies,  equipment, 
and  ordnance  stores  as  are  not  in  general  use  in  the  United 
States  and  which  can  not  be  rapidly  obtained  in  open  market." 

The  fundamental  responsibility  for  the  majority  of  these 
defects  rested  with  that  legislative  body  in  which  alone  is 
vested  the  power  ''  to  raise  and  support  armies/'  The  de- 
moralization, disorders  and  incapacity  which  attended  the 
opening  operations  were  nothing  more  than  the  logical  out- 
come of  the  unwillingness  of  Congress  to  prepare  for  war 


Lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  War       219 

until  the  last  possible  moment.  Once  again  was  demonstrated 
the  vicious  system  to  which  our  legislators  have  persistently 
hound  us  from  the  beginning  of  our  national  career,  by  neg- 
lecting to  provide  a  force  of  thoroughly  trained  soldiers  either 
large  enough  or  elastic  enough  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
war  as  well  as  of  peace,  supported  by  a  militia  which  has 
PREVIOUSLY  had  sufficient  training  to  make  it,  when 
called  out  as  volunteers,  fairly  dependable  against  the  regular 
forces  of  other  nations.'^^ 

The  whole  subject  was  admirably  summed  up  in  the  testi- 
mony given  before  the  Investigating  Commission  by  one  very 
distinguished  general  who  declared  that 

'^  Congress  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the  bad  adminis- 
tration OF  THE  ARMY  AND  ITS  ORGANIZATION.  ThEY  HAVE 
OFTEN  BEEN  APPEALED  TO  TO  RECONSTRUCT  THE  ARMY  ON  MOD- 
ERN PRINCIPLES,  AND  THEY  HAVE  FAILED  TO  DO  SO,  AND  UNTIL 
THIS  IS  DONE  THE  EVILS  WE  HAVE  ENCOUNTERED  WILL  RECUR 
AGAIN,  AND  WE  WILL  NEVER  BE  ABLE  TO  TAKE  OUR  PLACE  BESIDE 
OTHER  MILITARY   NATIONS  UNTIL  WE  DO   THAT/^  ^^ 


CHAPTEE  XVIII 

THE  PHILIPPINE  WAK 

ON"  December  21,  1898,  President  McKinley  issued  a 
proclamation  in  which  he  announced  that  the  mission 
of  the  United  States  in  the  Philippines  would  be  one  of 
"  benevolent  assimilation."  ^  This  pronunciamento  is  of  un- 
usual importance  ^^  because  it  precipitated  the  war  in  the 
Philippines  and  is  the  key  to  all  our  subsequent  dealings  with 
them."  ^  On  January  4,  1899,  it  was  officially  published  at 
Manila  in  amended  form  by  General  Otis  as  Military  Gov- 
ernor, but  within  a  few  days  it  was  recognised  to  be  a  mis- 
take, the  American  attitude  being  construed  by  the  natives  as 
indicative  of  weakness  and  the  desire  to  avoid  a  conflict.^  On 
the  night  of  February  4th  our  troops  were  attacked  by  the 
Tagalogs  who  sought  to  capture  Manila.  A  series  of  lively 
engagements  continuing  through  that  night,  the  5th,^  6th  and 
10th  of  February  ensued,  but  the  assaults  of  the  natives 
proved  ineffectual,  while  the  American  lines,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  extended  and  established  at  a  considerable  dis- 
tance from  the  city.  A  concerted  uprising  of  the  Tagalogs 
in  Manila  —  of  whom  there  were  some  200,000  —  took  place 
on  February  22nd,  incited  by  an  order  issued  by  the  Malalos 
government  exhorting  the  extermination  of  the  American 
army  of  occupation  and  of  ^'  all  other  individuals,  of  what- 
ever race  they  may  be,"  with  the  sole  exception  of  Filipinos.^ 
Luckily  this  attempted  massacre  was  forestalled  and  the  en- 
tire city  was  guarded  with  a  strong  hand. 

The  Eighth  Army  Corps  was  then  composed  of  20,870  offi- 
cers and  men — 5,372  being  regulars.^  As  Secretary  Root 
said  in  his  report  for  1899  :  "^ 

'^  All  of  the  volunteers  and  1,650  of  the  regulars  were,  or 
were   about  to  become,   entitled    to  their   discharge,   and   their 

220 


The  Philippine  War  221 

1899] 

right  was  perfected  by  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  treaty 
on  the  11th  of  April. 

"  The  total  force  to  which  Major-General  Otis  was  thus  en- 
titled to  command  for  any  considerable  period  consisted  of  only 
171  officers  and  8,551  enlisted  men.  .  .  .  The  eifective  men  of 
the  line,  officers  and  soldiers,  were  about  14,000.  Of  these  3,000 
constituted  a  provost  guard  necessary  to  preserve  order  within 
Manila  and  prevent  the  known  intention  of  the  secret  hostile  or- 
ganizations in  that  city  to  burn  and  sack  the  city  when  our  troops 
were  engaged  on  the  lines  of  defense.  Including,  therefore,  all 
the  troops  who  were  entitled  to  he  discharged,  there  were  not 
more  than  11,000  offl,cers  and  men  available  to  engage  the  in- 
surgent army,  which  was  two  or  three  times  that  number,  well 
armed  and  equipped,  and  included  many  of  the  native  troops 
formerly  comprised  in  the  Spanish  army,  and  to  occupy  and  hold 
positions  in  a  comparatively  unknown  country,  densely  popu- 
lated by  inhabitants  speaking,  in  the  main,  an  unknown  lan- 
guage. The  months  of  the  most  intense  heat,  followed  by  the 
severe  rainy  season  of  that  climate,  were  immediately  approach- 
ing, and  for  any  effective  occupation  of  the  country  it  wo.s  neces- 
sary to  await  both  the  close  of  the  rainy  season  and  the  supply  of 
new  troops  to  take  the  place  of  those  about  to  he  discharged. 
Practically  all  the  volunteers  who  were  then  in  the  Philippines 
consented  to  forego  the  just  expectation  of  an  immediate  return 
to  their  homes,  and  to  remain  in  the  field  until  their  places  could 
be  supplied  by  new  troops.  They  voluntarily  subjected  them- 
selves to  the  dangers  and  casualties  of  numerous  engagements, 
and  to  the  very  great  hardships  of  the  climate.  They  exhibited 
fortitude  and  courage,  and  are  entitled  to  high  commendation 
for  their  patriotic  spirit  and  soldierly  conduct." 


Such  was  the  predicament  into  which  the  United  States  was 
thrust  by  the  mistaken  theory  of  "  benevolent  assimilation  " 
of  the  Filipinos  which  pervaded  the  minds  of  certain  high 
officials.  The  sequel  —  as  a  writer  who  served  in  the  Philip- 
pines for  two  years  as  a  volunteer  officer  and  for  four  years 
as  a  United  States  District  Judge  declared — ^ 

"  is  a  requiem  over  those  brave  men  of  the  Eighth  Army  Corps 
from  Pennsylvania,  Tennessee,  and  the  Western  States  that  bore 
the  brunt  of  the  early  fighting,  whose  lives  were  needlessly  sac- 
rificed in  1899  as  the  result  of  an  unpreparedness  for  war  due 


222     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

to  anxiety  not  to  embarrass  Mr.  McKinley  in  his  efforts  to  get 
the  treaty  through  the  Senate,  an  unpreparedness  which  re- 
mained long  unremedied  thereafter  in  order  to  conceal  from  the 
people  of  the  United  States  the  unanimity  of  the  desire  of  the 
Filipinos  for  Independence/' 

Had  Congress  exercised  any  perspicacity  no  requiem  need 
have  been  necessary  but,  as  usual,  a  rude  jolt  was  required 
to  awake  it  from  its  habitual  slumber  when  military  needs 
are  at  stake.  The  outbreak  of  the  Philippine  insurrection  on 
February  4th  afforded  the  requisite  shock,  and  on  March  2, 
1899,^  "  An  Act  For  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  Army 
of  the  United  States,  and  for  other  purposes  ''  was  approved 
by  the  President  and  became  a  law.^^  This  measure  was 
one  of  the  most  notable  military  enactments  up  to  that 
date,  particularly  in  respect  to  the  new  force  created  thereby. 
The  first  nine  sections  related  to  the  composition  and  organi- 
zation of  the  Regular  Army,  the  method  by  which  vacancies 
were  to  be  filled,  promotions  and  retirements  made,  and  ex- 
aminations held  for  certain  appointments  to  the  staff  from 
civil  life.^^  Section  10  enlarged  the  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point  by  providing 

"  that  the  corps  of  cadets  shall  consist  of  one  from  each  Con- 
gressional district,  one  from  each  territory,  one  from  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  and  twenty  from  the  United  States  at  large. 
They  shall  be  appointed  by  the  President,  and  shall,  with  the 
exception  of  the  twenty  cadets  appointed  at  large,  be  actual  resi- 
dents of  the  Congressional  or  Territorial  districts,  or  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  or  of  the  States,  respectively,  from  which  they 
purport  to  be  appointed."  "^^ 

The  most  important  part  of  this  law  read  as  follows : 

"  Sec.  12.  That  to  meet  the  present  exigencies  of  the  mili- 
tary service  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  maintain  the 
Eegular  Army  at  a  strength  of  not  exceeding  sixty-five  thousand 
enlisted  men,  to  be  distributed  amongst  the  several  branches  of 
the  service,  including  the  Signal  Corps,  according  to  the  needs  of 
each,  and  raise  a  force  of  not  more  than  thirty-five  thousand 
volunteers  to  be  recruited  as  he  may  determine  from  the  country 


The  Philippine  War  223 

1899] 

at  large,  or  from  the  localities  where  their  services  are  needed, 
and  to  organize  the  same  into  not  more  than  twenty-seven  regi- 
ments organized  as  are  infantry  regiments  of  war  strength  in  the 
Eegular  Army,  and  three  regiments  to  be  composed  of  men  of 
special  qualifications  in  horsemanship  and  marksmanship,  to  be 
organized  as  cavalry  for  service  mounted  or  dismounted:  Pro- 
vided, That  each  regiment  shall  have  one  surgeon,  with  the  rank 
of  major ;  two  assistant  surgeons,  one  of  whom  shall  have  the  rank 
of  captain  and  one  that  of  first  lieutenant,  and  three  hospital 
stewards :  Provided  further,  That  such  increased  regular  and 
volunteer  force  shall  continue  in  service  only  during  the  necessity 
therefor,  and  not  later  than  July  first,  nineteen  hundred  and 
one. 

"  All  enlistments  for  the  volunteer  force  herein  authorized 
shall  be  for  the  term  of  two  years  and  four  months,  unless  sooner 
discharged." 

Section  13  empowered  the  President  to  continue  in  service 
or  to  appoint  Major  Generals  and  Brigadier  Generals  of  vol- 
unteers on  condition  that  such  officers,  including  those  of  the 
Regular  Army,  should  not  exceed  one  to  every  12,000  enlisted 
men  in  the  case  of  the  first  grade  or  one  to  every  4,000  men 
in  the  latter  case.  Regular  officers  appointed  to  the  volun- 
teers were  not  thereby  to  '^  vacate  their  Regular  Army  com- 
missions," but  their  term  of  ser\dce  in  the  volunteers  was  to 
expire  on  July  1,  1901.     It  was  also  stipulated 

"  That  any  officer  now  in  the  Army,  who  was  graduated  at  the 
head  of  his  class  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  and 
who  is  not  now  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  may  be  appointed  to 
the  Corps  of  Engineers  with  the  same  grade  and  date  of  com- 
mission that  he  would  have  if  he  had  been  appointed  to  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  on  graduation;  but  said  commission  shall 
not  entitle  an  officer  to  any  back  pay  or  allowance.'^ 

Section  14  authorized  the  continuance  in  service  or  the  ap- 
pointment of  certain  volunteer  staff  officers,  whose  number  was 
prescribed,  and  w^ho  were  to  be  "  honorably  discharged  on 
July  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  or  sooner  if  their  ser- 
vices are  no  longer  required  "  and,  wisest  of  all,  it ''  Provided 
further,  That  the  officers  herein  authorized  shall  be  appointed 


224     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

by  the  President  —  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate." 

Section  15  prescribed  that  the  volunteer  army  was  to  be 
mustered  out  of  service  in  the  manner  set  forth  in  the  Act  of 
April  22,  1898,  and  that  if  any  enlisted  men  thereof  desired 
to  remain  in  service,  either  in  the  Kegular  Army  or  in  the 
present  volunteer  force,  they  might  be  transferred  to  such  or- 
ganizations as  were  below  the  maximum  authorized  strength, 
and,  under  such  circumstances,  their  previous  service  was  to 
be  credited  on  their  new  enlistment  as  volunteers.  Congress, 
having  failed  to  take  adequate  measures  to  provide  for  a  suf- 
ficient force  to  meet  such  emergencies  as  were  almost  certain 
to  arise  in  a  war  against  a  Power  like  Spain  with  colonial 
possessions  in  both  hemispheres,  was  now  obliged  to  resort  to 
a  makeshift  by  providing  further 

"  That  the  President  is  authorized  to  enlist  temporarily  in 
service  for  absolutely  necessary  purposes  in  the  Philippine 
Islands  volunteers,  officers  and  men,  individually  or  by  organiza- 
tion, now  in  those  islands  and  about  to  be  discharged,  provided 
their  retention  shall  not  extend  beyond  the  time  necessary  to  re- 
place them  by  troops  authorized  to  be  maintained  under  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  and  not  beyond  a  period  of  six  months." 

Each  and  every  provision  of  this  law  was  to  continue  in  force 
until  July  1,  1901,  when  all  officers  appointed  thereunder 
were  to  be  discharged,  the  former  numbers  in  each  grade  re- 
stored, and  the  enlisted  line  of  the  Eegular  Army  reduced  to 
the  basis  established  by  the  Act  of  March  8,  1898,  except  in- 
sofar as  the  increase  in  the  artillery  and  corps  of  cadets  was 
concerned.     The  three  final  paragraphs  read  thus : 

"  Sec.  16.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be,  and  he  is  hereby, 
authorized  to  permit  enlisted  men  of  the  United  States  Army  to 
make  allotments  of  their  pay,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may 
prescribe,  for  the  support  of  their  families  or  relatives,  for  their 
own  savings,  or  for  other  purposes,  during  such  time  as  they  may 
be  absent  on  distant  duty,  or  under  other  circumstances  war- 
ranting such  action. 


The  Philippine  War  225 

1899] 

"  Sec.  17.  That  no  officer  or  private  soldier  shall  be  detailed 
to  sell  intoxicating  drinks,  as  a  bartender  or  otherwise,  in  any 
post  exchange  or  canteen,  nor  shall  any  other  person  be  required 
or  allowed  to  sell  such  liquors  in  any  encampment  or  fort  or  on 
any  premises  used  for  military  purposes  by  the  United  States; 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  directed  to  issue  such  general 
order  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  the  provisions  of  this  section 
into  full  force  and  effect. ^^ 

"  Sec.  18.  That  all  laws  or  parts  of  laws  which  conflict  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  are  hereby  repealed.^' 

Having  provided  for  an  increase  of  pay  for  the  volunteers/^ 
Congress  proceeded  to  do  likewise  for  the  military  establish- 
ment, and  the  Appropriation  Act  of  March  3rd  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  Regular  and  Volunteer  Army  for  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1899,  contained  the  following: 

"  That  all  enlisted  men  of  the  Eegular  Army  who  enlisted 
subsequent  to  the  declaration  of  war  for  the  war  only  and  mus- 
tered out  of  the  service  who  have  served  honestly  and  faithfully 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States  shall  be  paid  two  months' 
extra  pay  on  muster  out  and  discharge  from  the  service,  and  all 
enlisted  men  in  the  Eegular  Army  who  enlisted  subsequent  to 
the  declaration  of  war  for  the  war  only  and  mustered  out  of  the 
service  who  have  served  honestly  and  faithfully  within  the  limits 
of  the  United  States  shall  be  paid  one  month's  extra  pay  on  mus- 
ter out  and  discharge  from  the  service  from  any  money  in  the 
Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated,  said  moneys  to  be  immedi- 
ately available. 

"  That  the  Act  of  January  twelfth,  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-nine,  be,  and  it  is  hereby,  amended  so  as  to  authorize  the 
payment  to  the  legal  heirs  or  representatives  of  the  officers  and 
enlisted  men  who  died  or  were  killed  or  who  may  die  in  the 
service,  and  extra  pay  provided  for  in  that  Act  for  officers  and 
enlisted  men  who  have  been  or  are  to  be  mustered  out."  ^^ 

That  Congress  had  profited,  mirahile  didu,  by  the  conse- 
quences of  limiting  the  appropriation  of  $50,000,000  made 
on  March  9,  1898,  to  "  national  defense  "  only  ^^  is  evident 
from  another  act  that  became  a  law  on  March  3,  1899,  which 
suspended  certain  acts  passed  in  the  previous  year  and  speci- 


226     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

fied  that  "  materials  required  by  the  War  Department  may, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  be  purchased 
abroad,  and  shall  be  admitted  free  of  duty  '^ ;  and,  to  make 
amends  for  its  former  neglect,  it  provided  by 

"  Sec.  3.  That  during  the  same  time  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance 
of  the  War  Department  is  authorized  to  purchase  without  ad- 
vertisement such  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  as  are  needed  for 
immediate  use;  and  when  such  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  are 
to  be  manufactured,  then  to  make  contracts  without  advertise- 
ment for  such  stores,  to  be  delivered  as  rapidlv  as  manufac- 
tured." ^' 

The  last  military  legislation  of  the  year  which  concerns  us 
was  another  act  approved  on  March  3,  1899,  which  amended 
the  law  of  July  8,  1898,^^  so  as  to  allow  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  to  settle  the  claims  of  the  governors  of  States  and 
Territories  for  expenses  incurred  by  them  in  assisting  to  raise, 
organize,  equip  and  supply  the  Volunteer  Army  for  the  war 
with  Spain  "^^  by  reimbursing  them  for  "  expenses  incurred 
after,  as  w^ell  as  before,  July  eighth,  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-eight  " —  thus  confessing  the  inadequacy  of  the  prev- 
'ious  measure.     The  amount  of  compensation  was  specifically 
fixed,  transportation  expenses  for  men  w^ho  actually  presented 
themselves  as  well  as  for  the  subsistence  of  the  organized 
militia,  National  Guard  or  naval  reserves  called  out  on  or 
after  April  25,  1898,  were  allowed,  with  the  express  proviso 
"  that  such  organizations  shall  afterwards  have  been  accepted 
into  the  Volunteer  Army  of  the  United  States."     Unsettled 
accounts  were  not  to  be  set  off,  but  the  presentation  of  vouch- 
ers for  equipment  purchased  and  subsequently  used  by  the 
Regular  Army  was  to  constitute  a  valid  claim  for  reimburse- 
ment.    Accounts  for  transportation  properly  authorized  w^ere 
to  be  paid,  but  not  '^  in  excess  of  the  rates  charged  for  trans- 
porting  troops    of   the    United    States    under    like   circvim- 
stances  "  ;  all  claims  therefor  were  to  be  filed  with  the  Auditor 
of  the  War  Department,  "  supported  by  proper  vouchers  or 
other  conclusive  evidence  of  interest."     Demands  for  reim- 


The  Philippine  War  227 

1899] 

bursement  under  this  act  or  that  of  July  8,  1898,  were  to  be 
presented  in  itemized  form  to  the  Treasury  Department  on 
or  before  January  1,  1902,  "  or  be  forever  barred."  ^^ 

As  is  evident,  the  Act  of  March  2nd  ^^  was  by  all  odds  the 
most  important  military  legislation  passed  during  the  year 
1899.^^  The  organization  of  the  army  thereunder  was  a  dis- 
tinct improvement  over  the  previous  laws,  and  its  increase  to 
an  authorized  strength  of  67,585  officers  and  enlisted  men,^^ 
although  none  too  great,  was  a  sine  qua  non.  In  rendering 
available  for  positions  in  the  Adjutant-General's  and  Inspec- 
tor-General's departments  such  captains  as  had  shown  marked 
aptitude  for  command,  as  well  as  in  requiring  examinations 
for  civilians  to  be  appointed  to  the  positions  of  paymaster, 
judge-advocate  and  chaplain,  and  in  enlarging  the  number  of 
cadets  at  West  Point,  this  law  performed  a  meritorious  ser- 
vice. Greatest  of  all  were  the  provisions  for  the  new  volun- 
teer force,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  limitation  of  its  exist- 
ence to  July  1,  1901,  and  the  restriction  of  the  term  of  enlist- 
ment to  two  years  and  four  months  were  unwise  and  short- 
sighted in  the  extreme.  Had  these  qualifying  conditions 
been  omitted  and  had  the  section  terminated  w^ith  the  pro- 
viso "  that  such  increased  regular  and  volunteer  force  shall 
continue  in  service  only  during  the  necessity  therefor,"  all  pos- 
sible eventualities  would  have  been  prepared  against.  In 
spite  of  these  defects  this  measure  achieved  a  notable  success 
in  the  quality  of  the  troops  raised  under  its  operation. 
There  is  no  exaggeration  in  Captain  Rhodes'  declaration  ^* 
that 

"As  volunteer  regiments,  it  has  been  the  almost  unanimous 
verdict  that  they  have  never  been  surpassed.  Certainly  never, 
in  such  a  short  space  of  time,  have  such  excellent  troops  been 
organized,  trained  and  put  in  the  field. 

"  If  the  cause  of  this  efficiency  be  analyzed,  it  will  be  found  to 
have  resulted  from  four  factors: 

"1.  In  most  cases  the  field  officers  of  the  regiments  were 
selected  from  experienced  officers  of  the  regular  service. 

"2.  The  company  officers  were  principally  selected  hy  the  War 


228     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

Department,  from  officers  wlio  had  served  creditably  in  State 
organizations  during  the  war  with  Spain. 

"  3.  The  fact  that  from  this  method  of  selection  the  officers 
were  in  no  way  under  obligations  to  the  men  under  them. 

"  4.  From  careful  selection  of  the  enlisted  personnel,  accepting 
only  the  physically  perfect,  and  after  enlistment  summarily  dis- 
charging those  deficient  in  the  qualifications  of  a  good  soldier. 

^^  Under  this  Act  of  Congress,  1524  officers  and  33,050  men 
were  enlisted,  organized,  equipped,  and  instructed,  and  were  on 
their  way  to  their  destination  in  less  than  six  months  from  the 
date  of  passage  of  the  law.  They  proved  themselves  a  thoroughly 
reliable  force  in  the  Philippines,  and  it  was  largely  through  their 
aid,  that  the  Philippine  insurrection  was  checked,  and  relapsed 
into  guerilla  warfare/' 

Admirable  as  was  the  law  which  brought  this  volunteer 
force  into  existence,  it  partook  of  the  invariable  defect  of 
most  of  our  military  measures  in  being  passed  months  after 
it  ought  to  have  been.  We  have  already  adverted  to  the  fact 
that  it  was  not  until  June  14,  1899,  that  General  Otis  dared 
to  begin  to  send  home  the  volunteers  raised  in  1898,^^  as  the 
only  re-enforcements  which  reached  him  during  the  first  five 
months  of  1899  were  confined  to  347  officers  and  13,281  men, 
all  Regulars,  the  first  of  whom  did  not  arrive  until  March 
10th.  Other  regular  troops  followed  in  rapid  succession,  and 
by  October  9th  his  forces  had  been  swelled  by  an  additional 
330  officers  and  15,656  men,  many  of  whom  were  recruits; 
but  it  was  not  until  October  11th  that  the  first  part  of  the 
34th  Volunteer  Infantry,  which  formed  the  van  of  this  newly- 
created  force,  appeared  at  Manila,  their  approaching  arrival 
permitting  him  to  send  home  three  days  earlier  the  last  of 
his  State  volunteers. ^^  During  the  rest  of  the  year  General 
Otis  received  constant  accretions  in  the  shape  of  the  new  vol- 
unteers to  the  amount  of  433  officers  and  11,583  enlisted 
men  ^'^ —  the  grand  total  of  troops,  regular  and  volunteers, 
which  joined  him  during  1899  being  1,110  officers  and  40,520 
men.^^ 

The  Philippine  War  embraced  no  less  than  2,811  contacts 


The  Philippine  War  229 

1899] 

with  the  natives,^  ^  ranging  from  insignificant  skirmishes  to 
actions  of  considerable  importance.  To  chronicle  them  in 
detail  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  here,  nor  is  it  within  the 
scope  of  this  work.  IS^o  attempt  will  therefore  be  made  be- 
yond sketching  in  baldest  outline  certain  of  the  most  im- 
portant operations. 

The  opening  fighting  of  the  insurrection,  which  took  place 
on  February  4th,  5th  and  6th,  was  followed  on  the  10th  by 
the  battle  of  Caloocan,  ending  with  the  occupation  of  that 
town  by  General  Mac  Arthur.  ^^  These  successes  inaugurated 
the  operations,  the  object  of  which  was  to  strengthen  the 
American  positions,  to  extend  the  lines  and  to  restore  safety 
and  confidence  in  Manila.  Although  it  is  probable  that  any 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  insurgents  could  have  been  over- 
come, 

"  there  were  not  the  troops  necessary  to  garrison  the  towns,  or 
to  maintain  any  far  extended  lines  of  communication.  No  at- 
tempt was  accordingly  made  to  occupy  the  country,  except  in  the 
vicinity  of  Manila,  and  at  such  points  as  were  important  for  the 
protection  of  our  lines.  Such  movements  as  passed  beyond  this 
territory  were  designed  primarily  to  break  up  threatening  con- 
centrations of  insurgent  troops,  and  to  prevent  undue  annoyance 
to  the  positions  which  we  occupied."  ^^ 

On  February  11th  Iloilo,  on  the  island  of  Panay,  the  sec- 
ond port  in  size  and  importance  in  the  Philippines,  was  oc- 
cupied by  General  Miller,  and  on  the  26th  a  battalion  of  the 
23rd  Infantry  was  installed  at  Cebu,  which  had  been  taken 
possession  of  by  the  warships.  General  Smith  seized  the 
island  of  IN^egros  and  the  city  of  Bacolod,^^  while  Mindanao 
and  other  small  islands  were  occupied  subsequently.  On 
March  10th  General  Wheaton  captured  Pasig  and  by  the  I7th 
had  occupied  Taguig  —  notwithstanding  a  counter-attack 
upon  him  —  driven  the  insurgents  fifteen  miles  down  the  lake 
and  secured  that  line,  thus  intercepting  all  communication  be- 
tween the  Filipino  forces  on  the  north  and  south. ^^  On  the 
24th  General  MacArthur  began  his  advance  northward  against 


230     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

Malalos,  the  insurgent  capital,  where  a  large  quantity  of  am- 
munition had  been  stored,  and,  after  some  spirited  fighting, 
occupied  that  place  on  the  31st.^^  On  the  20th  the  Philippine 
Commission,  consisting  of  Dr.  J.  G.  Schurman,  Professor 
Dean  Worcester,  Colonel  Charles  Denby,  Admiral  Dewey  and 
General  Otis  began  its  labours  at  Manila,  and  on  April  4th 
issued  a  proclamation  promising  the  Filipinos 

"  the  most  ample  liberty  of  self-government  .  .  .  which  is  .  .  . 
compatible  with  the  sovereign  and  international  rights  and  obli- 
gations of  the  United  States." 

The  advance  of  the  dry  season  permitted  military  opera- 
tions on  a  larger  scale  than  heretofore,^ ^  and  on  April  9th 
General  Lawton  with  a  force  of  1,509  troops  crossed  the  La- 
guna  de  Bay,  captured  Santa  Cruz  on  the  following  day  and 
returned  on  the  I7th.  As  any  further  advance  beyond  Ma- 
lalos  by  General  MacArthur  was  unwise  so  long  as  the  enemy 
threatened  his  flanks  and  line  of  communications,  on  the  22nd 
Lawton  with  some  4,000  men  began  a  movement  which  car- 
ried him  through  I^orzagaray,  Baliuag  and  San  Miguel  to  San 
Isidro,  the  third  insurgent  capital,  which  he  entered  on  May 
I7th,  too  late  to  capture  Aguinaldo  and  his  cabinet  who  had 
withdrawn  to  Cabanatuan,  14  miles  farther  north.  Mean- 
while, on  April  24th,  General  MacArthur  resumed  his  ad- 
vance, crossed  the  Angat  Piver  four  days  later  in  the  face 
of  4,000  Filipinos,  took  Calumpit  and  occupied  San  Fernando, 
the  second  insurgent  capital,  on  May  5th. ^"^  These  opera- 
tions gave  the  Americans  possession  of  the  country  north  of 
Manila  which  it  was  urgent  to  hold,  doubly  so  since  the  enemy 
had  at  least  10,000  men  opposed  to  them  on  the  north,  while 
fully  5,000  were  advancing  against  Manila  from  the  south. 
MacArthur' s  troops  were  exhausted  by  three  months  of  march- 
ing and  fighting,  and  their  condition  gave  no  little  concern.  ^'^ 
The  withdrawal  of  the  Spanish  troops  in  Mindanao  and  the 
Sulu  archipelago  —  where  they  had  to  be  replaced  by  Ameri- 
can forces  —  the  detachment  of  others  to  Cebu  and  the  neces- 


The  Philippine  War  231 

1899] 

sity  to  increase  those  in  Negros,  capped  by  orders  from 
Washington  to  send  the  volunteer  regiments  home  without 
delay,  placed  the  army  in  a  critical  situation.  ^^  General 
Otis  persuaded  the  volunteers  to  remain  but,  by  the  end  of 
May,  the  rainy  season  set  in,  ^'  the  volunteers  had  again 
become  very  restless  and  desired  to  depart,''  ^^  and  General 
MacArthur  reported  of  his  command  ^"^  that 

'^  the  four  regiments  now  present  have  an  enUsted  strength  of 
3,701.  Of  these  1,003  are  sick  and  wounded,  leaving  an  effec- 
tive of  2,698,  which,  after  deducting  necessary  details  for  special 
duty,  yields  only  2,307  for  the  firing  line,  many  of  whom  could 
not  march  5  miles.  .  .  ." 

To  meet  the  insurgent  force  advancing  against  Manila  ^^ 
from  the  south,  which  had  entrenched  in  a  strong  position 
near  Paranaque,  General  Lawton  was  ordered  to  concen- 
trate about  4,000  troops  under  Generals  Wheaton  and  Oven- 
shine,  to  disperse  the  enemy  and  to  take  up  a  position  on  the 
American  flanks.  On  June  10th  his  advance  was  begun, 
three  days  later  he  attacked  the  Filipino  entrenchments  at 
the  Zapote  Eiver,  carried  them  in  spite  of  desperate  resist- 
ance and,  continuing  his  movement,  received  the  surrender 
of  Imus  on  the  15th,  and  at  once  took  possession  of  the 
place. ^^  The  enemy  having  divided  his  forces  and  retreated 
to  Das  Marinas  and  Malabon,  Wheaton  followed  up  the 
former  column  and  effectually  routed  it,  but  it  was  not  until 
July  26th  that  Calamba,  on  the  southeastern  part  of  the  La- 
guna  de  Bay,  was  captured  by  General  Hall.^^ 

On  the  north,  the  insurgents  attacked  MacArthur  at  San 
Fernando  on  June  16th  but  were  repulsed  by  Generals  Fun- 
ston  and  Hale,  a  similar  attempt  made  on  the  night  of  July 
1st  being  equally  ineffectual. 

The  situation  during  the  months  of  June,  July  and  August, 
1899,^^  is  thus  summed  up  by  General  Otis  in  his  report:  ^^ 

"  We  were  now  busily  engaged  in  discharging  over  60  per  cent, 
of  the  enlisted  men  of  the  artillery  and  infantry  regiments  of 


232     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

the  regular  establishment,  which  had  joined  ns  previous  to  Feb- 
ruary, and  in  bringing  into  Manila  and  preparing  for  departure 
the  volunteer  organizations.  We  had  still  in  the  Visayas  6,200 
men  and  in  Luzon  26,000,  of  whom  more  than  20,000  were 
[present?]  for  duty,  but  most  of  the  volunteers  were  not  con- 
sidered available,  except  possibly  to  meet  some  unexpected  emer- 
gency, and  before  the  end  of  July  more  than  8,000  of  them  had 
been  discharged  or  sailed  for  the  United  States,  their  places 
being  in  part  taken  by  new  arrivals. 

"  The  end  of  the  month  found  us  with  29,427  enlisted  men, 
of  whom  23,279  were  reported  for  duty,  and  of  whom  18,000 
were  in  the  island  of  Luzon.  Active  hostilities  were  maintained 
b}^  a  continued  series  of  minor  affairs,  notwithstanding  the  un- 
paralleled heavy  rainfall  of  forty-six  inches  in  a  single  month, 
with  an  accompaniment  of  a  number  of  severe  typhoons.  These 
affairs  occurred  mostly  on  our  railway  line  of  communication 
and  at  the  north,  and  attended  our  endeavors  to  open  the 
Laguna  de  Bay  country  for  traffic  with  Manila,  for  which  the 
inhabitants  were  particularly  desirous.  .  .  . 

''  Our  returns  for  August  31  showed  a  total  Army  force  pres- 
ent in  the  Philippines  of  30,963  officers  and  enlisted  men,  of  whom 
more  than  3,500  were  volunteers  awaiting  shipment  and  men 
of  the  regular  regiments  about  to  be  discharged,  and  hence  could 
not  be  reckoned  among  the  availables.  Of  this  total,  twelve 
and  a  fraction  per  cent,  were  sick,  leaving  27,189  officers  and 
men  for  duty.  .  .  .  The  force  of  active  combatants  outside  of 
the  city  was  therefore  between  13,000  and  14,000,  pf  whom 
5,000  were  required  to  hold  the  long  line  encircling  the  sam.e.  .  .  . 

"  The  casualties  in  killed  and  wounded  among  all  United  States 
troops  in  the  Philippines  .  .  .  for  the  period  from  February  4th, 
when  the  insurgents  declared  war  against  the  United  States, 
to  August  31,  1899,  [were]  19  officers  and  342  enlisted  men 
killed  or  who  died  of  wounds  received  in  battle  and  87  officers 
and  1,325  enlisted  men  wounded." 

By  October  10th  the  changes  in  the  army  and  the  approach 
of  the  dry  season  had  progressed  sufficiently  to  justify  a  for- 
ward movement  looking  to  a  general  occupation  of  the  coun- 
try. The  American  lines  then  stretched  south  from  the  Bay 
of  Manila  to  the  Laguna  de  Bay,  and  embraced  parts  of  the 
provinces  of  Cavite,  Laguna  and  Morong,  virtually  all  that  of 


The  Philippine  War  233 

1899] 

Manila  and  the  southern  portions  of  Bulacan  and  Pampanga, 
thus  dividing  the  Filipino  forces  into  two  parts  widely  sepa- 
rated from  each  other.  Numerous  bodies  of  insurgents  con- 
centrated from  time  to  time  south  and  east  of  the  American 
lines  in  Cavite  and  Morong,  but  their  attacks  were  uniformly 
repulsed,  their  forces  dispersed  and  driven  back  toward  the 
mountains.  l^Torth  of  Manila  for  the  distance  of  about  120 
miles  stretched  the  great  plain  of  central  Luzon,  which  is 
bounded  on  the  east  and  west  by  lofty  mountain  ranges 
barring  it  from  the  seacoasts,  on  the  north  by  the  Gulf  of 
Lingayen  and  other  mountains,  and  on  the  south  by  the  Bay 
of  Manila.  In  this  region  Aguinaldo  wielded  a  military 
dictatorship,  his  headquarters  being  at  Tarlac,  which  he 
styled  his  capital  and  where  he  and  his  cabinet  set  up  the 
semblance  of  a  civil  government.  ^^ 

The  first  operations  in  this  northern  territory  were  an  ad- 
vance by  troops  under  Generals  MacArthur  and  Wheeler, 
which  resulted  in  the  occupation  of  Porac,  a  small  town 
eight  miles  from  Bacolor,  on  September  28th.  The  follow- 
ing month  witnessed  a  combined  movement  by  three  separate 
columns  with  the  object  of  ridding  this  region  of  the  enemy. 
On  October  12  th  ^"^  a  force  of  3,500  under  General  Law  ton, 
with  General  Young  in  command  of  the  advanced-guard,  be- 
gan its  movement  to  Arayat,  driving  the  insurgents  toward 
the  north  and  west.  Six  days  later  Cabiao  was  occupied,  on 
the  19th  San  Isidro  was  captured,  on  the  27th  the  Rio  Grande 
was  reached  at  Cabanatuan  where  a  permanent  garrison  was 
installed,  and  on  November  first  Aliaga  and  Talavera  were 
occupied.^^  Meanwhile  Young's  cavalry  had  swept  the  coun- 
try west  of  the  line  of  advance  clear  of  the  enemy,  driving 
his  isolated  detachments  toward  the  railway.  Pushing  on 
to  the  north,  the  principal  towns  as  far  as  San  Nicolas  were 
in  the  American  possession  by  November  13th,  when  the  col- 
umn turned  west,  occupying  Asingan  and  Resales  five  days 
later  and  moving  against  Pozorrubio,  an  insurgent  strong- 
hold lying  between  San  Nicolas  and  San  Fabian,  on  the  Gulf 


234     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

of  Lingayen.^^  As  a  result  of  Lawton's  advance,  a  cordon 
of  posts  had  been  established  along  the  eastern  and  northern 
edges  of  the  plain  of  central  Luzon  to  within  a  few  miles  of 
the  Gulf  of  Lingayen,  where  a  force  of  2,500  under  General 
Wheaton,  which  had  been  transported  by  sea  from  Manila, 
had  landed  at  San  Fabian  on  the  7th  and  five  days  later 
drove  the  1,200  insurgents  out  of  their  entrenchments  at  San 
Jacinto,  inflicting  on  them  a  loss  of  three  hundred.  ^^ 

Meanwhile  General  MacArthur  had  been  no  less  success- 
ful. Starting  on  !N'ovember  5th  from  Angeles,  he  advanced 
up  the  line  of  the  railway,  capturing  Magalang,  Bamban, 
Capas  and  Concepcion,  his  right  covered  by  Colonel  J. 
Franklin  Bell  with  the  36th  Volunteers,  who  cleared  the 
country  as  far  east  as  Lawton's  left.  On  the  12th  Mac- 
Arthur  entered  Tarlac  from  which  Aguinaldo,  his  so-called 
government  and  his  forces  had  precipitately  fled.  On  the 
I7th  ^^  he  occupied  Gerona  and  Panique,  and  on  the  20th 
reached  Dagupan,  close  to  the  Gulf  of  Lingayen,  where 
Wheaton  had  arrived  the  day  before. ^^  The  junction  of  the 
three  columns  was  thus  effected  after  a  series  of  operations 
conducted  with  energy,  celerity  and  gratifying  success. 
Great  difficulties  had  been  encountered  and  overcome,  as  the 
entire  country  was  well-nigh  impassable  owing  to  the  extraor- 
dinarily unfavourable  weather  and  the  deluges  of  rain  which 
handicapped  the  progress  of  the  troops  and  rendered  the 
transportation  of  supplies  unusually  hard.  In  the  course  of 
these  operations 

^^  large  quantities  of  insurgent  supplies  of  all  descriptions  were 
captured,  including  stores  of  .food,  clothing,  arms,  munitions 
of  war,  quick-firing  and  Krupp  guns,  powder  factory  and  arsenal, 
engineering  tools,  money,  war  department  records,  personal  ef- 
fects of  officers,  and  numerous  private  despatches."  ^^ 

Meanwhile  General  Young,  with  a  small  force  of  80  picked 
troopers  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  and  the  Macabebe  scouts,  was 
in  hot  pursuit  of  Aguinaldo.  Starting  from  Pozorrubio  on 
N^ovember  18th  and  following  the  road  along  the  west  coast. 


The  Philippine  War  235 

1899] 

he  occupied  San  Fernando  de  Union  on  the  20th  after  a  brief 
engagement,  and  reached  !N'amacpacan,  30  miles  beyond,  on 
the  23rd. ^*  On  the  following  day  a  force  of  marines  from 
the  Oregon  landed  and  occupied  'Vigan,  the  chief  port  on 
the  northwest  coast,  and  General  Otis  was  able  to  telegraph  to 
Washington  that  the  insurgents  could  no  longer  set  up  any 
claim  to  government  insomuch  as  two  of  their  cabinet  and 
the  president  of  their  congress  had  been  captured,  Aguinaldo 
and  other  officials  were  in  hiding,  their  forces  had  been  dis- 
persed into  small  bands  and  were  reduced  either  to  guerilla 
warfare  or  to  "  playing  the  role  of  ^  Amigos,'  with  arms  con- 
cealed." ^^ 

In  response  to  Young's  request,^^  re-enforcements  were  sent 
him  and  with  them  he  continued  a  most  unrelenting  pursuit 
of  Aguinaldo  through  the  northern  provinces.  Following 
up  the  coast,  he  released  the  American  and  Spanish  prisoners 
held  in  various  places,  meanwhile  sending  Major  March  with 
a  battalion  of  the  33rd  Infantry  eastward  in  pursuit  of  the 
insurgent  leader.  At  the  Tila  Pass,  a  wild  spot  in  the  moun- 
tains overlooking  the  China  Sea  and  some  4,441  feet  above  it, 
March  encountered  Aguinaldo' s  rear-guard  vinder  General 
del  Pilar,  one  of  the  ablest  of  the  Filipino  commanders,  in- 
an  almost  impregnable  stronghold.  A  gallant  attack  was 
crowned  with  success  and  del  Pilar  was  killed  along  with 
fifty-one  others,  March's  loss  being  confined  to  two  killed  and 
nine  wounded. ^^  On  the  4th  General  Young  took  the  ene- 
my's trenches  at  Tangandan  mountain,  and  Lieutenant-Col- 
onel James  Parker  performed  an  extraordinary  feat  in  re- 
pelling Tinio  at  Vigan.^^  The  rest  of  the  month  was  spent 
in  pursuing  the  insurgent  forces  in  the  most  determined  fash- 
ion ^^ —  a  difficult  task  in  view  of  the  wild  and  broken  coun- 
try—  but  one  in  which  Colonels  Hare  and  Howze  among 
others  were  notable  for  the  results  they  achieved.^^  It  was 
no  fault  of  General  Young  and  his  subordinates  that  Agui- 
naldo remained  at  large  —  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  not  until 
fifteen  months  later  that  he  was  at  last  captured. 


236     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1899 

South  of  Manila  the  attacks  of  the  insurgents  upon  the 
American  communications  caused  General  Otis  to  send  a 
force  of  1,774  troops  and  63  scouts  under  General  Schwan 
to  put  a  stop  to  their  activity.  Leaving  Bacoor  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Cavite  on  October  7th,  Schwan  drove  them  southward 
beyond  Perez  das  Marinas,  killed  not  less  than  one  hundred, 
destroyed  whatever  organization  they  possessed  and  on  the 
13th  returned  to  Bacoor.^  ^ 

The  enemy  was,  however,  by  no  means  hors  de  combat  and 
continued  his  incessant  harassing  to  such  an  extent  that  in 
December  General  Lawton  was  recalled  from  the  north  and 
placed  in  command  of  a  punitive  expedition  consisting  of 
nine  troops  of  cavalry,  two  guns  and  two  battalions  of  in- 
fantry. Starting  on  the  evening  of  December  18th  for  San 
Mateo  and  Montalban,  its  progress  was  hampered  by  a  heavy 
downpour  which  caused  the  Mariquina  to  rise  considerably, 
and  on  the  following  morning,  while  superintending  the 
crossing  at  San  Mateo,  General  Lawton  w^as  killed.^^  While 
part  of  the  troops  fell  back  with  his  body,  Colonel  Lockett 
drove  the  enemy  into  the  mountains  beyond  Montalban  but, 
upon  his  withdrawal,  the  insurgents  again  resumed  the  offen- 
sive and  advanced  as  far  as  San  Mateo.  The  26th  was 
marked  by  an  attack  upon  the  American  garrison  at  Subig 
by  a  Filipino  force  under  General  Santa  Anna  which  was 
successfully  repulsed,  and  by  a  second  advance  on  the  part  of 
Lockett,  who  had  been  re-enforced  by  a  considerable  number 
of  infantry  and  who  now  had  some  2,500  troops  under  his 
command.  Reaching  Montalban  on  the  27th,  he  inflicted  a 
severe  defeat  upon  the  enemy  and  by  the  29th  he  had  success- 
fully routed  them,  killing  at  least  80  and  capturing  24,  be- 
sides large  amounts  of  war  materiel,  his  own  loss  being  con- 
fined to  one  drowned  and  seven  wounded.^ ^ 

This  terminated  the  operations  for  the  year  1899,  at  the 
close  of  which  the  American  army  in  the  Philippines  num- 
bered—  exclusive  of  the  sick — 51,167  oflicers  and  enlisted 


men.^* 


The  Philippine  War  237 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1900 

The  Army  measures  passed  by  the  Fifty-sixth  Congress 
during  this  year  present  but  little  of  interest.  The  Act  of 
February  24th  ^^  merely  continued  until  June  30,  1901,  the 
suspension  provided  for  in  the  law  of  March  3,  1899.^^  A 
military  post  was  established  at  Des  Moines,  Iowa,  by  the 
Act  of  April  4th,^^  and  on  May  25th  appropriations  Avere 
made  to  continue  the  work  and  armament  of  fortifications.^^ 
The  Act  of  May  26th,  which  made  the  usual  annual  appro- 
priation for  the  support  of  the  Regular  and  Volunteer 
Army,^^  extended  the  law  of  January  12,  1899,^^  so  as  to 
embrace  "  all  volunteer  officers  of  the  general  staff  who  have 
not  received  waiting  orders  pay  prior  to  discharge,"  and  offi- 
cers and  men  of  volunteer  organizations  "  honorably  dis- 
charged without  furlough,  or  by  reason  of  their  services  being 
no  longer  required,  or  at  any  time  by  reason  of  wounds  re- 
ceived, or  disability  contracted  in  the  service  and  in  the  line 
of  duty,  and  who  have  not  received  the  extra  pay  "  already 
granted.  This  extension  was  "  to  apply  to  officers  of  volun- 
teers who  resigned  and  enlisted  men  of  volunteers  w^ho  were 
discharged  upon  their  own  applications  subsequent  to  the  is- 
sue of  orders  for  the  muster  out  of  their  organizations  and 
prior  to  the  dates  of  muster  out."  '^^  On  June  6th,  aside 
from  two  appropriation  bills  w^hich  also  concerned  the 
Army,''^^  riders  were  attached  to  the  appropriation  for  the 
Military  Academy  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1901,"^^ 
which  were  thus  phrased: 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  senior  major-general  of  the  line  com- 
manding the  Army  shall  have  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of 
a  lieutenant-general,  and  his  personal  staff  shall  have  the  rank, 
pay,  and  allowances  authorized  for  the  staff  of  a  lieutenant- 
general. 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  shall  have 
the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  major-general  in  the  Army 
of  the  United  States,  and  on  his  retirement  shall  receive  the 


238     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

retired  pay  of  that  rank:  Provided,  That  whenever  a  vacancy 
shall  occur  in  the  office  of  Adjutant- General  on  the  expiration 
of  the  service  of  the  present  incumbent  the  Adjutant-General 
shall  thereafter  have  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  brigadier- 
general."  '^* 

The  distinction  drav^n  in  the  last  paragraph  and  the  ef- 
fect of  personal  influence  on  the  good  of  the  service  need  no 
comment. 

The  fourth  measure  approved  that  day  wisely  provided 

"  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  may  detail  as 
adjutant-general  of  the  District  of  Columbia  any  retired  officer 
of  the  Army  who  may  be  nominated  to  the  President  by  the 
brigadier-general  commanding  the  District  of  Columbia  militia, 
said  retired  officer  while  so  detailed  to  have  the  active  service 
pay  and  allowances  of  his  rank  in  the  Eegular  Army."  ^^ 

The  last  measure,  approved  on  June  7,  1900,  specified  that 
the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  should  be  sufficient  author- 
ity for  the  payment  of  travelling  allowances  to  soldiers  legally 
entitled  thereto,  but  it  restricted  the  application  of  the  law 
in  question  to  cases  arising  in  the  period  embraced  between 
April  21,  1898,  and  the  passage  of  the  present  act,  and  re- 
quired that  the  order  directing  the  discharge  must  set  forth 
"  that  the  soldier  was  entitled  to  travel  pay."  ^^ 

Two  joint  resolutions  also  concerned  the  Army,  the  first 
of  which  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  to  use  $60,000  out 
of  the  annual  appropriation  for  the  construction  of  ''  a  mod- 
ern military  post  hospital  "  at  Fort  Leavenworth, ''^^  while 
the  other  empowered  the  President  ^^  to  appoint  ten  first  lieu- 
tenants of  volunteers  in  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  whose 
commissions  shall  expire  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred 
and  one."  '^^ 

In  his  annual  report  for  1899  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
recommended  the  establishment  of  an  Army  War  College, 
and  on  February  19,  1900,  by  virtue  of  Special  Order  l^o. 
42,  a  board  of  three  officers  was  directed  to  convene  at  the 
War  Department  on  February  26th,  to  consider  regulations 


The  Philippine  War  239 

1900] 

looking  to  the  founding  of  such  an  institution."^^  Congress 
took  kindly  to  the  idea  and,  acting  with  unusual  promptitude, 
inserted  in  the  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  May  26,  1900, 
the  sum  of  $20,000 

"  For  hire  of  clerks,  purchase  of  stationery,  furniture,  and  for 
contingent  expenses  incident  to  the  establishment  of  the  Army 
War  College,  having  for  its  object  the  direction  and  coordination 
of  the  instruction  in  the  various  service  schools,  extension  of 
the  opportunities  for  investigation  and  study  in  the  Army  and 
militia  of  the  United  States,  and  the  collection  and  dissemina- 
tion of  military  information/^  ^^ 

The  scope  and  organization  of  the  War  College  Board  was 
further  enlarged  during  the  years  1901  and  1903,  and  culmi- 
nated in  the  establishment  of  the  present  Army  War  College 
which  has  exercised  a  highly-important  influence  on  the  mili- 
tary service. 

THE  PHILIPPINE  WAR— (Continued) 

The  operations  of  the  American  forces  in  the  Philippines 
during  1900  w^ere  similar  in  purpose  to  those  of  the  preced- 
ing year  —  namely,  to  crush  the  insurrection  by  attacking 
and  dispersing  all  assemblies  of  troops  wherever  found.  In 
l^orthern  Luzon  the  principal  task  was  that  of  hunting  down 
the  fugitive  Aguinaldo  in  the  mountain  fastnesses,  but  al- 
though his  capture  was  not  effected  —  for  dis  aliter  visum  — 
yet,  as  one  well-known  writer  on  the  American  occupation 
declared:  ^^ 

"  Many  were  the  combats,  great  and  small,  of  General  Young's 
brigade,  in  compassing  the  task  of  crushing  the  resistance  in  that 
part  of  Luzon  into  which  he  led  the  first  American  troops  in 
the  winter  of  1899-1900.  The  resistance  was  obstinate,  des- 
perate, and  long  drawn  out,  but  when  he  finally  reported  the 
territory  under  his  command  '  pacified,^  it  was  pacified.  The 
work  had  been  thoroughly  done ;  General  Young  gave  the  Ilocano 
country  a  lesson  it  never  forgot,  before  politics  had  time  to 
interfere.  We  have  never  had  any  trouble  in  that  region  from 
that  day  to  this." 


240     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

Of  these  operations  the  most  important  was  the  expedition 
under  Major  March  and  Colonel  Hare  which  left  Candon  and 
Bangued  on  May  10th  and  16th,  scoured  the  northern  prov- 
inces and  returned  in  June.  March  just  failed  to  capture 
Aguinaldo  at  Sagad  on  May  19th,  while  Captain  Eucker 
and  Lieutenant  Lipop  of  Hare's  column  surprised  and  killed 
Tinio  near  Malibcong  that  same  day.^^ 

In  Southern  Luzon  the  campaign  was  inaugurated  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  year,  the  plan  being  to  hold  the  enemy's 
principal  force  in  check  near  Imus  and  west  of  Bacoor  by 
means  of  the  troops  under  General  Wheaton,  while  General 
Schwan  advanced  down  the  western  side  of  the  Laguna  de 
Bay,  seizing  the  roads  leading  to  the  enemy's  supply  depots  at 
Siling  and  Indang,  and  placing  himself  in  position  to  inter- 
cept the  insurgent  retreat  to  the  mountains  of  southern  Ca- 
vite  and  Batangas.  On  January  4th  —  the  day  on  w^hich 
General  John  C.  Bates  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  1st 
division  of  the  Eighth  Corps  made  vacant  by  the  death  of 
General  Lawton  —  Wheaton  assembled  his  column  at  San 
Pedro  Macati,  from  which  General  Schwan  began  his  march 
next  day.  While  the  former  delivered  a  series  of  attacks 
commencing  near  Bacoor,  the  latter  moved  rapidly  along  the 
Laguna  de  Bay,  covered  more  than  600  miles,  during  which 
he  fought  incessantly,  captured  one  entrenched  position  after 
another,  occupied  and  garrisoned  the  towns  along  his  line  of 
march,  and  swept  the  entire  country  clean.  In  consequence 
of  these  combined  operations  the  insurgent  forces  in  that 
region  were  completely  annihilated  and  dispersed  by  Feb- 
ruary 8th,  a  large  number  had  been  killed  or  captured,  and 
the  others  stole  back  to  their  homes  in  the  guise  of  unarmed 
citizens,  or  escaped  to  the  south.  Some  600  Spanish  prison- 
ers were  liberated,  and  the  country  was  so  thoroughly  "  paci- 
fied "  that  no  attempt  to  rise  against  the  Americans  was  ever 
made  again.  ^^ 

Meanwhile  an  expedition  consisting  of  the  43rd  and  47th 
Volunteer  Infantry  and  light  battery  G  of  the  3rd  Artillery. 


The  Philippine  War  .  241 

1900] 

under  Brigadier  General  Kobbe,  was  sent  from  Manila  on 
January  18tb  to  occupy  the  important  ports  situated  in  the 
Province  of  Albay  and  in  the  islands  of  Samar,  Leyte  and 
Catanduanes.  Landing  at  Sorsogan  on  the  20th,  Kobbe  per- 
formed his  mission  thoroughly,  in  spite  of  the  resistance  en- 
countered at  Legaspi  on  the  23rd.  The  Chinese  general 
Paua,  not  content  with  the  defeat  suffered  on  that  occasion, 
returned  to  the  attack  but,  after  several  unsuccessful  attemps 
to  retrieve  the  native  cause,  surrendered  himself  and  his  staff 
to  Colonel  Howe.^^ 

Another  expedition,  composed  of  some  2,300  troops  under 
Brigadier  General  J.  M.  Bell,  the  whole  under  Major  Gen- 
eral Bates,  sailed  from  Manila  on  February  15th,  occupied 
the  provinces  of  J^orth  and  South  Camarines  and  Western 
Albay,  where  the  insurgents  who  had  been  driven  from  the 
north  had  taken  refuge,  defeated  them  in  a  lively  fight  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Bicol  Biver  on  April  4th,  routed  and  dis- 
persed them,  and  captured  large  quantities  of  war  materiel.^^ 
On  March  20th  General  Bell  was  appointed  military  governor 
of  these  provinces  and  General  Kobbe  of  "  the  district  of 
Mindanao  and  Jolo  Archipelago."  ^^ 

On  that  same  day  a  third  expedition,  consisting  of  the 
40th  Volunteer  Infantry,  under  General  Bates,  was  de- 
spatched to  establish  garrisons  in  Mindanao.  Upon  reaching 
Surigaoon  on  the  27th,  the  commander  received  the  surrender 
of  the  insurrecto  General  Garcia  and  such  ordnance  as  he 
possessed,  but  the  resistance  expected  at  Gagayan  did  not  ma- 
terialize, doubtless  owing  to  the  appearance  of  American 
gunboats  and  the  promptness  with  which  General  Bates  dis- 
embarked his  command.  ^^  A  week  later  the  insurgents,  who 
had  taken  to  the  hills,  reappeared  and  made  a  night  attack 
upon  the  American  garrison,  but  after  a  hand-to-hand  fight 
were  driven  back  in  disorder,  having  killed  two  Americans 
and  w^ounded  eleven. ^^ 

During  the  year  other  expeditions  of  a  similar  character 
were  sent  to  various  Visayan  islands,  and  the  numerous  par- 


242     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

ties  of  bandits  and  insurgents  infesting  them  were  summarily 
handled  and  dispersed. ^^  As  a  result  of  these  different  oper- 
ations and  the  establishment  of  over  400  posts  throughout 
the  Philippine  Islands,  all  organized  and  open  resistance  to 
the  American  authority  ceased  forthwith;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  sprang  up  a  species  of  guerilla  warfare  closely 
akin  to  brigandage,  which  proved  infinitely  more  vexatious 
to  cope  with  and  which  continued  to  be  waged  almost  unin- 
terruptedly until  the  summer  of  1901.  The  measures  taken 
to  suppress  it  need  not  be  chronicled  here.^^  Suffice  to  say 
that  every  effort  to  that  end  was  made  by  General  MacArthur 
in  the  department  of  Northern  Luzon,  by  General  Bates  in 
Southern  Luzon,  by  General  Hughes  in  the  Visayas  and  by 
General  Kobbe  in  Mindanao  and  Jolo,  to  which  districts  these 
officers  had  been  assigned  on  April  7,  1900,  by  the  order  of 
the  War  Department  creating  those  departments  and  sup- 
planting the  Department  of  the  Pacific  by  the  Military  Divi- 
sion of  the  Philippines.^^  On  May  5,  1900,  General  Mac- 
Arthur  superseded  General  Otis  both  in  command  of  the  divi- 
sion and  as  Governor-General,^^  his  total  forces  numbering, 
on  June  30th,  2,225  officers  and  61,059  enlisted  men,^^  which 
were  increased  to  2,367  officers  and  71,727  men  by  Novem- 
ber 30th.94 

THE  PEKING  BELIEF  EXPEDITION 

The  precarious  situation  of  the  American  Legation  at  Pe- 
king and  the  complete  isolation  of  the  Minister  and  his  staff 
in  the  midst  of  the  uprising  led  by  the  Boxers  in  the  spring 
of  1900,  coupled  with  the  realisation  that  American  interests 
in  China  would  require  a  larger  land  force  for  their  protec- 
tion than  could  be  supplied  by  our  warships  on  the  Asiatic 
station,  caused  instructions  to  be  sent  on  June  16,  1900,  to 
General  MacArthur  at  Manila  to  despatch  a  regiment  of  in- 
fantry, with  the  requisite  transportation,  surgeons  and  rapid- 
fire  guns,  to  Taku  on  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  where  its  command- 
ing officer  was  to  confer  with  Rear  Admiral  Kempff  and  sub- 


The  Peking  Relief  Expedition  243 

1900] 

sequently  report  to  the  American  Minister  for  the  protection 
of  American  lives  and  property  in  China.^^ 

On  June  10th,  in  response  to  an  urgent  telegram  from  the 
various  foreign  Ministers  in  Peking,  a  relieving  force  under 
Admiral  Seymour  set  out  by  train  in  the  effort  to  reach  the 
Chinese  capital,  but  at  Tang  Ts'u  the  destruction  of  the  rail- 
way obliged  it  to  stop  in  order  to  effect  the  necessary  repairs. 
At  that  point  it  was  joined  by  re-enforcements  which  brought 
its  strength  up  to  2,066  troops,^^  and  the  column  pushed 
slowly  forward,  in  the  face  of  a  constantly  increasing  enemy. 

On  June  I7th  the  Chinese  forts  on  the  Pei-Ho  River  at 
Taku  opened  fire  against  the  European  warships,  which  im- 
mediately returned  the  bombardment  and  captured  the  forts 
by  means  of  a  landing  force. ^^  On  the  20th  Baron  von  Ket- 
teler,  the  German  Minister,  was  assassinated  on  the  way 
from  his  Legation  at  Peking  to  the  Tsung-Li-Yamen  (Foreign 
Office),  and  that  day  Admiral  Kempff  cabled  the  Secretary 
of  the  I^avy  that  in  his  opinion  one  brigade  was  necessary  to 
represent  the  United  States  suitably  in  China.  On  the  22nd 
Major  General  Chaffee  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
American  troops  destined  to  participate  in  the  joint  expedi- 
tion to  Peking,^^  but  it  was  not  until  a  month  later  that  Gen- 
eral James  H.  Wilson,  who  was  thoroughly  familiar  with 
China,  was  relieved  from  the  Department  of  Matanzas  in 
Cuba  and  ordered  to  report  as  the  second  in  command.^^  On 
June  26th  Admiral  Seymour's  relieving  force  returned  to 
Tientsin,  having  been  unable  to  get  within  twenty-five  miles 
of  the  Chinese  capital  and  barely  escaping  annihilation.-^ ^^ 
On  the  27th  the  Allied  forces  attacked  Tientsin  and  captured 
the  east  arsenal,  and  that  same  day  the  9th  Infantry  under 
Colonel  E.  H.  Liscum,  after  being  delayed  by  a  typhoon, 
sailed  from  Manila,  en  route  for  Taku.  On  July  3rd  General 
Chaffee,  together  with  his  headquarters  and  eight  troops  of 
the  6th  Cavalry,  sailed  from  San  Erancisco  in  the  transport 
Grant, ^^'^  while  Pear  Admiral  Kempff  was  instructed  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  IN^avy  to  confer  with  the  foreign  command- 


244     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

L1900 

ers  of  Taku  and  to  report  the  proportional  mimber  of  Ameri- 
can troops  required  for  a  second  expeditionary  force  to  Pe- 
king.    On  the  8th  the  Admiral  replied  by  cable 

"that  a  meeting  had  been  held;  that  about  20,000  troops  were 
ashore,  which  were  necessary  to  hold  the  position  from  Taku 
to  Tientsin,  and  that  60,000  troops  in  addition  were  required 
to  march  upon  Peking;  that  our  proportion  of  the  entire  allied 
army  should  be  about  10,000 ;  that  re-enforcements  were  expected 
within  a  month  which  would  make  the  entire  active  force  of 
other  powers  by  the  middle  of  August  40,800." 

Anticipating  this  response,  the  War  Department  had  the 
day  before  directed  that  the  14th  Infantry  (Colonel  Daggett) 
and  light  battery  F  of  the  5th  Artillery  (Captain  Reilly's) 
be  despatched  from  the  Philippines  to  Taku,  and  followed 
them  by  various  other  troops  ^^^  to  the  number  of  435  officers 
and  15,018  enlisted  men,  to  which  the  Navy  Department  pur- 
posed to  add  some  2,000  marines.  Of  this  force  between 
5,000  and  6,000  reached  China  before  the  capture  of  Pe- 
king.!^-*^ 

Some  of  the  difficulties  encountered  in  supplying  the 
American  expeditionary  forces  at  such  a  distance  ^vere  indi- 
cated by  the  Secretary  of  War  who  stated  ^^^  that 

"  While  the  climate  of  the  province  of  Chili  is  extremely  hot 
in  summer,  it  is  extremely  cold  in  winter,  and  the  river  Pei-Ho 
and  that  part  of  the  Gulf  of  Chili  upon  which  Taku  is  situated 
are  closed  to  navigation  about  the  1st  of  December  and  remain 
closed  until  late  in  the  succeeding  spring,  so  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  provide  not  only  for  the  landing  of  the  troops  with  their 
horses,  transportation,  ordnance,  and  current  supplies,  but  for 
the  delivery  in  China,  not  later  than  the  middle  of  Xovember, 
of  six  months'  supply  of  food,  ammunition,  heavy  winter  cloth- 
ing, fuel,  stoves,  lumber  for  quarters,  medical  stores,  and  sup- 
plies of  all  kinds.  Adequate  provisions  were  made  to  meet  this 
requirement. 

"  The  supply  problem  was  somewhat  complicated  by  the  fact 
that  it  was  impossible  to  discontinue  the  regular  supply  service 
for  the  army  in  the  Philippines,  in  which  our  fleet  of  transports 


The  Peking  Relief  Expedition  245 

1900] 

were  engaged;  it  was  impossible  to  withdraw  from  that  service 
a  sufficient  number  of  vessels  for  a  separate  service  to  China, 
and  there  was  not  time  to  secure  new  transports.  The  problem 
was  solved,  however,  through  the  courtesy  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, which,  upon  our  application  through  the  State  De- 
partment, in  the  most  friendly  spirit,  permitted  us  to  use  the 
port  of  Nagasaki,  where  the  lines  from  the  United  States  to 
Manila  on  the  south  and  to  Taku  on  the  north  diverged,  for 
the  transshipment  of  supplies  and  material  without  passing 
through  their  custom-house  and  for  the  transfer  of  men  (not 
carrying  arms). 

"  This  enabled  us  to  establish  a  subsidiary  service,  which,  in 
connectioii  with  the  main  service  to  and  from  this  country, 
distributed  both  men  and  materials  between  Nagasaki  and  Ma- 
nila and  between  Nagasaki  and  Taku,  practically  using  both  our 
Pacific  ports  and  Manila  as  main  bases  and  Nagasaki  as  a 
secondary  base  of  supply.  This  arrangement  was  also  very  con- 
venient and,  as  it  ultimately  proved,  very  valuable,  in  enabling 
ns  to  direct  each  organization  as  it  left  this  country  to  look 
for  orders  at  Nagasaki,  so  that  if  at  any  time  it  should  become 
apparent,  as  of  course  we  always  regarded  it  possible,  that  their 
services  were  not  needed  in  China  they  could  be  diverted  from 
Nagasaki  to  the  Philippines,  to  take  the  place  of  an  equal  num- 
ber of  volunteers.  .  .  . 

"  The  gulf  at  Taku  is  too  shallow  for  large  vessels  to  ap- 
proach within  10  miles  of  the  shore,  and  all  of  the  men,  ani- 
mals, ordnance,  and  supplies  had  to  be  transported  for  that  dis- 
tance by  lighters  or  small  boats.  They  were  much  delayed  at 
times  by  stormy  weather,  which  particularly  interfered  with  the 
landing  of  horses  and  mules.  Besides  the  small  boats  used 
in  this  service  32  large  steamships  were  employed  in  the  ocean 
transportation  required." 

On  July  3rd  General  Chaffee  sailed  from  San  Francisco, 
reaching  Taku  on  the  29th. ^^^  In  the  meantime  the  9th  In- 
fantry from  Manila  had  landed  at  Taku  on  the  6th,  and  five 
days  later  two  of  its  battalions  arrived  at  Tientsin  where,  on 
the  13th,  they  participated  in  the  battle  between  the  Allied 
forces  —  composed  of  British,  French  and  Japanese  troops  — 
and  the  Chinese.  The  continual  shelling  of  the  foreign  quar- 
ters outside  the  walls  by  the  Imperial  troops  within  the  city 


246      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[190ff 

caused  an  assault  to  be  made  upon  the  southwestern  part 
of  the  walled  city,  in  which  the  two  battalions  of  the  9th 
Infantry  w^as  assigned  to  the  brigade  under  the  British  Gen- 
eral Dorward  and  posted  on  the  flank  of  the  Allied  forces. 
For  fifteen  hours  the  American  troops,  being  in  the  front  line, 
were  exposed  to  a  severe  fire  which  resulted  in  heavy  loss, 
Colonel  Liscum  and  seventeen  men  being  killed,  while  five 
officers  and  seventeen  men  were  wounded.  ^^^  During  the 
night  they  were  withdrawn  from  their  position,  but  on  the 
following  morning  Tientsin  was  captured  and  the  American 
forces  were  assigned  to  the  duty  of  guarding  and  policing  the 
southeastern  quarter. 

The  decision  of  the  Allied  commanders  that  80,000  troops 
would  be  needed  before  a  definite  advance  could  safely  be 
undertaken  —  that  is,  20,000  to  hold  the  intervening  district 
between  Taku  and  Tientsin,  and  60,000  to  comprise  the  re- 
lief force  —  denoted  an  abandonment  of  any  expectation  of 
rescuing  the  Diplomatic  corps  in  Peking,  especially  since  it 
was  not  anticipated  that  more  than  40,800  troops  would  ar- 
rive before  the  middle  of  August,  and  since  it  had  been  de- 
termined to  postpone  any  advance  until  the  entire  80,000 
were  on  hand.  Through  the  kind  offices  of  Wu  Ting  Fang^ 
the  Chinese  Minister  at  Washington,  a  cipher  despatch  was 
forwarded  on  July  11th  to  Mr.  Conger,  the  American  Minis- 
ter at  Peking,  and  on  the  20th  the  following  response  was 
received  from  him: 

"  For  one  month  we  have  been  besieged  in  British  Legation 
under  continued  shot  and  shell  from  Chinese  troops.  Quick 
relief  only  can  prevent  general  massacre." 

This  reply  was  the  first  despatch  from  a  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative in  Peking  received  by  any  of  the  western  Powers 
for  nearly  a  month ;  but,  although  considerable  doubt  at  first 
was  cast  in  Europe  upon  its  authenticity,  the  American  Gov- 
ernment persisted  in  the  belief  as  to  its  trustworthiness,  and 
made  it  the  basis  for  urgent  pressure  upon  the  other  Powers, 


The  Peking  Belief  Expedition  247 

1900] 

with  a  view  to  an  immediate  advance  to  Peking  without  await- 
ing the  assembly  of  the  80,000  troops  contemplated. ^*^^  In 
•consequence  of  the  representations  from  Washington,  a  con- 
ference of  the  Allied  generals  ^^^  was  held  in  Tientsin  on 
August  3rd,  and,  after  a  discussion  lasting  for  five  hours,  it 
was  decided  to  push  forward  and  give  battle  next  day,^^^  de- 
spite the  rainy  season  when  the  question  of  transport  pre- 
sented difficulties  well-nigh  insuperable,  and  regardless  of  the 
heterogeneous  troops  composing  the  Allied  forces,  the  in- 
sufficiency of  their  strength  and  the  variety  of  their  equip- 
TQent.-^^^ 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  4th  the  British  and  Americans 
moved  off  in  the  direction  of  Hsiku,  thus  forming  the  van  of 
the  expeditionary  force  which  comprised  —  according  to  the 
numbers  reported  at  the  conference  the  day  before  —  8,000 
Japanese,  4,800  Russians,  3,000  British,  2,100  Americans 
^nd  800  French,  aggregating  about  18,700.  By  the  time  the 
advance  was  begun  the  Americans  had  been  re-enforced  to 
2,500,  and  on  August  9th  were  joined  by  one  troop  of  the 
'6th  Cavalry  which  had  been  delayed  by  storms  in  the  Gulf  of 
Pechili,  while  the  rest  of  the  regiment  and  detachments  from 
•others  were  left  behind  to  do  guard  duty  at  Tientsin  and 
along  the  line  of  communications.  ■'^■^^  The  American  column 
was  formed  of  Troop  M  and  a  detachment  from  Troop  L  of 
the  6th  Cavalry,  light  battery  F  (Captain  Reilly)  of  the  5th 
Artillery^  the  9th  and  14th  Infantry,  and  comprised  ninety- 
six  officers  and  1,954  enlisted  men,^^^  in  addition  to  whom 
there  was  a  battalion  of  marines  containing  twenty-nine  offi- 
cers and  453  men,^^^  thus  making  a  total  strength  of  125 
officers  and  2,407  enlisted  men.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
forces  of  the  other  Powers  turned  out  to  be  somewhat  less 
than  the  numbers  reported  on  August  third. -^-^^ 

On  the  5th  the  Chinese  ^^^  were  encountered  in  a  strongly 
-entrenched  position  intersecting  the  Pei-Ho.  The  attack  on 
the  right  bank  was  made  by  the  Japanese  on  the  right,  the 
"British  in  the  centre  and  the  Americans  on  the  left,  while  the 


248     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

Eussians  and  French  moved  by  the  left  bank.  By  9  a.  m.  the 
position  had  been  carried,  but  the  Chinese  failed  to  hold  in 
another  strong  position  at  Pei-Ts'ang  and  the  Allies  occupied 
the  town,  where  they  spent  the  night.  On  the  following  day 
an  engagement  lasting  four  hours  took  place  at  the  railway 
station  of  Yang  Ts'un,  where  the  Americans  sustained  a  loss 
of  seven  killed  and  sixty-five  wounded. ^^^  So  exhausted  were 
the  troops  by  their  marches  and  fighting  in  the  excessive  heat 
that  a  day  of  rest  was  given  them  at  Yang  Ts'un,  and  an  op- 
portunity was  afforded  to  get  up  some  much-needed  sup- 
plies.-^^^ 

On  August  8th  the  advance  was  resumed,  the  entire  force 
moving  by  the  right  bank  —  the  Japanese  in  the  van,  followed 
by  the  Russians  and  Americans,  the  British  bringing  up  the 
rear,  while  the  French  remained  at  Yang  Ts'un.-^^^ 

"  The  Japanese  were  quick  marchers  and  the  Eussians  slow, 
slouching  along  with  frequent  halts  at  a  pace  hardly  exceeding 
a  mile  an  hour,  which  greatly  embarrassed  the  Americans  in 
their  rear,  who  were  often  compelled  to  halt  on  the  sandy  plains 
in  the  hot  sun,  while  the  Russians  were  resting  in  the  umbrageous 
villages  in  front.  This  fact  was  of  importance  as  accounting 
for  the  large  number  of  casualties  which  they  suffered  from  the 
heat,  the  Americans  and  the  British  being  obliged  to  do  the 
heaviest  marching  in  the  hottest  hours  of  the  day.^^^ 

"  The  superior  organization  and  equipment  of  the  Japanese 
were  everywhere  conspicuous,  and  their  position  in  the  front  of 
the  column  gave  the  enemy  no  time  to  rally,  so  that  their  retreat 
was  in  reality  a  long  and  rapid  flight  before  the  agile  men 
from  the  Land  of  the  Eising  Sun,  who  gave  them  no  respite  and 
no  pause.  Gen.  Fukushima,  the  moving  spirit  of  the  pursuit, 
was  asked  if  his  troops  were  not  very  tired,  and  replied :  '  Yes, 
but  so  are  the  enemy.' 

"  His  plan  was  to  keep  them  on  the  run  at  all  costs,  and  it 
was  carried  through  perfectly  and  with  great  success.  His  cav- 
alry and  mounted  infantry  were  usually  pushed  ahead  about 
three  miles  in  advance  of  the  main  body  of  infantry.  When- 
ever they  got  into  touch  with  the  enemy  they  dropped  back  upon 
the  infantry,  which  was  then  extended  and  sent  forward  to  go 
thoroughly  through  all  the  villages  to  the  right  and  left  of  the 


The  Peking  Relief  Expedition  249 

1900] 

line  of  inarch.  While  the  infantry  rested  after  this,  the  cavalry 
pushed  on  again,  and  the  process,  to  the  consternation  of  the 
pursued,  was  repeated."  ^^° 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  the  Japanese  shelled  Ho  Hsi 
Wu,  where  they  had  a  slight  skirmish  and  routed  the  Chinese ; 
and  during  the  day  their  mounted  infantry  and  the  Bengal 
Lancers  dispersed  some  200  of  the  Imperial  cavalry,  captur- 
ing four  banners.  Next  day  the  bulk  of  the  expeditionary 
forces  reached  Ma  T'ou  and  on  the  11th  occupied  Chang  Chia 
Wan,  while  the  Japanese  shelled  the  enemy  out  of  his  posi- 
tion south  of  T'ung  Chou,  to  which  he  retired.  Early  next 
morning  they  advanced  to  assault  the  south  entrance  and 
blew  up  the  outer  gate  of  the  enceinte,  but  the  Chinese  had 
evacuated  .the  place  and  the  Allies  enterd  without  opposi- 
tion.^ ^^  On  the  13th  began  the  march  destined  to  cover  the 
remaining  12  miles  to  Peking  —  the  Japanese  on  the  north 
moving  by  the  road  leading  to  the  Ch'i  Hua  gate,  the  Rus- 
sians and  Americans  and  British  on  their  left  in  the  order 
named.  It  had  been  agreed  that  the  day  should  be  devoted 
to  reconnaissance  and  that  on  the  14th  the  various  columns 
were  to  concentrate  on  the  advance  line  held  by  the  Japanese, 
while  the  plan  for  the  final  attack  was  to  be  determined  at  a 
conference  that  evening.  ^^^  Instead  of  halting  in  accord- 
ance with  this  arrangement,  the  Russians  pressed  on  and  at- 
tacked the  Tung  Pien  Men  gate,  one  of  the  eastern  entrances 
to  the  city,-^^^  but  were  met  by  a  hot  fire  and  suffered  con- 
siderable loss,  including  their  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Vasi- 
lewski.  They  did  force  their  way  in,  but  were  thrown  into 
confusion  just  inside  the  gate,  and,  in  spite  of  a  heavy  fire 
from  their  guns  and  small-arms,  which  continued  throughout 
the  night,  were  unable  to  make  any  progress.  ^^^ 

On  the  morning  of  August  14th  the  Japanese  advanced  to 
the  attack  of  the  Ch'i  Hua  gate,  but  were  frustrated  by  the 
rifle  fire  from  the  wall.  A  bombardment  begun  at  10  a.  m. 
and  lasting  all  day  achieved  little  except  to  pave  the  way  for 
blowing  up  the  gate,  which  was  effected  under  cover  of  the 


250     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

darkness  and  thus  permitted  them  to  penetrate  into  the  city. 

The  Russians  were  still  in  disorder  at  the  Tung  Pien  Men 
gate  when  General  Chaffee  arrived  there  and  found  some  of 
the  14th  Infantry  and  the  American  guns  at  the  gate.^^^ 
Under  his  direction  an  entrance  was  effected,  the  Tartar 
wall  was  swept  clear  of  Chinese  troops  by  the  use  of  shrapnel 
and,  during  the  early  part  of  the  afternoon  all  opposition 
having  been  overcome,  the  advance  was  resumed  toward  the 
British  compound. -^^^ 

South  of  this  gate  some  of  the  other  American  troops  had 
achieved  a  notable  success.  "At  11  a.  m.  two  companies  of 
the  Fourteenth  Infantry,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Colonel  Daggett,  had  scaled  the  wall  of  the  Chinese  city  at 
the  northeast  corner,  and  the  flag  of  that  regiment  was  the 
first  foreign  colors  unfurled  upon  the  walls  surrounding 
Pekin."  -^^^  These  companies,  supported  by  those  facing  the 
wall,  then  drove  the  Chinese  southward  to  the  Sha  Kno  Men 
gate,  where  the  British  entered  later  in  the  day  without  any 
considerable  opposition  and,  guided  by  the  information  given 
by  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  the  British  Minister,  penetrated 
through  the  w^ater-gate  ^^^  in  spite  of  the  fire  of  the  Chinese 
riflemen,  and  quickly  reached  the  British  Legation,  where  all 
the  foreigners  had  taken  refuge  during  the  siege.^^^  It  was 
somewhat  later  when  the  American  troops  arrived,  as  they 
had  encountered  more  opposition,  were  unfamiliar  with  the 
way  to  the  water-gate  and  the  advance  companies  of  the  14th 
Infantry  had,  moreover,  been  delayed  for  two  hours  by  run- 
ning short  of  ammunition. -^^^ 

The  relief  of  the  legations  in  Peking  was  thus  successfully 
effected  with  a  comparatively  small  loss  of  177  officers  and 
men  on  the  part  of  the  American  forces. -^'^^  The  conditions 
which  greeted  them  are  thus  described  by  General  Chaffee  in 
his  report :  ^  ^^ 

"  Upon  entering  the  legations  the  appearance  of  the  people 
and   their   surroundings,   buildings,   walls,    streets,    alleys,   en- 


The  Peking  Relief  Expedition  251 

1900] 

trances,  etc.,  showed  every  evidence  of  a  confining  siege.  Barri- 
cades were  built  everywhere  and  of  every  sort  of  material,  native 
brick  being  largely  used  for  their  construction,  topped  with  sand- 
bags made  from  every  conceivable  sort  of  cloth,  from  sheets  and 
pillowcases  to  dress  materials  and  brocaded  curtains.  Many  of 
the  legations  were  in  ruins,  and  the  English,  Eussian,  and 
American,  though  standing  and  occupied,  were  filled  with  bullet 
holes  from  small  arms,  and  often  having  larger  apertures  made 
by  shell. 

^^  The  children  presented  a  pitiable  sight,  white  and  wan 
for  lack  of  proper  food,  but  the  adults,  as  a  rule,  seemed  cheer- 
ful and  little  the  worse  for  their  trying  experience,  except  from 
anxiety  and  constant  care.  They  were  living  on  short  rations, 
a  portion  of  which  consisted  of  a  very  small  piece  of  horse  or 
mule  meat  daily.  The  Christian  Chinese  were  being  fed  upon 
whatever  could  be  secured,  and  were  often  reduced  to  killing 
dogs  for  meat. 

"  All  the  surroundings  indicated  that  the  people  had  been 
closely  besieged,  confined  to  a  small  area  without  any  comforts, 
no  conveniences  and  barely  existing  from  day  to  day  in  hope  of 


succor.'^ 


On  the  following  day,  having  been  informed  by  Mr.  Con- 
ger, the  American  Minister,  that  the  Chinese  had  utilized 
that  portion  of  the  Imperial  city  in  front  of  the  Ch'i  Hua 
Men  gate  to  fire  upon  the  legations,  General  Chaffee  deter- 
mined to  force  the  Chinese  troops  from  this  position.  On  the 
morning  of  the  15th  four  guns  opened  fire  from  the  Tartar 
wall  at  that  gate,  to  which  the  Chinese  replied  with  some 
spirit,  but  their  fire  was  soon  silenced  and  two  of  the  outer 
gates  w^ere  blown  over  by  Captain  Riley's  pieces,  although 
that  officer  was  killed  by  General  Chaffee's  side.  A  vigor- 
ous pursuit  drove  the  Chinese  from  four  gates  in  rapid  suc- 
cession, but  the  advance  was  suspended  at  the  last,  which  is 
hard"by  the  grounds  of  the  Imperial  palace.  That  afternoon 
a  conference  of  the  Allied  commanders  was  held  and,  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  decision  not  to  occupy  the  Imperial  city, 
the  American  troops  were  withdrawn  from  their  advanced 
positions,  although  they  continued  to  hold  the  Ch'i  Hua  Men 


252     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1900 

gate.-^^^  ]^ext  day  the  various  Ministers  assembled  and 
strongly  urged  the  occupation  of  the  Imperial  city.  Their 
action  caused  the  generals  to  reverse  their  former  decision 
and  to  divide  the  Chinese  and  Tartar  cities  into  several  dis- 
tricts to  be  guarded  by  the  different  Allied  contingents,  the 
Americans  being  assigned  to  the  west  half  of  the  Chinese 
city  and  to  that  section  of  the  Tartar  city  situated  between 
the  Ch'i  Hua  Men  and  Shun  Chin  gates,  and  bounded  by 
the  wall  of  the  inner  or  Forbidden  city  on  the  east  and  on 
the  north  by  the  principal  east  and  west  street  of  the  Tartar 
city.  Agreeably  to  this  decision,  General  Chaffee  re-occu- 
pied the  line  he  had  gained  the  day  before  and  stationed  the 
9th  Infantry  inside  the  fourth  gate,  where  his  pursuit  had 
been  relinquished. -^^^  Troops  were  also  posted  along  the 
Pei-Ho  River  as  far  as  Tientsin,  to  safeguard  the  transport 
of  sick,  wounded  and  supplies ;  -^^^  but  it  was  not  until  August 
28th  that  contingents  from  the  Allied  forces  formally  en- 
tered the  grounds  of  the  Imperial  palace  and  took  possession 
of  the  Forbidden  City.^^e 

On  August  22nd  ^^"^  General  Chaffee's  cable  announcing 
the  relief  of  Peking  was  received  at  Washington,  and  next 
day  he  was  instructed  to  take  no  further  aggressive  action 
unless  compielled  for  defensive  reasons.  Orders  were  also 
cabled  to  Nagasaki  diverting  to  Manila  all  troops  then  en 
route  for  China,  and  on  the  25th  Chaffee  was  directed  to  hold 
his  forces  in  readiness  to  withdraw  from  Peking;  but  it  was 
not  until  a  month  later  that  he  was  instructed  to  despatch  to 
Manila  all  the  American  troops  in  China,  with  the  exception 
of  a  regiment  of  infantry,  a  squadron  of  cavalry  and  one 
light  battery,  which  were  to  be  left  in  Peking  as  a  guard  for 
the  American  Legation. ^^^  The  intervening  time^^^  was 
spent  mainly  in  punitive  expeditions  destined  to  break  up 
the  predatory  bands  of  Boxers  which  infested  the  territory 
about  the  Chinese  capital. ^^^  On  October  3rd  began  the 
withdrawal  of  the  American  troops  which  were  sent  to  the 
Philippines. 


The  Philippine  War  253 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1901 

By  far  the  most  important  of  the  laws  enacted  by  the  sec- 
ond session  of  the  Eifty-sixth  Congress  during  the  year  was 
that  of  February  2nd  entitled  "  An  Act  to  increase  the 
efficiency  of  the  permanent  military  establishment  of  the 
United  States."  ^^^  This  fixed  the  force  of  the  Army  at 
fifteen  regiments  of  cavalry,  a  corps  of  artillery  and  thirty 
regiments  of  infantry,  with  the  senior  officer  ranked  as  a 
Lieutenant  General, ^^^  thus  giving  it  a  strength  of  3,820  of- 
ficers and  96,799  enlisted  men,  a  total  of  100,619.^^^  This 
law  contained  forty-two  sections,  of  which  twenty-four  dealt 
with  organization,^  ^^  and  in  this  category  the  two  which 
marked  a  radical  innovation  in  one  branch  of  the  service  were 
as  follows : 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  regimental  organization  of  the  artillery 
arm  of  the  United  States  Army  is  hereby  discontinued,  and 
that  arm  is  constituted  and  designated  as  the  Artillery  Corps. 
It  shall  be  organized  as  hereinafter  specified  and  shall  belong 
to  the  line  of  the  Army. 

"  Sec.  4.  That  the  Artillery  Corps  shall  comprise  two 
branches  —  the  coast  artillery  and  the  field  artillery.  The  coast 
artillery  is  defined  as  that  portion  charged  with  the  care  and 
use  of  the  fixed  and  movable  elements  of  land  and  coast  forti- 
fications, including  the  submarine  mine  and  torpedo  defenses; 
and  the  field  artillery  as  that  portion  accompanying  an  army  in 
the  field,  and  including  field  and  light  artillery  proper,  horse 
artillery,  siege  artillery,  mountain  artillery,  and  also  machine- 
gun  batteries:  Provided,  That  this  shall  not  be  construed  to 
limit  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  order  coast  artil- 
lery to  any  duty  which  the  public  service  demands  or  to  prevent 
the  use  of  machine  or  other  field  guns  by  any  other  arm  of  the 
service  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War." 

Section  6  prescribed  that  the  ranging  officer  of  the  Artil- 
lery Corps  should  be  "  a  Chief  of  Artillery  who  shall  be 
selected  and  detailed  by  the  President  from  the  colonels  of 
artillery,  to  serve  on  the  staff  of  the  general  officer  com- 
manding the  Army,  and  whose  duties  shall  be  prescribed  by 


254     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

the  Secretary  of  War."  Section  7  stipulated  "  that  each 
company  of  coast  artillery  shall  be  organized  as  is  now  pre- 
scribed by  law  for  a  battery  of  artillery  '' ;  Section  8  merely 
reiterated  "  that  each  battery  of  field  artillery  shall  be  or- 
ganized as  is  now  prescribed  by  law  '^ ;  and  Section  9  pro- 
vided 

"  That  the  increase  herein  provided  shall  be  made  as  follows : 
Not  less  than  twenty  per  centum  before  July  first,  nineteen 
hundred  and  one,  and  not  less  than  twenty  per  centum  each 
succeeding  twelve  months  until  the  total  number  provided  for 
shall  have  been  attained.  .  .  .'^ 

The  question  of  vacancies  and  promotions  was  dealt  with 
in  several  sections,^  ^^  and  one  of  the  most  important  fea- 
tures of  this  measure  was  the  following: 

"  Sec.  26.  That  so  long  as  there  remain  any  officers  holding 
permanent  appointments  in  the  Adjutant-General's  Department, 
the  Inspector-General's  Department,  the  Quartermaster's  De- 
partment, the  Subsistence  Department,  the  Pay  Department,  the 
Ordnance  Department,  and  the  Signal  Corps,  including  those 
appointed  to  original  vacancies  in  the  grades  of  captain  and  first 
lieutenant  under  the  provisions  of  sections  sixteen,  seventeen, 
twenty-one,  and  twenty-four  of  this  Act,  they  shall  be  promoted 
according  to  seniority  in  the  several  grades,  as  now  provided  by 
law,  and  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  deemed  to  apply  to 
vacancies  which  can  be  filled  by  such  promotions  or  to  the 
periods  for  which  the  officers  so  promoted  shall  hold  their  ap- 
pointments, and  when  any  vacancy,  except  that  of  the  chief  of 
the  department  or  corps,  shall  occur,  which  cannot  he  filled  hy 
promotion  as  provided  in  this  section,  it  shall  he  filled  hy  detail 
from  the  line  of  the  Army,  and  no  more  permanent  appointments 
shall  he  made  in  those  departments  or  corps  after  the  original 
vacancies  created  hy  this  Act  shall  have  heen  filled.  Such  de- 
tails shall  be  made  from  the  grade  in  which  the  vacancies  exist, 
under  such  system  of  examination  as  the  President  may  from 
time  to  time  prescribe. 

''  All  officers  so  detailed  shall  serve  for  a  period  of  four  years, 
at  the  expiration  of  which  time  they  shall  return  to  duty  with 
the  line,  and  officers  helow  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  shall 


The  Philippine  War  255 

1901] 

not  again  he  eligible  for  selection  in  any  staff  department  until 
they  have  served  two  years  with  the  line. 

"  That  when  vacancies  shall  occur  in  the  position  of  chief  of 
any  staff  corps  or  department  the  President  may  appoint  to 
such  vacancies,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
officers  of  the  Army  at  large  not  below  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
colonel,  and  who  shall  hold  office  for  terms  of  four  years.  .  .  . 
Provided,  That  so  long  as  there  remain  in  service  officers  of 
any  staff  corps  or  department  holding  permanent  appointments, 
the  chief  of  such  staff  corps  or  department  shall  be  selected  from 
the  officers  so  remaining  therein." 

The  changed  conditions  resulting  from  the  inauguration 
of  this  excellent  detail  system  were  thus  provided  for: 

"  Sec.  27.  That  each  position  vacated  by  officers  of  the  line, 
transferred  to  any  department  of  the  staff  for  tours  of  service 
under  this  Act,  shall  be  filled  by  promotion  in  the  line  until  the 
total  number  detailed  equals  the  number  authorized  for  duty 
in  each  staff  department.  Thereafter  vacancies  caused  by  de- 
tails from  the  line  to  the  staff  shall  be  filled  by  officers  re- 
turning from  tours  of  staff  duty.  If  under  the  operation  of  this 
Act  the  number  of  officers  returned  to  any  particular  arm  of 
the  service  at  any  time  exceeds  the  number  authorized  by  law 
in  any  grade,  promotions  to  that  grade  shall  cease  until  the 
number  has  been  reduced  to  that  authorized.'' 

Persons  not  more  than  forty  years  of  age  were  permitted 
to  be  appointed  to  the  grades  of  first  or  second  lieutenant  in 
the  Eegular  Army,  on  condition  that  their  fitness  were  fa- 
vourably passed  upon  by  examining  boards  and  that  they 
should  take  rank  "  according  to  seniority  as  determined  by 
length  of  prior  commissioned  service."  Enlisted  men  might 
likewise  be  appointed  second  lieutenants  in  the  Regular 
Army,  "  provided  that  they  shall  have  served  one  year,  under 
the  same  conditions  now  authorized  by  law  for  enlisted  men 
of  the  Regular  Army."  ^^^ 

In  order  to  insure  that  vacancies  in  organizations  serving 
outside  the  United  States  should  be  kept  filled  with  trained 
men,  the  President  was  empowered  "  to  enlist  recruits  in 


256     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

numbers  equal  to  four  per  centum  in  excess  of  the  total 
strength  authorized  for  such  organizations/'  ^'^'^  and  he  was 
explicitly  instructed  "  to  maintain  the  enlisted  force  of  the 
several  organizations  of  the  Army  at  their  maximum  strength 
as  fixed  by  this  Act  during  the  present  exigencies  of  the 
service,  or  until  such  time  as  Congress  may  hereafter  other- 
wise direct."  -^^^  The  Secretary  of  War  was  permitted  to 
detach  such  enlisted  men  as  were  needed  for  recruiting 
duty,^^^  while  the  President  was  to  select  two  Brigadier  Gen- 
erals of  volunteers,  who  were  to  be  appointed  to  the  same 
grade  in  the  Army  and  retired.  He  was  also  to  select  a 
Brigadier  General  from  the  retired  list  of  the  Regular  Army 
^'  who  may  have  distinguished  himself  during  the  Avar  with 
Spain,  in  command  of  a  separate  army ''  and  to  appoint  him 
a  Major  General  retired.-^ ^^ 

Permission  was  also  given  for  officers,  regular  or  volunteer, 
who  have  been  honourably  discharged,  to  bear  the  title  and 
wear  on  occasions  of  ceremony  the  uniform  of  the  highest 
commission  held  by  them;  ^^^  and  officers  and  men  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  were  allowed  to  wear  the  distinctive  badges 
of  military  societies  composed  of  men  "  who  served  in  the 
armies  and  navies  of  the  United  States  during  the  Spanish- 
American  war  and  the  incident  insurrection  in  the  Philip- 
pines." -^^^ 

An  important  feature  of  this  law  was  contained  in  Section 
35,  which  directed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  have  preliminary 
examinations  and  surveys  made  of  four  sites,  ''  with  a  view 
to  the  establishment  of  permanent  camp  grounds  for  instru.c- 
tion  of  troops  of  the  Regular  Army  and  National  Guard," 
and  appropriated  $10,000  for  that  purpose.  Not  less  essen- 
tial was  the  authority  given  to  the  President  to  enlist  not 
exceeding  12,000  Philippine  natives  as  scouts,  to  be  organ- 
ized in  the  usual  military  fashion,  but  with  all  majors  and 
captains  selected  from  officers  of  the  Regular  Army.^^^  He 
was  similarly  empowered  to  organize  and  maintain  in  Porto 
Rico   a  provisional  regiment,   the  enlisted  personnel  to  be 


The  Philippine  War  257 

1901] 

composed  of  natives  of  that  island  enlisted  for  three  years/ ^* 
and  to  prescribe  the  components  of  the  army  ration. ^^^  Once 
again  was  reiterated  the  prohibition  of  "  the  sale  of  or  deal- 
ing in  beer,  wine  or  any  intoxicating  liquors  by  any  person 
in  any  post  exchange  or  canteen  or  army  transport  or  upon 
the  premises  used  for  military  purposes  by  the  United 
States  ''  -^^^ —  a  restriction  the  good  intentions  of  which  have 
only  been  excelled  hy  the  evil  effects  produced  in  fostering 
the  very  vices  that  it  was  designed  to  suppress."^ 

Aside  from  the  usual  annual  and  deficiency  appropria- 
tions for  the  RegTilar  establishment,  as  well  as  for  fortifica- 
tions and  other  works  of  defence/ ^^  the  remaining  military 
legislation  enacted  during  the  year  1901  was  confined  to  two 
measures  of  importance.  The  Act  of  February  26th  ^^^  em- 
powered the  President  to  detail 

*'  such  retired  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United 
States  as  in  his  judgment  may  be  required  for  that  purpose, 
to  act  as  instructors  in  military  drill  and  tactics  in  schools  in 
the  United  States,  where  such  instruction  shall  have  been  au- 
thorized by  the  educational  authorities  thereof,  and  where  the 
services  of  such  instructors  shall  have  been  applied  for  by  said 
authorities." 

The  Act  of  March  2nd  ^^^  dealt  with  military  justice  and, 
by  direct  mandate  or  the  amendment  of  existing  statutes, 
fixed  the  penalties  for  persons  duly  subpoenaed  but  refusing 
to  qualify  as  witnesses  before  a  court-martial,  and  required 
the  United  States  District  Attorney  to  prosecute  such  per- 
sons "  on  the  certification  of  the  facts  to  him  by  the  general 

*  The  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Root,  in  his  report  for  1902,  p.  52,  said: 
"  Referring  to  the  operation  of  section  38  of  the  act  of  February  2,  1901, 
...  7  am  convinced  that  the  general  effect  of  prohibiting  the  use  of  beer 
and  light  wines  within  the  limited  area  of  the  army  post  is  to  lead  the 
enlisted  men  to  go  out  of  the  post,  to  frequent  vile  resorts  which  cluster 
m  the  neighborhood,  to  drink  bad  whisky  to  excess,  and  to  associate 
intimately  vAth  abandoned  men  and  more  abandoned  icomen;  and  that 
the  operation  of  the  law  is  to  increase  drunkenness,  disease  of  the  most 
loathsome  kind,  insubordination  and  desertion,  and  moral  and  physical 
degeneration." 


258     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

court-martial.''  In  case  of  conviction  the  punishment  was 
to  be  $500  or  six  months'  imprisonment,  or  both.^^^  Pen- 
alties were  also  fixed  for  frauds  against  the  United  States,  ^^^ 
Army  officers  were  permitted  to  administer  oaths, ^•^^  and 
certain  courts-martial  were  prohibited  from  trying  ^^  capital 
cases  or  commissioned  officers."  ^^^  By  the  repeal  ^^'^  of 
Article  94,  Section  1342  of  the  Revised  Statutes,^  ^^  the 
United  States  was  the  last  of  the  great  nations  to  suspend 
the  restriction  that  courts-martial  should  not  sit  after  3 
p.  M.  This  regulation  —  which  had  persisted  for  centuries 
in  the  British  army  at  least  —  was  based  on  the  unwritten 
law  that  any  officer  who  was  a  gentleman  w^ould,  by  the  dic- 
tates of  custom,  be  too  much  intoxicated  at  that  hour  to 
render  impartial  justice. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  on  pages  238-239  to  the 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  on  February  19,  1900,  creating 
a  War  College  Board.  This  was  supplemented  on  November 
27,  1901,  by  General  Order  No.  155,  which  prescribed  that 

"  A  college  is  hereby  established  for  an  advanced  course  of 
professional  study  for  army  officers,  to  be  known  as  the  Army 
War  College.  Such  buildings  and  grounds  as  may  be  available 
and  necessary  will  be  assigned  to  its  use  on  the  reservation  at 
Washington  Barracks,  D.  C. 

"  The  executive  head  of  the  college  will  be  an  officer  of  the 
Army,  not  below  the  grade  of  field  officer,  who  will  be  known  as 
the  president  of  the  Army  War  College,  and  who  will  preside 
over  the  War  College  board.  A  course  of  instruction  embracing 
the  higher  branches  of  professional  study  will  be  arranged  by  the 
board,  and  this  board  will  also  prepare  and  submit  for  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Secretary  of  War  such  regulations  as  it  shall  deem 
necessary, 

"  The  officers  to  be  detailed  to  pursue  the  course  at  the  War 
College  will  be  of  two  classes : 

"  (a)  Those  who  have  been  recommended  as  distinguished 
graduates  of  the  General  Service  and  Staff  College. 

"  (b)  Such  field  officers  and  captains  as  may  be  specially 
desiguated  by  the  War  Department  for  instruction. 

"  It  is  intended  that  the  officers  who  have  uniformly  shown 


The  Philippine  War  259 

1901] 

the  greatest  interest  and  most  proficiency  in  the  theoretical  and 
practical  courses  prescribed  for  the  officers'  schools  at  posts,  the 
General  Service  and  Staff  College,  and  the  War  College  shall 
have  high  consideration  of  the  War  Department,  with  a  view  to 
the  utilization  of  their  abilities  as  military  attaches  or  on  special 
missions  abroad  and  for  the  higher  duties  of  general  staff 
work."  ^^^ 

Elsewhere  in  this  same  order  the  various  special  service 
schools  -^^^  were  mentioned,  and  it  was  announced  that 

"  The  AVar  College  shall  be  tinder  the  immediate  direction 
of  a  board  of  five  members  detailed  from  the  Army  at  large  and 
the  following  ex-officio  members: 

'^  The  Chief  of  Engineers. 

''  The  Chief  of  Artillery. 

"  The  superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy. 

"  The  commanding  officer  of  the  General  Service  and  Staff 
College. 

"  The  War  College  Board  shall  exercise  general  supervision 
and  inspection  of  all  the  different  schools  above  enumerated, 
and  shall  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  maintaining  through  them 
a  complete  system  of  military  education,  in  which  each  separate 
school  shall  perform  its  proper  part.  Such  officers  as  shall 
be  requisite  to  assist  the  board  in  performing  its  duties  will  be 
detailed  from  time  to  time  for  that  purpose.  It  should  be  kept 
constantly  in  mind  that  the  object  and  ultimate  aim  of  all  this 
preparatory  work  is  to  train  officers  to  command  men  in  war. 
Theory  must  not,  therefore,  be  allowed  to  displace  practical  ap- 
plication." ^^^ 

This  scheme  of  such  an  institution  evidently  commended 
itself  to  Congress  insomuch  as  the  Appropriation  Act  of 
March  2,  1901,  "  for  the  support  of  the  Army  for  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  two  "  set 
apart  $10,000  "  for  the  continuance  of  the  Army  War  Col- 
lege, having  for  its  object  the  direction  and  co-ordination  of 
the  instruction  in  the  various  service  schools,  extension  of 
the  opportunities  for  investigation  and  study  in  the  Army 
and  militia  of  the  United  States,  and  the  collection  and  dis- 
semination of  military  information.''  ^^^ 


260     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

THE  PHILIPPINE  WAH  (Continued) 

It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  year  1900  wit- 
nessed a  complete  cessation  of  open  resistance  to  American 
authority  on  the  part  of  the  insurgents,  but  that  organized 
opposition  was  superseded  by  a  most  annoying  guerilla  war- 
fare, difficult  in  the  extreme  to  repress.  ^^^  The  four  hun- 
dred posts  established  in  that  year  were  augmented  in  1901 
to  502  stations  located  at  all  the  important  towns  and  strate- 
gic points  in  the  archipelago.  ■'^^■^  Obviously  such  funds 
and  supplies  as  were  procured  by  the  banditti  emanated  from 
the  towns  and  the  districts  in  the  vicinity  of  their  operations. 
A  mistaken  policy  dictated  that  the  persons  assisting  to  sup- 
port these  roving  bands  should  be  subjected  to  no  inter- 
ference, and  prisoners  taken  in  battle  were  merely  disarmed 
and  forthwith  liberated.  Ear  from  having  the  desired  ef- 
fect, this  policy  served  merely  to  increase  the  distrust  of  the 
natives  —  who  regarded  it  as  an  evidence  of  weakness  on  the 
part  of  the  Americans  —  and  it  was  accordingly  found  im- 
perative to  apply  with  considerably  more  rigour  to  the  Eili- 
pinos  the  laws  relating  to  the  government  and  control  of  occu- 
pied territory.  ^"^  Due  notice  of  this  purpose  was  given  by  a 
proclamation  issued  on  December  20,  1900,  by  General  Mac- 
Arthur  as  the  Military  Governor  of  the  Philippines, ^^^  and 
instructions  were  sent  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the  vari- 
ous departments  to  distribute  this  proclamation  "  as  expedi- 
tiously and  extensively  as  possible."  -^^^  That  the  error  of 
employing  consideration  in  a  warfare  waged  against  a  bar- 
baric or  semi-civilized  people  had  been  realized,  and  that  the 
military  authorities  had  at  last  learned  the  proper  method  of 
dealing  with  such  a  situation  is  attested  by  the  declaration 
of  the  division  commander  to  his  subordinates,  stating  that 

"  whenever  action  is  necessary  the  more  drastic  the  application 
the  better,  provided  only  that  unnecessary  hardships  and  per- 
sonal indignities  shall  not  be  imposed  upon  persons  arrested  and 
that  the  laws  of  war  are  not  violated  in  any  respect  touching 
the  treatment  of  prisoners."  ^^^ 


The  Philippine  War  261 

1901] 

The  inauguration  of  this  new  policy  Avas  accompanied  by 
decidedly  more  vigorous  military  operations,  and  orders  were 
issued  that  all  prisoners  of  war  captured  in  the  field  or  ar- 
rested in  towns  were  to  be  held  in  custody  until  the  close  of 
hostilities,  whereas  all  men  who  surrendered  themselves  were 
immediately  to  be  disarmed  and  released.^ '^'^  These  steps 
were  followed  during  the  month  of  January,  1901,  by  the 
deportation  to  the  island  of  Guam  of  some  fifty  prominent 
Filipinos,  insurgent  army  officers,  agents,  sympathisers,  agi- 
tators and  civil  officials.^  ^''^ 

The  operations  in  the  field  were  conducted  with  com- 
mendable energy  throughout  the  entire  archipelago, -^^^  and 
the  value  of  the  502  stations  established  was  manifest  from 
the  advantage  derived  from  them  as  secondary  or  advanced 
bases.  It  is  probable  that  each  department  commander  could 
have  said  with  as  much  truth  as  did  Brigadier  General  J. 
Franklin  Bell  of  the  First  District  of  ISTorthern  Luzon : 

"  I  have  worked  the  troops  as  hard  as  possible  —  they  have 
penetrated  the  mountains,  over  almost  impassable  trails  to  places 
Spanish  troops  never  went,  and  everything  has  been  accomplished 
that  could  be  done  with  the  means  at  my  disposal."  ^^^ 

Of  the  military  events  of  the  year  the  most  important  was 
the  capture  of  Aguinaldo,  who  had  baffled  every  effort  until 
he  was  taken  prisoner  as  the  result  of  a  plan  devised  and 
masterfully  executed  by  the  commander  of  the  Fourth  Dis- 
trict of  the  Department  of  Northern  Luzon.  This  notable 
exploit  is  thus  briefly  described  in  the  "  Summary  of  the 
principal  events  connected  with  military  operations  in  the 
Philippine  Islands,  September  1,  1900,  to  June  30,  1901," 
under  the  date  of  March  25th:  ^^^ 

''  Brig.  Gen.  Frederick  Funston,  IJ.  S.  Y.,  with  Capt.  T.  Haz- 
zaid,  Eleventh  Cavalry,  U.  S.  V.,  Capt.  Ilarrv  W.  Newton, 
Thirty-fourth  Infantry,  U.  S.  V.,  Lieut.  0.  P.  M.  Hazzard, 
Eleventh  Cavalry,  U.  S.  Y.,  Lieut.  B.  J.  Mitchell,  Fortieth  In- 
fantry, U.  S.  Y.,  and  78  Macabebe  scouts,  having  landed  near 


262     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

Baler,  on  the  east  coast  of  Luzon,  March  14,  1901,  and  marched 
inland  northeast  nearly  600  miles  to  Palanan,  province  of  Isabela, 
Luzon,  P.  L,  surprises  and  captures  the  insurgent  commander 
in  chief,  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  most  of  his  staff  and  escort  of  40 
men.  After  a  time  the  command  with  its  prisoners  marches  to 
Palanan  Bay,  where  the  U.  S.  S.  VicJcshurg  is  met,  and,  going 
aboard,  sails  for  Manila,  where  it  arrived  this  date." 

A  full  report  of  this  feat  was  made  by  General  Funston 
on  May  6,  1901,-^^^  but  even  more  interesting  to  the  la^Tiian 
is  the  graphic  description  given  in  his  article  entitled  '^  The 
Capture  of  Aguinaldo,"  which  appeared  in  Scrihners  Maga- 
zine for  November,  1911. 

The  capture  of  Aguinaldo  was  the  signal  for  the  complete 
collapse  of  the  Filipino  resistance,  particularly  since  he  is- 
sued a  proclamation  of  his  own  accord,  on  April  19th,  calling 
upon  his  fellow-countrymen  to  desist  from  their  struggle 
since  "  the  complete  termination  of  hostilities  and  a  lasting 
peace  are  not  only  desirable  but  absolutely  essential  to  the 
welfare  of  the  Philippines."  ^^^  As  Dr.  Worcester  declares, 
this  announcement  doubtless  hastened  the  end  of  the  war  but 
it  did  not  lead  to  immediate  surrender. ^^^  Within  a  short 
time,  however,  such  prominent  insurgent  leaders  as  Tinio, 
Aglipay,  Trias  and  Cailles  had  been  taken  prisoners,^^*  al- 
though Malvar  in  Batangas  (Southern  Luzon)  and  Lukban 
in  Samar  managed  to  hold  out  until  the  following  year,  in 
spite  of  the  vigorous  campaign  conducted  against  the  former 
by  General  J.  Franklin  Bell  and  against  the  latter  by  Gen- 
eral Frederick  D.  Grant.-^^^  Nevertheless  so  effectually  had 
the  insurrection  being  suppressed  elsewhere  that,  on  June  21^ 
1901,  President  McKinley  issued  an  order  directing  that  on 
and  after  July  4th  "  the  president  of  the  Philippine  Commis- 
sion will  exercise  the  executive  authority  in  all  civil  affairs, 
in  the  government  of  the  Philippine  Islands  heretofore  exer- 
cised by  the  military  governor  of  the  Philippines,"  and  ap- 
pointed Hon.  William  H.  Taft  the  Civil  Governor.  Inso- 
much as  the  military  was  to  give  away  to  a  civil  regime, — 


The  Philippine  War  263 

1901] 

"  The  military  governor  of  the  Philippines  is  hereby  relieved 
from  the  performance,  on  and  after  the  fourth  day  of  July, 
of  the  civil  duties  hereinbefore  described,  but  his  authority  will 
continue  to  be  exercised  as  heretofore  in  those  districts  in  which 
insurrection  against  the  authority  of  the  United  States  con- 
tinues to  exist  or  in  which  public  order  is  not  sufficiently  restored 
to  enable  provincial  civil  government  to  be  established  under  the 
instructions  to  the  Commission,  dated  April  7,  1900/'  ^®® 

July  4,  1901,  accordingly  marked  the  official  termination 
of  hostilities  in  the  Philippine  War.  On  that  same  day 
Judge  Taft  was  inaugurated  as  Civil  Governor,  and  General 
Chaffee  succeeded  General  MacArthur  in  command  of  the 
Military  Division  and  as  Military  Governor. ^^^ 

How  efficient  the  latter  had  been  in  the  conduct  of  affairs 
during  the  preceding  year  is  attested  by  the  fact  that 

"  The  operations  of  the  field  forces  were  so  vigorous  and  un- 
relenting that  more  than  1,000  contacts  occurred  between  our 
troops  and  the  insurgents  from  May,  1900,  to  June  30,  1901, 
in  which  the  insurgent  casualties  were :  Killed,  3,854;  wounded, 
1,193;  captured,  6,572;  surrendered,  23,095;  with  a  total  of 
15,693  rifles  and  nearly  300,000  rounds  of  small-arms  ammuni- 
tion captured  and  surrendered.  Our  casualties  during  the  same 
period  were:  Killed,  245;  wounded,  490;  captured,  118;  miss- 
ing, 20.''  i8« 


As  Secretary  Root  pertinently  stated :  -^ 


89 


"  These  field  operations  were  prosecuted  notwithstanding  the 
withdrawal  from  the  Philippines  and  return  to  the  United  States 
of  the  volunteer  army,  comprising  1  regiment  of  cavalry  and 
25  regiments  of  infantry,  a  total  of  nearly  1,400  officers  and 
29,000  enlisted  men,  whose  transfer  across  8,000  miles  of  sea 
to  San  Francisco,  where  they  were  mustered  out  of  service  as 
required  by  law,  was  accomplished  without  loss." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  volunteer  force  sent  home  between 
January  28  ^^^  and  June  5,  1901,  numbered  1,356  officers 
and  28,797  men.  They  were  replaced  by  regulars  to  the 
amount  of  only  89  officers  and  8,146  men,^^^  so  that  on  June 


264     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1901 

30th  the  actual  strength  of  the  American  troops  in  the  Philip- 
pines was  only  47,742  officers  and  men/^^  as  against  74,094 
in  the  preceding  J^ovember,^  ^^  and  by  the  end  of  ^November, 
1901,  it  was  further  reduced  to  43,239.^^^ 

The  suppression  of  the  Philippine  insurrection  was 
achieved  with  a  loss  among  the  American  forces  during  the 
period  from  February  4,  1899,  to  June  30,  1901,  amounting 
to  330  officers  and  6,746  enlisted  men,  killed,  wounded  or 
died.195 

In  the  Philippine  War  the  United  States  was  compelled 
to  use  76,416  Regular  troops  ^^^  and  50,052  volunteers  -^^^ 
against  native  insurgents  whose  numbers  cannot  be  estimated 
even  approximately.  This  war  cost  $170,326,586.11,^^^  and 
the  pensions,  taken  in  conjunction  with  those  paid  for  the 
Spanish-American  War,  amounted  on  June  30,  1914,  to  no 
less  than  $46,092,740.47.^^^ 


CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  PHILIPPIXE  WAR 

CONSIDERING  the  magnitude  of  the  task  involved  in 
the  suppression  of  an  insurrection  in  an  archipelago 
like  that  of  the  Philippines,  the  inhabitants  of  which  num- 
bered some  7,000,000  persons,^  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
abundant  reason  to  declare  that  he  could  not 

"  speak  too  highly  of  the  work  of  the  army  in  the  Philippines. 
The  officers  and  men  have  been  equal  to  the  best  requirements, 
not  only  of  military  service,  but  of  civil  administration  with 
which  they  were  charged  in  all  its  details  from  the  date  of  our 
occupancy  in  August,  1898,  until  the  inauguration  of  a  civil 
governor  on  the  4th  of  July,  1901."  ^ 

The  reason  for  the  efficiency  of  the  American  forces  is 
not  far  to  seek.  In  this  war  the  United  States  employed  a 
larger  percentage  of  Regular  troops  than  in  any  other  war 
in  its  history.  Apart  from  this  important  fact,  the  Volun- 
teer force  created  by  the  Act  of  March  2,  1899,  was  by  all 
odds  the  best  of  its  sort  ever  raised.  The  factors  which 
made  it  so  extraordinarily  effective  have  already  been  set 
forth  on  pages  227-228,  and  need  not,  accordingly,  be  reiter- 
ated here.  In  no  sense  was  it  composed  of  raw  troops  —  as  a 
matter  of  fact  it  was  mainly  officered  by  regulars  or  those 
who  had  acquitted  themselves  with  credit  during  the  Span- 
ish-American War;  the  enlisted  personnel  was  as  near  phy- 
sically perfect  as  elimination  could  make  it,  and  the  majority 
of  the  men  had  had  exceptional  training  previously.  This 
force  may  therefore  be  taken  as  a  model  of  its  kind,  and  can 
under  no  circumstances  be  put  in  the  category  with  the  class 
of  raw  troops  who  usually  comprise  the  volunteers. 

Sufficient  allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  dearth  of 

265 


266     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

trained  soldiers  at  the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection,  resulting 
from  the  customary  procrastination  of  Congress  until  the 
eleventh  hour;  and  it  has  been  seen  that,  in  consequence,  the 
first  of  the  newly-created  volunteer  regiments  did  not  reach 
the  Philippines  until  more  than  eight  months  after  the  war 
began,^  and  the  last  did  not  arrive  until  January  25,  1900  — 
almost  one  year  after  the  commencement  of  the  insurrec- 
tion.^ War,  properly  conducted,  is  the  most  drastic  and 
brutal  of  human  undertakings,  but  so  obsessed  was  our  Gov- 
ernment with  the  idea  of  "  benevolent  assimilation  '^  and  so 
loath  to  use  the  "  mailed  fist "  that  it  was  not  until  Decem- 
ber 20,  1900,  that  really  drastic  measures  were  inaugurated. 
As  a  result  of  the  relentless  operations  of  the  American 
forces  in  the  field,  "  by  April  1,  1901,  it  became  apparent  that 
the  insurrection  was  rapidly  approaching  complete  col- 
lapse," ^  and  it  is  undoubtedly  fortunate  that  this  desidera- 
tum was  on  the  eve  of  accomplishment  since  the  War  De- 
partment, as  early  as  December  11,  1900,  ordered  General 
MacArthur  to  "  start  home  volunteer  regiments,"  ^  and  six- 
teen days  later  cabled  him,  '^  We  must  push  this  movement, 
otherwise  [there]  will  be  trouble  getting  volunteers  home."  '^ 
It  is  not  difficult  to  read  between  the  lines  that  the  War  De- 
partment, influenced  possibly  by  having  been  compelled, 
nolens  volens,  to  retain  the  volunteers  raised  in  1898  in 
service  long  after  their  terms  of  enlistment  had  legally  ex- 
pired, was  resolved  that  there  should  be  no  repetition  of  such 
a  course  with  respect  to  the  Philippine  volunteers,  who  were 
to  be  mustered  out  on  July  1,  1901,  according  to  the  express 
provision  of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1899,  creating  them.  In 
conformity  with  his  instructions.  General  MacArthur  sent  off 
the  37th  Volunteer  Infantry  in  the  transport  Sheridan  on 
January  10th,  the  36th  Volunteers  in  the  Pennsylvania  on 
January  28th,  and  the  11th  Volunteer  Cavalry  in  the  Meade 
on  February  1,  1901.^  About  every  fortnight  thereafter  a 
volunteer  regiment  was  despatched  to  San  Francisco,^  so  that 


The  Lessons  of  the  Philippine  War  267 

the  last  regiment  left  Manila  on  May  5th.  ^^  As  early  as 
January  9th  General  MacArthur  warned  the  War  Depart- 
ment that  after  May  1st  it  would  only  be  safe  to  send  away 
the  volunteers  if  replaced  by  Regulars, ^^  and  the  straits  to 
which  the  military  authorities  were  put  to  find  the  necessary 
number  of  Regulars  is  attested  by  the  following  cable  sent 
by  Adjutant-General  Corbin  on  January  29,  1901,  to  General 
Leonard  Wood  at  Havana: 

"  Secretary  of  War  is  desirous  to  know  if  you  can  give  your 
consent  to  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Tenth  Infantry  from 
Cuba.  The  long  delay  in  passage  of  the  army  hill  makes  it 
imperative  that  we  have  imm^ediate  use  of  every  available  com,- 
pany  we  can  lay  our  hands  on  for  service  in  the  Philippines. 
Secretary  [of]  War  very  much  desires  if  possible  that  you  can 
see  your  way  clear  to  recommend  the  withdrawal  of  this  regiment 
at  once."  ^^ 

Thus  was  afforded  a  fresh  instance  of  Congressional  folly 
in  limiting  the  term  of  enlistment  instead  of  making  it 
''  for  the  war/'  Had  the  Philippine  insurrection  in  the 
bulk  of  the  archipelago  not  been  crushed  at  the  time  when 
It, was,  and  had  it  been  prolonged  until  1902,  as  was  the 
resistance  in  Batangas  and  Samar,  the  Government  would- 
have  found  itself  in  the  same  unenviable  predicament  as  in 
1899,  and  very  hard  put  to  find  an  adequate  number  of 
trained  soldiers  to  respond  to  the  demands,  not  only  in  the 
Philippines,  but  in  Cuba  and  various  insular  possessions. 
The  inadequacy  of  our  Army  was  again  made  manifest, 
and  such  was  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  a  sufficiency  of  re- 
cruits for  the  Regulars  in  the  Philippines  that  General 
MacArthur  recommended  a  bounty  of  $250  as  an  induce- 
ment to  volunteers  to  join  the  Army  in  those  islands. -^^ 

The  conduct  of  the  Philippine  War  was  marked  by  more 
than  one  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  War  Department. 
Among  them  was  the  failure  to  notify  the  commanding  offi- 
cers far  enough  ahead  of  the  departure  of  their  troops  —  with 


268      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

the  result  that  a  most  unnecessary  amount  of  supplies  was 
accumulated  at  certain  points,  deteriorated  rapidly  in  the 
tropical  climate,  and  either  had  to  be  shipped  back  to  the 
United  States  or  condemned  and  sold  for  a  mere  song.^^ 


/.'- 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  LESSONS  OF  OUR  PAST  WARS 

THE  various  wars  waged  by  the  United  States  from 
the  Revolution  down  to,  and  including,  the  Philip- 
pine War  have  been  characterised  by  certain  conspicuous 
blunders  from  a  military  standpoint.  At  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  the  Government  has  found  itself  seriously  em- 
barrassed for  the  ensuing  reasons: 

First :  The  Regular  Army  has  invariably  been  too  small 
to  cope  with  the  situation  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  a 
reasonable  assurance  of  success. 

Second:  Never  once  has  the  Army  been  properly  or- 
ganized, nor  has  it  been  so  constituted  that,  when  war  was 
recognized  to  be  inevitable,  it  could  be  automatically  ex- 
panded to  the  requisite  strength. 

Third :  No  proper  reserves  have  ever  existed  from  which 
could  be  drawn  the  trained  men  necessary  to  raise  the  Reg- 
ular Army  to  war  strength. 

Fourth :  In  consequence  of  a  total  lack  of  such  reserves, 
the  Army  has  almost  invariably  been  compelled  to  accept 
such  recruits  as  offered  themselves.  These  recruits  have,  as 
a  rule,  been  deficient  in  training  and  therefore  below  the 
standard  of  the  soldiers  already  in  the  Regular  service.  Not 
only  has  the  requisite  number  been  rarely  obtained  but,  in 
proportion  as  they  have  been  incorporated  into  the  Army, 
their  inferiority  has  necessarily  diminished  in  value  of  the 
Army  as  a  fighting  force  until  sufficient  training  could  be 
given  them  to  bring  them  up  to  the  standard  of  the  profes- 
sional soldier. 

Fifth:     The  policy  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to 

269 


270     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

the  length  of  enlistments  has  uniformly  been  the  very  in- 
carnation of  folly.     Rare   indeed  have   been  the   occasions 
when  they  have  not  been  for  too  short  a  term  of  service,  and 
so  seldom  has  Congress  displayed  the  wisdom  of  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  enthusiasm  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  to 
prescribe  that  all  enlistments  shall  be  FOR  THE  WAR  that  the 
instances   are   conspicuously   unique.     As   a   result   of   this 
failure,   troops,   which  after  long  periods  of  training  have 
developed  into  dependable  forces,  have  had  to  be  discharged ; 
generals  in  the  field  have  been  forced  to  act  in  opposition  to 
military  sense  or  been  greatly  embarrassed  in  their  opera- 
tions; the  War  Department  has  had  to  resort  to  innumer- 
able shifts  to  extricate  itself  from  the  difficulties  into  which 
it  was  plunged  by  approaching  or  actual  expiration  of  en- 
listments; and  more  than  once  our  national  destinies  have^ 
been  imperilled  by  the  depletion  of  armies  from  this  cause 
at  the  very  time  when  troops  were  most  imperatively  needed.  ^^     - 
GDhe  whole  question  was  admirably  summarized  by  Wash-  ^S^ 
ington   in   a   letter  —  hitherto   unpublished  —  addressed   to 
Fielding  Lewis,   Esq.,   and  dated   "  Peaks-kill,   28th   June, 
1781,"  in  which  he  said: 

"  I  lament  most  sincerely  the  system  of  policy  which  has 
been  but  too  generally  adopted  in  all  the  States,  to  wit,  tjwct  of 
temporary  expedients ;  which  like  quack  medicin^S'-^cfe  so  far 
from  removing  the  causes  of  complaint  tljjxitKey  only  serve  to 
increase  the  disorder.  This  has  m  -a'most  rem/irkahle  manner, 
been  the  case  with  respect  to  short  enlistments ;  ivhich  has  been 
the  primary  cause  of  all  our  misfortunes  —  all  our  expenses 
(which  may,  through  a  thousand  different  channels,  be  traced 
up  to  this  source)  —  and  of  the  calamities  which  Virginia,  the 
two  Carolinas  &  Georgia  now  groan  under.''  ^ 

And  the  United  States  has  groaned  under  this  system  of  too 
short  enlistments  in  war  from  that  day  to  the  close  of  the 
Philippine  insurrection. 

Sixth:  Invariable  failure  to  increase  the  Regular  Army 
until  the  eve,  and  frequently  after  the  beginning,  of  hostili- 


The  Lessons  of  Our  Past  Wars  271 

tieSj  with  the  result  that  it  has  rarely  attained  its  full  au- 
thorized strength  during  the  war. 

Seventh:  Persistent  neglect,  until  the  Spanish-American 
War,  to  keep  the  organizations  at  the  front  up  to  their  full 
war  strength,  while  new  and  untrained  regiments  were 
either  substituted  for,  or  used  to  increase,  the  armies  in  the 
field. 

Eighth:  Incessant  use  of  bounties,  both  State  and  na- 
tional, down  to  the  close  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  —  the 
logical  result  of  short  enlistments,  the  dearth  of  proper  meth- 
ods of  recruiting,  and  the  failure  to  enlist  FOR  THE  WAR 
only. 

Ninth:  Too  great  a  dependence  placed  upon  raw  troops 
and  neglect  to  set  a  proper  standard  for  them  until  the 
Philippine  War.  This  was  the  case  with  respect  to  the 
militia  used  even  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  and  the  volun- 
teers accepted  during  the  Spanish-American  War.  In  the 
Philippine  War,  however,  the  volunteer  army  created  under 
the  Act  of  1899  was  so  closely  akin  to  Regulars  in  many  re- 
spects that  it  proved  immeasurably  superior  to  any  similar 
force  we  have  ever  organized. 

Tenth:     The  needless  protraction  of  all  our  great  wars- 
down  to  1898,  owing  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  troops  em- 
ployed. 

Eleventh:  The  appalling  expense  caused  by  the  unneces- 
sarily large  number  of  troops  under  pay  until  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  the  wanton  waste  resulting  from  lack  of 
discipline,  and  the  heavy  losses  from  sickness  which  are  in- 
evitable among  raw  troops.  These  last  two  facts  were  abun- 
dantly demonstrated  in  the  various  camps  established  dur- 
ing our  '^  toy  war  "  with  Spain. 

Twelfth:  The  persistent  failure  of  Congress  to  realize 
that,  in  a  military  system  combining  the  use  of  Regulars  and 
volunteers  or  militia,  men,  in  the  absence  of  compulsion  or 
strong  inducement,  will  invariably  enlist  in  the  organization 
most  lax  in  discipline. 


272      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Thirteenth:  Uniform  neglect  to  provide  heforehand  for 
the  requisite  equipment  of  the  number  of  troops  likely  to  be 
called  into  service  during  the  war. 

Fourteenth :  Lack  of  a  General  Staff,  which  can  alone 
formulate  a  definite  military  policy  and  proper  plans  of 
campaign  to  be  inaugurated  at  the  beginning  of  war,  and 
thus  prevent  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  iliadequate  and 
costly  makeshifts  often  imperilling  the  chances  of  success. 

Fifteenth:  The  total  inability  of  Congress  and  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  comprehend  that  military  resources  can  only  he 
utilized  to  best  advantage  by  the  central  Government  to  which 
the  entire  nation  owes  paramount  allegiance ;  that  war  cannot 
be  conducted  with  that  degree  of  efficiency  which  the  people 
have  a  right  to  demand  in  return  for  their  sacrifices  unless 
the  Government  wields  its  power  despotically ;  and  that  any 
delegation  of  that  power  to  the  States  must  obviously  weaken 
the  national  military  strength  and  correspondingly  increase 
the  national  expenditures  beyond  all  justification. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
CITIZl:X-SOLDIERY 

WE  Americans  are  prone  to  boast  that  whatever  we 
possess  is  the  '^  finest  in  the  world,"  and  we  gloat 
with  a  pride  often  offensive  over  the  marvellous  achieve- 
ments of  our  national  career.  Superficiality  —  which  is  a 
dominant  American  trait  —  has  caused  us  to  slumber  under 
a  fictitious  security  and  to  flatter  ourselves  that,  because  we 
have  fortunately  been  victorious  in  our  past  wars,  we  may 
dismiss  any  apprehension  as  to  the  future.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  with  its  policy  of  non-interference  in  European 
politics  and  its  dogma  that  European  Powers  shall  not 
meddle  in  the  affairs  of  this  hemisphere,  has  contributed  to 
imbue  us  with  a  provincial  standpoint  from  which  even  the 
Spanish- American  War  and  our  sudden  development  into  a 
^^  World  Power  "  have  as  yet  been  unable  to  divest  us  en- 
tirely. Animated  by  the  deeply-rooted  Anglo-Saxon  repug- 
nance to  a  large  standing  army  and  to  anything  which  smacks 
of  militarism  in  the  remotest  degree,  we  as  a  people  cling 
with  incredible  tenacity  to  the  preposterous  fallacy  that  an 
American  with  a  rifle  in  his  hand  and  a  uniform  on  his  back 
is  fully  equal,  if  not  vastly  superior,  to  the  trained  soldier 
of  other  nations  both  in  courage  and  efficiency.  That  w^e 
have  thus  far  weathered  the  storms  to  which  the  American 
Ship  of  State  has  been  exposed  seems  to  us  to  afford  ample 
reason  why  we  should  content  ourselves  with  the  same  course 
that  we  have  steered  in  the  past,  utterly  oblivious  to  the  fact 
that  the  w^orld  is  constantly  progressing  in  military  matters 
and  that  we  have  apparently  tried  to  forget  every  lesson 
which  we  ought  to  have  learned  by  our  own  experience  in 
former  wars. 

273 


274     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Through  the  parsimony  and  short-sightedness  of  Con- 
gress, our  Eegular  Army  has  invariably  been  much  too  small 
to  meet  our  requirements  in  time  of  war  —  and,  indeed, 
often  in  time  of  peace  —  so  that  it  has  always  been  neces- 
sary to  depend  largely  upon  the  militia  and  volunteers. 
"  Why  not  ? ''  the  opinionated  American  will  reply  with 
characteristic  superficiality.  "  Have  we  not  always  had 
plenty  of  them  at  our  disposal?  And,  surely,  no  one  could 
ask  for  better  soldiers  than  these  same  militia  and  volun- 
teers were  at  the  close  of  the  War  of  the  Eebellion."  Grant- 
ing that  it  would  be  impossible  to  find  more  efficient  troops 
than  those  which  the  United  States  possessed  in  1865,  we 
must  not  forget  that  they  were  then  militia  and  volunteers 
in  name  only.  Four  years  of  desperate  fighting  had  "trans- 
formed them  from  extremely  raw  recruits  into  seasoned  vet- 
erans of  the  very  highest  type.  We  must,  furthermore,  dis- 
tinctly remember  that  the  opposing  forces  developed  at  about 
the  same  rate;  that  we  have  never  yet  been  pitted  agahwt 
the  land  forces  of  a  first-class  military  Power;  and  that  it  is 
highly  improbable  that  any  great  nation  in  the  future  will 
ever  oppose  us  with  an  army  which  is  not  trained  to  the 
highest  degree. 

We  Americans  have  achieved  our  phenomenal  successes 
by  the  application  of  sound  business  foresight  and  judg- 
ment, joined  with  progressive  business  methods,  to  the  vari- 
ous problems  which  we  have  undertaken  to  solve,  and  it  is 
consequently  surprising  that  our  people  have  not,  through 
their  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress,  made  use  of 
the  same  methods  in  dealing  w^ith  their  land  forces.  By 
tabulating  the  figures,  the  majority  of  which  have  already 
been  given,  it  can  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the  table  on  the  next 
page  what  our  wars  have  entailed  in  men  and  money. 

Probably  not  one  American  in  a  hundred  thousand  has 
any  conception  of  the  outrageous  extravagance  in  men  and 
money  that  has  characterised  almost  every  war  in  which  we 
have    engaged.     From    a    purely    business    standpoint,    the 


Citizen-Soldiery 


275 


Militia, 

War 

Regrulars 

Volunteers, 
etc. 

Opponents 

Cost 

Pensions 

Revolution 

231.771 

164,087 

About        150.605 

S  350,000,000.00 

$    70,000,000.001 

1812 

56,032 

471,622 

67,000 

86,627,009.14 

45.950.546.862 

Creek 
Seminole 

6003 

S  About 
/  1,0006 

43,9214 
5,9116 

2.0005 
1,0007 

Unestimated 
8,004,236.538 

=-  See  footnote!  ■* 

Black  Hawk 

1,3419 

4,6389 

S  Between 

?  800  and  1,00010 

5,446,034.8811 

Florida 
Mexican 

12,53912 
31,024 

48,15212 
73,532 

5  Between 
n,200  and  2,0001  3 

About          46,000 

69,751,611.5012 
88,500,208.38 

48,693,102.181  & 

Of  the 
Rebellion 

Spanish 

67,000 

58,688 

2,606,341 
223,235 

1,000,000 
228,160 

5,371,079,778.28 
321,833,254.7617 

4,457,974,496.001  & 

} 

Philippine 

76,416 

50,052 

Unestimated 

170,326,586.1118 

^'        46,092,740.471  T 

1  See  page  40,  and  authorities  on  page  574,  footnotes  6,  7,  8,  9  and  10. 

2  See  page  69,  and  page  590,  footnotes  142,  143,  144  and  145. 

3  39th   U.    S.    Infantry. 

4  According  to  the  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  Office,  Georgia,  Tennessee 
and  Mississippi  furnished  25,779,  and  North  and  South  Carolina  18,142  militia. 
Of  these  only   15,000   were  actually  put  into  the  field. 

5  Upton,   p.    119. 

6  In  a  letter  to  the  author  of  this  book,  dated  April  22.  1915,  The  Adjutant- 
General  cited  the  detailed  statement  compiled  from  the  muster  rolls  and  pub- 
lished in  the  American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  vol.  II,  p.  104,  showing 
a  force  of  5,911  volunteers,  militia  and  Indians  engaged  in  the  Seminole  War 
of  1817-1818.  The  Adjutant-General  also  stated  that  "  The  exact  number  of 
regulars  engaged  in  that  war  can  not  be  determined,  as  the  records  covering 
that  period  are  incomplete,  but  from  the  best  data  obtainable  it  appears  that 
there  were  about  1,000  regulars  engaged,  making  a  total  of  approximately  6,911 
regulars,  volunteers,  militia  and  Indians  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  in 
that   war." 

7  Report  of  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee.  American  State  Papers,  I, 
pp.    739-741. 

8  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  1914,  p.   236. 

9  See  page  73,  and  page  592,  footnote  24. 

_    10  Report  of   Major   General   Macomb,    commanding  the  Army.      American   State 
Papers,  V,   pp.   29-30. 

11  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  1914,  p.   237, 

12  See  page  77,  and  page  594,  footnotes  62,  63  and  64. 

13  See  pages  74  and  78,   and  page  593,   footnote  37. 

14  The  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,  1913,  p.  9,  and 
June  30,  1914,  p.  33,  gives  the  total  pensions  paid  out  for  Indian  wars  up  to 
June  30,    1914,    as  amounting  to   $12,801,521.01. 

15  See  pages  89  and  90,  and  page  602,  footnotes  106,  107,  108,  and  109.  To 
the  73,260  volunteers  and  militia  must  be  added  a  General  Staflf  numbering  472, 
thus  making  a  total  of  73,532. 

16  See  page  150,  and  pages  632-683,  footnotes  22,  23,  24,  25  and  26. 

17  See  page  201,  and  page  666,  footnotes  291,  292,  293,  294  and  295. 

18  See  page  264,  and  page  686,  footnotes  196,   197,  198  and  199. 


above  figures  are  indicative  of  puerile  short-sightedness  and 
criminal  blundering  such  as  would  not  be  tolerated  for  a 


276     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

moment  in  any  properly  managed  company  or  corporation 
in  the  United  States.  The  lamentable  policy  of  retrench- 
ment in  time  of  peace,  to  which  our  legislators  have  per- 
sistently adhered,  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  the  '^  penny 
wise,  pound  foolish"  policy  which  every  sane  business  man 
heartily  condemns.  The  results  entailed  by  this  false 
economy  furnish  a  further  corroboration  of  the  fact  that  our 
military  policy  has  always  been  unsound  from  a  financial  as 
well  as  a  numerical  standpoint,  as  will  appear  from  the  fol- 
lowing table: 

COST  OF  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  BY  PERIODS 


Period 

Condition 

Cost 

1791-18111 

1812-1816 

1817-1835 

1836  1843 

Peace    

Including  the  War  of  1812 

Minor  Indian  Wars.     Army  averag- 
ing under  6,000  officers  and  men . . 
Florida   War    

$5,669,930.65 
82,627,009.14 

90,411,068.59 
69,751,611.11 

1843-1845 
1846-1849 
1850-1860 
1861-1865 
1866-1869 

Peace.     The  Army  reduced 

Including  the  Mexican  War   

Peace.     The  Army  reduced 

Including  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Forces   large  on   account  of   French 

occupation   of   Mexico    

13,873,146.89 

88,500,208.38 

168,079,707.57 

2,736,570,923.50 

583,749,510.99  2 

1870-1897 
1898-1899 
1900-1902 
1902-1914 

Peace.     The  Army  reduced 

Including  the  Spanish-American  War 
Including  the  Philippine  War    .... 
Peace.     The  Army  reduced 

1,211,321,300.94 
321,833,254.76 
391,662,681.06 

1,693,920,509.96 

Total  cost  since  1790   

$7,457,970,863,54  8 

Total  cost  of  pensions  since  1790 

$4,729,957,370.94  * 

What  do  American  taxpayers  who  have  had  to  foot  some 
of  these  bills  think  of  such  figures  ?  How  long  do  they  sup- 
pose that  the  shareholders  in  any  bank  or  railway  would 
tolerate  any  such  mismanagement  ?  How  long  would  the 
officials  or  directors  be  permitted  to  remain  in  power  if  they 
could  produce  no  better  results  in  return  for  such  colossal 


1  Throughout  this  table  the  dates  given  are  "  both  inclusive  "   in  each  instance. 

2  Including  outstanding   warrants   amounting   to    $3,621,780.07. 

3  Annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  June  30,  1914,  pp.  236-238. 
,  4  Annual  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,  1913,  pp.  9—10, 
and  June   30,    1914,   p.    33. 


Citizen-Soldiery  277 

expenditures  ?  The  mere  expense  of  maintaining  arma- 
ments, however  costly,  is  by  no  means  the  only  item  to  be 
considered  in  war ;  the  outpouring  of  men  to  meet  the  call  to 
arms,  the  disturbance  of  all  business,  economic  and  political 
conditions,  are  additional  factors  which  must  not  be  disre- 
garded. When  one  considers  that  sacrifices  involving  pe- 
cuniary loss  to  almost  every  individual  have  always  been 
willingly  met,  and  that  our  military  forces  have  nearly  al- 
ways been  disgracefully  beaten  at  the  beginning  of  every 
war,  save  two,  it  is  indeed  a  veritable  enigma  that  the  nation 
has  not  long  ago  aw^akened  to  the  mismanagement  of  its  mili- 
tary affairs  and  risen  in  anger  against  the  indignities  to 
which  it  has  been  subjected  by  its  own  servants. 

When  the  progressive  American  business  man,  firm,  com- 
pany or  corporation  desires  to  have  affairs  properly  con- 
ducted, one  cardinal  rule  is  invariably  observed,  namely,  that 
men  specially  trained  for  that  particular  business  are  em- 
ployed in  numbers  proportioned  to  its  requirements  under 
any  and  all  circumstances  that  can  be  foreseen.  We  all 
sympathize  with  the  Israelites  who  were  compelled  to  make 
bricks  without  straw,  but,  in  some  respects,  Pharaoh  was 
no  harder  taskmaster  than  Congress  has  been,  insomuch  as 
the  Army  is  supposed  to  cope  with  every  possible  emergency, 
notwithstanding  that  the  requisite  strength  has  yet  to  be 
given  it.  Never  at  the  beginning  of  any  decade  in  our  na- 
tional history,  save  one,  have  our  'people  had  as  much  as  one 
trained  soldier  to  every  one  thousand  of  population  to  pro- 
tect them,  as  will  appear  from  the  table  on  page  278. 

When  any  individual  or  combination  of  individuals  strives 
for  the  acquisition  or  control  of  a  valuable  business  advantage, 
or  has  any  important  negotiation  to  transact,  the  most  ex- 
perienced and  best  trained  of  its  officials  or  agents  are  in- 
variably selected  for  the  work.  Per  contra.  Congress  has 
persistently  neglected  its  best  trained  forces  in  favour  of  com- 
paratively raw  and  inexperienced  soldiers ;  and,  what  is  more, 
down  to  1899  it  never  failed  in  time  of  crisis  to  place  its 


278     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 


Year 

Population  of  the 
United  States 

Actual  strength  of 
the  Regular  Army 

Number  of  soldiers 
per  1,000  of 
population 

1790 

3,929,214 

1,273 

0.324 

1800 

5,308,483 

4,436 

0.833 

1810 

7,239,881 

9,921 

1.378 

1820 

9,633,822 

8,942 

0.927 

1830 

12,866,020 

5,951 

0.462 

1840 

17,069,453 

10,570 

0.602 

1850 

23,191,876 

10,763 

0.421 

1860 

31,443,321 

16,367 

0.520 

1870 

38,558,371 

37,075' 

0.963 

1880 

50,155,783 

26,509 

0.527 

1890 

62,947,714 

27,095 

0.430 

1900 

76,303,387 

68,155 

0.895 

1910 

93,402,151 

77,035 

0.825 

main  dependence  in  the  latter.  Since  war  is  the  severest  test 
to  which  human  beings  can  be  subjected,  the  folly  of  this 
procedure  has  naturally  been  reiterated  ad  nauseam.  That 
the  militia  and  volunteers  have  never  failed  after  two  years 
of  war  —  which  afford  ample  time  to  transform  them  into 
well-trained  soldiers  —  to  acquit  themselves  with  credit  in 
nowise  alters  the  fact  that,  until  they  have  undergone  some 
similar  schooling,  they  have  never  been,  and  never  will 
be,  anything  but  comparatively  raw,  undisciplined  organiza- 
tions. Although  it  would  be  manifestly  unjust  to  blame  the 
militia  for  their  ignorance  —  particularly  since  our  laws  have 
never  provided  them  with  the  necessary  military  training  — 
and  although  we  must  not  withhold  the  praise  which  they 
have  always  merited  whenever,  as  volunteers,  they  have  at 
last  received  sufficient  schooling  in  actual  warfare,  yet  it  must 
be  confessed  that,  viewed  as  a  purely  military  asset,  their 
value  has  fallen  far  short  of  v^^hat  it  ought  to  have  been,  and 
that  their  history  has  fully  justified  Washington's  estimate 
that  '"^  to  place  any  dependence  upon  militia  is  assuredly  rest- 
ing upon  a  broken  staff/'  *  as  the  ensuing  exhibits  will  dem- 
onstrate. 


*  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  September  24,  1776.     See 
page  16. 


Citizen-Soldiery 

THE  MILITIA  RAN  AWAY  OR  DESERTED 


279 


Battle 


Organization  or  expe- 
dition 


Long   Island. 
Evacuation  of  New  York. 

Brandywine. 

Guilford  Court  House, 
North  Carolina. 

Burwell's  Ferry,  Vir- 
ginia. 

Williamsburg,    Virginia. 

Indian  village  near  Fort 
Wayne,  Indiana. 

Darke  County,  Ohio. 

Frenchtown    and    Raisin 

River,  Michigan. 
Sackett's     Harbor,     New 

York. 
French  Creek,  New  York. 

Chrystler's  Fields,  Can- 
ada. 

Burning  of  Buffalo,  Lew- 
istown  and  other  towns 
in  northern  New  York. 

New  Orleans,  Louisiana. 


L'ake    Okeechobee,    Flor- 
ida. 

Bull  Run,  Virginia. 


August  27,  1776 
September  15,  1776. 

September  11,  1777. 
March   15,   1781. 


April  19,  1781. 

April  20,   1781. 
October  22,   1790. 

November  4,   1791. 

January    18-22, 

1813. 
May  29,   1813. 

November    1    to   2, 

1813. 
November  11,  1813. 

December  30,  1813. 


January  8,  1815. 


December  25,  1837. 


July   21,    1861. 


Parsons'   Brigade.^ 

Brigades  of  Parsons  and 
Fellows.2 

Sullivan's  division. 3 

North  Carolina  militia 
and  2nd  Maryland  regi- 
ment.* 

Virginia  militia.s 

Virginia  militia.s 

Gen.  Harmar's  Miami  ex- 
pedition.6 

Gen.  St.  Clair's  expedi- 
tion.7 

Gen.  Winchester's  col- 
umn.s 

Gen.  Brown's  New  York 
militia.9 

Gen.  Hampton's  column.io 

Gen.  Wilkinson's  col- 
umn.n 

Gen.  McClure's  New  York 
militia.i2 

800  militia,  under  Gen. 
Morgan,  posted  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi.is 

Missouri  volunteers  and 
spies  under  Gen.  Za- 
chary   Taylor. i* 

The  entire  force  of  militia 
under  Gen.  McDow- 
ell.15 


1  Carrington,  p.  209.      See  also  page  560,  footnote  40. 

2  See  page  16,  and  page  560,  footnote  42. 

3  Gen.  Greene's  report;  Gen.  Sullivan's  letter  to  Congress,  quoted  by  Sparks,  V. 
Appendix  No.  II,  pp.  462-463. 

4  See  page  36. 

5  See  page  572,  footnote  221. 

6  See  page  46,  and  page  576,  footnote  22. 

7  See  page  46,  and  pages  577-578,  footnote  28. 

8  See  page  56,   and  page  585,  footnote  39. 

9  See  page  58,  and  page  586,  footnote  58. 

10  Report   of    Col.    Purdy,    4th   New    York   Militia.     American    State    Papers,    I, 
2)p.  479-480. 

11  Upton,  p.  113. 

12  See  page  58,  and  page  586,  footnote  62. 

13  See  page  68,   and  page  590,  footnote   138. 

14  See  page  75,  and  page  593,  footnote  48. 

15  See  page  101,  and  page  608,  footnote  55. 


280     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

THE  MILITIA  MUTINIED 


Place 


Date 


Mutineers 


Morristown,  New  Jersey. 


Pompton,  New  Jersey. 
Lancaster,   Pennsylvania. 


On  the  march  from  Ur- 
bana,  Ohio,  to  Detroit, 
Michigan. 

Detroit,  Michigan. 

On  the  march  from  Fort 
Harrison,  Indiana,  to 
the  Wabash  and  Illi- 
nois Rivers. 

En  route  to  the  rapids  of 
the  Maumee  River. 


Battle  of  Queenstown, 
Ontario. 

En  route  from  Platts- 
burg.  New  York,  to 
Canada. 

Fort  Strother,  Florida. 


Retreat  to  Buffalo,  New 
York,  after  the  evacua- 
tion of  Fort  George. 

Withlacoochee  River, 
Florida. 

Charlestown,  West  Vir- 
ginia. 


January    1,    1781. 

Jan.  24-28,  1781. 
June,    1783. 


June,  1812. 

July,  1812. 
October    19,    1812. 

October,   1812. 

October    13,   1812. 
November,    1812. 
November,  1813. 
December,    1813. 
December   31,  1835. 
July    16-18,    1861. 


Six  regiments  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Line, 
1,300  men.i 

New  Jersey  Line. 2 

Eighty  recruits,  joined 
by  200  other  malcon- 
tents, marched  to 
Philadelphia,  demand- 
ed their  pay  and 
held  Congress  pris- 
oner for  several  hours 
on  June  21,   1783.3 

Part  of  the  militia  un- 
der Gen.  Hull. 4 

180  Ohio  militia  of  Gen. 

Hull's  command. 4 
4,000  Kentucky  mounted 

militia      under       Gen. 

Hopkins.5 

Kentucky,  Tennessee  and 
Virginia  militia  un- 
der Gen.  William  H. 
Harrison. 6 

New  York  militia  under 
Generals  Van  Rensse- 
laer   and    Wadsworth.7 

Nearly  all  the  3,000 
militia  under  Gen. 
Dearborn. 8 

Tennessee  militia  and 
volunteers  under  Gen. 
Andrew  Jackson. 9 

The  New  York  militia 
under  Gen.  McClure.io 

About  500  Florida  mi- 
litia and  volunteers 
under  Gen.  Clinch. n 

Militia  of  the  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah  under 
Gen.  Patterson. 12 


1  See  pages  33-34,  and  page  570,  footnotes  182-186. 

2  See  page  34,  and  page  570,  footnotes  187-189. 

S  The  Madison  Papers,  I.  pp.  551-553;    Sparks,    Writinffs  of  Washington,  VIII, 
pp.  454-456;  Fiske,  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  pp.   117-118. 

4  See  page  54,  and  page  583,  footnote  11. 

5  See  pages  54-55,   and  page  583,  footnote  14. 

6  See  page  55,   and  page  583,  footnote  15. 

7  See  page  55,  and  page  584,  footnote  19. 

8  See  page  55,  and  page  584,  footnote  24. 
»  See  page  61,  and  page  587,  footnote  80. 

10  See  page   58,    and  page  586,   footnote  60. 

11  See  pages  73-74,  and  page  593,  footnote  33. 

12  Gen.  Patterson's  reports  to  the  Adjutant-General;  Report  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,   III,  pp.  126-127,    132,   138-139. 


Citizen- Soldiery 


281 


THE    STATES    DEFY   THE    UNITED    STATES    GOVERNMENT    BY 
REFUSING  TO  FURNISH  THEIR  MILITIA  TO  ITS  SERVICE 


State 

Governor 

Date 

Cause  and  Reason  for 
Refusal 

Massachusetts. 

Strong. 

April,   1812. 

Denied    the    right    of 
the      President      or 
Congress    to    deter- 
mine     when      such 
exigencies    arise    as 
to    require    the    mi- 
litia   to    be    called 
out,      and     claimed 
that  "  this  right  is 
vested   in    the   com- 
manders in  chief  of 
the    militia    of    the 
several   States."  i 

Connecticut. 

Griswold. 

April,    1812. 

Substantially           the 
same  contention   as 
the  above. 1 

Vermont. 

1 

Chittenden. 

November  10,  1813. 

Declared     that     "  the 
military       strength 
and  resources  of  the 
State    must    be    re- 
served  for    its    own 
defense      and      pro- 
tection      exclusive- . 
ly."  2 

Vermont. 

Chittenden. 

September,  1814. 

Refused  to  permit  the- 
militia    to    support 
Gen.  Macomb  in  re- 
pelling 11,000  Brit- 
ish veterans,   under 
Gen.      Sir      George 
Prevost,     who     had 
then  invaded  north- 
ern New  York.3 

Virginia. 

Letcher. 

April  16,   1861. 

North  Carolina. 

Ellis. 

April   15,   1861. 

Kentucky. 

Magoffin. 

April   15,   1861. 

>•  Rebellion.* 

Tennessee. 

Harris. 

April  17,  1861. 

Missouri. 

Jackson. 

April  22,   1861. 

Arkansas. 

Rector. 

April  22,   1861. 

> 

1  See  page  53,  and  page  582,  footnotes  7  and  8. 

2  See  pages  59-60,   and  pages  586-587,  footnotes  70  and  71. 

3  See  pages  63-64,  and  page  588,  footnotes  101  and   102. 

4  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,   II,   p,   130;    Upton,   pp.   227-228. 


282     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Is  not  the  above  a  glorious  record  for  Americans  to  con- 
template ?  —  we  who  are  so  prone  to  boasting  of  the  prowess 
of  our  citizen-soldiers.  Yet  these  results  are  by  no  means 
surprising,  in  view  of  the  utter  lack  of  a  definite  military 
policy  which  has  always  characterised  the  measures  of  the 
legislators  who  frame  our  military  laws  and  mould  our  mili- 
tary organization.  In  every  walk  of  life  the  v^lue  of  skilled 
labour  is  recognized,  and  specially  trained  men  are  selected 
in  preference  to  unskilled.  Yet  Congress  has  invariably 
placed  its  main  dependence  upon  the  unskilled  citizen-soldier. 
Every  schoolboy  knows  that  no  enthusiasm,  however  great, 
will  win  athletic  victories  without  long  weeks,  and  even 
months,  of  training.  Our  sages  in  the  Capitol  have  re- 
peatedly shown  that  they  believe  that,  because  our  people 
individually  possess  courage,  fortitude  and  self-reliance  in  a 
high  degree,  they  must  necessarily  possess  the  same  quali- 
ties when  aggregated  as  soldiers.  At  certain  periods  —  as, 
for  example,  that  just  prior  to  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  — 
the  measures  passed  by  Congress  demonstrated  that  it  actually 
believed  that  an  army  animated  by  patriotism  needed  neither 
instruction  nor  discipline  to  prepare  it  for  war.  How  utterly 
unfounded  is  such  a  belief  is  abundantly  proved  by  the  table 
on  page  275,  which  shows  that  down  to  1898  the  United 
States  never  engaged  in  a  single  war  in  which  it  did 

NOT  have  TO'  EMPLOY  AT  LEAST  TWO  MEN  TO  EVERY  ONE  USED 
BY  ITS  ADVERSARY. 

It  is  a  well-known  maxim  in  business  that  the  efficiency  of 
the  management  of  every  organization  depends  upon  the 
capabilities  of  its  officials.  .  Insomuch  as  the  bulk  of  the 
troops  which  the  United  States  has  employed  in  time  of 
war  has  always  —  except  during  less  than  two  years  in 
the  Philippines  —  consisted  of  militia  or  volunteers,  the 
officers  of  which,  being  drawn  from  professional  and  mer- 
cantile pursuits,  have  of  necessity  had  but  little  time  or  op- 
portunity to  master  the  multifarious  details  which  ought  to 
be  familiar  to  every  one  whose  duty  it  is  to  lead  troops,  is 


Citizen-Soldiery  283 

it  surprising  that  their  operations  in  war  have  been  attended 
with  mistakes  at  a  cost  often  appalling?  Actuated  by  the 
highest  motives,  sacrificing  their  business  and  personal  in- 
terests for  the  purpose  of  serving  their  country,  excelled  by 
none  in  courage,  these  officers  cannot  be  justly  blamed  for 
their  ignorance.  They  are  in  nowise  responsible  for  the  fact 
that  they  have  never  been  provided  by  Congress  with  the  edu- 
cation and  training  necessary  to  fit  them  to  cope  with  the 
many  difficult  problems  of  war.  No  sound  business  corpora- 
tion would  dream  for  an  instant  of  entrusting  the  manage- 
ment of  its  affairs  to  officials  so  comparatively  inexperienced, 
and  consequently  so  inferior,  as  are  the  officers  of  the  militia 
and  volunteers. 

It  is  for  this  very  reason  that  the  record  of  our  land  forces 
suffers  sadly  when  compared  with  that  of  the  Navy,  which 
has  achieved  an  almost  unbroken  succession  of  victories  from 
the  days  of  John  Paul  Jones  down  to  the  present  time.  The 
education,  training  and  personnel  of  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  Navy  being  substantially  on  the  same  plane  with  those 
of  their  confreres  in  the  Regular  Army,  the  fundamental 
reason  lies  deeper.  It  rests  in  the  fact  that  Congress  has 
been  wise  enough  to  hold  jealously  to  its  right  "  to  provide 
and  maintain  a  navy,"  instead  of  delegating  any  part  thereof 
to  the  various  States  and  thus  giving  them  the  power  to  inter- 
fere in  naval  as  they  can,  and  do,  in  military  affairs.  Fur- 
thermore, the  appointment  of  all  naval  officers  is  vested  in 
the  President  alone,  and  not  surrendered  to  the  governors 
of  the  States,  as  in  everv  case  of  the  militia  and  volunteers 
down  to  the  Spanish-American  War.  The  consequence  is 
that  the  honour  of  our  country  and  the  protection  of  our  peo- 
ple and  their  property  have  been  entrusted  to  disciplined 
sailors,  commanded  by  officers  thoroughly  trained  and  experi- 
enced. The  merits  of  this  system  over  that  pursued  in  re- 
spect to  the  major  part  of  our  land  forces  needs  no  com- 
mentary; the  results  speak  for  themselves. 

The  crux  of  the  entire  question  lies  in  the  efficiency  of  our 


284     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

militia  and  volunteers,  which  can  only  be  gauged  by  their 
training.  One  of  the  best  National  Guards  in  the  country  is 
that  of  Pennsylvania,  yet  its  actual  training  is  confined  to 
one  week  in  camp  and  about  seventy  hours  of  drill  per  an- 
num.^  At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  this  militia  would  fur- 
nish as  good  volunteers  as  the  United  States  could  hop6  to 
obtain,  and  how  long  does  any  reasonable  man  suppose  that 
these  troops  would  stand  against  the  regulars  of  France,  Ger- 
many or  Japan?  How  much  faith  would  the  officials  of  any 
corporation  place  in  an  agent  or  em^ploye  whose  training  is 
limited  to  one  week  and  seventy  hours  of  work  a  year?  Yet 
our  national  legislature  has  persevered  these  many  years  in 
the  delusion  that  an  untrained  citizen-soldiery  could  not 
possibly  jeopardize  the  destinies  of  the  nation. 

Throughout  its  history  Congress  has  shown  a  conspicuous 
absence  of  appreciation  of  its  duty  with  respect,  not  only  to 
the  country  in  time  of  war,  but  to  the  people  who  support 
the  struggle.  When  men  make  the  greatest  of  sacrifices,  in- 
cluding the  willingness  to  give  their  lives  for  the  welfare  of 
their  country,  surely  they  have  a  right  to  demand  that  the 
national  legislature  shall  do  its  duty  toward  them.  Yet  how 
often  has  the  American  people  been  treated  as  a  sacrifice  on 
the  altar  of  the  God  of  War,  in  atonement  for  the  sins  of 
omission  and  commission  of  Congress.  General  Henry  Lee, 
a  distinguished  officer  during  the  Revolution,  epitomized  the 
matter  admirably  Avhen  he  asserted  that  "  a  government  is 

THE  MUEDEEER  OF  ITS  CITIZENS  WHICH  SENDS  THEM  TO  THE 
FIELD  UNINFORMED  AI^D  UNTAUGHT,  WHERE  THEY  ARE  TO  MEET 
MEN  OF  THE  SAME  AGE  AND  STRENGTH,  MECHANIZED  BY  EDU- 
CATION   AND    DISCIPLINE    FOR    BATTLE."  f 

No  truer  words  were  ever  uttered  than  those  of  the  great- 
est of  all  Americans  and  no  more  fundamental  military  wis- 

*  Information  contained  in  a  letter  from  Gen.  Thomas  J.  Stewart, 
the  Adjutant-General  of  Pennsylvania,  dated  January  28,  1911,  to  the 
author  of  this  book. 

t  Memoirs  of  the  War  in  the  Southern  Department  of  the  United 
States,  I,  p.  97. 


Citizen-Soldiery  285 

dom  was  ever  embodied  in  a  maxim  than  in  Washington's 
declaration  that  ^'  to  expect,  then,  the  same  service  from 

KAW  AND  UNDISCIPLINED  RECRUITS  AS  FROM  VETERAN  SOLDIERS 
IS    TO    EXPECT    WHAT    NEVER    DID    AND    PERHAPS    NEVER    WILL 

HAPPEN."  ^  Yet  Congress  has  persisted  from  the  very  begin- 
ning in  believing  that  untrained  troops  are  a  sufficient  bul- 
wark for  national  defence  on  land,  and  even  President  Wilson 
in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  on  December  8,  1914,  an- 
nounced that  "  We  must  depend  in  every  time  of  national 
peril,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  not  upon  a  standing  army, 
nor  yet  upon  a  reserve  army,  but  upon  a  citizenry  trained  and 
accustomed  to  arms."  Earnestly  as  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  in 
the  near  future  the  majority  of  American  men  may  be  given 
sufficient  military  training  to  make  them  a  dependable  force 
in  time  of  war,  the  fact  none  the  less  remains  that  never  once,, 
from  the  beginning  of  our  national  career  until  the  present 
day,  have  we  possessed  ''  a  citizenry  trained  and  accustomed 
to  arms,"  And  President  Wilson  has  written  more  than  one 
work  treating  of  American  history. 


*  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  February  9,  1776.     Sparks, 
III,  p.  279. 


CHAPTEK  XXII 

MILITARY  POLICY,  LEGISLATION  AND  EVENTS 
FROM  1902  TO  JUNE  1,  1915  * 

ASIDE  from  the  usual  annual  appropriations  for  the 
support  of  the  Army,  for  fortifications  and  for  the 
Military  Academy,  the  appropriations  to  meet  deficiencies 
and  the  sundry  civil  expenses,  the  military  legislation  en- 
acted during  1902  was  confined  to  three  important  measures. 
The  Act  of  June  28th  allotted  $2,000,000  ''  for  the  enlarge- 
ment of  buildings  "  at  West  Point  "  and  for  other  necessary 
works  of  improvement  in  connection  therewith.''  ^  The 
Army  Appropriation  Act  of  June  30th  set  apart  $15,000 
"  for  the  continuance  of  the  Army  War  College,  having  for 
its  object  the  direction  and  coordination  of  the  instruction 
in  the  various  service  schools,  extension  of  the  opportunities 
for  investigation  and  study  in  the  Army  and  militia  of  the 
United  States,"  and  also  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
expend  $400,000  '^  for  the  erection  of  the  necessary  buildings 
for  the  Army  War  College,  established  at  Washington  Bar- 
racks, District  of  Columbia."  ^  The  third  and  last  meas- 
ure —  the  Act  of  July  1st  —  required  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
furnish  "  indelibly  marked  "  certificates  ^'  in  lieu  of  a  lost  or 
destroyed  discharge  "  to  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  '^  hon- 
orably discharged  from  the  military  sendee  of  the  United 
States  or  to  his  wddow,".  but  with  the  proviso  ^'  that  such  a 
certificate  shall  not  be  accepted  as  a  voucher  for  the  payment 
of  any  claim  against  the  United  States  for  pay,  bounty,  or 
other  allowance,  or  as  evidence  in  any  other  case."  ^ 


*  The  author  ventures  to  suggest  that  the  reader  who  is  not  inter- 
ested in  the  intricate  details  of  military  legislation  —  which  of  necessity 
comprise  a  large  part  of  this  chapter — should  either  omit  or  glance 
hurriedly  through  them,  and  should  devote  his  attention  to  the  parts 
dealing  with  military  events. 

286 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  287 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1902 

In  the  Philippines  the  remnants  of  insurrection  were  still 
kept  up  in  the  provinces  of  Batangas  and  Tayabas  under 
the  leadership  of  Malvar,  and  in  the  island  of  Samar  by  the 
guerillas  under  Lukban.  The  active  operations  of  the  troops 
in  Luzon  under  General  J.  Franklin  Bell  culminated  in  the 
surrender  of  Malvar  on  April  16th,  while  Lukban  was  cap- 
tured and  his  successor  Guevara  surrendered  to  the  forces 
under  General  Frederick  D.  Grant  on  April  27th.  These 
events  put  an  end  to  the  warfare  which  had  been  waged  by 
the  natives  with  such  ruthlessness  since  the  dispersal  of  Agui- 
naldo's  government  in  1899.  On  July  4th  President  Roose- 
velt issued  a  proclamation  announcing  the  termination  of  the 
insurrection  and  granting  "  complete  pardon  and  amnesty  " 
to  the  natives.  The  office  of  Military  Governor  was  discon- 
tinued, and  the  Secretary  of  War  in  a  General  Order  con- 
veyed to  the  Army  the  thanks  of  the  President  for  the  services 
rendered  to  the  country  by  its  conduct  "  in  the  great  and 
difficult  undertakings  "  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines.*  The 
Moros  of  the  Sulu  archipelago  and  Palawan  were  still  defiant, 
but  expeditions  under  Colonel  Frank  Baldwin  and  Captain 
John  Pershing  effected  a  distinctly  summary  pacification 
which  put  an  end  to  their  resistance  for  the  time  being.  ^ 

On  February  24,  1902,  the  Electoral  College  of  Cuba, 
chosen  at  a  general  election  on  December  31,  1901,  convened 
and  elected  a  President,  Vice-President,  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives.  On  May  20th  T.  Estrada  Palma  was  in- 
augurated as  the  first  President  of  the  Cuban  Republic,  and 
during  the  afternoon  of  that  same  day  the  American  forces 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Leonard  Wood, 
Military  Governor,  were  withdrawn  from  the  island. 

On  June  11th  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point  cele- 
brated wdth  appropriate  ceremonies,  attended  by  a  notable 
assemblage  of  distinguished  alumni,  the  completion  of  a  cen- 
tury of  honourable  and  useful  existence. 


288     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1902 

During  the  month  of  September  joint  manoeuvres,  sug- 
gested by  Brigadier  General  Wallace  F.  Eandolph,  Chief  of 
Artillery,  took  place  on  the  New  England  coast.  Simulated 
attacks  were  made  by  a  fleet  of  warships  against  the  fortifi- 
cations at  the  eastern  end  of  Long  Island  Sound,  situated  at 
New  London,  the  entrance  to  Narragansett  Bay  and  at  New 
Bedford.  A  force  of  Regular  troops  and  a  small  number  of 
militia  participated  in  the  defence,  and  much  profit  was  de- 
Tived  from  the  admirable  spirit  in  which  these  manoeuvres 
were  carried  out.^ 

As  has  been  seen  on  page  255,  Section  28  of  the  law 
of  February  2,  1901,  permitted  the  appointment  of  men 
not  over  forty  years  of  age  to  the  grades  of  first  or  second 
lieutenant  in  the  Regular  Army  when  their  fitness  had  been 
favourably  passed  upon  by  examining  boards,  as  well  as  allow- 
ing enlisted  men  who  had  served  one  year  in  the  Army  to  be 
appointed  second  lieutenants.  Many  proceeded  to  avail 
themselves  of  this  opportunity  and,  in  connection  with  this 
innovation.  Secretary  Root  made  the  following  pertinent 
comments  in  his  annual  report  for  1902 :  ^ 

"  An  examination  of  the  sources  from  which  are  drawn  the 
officers  of  the  Army,  as  now  constituted  under  the  Act  of  Feb- 
ruary 2,  1901,  shows  how  important  it  is  to  go  on  with  the  mili- 
tary education  of  officers  in  some  such  general  and  systematic 
way  as  was  outlined  in  my  last  report.  Of  the  2,900  officers 
of  the  line  of  the  Army,  1,818  have  been  appointed  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  with  Spain.  Of  these  1,818  but  276  were 
supplied  by  the  West  Point  Academy;  the  remaining  1,542 
have  come  —  414  from  the  ranks,  512  from  civil  life,  and  616 
from  the  volunteers  of  the  war  with  Spain  and  in  the  Philip- 
pines. 

"  The  volunteers  and  the  enlisted  men  have  of  course  acquired 
useful  experience,  and  they  were  all  selected  on  the  ground 
of  their  military  conduct  and  intelligence.  Yet  it  is  generally 
true  of  the  whole  1,542,  constituting  more  than  one-half  of  all 
the  officers  of  the  line,  that  they  have  had  no  systematic  mili- 
tary education.  They  constitute  nearly  the  entire  body  of  first 
and  second  lieutenants.     After  some  years,  when  their  seniors 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  289 

1902-1903] 

have  passed  off  the  stage,  they  will  have  to  supply  our  generals 
and  colonels  and  chief  staff  officers  charged  with  the  instruction, 
discipline,  and  command  of  our  forces.  Unless  the  theory  of 
military  education  under  which  we  have  maintained  the  Academy 
at  West  Point  for  a  century  is  all  a  mistake,  it  is  very  im- 
portant to  give  to  this  class  of  young  officers,  now  that  they  are 
in  the  Army,  some  degree  of  the  educational  advantages  which 
the  West  Point  men  get  before  they  are  commissioned.  The 
same  will  be  true  of  future  accessions  to  the  force  of  officers, 
for  the  West  Point  Academy,  even  with  the  recent  enlargements, 
can  not  be  expected  to  fill  more  than  about  two-thirds  of  the 
annual  vacancies  which  will  occur  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
life.^' 

MILITAEY  LEGISLATION  IN  1903 

The  second  session  of  the  Fifty-seventh  Congress  was  sig- 
nalized by  two  measures  of  far-reaching  importance  to  the 
military  service.  The  first  of  these  was  entitled  "  An  Act 
To  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  militia,  and  for  other  pur- 
poses," ^  w^hich  was  approved  on  January  21,  1903,  and  was 
generally  known  as  "  the  Dick  bill,"  having  been  introduced 
in  the  Senate  by  the  junior  Senator  from  Ohio.  As  origi- 
nally framed,  it  contained  a  number  of  admirable  provisions ; 
but,  as  in  the  case  of  past  measures,  it  ended  in  a  compro- 
mise containing  some  glaring  defects  which  substantially  de- 
feated the  very  purpose  for  which  the  measure  w^as  intended. 
The  merits  of  the  law  may  be  thus  summarized : 

( 1 )  It  separated  the  militia  into  two  classes,  namely,  "  the 
organized  militia,  to  be  known  as  the  National  Guard  of  the 
State,  Territory  or  District  of  Columbia,  or  by  such  other  desig- 
nations as  may  be  given  them  by  the  laws  of  the  respective 
States  and  Territories,  and  the  remainder  to  be  known  as  the 
Reserve  Militia."  ^ 

(2)  It  announced  that  "the  militia  shall  consist  of  every 
able-bodied  male  citizen  .  .  .  and  every  able-bodied  male  of 
foreign  birth  who  has  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen, 
who  is  more  than  eighteen  and  less  than  forty-five  years  of 
age." » 

(3)  It  defined  what  citizens  are  liable  to,  and  exempted 
from,  military  duty.^*^ 


290      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903 

(4)  It  stipulated  that  within  five  years  after  the  approval  of 
this  Act,  "  the  organization,  armament,  and  discipline  of  the 
organized  militia  .  .  .  shall  be  the  same  as  that  which  is  now 
or  may  hereafter  be  prescribed  for  the  Eegnlar  and  Volunteer 
Armies  of  the  United  States."  ^^ 

(5)  It  specified  the  manner  of  calling  out  the  militia,  their 
pay  and  the  regulations  to  govern  them  while  in  service.^^ 

(6)  It  provided  for  the  issuance  of  arms,  ammunition  and 
other  military  supplies  to  the  militia  by  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment/^ 

(7)  It  directed  that  regular  inspections  of  the  militia  be 
made  by  officers  specially  detailed  by  the  Secretary  of  War.^* 

(8)  It  provided  for  the  participation  of  the  militia  in  joint 
manoeuvres  with  the  Regular  Army,  which  manoeuvres  were  to 
be  under  the  command  of  a  Eegular  Army  officer,  irrespective 
of  the  rank  of  any  militia  officer  present.^^ 

(9)  It  fixed  the  pay  and  allowances  of  militia  participating 
in  encampments,  and  the  allowances  of  militia  officers  attending 
"  a  regular  course  of  study  at  any  military  school  or  college."  ^^ 

(10)  It  specifically  required  all  organized  militia,  unless  ex- 
cused by  the  governor,  "  to  participate  in  practice  marches  or 
go  into  camp  of  instruction  at  least  five  consecutive  days,  and 
to  assemble  for  drill  and  instruction  at  company,  battalion,  or 
regimental  armories  or  rendezvous  or  for  target  practice  not 
less  than  twenty-four  times,"  and  "  during  such  year  an  in- 
spection of  each  such  company,  troop,  and  battery  to  be  made 
by  an  officer  of  such  militia  or  an  officer  of  the  Eegular 
Army."  ^^ 

(11)  It  provided  that  Eegular  Army  officers  might  be  de- 
tailed *^  to  attend  any  encampment  of  the  organized  militia,  and 
to  give  such  instruction  and  information  to  the  officers  and 
men  assembled  in  such  camp  as  may  be  requested  by  the  gov- 
ernor " ;  and  that  Eegular  officers  might,  upon  application  of  a 
governor,  be  assigned  "  for  duty  in  connection  with  the  organized 
militia,"  such  assignments  to  be  revocable  at  tlie  request  of  the 
governor  or  the  pleasure  of  the  Secretary  of  War.^ 


18 


The  second  part  of  the  law  beginning  with  Section  23  ^^ 
dealt  with  the  subject  of  future  volunteers  and 

(12)  provided  for  securing  a  list  of  persons  specially  qualified 
for  commissions  in  any  volunteer  force  other  than  the  organized 
militia,  who  were  to  be  examined  by  boards  composed  of  those 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  291 

1903] 

who  have  had  previous  experience  in  the  Kegular  Arm}',  volun- 
teers, organized  militia  or  who  have  pursued  regular  courses 
of  military  instruction  in  some  school  or  college.  The  ages 
above  which  no  commission  was  to  issue  were  fixed  as  follows : 
for  a  second  lieutenant,  30;  for  a  first  lieutenant,  35;  for  a 
captain,  40;  for  a  major,  45;  for  a  lieutenant-colonel,  50;  and 
for  a  colonel,  55.^° 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Dick  Bill  presented  certain  de- 
fects which  were  as  follows: 

(1)  The  Act  of  May  8,  1792  —  which  wisely  prescribed  com- 
pulsory service  in  time  of  peace  on  the  part  of  every  able-bodied 
man  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45  —  was  repealed. ^^ 

(2)  The  United  States  must  call  the  militia  into  its  service 
through  the  governors  of  the  States.  A  governor  can  refuse 
to  obey  —  as  did  the  governors  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut 
and  Vermont  in  1812,  1813  and  1814  —  and  the  law  specified 
no  method  to  coerce  him.  The  militia  may  refuse  to  respond 
to  a  call  not  transmitted  through  their  governor.  In  that  event 
it  is  subject  to  trial  by  court-martial,  but  no  court  was  granted 
jurisdiction  over  such  cases  and  no  punishment  was  pre- 
scribed.^^ 

(3)  Notwithstanding  the  lessons  of  the  past  as  to  the  folly 
of  short  enlistments,  the  law  forbade  the  militia  from  being 
called  out  for  a  longer  period  than  nine  months.  Moreover,  it 
permitted  the  States  to  retain  the  right  to  impose  such  terms  and 
conditions  of  enlistment  as  they  saw  fit.  Under  this  act  militia, 
when  offered  for  the  service  of  the  United  States,  must  be  ac- 
cepted but  could  not  be  retained  beyond  the  term  of  enlistment. 
As  a  consequence  the  Federal  Government  might  have  large 
numbers  of  short-term^  troops  forced  upon  it,  instead  of  being 
able  to  depend  upon  men  enlisted  "  for  the  war.''  ^^ 

(4)  The  Dick  bill  required  that  the  organization,  armament 
and  discipline  of  the  militia  shall  be  the  same  as  that  of  the 
Regular  Army.  On  the  other  hand,  the  acceptance  of  the  militia 
was  in  nowise  dependent  upon  their  complying  with  this  obli- 
gation, and  no  penalty  was  imposed  for  failure  to  reach  the  re- 
quired standard.^* 

(5)  It  was  expressly  stipulated  that  appointments  of  officers 
from  the  list  of  persons  examined  and  found  qualified  to  hold 
volunteer  commissions  shall  not  include  appointments  to  or- 
ganizations of  the  organized  militia  "  which  volunteer  as  a  body, 


292     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903 

or  the  officers  of  which  are  appointed  by  the  governor  of  a  State 
or  Territory,"  ^^ 

(6)  Future  volunteer  forces  were  to  be  organized  according 
to  the  Act  of  x'^pril  22,  1898,  thus  again  giving  to  the  governors 
of  the  various  States  the  power  to  appoint  the  officers,  notwith- 
standing that  they  were  to  be  mustered  into  the  service  of,  and 
receive  their  pay  from,  the  United  States  Government.^® 

(7)  The  original  provision  for  the  creation  of  a  Volunteer 
Eeserve  of  100,000  men  in  time  of  peace  —  to  which  militia  of- 
ficers possessing  the  necessary  qualifications  could  be  appointed, 
and  for  which  the  power  of  the  governors  to  make  appointments 
had  wisely  been  limited  —  was  stricken  out,  and  no  provision  was 
made  for  such  a  volunteer  reserve,  or  even  to  keep  alive  the  ri- 
diculously inadequate  force  of  3,000  men  authorized  by  the 
former  Act  of  April  22,  1898." 

The  Act  of  January  30th  permitted  Army  officers  to  be 
detailed  for  service  as  chief  and  assistant  chiefs  —  the  latter 
not  to  exceed  four  in  number  —  of  the  Philippine  Constabu- 
lary, the  former  to  have  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances  of  a 
Brigadier  General  and  the  latter  those  of  a  colonel.  It  also 
permitted  companies  of  Philippine  scouts  to  assist  in  the 
maintenance  of  order  in  those  islands  and  to  be  placed  under 
the  command  of  the  chief  or  assistant  chiefs  of  the  Philippine 
Constabulary.^^ 

The  most  notable  military  legislation  enacted  in  many 
years  was  the  measure  in  which  the  recommendations  made 
by  Secretary  Root  in  1899  and  1901  ^^  were  carried  into  ef- 
fect by  a  radical  innovation  in  the  shape  of  the  creation  of  a 
General  Staff.  This  much-needed  institution  was  inaugu- 
rated by  "  An  Act  To  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  Army,''  ^^ 
and  was  sufficiently  important  to  warrant  its  being  quoted  in 
exienso.     The  phraseology  of  the  law  ran  as  follows : 

''  Be  it  enacted  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That 
there  is  hereby  established  a  General  Stafi!  Corps,  to  be  composed 
of  officers  detailed  from  the  Army  at  large,  under  such  rules 
as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  President. 

Sec.  2.     That  the  duties  of  the  General  Staff  Corps  shall  be 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  293 

1903] 

to  prepare  plans  for  the  national  defense  and  for  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  military  forces  in  time  of  war;  to  investigate  and 
report  upon  all  questions  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the  Army 
and  its  state  of  preparation  for  military  operations;  to  render 
professional  aid  and  assistance  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  to 
general  officers  and  other  superior  commanders,  and  to  act  as 
their  agents  in  informing  and  coordinating  the  action  of  all 
the  different  officers  who  are  subject  under  the  terms  of  this 
Act  to  the  supervision  of  the  Chief  of  Staff;  and  to  perform 
such  other  military  duties  not  otherwise  assigned  by  law  as 
may  be  from  time  to  time  prescribed  by  the  President. 

Sec.  3.  That  the  General  Staff  Corps  shall  consist  of  one 
Chief  of  Staff  and  two  general  officers,  all  to  be  detailed  by  the 
President  from  officers  of  the  Army  at  large  not  below  the  grade 
of  brigadier-general;  four  colonels,  six  lieutenant-colonels,  and 
twelve  majors,  to  be  detailed  from  the  corresponding  grades  in 
the  Army  at  large,  under  such  rules  for  selection  as  the  Presi- 
dent may  prescribe;  twenty  captains,  to  be  detailed  from  officers 
of  the  Army  at  large  of  the  grades  of  captain  or  first  lieutenant, 
who  while  so  serving  shall  have  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances 
of  captain  mounted.  All  officers  detailed  in  the  General  Staff 
Corps  shall  be  detailed  therein  for  periods  of  four  years,  unless 
sooner  relieved.  While  serving  in  the  General  Staff  Corps,  of- 
ficers may  be  temporarily  assigned  to  duty  with  any  branch  of 
the  Army.  Upon  being  relieved  from  duty  in  the  General 
Staff  Corps,  officers  shall  return  to  the  branch  of  the  Army  in 
which  they  hold  permanent  commission,  and  no  officer  shall  be 
eligible  to  a  further  detail  in  the  General  Staff  Corps  until  he 
shall  have  served  two  years  with  the  branch  of  the  Army  in 
which  commissioned,  except  in  case  of  emergency  or  in  time 
of  war. 

Sec.  4.  That  the  Chief  of  Staff,  under  the  direction  of  the 
President  or  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  the  direction  of 
the  President,  shall  have  supervision  of  all  troops  of  the  line 
and  of  the  Adjutant-GeneraPs,  Inspector-General's,  Judge-Ad- 
vocate's, Quartermaster's,  Subsistence,  Medical,  Pay,  and  Ord- 
nance departments,  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  and  the  Signal 
Corps,  and  shall  perform  such  other  military  duties  not  other- 
wise assigned  by  law  as  may  be  assigned  to  him  by  the  President. 
Duties  now  prescribed  by  statute  for  the  Commanding  General 
of  the  Army  as  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifi- 
cation and  of  the  Board  of  Commissioners  of  the  Soldiers'  Home 


294     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[190$ 

shall  be  performed  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  or  other  officer  desig- 
nated by  the  President.  Acts  and  parts  of  Acts  authorizing 
aides-de-camp  and  military  secretaries  shall  not  apply  to  general 
officers  of  the  General  Staff  Corps. 

Sec.  5.  That  the  Chief  of  Artillery  shall  hereafter  serve  as 
an  additional  member  of  the  General  Staff  and  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  shall  have  the  rank,  pay, 
and  allowances  of  a  brigadier-general  and  Avhen  the  next  vacancy 
occurs  in  the  office  of  brigadier-general  of  the  line,  it  shall  not  • 
be  filled,  and  thereafter  the  number  of  brigadier-generals  of 
the  line,  exclusive  of  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  shall  not  exceed 
fourteen ;  and  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  sections  of  this 
Act  shall  take  effect  August  fifteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and 
three. 

Approved,  February  14,  1903." 

As  Captain  Rhodes  pertinently  remarks  in  his  Gold  Medal 
Prize  Essay:  ^^ 

"  Besides  prescribing  in  a  general  way  the  duties  of  the  new 
body  and  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  the  act  provided  for  changing 
the  designation  of  the  commanding-general,  for  the  obvious  rea- 
son that  under  the  Constitution  the  President  alone  is  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and  in  past  years  bestowal  of  the  title  without 
the  legal  right  to  command  had  led  to  endless  friction  and  ill- 
feeling. 

"  Under  existing  law,  the  Chief  of  Staff  is  simply  military 
adviser  to  the  President,  aided  in  his  deliberations  and  con- 
clusions by  the  General  Staff,  and  the  law  very  wisely  places 
under  his  direct  supervision  not  only  all  troops  of  the  line,  but 
also  the  various  staff  corps  —  hitherto  independent  of  any  mili- 
tary control  except  that  of  the  President  or  Secretary  of  War. 

"  In  practice,  the  General  Staff  has  been  classified  as  the  War 
Department  General  Staff,  and  the  General  Staff  serving  with 
troops.^^ 

"  The  former  has  been  organized  for  convenience  into  three 
divisions,  with  appropriate  duties  pertaining  to  each:  the  first, 
generally  speaking,  dealing  with  army  administration,  the  second 
with  the  collection  and  distribution  of  military  information, 
and  the  third  with  questions  affecting  the  technical  services, 
military  education  and  plans  of  campaign. 

''  Since  its  organization  the  General  Staff  has  studied  and 
passed  upon  a  multitude  of  important  military  questions,  with 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  295 

1903] 

credit  to  itself,  and  with  unquestioned  benefit  to  the  armV. 
Being  an  advisory  body,  its  work  is  and  will  continue  to  be 
largely  confidential  in  character,  aside  from  those  military  mat- 
ters which,  from  their  nature,  are  properly  kept  secret.  Hence 
the  tangible  results  of  its  efforts  will  rarely  convey  to  the  public 
an  adequate  comprehension  of  the  full  extent  of  its  labors." 

Broadly  speaking,  the  functions  of  a  General  Staff  are 
threefold:  first,  to  prepare  all  plans  for  war;  second,  to  de- 
vise the  proper  co-ordination  between  the  various  branches  of 
the  military  service ;  and  third,  to  superintend  the  execution 
of  the  plans,  organization  and  co-ordination  determined  upon. 
In  greater  detail,  its  role  was  thus  comprehensively  portrayed 
hj  Secretary  Root  in  his  annual  report  for  1902 :  ^^ 

^*  The  most  intelligent  way  to  describe  such  a  body  of  men, 
however  selected  and  organized,  is  by  calling  it  a  general  staff, 
because  its  duties  are  staff  duties  and  are  general  in  their  char- 
acter. 

"  The  duties  of  such  a  body  can  be  illustrated  by  taking  for 
example  an  invasion  of  Cuba,  such  as  we  were  all  thinking  about 
a  few  years  ago.  It  is  easy  for  a  President,  or  a  general  acting 
under  his  direction,  to  order  that  50,000  or  100,000  men  proceed 
to  Cuba  and  capture  Havana.  To  make  an  order  which  has 
any  reasonable  chance  of  being  executed  he  must  do  a  great 
deal'  more  than  that.  He  must  determine  how  many  men  shall 
be  sent  and  how  they  shall  be  divided  among  the  different  arms 
of  the  service,  and  how  they  shall  be  armed,  and  equipped,  and 
to  do  that  he  must  get  all  information  possible  about  the  defenses 
of  the  place  to  be  captured  and  the  strength  and  character 
and  armament  of  the  forces  to  be  met.  He  must  determine  at 
what  points  and  by  what  routes  the  place  shall  be  approached, 
and  at  what  points  his  troops  shall  land  in  Cuba ;  and  for  this 
purpose  he  must  be  informed  about  the  various  harbors  of  the 
island  and  the  depth  of  their  channels;  what  classes  of  vessels 
can  enter  them;  what  the  facilities  for  landing  are;  how  they 
are  defended;  the  character  of  the  roads  leading  from  them  to 
the  place  to  be  attacked ;  the  character  of  the  intervening 
country ;  how  far  it  is  healthful  or  unhealthful ;  what  the  climate 
is  liable  to  be  at  the  season  of  the  proposed  movement;  the 
temper  and  sympathies  of  the  inhabitants;  the  quantity  and 
kind  of  supplies  that  can  be  obtained  from  the  country:  the 


296     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903 

extent  to  wliich  transportation  can  be  obtained,  and  a  great  va- 
riety of  other  things  which  will  go  to  determine  whether  it  is 
better  to  make  the  approach  from  one  point  or  from  another,  and 
to  determine  what  will  be  necessary  for  the  Army  to  carry  with 
it  in  order  to  succeed  in  moving  and  living  and  fighting. 

"  All  this  information  it  is  the  business  of  a  general  staff  to 
procure  and  present.  It  is  probable  that  there  would  be  in 
such  case  a  number  of  alternative  plans,  each  having  certain 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  and  these  should  be  worked  out 
each  by  itself,  with  the  reasons  for  and  against  it,  and  pre- 
sented to  the  President  or  general  for  his  determination.  This 
the  general  statf  should  do.  This  can  not  be  done  in  an  hour. 
It  requires  that  the  staff  shall  have  been  at  work  for  a  long 
time  collecting  the  information  and  arranging  it  and  getting 
it  in  form  to  present.  Then  at  home,  where  the  preparation 
for  the  expedition  is  to  be  made,  the  order  must  be  based  upon 
a  knowledge  of  the  men  and  material  available  for  its  execu- 
tion ;  how  many  men  there  are  who  can  be  devoted  to  that  pur- 
pose, from  what  points  they  are  to  be  drawn,  what  bodies  of 
troops  ought  to  be  left  or  sent  elsewhere,  and  what  bodies  may 
be  included  in  the  proposed  expedition ;  whether  there  are  ships 
enough  to  transport  them ;  where  they  are  to  be  obtained ; 
w^hether  they  are  properly  fitted  up ;  what  more  should  be  done 
to  them :  what  are  the  available  stocks  of  clothing,  arms  and 
ammunition,  and  engineers'  material,  and  horses  and  wagons, 
and  all  the  innumerable  supplies  and  m.unitions  necessary  for 
a  large  expedition :  how  are  the  things  to  be  supplied  which  are 
not  ready,  but  which  are  necessary,  and  how  long  time  will  be 
required  to  supply  them. 

"  All  this  and  much  more  necessary  information  it  is  the 
business  of  a  general  staff  to  supply.  When  that  has  been  done 
the  order  is  made  with  all  available  knowledge  of  all  the  cir- 
cumstances upon  which  the  movement  depends  for  its  success. 
It  is  then  the  business  of  a  general  staff  to  see  that  every  separate 
officer  upon  whose  action  the  success  of  the  movement  depends 
understands  his  share  in  it  and  does  not  lag  behind  in  the  per- 
formance of  that  share ;  to  see  that  troops  and  ships  and  animals 
and  supplies  of  arms  and  ammunition  and  clothing  and  food, 
etc.,  from  hundreds  of  sources,  come  together  at  the  right  times 
and  places.  It  is  a  laborious,  complicated,  and  difficult  work, 
which  requires  a  considerable  number  of  men  whose  special 
business  it  is  and  who  are  charged  with  no  other  duties. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  297 

1903] 

"  It  was  the  lack  of  such  a  body  of  men  doing  that  kind  of 
work  which  led  to  the  confusion  attending  the  Santiago  ex- 
pedition in  the  summer  of  1898.  The  confusion  at  Tampa  and 
elsewhere  was  the  necessary  result  of  having  a  large  number  of 
men,  each  of  them  doing  his  own  special  work  the  best  he  could, 
but  without  any  adequate  force  of  officers  engaged  in  seeing  that 
they  pulled  together  according  to  the  detailed  plans  made  be- 
forehand. Such  a  body  of  men  doing  general  staff  duty  is 
just  as  necessary  to  prepare  an  army  properly  for  war  in  time 
of  peace  as  it  is  in  time  of  war.  It  is  not  an  executive  body ; 
it  is  not  an  administrative  body;  it  acts  only  through  the  au- 
thority of  others.  It  makes  intelligent  command  possible  by 
procuring  and  rearranging  information  and  working  out  plans  in 
detail,  and  it  makes  intelligent  and  effective  execution  of  com- 
mands possible  by  keeping  all  the  separate  agents  advised  of  the 
parts  they  are  to  play  in  the  general  scheme.'' 

Mr.  Root  advocated  the  abolition  of  the  title  of  Command- 
ing General  of  the  Army  and  the  substitution  of  that  of  Chief 
of  Staff  on  the  ground  that  in  the  former  case  the  officer, 
by  virtue  of  his  rank,  would  naturally  expect  great  latitude 
in  following  his  own  ideas  in  preference  to  those  of  others, 
and  would  justly  regard  attempts  to  control  his  action  or 
to  restrict  his  power  as  unwarranted  interference.  In  this 
connection  he  went  on  to  say  ^^  that 

"  The  title  of  Chief  of  Staff,  on  the  other  hand,  denotes 
a  duty  to  advise,  inform,  and  assist  a  superior  officer  who  has 
command,  and  to  represent  him,  acting  in  his  name  and  by  his 
authority  in  carrying  out  his  policies  and  securing  the  execution 
of  his  commands.  The  officer  who  accepts  the  position  assumes 
the  highest  obligation  to  be  perfectly  loyal  to  his  commander,  to 
exclude  all  personal  interest  from  his  advice  and  representation, 
and  to  try,  in  the  most  whole-hearted  way,  to  help  him  to  right 
conclusions,  and  to  successful  execution  of  his  policies  even 
though  his  conclusions  may  not  agree  with  the  advice  given. 
For  the  successful  performance  of  his  duties  the  chief  of  staff 
must  have  the  entire  confidence  of  his  commander.  In  pro- 
portion as  he  merits  that  confidence,  the  chief  of  staff  gradually 
comes  to  find  his  advice  usually  accepted,  and  to  really  exercise 
the  authority  of  his  commander,  subject  only  to  the  most  general 


298     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903 

directions,  Just  as  Von  Moltke  exercised  the  authority  of  King 
William  of  Prussia  as  his  chief  of  staff." 

A  tremendous  stride  was  taken  in  the  right  direction  when 
the  General  Staff  came  into  being  on  August  15,  1903,  by 
virtue  of  the  law  of  February  14th  of  that  year.  As  has  been 
seen,  it  was  composed  entirely  of  line  officers  whose  period  of 
service  with  the  General  Staff  was  limited  to  four  years.  In 
other  words,  this  body  was  composed  of  officers  whose  duties 
were  primarily  with  the  line,  their  duties  on  the  General  Staff 
being  merely  supplemental  thereto.  While  this  new  scheme 
possessed  great  merit  in  that  it  permitted  a  supervision  and 
co-ordination  heretofore  inadequate  or  impossible,  the  system 
was  in  diametrical  opposition  to  that  of  the  German  General 
Staff,  in  which  the  officers  are  specialists  and  are  only  detailed 
to  troops  at  certain  periods  in  order  to  prevent  their  losing 
touch  with  the  conditions  in  the  line.  The  German  General 
Staff  is  a  model  of  its  sort  and,  insomuch  as  the  American 
General  Staff  differs  widely  from  it,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  latter  does  not  accomplish  as  much  or  work  as  smoothly 
as  the  former. 

The  remaining  military  legislation  of  the  year,  apart  from 
the  usual  annual  appropriations,  was  decidedly  brief.  The 
Army  Appropriation  Act  of  March  2nd  ^^  wisely  provided, 
under  the  heading  of  Retired  Officers, 

"  That  in  addition  to  the  detail  of  retired  officers  now  au- 
thorized by  law,  it  shall  hereafter  be  lawful  for  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  detail,  whenever  in  his  judgment  the  public  interest 
requires  it,  not  exceeding  twenty  retired  officers  for  service  in 
connection  with  the  organized  militia  in  the  States  and  Terri- 
tories, upon  the  request  of  the  governor  thereof,  and  such  re- 
tired officers  shall  be  entitled,  while  so  employed,  to  receive  the 
full  pay  and  allowances  of  their  respective  grades.''  ^^ 

Under  the  title  of  Retired  Enlisted  Men,  it  was  stipulated 

"  That  hereafter,  in  computing  the  length  of  service  for  re- 
tirement, credit  shall  be  given  soldiers  for  double  the  time  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  299 

1903] 

their  actual  service  in  China,  the  same  as  is  now  given  in  Porto 
Rico,  Cuba,  and  the  Philippine  Islands."  ^^ 

Two  decidedly  important  features  were  also  embodied  in  this 
law ;  the  first  —  a  capital  innovation  —  was  an  appropria- 
tion of  $2,500  to  be  continued  yearly 

"for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  a  national  trophy  and  medals 
and  other  prizes  to  be  provided  and  contested  for  annually,  under 
such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
said  contest  to  be  open  to  the  Army,  and  the  National  Guard  or 
organized  militia  of  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  of  the 
District  of  Columbia."  ^^ 

The  other  feature  was  the  allotment  of  $2,000,000 

"  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  the  necessary  articles  requisite 
to  fully  arm,  equip,  and  supply  each  regiment,  battalion,  squad- 
ron, company,  troop,  battery,  signal,  engineer,  and  hospital  corps 
and  medical  department  of  the  organized  militia  of  the  several 
States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  with  the  same 
armament  and  equipment  as  are  now  prescribed  for  correspond- 
ing branches  of  the  line  or  staff  in  the  Regular  Army,  without 
cost  to  said  States,  Territories,  or  the  District  of  Columbia, 
but  to  remain  the  property  of  the  United  States,  and  to  be 
accounted  for  in  the  manner  now  prescribed  by  law,  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  is  hereby  authorized,  under  such  regulations  as  he 
may  prescribe,  on  the  requisitions  of  the  governors  of  the  sev- 
eral States  and  Territories,  or  the  commanding  general  of  the 
militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  issue  the  said  armament 
and  equipment  to  the  organized  militia."  ^^ 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1903,  making  appropriations  for  the 
support  of  the  Military  Academy  for  the  fiscal  year  ending 
June  30,  1904,^^  contained  a  rider  amending  Section  5  of  the 
Act  of  February  14,  1902,  which  created  the  General  Staff. ^^ 
It  read  as  follows: 

"  That  the  Chief  of  Artillery  shall  hereafter  serve  as  an  ad- 
ditional member  of  the  General  Staff,  and  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  shall  have  the  rank,  pay,  and 
allowances  of  a  brigadier-general,  and  when  the  next  vacancy 
occurs  in  the  office  of  colonel  of  artillerv  it  shall  not  be  filled. 


300     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903 

and  thereafter  the  number  of  colonels  of  artillery  shall  not  ex- 
ceed thirteen;  and  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  sections  of 
this  Act  shall  take  effect  on  August  fifteenth,  nineteen  hundred 
and  three."  *^ 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1903,  making  appropriations  for  for- 
tifications and  works  of  defense  ^^  embodied  the  wise  restric- 
tion 

"  That  all  material  purchased  under  the  foregoing  provisions 
of  this  Act  shall  be  of  American  manufacture,  except  in  cases 
when,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  it  is  to  the 
manifest  interest  of  the  United  States  to  make  purchases  in 
limited  quantities  abroad,  which  material  shall  be  admitted  free 
of  duty."  ^' 

The  only  joint  Resolution  touching  upon  military  matters 
was  passed  on  January  12,  1903,  and  permitted 

"  That  the  distinctive  badges  adopted  by  military  societies  of 
men  who  served  in  the  armies  and  navies  of  the  United  States 
during  the  Chinese  relief  expedition  of  nineteen  hundred  may 
be  worn  upon  all  occasions  of  ceremony  by  officers  and  men  of 
the  Army  and  Na^^  of  the  United  States  who  are  members  of 
said  organizations  in  their  own  right." 


45 


MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1903 

In  the  Philippines,  the  Moros  in  the  region  of  Lake  Lanao 
still  continued  to  manifest  hostility  to  the  Americans  and  dur- 
ing the  month  of  April,  1903,  attacked  a  detachment  of  troops 
under  Captain  John  J.  Pershing,  who  retaliated  by  destroying 
the  fort  belonging  to  the  Sultan  of  Baccalod.  In  the  follow- 
ing month  a  force  under  the  same  officer,  which  was  engaged 
in  exploration  on  the  eastern  shore  of  that  lake,  was  fired 
upon  by  the  Taraca  Moros;  in  punishment  their  forts  were 
stormed  and  captured,  and  the  rest  of  the  year  passed  with- 
out further  opposition.  The  American  troops  in  the  archi- 
pelago had  been  reduced  to  such  an  extent  that  on  October 
15th  they  numbered  only  843  officers  and  14,667  enlisted 


men.^^ 


The  first  national  rifle  contest  authorized  by  Congress  was 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  301 

1903] 

held  at  Seagirt,  New  Jersey,  on  September  8  and  9,  1903, 
and  was  eminently  successful.  Six  prizes  were  awarded,  the 
first  being  won  by  a  team  from  the  New  York  National 
Guard.  The  Army  rifle  team  was  fifth  and  the  Marine  Corps 
sixth,  but  the  latter  was  debarred  from  the  cash  prizes  owing 
to  the  oversight  of  Congress  in  failing  to  include  the  Navy 
and  Marines  among  the  contestants.^"^ 

On  July  20th,  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  which  had  led 
to  the  institution  of  the  General  Staff,  the  Secretaries  of 
War  and  the  Navy  agreed  upon  '^  the  formation  of  a  joint 
board  to  be  composed  of  four  officers  of  the  Army  and  four 
officers  of  the  Navy,^^  to  hold  stated  sessions  and  such  ex- 
traordinary sessions  as  shall  appear  advisable  for  the  purpose 
of  conferring  upon,  discussing,  and  reaching  common  con- 
clusions regarding  all  matters  calling  for  the  cooperation 
of  the  two  services."  ^^  This  step  was  indeed  admirable,  but 
there  still  remains  much  to  be  done  before  such  plans  have 
been  evolved  as  will  insure  that  combination  of  military 
and  naval  forces  which  is  requisite  for  properly-conducted 
operations  alike  in  overseas  expeditions  as  in  national  de- 
fence. 

According  to  the  law  of  February  14,  1903,  the  General  • 
Staff  came  into  existence  on  August  15th,  Lieutenant  General 
S.  B.  M.  Young  being  selected  as  the  first  Chief  of  Staff.  The 
creation  of  this  body  necessarily  relieved  the  War  College 
Board  of  a  multiplicity  of  duties  pertaining,  strictly  speak- 
ing, to  a  General  Staff,  but  which  had  had  to  be  imposed 
upon  the  former  in  the  absence  of  the  latter.  The  division 
of  duties  between  the  two  permitted  a  simpler  organization 
for  the  Army  War  College,  which  was  made  an  adjunct  to 
the  General  Staff, ^^  and,  as  all  raison  d'etre  for  the  continu- 
ance of  the  War  College  Board  as  then  constituted  had  van- 
ished, it  was  permanently  disbanded  on  August  15th.^^ 

In  view  of  the  great  radical  changes  made  in  the  policy 
and  organization  of  the  military  establishment  in  the  pre- 
ceding six  years.   Secretary  Boot  recommended  the  discon- 


302     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1903-1904 

tinuance  of  important  legislation  affecting  the  Army  "  for 
some  time  to  come/'  and  he  thus  summarized  the  reasons 
for  his  standpoint: 

"  The  three-battalion  organization  of  infantry,  the  corps  or- 
ganization of  artillery,  the  authority  vested  in  the  President  to 
vary  the  numbers  of  the  Army  between  minimum  and  maximum 
limits,  the  system  of  details  to  the  Staff,  with  compulsory  re- 
turns to  line  service  at  fixed  intervals  in  place  of  permanent 
staff  organizations,  the  system  of  general  staff  supervision  and 
control,  the  new  militia  system  providing  for  cooperation  with 
the  Kegular  Army,  the  enlarged  system  of  military  education 
culminating  in  the  Army  War  College  as  an  adjunct  to  the 
General  Staff,  all  appear  to  be  working  well  and  are  enlisting  the 
best  efforts  of  the  officers  of  the  Army.  They  should  be  let 
alone  until  some  reason  for  interfering  with  them  appears  as 
the  result  of  trial.''  ^^ 

The  concluding  sentences  of  his  annual  report  for  1903 
were  noteworthy  for  the  following  statements  with  respect  to 
the  chiefs  of  bureau  and  their  assistants,  civil  and  military, 
the  civil  assistants  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  officers 
of  the  Army  in  general: 

"  I  do  not  think  that  any  government  ever  had  a  body  of 
public  servants  presenting  a  better  standard  of  personal  char- 
acter, a  higher  average  of  competency,  or  a  more  completely 
controlling  sense  of  public  duty.  A  country  is  fortunate  which 
has  such  officers  to  rely  upon  in  time  of  need."  ^^ 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1904 

The  first  important  military  legislation  of  the  year  was 
the  Act  of  April  21,  1904,^^  which  provided  that  the  Pres- 
ident might  select  chaplains  from  those  having  the  grade  of 
captain,  who  had  served  not  less  than  ten  years  and  who  had 
been  commended  "  for  exceptional  efficiency,"  and  promote 
them  to  the  grade  of  major,  but  that  not  more  than  fifteen 
chaplains  in  active  service  should  be  so  promoted.  A  proviso 
was  also  inserted  to  the  effect  that  chaplains  newly-appointed 
to  the  Army  "  shall  have  the  grade,  pay,  and  allowances  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  303 

1904] 

first  lieutenant  mounted,  until  they  shall  have  completed 
seven  years  of  service." 

Another  measure,  also  approved  on  April  21st,^^  made 
appropriations  for  fortifications,  and  Congress,  having  pro- 
crastinated for  ^Ye  years  after  the  United  States  had  acquired 
and  occupied  numerous  colonies  in  both  hemispheres,  at  last 
awoke  to  the  fact  that  our  insular  possessions  were  in  dire 
need  of  defence  and  therefore  appropriated  $1,318,920  for 
their  fortification.^^ 

The  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  April  23rd,^^  under  the 
heading  of  Retired  Ofiicers,  prescribed 

"  That  any  officer  of  the  Army  below  the  grade  of  brigadier- 
general  who  served  with  credit  as  an  officer  or  as  an  enlisted 
man  in  the  regular  or  volunteer  forces  during  the  civil  war 
prior  to  April  ninth,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-five,  other- 
wise than  as  a  cadet,  and  whose  name  is  borne  on  the  official 
register  of  the  Army,  and  who  has  heretofore  been,  or  may 
hereafter  be,  retired  on  account  of  wounds  or  disability  incident 
to  the  service,  or  on  account  of  age  or  after  forty  years'  service, 
may,  in  the  discretion  of  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  be  placed  on  the  retired  list  of  the 
Army  witb  the  rank  and  retired  pay  of  one  grade  above  that 
actually  held  by  him  at  the  time  of  retirement :  Provided,  That 
this  Act  shall  not  apply  to  any  officer  who  received  an  advance 
of  grade  since  the  date  of  his  retirement  or  who  has  been  restored 
to  the  Army  and  placed  on  the  retired  list  by  virtue  of  the 
provisions  of  a  special  Act  of  Congress;  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  may  assign  retired  officers  of  the  Army,  with  their  consent, 
to  active  duty  in  recruiting,  for  service  in  connection  with  the 
organized  militia  in  the  several  States  and  Territories  upon  the 
request  of  the  governor  thereof,  as  military  attaches,  upon 
courts-martial,  courts  of  inquiry  and  boards,  and  to  staff  duties 
not  involving  service  with  troops;  and  such  officers  while  so 
assigned  shall  receive  the  full  pay  and  allowances  of  their  respec- 
tive grades. 


"  r.i 


This  same  measure  likewise  appropriated  $12,000 

"  For  three  thousand  medals  of  honor  to  be  prepared,  with 
suitable  emblematic  devices,  upon  the  design  of  the  medal  of 
honor  heretofore  issued,  or  upon  an  improved  design,  together 


304     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1904 

with  appropriate  rosettes  and  other  insignia  to  be  worn  in  lieu 
of  the  medal,  and  to  be  presented  by  direction  of  the  President, 
and  in  the  name  of  Congress,  to  such  officers,  noncommissioned 
officers  and  privates  as  have  most  distinguished,  or  may  here- 
after most  distinguish,  themselves  by  their  gallantry  in  ac- 
tion/' '^^ 

The  Act  of  April  27th  ^^  amended  Section  6  of  the  Act 
of  March  3,  1899  ^^  by  extending  from  January  1,  1902, 
to  January  1,  1906,  the  time  within  which  claims  for  reim- 
bursement had  to  be  filed  by  governors  who  had  assisted  the 
United  States  in  raising,  organizing,  supplying  and  equipping 
the  Volunteer  Army  in  the  war  with  Spain.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  was  directed  to  settle  such  items  or  parts 
of  claims  as  had  been  disallowed  '^  for  the  reason  that  they 
appear  to  have  been  for  stores  furnished  or  expenses  incurred 
or  transportation  furnished  after  the  troops  raised  had  been 
mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  '' ;  and  the 
certificate  of  the  governor  to  the  effect  ^'  that  such  expenses 
were  incurred  in  good  faith  "  was  declared  ^^  to  be  sufficient 
to  authorize  the  final  settlement  and  payment  in  full  of  such 
claims  for  reimbursement." 

The  Sundry  Civil  bill,  approved  April  28,  1904,  contained 
an  appropriation  of  $105,000  for  the  construction  of  a  double 
barracks  for  four  troops  of  cavalry  at  Fort  D.  A.  Russell, 
•Wyoming  ^^ —  a  location  utterly  unsuited  from  the  standpoint 
of  strategic,  geographical  or  commercial  advantage  for  a 
garrison  of  any  considerable  size.  Another  measure,  likewise 
approved  on  April  28th,^^  continued  the  appropriation  of 
$2,500  for  trophies  for  the  annual  rifle  contest  which  had 
been  inaugurated  in  1903. 

The  last  military  legislation  enacted  in  1904  was  the  Act 
of  December  20th  "to  fix  the  rank  of  certain  officers  in  the 
Army,"  ^^  which  stated 

"  That  any  second  lieutenant  of  the  United  States  Marine 
Corps  who  may  have  been  appointed  second  lieutenant  of  artil- 
lery since  the  second  day  of  February,  nineteen  hundred  and 
one,  and  prior  to  the  passage  of  this  Act,  shall,  in  determining 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  305 

1904] 

his  lineal  and  relative  rank,  be  entitled  to  tRe  same  credit  for 
prior  commissioned  service  as  a  lieutenant  of  volunteers  ap- 
pointed under  the  Act  entitled  ^  An  Act  to  increase  the  ef- 
ficiency of  the  permanent  military  establishment  of  the  United 
States/  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one." 

Two  joint  resolutions  require  passing  notice.  The  first, 
approved  April  15,  1904,  authorized  the  President,  in  case 
of  the  loss  or  destruction  of  a  medal  presented  by  Congress 
to  any  officer  or  person  "  on  account  of  distinguished  or 
meritorious  services,"  to  cause  a  duplicate  medal  to  be  made.^^ 
The  second  resolution,  dated  April  28th,  provided 

"  That  the  military  rolls  and  records  of  the  Indian  wars  or 
any  other  wars  prior  to  the  Civil  War,  now  preserved  in  the  In- 
terior or  other  Departments,  be  transferred  to  the  War  De- 
partment, to  be  preserved  in  the  Record  and  Pension  Office  of 
that  Department,  and  that  they  shall  be  properly  indexed  and 
arranged  for  use."  ^^ 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1904 

A  few  encounters  took  place  during  the  year  in  the  Phil- 
ippines as  a  result  of  the  persistent  defiance  of  the  Moros 
in  Mindanao  and  Jolo.  In  the  former,  Datu  Ali  with  some 
3,000  followers  proved  especially  troublesome  in  the  Cata- 
bato  district  and  kept  the  troops  there  busy  pursuing  him 
constantly  from  March  until  October,  when  he  agreed  to 
surrender  but  soon  broke  his  promise  and  resumed  his  depre- 
dations in  the  country  about  Liguasan  and  Buluan.^^  With 
these  exceptions,  the  principal  operations  of  the  Regular 
troops  were  confined  to  joint  Army  and  Militia  manoeuvres. 
In  July  a  force  of  1,687  regulars  and  2,324  militia  from  the 
States  of  Washington,  Oregon  and  Idaho  assembled  at  Ameri- 
can Lake,  Washington,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier 
General  Funston.  In  August  similar  manoeuvres  occurred 
at  Atascadero,  California,  in  which  2,247  regulars  and  2,181 
California  militia  participated  under  the  command  of  Major 
General  MacArthur.  The  manoeuvres  in  the  vicinity  of 
Manassas,  Virginia,  during  September  were  conducted  under 


306     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1904 

Major  General  Corbin  on  a  larger  scale  tlian  anything  of 
the  sort  heretofore  attempted  in  the  United  States,  ^o 
less  than  26,296  troops,  composed  of  5,062  regulars  and 
21,234  militia,^^  were  mobilized  and  were  organized  into  two 
divisions,  one  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General 
Frederick  D.  Grant  encamped  near  Manassas,  the  other  under 
Brigadier  General  J.  Franklin  Bell  at  Thoroughfare.  Two 
problems  involving  movements  on  a  large  scale  were  pre- 
sented for  solution,  and  two  days  were  devoted  to  each,  ar- 
rangements being  made  to  reproduce  to  a  measure  the  situa- 
tions which  confronted  Pope  and  Lee  at  the  second  battle  of 
Bull  Eun  on  August  29  and  30,  1862.  These  manoeuvres 
were  highly  successful,  particularly  in  the  training  given  to 
the  militia,^  ^  and  it  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  Congres- 
sional apathy  has  made  it  impossible  to  continue  them  at  all 
in  1906  or  in  subsequent  years  on  the  same  scale. 

The  second  l^ational  Hifle  contest  was  held  at  Fort  Hiley, 
Kansas,  in  the  latter  part  of  Ajagust  and  was  again  won  by 
a  team  from  the  l^ational  Guard  of  !N"ew  York.*^^ 

Although  progress  was  made  in  the  construction  of  the 
new  building  authorized  for  the  Army  War  College,  so 
cramped  were  the  temporary  quarters  available  that  a  class  of 
only  nine  officers  could  be  assembled.  An  important  step 
was  taken  in  prescribing  the  following  course,  viz: 

^^  (a)  A  critical  study  of  an  approved  plan  of  operations,  with 
a  view  to  its  confirmation  or  modification. 

''(b)  The  assumption  of  the  original  conditions  on  which 
an  approved  plan  was  based  and  the  preparation  of  an  in- 
dependent plan,  the  two  to.be  subsequently  prepared  and  dis- 
cussed. 

''(c)  In  each  case  a  minute  or  detailed  study  of  a  certain 
number  of  days'  operations  at  an  important  period  of  the  plan, 
involving  the  preparation  of  every  daily  order  of  importance 
to  be  issued  during  the  period,  directing  the  position  and  move- 
ments of  wagon  trains  of  every  kind,  the  tactical  arrangement 
of  marches  (assignment  of  roads  to  columns,  arrangement  of 
columns  on  the  roads,  etc.),  length  of  marches,  tactical  arrange- 
ment of  camps  and  bivouacs,  etc. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  307 

1904] 

"(d)  In  connection  with  the  above,  the  discussion  of  special 
problems  encountered  by  the  technical  troops  of  the  tactical  use 
of  the  three  arms,  under  the  given  conditions,  the  supply  of 
ammunition,  of  disposition  of  the  wounded,  etc. 

"(e)  A  war  game  in  which  an  actual  campaign  (of  the  civil 
war,  for  instance)  will  be  taken,  all  the  initial  conditions  of 
the  campaign  being  assumed  to  exist  now  as  they  actually  did, 
except  that  the  organization,  armament,  equipment,  and  tactical 
methods  are  those  of  the  present  day,  the  probable  result  being 
worked  out  on  the  map. 

"(f)  Informal  lectures  and  general  discussions  of  current 
military  events  and  developments."  ^^ 

As  Secretary  Taft  went  on  to  point  out/^ 

"  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  study  pursued  at  this  institu- 
tion is  of  the  highest  character  that  can  be  exacted  of  officers 
of  the  Army.  It  consists  in  the  application  to  practical  problems 
of  the  knowledge  previously  gained  by  these  officers  at  one  or 
more  of  the  technical  schools,  which  constitute  our  excellent 
but  inexpensive  system  of  military  education.  The  work  of  the 
Army  War  College  is  intended  to  be  conducted  in  cooperation 
with  that  of  the  Naval  War  College,  thus  guaranteeing  harmony 
of  action  between  the  two  services,  which  can  not  fail  to  be  of 
great  advantage  to  the  Government." 

The  creation  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  assignment  to  it 
of  45  officers,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  481  other  officers 
were  on  detached  service,  reduced  the  number  of  officers 
available  for  duty  with  troops  below  the  point  of  proper  effi- 
ciency —  a  condition  which,  as  has  already  been  seen,  has 
often  recurred  in  the  history  of  our  Army.  The  Secretary  of 
War  therefore  recommended  that  the  detail  to  the  General 
Staff  of  line  officers  under  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
should  create  a  vacancy  in  the  line  and  thus  add  at  least  25 
officers  available  for  service  with  troops.  Similar  recom- 
mendations were  likewise  made  for  additional  officers  in  the 
Medical  and  Ordnance  departments.'^^ 

During  the  course  of  the  year  and  by  virtue  of  the  regula- 
tions issued  in  1903,  part  of  the  newly-created  General  Staff 
was  assigned  to  duty  with  the  various  commanders  of  geo- 


308     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1904 

graphical  divisions  and  departments,  while  the  other  portion, 
entitled  War  Department  General  Staff,  was  retained  at 
Washington,  where 

^^  besides  aiding  the  Secretary  of  War  as  contemplated  by  law 
in  the  administration  of  current  business,  [it]  has  made  im- 
portant revisions  during  the  year  of  existing  regulations,  orders, 
and  manuals  governing  the  instruction  and  administration  of 
the  Army.  In  consultation  with  the  chiefs  of  staff  bureaus  in 
the  War  Department  it  has  completed  a  revision  of  the  Articles 
of  War,  to  be  submitted  to  Congress  for  adoption,  and  of  the 
General  Eegulations  of  the  Army.  It  has  also  revised  the  drill 
regulations  for  infantry  and  the  orders  governing  military  edu- 
cation in  the  Army  and  at  military  colleges,  and  has  now  in 
course  of  preparation  field  service  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment of  troops  in  the  field  and  at  peace  maneuvers. 

"  It  has  further  systematized  and  developed  the  Military  In- 
formation Division,  to  which  has  been  transferred  the  War 
Department  library  and  the  distribution  of  AYar  Department 
publications.  In  addition  it  has  made  some  progress  in  ad- 
vance of  tbe  establishment  of  the  War  College  in  the  important 
duty  imposed  by  statute  on  the  General  Staff  of  preparing  plans 
for  the  national  defense  and  for  the  mobilization  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  country  in  time  of  war.  The  volume  of  work  done 
has  been  very  great,  and  substantially  all  of  the  subjects  placed 
by  statute  or  the  regulations  of  the  President  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  General  Staff  have  been  considered  during  the 
year."  '^* 

Twelve  months  sufficed  to  demonstrate  its  unquestioned 
utility.  AVhatever  its  defects,  there  was  abundant  reason  for 
Secretary  Taft's  declaration  that  "  no  one  at  all  familiar  with 
its  advantages  w^ill  ever  think  of  recommending  its  aboli- 
tion." ''^ 

The  year  1904  witnessed  the  completion  of  more  than  half 
of  the  scheme  of  seacoast  fortification  advocated  by  the  Endi- 
cott  Board  in  its  report  of  January  16,  1886,  but  consider- 
able difficulty  was  experienced  in  getting  recruits  in  order 
to  maintain  at  full  strength  the  coast  artillery  companies 
which,  even  then,  were  insufficient  to  man  one  half  of  the  guns 
already  mounted.     A  marked  disinclination  on  the  part  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  309 

1904] 

the  men  to  re-enlist  and  the  fact  that  nearly  three  years  are 
required  to  train  such  men  to  a  good  degree  of  proficiency, 
led  to  a  recommendation  for  more  troops  in  this  arm  of  the 
service,  as  well  as  in  the  field  artillery,  which  "  has  not  a 
proper  organization,  nor  sufficient  officers  in  the  dift'erent 
grades  even  for  the  present  force."  '^^ 

In  compliance  with  the  appropriation  of  $1,318,920  made 
on  April  21,  1904,  for  the  defenses  of  insular  possessions, 
the  actual  construction  of  fortifications  and  their  armament 
was  begun  in  the  Philippines,  in  Manila  and  Subig  bays. 
Plans  were  also  prepared  and  approved  for  defensive  works 
at  San  Juan,  Porto  Eico,  Pearl  Harbour  and  Honolulu  har- 
bour, Hawaii,  San  Luis  d'Apra  and  Guam."^^ 

Three  other  points  only  need  to  be  touched  upon.  One 
of  these  was  the  general  re-arrangement  of  military  com- 
mands made  on  January  15,  1904,  whereby  the  geographical 
territory  of  the  United  States  was  organized  into  five  grand 
military  divisions,  under  the  command  of  Major  Generals, 
and  each  was  in  turn  subdivided  into  one  or  more  military 
departments  under  a  Brigadier  General.  The  second  — 
which  was  the  most  important  occurrence  of  the  year  from 
the  standpoint  of  administration  and  business  —  was  the  cre- 
ation of  the  Military  Secretary's  Office,  effected  by  amalga- 
mating the  offices  of  the  Adjutant-General  and  the  Record 
and  Pension,  which  had  been  authorized  by  Congress  for  the 
purpose  of  simplifying  the  business  methods  and  expediting 
the  work  of  the  War  Department. 

The  third  was  the  satisfactory  progress  made  in  bringing 
the  armament  and  equipment  of  the  Organized  Militia  up 
to  the  standard  of  the  Regular  Army,  ^o  less  than  116,544 
rifles  and  carbines  were  issued  to  the  State  troops,  new  am- 
munition was  gratuitously  exchanged  for  obsolete  cartridges, 
steps  were  taken  looking  to  a  re-arming  of  the  artillery,  and 
special  inspections  were  made.  These  measures  met  with  a 
ready  response  on  the  part  of  the  militia,  resulting  in  a  dis- 
tinct improvement  in  its  discipline,  attendance  and  effi- 
ciency.^^ 


310     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DUEING  1905 

Congress  assuredly  took  heed  of  Mr.  Eoot's  injunction  in 
1903  that  no  further  measures  in  respect  to  the  Army  would 
be  necessary  "  for  some  time  to  time,"  '^^  as  the  military  leg- 
islation enacted  during  1905,  aside  from  the  usual  appro- 
priations for  the  Army,  fortifications  and  the  Military 
Academy,  was  extraordinarily  brief.  Allusion  has  already 
been  made  on  page  304  to  the  first  act  passed  at  the  third  ses- 
sion of  the  Fifty-eighth  Congress  and  approved  on  Decem- 
ber 20, 1904.  The  next  measure  of  importance  was  contained 
in  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  of  March  2,  1905,  and  pro- 
vided 

*^That  any  vacancy  that  shall  occur  in  the  office  of  the  Assist- 
ant Chief  of  the  Record  and  Pension  Office  previous  to  July 
first,  nineteen  hundred  and  five,  shall  be  filled  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  captain  of  the  line  of  the  Army,  and  vacancies  here- 
after occurring  shall  not  be  filled,  and  the  offices  now  designated 
by  the  title  of  Assistant  Chief  of  the  Record  and  Pension  Office 
and  by  the  title  of  Assistant  Adjutant-General  shall  hereafter 
be  designated  by  the  title  of  Military  Secretary.'^  ^^ 

This  same  law  likewise  specified 

"  That  retired  officers  of  the  Army  above  the  grade  of  major, 
heretofore  or  hereafter  assigned  to  active  duty,  shall  hereafter 
receive  their  full  retired  pay  and  shall  receive  no  further  pay  or 
allowances  from  the  United  States :  Provided  further,  That  a 
colonel  or  lieutenant-colonel  so  assigned  shall  receive  the  full 
pay  and  allowances  of  a  major  on  the  active  list."  ^^ 

Under  the  heading  of  Ordnance  Department,  $516,000  was 
appropriated 

^^  For  the  purpose  of  procuring  field-artillery  material  for  the 
organized  militia  of  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the 
District  of  Columbia,  but  to  remain  the  property  of  the  United 
States  and  to  be  accounted  for  in  the  manner  now  prescribed  by 
law,  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized,  under  such 
regulations  as  he  may  prescribe,  on  the  requisitions  of  the  gov- 
ernors of  the  several  States  and  Territories  or  the  commanding 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  311 

1905] 

general  of  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  issue  said 
artillery  material  to  the  organized  militia."  ®^ 

The  Appropriation  bill  for  fortifications,  approved  March 
3,  1905,8*  allotted  the  sum  of  $700,000  "  for  construction  of 
seacoast  batteries  in  the  insular  possessions ''  but  stipulated 
that 

'^  Hereafter  all  estimates  for  fortifications  for  insular  possessions 
of  the  United  States  shall  be  made  and  submitted  to  Congress 
showing  amounts  proposed  to  be  expended  at  each  harbor  in 
each  insular  possession."  ^ 

There  was  also  approved  that  day  "  An  Act  To  promote 
the  efficiency  of  the  reserve  militia  and  to  encourage  rifle 
practice  among  the  members  thereof,"  ^^  which  read  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  sell,  at 
the  prices  at  which  they  are  listed  for  the  Arm}^,  upon  the  re- 
quest of  the  governors  of  the  several  States  and  Territories,  such 
magazine  rifies  belonging  to  the  United  States  as  are  not  neces- 
sary for  the  equipment  of  the  Army  and  the  organized  militia, 
for  the  use  of  rifle  clubs  formed  under  regulations  prepared  by 
the  national  board  for  the  promotion  of  rifle  practice  and  ap- 
proved by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  in 
his  discretion  to  sell  to  the  several  States  and  Territories,  as 
prescribed  in  section  seventeen  of  the  Act  approved  January 
twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  for  the  use  of  said  clubs, 
ammunition,  ordnance  stores,  and  equipments  of  the  Government 
standard  at  the  prices  at  which  they  are  listed  for  the  Army. 
The  practice  of  the  rifle  clubs  herein  provided  shall  be  carried 
on  in  conformity  to  regulations  prescribed  by  the  national  board 
for  the  promotion  of  rifle  practice,  approved  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  the  results  thereof  shall  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the 
Military  Secretary  of  the  Army." 

The  Sundry  Civil  Bill,  approved  March  3,  1905, ^^  appro- 
priated $25,000 

"  To  enable  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  discretion,  to  cause  to 
be  transported  to  their  homes  the  remains  of  officers  and  soldiers 
who  die  at  military  camps  or  who  are  killed  in  action,  or  who 
die  in  the  field  or  hospital  in  Alaska,  and  at  places  outside  the 


312     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1905 

limits  of  the  United  States,  or  who  die  while  on  voyage  at  sea/' 

and  $2,500  were  set  apart  for  the  same  purpose  in  the  case 
of  civilian  employes  of  the  Army.^^ 

The  only  Joint  Resolution  that  year  which  is  of  interest 
was  approved  on  February  28th  and  provided 

"  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized 
to  deliver  to  the  proper  authorities  of  the  respective  States  in 
which  the  regiments  which  bore  these  colors  w^re  organized 
certain  Union  and  Confederate  battle  flags  now  in  the  custody 
of  the  War  Department,  for  such  final  disposition  as  the  afore- 
said proper  authorities  may  determine.'^  ^^ 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1905 

The  only  operations  of  the  Army  during  the  year  occurred 
in  the  Philippines  and  on  a  minor  scale.  Mention  of  the 
depredations  committed  in  Mindanao  during  1904  by  Datu 
Ali  has  already  been  made  on  page  305.  Repeated  attempts 
to  induce  him  by  peaceful  means  to  surrender  having  proved 
abortive,  and  his  incessant  terrorizing  of  the  Cotabato  valley 
and  of  the  Moros  who  were  friendly  to  the  Americans  hav- 
ing become  insupportable,  an  expedition  composed  of  three 
officers  and  100  picked  men  from  the  22nd  Infantry,  together 
with  a  detachment  of  one  officer  and  ten  Philippine  Scouts, 
the  whole  under  the  command  of  Captain  Prank  R.  McCoy, 
one  of  General  Wood's  aides-de-camp,  was  despatched  against 
him  by  Brigadier  General  Buchanan,  temporarily  command- 
ing the  Department  of  Mindanao.  Leaving  Digos  on  Octo- 
ber 16th,  a  rapid  march  attended  with  great  hardship  brought 
the  column  —  which  was  composed  of  Y7  men  stripped  of  all 
impedimenta  except  cooked  rations  for  one  day  and  reserve 
ammunition  —  to  the  Malala  River  on  October  22nd,  where 
Datu  Ali  was  surprised  in  his  hiding  place  and  killed. ^^ 
This  success  resulted  in  the  seizure  or  surrender  of  all  the 
arms  in  the  hands  of  the  hostile  Moros  and  in  the  complete 
pacification  of  the  Cotabato  valley. ^^  This  exploit,  planned 
with  great  cunning  and  executed  in  a  masterful  manner,^^ 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  313 

1905] 

while  less  well  known,  was  characterised  by  an  ability  not 
one  whit  inferior  to  Funston's  capture  of  Aguinaldo  two  and 
a  half  years  previously. 

Aside  from  the  operations  in  the  Philippines,  the  Army  — 
which  numbered  on  October  15,  1905,  3,750  officers  and 
56,064  enlisted  men  ^^ —  spent  a  year  of  the  usual  routine 
duties  in  its  various  garrisons,  without  even  such  manoeuvres 
as  were  held  in  1902,  1903  and  1904  to  enliven  the  monotony, 
because  Congress  had  been  too  parsimonious  to  make  the  nec- 
essary appropriations  for  them. 

In  his  annual  report  the  Secretary  of  War  laid  great  stress 
upon  the  impaired  efficiency  of  the  service  resulting  from  the 
fact  that  about  25  per  cent,  of  the  line  officers  and  11  per 
cent,  of  the  staff  officers  were  absent  on  detached  duty,  point- 
ing out  "  that  at  the  date  of  the  last  annual  inspection  of  the 
Army  about  40  per  cent,  of  the  captains  of  the  line  were  ab- 
sent from  their  commands  and  that  10  per  cent,  of  our  cav- 
alry, artillery,  and  infantry  companies  were  commanded  by 
second  lieutenants."  Emphasis  was  very  properly  laid  on 
the  fact  that 

"  these  conditions  can  not  continue  without  great  detriment  to 
the  service. 

"  With  a  full  complement  of  trained  officers  it  takes  a  long  pe- 
riod of  unremitting  effort  to  make  a  good  cavalryman  out  of  a  raw 
recruit,  and  this  remark  applies  with  even  greater  force  to  our 
artillery  service,  which  has  now  —  particularly  in  the  coast 
branch  —  become  of  a  highly  technical  and  specialized  character ; 
and  when  we  consider  that  our  small  arm}^  is  maintained 
chiefly  as  a  nucleus  of  the  army  that  would  be  required  in  the 
event  of  a  national  crisis,  and  must  therefore  always  be  kept  in 
the  highest  state  of  efficiency,  the  conditions  disclosed  by  these 
figures  are  so  startling  as  to  call  for  prompt  remedial  action."  ^^ 

To  that  end  he  recommended  an  increase  in  the  Artillery 
Corps  and  in  the  number  of  officers  of  the  Army,  particularly 
in  the  Medical  and  Ordnance  departments  —  indeed  the 
urgency  of  a  larger  force  in  these  last  two  corps  was  sufficient 


314     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1905 

to  prompt  President  Roosevelt  to  send  a  special  message  to 
Congress  on  January  9tli  advocating  their  increase. ^^ 

So  great  was  the  progress  made  in  the  re-organization  of 
the  militia  begun  in  1903  that  Secretary  Taft  was  able  to 
report  that  '^  with  few  exceptions  the  militia  now  conforms 
to  the  organization  of  the  Regular  Army  as  far  as  practica- 
ble/' and  that  "  a  strong  disposition  is  manifested  on  the 
part  of  the  State  authorities  to  bring  their  militia  to  a  state 
of  discipline  and  efficiency  approximating  as  closely  as  pos- 
sible that  of  the  Regular  Army."  He  also  pointed  out  that 
^^  while  much  remains  to  be  accomplished  as  to  organizatioUj 
supply,  discipline,  and  training  of  the  militia  before  there 
will  be  anything  like  uniformity  or  a  high  average  of  effi- 
ciency, a  general  improvement  was  shown  over  conditions 
prevailing  the  year  before,  and  continued  improvement  is 
confidently  expected  in  consequence  of  the  interest  and  pride 
in  the  matter  exhibited  generally  by  the  State  authorities 
concerned."  ^^ 

The  work  of  fortification,  not  only  of  the  seacoast  of  con- 
tinental United  States  but  of  Manila  and  Subig  Bays,  was 
continued  and  the  installation  of  batteries  for  the  defence  of 
the  important  naval  station  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba,  was 
begun.  ^^ 

By  all  odds  the  most  important  event  of  the  year  from  a 
military  standpoint  was  the  appointment  made  on  January 
31,  1905,  by  President  Roosevelt  of  a  board  to  revise  the 
report  of  the  Endicott  Board  with  respect  to  fortifications. 
In  the  Executive  order  creating  this  new  body,  Mr.  Roose- 
velt very  aptly  stated  that 

"  The  report  of  the  Endicott  Board,  submitted  nineteen  years 
ago,  was  very  carefully  considered  by  its  distinguished  members. 
It  enunciated  sound  military  principles  and  recommended  the 
best  application  of  these  principles  with  the  conditions  then  ex- 
isting. It  fully  deserved  the  generous  support  it  has  received 
from  Congress.  Nearly  two-thirds  of  the  land  armament  recom- 
mended by  the  Board  has  been  installed  or  provided  for;  but 
since  the  date  of  the  report  so  many  conditions  then  existing 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  315 

1905] 

have  been  materially  modified,  and  the  engines  or  implements  of 
war  have  been  so  greatly  improved,  and  others,  untried  or  un- 
known, of  undoubted  value  developed,  giving  a  greater  advan- 
tage to  the  defense,  that  it  is  confidently  believed  our  harbor 
defense  can  be  completed  effectively  and  satisfactorily  with  a 
much  less  expenditure  of  money  than  has  been  heretofore  esti- 
mated. With  this  object  in  view,  the  Board  will  recommend 
the  armament  fixed  and  floating,  mobile  torpedoes,  submarine 
mines,  and  all  other  defensive  appliances  that  may  be  necessary 
to  complete  the  harbor  defense  with  the  most  economical  and 
advantageous  expenditure  of  money. 

"  The  Board  will  also  recommend  the  order  in  which  the  pro- 
posed defense  shall  be  completed,  so  that  all  the  elements  of 
harbor  defense  may  be  properly  and  effectively  coordinated.'^ 

The  following  were  appointed  to  constitute  this  ne^v  board 
Hon.  William  H.  Taft,  Secretary  of  War,  president  of  the 
Board;  Lieutenant  General  Adna  E.  Chaffee,  Chief  of  Staff 
Major  General  George  L.   Gillespie,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff 
Brigadier  General  Adolphus  AV.   Greely,  Chief  Signal   Officer 
Brigadier  General  William  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance ;  Brigadier 
General    John    P.    Story,    Chief   of    Artillery,    General    Staff 
Brigadier  General  Alexander  Mackenzie,   Chief  of  Engineers 
Captain  Charles  M.  Thomas,  U.  S.  Navy;  Captain  Charles  S 
Sperry,  TJ.  S.  Navy;  Major  George  W.  Goethals,  General  Staff, 
secretary  of  the  Board. 

Upon  convening,  the  National  Coast  Defense  Board  —  or 
^'  The  Taft  Board ''  as  it  is  generally  known  —  subdivided 
its  preliminary  work  into  three  parts,  viz:  (1)  charge  and 
supervision  of  matters  relating  to  fortifications  and  arma- 
ment in  general;  (2)  torpedoes  and  similar  accessories  in  the 
work  of  defence  and  communication;  and  (3)  those  matters 
in  which  the  Navy  was  more  especially  concerned.  Each 
subdivision  was  allotted  to  a  separate  committee,  and  a  care- 
ful study  of  the  conditions  was  made  by  a  personal  inspec- 
tion of  the  various  harbours  along  the  Atlantic,  Gulf  and 
Pacific  coasts,  at  Guantanamo  and  on  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama. The  committee  whose  functions  were  enumerated  un- 
der the  first  heading  adopted  the  ensuing  important  resolu- 
tion : 


316     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1905-1906 

"  The  committee  is  of  the  opinion  that  in  the  present  state  of 
the  coast  defenses  it  is  highly  important  that  measures  be  taken 
to  render  the  armament  already  installed  fully  effective,  and 
that,  to  this  end,  ample  appropriations  should  be  made  to  com- 
plete, in  the  harbors  of  the  United  States  already  fortified, 
those  accessory  works  and  installations,  such  as  a  system  of  fire 
control  and  direction,  power  plants  and  searchlights,  and  the 
submarine  and  torpedo  defense,  which  are  necessary  to  realize 
the  full  value  of  what  has  already  been  provided." 


99 


The  full  report  of  the  Taft  Board  was  not  rendered  until 
February  1,  1906,  and  we  shall  have  occasion  to  comment 
upon  it  in  considering  the  events  of  that  year.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  this  board  took  pains  to  differentiate  between  coast 
defence  and  harbour  defence  —  a  distinction  which  is  of  im- 
portance insomuch  as  the  United  States  has  never  had,  and- 
does  not  to-day  possess,  anything  beyond  harbour  defence,  ex- 
cept insofar  as  the  mobile  army  can  be  depended  upon  for 
the  protection  of  our  coasts. 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1906 

The  first  session  of  the  Fifty-ninth  Congress  was  marked 
by  the  enaction  of  certain  military  legislation  of  consider- 
able importance.  The  Army  Appropriation  Act,  approved 
on  June  12,  1906,  provided,  under  the  heading  of  Retired 
Officers, 

"  That  hereafter  no  officer  holding  a  rank  above  that  of  colonel 
shall  be  retired  except  for  disability  or  on  account  of  having 
reached  the  age  of  sixty-four  years  until  he  shall  have  served 
at  least  one  year  in  such  rank."  ^^^ 

Congress  apparently  realized  that  the  valuable  training  af- 
forded by  such  joint  manoeuvres  as  had  occurred  in  1902, 
1903  and  1904,  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  lapse  as  they 
did  in  1905  owing  to  its  own  negligence,  and  it  therefore 
appropriated  $700,000  for  the  expenses  of  the  militia  par- 
ticipating "  in  such  brigade  or  division  encampments,"  ^^* 
and  further  allotted  $550,000  "  for  the  purpose  of  procur- 
ing field-artillery  material  for  the  organized  militia."  ^^^ 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  317 

1906] 

On  June  twenty-second  there  was  approved  "  An  Act  To 
increase  the  efficiency  of  the  militia  and  promote  rifle  prac- 
tice/' -^^^  which  was  of  more  than  ordinary  importance.  The 
amendment  to  Section  1661  of  the  Revised  Statutes  was  fur- 
ther amended  so  as  to  read 

"  That  the  sum  of  two  million  dollars  is  hereby  annually  ap- 
propriated, to  be  paid  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not 
otherwise  appropriated,  for  the  purpose  of  providing  arms,  ord- 
nance stores,  quartermaster  stores,  and  camp  equipage  for  issue 
to  the  militia,  such  appropriation  to  remain  available  until  ex- 
pended." 

Section  two  of  the  Act  of  February   12,    1887,   was   also 
changed  to  read  thus: 

'^  Sec.  2.  That  said  appropriation  shall  be  apportioned 
among  the  several  States  and  Territories,  under  the  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  according  to  the  number  of  Senators 
and  Eepresentatives  to  which  each  State  respectively  is  entitled 
in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  and  to  the  Territories  and 
District  of  Columbia  such  proportion  and  under  such  regulations 
as  the  President  may  prescribe:  Provided,  however,  That  no 
State  shall  be  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  appropriation  ap- 
portioned to  it  unless  the  number  of  its  regularly  enlisted,  or- 
ganized, and  uniformed  active  militia  shall  be  at  least  one  hun- 
dred men  for  each  Senator  and  Eepresentative  to  which  such 
State  is  entitled  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  And 
the  amount  of  said  appropriation  which  is  thus  determined  not 
to  be  available  shall  be  covered  back  into  the  Treasury:  Pro- 
vided also,  That  the  sums  so  apportioned  among  the  several 
States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be 
available  for  the  purposes  named  in  section  fourteen  of  the  Act 
of  January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  for  the 
actual  expenses  of  travel  in  making  the  inspections  therein  pro- 
vided for  over  the  allowances  made  for  same  by  law;  for  the 
promotion  of  rifle  practice,  including  the  acquisition,  construc- 
tion, maintenance,  and  equipment  of  shooting  galleries  and 
suitable  target  ranges ;  for  the  hiring  of  horses  and  draft  animals 
for  the  use  of  mounted  troops,  batteries,  and  wagons ;  for  forage 
for  the  same  and  for  such  other  incidental  expenses  in  connec- 
tion with  encampments,  maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  pro- 
vided for  in  sections  fourteen  and  fifteen  of  the  said  Act  of 


318     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1905 

January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  as  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  may  deem  necessary." 

Section  three  of  the  same  act  was  amended  and  re-enacted 
as  follows: 

^^  Sec.  3.  That  the  purchase  or  manufacture  of  arms,  ord- 
nance stores,  quartermaster  stores,  and  camp  equipage  for  the 
militia  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  made  under  the 
direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  such  arms,  ordnance  and 
quartermaster  stores,  and  camp  equipage  are  now  manufactured 
or  otherwise  provided  for  the  use  of  the  Eegular  Army,  and  they 
shall  be  receipted  for  and  shall  remain  the  property  of  the 
United  States,  and  be  annually  accounted  for  by  the  governors 
of  the  States  and  Territories  and  by  the  commanding  general  of 
the  National  Guard  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  for  which  pur- 
pose the  Secretary  of  War  shall  prescribe  and  supply  the  neces- 
sary blanks  and  make  such  regulations  as  he  may  deem  neces- 
sary to  protect  the  interests  of  the  United  States.'' 

Section  four  of  the  Act  of  February  12,   1887,   was  thus 
amended : 

"  Sec.  4.  That  whenever  any  property  furnished  to  any 
State  or  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  as  hereinbefore 
provided,  has  been  lost  or  destroyed,  or  has  become  unserviceable 
or  unsuitable  from  use  in  service,  or  from  any  other  cause,  it 
shall  be  examined  by  a  disinterested  surveying  officer  of  the 
organized  militia,  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor  of  the  State 
or  Territory,  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  National  Guard 
of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  whom  the  property  has  been 
issued,  and  his  report  shall  be  forwarded  by  said  governor 
or  commanding  general  direct  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  if  it 
shall  appear  to  the  Secretary  of  War  from  the  record  of  survey 
that  the  property  has  been  lost  or  destroyed  through  unavoid- 
able causes,  he  is  hereby  authorized  to  relieve  the  State  from  fur- 
ther accountability  therefor;  if  it  shall  appear  that  the  loss  or 
destruction  of  property  was  due  to  carelessness  or  neglect  or 
that  its  loss  could  have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care,  the  money  value  therof  shall  be  charged  against  the  allot- 
ment to  the  States  under  section  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one 
of  the  Eevised  Statutes  as  amended.  If  the  articles  so  surveyed 
are  found  to  be  unserviceable  or  unsuitable,  the  Secretary  of 
War  shall  direct  what  disposition,  by  sale  or  otherwise,  shall  be 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  319 

1906] 

made  of  them,  except  unserviceable  clothing  which  shall  be  de- 
stroyed, and  if  sold  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  shall  be  covered 
into  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States/^ 

On  June  25,  1906,  was  approved  "  An  Act  To  increase 
the  efficiency  of  the  Ordnance  Department  of  the  United 
States  Army,"  ^^^  in  which  the  repeated  recommendations  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  for  more  officers  were  heeded  by  the 
provision 

"  That  the  Ordnance  Department  shall  consist  of  one  chief 
of  ordnance  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general;  six  colonels^ 
nine  lieutenant-colonels,  nineteen  majors,  twenty-five  captains, 
twenty-five  first  lieutenants,  and  the  enlisted  men,  including 
ordnance-sergeants,  as  now  authorized  by  law. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  details  to  the  Ordnance  Department  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  February  second,  nineteen  hundred 
and  one,  may  be  made  from  the  Army  at  large  from  the  grade 
in  which  the  vacancy  exists,  or  from  the  grade  below :  Provided, 
That  no  officer  shall  be  so  detailed  except  upon  the  recommenda- 
tion of  a  board  of  ordnance  officers,  and  after  at  least  one  ex- 
amination, which  shall  be  open  to  competition:  And  'provided 
further,  That  officers  so  detailed  in  grades  below  that  of  major 
shall  not  be  again  eligible  for  such  detail  until  after  they  have 
served  for  at  least  one  year  out  of  that  department.'^ 

The  Act  of  June  25th  stipulated  that  the  chief  of  the  Bu- 
reau of  Insular  Affairs  should  be  appointed  by  the  President 
for  four  years  "  and  while  holding  that  office  he  shall  have 
the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  brigadier-general";-^^^ 
while  a  third  act,  approved  that  same  day,  appropriated 
$250,000  for  the  purchase  of  two  tracts  of  land,  on  Deer 
Island,  in  Boston  Harbour,  "  for  fortification  purposes  " ;  io& 
and  Congress,  forgetting  that  national  defence  and  the  neces- 
sary training  for  it  are,  or  ought  to  be,  paramount  to  any  con- 
sideration of  local  interests,  inserted  the  ensuing  proviso: 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  United  States  shall  be  liable  for  any 
damage  to  the  property  of  the  city  of  Boston  or  to  the  works  of 
the  North  Metropolitan  Sewerage  System  located  on  said  island 
that  may  be  caused  by  the  firing  of  guns  in  time  of  peace  from 
batteries  erected  within  the  area  that  may  be  acquired  as  afore- 


320     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1906 

said ;  and  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  and  directed,  when- 
ever any  such  damage  occurs,  to  ascertain  and  determine  what 
would  be  a  reasonable  and  proper  compensation  to  pay  the  city 
of  Boston  and  shall  certify  the  same  to  Congress  for  considera- 
tion/' 1^7 

The  fourth  act,  approved  on  June  25th,  made  appropria- 
tions ^^  for  fortifications  and  other  w^orks  of  defense  "  and 
allotted  $165,000 

"  for  the  erection  and  equipment  of  a  powder  factory,  with  its 
necessary  communications  and  accessory  structures,  upon  such 
reservation  now  or  that  may  hereafter  be  under  the  control  of 
the  War  Department  as  may  be  selected  by  the  Secretary  of 
War."  1^8 

A  most  important  step  was  thus  taken  in  empowering  the 
military  service  to  embark  upon  the  manufacture  of  powder 
—  the  object  being  to  render  it  more  or  less  independent  of 
private  producers  —  and  the  new  factory  was  located  at  the 
Picatinny  Arsenal  at  Dover,  New  Jersey.  The  same  act  set 
apart  $310,000  for  the  purchase  of  sites  and  the  erection  of 
seacoast  batteries  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,-^  ^^  and  three  days 
later  an  additional  appropriation  of  $1,700,000  was  made 
"  for  completing  the  necessary  improvements  at  the  United 
States  Military  Academy  at  West  Point.''  ^^^ 

On  June  30th  a  law  ^^^  went  into  operation  specifying 

^'  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  issue, 
at  his  discretion  and  under  proper  regulations  to  be  prescribed 
by  him,  without  cost  of  transportation  to  the  United  States,  such 
obsolete  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  as  may  be  available  to 
State  and  Territorial  educational  institutions  and  to  State  sol- 
diers and  sailors  orphans'  homes,  for  purposes  of  drill  and  in- 
struction. 

"  And  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  require  from  such  institutions 
or  homes  a  bond  in  each  case  in  double  the  value  of  the  property 
issued  for  the  care  and  safe-keeping  thereof  and  for  the  return 
of  the  same  to  the  United  States  when  required  :  Provided,  That 
the  issue  herein  provided  for  shall  be  made  only  to  institutions 
upon  recommendation  of  the  governors  of  States  and  Territories 
iind  shall  not  be  made  in  any  case  to  any  educational  institution  to 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  321 

1906] 

which  issues  of  such  stores  are  allowed  to  be  made  under  pro- 
visions of  existing  law." 

Five  Joint  Resolutions  relating  to  the  military  service 
were  passed  during  the  year  ^^  ^  but  they  are  not  of  sufficient 
importance  to  require  chronicling  here. 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1906 

During  the  year  it  became  necessary  to  use  certain  of 
the  troops  stationed  in  the  Philippines  to  assist  the  Philip- 
pine constabulary  and  scouts  in  quelling  disorders  which  they 
were  unable  to  cope  with.  In  the  island  of  Jolo  the  depreda- 
tions of  a  band  of  fanatical  Moros,  several  hundred  strong, 
led,  after  peaceful  measures  had  been  exhausted,  to  the  de- 
spatching in  March  of  an  expedition  under  Colonel  Joseph 
W.  Duncan  of  the  6th  Infantry  against  their  stronghold  at 
Bud-Da  jo.  The  engagement,  which  lasted  from  the  5  th  to  the 
8th  of  that  month,  was  characterised  by  some  desperate  fight- 
ing on  both  sides  and  the  attempts  of  the  American  troops  to 
carry  the  place  —  which  was  one  of  extraordinary  natural 
strength  —  threatened  to  end  in  failure  when  an  escalade  led 
by  Lieutenant  Gordon  Johnston,  who  had  volunteered  to  ac- 
company the  expedition,  effected  an  entrance  over  the  stock- 
ade, and  the  fight  culminated  in  the  killing  of  many  of  the 
Moros  and  in  the  dispersal  of  the  rest.^^^ 

From  the  18th  of  April  until  the  first  of  July  the  Regular 
troops  rendered  signal  service  in  supplying  the  destitute  and 
maintaining  order  in  San  Francisco  after  the  earthquake 
and  conflagration  which  had  destroyed  a  large  part  of  that 
city. 

During  the  summer  an  insurrection  against  the  Cuban 
government  assumed  such  proportions  that  the  President  of 
that  republic  requested  the  United  States  Government  to  in- 
tervene, basing  its  action  on  the  authority  emanating  from 
the  so-called  "  Piatt  amendment.'^  In  compliance  therewith 
and  as  a  preliminary  to  the  establishment  of  a  provisional 
government  looking  to  the  pacification  of  the  island,  an  ex- 


322     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1905 

peditionary  force  composed  of  5,396  Eegular  troops  was  de- 
spatched to  Cuba  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General 
J.  Franklin  Bell,  the  Chief  of  Staff.  The  value  of  a  General 
Staff  was  evinced  by  the  precision  and  utter  absence  of  fric- 
tion and  confusion  which  characterized  the  organization, 
equipping,  supplying  and  transportation  of  this  expedi- 
tion. ^^^ 

Disaffection  over  the  allotment  of  lands  in  the  Uintah 
reservation  caused  a  band  of  some  300  Ute  Indians  to  break 
out  across  Wyoming.  In  response  to  the  call  of  the  gov- 
ernor of  that  State,  troops  were  sent  to  intercept  them,  and 
the  entire  body  was  conducted  to  Fort  Meade,  South  Dakota. 

A  serious  breach  of  military  discipline  occurred  during  the 
night  of  August  13th-14th,  when  certain  soldiers  of  the  25th 
Infantry  (coloured)  stationed  at  Fort  Brown  "  shot  up  "  the 
town  of  Brownsville,  killing  and  wounding  several  persons. 
An  investigation  conducted  by  Inspector-General  Garlington 
was  promptly  made  and  the  culprits  punished.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  report  of  the  Judge-Advocate  showed  that 
the  number  of  cases  tried  by  summary  courts  during  1906 
"  was  but  slightly  less  than  during  the  preceding  year,  when 
there  were  51,329." 

The  excellent  innovations  in  the  matter  of  schooling  of  the 
troops,  which  were  put  into  operation  during  the  year  1906, 
are  comprehensively  described  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  who  stated, -^^^  under  the  heading  of  Encampments 
of  the  Eegular  Army  and  the  Militia,  that 

"  The  past  year  has  been  one  of  great  activity  for  the  Army  in 
the  earnest  and  persistent  training  that  has  been  had  in  the  dif- 
ferent exercises  calculated  to  instruct  and  prepare  the  soldier  in 
time  of  peace  for  his  actual  duties  in  war.  There  have  been 
weekly  practise  marches  of  not  less  than  12  miles  for  foot  troops 
and  18  miles  for  mounted  troops,  and  during  the  open  season  a 
monthly  march  of  instruction  covering  three  consecutive  days 
and  requiring  two  camps. 

"  The  principal  difference  between  the  old  system  of  training 
and  the  new  system  inaugurated  during  the  past  year  consists  in 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  323 

1906] 

the  frequence  of  practise  inarches  with  full  equipment  and  the 
conduct  of  skirmish  fire  at  target  practise  in  field  kit;  and  in 
addition  to  the  valuable  practical  knowledge  that  was  to  be  ac- 
quired, one  of  the  main  objects  was  to  keep  both  men  and  ani- 
mals in  fit  condition  for  active  service  at  any  time.  There  has 
been  some  difference  of  opinion  regarding  the  efficacy  of  the  new 
system,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  marching  and  skirmish 
fire  in  full  equipment,  but,  upon  the  whole,  it  has  met  with  ap- 
proval. 

"  Some  of  the  requirements  of  this  new  system  of  practical 
training  were  fulfilled  in  connection  with  the  joint  encampments 
of  the  Army  and  the  Militia  during  August  and  September  in 
the  seven  camps  of  instruction  that  were  established  at  Mount 
Gretna,  Pa.;  American  Lake,  Washington;  Fort  Eiley,  Kans. ; 
Fort  Benjamin  Harrison,  Ind. ;  State  Maneuver  Camp,  near 
Austin,  Tex. ;  Target  and  Maneuver  Eeservation,  near  Fort  D. 
A.  Russell,  Wyo.,  and  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. 

"  Each  camp  was  commanded  by  a  general  officer,  and  prac- 
tically all  the  cavalry,  infantry,  and  field  artillery  stationed  in 
the  United  States  were  assembled  in  these  seven  camps  of  instruc- 
tion. In  the  concentration  of  the  troops  and  their  dispersion  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  camp  period,  the  infantry  were  required  to 
march  approximately  200  miles  and  the  field  artillery  and  cavalry 
250  miles  each  way,  and  both  on  the  march  and  in  camp  the 
conditions  of  field  service  in  time  of  war  were  approximated  as 
nearly  as  possible.  The  flooring  of  tents  and  similar  semi- 
permanent arrangements  were  forbidden,  and  the  maximum  of 
drills,  exercises,  and  problems  calculated  to  harden  the  troops 
and  perfect  their  field  training  were  enjoined,  ^together  with 
the  minimum  of  formal  ceremonies  and  a  total  absence  of  merely 
spectacular  exhibitions.^ 

"  All  the  work  incident  to  the  formation,  maintenance,  and  dis- 
continuance of  the  camps  was  done  by  officers  and  enlisted  men, 
each  officer  doing,  so  far  as  practicable,  the  duties  of  the  staff 
corps  or  arm  of  service  to  which  he  belonged." 

The  resumption  of  these  joint  manoeuvres,  which  had  been 
discontinued  during  1906  for  want  of  an  appropriation,  was 
welcomed  by  the  military  authorities,  Federal  and  State 
alike,  as  is  attested  by  the  fact  that  no  less  than  49,717  troops 
participated  in  them,  the  Regular  officers  and  men  number- 
ing 20,478  and  the  Militia  29,239.^1  ^ 


324     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1906 

As  a  further  step  to  increased  efficiency  of  the  Army,  the 
Secretary  of  War  recommended  the  abolition  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  the  small  posts  scattered  all  over  the  country  —  a 
necessity  during  the  Indian  wars,  but  one  whose  raison  d'etre 
had  long  since  vanished  —  and  the  concentration  of  the 
troops  in  regimental  and  brigade  posts,  in  order  that  officers 
and  men  might  be  afforded  the  opportunity  for  training  such 
bodies  as  they  would  necessarily  serve  with  in  time  of  war. 
He  again  called  attention  to  the  need  of  an  increase  in  the 
Artillery  Corps,  and  advocated  its  separation  into  Field  Ar- 
tillery and  Coast  Artillery  on  the  ground  that  the  existing 
system  was  ''  illogical  and  wasteful  and  altogether  unsatis- 
factory," and  that  "  modem  experience  teaches  the  wisdom 
of  a  regimental  organization  for  field  artillery,  and  the  ne- 
cessity for  a  corps  organization  for  the  coast  artillery  is 
founded  in  the  very  nature  of  things."  An  increase  had 
been  made  by  the  Act  of  June  26,  1906,  in  the  Ordnance  de- 
partment but,  as  the  Medical  Corps  had  been  overlooked,  em- 
phasis was  laid  on  the  need  for  more  officers  in  that  depart- 
ment, and  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  Act  of  February  2, 
1901,  had  left  it  defective  in  three  important  particulars, 
namely : 

"  I.  A  commissioned  personnel  entirely  adequate  to  perform 
the  medical  service  of  the  Army  in  time  of  peace. 

"  II.  Insufficient  enducement  in  the  way  of  pay  and  promo- 
tion to  attract  the  most  desirable  class  of  young  physicians  to 
enter  and  remain  in  the  corps. 

"  III.  No  satisfactory  means  of  expansion  to  meet  war  con- 
ditions and  special  needs  in  time  of  peace."  ^^^ 

Particular  stress  was  placed  upon  the  urgent  advisability  of 
amendment  of  the  laws  of  April  22,  1898,  and  January  21, 
1903  (the  Dick  Bill)  — governing  the  use  in  time  of  war  of 
forces  other  than  the  Regular  establishment.  The  whole 
matter  was  thus  admirably  summed  up  by  Secretary  Taf  t :  — 

"*There  seems  to  be  lack  of  clearness  as  to  the  distinction  be- 
tween calling  the  militia  (i.  e.,  all  citizens  liable  to  military  duty) 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  the  raising  of  volun- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  325 

1906] 

teers,  these  two  operations  being  seemingly  taken  as  practically 
identical  procedures  and  the  two  forces  as  identical,  whereas 
they  are  wholly  distinct  forces  and  should  be  kept  so.  The  or- 
ganized militia  is  primarily  under  the  control  of  the  State  au- 
thorities, at  the  disposal,  however,  of  the  National  Government 
for  a  limited  period  and  for  certain  purposes,  as  set  forth  in  sec- 
tion 4  of  the  act  of  January  21,  1903.     Volunteer  forces,  on 

THE  OTHER  HAND,  CONSTITUTE  A  FEDERAL  AGENCY,  CREATED  BY 
FEDERAL  LAW,  AND  TO  BE  USED  EXCLUSIVELY  FOR  NATIONAL  PUR- 
POSES, AND  THIS  DISTINCTION  SHOULD  BE  MORE  CLEARLY  MAIN- 
TAINED IN   THE   LAWS. 

"  The  general  practise  heretofore  of  calling  out  volunteers  has 
been  to  address  a  call  to  the  governors  of  the  various  States  for 
so  many  organizations,  complete,  the  officers  being  appointed 
by  the  governors.  The  last  portion  of  Section  6  of  the  act  of 
April  22,  1898,  however,  authorizes  the  raising  from  the  nation 
at  large  of  not  to  exceed  3,000  men,  and  provided  for  the  appoint- 
ment by  the  President  of  the  officers  of  this  force.  Similar  pro- 
vision was  later  made  for  volunteer  regiments  for  service  in  the 
Philippine  Islands.  These  experiments  were  so  entirely  suc- 
cessful as  to  force  the  conclusion  that  this  is  the  proper  method 
of  raising  and  training  volunteers.  This  of  course  is  not  an  in- 
fringement of  the  constitutional  provision  reserving  to  the 
States  the  appointment  of  the  officers  of  the  militia.  This  lat- 
ter vests  in  the  State  authorities,  even  after  the  organized  militia 
is  ordered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  but  for  volunteer 
forces  the  President  should  be  free  to  exercise  his  constitutional 
power  to  ^  nominate  and,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,'  to  appoint  the  commissioned  officers  of  the  Army."  ^ 


17 


By  all  odds  the  most  important  event  of  the  year  from  a 
military  standpoint  was  the  report  of  the  ]^ational  Coast- 
Defense  Board  rendered  to  the  President  on  February  1, 
1906.-^-^^  The  principal  consideration  upon  which  its  recom- 
mendations were  based  was  contained  in  the  postulate  with 
respect  to  any  given  fortification  and  its  guns  that, 

"  If  the  ariymment  will  compel  the  enemy  to  land  in  order  to 
effect  its  capture,  it  has  fulfilled  its  function,  and  any  increase 
in  armament  thereafter  is  an  unwarrantable  expense  in  material 
and  personnel."  ^^^ 

In  other  words,  it  admitted  tacitly  that  the  United  States 


326     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1906 
POSSESSES    NO    COAST    DEFENCES,,    ONLY    HAitBOUR    DEFENCES,, 

and  that  the  ultimate  peotection  of  our  coasts,  and  in- 
deed OF  ANY  FORTIFICATION  GUARDING  A  HARBOUR,  MUST  NEC- 
ESSARILY devolvei  upon  a  MOBILE  ARMY  —  f acts  which  can- 
not be  too  strongly  emphasized. 

Under  the  plan  advocated  by  the  Endicott  Board  in  1886,  per- 
manent harbour  defences  had,  by  the  beginning  of  1906,  been 
installed  at  the  following  places  in  continental  United  States : 

1.  Kennebec  River,  Maine. 

2.  Portland,  Maine. 

3.  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 

4.  Boston,  Massachusetts. 

5.  N'ew  Bedford,  Massachusetts. 

6.  Narragansett  Bay,  Ehode  Island. 

7.  Eastern  entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound. 

8.  New   York. 

9.  Delaware  River. 

10.  Baltimore,  Maryland. 

11.  Washington,  District  of  Columbia. 

12.  Hampton  Roads,  Virginia. 

13.  Cape  Fear  River,  North  Carolina. 

14.  Charleston,  South  Carolina. 

15.  Port  Royal,  South  Carolina. 

16.  Savannah,  Georgia. 

17.  Key  West,  Florida. 

18.  Tampa  Bay,  Florida. 

19.  Pensacola,  Florida. 

20.  Mobile,  Alabama. 

21.  New  Orleans,  Louisiana. 

22.  Galveston,  Texas. 

23.  San  Diego,  California. 

24.  San   Francisco,   California. 

25.  Columbia  River,  Oregon  and  Washington. 

26.  Puget  Sound,  Washington.^^o 

To  the  above,  the  Taft  Board  added  the  ensuing : 

1.  Eastern  entrance  to  New  York. 

2.  Southern  entrance  to  New  York. 

3.  Entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay. 

4.  Lake  ports. 

5.  Kiska  Island,  Bering  Sea. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  327 

1906] 

In  the  insular  possessions,  fortifications  were   advocated  at 

1.  Gnantanamo,  Cuba. 

2.  San  Juan,  Porto  Eico. 

3.  Guam,  in  the  Pacific. 

4.  Subig  Bay,  Philippines. 

5.  Manila  Bay,  Philippines. 

6.  Pearl  Harbour  and  Honolulu. 

On  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  defences  were  to  be  placed  at 

1.  Colon. 

2.  Panama. 

Attention  was  invited  to  the  fact  that 

"  Commercially  and  strategically  Chesapeake  Bay  is  to-day, 
as  it  always  has  been,  of  the  very  first  importance.  With  the 
entrance  as  it  is  now,  unfortified,  a  hostile  fleet,  should  it  gain 
control  of  the  sea,  can  establish,  without  coming  under  the  fire 
of  a  single  gun,  a  base  on  its  shores,  pass  in  and  out  at  pleasure, 
have  access  to  large  quantities  of  valuable  supplies  of  all  kinds, 
and  paralyze  the  great  trunk  railway  lines  crossing  the  head  of 
the  bay. 

"  The  completion  of  the  fortifications  at  the  entrance  to  Long 
Island  Sound  is  placed  second  to  Chesapeake  Bay  only  because 
there  are  some  guns  already  mounted  at  the  former,  while  there 
are  none  to  defend  the  channel  between  Cape  Charles  and  Cape 
Henry.  The  importance  of  the  fortifications  at  the  entrance  to 
Long  Island  Sound  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  constitute  the 
first  and  chief  line  of  defense  of  !N'ew  York  City  against  naval 
attack  from  that  direction;  they  will  prevent  the  occupation  by 
a  hostile  fleet  of  Gardiner's  Bay  or  other  interior  water  as  a  naval 
base,  and  will  also  protect  various  manufacturing  towns  estab- 
lished along  the  Sound,  including  New  London,  Bridgeport, 
New  Haven,  and  others." 

Next  in  importance  were  placed  Puget  Sound,  Subig  Bay, 
Guantanamo  and  the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay,  in  the  order 
named. -^^-^ 

The  above  is  of  interest  in  that  it  affords  another  example 
of  Congressional  procrastination  and  unwillingness  to  do  its 
whole  duty  in  respect  to  national  defence.  Though  no  less 
than  twenty  years  had  elapsed  since  the  report  of  the  Endi- 


328     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1906 

cott  Board,  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay,  one  of  the  most 
important  inland  arteries  of  trade  in  the  country,  was  still 
defenceless.  One  wonders  if  Job  had  dealings  with  a  body 
like  Congress  and  for  that  reason  uttered  the  complaint, 
"  How  long,  O  Lord,  how  long  ? '' 

The  report  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board  showed 
that  the 

1.  The  total  cost  of  the  existing  system  of  coast  defenses  of 
continental  United  States,  up  to  February,  1906,  amounted  to 
$72,750,583.98. 

2.  The  cost  to  complete  the  defenses  of  the  United  States,  in- 
cluding sites  and  ammunition,  was  estimated  at  $50,879,339.00. 

3.  The  estimated  cost  of  ilie  defenses  for  insular  harbors,  in- 
cluding ammunition,  was  placed  at  $19,873,895.00. 

4.  The  expenditures  necessary  for  the  fortifications  at  the  two 
entrances  to  the  Panama  Canal  were  calculated  at  $4,827,682.00. 

5.  The  cost  of  completing  the  submarine  equipment,  installa- 
tion of  the  system  of  range  and  position  finding,  and  tlie  neces- 
sary search-lights  for  harbor  defense  at  night  was  estimated  at 
$14,513,084. 

6.  The  requisite  power  plants  and  electrical  installation  for 
use  in  connection  with  both  guns  and  mines  was  calculated  to 
involve  an  expenditure  of  $3,062,664.^" 

During  the  course  of  the  year  work  was  continued  on  the 
fortifications  of  continental  United  States,  at  Manila  Bay 
and  at  Subig  Bay  in  the  Philippines.  Careful  study  was 
also  made  of  the  proper  sites  for  batteries  at  Pearl  Harbour 
and  Honolulu,  but  the  construction  of  batteries  at  those  points 
could  not  be  begun  until  the  following  year.^^^ 

MHJTAI^Y  LEGISLATION  DURING  1907 

The  military  legislation  passed  during  the  year  1907  pre- 
sented only  a  few  notable  features,  the  most  important  by  all 
odds  being  "  An  Act  To  reorganize  and  to  increase  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  artillery  of  the  United  States  Army,"  approved 
on  January  25th. ^^'^  The  separation  of  this  corps  into  two 
parts,  as  advocated  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his  report  for 
1906,  was  made  by  the  first  section  which  provided 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  329 

1907] 

'*  That  the  artillery  of  the  United  States  Army  shall  consist 
of  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  the  coast  artillery  and  the  field  artillery. 
The  coast  artillery  and  the  field  artillery  shall  he  organized  as 
hereinafter  specified,  and  the  artillery  shall  belong  to  the  line  of 
the  Army:  Provided,  That  on  and  after  July  first,  nineteen 
hundred  and  eight,  the  Chief  of  Artillery  shall  cease  to  exercise 
supervision  over  the  field  artillery  and  shall  hereafter  be  desig- 
nated as  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery/' 

It  seems  incredible  that  these  two  branches  of  the  artillery 
should  have  been  retained  so  long  together,  instead  of  being 
kept  distinct  and  apart  as  almost  every  other  military  Power 
has  found  it  expedient  to  do.  Indeed,  in  Germany  the  coast 
artillery  is  designated  as  "  Marine  Artillery  "  and  is  placed 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Minister  of  the  Marine. 

Section  2  specified  "  That  the  Chief  of  Artillery  or  Chief 
of  Coast  Artillery  shall  be  an  additional  member  of  the 
General  Staff  Corps,  and  his  other  duties  shall  be  prescribed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War.''  It  also  provided  that  he  should 
be  selected  from  the  Coast  Artillery ;  that  when  retired  should 
have  ^^  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances  authorized  by  law  for  a 
brigadier-general  on  the  retired  list " ;  and  that  he  should 
either  continue  in  the  same  lineal  position  as  he  w^ould  have 
held  under  ordinary  circumstances  or  be  an  additional  num- 
ber either  in  the  grade  to  which,  or  that  from  which,  he  was 
appointed. 

The  next  two  sections  ran  as  follows : 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  coast  artillery  is  the  artillery  charged 
with  the  care  and  use  of  fixed  and  movable  elements  of  land  and 
coast  fortifications,  including  the  submarine  mine  and  torpedo 
defenses. 

"  Sec.  4.  That  the  field  artillery  is  the  artillery  which  ac- 
companies an  army  in  the  field,  and  includes  light  artillery, 
horse  artillery  siege  artillery,  and  mountain  artillery.'' 

Section  5  stipulated  "  That  the  coast  artillery  shall  con- 
stitute a  corps,  and  shall  consist  of  one  Chief  of  Coast  Artil- 
lery with  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  brigadier-gen- 
eral,"  certain  commissioned   and  non-commissioned   officers 


330     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

duly  enumerated  and  numbering  respectively  700  and  399, 
"  one  hundred  and  seventy  companies,  and  fourteen  bands." 

Section  6  prescribed  the  strength  of  each  company  of  Coast 
Artillery,  and  inserted  the  proviso  that  the  number  of  ser- 
geants should  be  in  excess  of  1,362  or  the  corporals  2,040, 
"  and  that  the  total  enlisted  strength  of  the  coast  artillery 
as  provided  under  this  Act,  shall  not  exceed  nineteen  thou- 
sand one  hundred  and  forty-seven,  exclusive  of  master  elec- 
tricians, electrician-sergeants,  first  class,  and  electrician-ser- 
geants, second  class." 

Section  7  fixed  the  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery, 
which  was  to  consist  of  six  regiments,  each  having  ^^  six  bat- 
teries organized  into  two  battalions  of  three  batteries  each," 
while  Section  8  established  the  composition  of  the  field  bat- 
teries which,  exclusive  of  the  commissioned  and  non-com- 
missioned officers,  were  to  contain  102  privates.  An  expan- 
sive organization  was  wisely  arranged  for  by  permitting  the 
President  to  increase  in  any  battery  of  Field  Artillery  the 
number  of  sergeants  from  six  to  eight,  the  corporals  from 
twelve  to  sixteen,  the  mechanics  from  four  to  seven,  the  mu- 
sicians from  two  to  three,  "  and  the  number  of  privates  to 
one  hundred  and  forty-nine  " ;  but  it  was  expressly  stipulated 
that  the  total  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  line  of  the  Army, 
together  with  native  scouts,  was  not  to  be  increased  beyond 
that  fixed  by  Section  36  of  the  Act  of  February  2,  1901, 
which  —  as  has  been  seen  —  was  limited  to  96,799. 

The  severance  of  the  two  branches  of  the  artillery  was  thus 
provided  for: 

"  Sec.  9.  That  on  and  after  the  approval  of  this  Act  the 
coast  artillery  and  the  field  artillery  shall  be  permanently  sepa- 
rated, the  separation  to  be  effected  as  follows : 

"  All  officers  in  the  present  Artillery  Corps  shall  remain  on 
one  list  as  regards  promotion  until  sufficient  promotions  shall 
have  been  made,  as  far  as  the  present  number  of  officers  permit, 
to  provide  in  each  grade,  together  with  the  officers  remaining 
therein,  the  total  number  of  officers  of  the  grade  provided 
for  in  this  Act  for  the  coast  and  field  artillery  combined.     After 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  331 

1907] 

such  promotion  they  shall,  in  each  grade,  be  assigned  by  the 
President  to  the  coast  artillery  or  to  the  field  artillery,  according 
to  special  aptitude  and  qualifications  and  agreeably  to  individual 
preference,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable  and  for  the  good  of  the 
service,  such  assignments  to  be  permanent;  and  all  officers  pro- 
moted or  appointed  in  the  artillery  thereafter  shall  be  commis- 
sioned as  officers  of  the  coast  artillery  or  the  field  artillery,  as 
the  case  may  be,  and  shall  be  promoted  by  seniority  in  their  own 
branch,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  laws  governing  promo- 
tion in  the  Army  at  large.'^ 

Section  10  prescribed  that  vacancies  should  be  filled  in 
the  usual  method  of  promotion  but,  in  case  of  an  insufficiency 
of  officers  in  the  Artillery  Corps, 

^'  one-fifth  in  each  branch  shall  be  filled  in  each  fiscal  year  until 
the  total  number  of  officers  herein  provided  for  shall  have  been 
attained.  The  vacancies  remaining  in  the  grade  of  second  lieu- 
tenant shall  be  filled  by  appointment  in  the  following  order: 
First,  of  graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy ;  sec- 
ond, of  enlisted  men  whose  fitness  for  advancement  shall  have 
been  determined  by  competitive  examination ;  third,  of  candidates 
from  civil  life;  and  all  such  appointments  shall  be  made  in  ac- 
cordance w4th  the  provisions  of  existing  law." 

The  next  section  established  the  pay  and  allowances  of 
non-commissioned  staff  officers,  as  well  as  additional  pay  for 
certain  of  them  such  as  casemate  electricians,  plotters,  etc., 
and  fixed  their  number,  with  the  proviso  that  no  enlisted 
man  should  receive  '^  more  than  one  addition  to  his  pay." 
Section  12  permitted  the  appointment  of  "  one  chaplain  for 
each  regiment  of  field  artillery  and  two  for  the  coast  artil- 
lery," while  the  final  section  repealed  "  all  laws  and  parts 
of  laws  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act." 

The  Act  making  appropriations  for  fortifications,  approved 
March  2,  1907,  repealed  Section  2  of  the  law  of  May  19, 
1882,  which  permitted  two  guns  and  four  mortars  to  be 
loaned  to  any  State  bordering  on  the  sea  or  Gnlf  coast  where 
the  militia  thereof  held  an  annual  encampment  of  not  less 
than  six  days,  as  well  as  the  appropriation  of  $5,000  to  each 


ft. 

332     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

State  "  for  the  construction  of  a  suitable  battery  for  the  can- 
non so  issued."  ^^^ 

The  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  the  same  day  contained 
four  items  of  more  than  passing  interest.  The  first  put  an 
end  to  the  short-lived  existence  of  exactly  two  years  of  the 
office  of  Military  Secretary  by  providing 

"That  hereafter  the  Military  Secretary's  Department  of  the 
Army  shall  be  known  as  the  Adjutant-GeneraFs  Department,  the 
senior  in  rank  of  the  officers  of  said  department  shall  be  desig- 
nated by  the  title  of  The  Adjutant-General,  the  other  officers  of 
the  Department  shall  be  designated  by  the  title  of  Adjutant- 
General,  and  The  Military  Secretary's  Office  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment shall  be  known  as  the  Adjutant-General's  Office."  ^^^ 

Under  the  heading  of  Pay  of  Officers  of  the  Line  and  as  a 
logical  consequence  of  the  creation  of  the  office  of  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  it  was  announced 

"  That  when  the  office  of  Lieutenant- General  shall  become  vacant 
it  shall  not  thereafter  be  filled,  but  said  office  shall  cease  and  de- 
termine," ^^^ 

and,  under  the  caption  of  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs,  it  was 
provided 

"  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  detail  an 
officer  of  the  Army,  whom  he  may  consider  especially  well  quali- 
fied to  act  as  principal  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Insular  Affairs  of  the  War  Department,  and  said  principal  as- 
sistant while  acting  under  said  detail  shall  have  the  rank,  pay, 
and  allowances  of  a  major:  And  provided  further,  That  the 
provisions  of  section  twenty-seven  of  the  Act  of  February  sec- 
ond, nineteen  hundred  and  one,  with  reference  to  the  transfer 
of  officers  of  the  line  to  the  departments  of  the  staff  for  tours 
of  service,  shall  apply  to  the  vacancy  created  by  this  Act  and  to 
the  return  of  the  officer  so  detailed  to  the  line  of  the  Army."  ^^^ 

Although  the  United  States  military  prison  at  Fort  Leaven- 
worth had  been  re-established  early  in  the  preceding  year 
and  thus  relieved  the  overcrowding  of  the  guard-houses  at 
various  posts  and  garrisons,  it  had  become  filled  to  its  fullest 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  333 

1907] 

capacity  by  the  end  of  June,  1906/^^  and  this  same  act  sought 
to  alleviate  the  existing  conditions  by  prescribing 

"  That  hereafter  any  military  prison  that  the  Secretary  of  War 
may  designate  for  the  confinement  of  general  prisoners  for  whom 
there  is  no  room  at  the  United  States  Military  Prison  at  Fort 
Leavenworth,  Kansas,  or  whom  it  is  impracticable  to  send  there, 
shall  be  regarded  as  a  branch  of  the  said  United  States  Military 
Prison  and  equally  with  it  shall  be  subject  to  the  laws  relating 
thereto,  including  chapter  six,  title  fourteen,  of  the  Revised 
Statutes.'^  13^ 

A  third  act,  likewise  approved  on  March  2,  190Y,^^^  stipu- 
lated 

"  That  when  an  enlisted  man  shall  have  served  thirty  years  either 
in  the  Army,  Nav}^,  or  Marine  Corps,  or  in  all,  he  shall,  upon 
making  application  to  the  President,  be  placed  upon  the  retired 
list,  with  seventy-five  per  centum  of  the  pay  and  allowances  he 
may  then  be  in  receipt  of,  and  that  said  allowances  shall  be  as 
follows :  Nine  dollars  and  fifty  cents  per  month  in  lieu  of  ra- 
tions and  clothing  and  six  dollars  and  twenty-five  cents  per 
month  in  lieu  of  quarters,  fuel,  and  light:  Provided,  That  in 
computing  the  necessary  thirty  years'  time  all  service  in  the 
Army,  Navy,  and  Marine  Corps  shall  be  credited. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  all  Acts  and  parts  of  Acts,  so  far  as  they  con- 
flict with  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  are  hereby  repealed.'' 

The  next  measure  ^^^  of  importance  requiring  attention 
was  contained  in  the  Deficiency  Appropriation  Act  of  March 
4,  1907,  and  specified  under  the  caption  of  Military  Estab- 
lishment that 

"  The  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  receive  from  the 
treasury  of  the  Cuban  Republic  and  pay  into  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States  from  time  to  time  such  amounts  to  reimburse  the 
United  States  for  the  expenditures  from  the  United  States 
Treasury  made  necessary  on  account  of  the  present  intervention 
as  he  may  consider  the  Cuban  Treasury  then  able  to  pay  without 
serious  embarrassment."  ^^^ 

Ten  thousand  dollars  were  also  appropriated 

^^for  expenses  incident  to  stay  of  United  States  troops  at  the 


334     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

Jamestown  Tercentennial  Exposition  and  of  visiting  foreign 
military  organizations  in  attendance  upon  such  Exposition  at  the 
invitation  of  the  United  States  Government,  including  prepara- 
tion and  sanitation  of  a  camp  site  for  such  troops."  ^^* 

Of  the  Joint  Resolutions  of  Congress  passed  that  year, 
only  one  —  numbered  17  and  approved  February  27th  — 
needs  to  be  recorded  here.     It  read  thus : 

"  That  the  liolders  of  medals  of  honor  under  the  Act 
approved  July  twelfth,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-two,  an*] 
section  six  of  the  Act  approved  March  third,  eighteen  hundred 
and  sixty-three,  shall  not  be  required  to  surrender  such  medals 
in  case  such  medals  are  replaced,  in  pursuance  of  the  provision.^ 
of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  April  twenty-third,  nineteen 
hundred  and  four ;  and  that  whenever  the  holders  of  such  medals 
of  honor  have  surrendered  them,  in  order  to  receive  medals 
provided  for  by  said  Act  approved  April  twenty-third,  nineteen 
hundred  and  four,  such  medals  shall  be  returned  to  them : 
Provided,  That  no  recipient  of  both  medals  shall  wear  both 
medals  at  the  same  time."  ^^^ 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1907 

The  military  operations  during  1907  can  be  told  in  a  few 
words.  In  the  Philippines  order  and  quiet  reigned  except 
in  the  islands  of  Samar  and  Leyte,  where  the  assistance  of 
Regular  troops  was  needed  to  aid  the  Philippine  Con- 
stabulary to  suppress  the  disturbances  caused  by  the  Pula- 
janes,  but  by  June  24th  General  Wood,  commanding  that 
division,  reported  that  the  disturbed  conditions  were  ap- 
parently at  an  end.  In  Cuba  the  Army  of  Pacification 
under  Brigadier  General  Barry  performed  its  task  effec- 
tively but  without  ostentation,  and  no  necessity  for  resorting 
to  forcible  measures  occurred  during  the  year.  The  Ute 
Indians,  whose  outbreak  in  1906  was  mentioned  on  page  322, 
were  removed  to  the  number  of  393  from  Fort  Meade,  South 
Dakota,  to  the  Cheyenne  River  Reservation,  as  the  latter 
tribe  had  agreed  in  a  general  council  held  on  April  15th,  to 
lease  part  of  their  lands  to  the  Utes.^^^ 


1907] 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915 


335 


On  October  15,  1907,  the  Eegular  Army  was  stationed 
and  composed  as  follows : 


Geographical  distribution 

Officers 

Enlisted 
men 

Total 

In  the  United  States   

In  Alaska     

In  the    Philippines    

2,625 
52 

688 

3 

276 

12 

94 

3,750 

31,637 

970 

12,091 

6 

4,182 
196 

1,108 

34,262 

1,022 

12,779 

In  Porto    Rico    

9 

In  Cuba    

In  Hawaii    

Troops    en    route    and    officers    at 
other    foreign    stations 

4,458 
208 

1,202 

Total  

50,190 

53,940  13T 

In  addition  to  the  above  there  were  in  service 


Geographical  distribution 

Officers 

Enlisted 
men 

Total 

In  the  Philippine   Scouts    

In  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment 

In  the  Hospital  Corps,  excluded  by 
the  Act  of  March  1,  1887  (24 
Stat.  L,,  435 )  from  being  counted 
as  part  of  the  enlisted  strength 
of  the  Army   

116 
24 

3,890 

'       4,346 
572 

4,462 
596 

3,400 

Making  a  grand  total  of   

55,108 

62,398 

This  was  a  decrease  of  4,855  from  the  preceding  year,  and 
considerably  below  the  authorized  maximum  strength  of 
3,997  officers  and  69,861  enlisted  men  fixed  by  the  Act  of 
January  25,  1907.^^^  At  the  bottom  of  the  trouble  lay  the 
difficulty  in  obtaining  recruits,  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
pointed  out  that  ^^^ 

"  although  the  Department,  by  the  most  strenuous  efforts,  has 
succeeded  in  raising  the  average  monthly  number  of  enlistments 
and  reenlistments  beyond  the  monthly  average  of  the  preceding 
year,  this  increased  average,  even  if  kept  up,  will  not  be  sufficient 
to  maintain  the  Army  at  its  present  enlisted  strength,  which,  as 


336     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

shown  above,  is  less  than  72  per  cent,  of  the  maximum  authorized 
strength. 

"  While  many  reasons  have  been  advanced  for  the  difficulty  en- 
perienced  in  recruiting,  I  think  a  sufficient  reason  is  to  be  found 
in  the  inadequacy  of  the  pay. 

"  While  there  is  always  more  or  less  difficulty  in  securing  the 
enlistment  of  soldiers  in  time  of  peace,  this  difficulty  is  of  course 
much  augmented  in  periods  of  great  and  widespread  prosperity. 
When  the  supply  of  mere  laborers  is  not  equal  to  the  demand 
for  them,  although  the  wages  offered  range  from  $1.75  to  $2.50 
or  more  a  day,  it  is  not  strange  that  men  do  not  care  to  enlist  in 
the  Army  at  $13  a  month.  Although  their  real  compensation 
is  much  more  than  this,  because  the}^  are  well  housed  and  fed 
and  clothed  and  receive  medical  and  dental  services  in  addition, 
still  the  life  is  full  of  hard  work  with  the  drills  and  practice 
marches  and  fatigue  duty  that  are  essential  to  the  proper  train- 
ing of  a  soldier  and  inseparable  from  the  maintenance  of  an 
army  post  in  good  condition ;  and  there  is  of  course  a  far 
greater  degree  of  discipline  required  than  is  usually  found  in 
civil  employment.  At  small  and  isolated  posts  the  monotony 
of  the  routine  becomes  accentuated  and  the  soldier's  life  corre- 
spondingly less  attractive. 

"  With  the  present  rates  of  pay  it  is  especially  difficult  to  keep 
the  ranks  of  the  Coast  Artillery  full.  This  service  requires  for 
its  proper  performance  a  high  degree  of  mechanical  skill,  and 
the  training  necessary  to  develop  the  men  leads  to  their  acquisi- 
tion of  a  considerable  knowledge  of  electricity  and  a  skill  in 
assembling  and  manipulating  various  kinds  of  electrical  ap- 
paratus in  general  use  in  the  commercial  world.  The  result  is 
that  by  the  time  these  men  have  served  one  enlistment  they  have 
attained  a  proficiency  which  commands  a  very  much  higher  re- 
muneration in  civil  employment  than  it  does  in  the  army,  and 
they  do  not  reenlist.  I  think  it  is  quite  probable  that  an  in- 
crease in  the  pay  of  enlisted  men,  including  considerable  addi- 
tional inducement  for  men  to  reenlist  and  such  reasonable  in- 
crease in  the  pay  of  noncommissioned  officers  would  stimulate 
men  to  remain  in  the  service  and  to  qualify  themselves  for  these 
higher  positions,  would  have  a  markedly  beneficial  effect  upon 
the  recruitment  of  the  Army. 

'^  I  earnestly  recommend  that  the  same  system  be  made  to  apply 
to  the  fixing  of  the  pay  of  enlisted  men  and  of  the  noncom- 
missioned officer  that  now  obtains  in  respect  to  the  Navy,  so 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  337 

1907] 

that  the  President  may  fix  tlie  rates  of  pay  within  defined  limits. 
This  would  enable  the  President  to  classify  enlisted  men  ac- 
cording to  length  of  service  and  meritorious  service  and  vary 
their  pay  accordingly,  and  also  to  make  a  large  proportionate 
advance  in  the  pay  of  noncommissioned  officers,  which  would 
secure  them  as  permanent  members  of  the  Army.  Such  results 
would  make  much  for  better  discipline  and  higher  efficiency." 

Elsewhere  in  his  report  Secretary  Taft  invited  attention 
to  the  urgent  need  of  more  medical  officers  and  of  a  General 
Service  Corps  for  the  Army,  as  well  as  to  the  failure  of  men  to 
re-enlist,  to  the  large  number  who  purchase  their  discharge 
from  the  service  before  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  en- 
listment, and  to  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the  employ- 
ment of  officers  in  the  capacities  where  they  w^ere  of  most  use, 
no  less  than  "13.45  per  cent,  of  the  general  and  staff  officers 
and  27.14  per  cent,  of  the  line  officers  were  absent  from  their 
regular  duties."  -^^^  For  the  benefit  of  the  reader  who  may 
be  ignorant  of  the  functions  of  a  General  Service  Corps,  the 
following  recommendations  of  the  Secretary  of  War  w^ith 
respect  to  such  a  body  are  inserted  here: 

"  Another  measure  that  would  undoubtedly  secure  greater, 
contentment  in  the  line  of  the  Army  and  reduce  desertions  is 
the  establishment  of  a  general  service  corps,  for  duty  as  wagon 
masters,  engineers,  firemen,  overseers,  teamsters,  packers,  car- 
penters, blacksmiths,  laborers,  clerks,  etc.  This  class  of  work  is 
now  performed  in  part  by  civilian  employees  and  in  part  by  sol- 
diers detailed  on  extra  and  special  duty.  Under  present  condi- 
tions there  must  always  be  a  large  number  of  soldiers  detached 
from  their  companies  for  work  of  this  kind.  If  they  are  given 
extra  pay  for  it,  it  encourages  them  to  seek  duty  other  than  that 
for  which  they  were  primarily  enlisted.  If  they  are  not  paid 
extra  for  this  class  of  work,  they  are  dissatisfied  at  being  em- 
ployed upon  work  for  which  they  did  not  enlist  and  at  wages 
which  are  much  less  than  like  services  would  command  in  civil 
employment ;  and  in  either  event  the  organizations  to  which  they 
belong  are  depleted  of  their  proper  strength  and  the  soldiers  de- 
prived of  the  military  training  which  was  the  main  purpose  of 
their  enlistment.  Under  present  conditions,  it  is  possible  that  a 
private  with  only  a  few  months'  service  to  his  credit  may  secure 


338     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

a  detail  for  extra  duty  which  will  give  him  more  pay  than  his 
first  sergeant,  although  the  latter  may  be  a  trained  soldier  of 
many  years'  service.  The  veteran  first  sergeant  is  an  invaluable 
factor  in  securing  and  maintaining  the  discipline  of  a  company 
organization,  and  as  a  noncommissioned  officer  has  a  unique  and 
peculiar  status  among  enlisted  men.  The  conditions  that  have 
been  described  do  not  conduce  to  the  perpetuation  of  his  kind, 
nor  do  they  make  for  the  best  interests  of  either  noncommis- 
sioned officer  or  private."  ^*^ 

The  failure  of  men  to  re-enlist  and  the  frequency  with 
which  they  purchased  their  discharge  was  declared  to  be 
largely  attributable  to  the  neglect  to  offer 

^^  suitable  rewards  for  proficiency  when  attained,  a  greater  in- 
crease of  pay  for  length  of  service,  and  by  the  establishment  of 
conditions  that  will  elevate  and  sustain  the  self-respect  of  the 
enlisted  man  by  making  the  duties  of  his  daily  life  more  those  of 
a  soldier  —  for  which  object  he  entered  the  Army  —  and  less 
those  of  a  laborer,  for  service  at  which  he  could  get  much  more 
pay  in  civil  life."  ^*^ 

In  respect  to  the  absence  of  line  and  staff  officers  from  the 
commands  or  departments  to  w^hich  they  strictly  belonged, 
Secretary  Taft  asserted  with  much  truth  that 

'^  these  detached  officers  are  all  usefully  employed.  Generally 
their  work  is  of  a  military  character,  and  in  the  very  few  cases 
where  it  is  not  so  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  duty  performed 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  and  could  not  well  be  dispensed 
with.  The  fact  remains,  nevertheless,  that  the  absence  of  such 
a  large  number  of  officers  from  their  commands  is  not  without 
its  bad  effect  upon  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  the  Army.  .  .  . 

"  The  seriousness  of  this  situation  is  such  that  a  majority  of 
the  commanding  generals  of  military  departments  comment  upon 
this  undesirable  condition  of  affairs  in  their  annual  reports  for 
1907.  In  a  general  way  the  remedies  suggested  by  them  are 
broadly  in  the  direction  of  an  increase  in  the  total  number  of 
officers  for  the  service,  rather  than  a  reduction  in  the  number  of 
places  that  must  necessarily  be  filled  by  detaching  officers  from 
their  commands  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period. 

"  It  is  apparent  .  .  .  that  the  great  bulk  of  absenteeism  of  offi- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  339 

1907] 

cers  from  their  usual  military  duties  with  their  commands  re- 
sults from  detailing  officers  for  recruiting  dut}-  and  for  duty  in 
connection  with  the  extensive  system  of  military  education  that 
is  being  carried  on  both  in  the  Army  and  in  the  several  States 
at  institutions  of  learning  and  with  the  militia  forces.  It  goes 
without  saying  that  many  officers  must  always  be  needed  for  re- 
cruiting service;  it  is  equally  certain  that  the  number  of  officers 
engaged  in  work  of  an  educational  character,  either  as  students 
or  instructors,  can  never  be  materially  reduced  without  serious 
impairment  of  the  efficiency  of  the  Army  and  the  militia. 

"  These  facts  are  incontrovertible  and  the  statements  made  are 
but  repetitions  in  substance  of  what  has  been  said  in  annual  re- 
ports for  several  years  past.  In  my  judgment  it  will  be  the 
wisest  sort  of  economy  for  the  nation  to  recognize  the  situation 
and  to  provide  additional  officers  to  meet  a  condition  which  is 
fast  becoming  a  menace,  for  I  can  not  but  feel  that  it  has  a  very 
decided,  if  not  direct,  bearing  upon  the  failure  of  men  to  reenlist 
in  the  Army  and  upon  desertions.  There  can  be  no  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  more  constant  presence  of  company  officers  with 
the  organizations  to  which  they  belong,  and  whose  military  train- 
ing, discipline,  and  general  welfare  it  is  their  legitimate  function 
to  maintain,  would,  next  to  increased  pay,  prove  one  of  the  most 
potent  factors  for  promoting  contentment  among  the  enlisted 
men  of  their  commands."  ^*^ 

The  needs  of  our  military  establishment  at  that  time 
were  thus  pithily  summarized :  ^^^ 

"  Our  Army  is  relatively  a  small  one  compared  with  the  armies 
of  other  nations  and  in  proportion  to  our  area,  population,  and 
resources.  The  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  has  al- 
ways been  against  the  maintenance  of  a  large  standing  army-  and 
probably  always  will  be;  but  our  interests  and  our  necessities 
demand  that  the  Army  shall  always  be  of  the  highest  standard 
and  of  the  greatest  effectiveness  possible  for  its  size.  We  can 
afford  to  have  this  so ;  we  can  not  afford  to  have  it  otherwise.  To 
that  end  the  Army  now  needs  more  officers,  both  in  the  line  and 
in  the  staff,  and  it  needs  more  enlisted  men ;  and  it  is  impera- 
tive that  both  officers  and  enlisted  men  should  be  a  carefully  se- 
lected force,  and  that  they  should  be  at  all  times  in  prime  condi- 
tion, mentally  and  physically,  for  active  service.  To  accomplish 
this  and  constantly  to  keep  the  best  class  of  men  in  the  Army  re- 


340     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

quires  adequate  pay,  a  steady  flow  of  promotion  for  efficiency,  and 
a  fair  degree  of  elimination  by  retirement  or  otherwise  as  the 
circumstances  may  call  for.  Individual  cases  of  enthusiasm,  in- 
telligent effort,  and  hard  work  without  sufficient  compensation 
or  other  adequate  recognition  are  to  be  found  in  every  vocation, 
and  fortunately  are  not  rare  in  our  Army ;  but  to  secure  these  en 
masse  requires,  as  inducements  to  preparation  and  performance, 
the  just  rewards  of  labor  of  a  character  similar  to  those  which 
I  have  indicated  above/' 

On  June  30,  1907,  the  former  system,  whereby  the  United 
States  territory  was  subdivided  into  geographical  divisions 
and  departments  for  the  purpose  of  military  administration, 
was  discontinued,  by  abolishing  the  geographical  divisions 
within  continental  United  States.  The  nine  existing  mili- 
tary departments  remained  unaltered,  except  that  the  State 
of  Missouri  was  transferred  from  the  Department  of  Texas 
to  the  Department  of  the  Missouri,  but  no  change  was  made 
in  the  Philippines  Division.  The  motive  which  prompted 
the  introduction  of  this  new  classification  w^as  the  desire  to 
simplify  military  administration  by  bringing  the  generals 
in  command  of  territorial  subdivisions  into  closer  touch 
with  the  War  Department  at  Washington. ^^^ 

Although  Congress  had  made  the  necessary  appropriations 
and  although  the  War  Department  had  contemplated  con- 
tinuing the  summer  encampments,  the  absence  of  troops  in 
Cuba  and  at  the  Jamestown  Exposition,  coupled  with  the 
preparations  for  despatching  a  large  portion  of  the  mobile 
army  to  the  Philippines  in  order  to  relieve  the  regiments 
stationed  in  those  islands,  so  greatly  diminished  the  num- 
ber of  troops  available  that  no  joint  manoeuvres  were  held. 
As  a  substitute,  joint  Army  and  Militia  coast-defence  exer- 
cises under  the  supervision  of  the  Coast  Artillery  took  place 
at  various  forts.  These  lasted  about  ten  days  at  each 
fortification,  commencing  on  June  8th  and  continuing  dur- 
ing July,  August  and  October,  the  last  being  held  in  the 
Florida  district  from  October  18th  to  November  1st.     Of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  341 

1907] 

the  militia  organizations  of  the  seaboard  States,  860  officers 
and  12,660  men  participated/^^  and  the  exercise  proved  so 
successful  that  Brigadier  General  Murray,  the  Chief  of  the 
Coast  Artillery,  was  encouraged  to  hope  that  the  impetus 
thus  given  might 

^^  in  course  of  time,  develop  an  adequate  and  efficient  Coast  Ar- 
tillery reserve  among  the  militia  to  reenforce  the  Eegular  Coast 
Artillery  in  time  of  war  and  an  equally  adequate  and  efficient 
body  of  Coast  Artillery  supports  to  defend  the  coast  batteries 
against  land  attacks  from  the  rear.'^  ^^ 


L47 


A  change  was  made  in  the  schedule  of  studies  at  the  Mili- 
tary Academy  at  West  Point,  and  the  Army  War  College 
building  at  the  Washington  Barracks,  D.  C,  was  completed. 
The  policy  of  having  I^avy  officers  attend  the  course  of  in- 
struction at  the  Army  War  College,  and  Army  officers  at- 
tend that  at  the  Naval  War  College  at  ISTewport  —  which 
policy  had  been  in  operation  for  three  years  —  was  continued 
to  the  manifest  advantage  of  both  services.-^  *^ 

The  work  of  harbour  defence  continued  as  usual,  but  with 
some  handicap,  as  Congress  had  failed  since  April  21,  1904, 
to  make  appropriation  for  the  construction  of  gun  and 
mortar  batteries.  For  the  insular  possessions,  however, 
$2,360,000  had  been  allotted  during  the  years  1904-1907, 
and  the  work  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba,  Honolulu  and 
Pearl  Harbour,  Hawaii,  and  at  Manila  and  Subig  Bay  in 
the  Philippines  made  corresponding  progress  during  the 
year.  The  suitability  of  sites  for  fortifications  was  care- 
fully studied  by  the  ^NTational  Coast-Defense  Board,  and 
each  place  recommended  was  visited  by  one  or  more  members 
thereof.-^  ^^ 

The  most  notable  innovation  of  the  year  was  introduced 
with  a  view  to  keeping  all  Army  officers  up  to  the  proper 
standard  in  respect  to  physical  fitness,  and  it  was  pro- 
mulgated in  the  following  communication: 


342     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1907 

"  War  Department, 

Washington,  December  J/.,  1907. 
General  Ori>ers, 
No.  240. 

The  following  is  published  to  the  army  for  the  information 
of  all  concerned : 

The  White  House, 

Washington,  December  2,  1907. 

To  the  secretary  of  war  : 

I  desire  due  notice  given  to  all  officers  concerned  that  here- 
after suitable  physical  tests  to  determine  their  fitness  for  active 
operations  will  annually  be  made  of  all  field  officers  of  the  army, 
under  such  regulations  as  you  may  prescribe.  A  sufficient  num- 
ber of  the  practice  marches  of  cavalry,  occurring  in  the  fall  of 
each  year,  might  be  taken  advantage  of  to  test  the  ability  of  all 
field  officers,  except  those  of  seacoast  artillery,  to  make  a  daily 
march  of  not  less  than  30  miles,  for  three  days  in  succession, 
under  conditions  suitable  to  the  making  of  forced  marches  in 
active  field  operations.  Tests  suitable  to  the  character  of  ser- 
vice required  of  them  should  also  be  prescribed  for  field  officers 
of  seacoast  artillery. 

Annual  reports  should  also  be  required,  under  such  conditions 
as  will  insure  accuracy  and  thoroughness,  upon  every  junior  offi- 
cer of  the  army,  setting  forth  whether  physically  qualified  for 
active  operations. 

Except  when  excused  by  higher  authority,  all  officers  should 
accompany  their  commands  on  the  monthly  practice  marches, 
and  reports  should  be  required,  naming  in  every  case  any  who 
are  unable  or  fail  to  do  so  or  fall  out  on  the  march. 

Appropriate  action  should  be  taken  in  the  cases  of  all  officers 
found  not  qualified  physically  for  active  service. 

It  is  just  as  much  the  duty  of  all  officers  of  the  army  to  adopt 
such  measures  and  pursue  such  habits  as  will  maintain  a  physical 
condition  fit  for  active  service  as  to  cultivate  their  minds  in 
fitting  themselves  for  the  intellectual  duties  of  their  profession. 

I  should  also  like  as  much  encouragement  given  to  the  culti- 
vation of  horsemanship  in  the  army  as  may  be  practicable  under 
the  law,  and  likewise  to  have  as  many  facilities  for  riding  horse- 
back as  possible  afforded  to  infantry  captains  on  government 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  343 

1907-1908] 

horses,  until  they  have  been  made  mounted  officers  as  in  foreign 
armies. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 

By  order  of  the  Acting  Secretary  of  War: 

J.  Franklin  Bell, 
Major-General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Official : 

Henry  P.  McCain, 

Adjutant-General.^' 


L50 


MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1908 

The  first  session  of  the  Sixtieth  Congress  was  marked  by 
a  number  of  important  legislative  enactments  in  respect  to 
the  military  service,  beginning  with  '^  An  Act  To  increase 
the  efficiency  of  the  Medical  Department  of  the  United 
States  Army,"  Avhich  was  approved  on  April  23,  1908,^^^ 
and  in  which  the  repeated  recommendations  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  were  at  last  heeded.  The  opening  section  de- 
clared 

"  That  from  and  after  the  approval  of  this  Act  the  Medical 
Department  of  the  United  States  Army  shall  consist  of  a  Medical 
Corps  and  a  Medical  Reserve  Corps,  as  hereinafter  provided ;  and 
the  Hospital  Corps,  the  nurse  corps,  and  dental  surgeons,  as  now 
authorized  by  law.'' 

Section  2  provided 

"  That  the  Medical  Corps  shall  consist  of  one  Surgeon-Gen- 
■eral,  with  rank  of  brigadier-general,  who  shall  be  chief  of  the 
Medical  Department;  fourteen  colonels,  twenty-four  lieutenant- 
colonels,  one  hundred  and  five  majors,  and  three  hundred  cap- 
tains or  first  lieutenants,  who  shall  have  the  rank,  pay,  and  al- 
lowances of  officers  of  corresponding  grades  in  the  cavalry  arm 
of  the  service." 

It  further  specified  that  all  medical  officers  on  the  active 
list,  other  than  the  Surgeon-General,  were  to  be  re-com- 
missioned, and  it  fixed  their  grades  and  ranks,  as  well  as 
stipulating  that   ^^  hereafter   first  lieutenants   shall  be   pro- 


344     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

moted  to  the  grade  of  captain  after  three  years'  service  in 
the  Medical  Corps." 

Section  3  provided  that  promotions  should  "  be  made  ac- 
cording to  seniority,"  fixed  the  maximum  yearly  increase 
in  the  various  grades,  and  stated  that  assistant  surgeons  from 
the  volunteers  were  to  take  rank  among  the  captains  accord- 
ing to  the  date  of  their  entrance  into  the  Medical  Department 
"  as  commissioned  officers."  Section  4  contained  the  follow- 
ing wise  restriction: 

"  That  no  person  shall  receive  an  appointment  as  first  lieutenant 
in  the  Medical  Corps  unless  he  shall  have  been  examined  and 
approved  by  an  army  medical  board  consisting  of  not  less  than 
three  officers  of  the  Medical  Corps  designated  by  the  Secretary 
of  War." 

Section  5  prescribed  that  medical  officers  below  the  rank 
of  lieutenant-colonel  must  pass  a  successful  examination  in 
order  to  be  promoted,  and,  in  the  event  of  "  physical  dis- 
ability contracted  in  the  line  of  duty,"  were  to  be  retired 
unless  a  reviewing  board  disapproved  the  finding  of  the  orig- 
inal examining  board.  On  the  other  hand,  it  forbade  a  sec- 
ond examination  for  any  other  cause  than  that  above  men- 
tioned. Section  6  expressly  stated  that  the  rank  and  serv- 
ice of  present  medical  officers  were  not  to  be  effected  by  this 
act. 

An  important  feature  was  contained  in 

"  Sec.  7.  That  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  reserve  corps  of 
medical  officers  available  for  military  service,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  is  authorized  to  issue  commissions  as  first 
lieutenant  therein  to  such  graduates  of  reputable  schools  of  medi- 
cine, citizens  of  the  United  States,  as  shall  from  time  to  time, 
upon  examination  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  be 
found  physically,  mentally,  and  morally  qualified  to  hold  such 
commissions,  the  persons  so  commissioned  to  constitute  and  be 
known  as  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps.  The  commissions  so  given 
shall  confer  upon  the  holders  all  the  authority,  rights,  and  priv- 
ileges of  commissioned  officers  of  the  like  grade  in  the  Medical 
Corps  of  the  United  States  Army,  except  promotions,  but  only 


•      From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  345 

1908] 

when  called  into  active  duty,  as  hereinafter  provided,  and  during 
the  period  of  such  active  duty.  Officers  of  the  Medical  Reserve 
Corps  shall  have  rank  in  said  corps  according  to  date  of  their 
commissions  therein,  and  when  employed  on  active  duty,  as  here- 
inafter provided,  shall  rank  next  below  all  other  officers  of  like 
grade  in  the  United  States  Army :  Provided,  That  contract  sur- 
geons now  in  the  military  service  who  receive  the  favorable 
recommendation  of  the  Surgeon-General  of  the  Army  shall  be 
eligible  for  appointment  in  said  reserve  corps  without  further 
examination :  Provided  further.  That  any  contract  surgeon  not 
over  twenty-seven  years  of  age  at  date  of  his  appointment  as  con- 
tract surgeon  shall  be  eligible  to  appointment  in  the  regular 
corps." 

t 

Section  8  prescribed 

'^  That  in  emergencies  the  Secretary  of  War  may  order  officers 
of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  to  active  duty  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States  in  such  numbers  as  the  public  interests  may 
require,  and  may  relieve  them  from  such  duty  when  their  ser- 
vices are  no  longer  necessary," 

but  it  permitted  such  officers  to  decline  "  to  accept  such  serv- 
ice "  or  to  serve  with  the  militia.  It  also  authorized  the 
President  "  to  honorably  discharge "  any  officer  no  longer 
needed,  allowed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  place  on  the  active 
list  and  order  "  to  the  Army  Medical  School  for  instruction 
and  further  examination  to  determine  their  fitness  for  com- 
mission "  all  applicants  for  admission  to  the  Medical  Corps,, 
and  finally  provided 

"  That  any  officer  of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  who  is  subject 
to  call  and  who  shall  be  ordered  upon  active  duty  as  herein  pro- 
vided and  who  shall  be  unmlling  and  refuse  to  accept  such  serv- 
ice shall  forfeit  his  commission." 

The  final  part  of  this  important  law  ran  as  f oIIoavs  :  — 

"  Sec.  9.  That  all  officers  of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  when 
called  upon  active  duty  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  as 
provided  in  section  eight  of  this  Act,  shall  be  subject  to  the 
laws,  regulations,  and  orders  for  the  government  of  the  Regular 
Army,  and  during  the  period  of  such  service  shall  be  entitled 


346     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

to  the  pay  and  allowances  of  first  lieutenants  of  the  Medical 
Corps  with  increase  for  length  of  service  now  allowed  by  law, 
said  increase  to  be  computed  only  for  time  of  active  duty : 
Provided,  That  no  officer  of  the  Medical  Eeserve  Corps  shall  be 
entitled  to  retirement  or  retirement  pay,  nor  shall  he  be  entitled 
to  pension  except  for  physical  disability  incurred  in  the  line  of 
duty  while  in  active  duty :  And  provided  further.  That  nothing 
in  this  Act  shall  be  construed  to  prevent  appointments  in  time 
of  war  of  medical  officers  of  volunteers  in  such  numbers  and  with 
such  rank  and  pay  as  may  be  provided  by  law. 

^'  Sec.  10.  That  all  Acts  and  parts  of  Acts  in  conflict  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  are  hereby  repealed." 

The  next  measure  of  importance  pertaining  to  the  military 
establishment  was  contained  in  the  annual  Army  Appropria- 
tion Act,  approved  May  11,  1908,  which,  under  the  caption 
of  Pay  of  Enlisted  Men,  increased  that  of  the  commissioned 
officers  by  providing  ^  ^^ 

"  That  hereafter  the  annual  pay  of  officers  of  the  Army  of  the 
several  grades  herein  mentioned  shall  be  as  follows :  Major-gen- 
eral, eight  thousand  dollars;  brigadier-general,  six  thousand  dol- 
lars; colonel,  four  thousand  dollars;  lieutenant-colonel,  three 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars;  major,  three  thousand  dollars; 
captain,  two  thousand  four  hundred  dollars;  first  lieutenant, 
two  thousand  dollars ;  second  lieutenant,  one  thousand  seven  hun- 
dred dollars.  And  the  pay  of  cadets  at  the  Military  Academy 
shall  hereafter  be  six  hundred  dollars  a  year.  TlAt  hereafter  the 
United  States  shall  furnish  mounts  and  horse  equipments  for  all 
officers  of  the  Army  below  the  grade  of  major  required  to  be 
mounted,  but  in  case  any  officer  below  the  grade  of  major  re- 
quired to  be  mounted  provides  himself  with  suitable  mounts  at 
his  own  expense,  he  shall  receive  an  addition  to  his  pay  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars  per.  annum  if  he  provides  one  mount, 
and  two  hundred  dollars  per  annum  if  he  provides  two  mounts. 
Section  twelve  hundred  and  sixty-seven  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  the  United  States  is  hereby  amended  to  read  as  follows:  "  In 
no  case  shall  the  pay  of  a  colonel  exceed  five  thousand  dollars  a 
3'ear;  the  pay  of  a  lieutenant-colonel  exceed  four  thousand  five 
hundred  dollars  a  year,  or  the  pay  of  a  major  exceed  four  thou- 
sand dollars  a  year." 

The  law"  went  on  to  stipulate  that,  upon  official  notifica- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  347 

1908] 

tion  of  the  death  of  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  from  wounds 
or  disease  contracted  in  the  line  of  duty,  the  Paymaster- 
General  shall  pay  to  the  widow  or  to  any  person  designated 
by  the  deceased  six  months'  pay,  less  $75  in  the  case  of  an 
officer  and  $35  in  the  case  of  an  enlisted  man,  which  amount 
was  to  cover  the  expenses  of  interment. -^^^  The  recom- 
mendations made  by  Secretary  Taft  were  next  heeded  in  a 
general  increase  of  pay  for  the  enlisted  men  of  the  Army, 
and  certain  bonuses  were  likewise  given  for  re-enlist- 
ment.-^ ^^  Under  the  heading  of  Miscellaneous,  the  act  pro- 
vided 

^^  That  men  hereafter  enlisted  in  the  Porto  Eico  Provisional 
Eegiment  of  Infantry  shall  be  enlisted  for  a  period  of  three 
years  and  may  be  reenlisted,  such  enlistments  and  reenlistments 
to  be  subject  to  the  regulations  governing  the  Army  at  large, 
with  such  modifications  as  to  physical  requirements  as  the  Presi- 
dent may  prescribe."  ^^^ 

On  May  16th  there  was  approved  an  act  which  specified 

"  That  the  office  of  captain  in  the  Philippine  Scouts  is  hereby 
created  as  a  grade  in  the  military  establishment.  Such  captains 
shall  be  selected  from  officers  of  the  grade  of  first  lieutenants  in 
said  scouts,  and  shall  be  given  provisional  appointments  for 
periods  of  four  years  each,  and  no  such  appointments  shall  be 
continued  for  a  second  or  subsequent  period  unless  the  officers' 
conduct  shall  have  been  satisfactory  in  every  respect :  Provided, 
That  the  number  of  officers  provisionally  appointed  under  the 
terms  of  this  Act  shall  not  at  any  time  exceed  the  number  of 
companies  of  said  native  troops  which  may  be  formed  by  the 
President  from  time  to  time  for  service  in  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands." i^« 

On  May  27,  1908,  three  important  laws  affecting  the  mili- 
tary sendee  went  into  operation.  The  first,  "  An  Act  Fix- 
ing the  status  of  the  Porto  Rico  Provisional  Regiment  of 
Infantry,"  ^^^  changed  its  title  on  and  after  June  30,  1908, 
to  "  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry  of  the  United 
States  Army,"  specified  its  field  officers  and  the  method  to 


348     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

be  followed  in  respect  to  the  appointment  of  the  captains 
and  lieutenants,  as  well  as  to  promotions  and  retirement. ^^^ 
The  second  law  was  '^  An  Act  Making  appropriations  for 
fortifications  and  other  works  of  defense/'  and  Congress 
made  amends  for  its  omission  of  the  past  four  years  by  al- 
lotting $300,000  "  for  construction  of  gun  and  mortar  bat- 
teries." ^^^  The  third  was  most  important,  particularly 
since  attention  was  paid  to  the  recommendations  contained 
in  Secretary  Taft's  report  of  1906  —  w^hich  have  been  enu- 
merated on  pages  324-325  —  and  since  amendments  were 
made  to  no  less  than  eleven  sections  of  the  Act  of  January  21, 
1903,  better  known  as  ^'  the  Dick  Bill,"  which  has  been  con- 
sidered at  length  on  pages  289-292.  So  vital  and  far-reach- 
ing were  the  alterations  made  by  this  Act  of  May  27, 
1908,^^^  that,  especially  since  it  constitutes  the  last  measure 
dealing  with  the  organization  of  the  militia  now  standing 
on  the  statute  books,  it  is  deemed  advisable  to  recite  it  in 
extenso  in  the  footnotes  to  this  chapter  on  pages  694-698,  its 
great  length  precluding  its  insertion  here.-^^-^ 

In  many  respects  the  amendments  made  by  the  law  of 
May  27,  1908,  were  a  marked  improvement  over  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Dick  bill  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  were  a 
distinct  retrogression  from  the  measure  as  drafted  by  the 
General  Staff.  The  merits  of  the  amendments  may  thus  be 
briefly  summarized: 

(1)  Declaration  that  all  able-bodied  males  between  the  ages 
of  18  and  45  were  amenable  to  service  in  the  militia ; 

(2)  Eequirement  that  the  regularly  enlisted,  organized  and 
active  militia  participating  in  the  apportionment  of  the  annual 
appropriation  fixed  by  law  shall  constitute  the  organized  militia ; 

(3)  Obligation  of  the  organized  militia  to  conform  to  the 
standard  of  the  Eegular  Army  on  and  after  January  21,  1910;  ^^^ 

(4)  Power  granted  to  the  President  to  fix  the  minimum  num- 
ber of  troops  in  each  unit  of  the  organized  militia ; 

(5)  Punishment  by  court-martial  of  any  officer  or  enlisted 
man  of  the  organized  militia  for  failure  to  answer  a  call  by  the 
President ; 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  349 

1908] 

(6)  The  militia  was  not  to  receive  any  pay  when  called  into 
Government  service  until  they  had  actually  reached  the  rendez- 
vous; 

(7)  Arms,  equipments  and  other  war  matenel  issued  to  the 
organized  militia  were  to  be  free  of  cost  to  the  States,  but  were 
not  to  exceed  $2,000,000  per  annum  and  to  remain  the  property 
of  the  United  States; 

(8)  Upon  request  of  a  governor,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  to 
make  provision  for  the  participation  of  the  organized  militia 
of  that  State  in  joint  manoeuvres,  encampments  or  coast-de- 
fense training  with  the  Eegiilar  troops; 

(9)  Militia  so  participating  was  to  be  under  the  orders  of 
the  Eegular  officer  in  command  of  the  post  ^'  without  regard 
to  the  rank  of  the  commanding  or  other  officers  of  the  militia 
temporarily  so  encamped  within  its  limits  or  its  vicinity  " ; 

(10)  Militia  officers  and  enlisted  men  attending  military 
schools  were  to  receive  the  same  allowances  as  are  granted  by  law 
to  Eegular  officers  and  men  "  while  in  actual  attendance  upon  a 
course  of  instruction  ^' ; 

(11)  Provision  was  made  for  the  assignment  of  Army  officers 
or  enlisted  men  for  duty  with  the  militia ; 

(12)  Authorization  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  appoint  a 
representative  board  of  five  officers  on  the  active  list  of  the  or- 
ganized militia  for  a  term  of  four  years,  to  be  summoned  to 
Washington  from  time  to  time  '^  for  consultation  with  the  Secre- 
tary of  AYar  respecting  the  condition,  status,  and  needs  of  the 
whole  body  of  the  organized  militia/^  ^^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  benefits  conferred  bv  this  law  were 
to  a  measure  neutralized  by  its  defects,  the  most  conspicu- 
ous being 

(1)  'No  comptilsory  service  on  the  part  of  every  able-bodied 
man  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45  was  exacted  in  time  of  peace, 
such  as  had  been  required  by  the  Act  of  May  8,  1792 ; 

(2)  So  hazy  was  the  definition  given  to  militia  that  incom- 
petent officers  of  high  rank  and  troops  who  are  not  up  to  the 
requisite  standard  could  be  forced  upon  the  Federal  Government ; 

(3)  Accustomed  privileges  of  militia  organizations  in  exist- 
ence since  1792  were  virtually  made  hors  la  lot,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  such  immunity  might  readily  have  proved  detrimental 
to  the  good  of  the  military  service  under  many  circumstances ; 


350     Wlilitary  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

(4)  The  militia  could  only  be  called  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  through  the  medium  of  the  governors; 

( 5 )  A  radical  step  was  taken  by  prescribing  that  ''  the  militia 
so  called  shall  continue  to  serve  during  the  term  so  specified, 
either  within  or  without  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  unless 
sooner  relieved  by  order  of  the  President."  Such  a  mandate  was 
admirable  in  that  it  was  intended  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  the 
many  refusals  in  the  past  on  the  part  of  the  militia  to  serve  out- 
side the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  it  demonstrated  anew 
how  ill-digested  are  many  of  the  enactments  of  Congress  in 
respect  to  the  military  service,  and  on  February  17,  1912,  was 
declared  by  Attorney-General  Wickersham  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional ^^^ —  a  fact  which  ought  to  have  been  apparent  on  the  face 
of  it; 

(6)  Although  the  President  was  permitted  to  specify  the  pe- 
riod for  which  the  militia  was  to  be  called  out,  this  was  largely 
nullified  by  the  proviso  ^^  that  no  commissioned  officer  or  en- 
listed man  of  the  organized  militia  shall  be  held  to  service  be- 
yond the  term  of  his  existing  commission  or  enlistment/"'  In 
this  case  the  lesson  in  respect  to  the  State  volunteers  retained  in 
the  Philippines  in  1899  had  been  taken  to  heart; 

(7)  The  most  flagrant  defect  of  all,  and  one  which  placed  an 
utterly  unnecessary  handicap  on  the  Government  in  the  effort 
which  it  would  obviously  make  at  the  outbreah  of  war  to  obtain 
the  best  troops  possible,  was  contained  in  the  proviso  "  That 
when  the  military  needs  of  the  Federal  Government  arising  from 
the  necessity  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  to  suppress  insur- 
rection, or  repel  invasion,  cannot  be  met  by  the  regular  forces, 

THE  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  SHALL  BE  CALLED  INTO  THE  SERVICE  OF 

THE  United  States  in  advance  of  any  volunteer  force 

WHICH  IT  WAY  BE  DETERMINED  TO  RAISE."" 

(8)  The  law  specified  that,  where  any  State  has  adopted  the 
medical  standard  of  the  Army,  its  militia  shall  be  mustered  into 
United  States'  service  without  further  medical  examination. 
The  mere  fact  that  a  physical  standard  has  been  adopted  does 
not  insure  its  enforcement,  nor  was  there  anything  in  the  law 
to  compel  such  enforcement ; 

(9)  In  the  event  of  a  trial  by  court-martial  ^^  of  officers  or  men 
of  the  militia  when  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,"  it  was 
expressly  stated  that  the  majority  of  the  members  constituting 
such  courts-martial  "  shall  be  composed  of  militia  officers."  In 
otlier  words,  the  Government  voluntarily  pandered  to  the  States 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  351 

1908] 

by  relinquishing  its  right  to  control  courts-martial  destined  to 
try  offenses  committed  by  troops  in  the  employ  of  the  United 
States ; 

(10)  In  the  call  to  arms  priority  was  given  to  the  States,  and 
governors  could  effectually  prevent  the  raising  of  volunteers 
within  their  jurisdiction  by  the  United  States  merely  by  sum- 
moning into  active  service  all  the  militia  of  their  States ;  ^^^ 

(11)  The  law  left  it  wholly  within  the  discretion  of  the  gov- 
ernors to  obey  a  call  made  by  the  President  or  to  refuse  as  did 
the  governors  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut  and  Vermont  in 
1812  and  1813.  Furthermore,  the  militia  may  decline  to  respond 
to  a  call  not  transmitted  through  the  governor  of  its  State,  and  in 
that  event  the  United  States  would  be  powerless  to  coerce  it ; 

(12)  Although  it  was  prescribed  that  on  and  after  January 
21,  1910,  "  the  organization,  armament,  and  discipline  of  the 
organized  militia  "  must  conform  to  those  of  the  Kegular  Army, 
no  penalty  was  attached  to  their  failure  to  reach  this  requisite 
standard. 

The  Act  of  May  28th  making  appropriations  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  Military  Academy  provided,  among  other  things, 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  should  designate  four  Filipinos 
"  to  receive  instruction  at  West  Point  and  to  be  eligible  on 
graduation  ^  only  to  commissions  in  the  Philippine  Scouts,' 
in  which  they  w^ere  required  to  bind  themselves  to  serve  for 
eight  years."  ^^^  Another  act,  approved  that  same  day,  au- 
thorized the  donation  of  certain  condemned  ordnance  to  vari- 
ous institutions,  and  the  last  section  specified 

"  That  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  is  hereby  authorized  to  sell  with- 
out advertisement  to  patriotic  organizations  for  military  purposes 
surplus  obsolete  small  arms  and  their  equipments  and  ammuni- 
tion at  such  prices  as  he  may  deem  reasonable  and  just:  Pro- 
vided, That  hereafter  obsolete  small  arms  and  their  equipment 
and  ammunition  shall  not  be  disposed  of  to  such  organizations 
except  as  provided  for  in  this  Act.^^  ^^^ 


MILITARY  EVEA^TS  DURIXG  1908 

the  course  of  1908  there  was  a  consii 
crease  in  the  strength  of  the  Regular  Army  which,  exclusive 


During  the  course  of  1908  there  was  a  considerable  in- 


352     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

of  the  3,521  men  in  the  Hospital  Corps,  numbered  on  Octo- 
ber 15th,  4,116  officers  and  68,512  enlisted  men,  a  total  of 
72,628,  which  was  still  considerably  below  the  authorized 
maximum  strength  of  4,307  officers  and  77,743  men,  al- 
though it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  that  maximum  had 
been  increased  7,308.^^^ 

Beyond  a  few  trivial  cases  of  lawlessness  committed  in 
Mindanao  by  roving  bands  of  outlaws  against  other  Moros, 
there  were  no  disturbances  in  the  Philippines,  and  quiet  like- 
wise reigned  in  Cuba,  where  Regular  troops  to  the  number 
of  268  officers  and  4,853  men  were  retained  in  the  work  of 
pacification.  Camps  of  instruction  lasting  for  a  month  were 
held  during  the  summer  at  Pine  Plains,  ]N^.  Y, ;  Fort  Benja- 
min Harrison,  Indiana ;  Chickamauga  Park,  Georgia ;  Fort 
Eiley,  Kansas;  Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Wyoming;  American 
Lake,  Washington ;  Atascadero  Ranch,  California,  and  Leon 
Springs,  Texas.  These  were  attended  by  about  45,000  of 
the  organized  militia,  and  by  some  1,099  officers  and  19,164 
men  of  the  Regular  Army,  the  mounted  troops  of  the  latter 
marching  250  miles  one  way  or  150  miles  in  going  and  re- 
turning, while  the  infantry  covered  200  or  150  miles  in  a 
like  manner.  The  joint  Army  and  Militia  coast  defence 
exercises  inaugurated  the  year  before  were  repeated  to  ex- 
cellent advantage  in  the  eleven  artillery  districts  along  the 
Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts  during  May  and  June,  and  ap- 
proximately 10,000  troops  took  part  in  them.  The  entire 
Army  and  ]^ational  Guard,  with  the  exception  of  that  of 
Florida  and  E^evada,  were  re-armed  with  the  new  United 
States  magazine  rifle,  model  of  1903,  chambered  for  1906 
ammunition,  which,  being  much  more  powerful,  accurate 
and  rapid,  superseded  the  Krag-Jorgensen  rifle.  Consider- 
able progress  was  also  made  at  the  new  factory  at  the 
Picatinny  Arsenal,  Dover,  ISTew  Jersey,  in  the  manufacture 
of  smokeless  powder,  about  500  lbs.  being  turned  out  per 
diem.  Another  notable  incident  were  the  successful  tests 
for  military  purposes  made  during  the  summer  of  a  biplane 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  353 

1908] 

invented  by  Messrs.  Orville  and  Wilbur  Wrigbt,  but  in  the 
absence  of  appropriation,  the  War  Department  was  pre- 
cluded from  purchasing  even  one  aeroplane.  ^^^ 

Considerable  progress  was  made  in  the  work  on  the  seacoast 
defences,  so  that  85  per  cent,  of  the  heavy  guns  and  72  per 
cent,  of  the  rapid-fire  guns  contemplated  for  these  fortifica- 
tions were  mounted  by  the  close  of  1908.  The  results  of  the 
target-practice  were  especially  gratifying  in  the  number  of 
hits  scored.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps 
was  still  370  officers  and  7,071  men  short  of  the  number  re- 
quired "  to  furnish  one-half  of  the  personnel  required  for 
one  complete  manning  detail  of  the  guns  now  provided  in 
the  United  States,  the  full  number  for  the  mines,  and  the 
full  number  for  guns  and  mines  now  provided  for  the  in- 
sular possessions."  Moreover,  so  parsimonious  had  been 
the  appropriations  made  by  Congress  that  the  auxiliaries  — 
which  had  become  a  sine  qua  non  in  modem  fortifications  — 
such  as  fire  control,  searchlights,  submarine  mines  and 
power  plants,  were  still  in  a  lamentable  state  of  backward- 


ness.-^^^ 


The  detrimental  effect  of  the  detachment  of  officers  for 
services  which  could  not  be  avoided  —  among  them  being 
the  extensive  system  of  military  education  not  only  in  the 
Army  but  at  State  institutions  and  in  the  militia,  recruit- 
ing service,  and  the  river  and  harbour  improvement  con- 
ducted under  the  supervision  of  Engineer  officers  —  made 
itself  strongly  felt  as  in  past  years. -^^^  Like  his  predecessors. 
Secretary  Wright  was  impelled  to  recommend  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  officers,  to  which  he  added  an  enlargement  of 
the  Quartermaster's  Department  and  the  advisability  of  a 
system  to  hasten  the  flow  of  promotion,  as  well  as  proper 
appropriation  for  such  joint  Army  and  Militia  manoeuvres 
as  would  teach  the  higher  officers  to  handle  the  bodies  of 
troops  that  they  would  be  expected  to  command  in  time  of 


war.^^^ 


The  year  1908  witnessed  the  introduction  of  two  notable 


354     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908 

innovations  in  the  military  service.  The  first  was  the  crea- 
tion a  "  Division  of  Militia  Affairs "  effected  by  virtue 
of  the  executive  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  on  February 
12th.  It  was  charged  with  the  superintendence  of,  and  the 
transaction  of  business  relating  to,  the  organized  and  unor- 
ganized militia  except  when  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  and  its  principal  functions  are  the  co-ordination  of 
the  militia  with  the  Army  and  the  assignment  of  Regular 
ofiicers  as  instructors  and  inspectors  of  the  various  l^ational 
Guards.  By  virtue  of  the  War  Department  orders  of  June 
10,  1908,  all  records  pertaining  to  the  militia  were  trans- 
ferred to  it  from  the  office  of  the  Adjutant-General,  and 
three  days  later  it  was  definitely  organized  as  part  of  the 
General  Staff.  The  other  innovation  consisted  in  putting 
into  effect  the  physical  tests  directed  by  President  Roose- 
velt on  December  2,  1907,  and  the  conditions,  promulgated 
in  War  Department  General  Orders  No.  79,  under  date  of 
May  14,  1908,  were,  in  brief,  as  follows : 

(1)  An  annual  physical  examination  by  two  or  more  medical 
officers  was  to  be  made  of  all  field  officers  of  the  Army  stationed 
in  the  United  States  and  Alaska  during  the  three  months  be- 
ginning about  August  firsts  and  of  those  stationed  in  Cuba,  Porto 
Rico,  Hawaii  and  the  Philippines  during  a  similar  period  com- 
mencing about  December  first. 

(2)  As  soon  as  possible  thereafter  the  riding  test  prescribed 
was  to  begin.  It  was  to  consist  of  three  marches  of  30  miles 
each,  made  on  three  consecutive  days.  Two  of  these  marches 
were  required  to  be  made  within  7I/2  hours  of  the  time  of  start- 
ing and  the  third  within  6  hours.  The  gaits  were  limited  to  the 
walk  and  trot. 

(3)  Within  three  hours  of  concluding  the  third  day's  march, 
a  second  medical  examination  of  each  officer  was  to  be  held. 

(4)  For  the  field  officers  of  the  Coast  Artillery  a  walking  test 
was  prescribed  to  "  consist  of  a  march  of  50  miles,  to  be  made 
in  three  consecutive  days  and  in  a  total  of  twenty  hours,  includ- 
ing rests,  the  march  on  any  one  day  to  be  during  consecutive 
hours.'' 

(5)  Field  officers  holding  permanent  appointments  in  the  va- 
rious  staff  corps  —  the   departments   of  the   Adjutant-General 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  355 

1908] 

and  Inspector-General,  the  Engineer  and  Signal  Corps  excepted 
—  were  permitted  to  elect  which  test  they  preferred  to  take. 

(6)  Field  officers  whose  health  would  be  seriously  endan- 
gered thereby,  and  so  certified  to  by  medical  officers,  were  for- 
bidden to  take  the  test.  In  that  case  they  were  required  to  retire 
under  the  30  years^  service  clause  or  to  appear  before  a  retiring 
board. 

(7)  Field  officers  of  the  permanent  staff  corps  engaged  upon 
civil  work  of  a  technical  character  and  who  have  reached  an  age 
and  rank  such  as  to  make  it  improbable  that  they  will  ever  par- 
ticipate in  active  operations,  were  excused  from  the  physical  test 
but  not  from  the  examination. 

(8)  All  officers  below  the  grade  of  major  were  to  be  subjected 
to  a  physical  examination  once  each  year.^^^ 

The  work  of  the  War  Department  General  Staff  was  re- 
cast, ^^^  and  the  first  National  Militia  Board,  authorized  by 
the  Act  of  May  27,  1908,  met  in  Washington  on  June  15th 
to  17th,  and  submitted  a  number  of  recommendations  which 
were  duly  approved  by  the  War  Department  and  transmitted 
to  the  Adjutant-General  of  each  !N^ational  Guard  for  their 
information  and  guidance.  ■^''^^ 

Apropos  of  the  above-mentioned  law,  the  Secretary  of 
War  in  his  annual  report  for  1908  made  the  following  in- 
teresting comments :  ^  ^^ 

"  The  conditions  established  by  this  new  legislation  make  it 
possible  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  United  States  to 
prepare  in  time  of  peace  a  scheme  of  organization  of  all  organized 
land  forces  with  a  view  to  immediate  mobilization  of  such  forces 
on  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  working  out  of  the  plans  of  mo- 
bilization will  make  it  possible  to  avoid  the  confused  and  con- 
gested conditions  which  have  in  the  past  characterized  the  initial 
periods  of  some  wars.  It  is  expected  that  the  new  conditions 
will  lead  to  the  establishment  of  mobilization  plans  so  complete 
that,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  it  will  be  necessary  simply  to  open 
reserve  depots  of  supplies  and  to  call  the  troops  to  their  respec- 
tive colors. 

"  These  new  conditions  suggest  that  the  time  is  opportune  to 
consider  the  relations  of  the  organized  militia  to  the  first  line  of 
defense  of  the  nation  in  case  of  war.     A  careful  study  has  been 


356     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1908-1909 

made  of  this  question,  and  the  conclusions  reached  are  worthy  of 
the  serious  consideration  of  the  Congress. 

"  There  are  at  present  approximately  111,000  officers  and  men 
in  the  organized  militia.  It  is  considered  that  about  75  per 
cent,  of  this  number  would  respond  to  a  call  to  arms  and  of  the 
number  responding  a  small  percentage  would  be  eliminated  prob- 
ably by  physical  disqualification.  It  is  estimated  that  little 
more  than  60  per  cent. —  that  is,  about  67,000  —  would  be  avail- 
able at  present  in  case  of  an  emergency. 

'^  The  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  has  indicated  that  about  20,000 
of  the  organized  militia  will  be  required  for  the  coast  artillery 
reserves  and  approximately  the  same  number  for  coast  artillery 
supports.  These  troops  would  be  required  for  service  in  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  fortifications,  and  would  not  be  available 
for  use  with  the  mobile  army  until  all  question  of  sea  power  along 
the  coast  had  been  settled  favorably. 

"  The  result  of  careful  study  in  the  War  Department  shows  that 
in  the  event  of  war  with  any  first-class  power  we  ought  to  have 
a  first  line  of  defense  of  at  least  350,000  combatants.  As  the 
Eegular  Army  is  limited  to  100,000,  it  follows  that  in  order  to 
be  at  all  ready  for  war  it  would  be  necessary  to  draw  250,000 
men  from  the  organized  militia.  It  would  be  fortunate  if  the 
several  States  of  the  Union  appreciated  the  importance  of  in- 
creasing their  organized  militia  to  the  extent  indicated,  and  in 
order  to  luring  about  this  result  the  General  Government  might 
well,  in  furtherance  of  the  act  of  May  27,  1908,  still  further  in- 
crease the  appropriations  for  the  equipment  of  the  militia  and 
for  general  maneuvers  of  the  militia  with  the  regular  forces.'^ 

Secretary  Wright  also  laid  particular  emphasis  upon  the 
fact  that 

"  The  two  most  pressing  needs  in  the  way  of  fighting  material 
are  now  an  increase  of  reserve  supply  of  artillery  for  the  mobile 
army,  both  light  and  heavy  field  artillery,  and  reserve  ammuni- 
tion of  both  kinds.  It  is  hoped  that  it  may  be  possible  to  appro- 
priate the  full  amounts  which  are  estimated  for  these  important 
purposes."  ^" 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1909 

Aside  from  six  acts  of  Congress  and  two  joint  resolutions 
authorizing  the  donation  of  condemned  ordnance  to  certain 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  357 

1909] 

States,  towns,  institutions  or  organizations/"^^  and  apart 
from  the  usual  annual  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the 
Army  and  the  Military  Academy  and  for  the  fortifications 
at  home  and  in  the  insular  possessions/^^  the  military  legis- 
lation of  1909  presents  remarkably  little  of  interest.  The 
most  important  measure  was  "  An  Act  For  the  organization 
of  the  militia  in  the  District  of  Columbia/'  approved  on 
February  18th/ ^^  which  so  amended  and  revised  the  Act  of 
March  1st,  1899,  as  to  make  it  over  de  novo.  The  altera- 
tions w^ere  effected  for  the  purpose  of  making  this  organi- 
zation —  which  was  henceforth  to  be  styled  '^  the  National 
Guard  of  the  District  of  Columbia  " —  conform  to  the  new 
standard  required  for  organized  militia  but,  as  this  measure 
was  only  of  local  concern,  its  details  need  not  arrest  us  here. 
The  Act  of  March  3,  1909,  "  making  appropriations  for 
the  support  of  the  army  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June 
thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  ten,''  made  a  slight  change 
in  one  part  of  the  law  of  May  11,  1908,^^^  as  well  as  in  that 
of  !N'ovember  3,  1893,^^^  and  provided  that  any  major  in 
the  Medical  Corps  found  disqualified  for  promotion  to  the 
grade  of  lieutenant-colonel,  for  any  reason  other  than  phy- 
sical disability,  should  be  suspended;  if  upon  re-examina- 
tion at  the  end  of  a  year,  he  were  then  found  qualified  for 
promotion,  he  was  to  be  advanced,  but  if  the  finding  were 
adverse,  he  was  to  be  retired.  ^^^  Under  the  caption  of  Ord- 
nance Department,  this  law  wisely  specified  that 

"  Hereafter  whenever  pressing  obligations  are  required  to  be 
paid  by  a  disbursing  officer  of  the  Ordnance  Department  and 
there  is  an  insufficient  balance  to  his  official  credit  under  the 
proper  appropriation  or  appropriations  for  that  purpose,  he  is 
authorized  to  make  payment  from  the  total  available  balance  to 
his  official  credit,  provided  sufficient  funds  under  the  proper  ap- 
propriation or  appropriations  have  been  allotted  by  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance  for  the  expenditure."^^* 

The  serious  infraction  of  discipline  resulting  from  the 
shooting  affray  alluded  to  on  page  322  had  been  a  burning 


358     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

question  for  three  years  and  formed  the  subject  of  "An  Act 
To  correct  the  records  and  authorize  the  re-enlistment  of  cer- 
tain noncommissioned  officers  and  enlisted  men  belonging  to 
Companies  B,  C,  and  D  of  the  twenty-fifth  United  States 
Infantry  who  were  discharged  without  honor  under  Special 
Orders,  Numbered  Two  Hundred  and  Sixty-six,  War  De- 
partment, J^ovember  ninth,  nineteen  hundred  and  six,  and 
the  restoration  to  them  of  all  rights  of  which  they  have  been 
deprived  on  account  thereof."  ^^^  This  measure,  approved 
March  3,  1909,  provided 

"  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint 
a  court  of  inquiry,  to  consist  of  five  officers  of  the  United  States 
Army,  not  below  the  rank  of  colonel,  which  court  shall  be  author- 
ized to  hear  and  report  upon  all  charges  and  testimony  relating 
to  the  shooting  affray  which  took  place  at  Brownsville,  Texas, 
on  the  night  of  August  thirteenth-fourteenth,  nineteen  hundred 
and  six.  Said  court  shall,  within  one  year  from  the  date  of  its 
appointment,  make  a  final  report,  and  from  time  to  time  shall 
make  partial  reports,  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  results  of 
such  inquiry,  and  such  soldiers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of 
Companies  B,  C,  and  D,  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Eegiment  United 
States  Infantry,  who  were  discharged  from  the  military  service 
as  members  of  said  regiment,  under  the  provisions  of  Special 
Orders,  numbered  two  hundred  and  sixty-six,  dated  at  the  War 
Department  the  ninth  day  of  November,  nineteen  hundred  and 
six,  as  said  court  shall  find  and  report  as  qualified  for  reenlist- 
ment  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States  shall  thereby  become 
eligible  for  reenlistment. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  any  noncommissioned  officer  or  private  who 
shall  be  made  eligible  for  reenlistment  under  the  provisions  of 
the  preceding  section  shall,  if  reenlisted,  be  considered  to  have 
reenlisted  immediately  after  his  discharge  under  the  provisions 
of  the  special  order  hereinbefore  cited,  and  to  be  entitled,  from 
the  date  of  his  discharge  under  said  special  order,  to  the  pay, 
allowances,  and  other  rights  and  benefits  that  he  would  have 
been  entitled  to  receive  according  to  his  rank  from  said  date  of 
discharge  as  if  he  had  been  honorably  discharged  under  the 
provisions  of  said  special  order  and  had  reenlisted  immediately.'^ 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  359 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1909 

Beyond  certain  isolated  cases  in  which  the  Regular  troops 
were  called  upon  to  assist  the  civil  authorities  in  the  Philip- 
pines to  punish  occasional  acts  of  lawlessness  committed  by 
the  Moros,  there  were  no  active  operations  during  the  year 
worthy  of  mention.  Between  January  1st  and  April  1st, 
the  Army  of  Cuban  Pacification  was  withdrawn  from  that 
island,  having  performed  its  mission  in  an  admirable  man- 
ner. Joint  combined  manoeuvres  of  the  organized  militia  of 
Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  the 
District  of  Columbia  were  held  in  southeastern  Massachusetts 
simultaneously  with  the  Regular  forces  in  the  Department  of 
the  East.-^^^     As  Secretary  Dickinson  declared,^  ^^ 

"  Some  defects  and  irregularities  developed  in  connection  with 
these  maneuvers,  but  the  object  of  such  maneuvers,  like  all 
other  drills  and  practical  instruction,  is  to  develop  defects  and 
to  profit  thereby.  It  is  important  that  defects  of  material  and 
shortcomings  of  methods  should  be  known,  and  they  can  only 
be  known  by  such  practical  tests.  If  effects  of  mobilization  and 
shortcomings  in  delivering  supplies  are  to  be  avoided  at  the  out- 
break of  war,  it  is  of  first  importance  that  they  be  ascertained 
in  peace  maneuvers,  and  ways  found  to  avoid  them  when  mob- 
ilization for  war  becomes  necessary. 

"  It  is  urged  that  Congress  make  a  suitable  appropriation  to 
carry  out  the  policy  of  the  department  to  have  joint  maneuvers 
between  the  state  forces  and  the  regular  forces  during  the  en- 
suing year." 

A  gratifying  improvement  was  made  during  the  year  in 
the  target  practice  of  the  infantry,  field  and  coast  artillery. 
So  effectively  had  the  interest  in  rifle  practice  been  fostered 
that  in  December,  1909,  78  civilian  rifle  clubs,  with  a  mem- 
bership of  some  3,300,  and  44  school  boy  rifle  clubs  had  been 
organized. -^^^ 

■While  the  recruiting  for  the  Army  progressed  so  satis- 
factorily during  the  early  part  of  the  year  that  it  was  sus- 
pended for  several  months,  the  15th  of  October  found  the 
Regular  establishment  numbering  4,366  ofiicers  and  77,412 


360     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

enlisted  men,  a  total  of  81,778,  which  was  7,350  short  of  the 
maximum  strength  authorized  by  law.^^^  Notwithstanding 
the  severe  measures  taken  to  deter  desertions,  there  was  a 
slight  increase  over  1908,  and  the  Adjutant-General  pointed 
out  in  his  report  for  1909,  "  that  there  should  have  been 
nearly  ^Ye  thousand  desertions  from  the  army  of  the  United 
States  during  the  last  fiscal  year  is  simply  a  disgrace  to  the 
army  and  a  reproach  to  American  citizenship."  ^^^  There 
was  a  considerable  increase  in  the  number  of  courts-martial, 
although  the  trials  were  mainly  for  minor  offences.  In  obe- 
dience to  the  Act  of  March  3,  1909,  a  court  of  inquiry  was 
appointed  to  determine  which  non-commissioned  officers  and 
soldiers  of  Companies  B,  C,  and  D  of  the  25th  Infantry 
(coloured),  who  had  been  discharged  as  a  result  of  the  shoot- 
ing affray  at  Brownsville,  Texas,  on  the  night  of  August  13- 
14,  1906,  w^ere  entitled  to  re-enlist.  The  members  of  this 
court  were  Lieutenant-General  S.  B.  M.  Young,  Major  Gen- 
eral Joseph  P.  Sanger,  Brigadier  General  John  M.  Wilson, 
Brigadier  General  Theodore  Schwan,  Brigadier  General  But- 
ler D.  Price  —  all  retired  Army  officers  —  and  Captain 
Charles  P.  HoAvland  of  the  21st  Infantry  as  the  recorder,  but 
so  thorough  was  its  investigation  that  its  labours  were  not 
finished  until  1910.^^1 

A  systematic  effort  was  made  for  the  first  time  to  secure  a 
proper  equipment  for  the  infantry,  and  to  that  end  a  board 
of  six  officers  was  convened  at  the  Rock  Island  Arsenal  on 
April  28th.  Samples  of  the  field  equipment  used  by  the  in- 
fantry of  other  armies,  all  available  information  and  the 
shops  of  the  arsenal  were  placed  at  its  disposal  in  order  to 
enable  the  board  to  reach  a  practical  conclusion. ^^^ 

Progress  was  made  in  respect  to  the  seacoast  fortifications, 
so  that  at  the  close  of  the  year  85  per  cent,  of  the  heavy  guns 
and  75  per  cent,  of  the  rapid-fire  guns  contemplated  under  the 
plan  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board  had  been  mounted. 
Seventy  per  cent,  of  the  work  required  at  Manila  Bay,  Hono- 
lulu  and  Pearl   Harbour  had   been   appropriated   for,   but 


Fro7n  1902  to  June  1,  1915  361 

1909] 

$11,685,789  were  still  needed  to  complete  the  fortifications  in 
the  insular  possessions,  and  no  money  had  been  allotted  by 
Congress  for  the  important  positions  of  Caballo  Island  in  Ma- 
nila Bay  nor  for  the  island  of  Oahu  in  Hawaii.  ^^^ 

Secretary  Dickinson  pointed  out  that  the  evil  of  detached 
service  was  still  present  to  the  detriment  of  the  Army,  as  no 
less  than  "12.51  per  cent,  of  the  general  and  staff  officers 
and  27.38  per  cent,  of  the  line  officers  were  absent  from 
their  commands,''  and  he  laid  emphasis  on  the  report  of  the 
Inspector-General  "  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  dis- 
cipline and  efficiency  of  troops  were  lowered  by  the  continued 
absence  of  so  many  company  officers  and  the  resulting  fre- 
quent changes  of  commanders."  He  therefore  reiterated 
the  recommendation  so  often  made  by  his  predecessors  as  to 
the  absolute  necessity  of  more  officers  for  the  Army,  and  the 
need  of  additional  officers  in  the  Quartermaster's  depart- 
ment, in  which  a  new  system  of  decentralization  introduced 
on  July  1,  1908,  had  proved  of  marked  benefit  to  its  busi- 
ness methods.  He  likewise  urged  the  passage  of  a  law  in- 
augurating a  system  of  selection  founded  upon  merit,  in 
order  to  hasten  promotion  in  the  Army,  as  most  officers  be- 
came superannuated  before  they  reached  field  rank;  as  well 
as  of  a  measure  providing  for  the  raising  of  a  volunteer  army 
in  time  of  actual  or  threatened  war,  which  had  been  before 
the  Military  Committee  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives 
for  two  sessions  without  any  action  having  been  taken 
thereon.  ^^^  In  addition  to  these,  the  Secretarv  of  War 
advocated  a  modification  of  the  annual  physical  test  pre- 
scribed for  officers,  insomuch  as  "  it  required  officers  to  be 
fit  only  once  in  a  year,  whereas  they  should  be  required  to 
keep  themselves  continuously  fit  " ;  the  advisability  of  an  ap- 
propriation of  $500,000  for  military  aeroplanes ;  regulations 
governing  the  control  of  wireless  telegraphy  both  national 
and  international;  and  the  appointment  of  candidates  for 
West  Point  every  three  years  instead  of  every  four,  since 
"  during  the  past  ten  years  the  number  of  cadets  graduated 


362     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

from  the  Military  Academy  has  averaged  51  a  year  less  than 
vacancies  caused  by  casualties  alone,  without  considering  the 
increases  in  the  army  "  ^^^ —  a  state  of  affairs  which  needed 
prompt  rectification. 

The  strength  of  the  Organized  Militia,  as  reported  after 
the  annual  spring  inspections,  was  118,926  officers  and  en- 
listed men,  an  increase  of  7,985  over  the  preceding  year.^^^ 
There  was  also  a  distinct  improvement  in  its  military  effi- 
ciency but,  as  Secretary  Dickinson  remarked,^  ^^ 

"  Much  remains  to  be  done  in  the  way  of  instruction.  While 
the  Constitution  provides  that  discipline  shall  be  the  same  as 
that  of  the  Eegular  Army,  it  reserves  to  the  States  the  authority 
of  training  the  militia.  It  thus  appears  that  while  the  War  De- 
partment can  fix  standards  it  has  no  authority  to  take  direct 
charge  of  the  training  and  cause  the  organized  militia  thereby  to 
attain  such  standards.  The  War  Department  may  provide  ways 
for  training,  make  suggestions  as  to  methods,  and  fix  the  stand- 
ards that  must  be  attained,  but  it  cannot  directly  conduct  the 
training.  With  a  view  to  meeting  the  full  obligation  of  the 
department  in  regard  to  instruction,  there  has  been  organized  in 
the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  an  instruction  branch,  with  the 
object  of  placing  at  the  disposal  of  the  States  every  facility  that 
can  properly  be  extended  under  the  law  to  assist  the  military 
authorities  thereof  in  imparting  both  theoretical  and  practical  in- 
struction to  the  state  forces.  In  addition  it  is  desired,  so  far 
as  possible,  to  coordinate  the  work  of  instruction  between  the 
States,  and  do  what  can  be  done  in  establishing  uniformity  of 
instruction  throughout  the  States.  Along  these  lines  the  de- 
partment has  encouraged  the  formation  of  correspondence  schools 
for  officers  and  enlisted  men,  and  in  connection  with  state  en- 
campments and  special  assemblages  for  field  instruction  has 
furnished  commissioned  officers  and  enlisted  men,  to  assist  in 
giving  practical  instruction.  In  establishing  these  correspon- 
dence schools  it  is  the  desire  of  the  department  to  have  the  sub- 
jects and  methods  of  treatment  conform,  as  far  as  possible,  to 
those  practised  at  the  regular  service  schools.  As  to  the  mobile 
state  forces,  it  is  specially  desired  to  have  them  conform  to  the 
course  at  the  Army  School  of  the  Line  at  Fort  Leavenworth, 
Kans.  Correspondence  schools  have  been  established,  or  are 
pending  organization,  in  the  following  States: 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  363 


1909] 

Colorado. 

Massachusetts. 

Tennessee. 

Florida. 

Michigan. 

Texas. 

Georgia. 

'  District  of  Columbia. 

Vermont. 

Iowa. 

New  York. 

Virginia. 

Kansas. 

Ohio, 

West  Virginia, 

Maine. 

Pennsylvania. 

Wisconsin. 

"  Aside  from  the  theoretical  instruction  imparted  by  correspon- 
dence lectures  by  commissioned  officers  and  special  literature 
prepared  and  issued  to  officers  of  the  organized  militia,  the 
question  of  practical  instruction  is  being  closely  observed  by 
the  department.  This  divides  itself  into  two  classes,  viz,  the 
practical  instruction  that  can  be  given  in  armories,  and  that 
which  can  be  given  only  in  the  field," 

and  stress  was  laid  upon  the  fact  that  in  many  of  the  States 
the  armouries  were  totally  inadequate  for  the  proper  drills. 

During  the  summer  a  successful  experiment  was  made  in 
the  shape  of  a  school  of  instruction  for  field  artillery,  held  for 
ten  days  on  the  Government  reservation  at  Sparta,  Wis- 
consin, in  which  the  field  batteries  of  Wisconsin,  Minnesota, 
Michigan,  Iowa  and  Indiana  participated  in  conjunction 
with  a  battalion  of  Regular  field  artillery.  Field  schools 
for  the  instruction  of  medical  officers  were  also  held  at 
Sparta,  Antietam  and  the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco. -^^^ 

Most  encouraging  was  the  progress  made  in  the  policy  of 
developing  an  adequate  force  of  militia  coast  artillery  to 
supplement  that  of  the  Regular  Army,  no  less  than  138  com- 
panies being  organized,  or  in  the  process  of  organization,  by 
the  end  of  1909.  Field  exercises  of  coast  artillery  troops 
w^ere  conducted  with  the  usual  success  in  seventeen  artillery 
districts. 

The  interest  in  rifle  practice  showed  no  signs  of  flagging 
during  the  year,  and  forty-three  militia  teams  attended  the 
national  match  at  Camp  Perry,  Ohio.  The  improvement 
in  firing  was  particularly  noticeable  and  the  scores  in  the 
national  matches  reflected  accurately  the  amount  of  encour- 
agement given  to  individual  range  practice.^  ^^ 

The  Secretary  of  War  laid  strong  emphasis  upon  three 


364     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

features  of  our  military  organization  which  were  in  sad 
need  of  rectification.  Apropos  of  one  of  these  he  stated  ^^^ 
that 

''It  is  particularly  important  that  the  field  artillery  he  pro- 
vided for,  if  practicable.  Recent  wars  have  enhanced  its  im- 
portance immensely.  Foreign  governments  are  increasing  the 
proportion  of  guns  in  their  armies.  The  General  Staff  has  con- 
sidered that  the  proportion  of  guns  which  should  be  provided 
in  the  American  Army  should  be  3.35  per  thousand  bayonets. 
It  is  estimated,  further,  that  there  should  be  about  2.5  guns 
per  thousand  sabres,  to  act  with  cavalry  in  time  of  war.  This 
is  less  than  in  most  foreign  armies.  Accepting  the  propoi'tion 
of  3.35  guns  per  thousand  bayonets,  however,  it  would  require 

228  BATTERIES  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY  FOR  THE  PRESENT  FORCE  OF 
INFANTRY  OF  THE  ORGANIZED  MILITIA.  ThERE  ARE  IN  EXIST- 
ENCE BUT  48  BATTERIES.  TlIE  REGULAR  FIELD  ARTILLERY  IS 
ONLY  ONE-HALF  OF  WHAT  IS  NECESSARY  TO  SUPPLY  THE  LARGER 
PROPORTION    OF    GUNS    FOR    THE    PRESENT    AUTHORIZED    REGULAR 

INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY.  The  bare  statement  of  these  numbers 
indicates  the  very  unsatisfactory  state  of  the  field  artillery 
question." 

Under  the  caption  of  "  Military  Policy  for  defense  of  the 
United  States,"  Secretary  Dickinson  asserted  ^^^  that 

"  The  military  system  of  the  United  States  contemplates  a 
correlation  of  the  Eegular  Army  with  the  National  Guard.  It 
necessarily  follows  that  the  organization  of  the  Eegular  Army 
and  the  militia  in  combination  should  be  such  as  to  permit  them 
to  cooperate  and  practice  together  in  time  of  peace  under  con- 
ditions similar  to  those  which  would  obtain  in  time  of  war.  .  .  . 

'^  Joint  camps  of  instruction  and  maneuvers  in  which  the 
army  and  national  guard  h-ave  taken  part  have  been  held  bien- 
nially since  1903  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  which  have 
been  of  pronounced  benefit  to  all  the  troops  engaged.  The 
participation  of  the  national  guard  in  these  maneuvers  has  given 
to  the  Eegular  Army  the  inestimable  advantage  not  otherwise 
obtainable  of  experience  in  the  maneuvering  of  large  masses  of 
men  under  conditions  of  service  assimilated  so  far  as  practicable 
to  the  actual  conditions  that  may  be  expected  when  war  is  on. 
The  national  guard,  in  addition,  had  the  opportunity  to  acquire 
military   experience   in    association   with   professional   soldiers. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  365 

1909] 

The  number  of  men,  Eegular  Army  and  National  Guard  com- 
bined, participating  in  these  different  maneuvers  has  ranged 
from  30,000  to  50,000.  Recognizing  the  fact  that  Congress 
was  not  likely  to  authorize  in  time  of  peace  so  large  an  increase 
in  the  seacoast  artillery  as  is  necessary  for  the  complete  manning 
details  for  all  the  guns  of  the  coast  defense  of  the  United  States, 
the  plan  has  been  inaugurated  and  put  in  successful  operation 
of  relying  on  the  militia  of  the  seacoast  States  to  furnish  a  part 
of  the  remainder.  The  time  has  now  arrived  when  a  rational 
plan  should  be  devised  for  a  similar  cooperation  of  the  army 
and  the  militia  with  respect  to  the  mobile  army. 

"  In  order  to  put  such  a  plan  into  operation  and  permit  of 
practice  under  war  conditions  in  time  of  peace  by  the  Eegular 
Army  and  the  militia  in  combination  the  United  States  should 
he  divided  into  a  number  of  territorial  and  tactical  districts,  so 
that  the  organized  militia  of  the  States  comprising  such  dis- 
tricts may  he  conveniently  combined  with  the  Regular  Army 
stationed  therein  into  permanent  brigades,  divisions,  and  corps 
for  instruction  and  tactical  organization.  It  will  probably  be 
found  desirable  to  have  in  each  State  in  such  district  at  least 
one  military  post,  the  said  posts  to  be  occupied  by  troops  of  the 
different  arms  of  the  service  in  such  numbers  that  when  the 
troops  from  all  the  posts  included  in  tl^ie  district  are  assembled 
that  they  would  constitute  a  division,  including  the  proper 
proportion  of  all  arms  and  branches  of  the  regular  service. 
This  regular  organization  should  be  the  special  educator  and 
assistant  of  the  militia  forces  of  those  States  and  should  be 
the  center  from  which  general  instruction  could  be  given.  No 
post  smaller  than  a  regimental  one  is  of  real  value  from  a 
military  standpoint,  so  far  as  education,  discipline,  and  drill 
are  conceited. 

"  The  present  system  of  departmental  military  government 
should  give  way  to  an  organization  tactically  correct  for  war 
purposes;  that  is,  these  various  troops,  both  regular  and  militia, 
gathered  together,  should  be  permanently  designated  in  name 
and  organization,  with  all  the  attendant  system  which  would  be 
in  existence  in  time  of  war,  so  that  when  the  troops  retire  to 
their  proper  stations  they  will  not  lose  their  brigade  or  division 
organization  and  will  be  controlled  by  their  proper  commanding 
officers,  stationed  within  the  district. 

"  In  each  tactical  corps  or  division  district  a  central  point  for 
a  camp  site  should  be  selected,  with  a  view  to  the  convenience 


366     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

and  economy  of  easy  concentration  of  both  the  regular  and 
militia  forces  of  such  district.  The  regular  and  militia  troops 
should  be  concentrated  for  instruction  at  these  points.  Such 
camps  will  answer  the  purpose  of  permanent  brigade  posts,  so 
far  as  instruction  is  concerned,  and  the  marching  to  and  fro 
from  the  regimental  stations  to  such  points  will  bring  the  army 
before  the  people  and  more  or  less  in  contact  with  them. 

^^  Should  such  plan  be  carried  out  it  would  be  possible  to  con- 
centrate about  8  army  corps  —  possibly  somewhat  imperfect  and 
incomplete.  .  .  . 

"  In  time,  at  the  points  of  concentration  in  each  corps  district, 
there  should  he  established  supply  depots,  so  planned  that  upon 
the  assemblage  of  the  corps  or  divisions  there  would  be  avail- 
able such  equipment  as  might  possibly  be  lacking  in  the  various 
States  for  the  equipment  of  their  organizations.  .  .  . 

''  What  is  greatly  needed  is  a  decentralization  of  the  powers 
of  supply  and  initiative.  The  pi'esent  centralization  ahuays 
hreaks  doiun  the  moment  it  is  put  to  the  test,  and  the  peace 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  AS  IT  STANDS  TO-DAY  IS  INCOM- 
PLETE  AND    IMPROPER   FOR   MILITARY    PURPOSES. 

"  It  is  proposed  to  submit  such  plan  of  organization  to  the 
governors  of  the  States,  asking  their  assent  thereto,  as  all  this 
system,  so  far  as  the  national  guard  is  concerned,  must  be 
voluntary.  Upon  receiving  such  assent  from  the  governors,  the 
War  Department  should  designate  in  each  district  the  exact 
organizations,  assigning  the  various  branches  of  the  service  to 
their  proper  brigades  or  divisions.  Wliile  this  will  necessarily 
result  in  an  incomplete  organization,  as  there  will  be  lacking 
in  all  branches  certain  organizations  both  in  the  Regular  Army 
and  in  the  militia,  still  it  will  be  the  first  step  toward  carrying 
out  this  proposed  creation. 

"  There  is  a  shortage  of  various  militia  organizations  to  com- 
plete the  proposed  corps.  In  order  to  obtain  these  necessary 
organizations  the  various  States  should  be  urged  to  add  to  their 
national  guard  such  organizations  as  would  be  required  in  each 
district.'^ 

Intimately  co-related  with  this  policy  was  the  question  of 
the  distribution  and  shelter  of  the  Mobile  Army  —  that  is, 
the  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery,  engineers  and  other  auxiliary 
troops  which  can  be  moved  from  place  to  place  and  are  not 
permanently  fixed  to  certain  spots  as  is  the  coast  artillery. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  367 

1909] 

Apropos  of  it,  the  Secretary  of  War  made  the  following 
pertinent  comments:  ^^^ 

^^  The  present  distribution  and  shelter  of  the  mobile 
forces  of  the  army,  .  .  .  are  not  based  upon  any  consist- 
ent policy  or  plan,  and  are  not  such  as  to  make  the  army 
as  effectively  responsive  as  it  should  be  to  the  proper 
demands  of  the  government.  tlie  mobile  army,  under 
present  conditions,  can  not  be  economically  administered. 

It  IS  NOT  IN  PROPER  STRATEGIC  POSITIONS  FOR  MOST  EFFECTIVE 
USE,  AND  IS  NOT  SO  DISPOSED  AS  TO  BE  OF  GREATEST  VALUE  IN 
TRAINING  THE  MILITIA  FOR  SERVICE  IN  THE  FIELD.       The  present 

distribution  of  our  mobile  army  appears  to  be  a  consequence  of 
conditions  of  army  service  incident  to  the  development  of  the 
West  and  Indian  warfare,  rather  than  the  result  of  a  plan 
founded  upon  modern  ideas  and  necessities. 

"  Prior  to  the  civil  war  and  afterwards  until  the  early 
eighties,  the  Eegular  Army  was  mainly  employed  in  affording 
protection  to  the  settlers  on  our  Indian  frontiers.  In  the  prose- 
cution of  this  work  it  necessarily  happened  that  the  army  was  in 
constant  movement.  Many  of  the  posts  or  cantonments  estab- 
lished were  of  temporary  character,  built  by  soldier  labor  from 
local  material  and  at  a  minimum  cost  to  the  Government.  As 
the  Indian  problem  approached  settlement  and  wars  with  the 
tribes  became  less  frequent  these  stations  took  on  a  more  per- 
manent character.  The  rude  structures  erected  by  the  soldiers 
were  replaced  by  more  commodious  barracks  built  by  civilian 
labor  of  superior  material  and  equipped  with  modern  appli- 
ances, and  water  and  sewerage  systems  were  established,  involv- 
ing heavy  expense. 

"  While  the  necessity  for  maintaining  the  army  in  the  West  for 
the  protection  of  settlers  against  Indians  practically  disappeared 
years  ago,  as  a  consequence  of  such  service  our  mobile  army  is 
now  in  large  part  located  at  points  far  distant  from  sources  of 
supply  and  in  places  not  at  all  suited  to  modern  requirem^ents ; 
but  the  elaborate  and  costly  improvements  to  which  I  have  re- 
ferred, ivith  their  conveniences  and  comforts,  and  the  strong  de- 
sire of  the  communities  in  which  posts  are  located  to  have  them 
continued*  have  naturally  had  a  tendency  to  prevent  the  adop- 

*  The  desire  of  any  community  to  prevent  the  abolition  of  a  post  in 
its  vicinity  is  obviously  founded  upon  the  fact  that  the  troops  are  a 
decided  source  of  revenue. 

I 

As   the   Chief   of    Staff,   General   Leonard   Wood,   stated   in    1910  to 


368     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1909 

tion  of  any  plan  changing  the  distribution  of  troops  which  in- 
cluded the  abandonment  for  military  purposes  of  property  of 
such  value.  The  ever  increasing  cost  of  material  and  labor  had 
made  the  expense  of  construction  and  maintenance  of  our  army 
posts  a  very  important  one  and  necessitates  serious  consideration 
of  the  question  of  the  distribution  and  shelter  of  the  army. 

"...  I  am  satisfied  that  there  should  be,  both  for  economy 
and  usefulness,  A  radical  change  in  the  distribution  and 
shelter  of  the  army,  and  that  a  proper  military  policy 
for  the  defense  of  the  United  States  demands  a  change 
in  the  distribution  of  troops  and  a  correlation  of  the 

REGULAR   ARMY    WITH    THE    NATIONAL   GUARD.      A    lai'ge    part    of 

our  military  expenditures  is  for  the  upkeep  of  our  expensive 
system  of  quartering  troops.  .  .  . 

"  In  any  plan  for  distributing  the  mobile  army  throughout 
the  country  three  prime  considerations  should  be  kept  in  mind : 

"  First.  The  forces  should  he  so  located  as  to  permit  of  their 
being  maintained  and  administered  in  the  most  economical  man- 
ner. 

"  Second.  They  should  he  stationed  in  positions  from  which 
they  can  he  moved  most  expeditiously  and  economically  to  points 
of  concentration  against  foreign  or  domestic  enemies. 

Third.  They  should  he  so  distnhuted  as  to  he  of  the  greatest 
value  in  educating  and  training  the  militia  and  carrying  out 
plans  for  raising  volunteers  in  case  of  necessity. 

"  Under  the  first  the  natural  conclusion  would  be  that  the 
troops  should  be  stationed  near  great  centers  of  production  and 
supply.  Under  the  second  they  should  be  stationed  at  great 
centers  of  transportation,  and  under  the  third  they  should  be 
distributed  in  the  several  States  in  proportion  to  their  population 
and  organized  militia.  Each  State  has  one  or  more  centers  of 
supply  at  which  troops  could  be  economically  maintained.  These 
centers  of  supply  are,  as  a  rule,  centers  of  transportation,  and 
are  usually  large  and  important  cities.  The  proportion  of  mi- 
litia organized  in  the  cities  of  the  several  States  is  far  greater 
than  the  proportion  organized  in  small  towns  and  country  dis- 
tricts. Hence  the  three  requirements  —  economy,  possibil- 
ity   OF    RAPID    MOVEMENT,    AND    TRAINING    OF    THE    MILITIA 

WOULD   ALL    BE    MET    IN    THE    MOST   EFFECTIVE    MANNER    IF    THE 


the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
"  there  is  a  great  uproar  always  made  when  we  withdraw  troops." — 
See  Hearing  on  the  Army  Appropriation  Bill  for  the  Fiscal  Year  1911- 
1912,  p.  360. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  369 

1909-1910] 

TROOPS  WERE  STATIONED  IN  OR  NEAR  THE  PRINCIPAL  CITIES  ;  and 

this  is  the  course  which  the  General  Staff  believes  should  be 
pursued.^^ 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1910 

The  military  legislation  enacted  by  the  second  session  of 
the  Sixty-first  Congress  during  1910  contained,  aside  from 
the  usual  appropriation  acts  and  certain  measures  of  minor 
importance,^^^  only  six  measures  of  sufficient  interest  to  the 
general  reader  to  warrant  mention.  The  first  was  the  Act 
approved  March  8th,^^^  which  ran  thus : 

"  That  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second  and  one  hundred 
and  twenty-fourth  articles  of  war  be,  and  hereby  are,  modified 
to  read  as  follows : 

"  Art.  122.  If,  upon  marches,  guards,  or  in  quarters,  dif- 
ferent corps  of  the  army  happen  to  join  or  do  duty  together,  the 
officer  highest  in  rank  of  the  line  of  the  Army,  Marine  Corps, 
organized  militia,  or  volunteers,  by  commission,  there  on  duty 
or  in  quarters,  shall  command  the  whole,  and  give  orders  for 
what  is  needful  in  the  service,  unless  otherwise  specially  directed 
by  the  President,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case. 

"  Art.  124.  Officers  of  the  organized  militia  of  the  several' 
States,  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  shall  on 
all  detachments,  courts-martial,  and  other  duty,  wherein  they 
may  be  employed  in  conjunction  with  the  regular  or  volunteer 
forces  of  the  United  States,  take  rank  next  after  all  officers  of 
the  like  grade  in  said  regular  forces,  and  shall  take  precedence 
of  all  officers  of  volunteers  of  equal  or  inferior  rank,  notwith- 
standing the  commissions  of  such  militia  officers  may  be  older 
than  the  commissions  of  the  said  officers  of  the  regular  forces  of 
the  United  States. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-third  article  of 
war  be,  and  hereby  is,  repealed.'^ 


205 


The  Act  of  April  12th  making  appropriations  for  the  Mili- 
tary Academy  embodied  the  recommendation  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  by  providing  that 

"  Hereafter,  for  six  years  from  July  first  anno  Domini,  nine- 
teen hundred  and  ten,  whenever  any  cadet  shall  have  finished 


370     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

three  years  of  his  course  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy, 
his  successor  may  he  admitted  to  the  Academy;  and  the  corps 
of  cadets  is  hereby  increased  to  meet  this  provision."  ^°* 

The  next  measure  of  importance  was  approved  on  April 
21st  and  further  amended  Section  15  of  the  '^  Dick  Bill  '^ 
of  January  21,  1903,  which  had  been  amended  by  Section  9 
of  the  Act  of  May  27,  1908,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference  to 
pages  348  and  697.     The  law  in  question  ^^^  provided 

"  That  section  fifteen  of  the  Act  entitled  ^  An  Act  to  pro- 
mote the  efficiency  of  the  militia,  and  for  other  purposes,^  ap- 
proved January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  as 
amended  by  "  An  Act  entitled  "  An  Act  to  further  amend  the 
Act  entitled  ^  An  Act  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  militia, 
and  for  other  purposes/  approved  May  twenty-seventh,  nineteen 
hundred  and  eight,"  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  amended  so  as 
to  read  as  follows : 

"  Sec.  15.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  to  pro- 
vide for  participation  by  any  part  of  the  organized  militia  of 
any  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  on  the  request 
of  the  governor  of  a  State  or  Territory,  or  the  commanding- 
general  of  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  in  the  en- 
campments, maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  of  any  part  of  the 
Eegular  Army,  at  or  near  any  military  post  or  camp  or  lake  or 
sea-coast  defenses  of  the  United  States.  In  such  case  the  or- 
ganized militia  so  participating  shall  receive  the  same  pay,  sub- 
sistence, and  transportation  as  is  provided  by  law  for  the  offi- 
cers and  men  of  the  Eegular  Army,  and  no  part  of  the  sums  ap- 
propriated for  the  support  of  the  Eegular  Army  shall  be  used  to 
pay  any  part  of  the  expenses  of  the  organized  militia  of  any 
State  or  Territory  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  while  engaged  in 
joint  encampments,  maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  of  the 
Eegular  Army  and  militia :  Provided,  That  the  Secretary  of 
AVar  is  authorized,  under  requisition  of  the  governor  of  a  State 
or  Territory  or  the  commanding-general  of  the  militia  of  the 
District  of  Columbia,  to  pay  to  the  quartermaster-general,  or 
such  other  officer  of  the  militia  as  may  be  duly  designated  and 
appointed  for  the  purpose,  so  much  of  its  allotment,  under  the 
annual  appropriation  authorized  by  section  sixteen  hundred  and 
sixty-one,  Eevised  Statutes,  as  amended,  as  shall  be  necessary 
for  the  payment,  subsistence,  transportation,  and  other  expenses 
of  such  portion  of  the  organized  militia  as  may  engage  in  en- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  371 

1910] 

campments,  maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  with  any  part  of 
the  Regular  Army  at  or  near  any  military  post  or  camp  or  lake 
or  sea-coast  defenses  of  the  United  States,  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  shall  forward  to  Congress,  at  each  session  next  after  said  en- 
campments, a  detailed  statement  of  the  expense  of  such  encamp- 
ments and  maneuvers:  Provided,  That  the  command  of  such 
military  post  or  camp  and  the  officers  and  troops  of  the  United 
States  there  stationed  shall  remain  with  the  regular  commander 
of  the  post  without  regard  to  the  rank  of  the  commanding  or 
other  officers  of  the  militia  temporarily  so  encamped  within  its 
limits  or  in  its  vicinity:  Provided  further.  That  except  as 
herein  specified  the  right  to  command  during  such  joint  en- 
campments, maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  shall  be  governed 
by  the  rules  set  out  in  Articles  One  hundred  and  twenty-two  and 
One  hundred  and  twenty-four  of  the  rules  and  articles  for  the 
government  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States." 

The  third  military  measure  of  importance  was  "  An  Act 
To  authorize  conmiissions  to  issue  in  the  cases  of  officers  of 
the  army  retired  with  increased  rank/'  approved  on  May  6^ 
1910,2o«  and  provided 

"  That  officers  of  the  army  on  the  retired  list  whose  rank  has 
been,  or  shall  hereafter  be,  advanced  by  operation  of  or  in  ac- 
cordance with  law  shall  be  entitled  to  and  shall  receive  commis- 
sions in  accordance  with  such  advanced  rank." 

The  fourth  was  "  An  Act  Providing  for  the  retirement  of 
certain  medical  officers  of  the  army,"  approved  on  June 
twenty-second,^^ ^  and  specified 

"  That  any  officer  of  the  Medical  Eeserve  Corps  who  shall 
have  reached  the  age  of  seventy  years,  and  whose  total  active  serv- 
ice in  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  regular  or  volunteer,  as 
such  officer,  and  as  contract  or  acting  assistant  surgeon,  and  as 
an  enlisted  man  in  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  shall  equal  forty 
years,  may  thereupon,  in  the  discretion  of  the  President,  be 
placed  upon  the  retired  list  of  the  army  with  the  rank,  pay,  and 
allowances  of  a  first  lieutenant/' 

The  last  item  of  interest  was  contained  in  the  Sundry 
Civil  Bill  of  June  25,  1910,  which  allotted  $50,000  for  mili- 
tary posts  but  explicitly 


372     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

''Provided,  That  hereafter  no  money  appropriated  for  mili- 
tary posts  shall  be  expended  for  the  construction  of  quarters  for 
ofHcers  of  the  army,  or  for  barracks  and  quarters  for  the  artil- 
lery, the  total  cost  of  which,  including  the  heating  and  plumb- 
ing apparatus,  wiring  and  fixtures,  shall  exceed,  in  the  case  of 
quarters  of  a  general  officer,  the  sum  of  fifteen  thousand  dollars, 
of  a  colonel  or  an  officer  above  the  rank  of  captain,  twelve  thou- 
sand dollars,  and  of  an  officer  of  and  below  the  rank  of  captain, 
nine  thousand  dollars."  ^^^ 

MILITAKY  EVENTS  DUKING  1910 

On  October  15,  1910,  the  actual  strength  of  the  Eegular 
Army  was  4,310  officers  and  67,459  enlisted  men,  exclusive 
of  the  Hospital  Corps  of  3,486  men.  If  the  Philippine 
Scouts  numbering  166  officers  and  5,100  men  be  added  to  the 
above,  the  total  Regular  force  amounted  to  77,035  officers 
and  enlisted  men,  which  was  10,084  short  of  the  maximum 
strength  authorized  by  law.  At  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year 
"  121  general  and  staff  officers  (10.37  per  cent.)  and  800  line 
officers  (25.76  per  cent.)  were  absent  from  their  commands," 
and  the  number  of  desertions  which  had  occurred  during  the 
preceding  twelve  months  amounted  to  3,464  —  30.6  per  cent, 
less  than  the  year  before.  The  principal  activities  of  the 
Army  were  devoted  to  fighting  forest  fires  during  August  and 
September  in  Montana,  Idaho,  Washington  and  Ol*egon ;  and 
the  camp  of  instruction  at  American  Lake,  Washington,  had 
to  be  discontinued  on  account  of  the  withdrawal  of  nearly 
all  the  troops  for  that  purpose.  Certain  Regular  forces  did, 
iiowever,  participate  in  military  tournaments  at  Toledo, 
Ohio ;  Dallas,  Texas ;  Des  Moines,  Iowa ;  Albany,  N.  Y. ; 
iN'ashville,  Tennessee;  Chicago;  and  at  Tacoma,  Washing- 
ton. The  first  tournament  at  Des  Moines  from  September 
20  to  30,  1909,  proved  so  successful  that  a  second  was  held 
there  from  September  26  to  October  5,  1910 ;  the  tourna- 
ment at  Albany  was  an  adjunct  to  the  Hudson-Eulton  cele- 
bration, and  the  one  at  Chicago  was  attended  by  over  a  mil- 
lion   people.     These    exhibitions    comprised,    among    other 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  373 

1910] 

things,  reviews  of  troops,  competitive  drills,  tests  in  scaling 
walls,  building  and  demolishing  bridges,  and  packing.  They 
were  of  service  in  that  they  not  only  afforded  capital  school- 
ing to  the  troops,  but  enabled  the  people  at  large  to  gain 
some  understanding  of  the  variety,  extent  and  character  of 
modern  military  training.^^^ 

During  the  year  more  than  13,000  of  the  Kegulars  were 
innoculated  against  typhoid  fever ;  the  physical  tests  for  offi- 
cers were  modified  by  General  Orders  No.  148,  under  date 
of  July  10,  1910,  which  prescribed  that  all  officers  on  the 
active  list  were  to  keep  themselves  at  all  times  in  condition 
to  perform  duty  with  troops  under  war  conditions;  the  in- 
fantry equipment  recommended  on  April  5th  by  the  board  of 
six  officers  convened  in  1909  was  approved  with  slight  modi- 
fications; and  a  similar  board  was  appointed  during  April, 
1910,   to  consider  the  subject   of  equipments   for  the  cav- 

^|j.y     212 

In  the  seacoast  fortifications  three  10-inch  guns  and  46 
rapid-fire  guns  were  added  during  the  year,  and  the  first 
three  of  the  more  powerful  14-inch  guns  were  completed. 
Owing  to  the  neglect  of  Congress,  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake 
Bay,  one  of  the  most  important  strategic  points  on  our  At- 
lantic coast,  remained  wholly  unfortified  and  without  so 
much  as  one  gun  to  defend  the  channel  between  Capes  Charles 
and  Henry.  There  was  also  dire  need  for  more  guns  at  the 
eastern  entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound,  but  nothing  could 
be  done  to  rectify  this  condition  without  the  proper  appro- 
priation. Progress  was  made  in  the  matter  of  installing 
searchlights  and  fire-control,  but  both  were  a  long  way  from 
completed.^  ^^ 

In  the  insular  possessions,  the  heavy  gun  batteries  for  the 
defence  of  Subig  Bay  were  finished,  but  the  work  in  Manila 
Bay,  Corregidor  and  Carabao  islands  was  handicapped,  and 
that  at  Caballo  island  could  not  be  begun,  owing  to  the  in- 
sufficiency of  money.  In  the  defences  of  Honolulu  and  Pearl 
Harbour,  Hawaii,  as  well  as  those  guarding  the  Panama 


374     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

Canal,  the  same  cause  prevented  their  completion  in  the  man- 
ner contemplated  by  the  National  Coast  Defense  Board.  ^^* 
According  to  the  returns  made  in  consequence  of  the  an- 
nual inspections,  the  Organized  Militia  numbered  9,155  offi- 
cers and  110,505  enlisted  men,  an  increase  of  734  over  1909. 
The  law  of  May  27,  1908,  had  fixed  January  21,  1910,  as 
the  date  when  the  militia  was  to  conform  to  the  standard  of 
the  Regular  Army  in  organization,  equipment  and  discipline, 
but,  in  default  of  a  clause  enforcing  this  standard,  the  State 
authorities  complied  or  not  as  they  saw  fit,  and  as  a  result 
it  was  found  that  the  efficiency  of  their  respective  National 
Guards  varied  "  from  a  high  to  a  low  degree."  Every  effort 
was  made  by  the  War  Department  to  stimulate  instruction 
through  the  encampments  and  schools  of  correspondence  to 
which  allusion  has  been  made,  but  the  limit  in  this  direction 
was  reached  during  1910,  and  no  further  development  could 
be  expected  until  Congress  had  authorized  the  assignment  of 
Regular  officers  on  the  active  list  to  duty  with  the  organized 
militia.^ -^^  In  his  annual  report  Secretary  Dickinson 
stated  216  that 

"  The  year  has  been  notable,  in  so  far  as  the  Organized  Militia 
is  concerned,  by  the  publication  of  a  War  Department  order 
which,  with  the  approval  of  the  authorities  of  certain  States, 
established  a  paper  organization  of  combined  regular  and  militia 
troops,  organized  into  three  military  divisions,  constituting  a 
field  army.  This  is  an  initial  movement  which  looks  ultimately 
toward  providing  a  similar  combination  of  regular  and  militia 
troops  for  the  whole  country  suitable  for  mobilization  for  field 
operations  in  case  of  war.  It  is  hoped  during  the  ensuing  year 
to  extend  this  organization  scheme  to  include  all  of  the  States 
and  Territories.  It  is  further  planned  to  accomplish  the  act- 
ual mobilization  of  one  of  the  three  divisions  of  the  first  field 
army  if  appropriations  are  granted  by  Congress  for  this  purpose. 
Such  a  mobilization  is  considered  of  much  importance  in  the 
tentative  working  out  of  the  general  defensive  scheme  and  an 
adequate  appropriation  therefor  is  urged.^^ 

During  the  year  all  the  coast  States,  except  New  Jersey, 
Delaware  and  Louisiana,  made  provision  for  militia  coast 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  375 

1910] 

artillery  reserves  in  conformity  with  the  policy  of  the  War 
Department  of  having  one-half  of  the  personnel  necessary 
to  man  the  seacoast  fortifications  furnished  by  the  militia. 
The  State  troops  participating  in  the  joint  coast  defence 
exercises  continued  to  make  fair  progress,  although  obviously 
hampered  by  the  lack  of  dummy  guns  and  other  apparatus 
which  would  permit  much  valuable  instruction  to  be  given 
them  in  their  armouries.  ^^^ 

The  restricted  demand  for  the  type  of  horses  required  for 
the  military  service  had  resulted  in  such  a  scarcity  of  re- 
mounts throughout  the  country  that  the  Secretary  of  War 
appealed  to  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  for  assistance  and 
co-operation.  Each  department  designated  a  representative 
and  the  outcome  of  their  joint  endeavours  to  devise  the  means 
to  remedy  the  situation  was  a  project  to  encourage  the  breed- 
ing of  horses  for  military  purposes. ^^^ 

''  In  brief,  the  plan  was  drawn  so  as  to  provide  in  time  for  a 
sufficient  number  of  remounts  annually  for  the  mounted  service 
of  the  Army  on  the  present  peace  footing.  The  country  is  to 
be  divided  into  four  breeding  districts  and  100  stallions  pur- 
chased to  stand  for  service  free  of  charge  for  approved  sound 
mares,  the  mare  owner  to  give  in  return  an  option  on  the  result- 
ing foal  during  the  year  it  is  3  years  of  age.  The  localities  sug- 
gested for  breeding  districts  are  those  where  conditions  are 
especially  suited  for  horse  raising,  where  the  prevailing  type  of 
mares  is  most  likely  to  approach  that  desired  for  the  Army, 
where  a  light  type  of  horse  will  always  in  the  long  run  be  the 
most  profitable  to  the  farmer  and  draft  horses  least  likely  to  ob- 
tain a  firm  foothold,  and  where  the  mares  are  sufficiently  nu- 
merous to  give  the  stallions  maximum  service.''  "^^ 

The  cost  of  this  plan  -was  estimated  to  be  $250,000  for  the 
first  year  and  $100,000  annually  thereafter.^^^ 

Secretary  Dickinson  again  laid  strong  emphasis  upon  the 
necessity  for  Congressional  action  for  the  following  purposes : 

(1)  The  elimination  of  inefficient  officers  from  active  service 
in  the  Army  in  order  to  expedite  the  flow  of  promotion  for  ca- 
pable officers. 

(2)  An  increase  in  the  number  of  officers,  which  was  urgently 


376     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

needed  if  the  Army  was  to  perform  the  duties  required  of  it  by 
law. 

(3)  The  creation  of  a  General  Service  corps. 

(4)  Sufficient  appropriations  to  purchase  aircraft,  to  complete 
the  fortifications  in  the  United  States  and  insular  possessions, 
and  to  secure  the  necessary  supply  of  field-artillery  guns,  car- 
riages and  ammunition  of  which  there  was  a  woeful  shortage. 

(5)  To  make  some  much-needed  amendments  in  the  existing 
law  governing  the  militia,  which  still  contained  certain  material 
defects. 

(6)  To  enact  a  comprehensive  law  for  the  organization  of  a 
volunteer  army  to  be  raised  in  the  event  of  war.^^^ 


In  further  explanation  of  the  last,  he  declared  that 


222 


"  Such  a  measure  can  best  be  formulated  in  time  of  peace  and 
tranquillity,  when  the  opportunity  is  afforded  to  proceed  with 
deliberation  and  care  in  the  preparation  of  laws  adequate  and  in- 
dispensable for  our  possible  war  needs.  The  passage  of  such 
legislation  will  permit  of  the  preparation  of  all  the  necessary 
plans  for  the  organization,  equipment,  and  supply  of  the  volun- 
teer army  and  the  selection  of  places  for  mobilization.  Without 
the  necessary  legislation  all  such  matters  must  be  deferred.  A 
bill  for  this  purpose  (S.  4003,  61st  Cong.,  2d  sess.)  is  now  be- 
fore Congress,  and  it  is  hoped  that  it  will  receive  favorable 
consideration  at  the  present  session.  Some  new  legislative  en- 
actment of  this  hind  is  an  essential  part  of  our  national  military 
system,  and  will  enable  the  General  Staff  and  the  War  College 
to  discharge  one  of  the  most  important  duties  for  which  Con^ 
gress  created  them,  and  which  they  are  now  prevented  from 
doing  because  of  the  absence  of  such  a  law.  The  measure  in 
question  has  been  very  carefully  considered  by  the  department, 
and  it  is  believed  to  be  adequate  for  the  purpose.  It  does  not 
call  for  any  appropriation,  nor  would  it  cause  any  expenditure 
of  public  money  during  the  years  of  peace." 

Under  the  caption  of  National  Military  Policy,  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  laid  down  these  most  important  principles :  ^^^ 

''  In  order  to  avoid  the  waste  inseparable  from  going  to  war 
without  full  preparation,  we  must  be  ready  with  a  complete 

SYSTEM  FOR  PASSING  FROM  A  PEACE  TO  A  WAR  ESTABLISHMENT. 
We  should  UNDERTAKE  WITHOUT  FURTHER  DELAY  THE  PROBLEM 
OF  SIMPLIFYING  AND  PERFECTING  THE  ADMINISTRATION  AND  OR- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  377 

1910] 

GANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  TO  THE  END  THAT  THE  NEW  ARMY  OF 
REGULARS,  ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  AND  VOLUNTEERS  MAY  PASS  AUTO- 
MATICALLY FROM  A  PEACE  TO  A  WAR  BASIS.  We  have  vdst  mili- 
tary resources,  and  if  we  but  organize  them  in  time  of  peace 

IT    WILL    NOT    ONLY    HAVE   A    TENDENCY    TO    PREVENT    WAR,    BUT 

should  war  come  it  will  enable  the  nation  to  conduct  its 

CAMPAIGNS  WITH  A  GREATER  REGARD  FOR  ECONOMY  AND  EFFI- 
CIENCY THAN  HAS  BEEN  HITHERTO  POSSIBLE.  It  IS  FUTILE  TO 
ATTEMPT    TO     PLACE    THE    MILITARY    ESTABLISHMENT     OF     THE 

COUNTRY  UPON  A  PROPER  BASIS,  having  due  regard  for  economy 
and  efficiency,  by  the  passage  of  detached  legislation.  In 
my  opinion  the  time  has  come  when  Congress  should  estab- 
lish A  commission  to  determine  as  early  as  practicable  a 
comprehensive  policy  for  the  organization,  mobilization, 

AND  administration  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY,  THE  ORGANIZED 
MILITIA,  AND  THE  VOLUNTEER  FORCES   IN   TPIE   EVENT   OF  WAR." 

Insomuch  as  the  year  1910  marked  the  end  of  the  first  de- 
cade of  the  twentieth  century,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  ex- 
amine in  somewhat  greater  detail  the  condition  of  our  land 
forces  and  our  readiness  for  war  at  that  epoch.  It  will  thus 
be  possible  to  gauge  how  far  Congress  had  profited  by  the 
lessons  of  the  Spanish- American  and  Philippine  Wars,  and 
how  much  it  had  achieved  in  the  fulfilment  of  its  duty  tq 
provide  the  country  with  adequate  national  defence. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  Eegular  Army  —  including  the  Phil- 
ippine Scouts  —  numbered  on  October  15,  1910,  77,035  offi- 
cers and  enlisted  men,  distributed  as  follows : 

In  the  United  States 56,961 

In  Alaska    1,128 

In  Hawaii   1,371 

In  the  Philippines : 

Regular  Army 10,962 

Philippine   Scouts    5,266  16,228 

In  Porto  Eico 601 

Troops  en  route  and  officers  at  other  for- 
eign stations   743 

Total     77,035  "* 

In  other  words,  there  was  only  one  Regular  officer  and  soldier 
to  defend  every  10,000  inhabitants  in  continental   United 


378     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

States,  As  the  enlisted  men  in  the  entire  Army  numbered 
72,559,  in  order  to  raise  the  military  establishment  to  the 
maximum  war  strength  authorized  by  the  law  of  February  2, 
1901,  27,441  additional  men  would  be  required.  The  Army 
would  tlien  contain  about  thirty  per  cent,  of  recruits  and, 
obviously,  be  far  below  the  fighting  efficiency  it  ought  to  pos- 


sess.^ 


In  one  respect  Congress  had  been  generous,  since  appro- 
priations had  been  made  for  675,000  Springfield  rifles  of 
the  latest  model,  but  the  Ordnance  Department  declared 
that  a  reserve  of  1,000,000  rifles  ought  to  be  kept  on  hand  for 
an  emergency. 

The  sources  of  supply  for  small-arms  ammunition  were  the 
Frankf ord  Arsenal  and  certain  private  manufacturers.  Dur- 
ing the  fiscal  year  1909-1910  the  former  produced  80,000,000 
rounds  and  the  latter  8,000,000,  but  from  this  amount  must 
be  deducted  the  40,000,000  rounds  consumed  each  year  in  tar- 
get practice  by  the  Eegular  Army  and  the  Organized  Mi- 
litia, and  in  the  supplies  furnished  to  the  l^avy  and  Marine 
Corps.  In  other  words,  the  actual  increase  in  the  reserve 
per  annum  was  only  about  48,000,000  rounds.  In  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  the  average  expenditure  of  small-arms  ammu- 
nition in  a  one-day's  battle  was  fully  300  rounds  per  man 
engaged,  according  to  General  Kuropatkin's  own  account;  ^^^ 
and  in  the  present  European  War,  so  far  as  the  author  was 
able  to  ascertain  from  French,  English  and  German  officers 
and  men,^^^  the  amount  is  even  larger.  An  army  of 
500,000  men  would  therefore  use  in  a  single  day's  fighting 
the  entire  152,000,000  rounds  which  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
stated  constituted  the  American  resen^e  on  June  30,  1911. 


*  The  following  account  of  our  military  condition  at  the  close  of 
1911  is  based  upon  the  author's  articles,  "The  Truth  Concerning  the 
United  States  Army  "  and  "  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized  Mi- 
litia To-day  "  as  published  in  the  Infantry  Journal  for  May-June  and 
July- August,  1911,  and  re-published  in  pamphlet  form  in  July  and 
August  of  that  year  respectively.  In  these  articles  the  authorities  for 
every  statement  of  fact  in  the  text  are  given  in  copious  footnotes. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  379 

1910] 

Our  field  artillery  was  hopelessly  inadequate  for  war.  In 
almost  every  large  army  there  are  four  guns  to  each  1,000 
infantrymen,  while  France  had  nearly  ^yq  and  Germany  six 
guns  per  thousand.  The  available  infantry  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  Organized  Militia  in  the  United  States  in  1910 
recruited  up  to  its  full  war  strength  would  have  numbered 
approximately  212,520  rifles.  According  to  our  Field  Ser- 
vice Regulations  at  that  time,  such  a  force  would  require  at 
least  850  guns,  but  General  Leonard  Wood,  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  testified  before  the  Committee  on  Militarv  Affairs  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  on  December  14,  1910,  that  we 
possessed  only  432  three-inch  field  pieces.  The  German 
army  then  had  2,800  rounds  per  gun,  while  our  own  Field 
Service  Regulations  required  only  1,856  rounds  for  each 
3-inch  piece,  yet,  according  to  General  Wood's  testimony, 
we  possessed  less  than  one-third  of  the  amount  prescribed  and, 
what  was  more,  that  was  all  we  had.  The  Chief  of  Staff  in 
his  annual  report  laid  special  emphasis  upon  the  fact  that,  at 
the  existing  rate  of  appropriation,  it  will  be  more  than 
FIFTY  yf:aks  before  kn  adequate  reserve  supply  of  field 

ARTILLERY    AMMUNITION    CAN    BE    ACCUMULATED.        "  The    eX-. 

isting  want  of  field-artillery  guns,  carriages,  and  ammuni- 
tion," he  declared,  "  constitutes  a  grave  menace  to  the  public 
safety  in  case  of  war,''  and  he  pointed  out  that 

"  once  a  state  of  war  exists  with  a  first-class  power  there  will  be 
no  opportunity  to  buy  this  material  abroad  or  time  to  manufac- 
ture it  at  home,  even  if  all  available  plants  were  running  at  the 
maximum  capacity,  without  such  delay  as  would  be  fatal  to  our 
hopes  of  success.  This  shortage  of  field-artillery  material  is 
the  most  serious  feature  of  the  present  military  situation,  and 
one  which  should  be  immediately  corrected." 

Our  seacoast  defences  were  fortunately  in  a  decidedly  bet- 
ter condition  and,  so  far  as  concerned  the  installation  of 
armament,  were  well  advanced  toward  completion;  but  in 
certain  posts  the  number  of  guns  was  insufficient  and  certain 
ports  were  conspicuous  for  the  absence  of  needed  fortifica- 


380     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

tions.  In  the  matter  of  ammunition,  searchlights  and  ap- 
paratus for  fire  control,  there  was,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
notable  deficiency.  For  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30, 
1911,  Congress  had  appropriated  only  $140,000  for  reserve 
ammunition  for  the  ports  within  the  confines  of  the  United 
States,  while  the  allotment  for  the  preceding  years  had  been 
only  $325,000  per  annum.  Even  were  the  appropriations 
continued  at  the  latter  rate,  no  less  than  thirteen  years  would 
elapse  before  the  full  supply  of  reserve  ammunition  could 
be  accumulated  for  our  home  ports,  and  twenty-one  years 
would  pass  before  this  supply  would  be  completed  for  the 
existing  batteries  and  for  those  to  be  constructed  within  the 
country. 

The  installation  of  searchlights  for  the  fortifications  in  the 
United  States  was  slightly  more  than  half  finished  but,  to 
judge  by  the  average  rate  of  appropriation,  nearly  ten  years 
w^ill  be  necessary  to  complete  it.  About  one-half  of  the  ap- 
paratus for  fire-control  had  been  put  into  the  fortifications, 
but  this  work  would  be  prolonged  for  eight  years  unless  Con- 
gressional appropriations  were  made  in  larger  amounts  than 
during  the  previous  -^ve  years.  Without  the  proper  search- 
lights, fire-control  apparatus,  and,  above  all,  without  reserve 
ammunition,  the  expenditures  already  incurred  for  fortifica- 
tions —  amounting  in  round  numbers  to  $70,000,000  — 
would  have  been  virtually  wasted. 

A  decided  dearth  existed  in  the  matter  of  large  reserve 
supply  depots  located  with  reference  to  supply  centres  or  at 
such  points  as  to  be  utilized  to  the  best  advantage  during  the 
mobilization  and  concentration  of  the  Regular  Army,  Volun- 
teers and  Militia.  Nearly  every  European  army  has  for 
years  possessed  a  system  of  such  depots  containing  sufficient 
supplies  of  all  sorts  —  except  perishable  stores  like  food  — 
to  equip  fully  all  troops  that  may  be  recruited  or  mobilized 
within  its  sphere.  Without  such  depots,  no  army  can  be  put 
into  the  field  with  the  speed  and  precision  demanded  by  mod- 
ern war. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  381 

1910] 

Inferior  as  was  the  condition  of  our  military  forces  in  re- 
spect to  materiel,  the  personnel  conditions  were  worse.  Al- 
though the  backbone  of  an  army  is  the  infantry  upon  which 
falls  the  brunt  of  fighting,  the  United  States  possessed  in  1910 
only  thirty  regiments  of  Regular  infantry  —  eight  in  the 
Philippines,  one  in  Honolulu  and  Alaska,  and  twenty-one 
in  continental  United  States.  The  War  Department,  hav- 
ing planned  a  joint  force  of  Regulars  and  militia  for  national 
defence,  constituted  them  into  the  first  field  army  by  Gen- 
eral Orders  No.  35 ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  was  a  field 
army  in  name  only,  so  deficient  was  its  organization  and 
equipment.  As  for  the  other  proposed  field  armies,  they 
would  of  necessity  be  little  more  than  mere  skeletons,  and 
would  consequently  cut  a  sorry  figure  if  opposed  to  a  prop- 
erly organized  army  such  as  other  great  nations  possess. 

Both  in  the  Regular  Army  and  the  Organized  Militia,  the 
field  artillery  fell  far  short  of  its  correct  proportion  to  the 
number  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  Had  they  been  recruited 
up  to  their  full  war  strength  at  that  time,  there  would  have 
been  a  shortage  of  more  than  50  per  cent,  in  the  number  of 
guns  required  to  arm  them  properly.  Such  a  force  would 
have  amounted  approximately  to  over  300,000  men,  and  in 
war  this  number  would  unquestionably  have  to  be  doubled. 
The  dearth  of  guns,  not  to  mention  ammunition,  was  there- 
fore all  the  more  striking.  The  report  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Division  of  Militia  Affairs  for  1910  showed  that  the  light  bat- 
teries in  the  militia  were  deficient  in  organization,  personnel 
and  instruction,  and  that  they  were  very  deficient  in  the 
numbers  needed  to  make  their  existing  infantry  effective  as 
fighting  units. 

The  Coast  Artillery  was  likewise  short  of  its  requisite 
strength.  The  number  needed  to  provide  one  manning  de- 
tail for  the  fortifications  already  constructed  within  the 
United  States  was  42,065,  whereas  there  were  available  only 
18,079  Regular  coast  artillery  troops,  and  6,864  militia,  a  to- 
tal of  24,943.     The  deficit  was  therefore  17,122  troops,  ir- 


382     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1910 

respective  of  the  13,045  who  would  be  required  to  man  the 
fortifications  at  the  Panama  Canal  and  in  the  insular  pos- 
sessions. Furthermore,  the  protection  of  these  fortifications 
against  attacks  from  the  rear  would  demand  some  45,000 
field  troops  in  time  of  war. 

The  retention  of  many  of  the  Army  posts  was  utterly  un- 
warranted from  a  military  standpoint,  but  Congressional 
indifference  and  local  influence  prevented  their  abandonment. 
As  a  result  mountain  batteries  were  stationed  several  days' 
march  from  any  mountains  where  they  could  be  properly 
trained,  and  cavalry  found  itself  located  in  the  north  where 
it  was  snowed  up  for  half  the  year.  Economy  and  better 
administration  dictated  an  improvement  in  the  business 
methods  of  the  War  Department,  the  concentration  of  troops 
in  large  garrisons,  and  the  creation  of  a  supply  corps  and  a 
general  service  corps,  such  as  the  French  and  German  armies 
possess,  but  Congress  persisted  in  ignoring  every  recommen- 
dation in  respect  to  them. 

jj' Greatest  of  all  the  defects  in  our  military  system  in  1910 
rwas  the  absence  of  a  reserve  for  the  Eegular  Army.  Not- 
withstanding that  three  years  of  excellent  schooling  were 
given  to  regular  soldiers  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  expiring 
enlistments  graduated  some  30,000  men  annually  from  the 
military  establishment,  all  control  of  these  trained  men  was 
lost  the  moment  their  term  of  service  was  ended.  Congress, 
with  its  customary  proclivity  for  undue  waste  and  short- 
sightedness, had  not  shown  the  slightest  inclination  to  utilize 
them  in  the  event  of  war,  and  the  bills  introduced  to  create 
them  into  a  reserve  —  such  as  the  smallest  nations  with  any 
pretensions  to  a  modern  military  force  possessed  —  had  been 
persistently  ignored,  along  with  other  measures  imperatively 
needed  by  our  land  forces.  It  is  therefore  scarcely  surpris- 
ing that  the  close  of  1910  witnessed  our  land  forces  utterly 
unprepared  for  war  against  any  first-class  Power,  and  that 
there  was  abundant  reason  for  apprehension  concerning  our 

defencelessness.      / 
/ 


Fro7n  1902  to  June  1,  1915  383 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1911 

The  third  session  of  the  Sixty-first  Congress  enacted  cer- 
tain military  legislation  of  decided  importance,  in  that  the 
recommendations  of  the  Secretary  of  War  were  at  last  put 
into  effect,  in  part  if  not  in  toto.  The  first  act  was  ap- 
proved on  January  19,  1911,  and  provided 

"  That  the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  drop 
from  the  rolls  of  the  army  any  officer  who  is  absent  from  duty 
for  three  months  without  leave,  or  who  has  been  absent  in  con- 
finement in  a  prison  or  penitentiary  for  more  than  three  months 
after  final  conviction  by  a  civil  court  of  competent  jurisdiction; 
and  no  officer  so  dropped  shall  be  eligible  for  reappointment."  ^^^ 

The  act  of  February  twenty-seventh  ^^^  making  appropria- 
tions for  rivers  and  harbours  contained  the  following  stipu- 
lation : 

"  Sec.  5.  That  the  Corps  of  Engineers  of  the  United  States 
Army  is  hereby  increased  by  five  colonels,  six  lieutenant  colonels, 
nineteen  majors,  seventeen  captains,  and  thirteen  first  lieuten- 
ants. The  increase  in  each  grade  hereby  provided  for  shall  be 
extended  over  a  period  of  five  years  as  nearly  as  practicable,  and 
the  original  vacancies  hereby  created  in  each  grade  shall  be 
filled  by  promotion  from  the  next  lower  grade  in  accordance  with 
existing  law :  Provided,  That  officers  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
when  on  duty  under  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  connected  solely 
with  the  work  of  river  and  harbor  improvements  may,  while 
so  employed,  be  paid  their  pay  and  commutation  of  quarters  from 
appropriations  for  the  work  or  works  upon  which  they  are  em- 
ployed :  Provided  further,  That  whenever  it  shall  be  necessary  in 
order  to  properly  prosecute  works  of  river  and  harbor  improve- 
ment, the  Chief  of  Engineers  is  authorized  to  detail  for  duty  in 
charge  of  river  and  harbor  districts  or  as  members  of  boards  of 
engineers  any  assistant  engineers  in  the  employ  of  the  Engineer 
Bureau  of  the  War  Department.  Vacancies  in  the  grade  of 
second  lieutenant  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers  shall  hereafter  be 
filled,  as  far  as  may  be  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  mili- 
tary service,  by  promotions  from  the  Corps  of  Cadets  at  the 
United  States  Military  Academy:  Provided,  That  vacancies 
remaining  in  any  fiscal  year  after  the  assignment  of  cadets  of 
the  class  graduating  in  that  fiscal  year  may  be  filled  from  civil 


384     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

life  as  hereinafter  provided:  And  provided  further,  ...  To 
become  eligible  for  examination  and  appointment,  a.  civilian  can- 
didate for  the  appointment  as  second  lieutenant  must  be  an 
unmarried  citizen  of  the  United  States  between  the  ages  of 
twenty-one  and  twenty-nine,  who  holds  a  diploma  showing  grad- 
uation in  an  engineering  course  from  an  approved  technical 
school,  and  is  eligible  for  appointment  as  a  junior  engineer 
under  the  Engineer  Bureau  of  the  War  Department.  Selection 
of  eligible  civilians  for  appointment,  including  term  of  proba- 
tion, shall  be  made  as  the  result  of  such  competitive  examination 
into  the  mental,  moral,  and  physical  qualifications,  and  under 
such  rules  and  regulations  as  shall  be  recommended  by  the  Chief 
of  Engineers  and  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War.'^  ^^^ 

On  March  1st  there  was  approved  "  An  Act  To  protect  the 
dignity  and  Honor  of  the  •uniform  of  the  United  States  "  ^^^ 
which  provided 

"  That  hereafter  no  proprietor,  manager,  or  employee  of  a 
theater  or  other  public  place  of  entertainment  or  amusement  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  or  in  any  Territory,  the  District  of 
Alaska  or  Insular  possession  of  the  United  States,  shall  make, 
or  cause  to  be  made,  any  discrimination  against  any  person  law- 
fully wearing  the  uniform  of  the  Army,  Navy,  Kevenue  Cutter 
Service  or  Marine  Corps  of  the  United  States  because  of  that 
uniform,  and  any  person  making  or  causing  to  be  made,  such 
discrimination  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by 
a  fine  not  exceeding  five  hundred  dollars." 

On  March  3rd  three  acts  were  approved.  The  first,  mak- 
ing appropriations  for  the  Military  Academy,  contained  a 
proviso  ]*elating  to  acting  first  sergeants  of  engineers,^  ^^  while 
the  second,  which  made  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the 
Army  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1912,  embodied  sev- 
eral features  of  importance.  The  Secretary  of  War  was 
"  authorized  to  detail  an  oflficer  of  the  Medical  Corps  to  take 
charge  of  the  first-aid  department  of  the  American  Eed 
Cross,"  ^^^  and  veterinarians  were  to  be  retired  "  VTnder  the 
laws  governing  the  retirement  of  second  lieutenants."  ^^^ 
Under  the  caption  of  "  Equipment  of  Coast  Artillery,  Arm- 
ories, Organized  Militia,"  the  reiterated  recommendations  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  385 

1911] 

Secretaries  of  War  were  at  last  heeded  by  permitting  200 
Regular  officers  on  the  active  list  to  be  assigned  to  duty  with 
the  militia,  by  arranging  for  filling  vacancies  in  the  grade  of 
second  lieutenant,  and  by  a  much-needed  increase  in  the  Quar- 
termaster's department.  This  important  part  of  the  law  ran 
as  follows :  — 

"  Upon  the  request  of  the  governors  of  the  several  States  and 
Territories  concerned,  the  President  may  detach  officers  of  the 
active  list  of  the  Army  from  their  proper  commands  for  duty  as 
inspectors  and  instructors  of  the  Organized  Militia,  as  follows, 
namely :  Not  to  exceed  one  officer  for  each  regiment  and  sep- 
arate battalion  of  infantry,  or  its  equivalent  of  other  troops : 
Provided,  That  line  officers  detached  for  duty  with  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  under  the  provisions  hereof,  together  with  those  de- 
tached from  their  proper  commands,  under  the  provisions  of 
law,  for  other  duty  the  usual  period  of  which  exceeds  one  year, 
shall  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  section  twenty-seven  of  the 
Act  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  with 
reference  to  details  to  the  staff  corps,  but  the  total  number  of 
detached  officers  hereby  made  subject  to  these  provisions  shall 
not  exceed  two  hundred :  And  provided  further,  That  the  num- 
ber of  such  officers  detached  from  each  of  the  several  branches  of 
the  line  of  the  Army  shall  be  in  proportion  to  the  authorized 
commissioned  strength  of  that  branch;  they  shall  be  of  the 
grades  of  first  lieutenant  to  colonel,  inclusive,  and  the  number 
detached  from  each  grade  shall  be  in  proportion  to  the  number 
in  that  grade  now  provided  by  law  for  the  whole  Army.  The 
vacancies  hereby  caused  or  created  in  the  grade  of  second  lieu- 
tenant shall  be  filled  in  accordance  with  existing  law,  one-half 
in  each  fiscal  year  until  the  total  number  of  vacancies  shall  have 
been  filled :  Provided,  That  hereafter  vacancies  in  the  grade  of 
second  lieutenant  occurring  in  any  fiscal  year  shall  be  filled  by 
appointment  in  the  following  order,  namely:  First,  of  cadets 
graduated  from  the  United  States  Military  Academy  during  that 
fiscal  year;  second,  of  enlisted  men  whose  fitness  for  promotion 
shall  have  been  determined  by  competitive  examination;  third, 
of  candidates  from  civil  life  between  the  ages  of  twenty-one  and 
twenty-seven  years.  The  President  is  authorized  to  make  rules 
and  regulations  to  carry  these  provisions  into  effect :  Provided, 
That  the  Quartermaster's  Department  is  hereby  increased  by 
two  colonels,  three  lieutenant  colonels,  seven  majors,  and  eighteen 


386     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

captains,  the  vacancies  thus  created  to  be  filled  by  promotion  and 
detail  in  accordance  with  section  twenty-six  of  the  Act  ap- 
proved February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one."  ^^* 

Under  the  caption  of  Quartermaster's  Department,  an  ap- 
propriation was  made  for  horses  for  cavalry,  artillery  and  en- 
gineers, with  the  condition  attached  '^  that  no  part  of  this  ap- 
propriation shall  be  used  for  breeding  purposes,"  and  it  was 

''Provided  further.  That  hereafter  from  the  enlisted  force 
of  the  Army  now  provided  by  law  the  President  may  authorize 
the  organization  of  remount  detachments  at  each  of  the  remount 
depots,  and  may  authorize  the  appointment  therein  of  such  non- 
commissioned officers,  mechanics,  artificers,  farriers,  horse- 
shoers,  and  cooks  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  administration  of 
such  remount  depots."  ^^^ 

Under  the  heading  of  Army  Medical  Museum  and  Library, 
it  was  provided  that 

"  Hereafter  there  shall  be  attached  to  the  Medical  Department 
a  dental  corps,  which  shall  be  composed  of  dental  surgeons  and 
acting  dental  surgeons,  the  total  number  of  which  shall  not  ex- 
ceed the  proportion  of  one  to  each  thousand  of  actual  enlisted 
strength  of  the  Army;  the  number  of  dental  surgeons  shall  not 
exceed  sixty,  and  the  number  of  acting  dental  surgeons  shall  be 
such  as  may,  from  time  to  time,  be  authorized  by  law.  All 
original  appointments  to  the  dental  corps  shall  be  as  acting 
dental  surgeons,  who  shall  have  the  same  official  status,  pay,  and 
allowances  as  the  contract  dental  surgeons  now  authorized  by 

law.     .     .     ."236 

The  closing  paragraph  of  this  act  was  as  follows: 

"  On  and  after  the  passage  of  this  Act,  every  line  officer  on 
the  active  list  below  the  grade  of  colonel  who  has  lost  in  lineal 
rank  through  the  system  of  regimental  promotion  in  force  prior 
to  October  first,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety,  may,  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  President,  and  subject  to  examination  for  promo- 
tion as  prescribed  by  law,  be  advanced  to  higher  grades  in  his 
arm  up  to  and  including  the  grade  of  colonel,  in  accordance  with 
the  rank  he  would  have  been  entitled  to  hold  had  promotion  been 
lineal  throughout  his  arm  or  corps  since  the  date  of  his  entry 
into  the  arm  or  corps  to  which  he  permanently  belongs :     Pro- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  387 

1911] 

vided,  That  officers  advanced  to  higher  grades  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  shall  be  additional  officers  in  those  grades: 
Provided  further.  That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  operate  to  inter- 
fere with  or  retard  the  promotion  to  which  any  officer  would  be 
entitled  under  existing  law:  And  provided  further.  That  the 
officers  advanced  to  higher  grades  under  this  Act  shall  be  junior 
to  the  officers  who  now  rank  them  under  existing  law,  when  these 
officers  have  reached  the  same  grade."  ^^^ 

The  third  measure,  which  became  a  law  on  March  3,  1911, 
was  of  major  importance.  It  was  entitled  "  An  Act  To  pre- 
vent the  disclosure  of  national  defense  secrets  "  ^^^  and  pro- 
vided 

"  That  whoever,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  re- 
specting the  national  defense,  to  which  he  is  not  lawfully  en- 
titled, goes  upon  any  vessel,  or  enters  any  navy-yard,  naval  sta- 
tion, fort,  battery,  torpedo  station,  arsenal,  camp,  factory,  build- 
ing, office,  or  other  place  connected  with  the  national  defense, 
owned  or  constructed  or  in  process  of  construction  by  the  United 
States,  or  in  the  possession  or  under  the  control  of  the  United 
States  or  any  of  its  authorities  or  agents,  and  whether  situated 
within  the  United  States  or  in  any  place  noncontiguous  to  but 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof ;  or  whoever,  when  lawfully  or 
unlawfully  upon  any  vessel,  or  in  or  near  any  such  place,  without 
proper  authority,  obtains,  takes,  or  makes,  or  attempts  to  obtain, 
take,  or  make,  any  document,  sketch,  photograph,  photographic 
negative,  plan,  model,  or  knowledge  of  anything  connected  with 
the  national  defense  to  which  he  is  not  entitled ;  or  whoever,  with- 
out proper  authority,  receives  or  obtains,  or  undertakes  or  agrees 
to  receive  or  obtain,  from  any  person,  any  such  document,  sketch, 
photograph,  photographic  negative,  plan,  model,  or  knowledge, 
knowing  the  same  to  have  been  so  obtained,  taken,  or  made;  or 
whoever,  having  possession  of  or  control  over  any  such  document, 
sketch,  photograph,  photographic  negative,  plan,  model,  or  knowl- 
edge, willfully  and  without  proper  authority,  communicates  or 
attempts  to  communicate  the  same  to  any  person  not  entitled  to 
receive  it,  or  to  whom  the  same  ought  not,  in  the  interest  of  the 
national  defense,  to  be  communicated  at  that  time ;  or  whoever, 
being  lawfully  intrusted  with  any  such  document,  sketch,  photo- 
graph, photographic  negative,  plan,  model,  or  knowledge,  will- 
fully and  in  breach  of  his  trust,  so  communicates  or  attempts  to 


388     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

communicate  the  same,  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars,  or  imprisoned  not  more  than  one  year,  or  both. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  whoever,  having  committed  any  offense  de- 
fined in  the  preceding  section,  communicates  or  attempts  to  com- 
municate to  any  foreign  government,  or  to  any  agent  or  employee 
thereof,  any  document,  sketch,  photograph,  photographic  negative, 
plan,  model,  or  knowledge  so  obtained,  taken,  or  made,  or  so  in- 
trusted to  him,  shall  be  imprisoned  not  more  than  ten  years. 

"  Sec.  3.  That  offenses  against  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
committed  upon  the  high  seas  or  elsewhere  outside  of  a  judicial 
district  shall  be  cognizable  in  the  district  where  the  offender  is 
found  or  into  which  he  is  first  brought ;  but  offenses  hereunder 
committed  within  the  Philippine  Islands  shall  be  cognizable  in 
any  court  of  said  islands  having  original  jurisdiction  of  criminal 
cases,  with  the  same  right  of  appeal  as  is  given  in  other  criminal 
cases  where  imprisonment  exceeding  one  year  forms  a  part  of 
the  penalty ;  and  jurisdiction  is  hereby  conferred  upon  such 
courts  for  such  purpose." 

The  next  military  legislation  of  interest  was  contained  in 
the  act  making  appropriations  for  the  Department  of  Agricul- 
ture, approved  March  4,  1911,  and,  in  furtherance  of  the  plan 
to  encourage  the  breeding  of  horses  for  military  purposes  — 
to  which  allusion  has  been  made  on  page  375,  allotted  $50,000 

"  For  experiments  in  animal  feeding  and  breeding,  including 
cooperation  with  the  State  agricultural  experiment  stations, 
including  the  repairs  and  additions  to  and  erection  of  buildings 
absolutely  necessary  to  carry  on  the  experiments,  including 
rent,  and  the  employment  of  labor  in  the  city  of  Washington 
and  elsewhere,  and  all  other  necessary  expenses."  ^^^ 

On  March  fourth,  aside  from  the  Appropriation  Acts  for 
General  and  Deficiency  Expenses  and  for  Fortifications,^ ^^  the 
law  of  June  22,  1910,  relative  to  the  retirement  of  certain 
medical  officers  was  amended  so  as  to  read : 

"  That  any  officer  of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  who  shall 
have  reached  the  age  of  seventy  years,  and  whose  total  active 
service  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  Eegular  or  Volun- 
teer, as  such  officer,  and  as  contract  or  acting  assistant  surgeon, 
and  as  an  enlisted  man,  shall  equal  forty  years,  may  thereupon, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  President,  be  placed  upon  the  retired 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  389 

1911] 

list  of  the  Army  with  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  first 
lieutenant."  ^41 

The  Sundry  Civil  Bill,  approved  on  the  same  date,  wisely 
appropriated  $2,000,000  for  the  construction  of  seacoast  bat- 
teries in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  and  $1,966,000  "  for  the 

purchase,  manufacture  and  test  of  seacoast  cannon  for  coast 
defense.'' 242 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1911 

On  October  15,  1911,  the  actual  strength  of  the  Regular 
Army  was  4,388  officers  and  70,250  enlisted  men,  a  total  of 
74,638  and  an  increase  of  78  officers  and  2,791  men  over  the 
preceding  year,  but  about  nine  per  cent,  below  its  maximum 
strength  as  authorized  by  law.  Although  Congress  had  at 
last  created  an  additional  force  of  officers  —  12  engineers,  60 
dental  surgeons  and  200  to  meet  the  drain  caused  by  detached 
duty  and  instruction  of  the  militia  —  the  graduating  class  at 
West  Point  and  the  officers  raised  from  the  ranks  were  in- 
sufficient to  supply  the  necessary  quota  and,  as  it  had  become 
evident  that  many  w^ould  have  to  be  appointed  from  civil  life, 
great  care  was  taken  in  prescribing  the  requirements  and  a 
high  standard  w^as  wisely  set.  Similar  care  was  taken  in  re- 
cruiting for  the  Army  and  no  less  than  72  per  cent,  of  the 
applicants  w^ere  rejected.  The  desertions,  which  had  num- 
bered 4,993  in  1909  and  3,464  in  1910,  fell  to  2,504,  or  2.28 
per  cent,  of  the  total  number  of  enlisted  men  in  service  dur- 
ing the  year.  This  diminution  was  particularly  gratifying 
in  that  it  was  the  lowest,  wdth  one  solitary  exception,  that 
had  occurred  in  the  American  Army  in  ninety  years.^*^ 

The  military  operations  of  1911  were  of  considerably  more 
importance  than  in  the  years  immediately  preceding.  The 
depredations  of  the  Moros  in  the  Sarangani  peninsula,  Dis- 
trict of  Davao,  in  Mindanao,  reached  such  a  point  that  a  puni- 
tive expedition  was  sent  against  them  under  the  command  of 
JMajor  E.  P.  Heiberg  of  the  Philippine  Scouts  and  other 
columns  were  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  bandits.     As  a  result  of 


390     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

the  thoroughness  with  which  the  work  was  performed,  all 
opposition  was  crushed  and  the  country  restored  to  a  peace- 
ful condition.  As  in  the  past  a  considerable  amount  of  ex- 
tremely arduous  police  duty  had  to  be  done  by  the  Regular 
troops  in  assisting  the  civil  authorities  in  the  Lake  Lanao 
district  in  Mindanao. 

By  all  odds  the  most  noteworthy  military  event  of  recent 
years  occurred  during  the  month  of  March,  1911.  So  serious 
were  the  unrest  and  the  intrigues  prevailing  on  both  sides 
of  the  frontier  separating  Texas  from  Mexico  that,  in  'No- 
vember, 1910,  two  troops  of  cavalry  were  despatched  to  as- 
sist the  civil  authorities  to  enforce  the  laws  of  neutrality. 
As  the  conditions  became  worse  rather  than  better,  additional 
troops  were  sent,  until  the  entire  border  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Eio  Grande  River  in  Texas  to  San  Diego,  California, 
was  more  or  less  effectually  patrolled  by  Regulars.  As  the 
indications  pointed  to  the  salutary  effect  which  would  un- 
questionably be  exercised  by  the  presence  of  a  large  force  of 
troops,  orders  w^ere  issued  by  the  War  Department  on  March 
6,  1911,  for  the  concentration  of  certain  troops  destined  to  be 
organized  into  a  "  manoeuvre  division ''  composed  of  three 
brigades  of  infantry,  a  field  artillery  brigade,  an  independent 
cavalry  brigade,  and  the  necessary  auxiliary  troops,  the 
whole  under  the  command  of  Major  General  William  H. 
Carter.  On  the  same  day  instructions  were  also  issued  for 
the  mobilization  of  thirty-six  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  to 
be  organized  into  three  provisional  regiments  of  twelve  com- 
panies each  and  designated  as  the  First  Separate  Brigade 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  Albert  L.  Mills.^"*^ 
As  General  Wood,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  stated  in  his  annual 
report,^  ^^ 

"  The  mobilization  of  the  maneuver  division  in  Texas  was 
attended  with  the  delay  incident  to  assembling  this  number  of 
troops  from  many  widely  scattered  stations,  which  was  in- 
creased by  the  time  necessary  to  assemble  railroad  transporta- 
tion, it  not  having  been  practicable  to  give  the  railroads  any 
advance  information  of  the  movement." 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  391 

1911] 

The  troops  from  Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  near  Cheyenne,  Wyom- 
ing —  the  largest  garrison  in  the  United  States  —  did  not 
reach  San  Antonio  until  March  13th  to  16th,  and  the  ma- 
noeuvre division  —  the  aggregate  strength  of  which  was  613 
officers  and  15,056  enlisted  men  —  actually  numbered  on 
March  31,  1911,  only  11,254;  on  April  30th,  12,598 ;  on  May 
31st,  12,809;  and  on  June  30th,  11,882.  In  other  words,  its 
maximum  strength  w^as  not  attained  until  nearly  three  months 
after  it  had  been  ordered  to  assemble.  The  First  Separate 
Brigade,  on  the  other  hand,  reached  its  maximum  of  4,045 
officers  and  men  at  the  end  of  March.  ^^"^  The  commander  of 
the  "  manoeuvre  division  '^  was  taken  from  Washington,  his 
chief  of  staff  from  ISTew  York,  and  the  other  staff  officers  from 
all  over  the  country.  They  had  never  worked  together,  but 
were  immediately  called  upon  to  improvise  a  division  ad- 
ministration and  supply  system.  This  division  never  ap- 
proximated anywhere  near  the  19,200  troops  it  ought  to 
have  numbered,  and  on  August  7,  1911,  it  w^as  disbanded,  the 
provisional  brigade  having  been  discontinued  on  June 
15th.24' 

As  the  Chief  of  Staff  observed,^^^ 

''  The  mobilization  brought  out  the  necessity  for  the  concen- 
tration of  our  troops  into  larger  garrisons  on  lines  of  commu- 
nication better  suited  for  rapid  mohilization.  The  troops 
themselves  were  ready  to  move  promptly  and  no  delay  what- 
ever was  incident  to  lack  of  preparedness  on  the  part  of  organi- 
zations. As  the  regiments  were  at  peace  strength  when  first  as- 
sembled, the  division  was  only  a  little  over  half  the  strength  of 
a  war  division.  Eecruits  were  rapidly  added  to  the  different 
regiments  until  they  were  brought  up  to  an  average  per  regi- 
ment as  follows:  Infantry,  1,036;  cavalry,  957,  and  Field 
Artillery,  847.  To  have  brought  this  division  up  to  war 
strength  would  have  required  the  addition  to  the  regiments  of 
an  excessive  number  of  recruits  and  unless  a  considerable  period 
had  been  available  to  instruct  and  discipline  this  new  personnel 
the  result  would  have  been  disastrous  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
Regular   organizations.     The   mobilization   has   emphasized 

THE  FACT  THAT  OUR  REGIMENTS   IN  PEACE   SHOULD  BE   KEPT  AT 


392     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 
GREATER  STRENGTH,  AND  IT  HAS  ALSO  BROUGHT  OUT  VERY 
FORCIBLY  THE  NECESSITY  FOR  A  RESERVE  WITH  WHICH  TO 
BRING  THE  REGIMENTS  FROM  THEIR  PEACE  STRENGTH  TO  FULL 
WAR    STRENGTH.      ThE    EXPERIENCE    IN    THE    MOBILIZATION    IN 

Texas  has  also  emphasized  the  necessity  for  accumulat- 
ing A  sufficient  quantity  of  reserve  supplies  and  the 
establishment  of  proper  depots;  in  short,  the  necessity 
for  proper  military  organization  and  preparedness  for 

WAR."  249 

The  Infantry  Journal  for  May-June^  1911,  told  the  plain 
unvarnished  truth  when  it  declared  ^^^  that 

'^  It  is  a  pitiable  thing  to  rejoice  at  a  display  of  our  own 
weakness,  but  the  concentration  in  Texas  .has  been  such  a  piti- 
able display  of  that  weakness  that  we  must  all  either  rejoice  or 
slink  away  in  shame,  and  it  is  to  the  credit  of  our  manhood  and 
the  one  sign  of  military  regeneration  discoverable  that  far  from 
slinking  away  in  shame  the  great  mass  of  the  line  officers  of  the 
Army  have  faced  the  facts  unshrinkingly  and  declared  our 
whole  military  organization  inefficient  and  our  whole  mili- 
tary system  extravagant  and  useless.  The  concentration  in 
Texas  —  we  do  not  say  mobilization,  because  the  force  in  Texas 
even  now,  months  after  the  original  order,  is  not  mobilized  — 
has  proved  conclusively  several  things.  Primarily  it  has 
proved  that  in  individual  efficiency  of  personnel,  enlisted  and 
commissioned,  we  are  the  peer  of  any  military  force  in  the 
world.  Undeniably  there  are  unfortunate  exceptions  that  go 
to  reduce  the  average,  but  these,  while  much  to  be  regretted 
and  obviously  to  be  got  rid  of  as  soon  as  possible,  are  counter- 
balanced by  others  of  equally  exceptional  enthusiasm,  energy, 
and  ability.  The  average  is  high.  Again,  it  has  proved  that 
just  so  far  as  we  have  any  tactical  organization  in  the  Army, 
just  so  far,  and  not  one  hit-  farther,  is  our  Army  efficient.  In 
the  company,  the  battalion,  and  the  regiment,  within  the  limits 
of  their  authorized  strength  —  no  farther  —  efficiency  has  been 
shown.  .  .  .  And,  finally,  the  concentration  has  shown  that  at 

THIS  POINT  IN  OUR  MILITARY  SYSTEM  EVERY  SIGN  OF  EFFICIENCY 
DISAPPEARS,  AND  THAT  NO  MATTER  HOW  HIGH ,  A  DEGREE  IS 
OTHERWISE    MAINTAINED,     IT    IS    INSUFFICIENT,    and    in    COUSe- 

quence   that    our   whole    military    establishment    on    its 

PRESENT    LINES    IS    USELESS    FOR    ANY    REAL    MILITARY    PURPOSE. 

It  is  altogether  useless  and  foolish  to  attempt  to  gloss  over  the 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  393 

1911] 

matter.  There  were  not  lacking  those,  certainly  within  the 
line,  to  understand  long  ago  that  no  other  result  could  be  ex- 
pected once  an  attempt  was  made  to  concentrate  any  part  of 
the  Army  into  a  tactical  organization  larger  than  a  regiment. 
There  were  not  lacking  critics  outside  the  Army,  even  in  Con- 
gress itself,  to  suggest  the  limitations  of  our  system.  But  these 
were  all  counted  as  alarmists,  yet  not  one  of  us  dared  to 

THINK,  NOR  ANY  CRITIC  DARED  TO  GO  SO  FAR  AS  TO  SUGGEST, 
THAT  OUR  WEAKNESS  WAS  SO  GREAT,  OUR  SYSTEM  SO  PITIABLY 
FUTILE,   AS   THIS   ATTEMPT   HAS   PROVED   TO   BE   THE   CASE.      But 

we  have  exposed  our  shame  unhesitatingly.  Foreign  military 
attaches  were  invited  to  witness  it,  and  they  came  and  saw  and 
laughed;  national  guard  officers  from  all  over  the  country  were 
welcomed,  and  they  came  and  saw  and,  we  hope,  understood; 

for  WHATEVER  HAS  BEEN  DISPLAYED  OF  THE  WEAKNESS  OF  THE 
ARMY  IS  WEAKNESS  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD  IN  STILL  GREATER 
MEASURE,  AND  WHATEVER  THERE  IS  IN  THIS  COMBINED  WEAK- 
NESS IS  ALL  THERE  IS  TO  THE  MILITARY  SYSTEM  THAT  SUP- 
PORTS THIS  NATION  IN   ITS  CLAIM  AS  A  WORLD  POWER.^' 

During  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1911,  four  10-inch 
guns  and  23  rapid-fire  guns  were  added  to  those  in  the  sea- 
coast  defences,  thus  making  a  total  of  1,182. 

The  Organized  Militia,  according  to  the  last  reports,  was 
composed  of  117,988  officers  and  men,  a  decrease  of  1,672 
over  the  previous  year.  Aside  from  the  usual  camps  of  in- 
struction for  officers  of  the  infantry,  cavalry  and  field  artil- 
lery, more  than  1,000  officers  of  the  militia  served  for  pe- 
riods of  fourteen  days  with  the  manoeuvre  division  at  San 
Antonio.  Twelve  batteries  of  field  artillery  participated  in 
the  instruction  given  the  Regular  batteries  at  Sparta,  Wis- 
consin, and  the  reserves  of  the  militia  coast  artillery  received 
their  customary  annual  training  at  various  fortifications. 
During  July  the  National  Guard  of  Massachusetts  held 
manoeuv:fes  lasting  for  seven  days,  in  which  war  conditions 
were  reproduced  in  so  far  as  possible,  and  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  efficiency  over  that  of  two  years  previously  was  mani- 
fest. In  compliance  with  the  Act  of  Congress  of  March  3, 
1911,  one  Regular  infantry  officer  was  assigned  to  duty  with 


394     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

each  State  and  Territory,  while  Eegular  cavalry,  field  artil- 
lery and  coast  officers  were  detailed  to  districts  of  contiguous 
States  possessing  these  respective  arms.^^-^ 

On  February  20,  1911,  a  board  of  officers  —  of  which 
Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  St.  John  Greble,  General  Staff,  was 
the  president  and  Captain  William  D.  Connor,  General  Staff, 
the  recorder  —  was  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  ^'  to 
consider  questions  concerning  the  types  of  field  guns  and  am- 
munition supply  therefor."  The  report  of  this  board  stated 
that 

"  On  February  4,  1911,  the  Chief  of  Staff  approved  a  mem- 
orandum to  the  effect  that  in  case  of  war  with  a  first-class  power, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  raise  at  once  a 
mobile  force  of  approximately  450,000  men  within  the  con- 
tinental limits  of  the  United  States," 

and  it  therefore  recommended  that  a  total  of  323  batteries, 
numbering  1,292  guns,  be  procured.  It  also  stated  that  the 
amount  of  artillery  ammunition  which  should  be  provided 
in  time  of  peace  is  1,713,240  rounds,  but  added  that 

"  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  ammunition  here  provided  for  is 
simply  that  which  should  be  on  hand  at  the  outbreak  of  war, 
and  is  in  no  sense  a  complete  supply  for  war." 

On  June  23,  1911,  the  Secretary  of  War  approved  this  re- 
port and  directed  that  the  '^  policy  outlined  in  this  report  be 
adopted  by  the  General  Staff."  This  action  was  followed 
on  July  14th  by  directions  from  the  same  official  ''  that  the 
accompanying  report  of  the  board  of  officers  on  types  of  field 
guns  and  ammunition  therefor  be  referred  to  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  the  Quartermaster  General,  and  the  Chief  Signal 
Officer,  and  then  filed  in  the  Adjutant  GeneraFs  Office."  ^^^ 
By  virtue  of  War  Department  General  Orders  No.  72, 
dated  June  3,  1911,  a  School  of  Fire  for  Field  Artillery  was 
established  at  Fort  Sill,  Oklahoma,  with  the  object  of  giving 
a  thorough  instruction,  both  practical  and  theoretical,  in  the 
principles  and  methods  of  target  practice  and  fire  by  field 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  395 

1911] 

pieces.^^^  On  July  1st  the  United  States  was  divided,  for 
administrative  purposes,  into  three  territorial  divisions,  to 
which  were  entrusted  the  administrative  functions  formerly 
performed  by  the  seven  departments,  thus  eliminating  a  very 
large  amount  of  paper  work  and  overhead  expense,  and  ef- 
fecting a  saving  estimated  at  $245,000  a  year.  Apropos  of 
this  innovation,  the  Secretary  of  War  stated  ^^^  that 

"  The  department  commanders,  having  been  freed  from  the 
administrative  work  formerly  performed  by  them,  are  now  able 
to  devote  their  time  to  the  personal  inspection,  training,  and 
supervision  of  the  troops  within  their  departments.  The  result 
has  been  a  complete  change  in  the  relations  sustained  between 
the  department  commander  and  the  troops  within  his  depart- 
ment. He  now  goes  into  the  field  with  them  and  has  a  per- 
sonal acquaintance  with  the  officers  and  men  which  he  was 
never  able  to  have  before." 

The  so-called  mobilization  in  Texas  afforded  an  opportunity 
to  transfer  many  of  the  cavalry  regiments  from  northern  to 
southern  stations  where  conditions  were  infinitely  more  fa- 
vourable for  training  at  all  seasons.  A  new  policy  was  there- 
fore inaugurated  for  that  purpose  and  the  mounted  troops  • 
were  replaced  at  the  northern  stations  by  infantry.  Steps 
were  likewise  taken  to  recruit  regiments  intended  for  service 
in  the  Philippines  up  to  full  w^ar  strength  and  to  retain  them 
there  permanently,  thus  augmenting  the  number  of  combat- 
ants and  effecting  a  notable  saving  in  pay,  construction  of 
barracks,  transportation,  etc.  As  a  result  of  the  co-operation 
of  the  Economy  and  Efficiency  Commission  and  a  specially 
appointed  board,  many  and  important  economies  were  ef- 
fected during  the  year,  one  of  the  most  notable  being  the 
continuation  of  experiments  by  the  Ordnance  department  of 
the  "  Taylor  system ''  of  scientific  management  in  the  Water- 
town  Arsenal,  whereby  waste  was  prevented,  more  efficient 
production  obtained  and  skilled  workmen  received  an  in- 
creased wage.^^^ 

In  his  annual  report  to  the  President,  Secretary  Stimson 


396     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1911 

recommended  the  enacting  of  legislation  for  the  following 
needs  of  the  military  service: 

(1)  A  fair  merit  system  governing  both  the  promotion  and 
elimination  of  officers. 

(2)  The  abolition  of  many  of  the  useless  posts  scattered 
throughout  the  country,  the  maintenance  of  which  entailed  ex- 
penditures in  nowise  justified. 

Mr.  Stimson  pointed  out  that  the  result  was  "  to  make  the 
maintenance  of  the  Army  extraordinarily  expensive  "  and  that 
"  it  is  a  conservative  estimate  that  we  pay  per  effective  rifle' 
men  between  two  and  five  times  as  much  as  any  first-class  power 
on  the  continent  of  Europe;  and  this  comparison  is  made  after 
excluding  from  the  comparison  the  higher  pay  and  subsistence 
which  our  soldiers  receive.'^ 

(3)  A  proper  organization  of  the  Army  stationed  within  the 
United  States. 

(4)  A  shortening  of  the  existing  term  of  enlistment  of  three 
years,  on  the  ground  that  "  the  theory  of  the  modern  state  is 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  citizen  to  train  himself  as  promptly 
as  possible  to  perform  his  function  as  a  soldier  in  case  of  possible 
war  and  to  return  as  quicMy  as  possible  to  his  normal  civil  life." 

(5)  The  creation  of  a  reserve  composed  of  soldiers  who  have 
received  training  in  the  Eegular  Army,  which  reserve  would 
be  utilized  in  time  of  war  to  maintain  the  first  line  of  defense 
at  its  full  fighting  strength. 

(6)  A  radical  revision  and  reform  of  the  existing  laws  in 
respect  to  military  crimes  and  offenses.  Particular  stress  was 
laid  upon  the  excellent  results  obtained  in  the  punishment  of 
deserters  under  the  system  used  in  the  detention  barracks  of 
the  British  Army. 

(7)  The  consolidation  of  the  supply  departments,  whereby  a 
great  saving  would  be  made  and  increased  efficiency  obtained. 

(8)  The  creation  of  a  General  Service  corps. 

(9)  The  imperative  need  for  additional  reserve  supplies  of 
field  artillery  guns,  carriages  and  ammunition. 

Mr.  Stimson  emphasized  the  fact  that  ''  We  are  less  ade- 
quately supplied  with  field  artillery  material  than  with  any 
other  class  of  fighting  equipment.  There  is  not  enough  field 
artillery  ammunition  for  the  guns  we  now  have  for  a  single  en- 
gagement such  as  were  frequent  in  the  Manchurian  War.'' 

(10)  To  keep  the  corps  of  cadets  at  West  Point  filled  to  its 
maximum  by  permitting  vacancies  to  the  extent  of  30  per  cent 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  397 

1911-1912] 

to  be  filled  from  the  whole  list  of  applicants  selected  in  the 
order  of  merit  established  at  the  entrance  examinations,  such 
appointments  to  be  credited  to  the  United  States  at  large  and 
without  prejudice  to  other  appointments  authorized  by  law.^^^ 

The  Secretary  of  War  also  laid  great  stress  upon  his  hope 
that  Congress  would  take  favourable  action  in  respect  to  the 
bill  establishing  a  Council  of  National  Defense,  and  to  an- 
other bill  providing  for  a  force  of  national  volunteers  to  be 
created  without  delay  in  the  event  of  actual  or  threatened 
war,^^^  which  had  been  introduced  in  the  Senate  on  May 
25,  1911,  by  Colonel  Henry  A.  du  Pont,  the  senior  Senator 
from  Delaware  and  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs.^^s 

MILITAEY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1912 

The  most  important  military  legislation  enacted  by  the 
second  session  of  the  Sixty-second  Congress  occurred  during 
the  months  of  July  and  August,  1912,  although  measures  re- 
lating to  the  Eemale  Nurse  corps,  the  Mississippi  floods,  the 
use  of  the  American  Eed  Cross  with  the  land  and  naval 
forces  in  time  of  actual  or  threatened  war,  and  the  usual 
annual  appropriation  for  fortifications  became  laws  pre- 
viously.^ ^^  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  experi- 
ments made  of  the  "  Taylor  system  '^  of  scientific  manage- 
ment in  the  Watertown  Arsenal,  and  permission  was  given 
for  its  introduction  by  "  An  Act  Authorizing  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  pay  a  cash  reward  for  suggestions  submitted  by  em- 
ployees of  certain  establishments  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment for  improvement  or  economy  in  manufacturing  proc- 
esses or  plant,"  which  was  approved  on  July  I7th.^^^  On 
August  9th  the  necessary  appropriations  were  made  for  the 
Military  Academy  for  the  ensuing  fiscal  year  and  some  fea- 
tures of  slight  moment  only  embodied  therein,^^^  while  next 
day  there  was  approved  a  similar  act  relating  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture,  which  doubled  the  previous  allotment 
by  setting  aside  $100,000  "  for  experiments  in  animal  feed- 


398     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

ing  and  breeding,  .  .  .  and  the  experiments  in  the  breeding 
of  horses  for  military  purposes.''  ^^^  After  creating  Fort 
McHenry  a  Government  reservation  "  in  the  control  of  the 
War  Department/'  ^^^  Congress  passed  an  act  which  was  ap- 
proved on  August  22,  1912,  and  which  amended  certain  sec- 
tions of  the  Eevised  Statutes  and  authorized  "  the  President, 
in  certain  cases,  to  mitigate  or  remit  the  loss  of  rights  of  citi- 
zenship imposed  by  law  upon  deserters  from  the  military  or 
naval  service,  and  to  authorize  certain  reenlistments  in  the 
Army  and  I^aval  service."  The  reader  who  is  interested  to 
examine  this  law  in  detail  will  find  it  set  forth  in  extenso  in 
footnote  on  pages  705-706.^^* 

On  August  24,  1912,  three  measures  were  approved  by  the 
President.  The  first  of  these  —  the  Sundry  Civil  Bill  — 
contained  nothing  of  importance  from  a  military  point  of 
view  except  the  appropriations  to  the  extent  of  $2,806,950  for 
fortifications  and  armament  for  the  Panama  Canal;  ^^^  the 
second  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  "  to  deliver  to  cer- 
tain cities  and  towns  condemned  bronze  or  brass  cannon,  with 
their  carriages  and  outfit  of  cannon  balls,  and  so  forth ;  "  266 
while  the  third  —  the  Army  Appropriation  Act  for  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  30,  1913  ^^^ —  embraced  some  of  the  most 
important  military  legislation  in  recent  years  and  embodied 
in  various  provisions  many  of  the  reiterated  recommendations 
of  several  Secretaries  of  War. 

The  first  feature  of  this  law  deserving  of  attention  was  the 
allotment  of  $100,000  "  for  the  purchase,  maintenance,  ope- 
ration and  repair  of  airships  and  other  aerial  machines,"  ^^^ 
in  which  our  Army  was  far  behind  those  of  other  great  na- 
tions. The  second  occurred  in  the  proviso  under  the  caption 
of  '^  Pay  of  ofiicers  of  the  line  "  and  stipulated 

"  That  hereafter  *  in  time  of  peace  whenever  any  officer  holding 

*  Joint  Resolution  No.  53,  approved  August  24,  1914,  amended  the 
Army  Appropriation  bill  by  providing  "  That  in  the  Act  making  ap- 
propriation for  the  support  of  the  Army  for  the  fiscal  year  ending 
June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  thirteen,  and  for  other  purposes," 
there   be   substituted   for   the  word   "  hereafter "   where   it   first   occurs 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  399 

1912] 

a  permanent  commission  in  the  line  of  the  Army  with  rank  be- 
low that  of  major  shall  not  have  been  actually  present  for  duty 
for  at  least  two  of  the  last  preceding  six  years  with  a  troop,  bat- 
tery, or  company,  of  that  branch  of  the  Army  in  which  he  shall 
hold  said  commission,  such  officer  shall  not  be  detached  nor  per- 
mitted to  remain  detached  from  such  troop,  battery,  or  com- 
pany, for  duty  of  any  kind;  and  all  pay  and  allowances  shall  be 
forfeited  by  any  superior  for  any  period  during  which,  by  his 
order,  or  his  permission,  or  by  reason  of  his  failure  or  neglect 
to  issue  or  cause  to  be  issued  the  proper  order  or  instructions  at 
the  proper  time,  any  officer  shall  be  detached  or  permitted  to 
remain  detached  in  violation  of  any  of  the  terms  of  this  proviso ; 
but  nothing  in  this  proviso  shall  be  held  to  apply  in  the  case  of 
any  officer  for  such  period  as  shall  be  actually  necessary  for  him,, 
aft^r  having  been  relieved  from  detached  service,  to  join  the 
troop,  battery,  or  company,  to  which  he  shall  belong  in  that 
branch  in  which  he  shall  hold  a  permanent  commission,  nor  shall 
anything  in  this  proviso  be  held  to  apply  to  the  detachment  or 
detail  of  officers  for  duty  in  the  Judge  Advocate  Generals  De- 
partment or  in  the  Ordnance  Department,  or  in  connection  with 
the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  until  after  such  canal 
shall  have  been  formally  opened,  or  in  the  Philippine  Con- 
stabulary until  the  first  day  of  January,  nineteen  hundred  and 
fourteen,  or  to  any  officer  detailed,  or  who  may  be  hereafter  de- 
tailed, for  aviation  duty.  And  hereafter  no  officer  holding  a  per- 
manent commission  in  the  Army  with  rank  below  that  of  major 
shall  be  detailed  as  assistant  to  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  In- 
sular Affairs  with  rank  of  colonel,  or  as  commanding  officer  of 
the  Porto  Eico  Eegiment  of  Infantry,  or  as  chief  or  assistant 
chief  (Director  or  Assistant  Director)  of  the  Philippine  Con- 
stabulary, and  no  other  officers  of  the  Army  shall  hereafter  be 
detailed  for  duty  with  the  said  Constabulary  except  as  specifically 
provided  by  law."  ^^^ 

Having  dealt  a  knock-out  blow  to  the  evils  of  detached  ser- 
vice and  absenteeism  by  the  above  proviso  —  which  is  gen- 
erally known  in  the  Army  under  the  nickname  of  "  the 
Manchu  law  " —  the  act  went  on  to  declare,  under  the  head- 
ing of  "  Pay  of  Enlisted  Men," 


in  the  first  proviso  under  the  heading  "  Pay  of  Officers  of  the  Line," 
the  words :  "  on  and  after  December  fifteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and 
twelve."—  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  645. 


400     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

"  That  no  officer  or  enlisted  man  in  active  service,  who  shall  be 
absent  from  duty  on  account  of  disease  resulting  from  his  own 
intemperate  use  of  drugs,  or  alcoholic  liquors,  or  other  miscon- 
duct, shall  receive  pay  for  the  period  of  such  absence  from  any 
part  of  the  appropriation  in  this  Act  for  the  pay  of  officers  or 
enlisted  men,  the  time  so  absent  and  the  cause  thereof  to  be 
ascertained  under  such  procedure  and  regulations  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War."  ^"^ 

Some  modifications  were  made  in  former  laws  pertaining 
to  the  Subsistence  Department ;  ^'^•^  retired  enlisted  men 
were  to  be  given  "  credit  for  double  time  for  foreign  service/' 
but  no  such  privilege  was  to  inure  "  to  those  who  hereafter 
enlist '' ;  and  accounting  officials  of  the  Treasury  were  di- 
rected to  remove  any  suspensions  and  disallowances  in  the 
accounts  of  quartermasters  for  1910,  1911  and  1912  for  cer- 
tain "  expenditures  in  connection  with  the  raising  of  forage 
at  remount  depots/'  In  allotting  $1,700,000  for  the  con- 
struction of  barracks  and  quarters,  the  law  wisely  stipulated 

"  That  no  part  of  the  appropriations  contained  in  this  Act  shall 
be  expended  for  permanent  improvements  at  any  Army  post 
which  has  been  abandoned  or  which  may  be  ordered  abandoned 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States." 

It  was  also 

''  Provided,  That  hereafter  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized 
to  consider,  ascertain,  adjust,  and  determine  the  amounts  due 
on  all  claims  for  damages  to  and  loss  of  private  property  when 
the  amount  of  the  claim  does  not  exceed  the  sum  of  one  thou- 
sand dollars,  occasioned  by  heavy  gun  fire  and  target  practice 
of  troops  and  for  damages  to  vessels,  wharves,  and  other  private 
property,  found  to  be  due  to  maneuvers  or  other  military  opera- 
tions for  which  the  Government  is  responsible.  .  .  .", 

and  it  was  expressly  specified  that  none  of  the  appropriation 
for  Ordnance  stores  and  ammunition  "  shall  be  paid  for 
small-arms  powder  at  a  price  exceeding  seventy-one  cents  a 
pound."  ^'^^ 

The  really  important  part  of  the  Army  Appropriation  Act 


I 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  401 

1912] 

of  August  24,  1912,  was  embodied  in  Sections  2,  3  and  4. 
By  virtue  of  Section  2  there  was  created  for  the  first  time 
in  our  history  a  reserve  for  the  Regular  Army  similar  to 
that  possessed  for  years  by  every  other  nation  in  the  world 
with  any  pretensions  to  a  modern  military  force,  and  for 
the  lack  of  which  our  past  wars  have  been  so  needlessly  pro- 
longed and  our  expenditures  so  appalling.  Section  3  insti- 
tuted a  consolidation  of  the  supply  departments  into  a  single 
body  to  be  known  as  the  Quartermaster  Corps;  and  Section 
4  organized  its  logical  adjunct,  the  oft-recommended  General 
Service  corps.^'^  Only  a  resume  of  these  three  important 
innovations  will  be  made  here,  insomuch  as  their  great  length 
precludes  their  insertion  in  the  text,  but  the  reader  who  is 
interested  to  examine  them  in  detail  will  find  those  portions 
of  the  law  dealing  with  them  given  in  extenso  in  footnote 
274  on  pages  706-711.2^^ 

The  purpose  of  a  reserve  for  the  Regular  Army,  as  well  as 
the  merits  and  defects  of  Section  two,  were  completely  sum- 
marized in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stimson, 
for  1912,  which  stated  ^^^  that 

'^  It  has  been  our  historical  policy  in  the  past  to  keep  the  regi- 
ments of  the  Regular  Army  in  time  of  peace  at  only  about  half 
the  strength  in  enlisted  men  requisite  for  its  complement  of 
officers.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  provision  made  by  law  for 
filling  the  ranks  of  these  regiments  in  case  of  war.  When  the 
Spanish  War  broke  out  the  efficiency  of  many  regiments  was 
greatly  injured  by  the  necessity  of  throwing  into  them  a  large 
number  of  perfectly  raw  recruits,  and  in  order  to  fill  the  ranks  of 
other  regiments  it  was  necessary  to  consolidate  two  regiments 
into  one.  Such  a  system  postulates  the  development  of  a  re- 
serve force  of  trained  soldiers  which,  on  the  outbreak  of  war, 
can  be  called  back  from  their  civil  occupations  to  bring  our 
Army  up  to  its  full  strength  and  to  keep  its  ranks  full  during 
the  inevitable  losses  of  the  first  engagements.  A  reserve  system 
is  in  effect  in  the  armies  of  practically  all  nations  of  the  civilized 
world  except  our  own.  It  has  also  been  shown  by  experience  to 
be  the  most  economical  and  effective  way  of  creating  a  citizen 
army,  the  men  of  which  in  time  of  peace  will  be  free  to  perform 


402     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

the  activities  of  civil  life  and  be  no  drain  upon  the  treasury  of 
their  country. 

"  I  am  very  glad  to  report  that  Congress  enacted  as  a  part  of 
the  Army  appropriation  Act  last  summer  legislation  looking  to 
the  creation  of  such  a  reserve  for  our  Eegular  Army.  The 
former  term  of  enlistment  for  three  years,  all  of  which  was  spent 
with  the  colors,  has  been  changed  to  an  enlistment  for  seven 
years,  four  of  which  are  to  be  spent  with  the  colors  and  three 
as  a  reserve.  There  is  also  a  provision  which  permits  a  soldier 
to  apply  voluntarily  for  transfer  to  the  reserve  at  any  time 
after  three  years  with  the  colors.  Provision  is  also  made  for 
voluntary  enlistment  of  veterans  in  the  reserve  for  a  period  of 
three  years.  No  provision  is  made  for  any  payment  to  re- 
servists, except  in  case  of  war,  when  they  will  receive  $5  per 
month  for  the  time  which  they  have  hitherto  served  in  the  re- 
serve. While  the  reserve  created  by  this  bill  is  far  from  perfect, 
it  is  in  my  opinion  a  long  step  in  the  right  direction,  and  I  be- 
lieve that  it  can  be  made  the  beginning  of  a  permanent  reserve 
system.  The  most  serious  defect  in  my  opinion  is  that  it  cre- 
ates too  long  a  period  of  service  with  the  colors.  I  believe,  as 
I  indicated  in  my  last  report,  that  our  own  experience,  and  the 
experience  of  nations  in  Europe,  have  shown  that  the  soldier  can 
be  adequately  trained  for  his  duties  in  considerably  less  than 
three  years.  Thereafter  economy  demands  that  he  should  be 
transferred  to  the  reserve  as  promptly  as  possible,  except  for 
the  number  of  trained  men  in  the  shape  of  noncommissioned 
officers  and  special  privates  who  are  retained  as  a  nucleus  for 
the  training  of  future  recruits.  I  think  our  experience  will 
gradually  lead  to  a  shortening  of  the  period  of  training  with 
the  colors,  and  that  by  so  doing  we  will  greatly  improve  the 
character  of  the  young  men  who  will  come  into  the  Army,  while 
in  no  way  diminishing  the  effectiveness  of  their  training.  Never- 
theless, I  believe  that  a  reserve  can  be  initiated  under  the  pres- 
ent law,  and  every  effort  is  being  made  to  insure  that  this  result 
will  be  accomplished." 

The  author,  who  was  afforded  an  opportunity  to  be  thor- 
oughly conversant  at  that  time  with  the  opposing  standpoints 
of  the  War  Department  on  one  hand  and  Congress  on  the 
other,  can  testify  that  the  feature  of  the  bill  creating  an 
Army  Reserve  ended,  as  so  often  in  the  past,  in  a  compro- 
mise which  virtually  defeated  the  very  purpose  for  which  it 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  403 

1912] 

was  framed ;  and  in  support  of  this  contention  it  is  only  nec- 
essary to  repeat  the  statement  made  in  the  annual  report  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  on  November  15,  1914,  that 

"  We  have  a  reserve  —  that  is,  men  who  have  been  trained  in 
the  Army  and  under  the  terms  of  their  enlistment  are  subject 
to  be  called  back  to  the  colors  in  time  of  war  —  consisting  of 
16  men."  276 

In  other  words,  so  faulty  were  the  'provisions  of  this  act  in 
question  that  at  the  end  of  two  years  it  had  produced  a  re- 
serve limited  to  the  preposterously  small  number  of  sixteen 
soldiers.  The  results  speak  for  themselves  and  the  necessity 
of  immediate  amendment  of  the  law  needs  no  commentary. 
Section  three  consolidated  the  Quartermaster's,  Subsist- 
ence and  Pay  departments  into  a  new  organization  to  be 
known  as  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  under  "  a  Chief  of  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  "  with  the  rank  of  Major  General.  It 
provided  for  a  reduction  of  the  officers  in  the  grades  of 
captain  to  colonel,  both  inclusive,  until  the  total  number  had 
reached  180 ;  stipulated 

"  That  the  Quartermaster  Corps  shall  be  subject  to  the  super- 
vision of  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  extent  the  departments  hereby 
consolidated  into  said  corps  have  heretofore  been  subject  to  such 
supervision  under  the  terms  of  existing  law  " ; 

and  required  the  President  to  appoint  immediately  the  Chief 
of  the  new  corps,  who  was  "  to  put  into  effect  the  provisions 
of  this  section  not  less  than  sixty  days  after  the  passage  of 
this  Act." 

Section  four  created  a  General  Service  corps  "  of  not  to 
exceed  six  thousand  men,  who  shall  be  permanently  attached 
to  the  Quartermaster  Corps  and  who  shall  not  be  counted  as 
a  part  of  the  enlisted  force  provided  by  law."  They  were 
destined  to  supersede  4,000  civilian  employes  and  2,000 
soldiers  detailed  on  extra  duty  in  performing  such  work  as 
that  of  clerks,  engineers,  firemen,  overseers,  carpenters, 
blacksmiths,  packers,  teamsters,  and  labourers.     Such  a  body 


404     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

is  to  be  found  in  all  great  armies,  and  the  saving  and  in- 
creased efficiency  resulting  therefrom  have  been  abundantly 
demonstrated  through  many  years. 

The  Act  of  February  14,  1903,  creating  the  General  Staff, 
had  specified  that  it  should  consist  of  a  Chief  of  Staff,  two 
general  officers,  four  colonels,  six  lieutenant-colonels,  twelve 
majors  and  twenty  captains  detailed  from  the  grade  of  cap- 
tain or  first  lieutenant,  a  total  of  45  officers,  as  has  been  seen 
on  page  293.  This  body  was  subsequently  divided  into  two 
parts,  the  War  Department  General  Staff  and  the  General 
Staff  serving  with  troops.  In  case  of  the  latter,  these  offi- 
cers were  attached  to  various  commands,  with  the  ultimate 
object  of  having  them  become  chiefs  of  staff  and  in  order  to 
maintain  a  closer  touch  between  the  different  commanders 
and  the  plans  of  the  War  Department,  as  worked  out  by  the 
General  Staff,  than  had  previously  been  possible.  However, 
as  the  dispersion  of  the  Army  into  small  forces  scattered 
throughout  the  country  had  rendered  impossible  the  forma- 
tion of  any  units  larger  than  a  regiment  —  such  as  brigades, 
divisions  or  corps  —  the  General  Staff  officer  thus  serving 
with  troops  found  himself  either  in  the  position  of  a  super- 
numerary or  tempted  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the  adjutant- 
general  of  that  command,  with  which  his  own  conflicted. 
Congress,  having  ascertained  the  facts,  jumped  at  the  con- 
clusion that  the  General  Staff  was  larger  than  there  was  any 
necessity  for  its  being,  that  its  powers  needed  to  be  scruti- 
nized and  its  numbers  reduced.  This  it  proceeded  to  carry 
out  by  means  of  the  following  provision  in  the  law  w^e  have 
been  discussing: 

"  Sec.  5.  That  hereafter  the  General  Staff  Corps  shall  con- 
sist of  two  general  officers,  one  of  whom  shall  be  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  four  colonels,  six  lieutenant  colonels,  twelve  majors,  and 
twelve  captains  or  first  lieutenants,  all  of  whom  shall  be  detailed 
from  the  Army  at  large  in  the  manner  and  for  the  periods  pre- 
scribed by  law:  Provided,  That  hereafter,  except  as  otherwise 
provided  herein,  when  any  officer  shall  under  the  provisions  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  405 

1912] 

section  twenty-six  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  February 
second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  be  appointed  to  an  office  above 
that  of  colonel,  his  appointment  to  said  office  and  his  acceptance 
of  the  appointment  shall  create  a  vacancy  in  the  arm,  staff 
corps,  or  staff  department  from  which  he  shall  be  appointed,  and 
said  vacancy  shall  be  filled  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  existing 
law,  but  he  shall  retain  in  said  arm,  staff  corps,  or  staff  depart- 
ment, the  same  relative  position  that  he  would  have  held  if  he 
had  not  been  appointed  to  said  office,  and  he  shall  return  to 
said  relative  position  upon  the  expiration  of  his  appointment  to 
said  office  unless  he  shall  be  reappointed  thereto;  and  if  under 
the  operation  of  this  proviso  the  number  of  officers  of  any  par- 
ticular grade  in  any  arm,  staff  corps,  or  staff  department,  shall 
at  any  time  exceed  the  number  authorized  by  law,  no  vacancy 
occurring  in  said  grades  shall  be  filled  until  after  the  total  num- 
ber of  officers  therein  shall  have  been  reduced  below  the  number 
authorized  by  law;  but  nothing  in  this  proviso  shall  be  held  to 
apply  in  the  case  of  any  officer  who  now  holds  a  four-year  ap- 
pointment to  an  office  with  rank  above  that  of  colonel,  and 
whose  return  to  the  relative  position  that  he  would  have  held  if 
he  had  not  been  appointed  to  said  office  is  not  possible  under 
existing  law."  ^^^ 

There  were  other  causes  which  brought  about  the  passage 
of  this  law  —  causes  which  cannot  be  so  charitably  con- 
strued as  those  above  mentioned.  Be  that  as  it  may,  this  was 
a  retrogressive  piece  of  legislation  and  ought  to  be  repealed 
at  once,  on  account  of  the  handicap  that  it  placed  on  one  of 
the  most  important  branches  of  our  military  service. 

The  law  concluded  with  the  following  provisions: 

"  Sec.  6.  That  hereafter  the  service  of  a  cadet  who  may 
hereafter  be  appointed  to  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
or  to  the  N'aval  Academy  shall  not  be  counted  in  computing 
for  any  purpose  the  length  of  service  of  any  officer  of  the 
Army. 

^,r .".Sec.  7.  That  the  appropriations  herein  provided  for  the 
several  departments  consolidated  under  this  Act  shall  be  avail- 
able for  the  consolidated  corps  herein  created. 

"Sec.  8.     That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  held  or  construed 

so  as  to  separate  any  officer  from  the  Army  or  to  diminish  the 

,  rank  now  held  by  him,  and  that  all  laws  and  parts  of  laws,  so 


406     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

far  as  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Act,  be,  and 
they  are  hereby,  repealed.'^  ^'^^ 

The  Joint  Eesolutions  passed  and  approved  during  1912 
present  few  features  of  interest  from  a  military  point  of 
view  except  the  one  forbidding  the  export  of  arms  or  muni- 
tions of  war  subsequent  to  a  proclamation  by  the  President 
prohibiting  the  same,  and  the  resolution  appropriating 
$1,350,000  for  the  participation  of  the  Organized  Militia  in 
joint  encampments  and  manoeuvres  with  the  Regular 
Army.^^^ 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1912 

On  June  30,  1912,  the  actual  strength  of  the  Regular 
Army  was  4,470  officers  and  77,835  enlisted  men,  a  total  of 
82,305  and  an  increase  of  8,023  over  the  preceding  year,  but 
still  3,916  below  the  maximum  authorized  by  law.  How  suc- 
cessful had  been  the  effort  to  maintain  a  high  standard  among 
the  soldiers  is  evinced  by  the  fact  that  out  of  158,917  appli- 
cants for  enlistment  and  re-enlistment,  only  about  25  per 
cent,  were  accepted.  The  percentage  of  desertions  was  about 
three  per  cent. —  slightly  higher  than  the  year  before  but  still 
extraordinarily  low.  During  the  period  from  June  30, 
1911,  to  October  15,  1912,  395  second  lieutenants  were  ap- 
pointed to  the  Army  — 177  from  graduates  of  West  Point, 
29  from  the  ranks  and  189  from  civil  life  —  but  134  vacan- 
cies still  remained  unfilled.  Great  care  was  taken  to  main-  * 
tain  the  highest  possible  standard  in  the  selection  of  candi- 
dates.28<> 

The  Secretary  of  War  declared  in  his  annual  report  for 
1912,^^^  that,  notwithstanding  the  vigorous  efforts  made  by 
the  Medical  Corps  and  the  commanders  of  troops  to  check  the 
evil,2^2 

"  The  high  percentage  of  venereal  disease  continues  to  be  the 
reproach  of  the  American  Army,  and  the  daily  average  number  of 
those  sick  from  that  cause  during  the  past  calendar  year  was 
larger  than  the  daily  average  of  those  sick  from  all  other  of  the 
more  important  diseases  combined.  ...  In  my  last  annual  re- 
port I  recommended  the  stoppage  of  pay  of  officers  and  men 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  407 

1912] 

during  periods  of  disability  caused  by  such  misconduct,  and 
I  am  glad  to  report  that  legislation  to  the  effect  was  adopted  at 
the  past  session  of  Congress  and  is  now  being  vigorously  en- 
forced. It  is  hoped  that  these  steps  will  result  in  reduction  of 
the  evil, 

"  Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  the  ultimate  causes  which  make 
the  record  of  our  Army  in  this  respect  shameful  beyond  that  of 
the  army  of  any  other  civilized  nation  are  inherent  in  our  own 
shortcomings  as  a  nation  in  dealing  with  this  matter.  So  long 
as  in  our  civil  communities,  and  particularly  our  larger  cities,  we 
continue  to  close  our  eyes  to  the  magnitude  and  extent  of  the 
evil  and  refrain  from  attacking  it  with  all  of  the  weapons  which 
modern  scientific  knowledge  places  in  our  hands,  it  can  not  but  be 
expected  that  the  younger  men  in  our  Army,  leading  the  abnor- 
mal life  of  the  soldier,  will  show  the  effect  of  the  evil  to  a 
marked  degree.     In  this  respect  I  believe  that  the  so-called 

ANTICAXTEEN    LEGISLATION    HAS    BEEN    RESPONSIBLE    FOR    MUCH 

VICE.     During  the  past  year  and  a  half  I  have  visited 

PERSONALLY  AND  INSPECTED  NEARLY  HALF  OF  THE  49  MO- 
BILE ARMY  POSTS  IN  THE  UnITED  StATES.  In  ALMOST  EVERY 
INSTANCE  I  HAVE  FOUND  THE  MILITARY  RESERVATIONS  ADJOINED 
BY  DIVES  AND  ILL  RESORTS  OF  THE  VILEST  CHARACTER.  ThE 
TESTIMONY  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  THE  ARMY  IS  ALMOST  UNANI- 
MOUS TO  THE  EFFECT  THAT  THESE  ESTABLISHMENTS  HAVE 
ARISEN  OR  GREATLY  INCREASED  IN  NUMBER  SINCE  THE  SALE  OF 
LIGHT  WINES  OR  BEER  AT  THE  POST  EXCHANGES  HAS  BEEN 
ABOLISHED.  By  THAT  LEGISLATION  THE  SOLDIER  IS  IN  EFFECT 
DEPRIVED  OF  THE  GARRISON  CLUB,  WHERE  FORMERLY  IT  WAS  COM- 
PARATIVELY EASY  TO  KEEP  HIM  FOR  HIS  AMUSEMENTS,  AND  HE 
NOW    RESORTS    FOR    HIS    LIQUOR    TO    PLACES    WHERE    EVERY    KIND 

OF  TEMPTATION  SURROUNDS  HIM.  There  may  have  been  and 
probably  were  abuses  in  the  methods  of  some  of  the  so-called 
canteens  as  managed  under  the  system  now  abolished  by  law; 
but  the  abuses  were  not  necessary  or  inherent  in  the  system,  and 
I  am  very  confident,  from  my  personal  investigation,  that  most 
of  the  post  exchanges  under  that  system  constituted  effective 
and  practical  instruments  toward  Army  temperance  and  clean- 
liness of  living,  and  that  a  very  considerable  percentage  of  the 
evils  from  which  the  Army  is  now  suffering  is  directly  attribut- 
able to  their  abolition." 

The  military  operations  in  the  Philippines  were  insignifi- 
cant except  for  the  attack   against  a  force   of  two  troops 


408     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

of  cavalry  and  two  companies  of  Philippine  Scouts  under 
Captain  E.  G.  Peyton  made  by  a  band  of  Moro  outlaws  in 
the  island  of  Jolo  on  January  14,  1912,  which  resulted  in 
the  killing  of  20  Moros  and  the  wounding  of  one  American 
officer  and  one  man.  Upon  the  disbanding  of  the  manoeuvre 
division  and  the  first  separate  brigade  during  the  summer  of 
1911,  the  revolutions  instituted  against  the  Madero  govern- 
ment rendered  it  obligatory  to  patrol  the  Mexican  frontier 
in  order  to  enforce  the  laws  of  neutrality,  and  this  task  was. 
entrusted  to  the  2nd  and  14th  Cavalry.  The  border  raids- 
made  by  certain  Mexicans  formerly  of  Orozco's  rebel  force 
compelled  the  War  Department  to  send  the  9th  Cavalry  to* 
Douglas,  Arizona,  and  the  13th  Cavalry  to  El  Paso,  Texas. 
These  troops  were  decidedly  effective  in  the  work  of  sup- 
pressing the  attempt  made  in  Texas  by  General  Reyes  to  in- 
stigate an  insurrection  against  Madero ;  in  enforcing  the  ex- 
port of  arms  and  ammunition  prohibited  by  the  P resident' » 
proclamation,  which  resulted  in  the  collapse  of  the  uprising  in 
Chihuahua  led  by  Orozco;  and  in  the  active  patrolling  that 
prevented  raids  being  made  upon  American  ranches  in  Texas 
and  Arizona.^^^  Apropos  of  these  events,  Secretary  Stim- 
son  stated  in  his  report  ^^*  that 

"  In  the  light  of  the  recent  proposals  to  reduce  by  one-third  the 
force  of  the  Eegular  Cavalry  belonging  to  the  United  States 
Army,  I  deem  it  proper  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
brunt  of  this  entire  work  fell  upon  and  was  performed  by 
Cavalry,  and  that  during  any  continuance  of  unsettled  condi- 
tions on  that  long  and  sparsely  settled  frontier,  such  patrol  work 
must  be  continued  by  that  arm  of  the  service.  There  are  now 
on  duty  in  connection  with  the  patrol  of  the  Mexican  border  six 
regiments  of  Cavalry,  a  regiment  and  a  half  of  Infantry,  a  bat- 
tery of  Field  Artillery,  two  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  and 
one  company  of  Signal  Corps  troops.  The  approximate  total 
strength  of  these  troops  is  6,754  officers  and  enlisted  men. 
There  are  thus  at  the  present  time  engaged  in  this  special  duty 
a  larger  number  of  Cavalry  regiments  than  the  five  which  it  was 
proposed  last  winter  to  cut  out  of  the  Army." 

During  the  summer  67,280  of  the  Organized  Militia  p^r- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  409 

1912] 

ticipated  with  the  Regular  troops  in  five  joint  manoeuvres, 
in  which  the  conditions  of  a  campaign  were  reproduced  by 
placing  the  opposing  forces  several  days'  march  apart  and  by 
having  them  approach  and  locate  each  other.  Out  of  a 
strength  of  121,852  officers  and  men  who  constituted  the  Or- 
ganized Militia  during  1912,  no  less  than  103,453  took  part 
in  field  service  or  encampments ;  more  than  3,000  officers  at- 
tended the  usual  camps  of  instruction;  24  of  the  field  artil- 
lery officers  took  a  course  of  a  month  at  the  newly-established 
School  of  Fire  at  Fort  Sill ;  seven  medical  officers  were  pres- 
ent at  the  initial  course  in  the  Field  Service  Medical  School ; 
and  the  garrison  or  service  schools  of  the  Regular  Army  were 
attended  by  45  militia  officers,  of  whom  22  were  found  pro- 
ficient in  every  subject.  There  was  thus  a  gratifying  im- 
provement made  in  the  efficiency  of  the  organized  militia.^^^ 
Several  events  of  importance  occurred  during  1912.  In 
March  and  April  the  Quartermaster's  and  Subsistence  de- 
partments performed  a  signal  service  in  relieving  the  dis- 
tress caused  by  the  tremendous  floods  of  the  Mississippi,  but 
so  quietly  and  efficiently  was  their  work  done  that  it  attracted 
little  of  the  public  attention  which  it  merited.  The  former 
garrison  in  the  Philippines,  composed  of  twelve  regiments  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  at  a  reduced  strength  of  7,536  effective 
combatants,  was  replaced  by  six  regiments  —  four  of  infan- 
try and  two  of  cavalry  —  at  full  strength,  which  comprised 
8,592  combatants.  A  greater  effectiveness  was  thus  given, 
and  it  was  estimated  that  the  cost  of  maintenance  would  be 
reduced  by  fully  $1,000,000  'per  annum,  as  the  regimental 
units  were  destined  to  remain  continuously  in  the  islands 
instead  of  being  transferred  back  and  forth  as  heretofore. 
The  officers  and  men  composing  them  were  to  serve  the  regu- 
lar tropical  detail  as  usual.  Steps  were  also  taken  to  con- 
stitute the  mobile  army  —  which  was  scattered  in  some  49 
posts  in  24  different  States,  the  average  strength  being  less 
than  700  men  and  no  unit  higher  than  a  regiment  existing  — 
into  a  tactical  organization  of  three  infantry  divisions,  com- 


410     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

posed  of  two  or  three  brigades  with  a  proper  quota  of  divi- 
sional cavalry  and  artillery,  apart  from  separate  brigades  of 
cavalry.  Although  in  default  of  Congressional  action  and 
the  necessary  appropriations,  this  organization  was  obviously 
merely  skeleton,  it  none  the  less  furnished  a  basis  for  the 
future  formation  in  peace  as  well  as  war.^^^ 

Considerable  reforms  were  effected  in  the  paper  work 
both  of  the  Army  and  the  War  Department,  and  in  the  sys- 
tem of  military  prison  administration.  In  the  latter  case  a 
system  of  "  detention  barracks  "  similar  to  that  used  by  Great 
Britain  was  introduced,  whereby  men  convicted  of  purely 
military  offences  were  upon  release  sent  back  to  the  colours, 
instead  of  being  converted  into  hardened  and  degraded  char- 
acters and  regarded  as  outlaws. 

Progress  was  also  made  on  the  fortifications  for  the  insu- 
lar possessions.  Those  at  Subig  Bay  were  finished  and 
those  at  Manila  Bay  about  three-fourths  completed.  The  de- 
fences of  Pearl  Harbour  and  Honolulu  were  well  advanced, 
while  in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  about  half  of  the  excava- 
tions, foundations  and  concrete  foundations  was  accom- 
plished. The  defences  of  Guantanamo,  Cuba,  were  held  in 
abeyance  pending  the  appropriation  made  during  the  sum- 
mer, but  no  work  was  authorized  by  Congress  at  San  Juan, 
Porto  Pico,  at  Kiska  Island,  Alaska,  or  at  Guam.^^^ 

By  all  odds  the  most  important  event  of  the  year  from  a 
military  standpoint  was  the  scheme  of  a  complete  re-organi- 
zation of  the  Army  worked  out  by  the  War  College  Division 
of  the  General  Staff  and  culminating  in  a  series  of  confer- 
ences held  at  the  War  Department  during  July,  1912,  at 
w^hich  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson, 
presided  in  person.*  The  object  of  this  scheme  was  to  rec- 
tify the  utter  absence  of  the  tactical  organization  which  an 
army  ought  to  possess  and  which  had  resulted,  in  the  case  of 

*  Through  the  kind  invitation  of  Secretary  Stimson,  the  author  had 
the  honour  of  being  the  only  civilian,  except  certain  members  of  Con- 
gress, present  at  these  conferences.  He  therefore  speaks  from  his  own 
personal  knowledge  and  experience. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  411 

1912] 

the  American  army,  from  the  dispersion  of  the  troops 
throughout  the  country  into  groups,  the  duties  and  forma- 
tion of  which  were  much  more  akin  to  those  of  a  constabulary 
than  of  a  properly  constituted  army.  Broadly-speaking,  these 
conferences  discussed  ( 1 )  the  principles  of  military  organiza- 
tion; (2)  what  the  United  States  possessed  in  the  way  of 
land  forces ;  ( 3 )  how  far  and  in  what  manner  the  desired  or- 
ganization could  be  effected  with  the  means  at  hand;  and  (4) 
what  would  then  remain  to  be  done  to  achieve  a  modern  mili- 
tary force  of  such  strength  and  organization  as  the  United 
States  ought  to  have.  The  War  Department,  as  Secretary 
Stimson  stated, ^^^ 

"  proceeded  upon  the  theory  that  before  asking  Congress  for 
legislative  help,  we  should  advance  as  far  as  possible  in  the  di- 
rection of  reform  by  administrative  action.  By  doing  this,  not 
only  can  many  evils  be  remedied  without  legislation,  but  the 
very  effort  at  reorganization,  and  the  study  which  that  involves, 
as  well  as  the  practice  under  the  new  methods,  all  tend  to  shed 
a  clearer  light  upon  the  ultimate  problem  and  to  make  much 
more  definite  and  clear  the  character  of  the  legislation  which 
will  be  eventually  needed." 

Out  of  these  conferences  was  evolved  a  plan  which 

"  does  not  aim  to  go  into  too  specific  details,  but  is  a  study  of  the 
broad  principles  which  must  govern  any  successful  military 
policy  of  this  country.  It  constitutes  a  broad  chart  for  present 
guidance  and  for  future  progress.  ...  In  general  scope  and 
purpose,  the  plan  is  a  constructive  application  to  modern  x\meri- 
can  conditions  of  the  principles  of  military  policy  carefully 
worked  out  by  General  Upton  in  his  exhaustive  studies  of  mili- 
tary policy  soon  after  the  Civil  War."  ^^^ 

For  the  first  time  in  our  history  a  sound  and  definite  pol- 
icy in  respect  to  the  military  branch  of  our  service  was  for- 
mulated, and  the  importance  of  this  step  cannot  be  over-esti- 
mated. The  plan  was  promptly  published  under  the  title  of 
^^  Eeport  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the 
United  States,"  and  contained  a  short  introductory  note  dated 
August  10,  1912,  and  signed  by  Secretary  Stimson.     It  was 


412     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912 

distributed  to  members  of  Congress,  as  well  as  throughout  the 
Army  and  the  National  Guard,  and  to  institutions  of  learning 
all  over  the  country.  Its  length  precludes  its  insertion  here, 
but  the  reader  who  is  interested  to  examine  this  masterful 
document  will  find  it  in  Appendix  A  of  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  1912,  and  attention  is  particularly 
called  to  the  "  Estimate  of  the  land  forces  needed  in  the 
United  States,"  in  which  it  was  stated  that 

'^  Our  requirements  in  the  way  of  land  forces  are  certain  to 
change  as  the  years  go  on;  in  the  light  of  present-day  conditions 
it  is  estimated  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  with  a  first- 
class  POWER  WE  SHOULD  BE  CAPABLE  OF  MOBILIZING  AT  ONCE  IN 

THE  United  States  an  effective  force  of  460,000  mobile 

TROOPS  AND  42,000  COAST  ARTILLERY;  that  THIS  IS  THE  MINT- 
MUM  NUMBER  OF  FIRST-LINE  TROOPS  NECESSARY;  AND  that  TO 
AUGMENT  THIS  FORCE  AND  REPRICE  ITS  LOSSES  WE  SHOULD  HAVE 
PLANS  MADE  FOR  RAISING  IMMEDIATELY  AN  ADDITIONAL  FORCE 
OF    300,000    MEN. 

"  To  meet  requirements  less  vital  than  a  great  national  war 
—  as  for  example,  the  sending  of  expeditionary  forces  to  pro- 
tect certain  foreign  interests  —  it  may  be  presumed  that  we 
would  draw  upon  the  forces  thus  enumerated;  and  as  in  the 
light  of  our  recent  experiences  we  can  not  possibly  foretell  to 
what  places  expeditions  may  have  to  be  sent  nor  what  numbers 
will  be  required,  all  of  these  forces  should  be  available  for  service 
anywhere."  ^^^ 

The  Secretary  of  War  strongly  recommended  action  by 
Congress  looking  to 

(1)  The  abolition  of  many  useless  posts. 

(2)  Proper  Federal  control  over  the  National  Guard  in  or- 
der that  adequate  training  may  be  given  it,  to  the  end  that  it  will 
attain  the  standard  prescribed  by  the  War  Department  and  thus 
meet  ''one  of  the  greatest^  military  needs  of  our  Government, 
namely,  the  creation  of  a  trained  and  definitely  organized  nucleus 
for  a  citizen  army." 

(3)  An  adequate  law  governing  the  raising  of  a  IsTational 
Volunteer  force  in  time  of  war.^^^ 

(4)  The  creation  of  a  Council  of  National  Defense. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  413 

1912] 

(5)  The  maintenance  of  the  Military  Academy  at  its  full  ca- 
pacity in  the  number  of  cadets  allowed  by  law. 

(6)  An  increase  in  the  supply  of  field  artillery  material. 
Secretary  Stimson  emphasized  the  fact  that  ''  Such  material 

can  not  he  extemporised.  It  requires  rnonths  and  even  years  to 
manufacture  it,  and  in  time  of  war  it  can  not  he  purchased 
ahroad.  The  aiiiount  which  ive  have  heen  permitted  to  accumu- 
late would  not  he  sufficient  for  a  single  engagement  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  engagements  in  either  the  Russo-Japanese  or  the 
p'esent  Balkan  War."  ^^- 

On  March  21,  1912,  the  Washington  Branch  of  the  !N'a- 
tional  Cavalry  and  Artillery  Remount  Association  of  the 
United  States  was  organized  on  the  lines  of  a  similar  body 
tentatively  formed  in  New  York  several  months  previously, 
the  purpose  of  both  being  to  encourage  the  breeding  of  horses 
for  military  purposes.^^^  On  May  28th,  a  "  Sen^ice  Test '-' 
for  officers  was  held  under  the  auspices  of  the  Washington 
Branch,  in  conjunction  with  the  race  meeting  of  the  Wash- 
ington Riding  and  Hunt  Club  at  Benning,  D.  C.  The  dis- 
tance was  about  fifteen  miles.  Starting  from  the  Benning 
race  track,  the  course  was  nine  miles  along  roads,  then  six 
miles  across  country,  with  obstacles  during  the  last  part  — 
the  first  two  being  ditches,  followed  by  a  steep  embankment, 
an  "  in-and-out  "  and  eight  jumps,  the  last  four  in  the  steeple- 
chase course.  There  were  seventeen  entries  and  all  officers, 
including  one  of  the  I^avy,  rode  in  uniform.^ ^^  The  trophy, 
a  handsome  silver  cup,  was  won  by  Major  Henry  T.  Allen, 
Captain  D.  L.  Rockwell  being  second  and  Colonel  St.  John 
Greble  third.  This  Service  Test,  the  first  of  its  kind  ever 
held  in  the  United  States,  excited  an  immense  amount  of  in- 
terest, and  the  movement  thus  inaugurated  bore  fruit  almost 
immediately,  since  the  War  Department  prescribed  in  Gen- 
eral Orders,  l^o.  19,  issued  on  June  24,  1912,  that 

"  Commanders  of  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery  detachments  or 
regiments  at  all  posts  and  stations  where  such  mounted  troops 
are  serving  will  annually  (this  calendar  year  included)  conduct 
the  officers  of  their  command  over  a  course  three  miles  in  length, 


414     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1912-1913 

and  over  rolling  country  when  practicable,  with  an  average  of 
three  obstacles  to  the  mile  uniformly  distributed  throughout  the 
course  within  a  period  of  11  minutes.  The  six  over-ground  ob- 
stacles will  consist  of  fences,  logs,  brush,  and  stone  walls  not  less 
than  three  feet  high  and  of  such  stiffness  that  they  will  not  brealj: 
when  struck  by  the  horses'  feet.  The  three  ditches  will  be  six 
feet  wide  and  two  and  one-half  deep.  Post  commanders  will 
fix  the  date  of  this  ride  and  the  commanders  of  detachments  or 
regiments  will  make  report  thereof  through  channels  to  The 
Adjutant  General  of  the  Army.  Officers  failing  to  finish  within 
15  seconds  of  the  prescribed  time  will  be  mentioned  by  name  in 
the  reports."  ^^^ 

A  further  outcome  of  this  Service  Test  was  a  second  test  held 
at  Middleburg,  Virginia,  on  November  16,  1912,  and  opened 
to  civilians  as  well  as  officers.^ ^^ 

On  April  3,  1912,  at  a  meeting  called  by  the  author  and 
held  at  his  house  in  Washington,  the  Army  League  of  the 
United  States  was  founded  for  the  purpose  of  making  known 
to  the  public  the  exact  condition  of  the  land  forces  of  the 
United  States,  and  of  awakening  interest  and  co-operation 
in  all  matters  tending  to  aid,  improve  or  develop  their  effi- 
ciency. 

MILITAEY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1913 

The  important  military  legislation  enacted  during  the 
third  session  of  the  Sixty-second  Congress  was  confined,  with 
the  exception  of  three  measures,  to  the  various  appropriation 
acts.  The  allotments  made  by  the  Act  of  February  13,  1913, 
for  fortifications  in  the  United  States  and  insular  posses- 
sions ^^^  are  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  absence  of  any  appro- 
priation for  the  defences  of  Chesapeake  Bay  and  Guanta- 
namo,  and  for  the  parsimonious  sums  assigned  for  the  in- 
stallation of  searchlights,  fire-control  and  other  most  impor- 
tant auxiliaries.  The  bill  carrying  appropriations  for  the 
support  of  the  Army  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30, 
1914,  approved  March  2nd,^^^  contained  a  number  of  impor- 
tant provisions  which  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  415 

1913] 

(1)  An  assignment  of  a  small  amount  of  money  for  the  vari- 
ous service  schools,  including  the  new  School  of  Fire  for  Field 
Artillery  at  Fort  Sill,  Oklahoma. 

(3)  An  appropriation  of  $125,000  "for  the  purchase,  main- 
tenance, operation  and  repair  of  airships  and  other  aerial  ma- 
chines/^ 

(3)  An  increase  of  35  per  cent,  in  pay  and  allowances  to 
officers  detailed  to  aviation  duty,  with  the  provisos  that  they 
shall  be  "  actual  flyers  of  heavier  than  air  craft " ;  that  not  more 
than  thirty  officers  shall  be  assigned  to  the  aviation  service;  and 
that  the  Act  of  February  2,  1901,  "  shall  not  limit  the  tour  of 
detail  to  aviation  duty  of  officers  below  the  grade  of  lieutenant 
colonel." 

(4)  "  That  hereafter,  in  determining  the  eligibility,  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  August  twenty- 
fourth,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve,  of  troop,  battery,  or  com- 
pany officers  for  detail  as  officers  of  the  various  staff  corps  and 
departments  of  the  Army,  except  the  General  Staff  Corps,  service 
actually  performed  by  any  such  officer  with  troops  prior  to 
December  fifteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve,  as  regimental, 
battalion,  or  squadron  staff  officer,  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
been  duty  with  a  battery,  company,  or  troop :  Provided  furtlier, 
That  regimental,  battalion,  and  squadron  quartermasters  and 
commissaries  shall  hereafter  be  required  to  perform  the  duties  of 
officers  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  including  the  receipting  for 
any  money  or  property  pertaining  to  said  corps,  when  no  officer 
of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  is  present  for  such  duties,  and 
nothing  contained  in  the  Army  appropriation  Act  approved 
August  twenty-fourth,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve,  shall  here- 
after be  held  or  construed  so  as  to  prevent  competent  authority 
from  requiring  any  officers  of  the  Army  to  act  temporarily  as 
quartermasters  wherever  there  shall  be  no  officers  of  the  Quar- 
termaster Corps  and  no  regimental,  battalion,  or  squadron  quar- 
termasters or  commissaries  present  for  such  duty." 

(5)  The  number  of  majors  in  the  Judge  Advocate  General's 
department  was  fixed  at  seven. 

(6)  $350,000  were  appropriated  for  the  organized  militia  for 
joint  encampments  and  manoeuvres,  of  which  $50,000  were  to  be 
expended  for  land  "  for  a  suitable  range  for  Field  Artillery 
target  practice." 

(7)  $185,000  were  allotted  for  the  equipment  of  the  Coast 
Artillery  armories  of  the  organized  militia  with  "  dummy  guns 


416     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

and  mortars,  mounts  for  dummy  guns  and  mortars,  dummy 
ammunition,  loading  appliances,  range  and  position  finding 
equipment,  aiming  and  laying  devices,  subcaliber  tibes  and 
mountings,^'  etc. 

(8)  $325,240  were  appropriated  for  horses  for  the  cavalry, 
artillery,  engineers,  etc.,  with  the  express  proviso  "  That  no  part 
of  this  appropriation  shall  be  expended  for  polo  ponies  except  for 
West  Point  Military  Academy,  and  such  ponies  shall  not  be  used 
at  any  other  place.^^ 

(9)  $150,000  were  set  apart  "for  the  construction  of  the 
necessary  officers'  quarters  and  other  buildings  required  at  the 
remount  depot,  Front  Eoyal,  Virginia." 

(10)  The  cost  of  construction  for  officers'  quarters,  as  fixed 
by  the  Sundry  Civil  Act  of  June  25,  1910,  was  cut  virtually  in 
half  and  restricted  to  $8,000  for  the  quarters  of  a  general  officer, 
$6,000  for  those  of  a  colonel,  lieutenant-colonel  or  major,  and 
$4,000  for  those  of  a  captain  or  lieutenant. 

(11)  In  the  allotment  made  for  Ordnance  stores  and  ammuni- 
tion, it  was  distinctly  ''Provided,  That  no  part  of  any  sum  in 
this  Act  appropriated  shall  be  expended  in  the  purchase  of  ord- 
nance powder  at  a  price  in  excess  of  53  cents  per  pound  or  for 
small-arms  powder  at  a  price  in  excess  of  65  cents  per  pound." 

(12)  $1,000,000  was  set  apart  for  the  procuring  of  field  artil- 
lery material  for  the  organized  militia ;  and 

(13)  Courts-martial  were  divided  into  three  sorts,  viz:  gen- 
eral, special  and  summary,  and  the  composition,  duties  and 
jurisdiction  of  each  defined. ^^^  The  law  covering  them  is  set 
forth  in  detail  in  footnote  300,  on  pages  712-714. 

On  March  2,  1913,  the  following  measure  Avas  approved: 

"  That  within  the  limits  of  the  appropriation  herein  made,  the 
Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  and  directed  to  collect  or 
copy  and  classify,  with  a  view  to  publication,  the  scattered  mili- 
tary records  of  the  E evolutionary  War,  including  all  troops  act- 
ing under  State  authority,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  is 
hereby  authorized  and  directed  to  collect  or  copy  and  classify, 
with  a  view  to  publication,  the  scattered  naval  records  of  the 
Eevolutionary  War. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  all  such  records  in  the  possession  or  custody  of 
any  official, of  the  Ignited  States  shall  be  transferred,  the  mili- 
tary records  to  the  War  Department  and  the  naval  records  to  the 
Navy  Department. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  411 

1913] 

'^  Sec.  3.  That  there  is  hereby  appropriated  for  the  purposes 
of  this  Act,  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  ap- 
propriated, twenty-five  thousand  dollars  for  the  War  Department 
and  seven  thousand  dollars  for  the  Navy  Department :  Pro- 
vided, That  the  aforesaid  sums  of  money  shall  be  expended,  re- 
spectively, und^r  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  ^Yar  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  that  they  shall  make  to  Congress  each 
year  detailed  statements  showing  how  the  money  herein  appropri- 
ated has  been  expended  and  to  whom:  Provided  further,  That 
no  part  of  the  sum  hereby  appropriated  shall  be  used  in  the 
purchase  of  any  such  records  that  may  be  discovered  either  in  the 
hands  of  private  owners  or  in  public  depositories."  ^^^ 

On  March  4th  the  President  affixed  his  signature  to  four 
bills  containing  provisions  in  respect  to  the  military  ser- 
vice,^^^  but  the  only  ones  deserving  of  notice  here  were  the 
Agricultural  Appropriation  act,  which  carried  with  it  an  al- 
lotment of  $100,000  to  be  devoted  in  part  to  '^  the  breeding 
of  horses  for  military  purposes,''  and  the  appropriation  for 
the  Military  Academv  for  the  ensuing  fiscal  vear  which  di- 
rected  the  retrial  of  four  cadets  who  had  been  dismissed  from 
the  service. ^^^ 

The  military  legislation  passed  during  the  first  session  of 
the  Sixty-third  Congress  —  which  convened  on  April  7th  and 
adjourned  on  December  1,  1913  — was  embodied  in  the  Sun- 
dry Civil  and  Urgent  Deficiencies  acts  approved  on  June  23 
and  October  22,  1913,  respectively.  Aside  from  the  fact 
that  Congress  had  at  last  awakened  to  the  repeated  warnings 
as  to  the  dearth  of  field  guns,  carriages  and  ammunition  and 
therefore  appropriated  $250,000  "  for  increasing  the 
capacity  of  the  plant  at  the  Eock  Island  Arsenal  for  the  pro- 
duction of  field  artillery  materiel''  it  contains  no  features 
of  special  interest  beyond  the  appropriation  of  $2,506,000 
for  guns  for  the  armament  of  the  Panama  Canal ;  the  authori- 
zation to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  to  equip  those  defences  with 
one  16-inch  gun  and  carriage ;  and  the  sums  allotted  to  replace 
the  military  stores,  supplies  and  equipments  lost  by  the  Na- 
tional Guard  of  Ohio,  and  to  reimburse  the  War  Department 


418     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

for  the  expenditures  made  during  the  year  in  the  work  of 
relief  to  sufferers  from  floods,  tornadoes  and  fires.^*^* 

MILITARY  EVENTS  DURING  1913 

On  June  30,  1913,  the  actual  strength  of  the  Eegailar 
Army  was  4,665  officers  and  75,321  enlisted  men,  a  total  of 
79,986,  which  was  an  increase  of  195  officers  and  a  decrease 
of  2,514  men  over  the  preceding  year,  and,  moreover,  fell 
below  the  maximum  strength  authorized  by  law  to  the  extent 
of  98  officers  and  9,489  men.  Although  the  lower  grades 
of  officers  were  almost  completely  filled  by  the  appointments 
made  betw^een  June  30,  1912,  and  December  11,  1913,  of 
327  second  lieutenants  — 187  from  West  Point,  28  from  the 
ranks  and  112  from  civil  life  —  in  the  higher  grades  the 
pernicious  effect  of  detached  duty  continued  to  make  itself 
felt,  as  162  general  and  staff  officers  — 13.20  per  cent. — 
and  821  line  officers  —  23.88  per  cent. —  were  absent  from 
their  commands.  Out  of  127,827  applicants  for  enlistment, 
only  about  20  per  cent,  were  accepted,  thus  indicating  the 
care  taken  to  maintain  a  high  standard  among  the  men  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  desertions  amounted  to 
4,451,  an  increase  over  the  three  preceding  years. ^^^ 

The  only  military  operations  of  any  consequence  occurred 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Mexican  frontier,  which  continued  to  be 
patrolled  by  some  6,700  troops  throughout  its  extent  of  1,600 
miles  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  Sasabe,  which  is  situated 
30  miles  w^est  of  Nogales,  Arizona.  During  February, 
1913,  the  overthrow  of  the  Madero  government  and  the  acces- 
sion to  power  of  General  Yictoriano  Huerta  was  the  signal 
for  the  inauguration  of  hostilities  against  the  latter  by  the  so- 
called  constitutionalists  led  by  Carranza,  Villa  and  Zepata. 
The  possession  of  the  border  towns  being  coveted  by  both 
factions,  considerable  fighting  took  place  along  the  boundary 
line,  and  many  Mexican  wounded  or  refugees  betook  them- 
selves to  American  territory.  Although  our  troops  con- 
ducted themselves  in  a  most  commendable  manner,  their  task 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  419 

191 33 

was  anything  but  easy,  and  it  soon  became  manifest  that 
nothing  short  of  the  presence  of  a  large  force  would  put  an 
end  to  the  disturbances  on  our  southern  frontier.  On  Feb- 
ruary 21st  and  21th  orders  were  issued  for  the  concentration 
at  Texas  City  and  Galveston  of  the  2nd  Division  under  the 
command  of  Major  General  William  H.  Carter,  amounting 
to  11,450  officers  and  men.  The  transportation  of  this  force 
was  effected  with  greater  precision  and  celerity  than  in  the 
case  of  the  '^  manceuvre  division  ''  of  1911,  and  on  March  3rd 
all  the  troops  had  reached  their  destinations.  This  so-called 
division  —  which  ought  to  have  numbered  22,565  —  did  not 
attain  its  maximum  streng*th  of  517  officers  and  10,770  men 
present  for  duty  until  June  30,  1913  ;  and,  moreover,  220  men 
deserted  and  160  were  discharged  by  sentence  of  court-mar- 
tial or  "  without  honor,"  while  only  940  recruits  were  re- 
ceived between  March  1st  and  June  30th.^^^  As  General 
Carter  himself  stated  ^^^ 

"  The  only  available  source  of  reservists  is  from  men  discharged 
by  expiration  of  service.  Of  the  464  so  discharged  207  reen- 
listed,  leaving  the  maximum  number  of  men  who  could  pass  to 
the  reserve  257  out  of  a  total  of  941  separated  from  the  service 
during  the  period  under  discussion. 

"  The  number  of  deserters  at  large,  together  with  those  ap- 
prehended and  discharged  by  sentence  of  court-martial  or  with- 
out honor  greatly  exceeds  the  number  of  possible  reservists. 
These  are  unpalatable  facts,  and  are  cited  only  that  those  en- 
gaged in  the  problem  of  creating  a  reserve  may  have  the  benefit 
of  the  experience  of  this  Division.^' 

The  British  and  German  military  attaches  personally  as- 
sured the  author  that  they  had  never  seen  a  finer  body  of 
troops,  superior  discipline,  less  intoxication  or  such  perfect 
sanitary  arrangements  in  camps,  but  when  questioned  as  to 
the  subject  of  supply  they  were  discreetly  silent.  The 
truth  was  that  this  alleged  division  was  short  one  full  regi- 
ment of  field  artillery,  not  to  mention  ambulance  companies, 
field  hospitals,  field  signal  company  and  three  companies  of 
engineers.  ^^^     Generally  speaking,  there  existed  no  proper 


420      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

supply  columns  or  ammunition  trains,  no  adequate  trans- 
port, and  the  regiments  were  scarcely  more  than  half  their 
requisite  war  strength.  In  a  word,  these  troops  were  at  no 
time  ready  to  take  the  field  owing  to  a  lack  of  adjuncts  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  active  operations.  The  editor  of  the 
Infantry  Journal  pointed  out  at  the  time  that 

"  If  the  infantry  in  the  2d  Division  now  concentrated  on  the 
southern  frontier  was  needed  for  active  service,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  raise  to  war  strength  the  companies  of  sixty-five  men. 
As  a  result  the  efficiency  of  these  companies  would  be  spoiled  and 
the  division  would  not  be  able  to  move,  but  would  be  compelled 
to  remain  where  it  is  to  train  the  recruits.  On  the  other  hand  if 
these  companies  had  now  one  hundred  men  each,  although  not 
even  then  at  war  strength,  they  would  not  only  be  of  a  strength 
which  would  allow  training  for  war,  but  would  be  strong  enough 
to  allow  the  division  to  move  promptly  and  thus  become  an  ef- 
fective agent  in  a  military  policy."  ^^^ 

At  the  close  of  his  report  General  Carter  made  the  ensu- 
ing obser\^ations :  ^-^^ 

"  The  value  of  the  experience  obtained  by  the  concentration 
of  brigades  and  divisions,  their  tactical  employment  and  their 
administration  and  supply  in  the  field  is  very  great.  The  mo- 
ment we  enter  upon  the  employment  of  the  division  to  the  front, 
in  retreat  or  in  the  attack  or  defense  of  a  position  the  importance 
of  individual  instruction  and  discipline  becomes  evidenf.  The 
ease  with  which  ammunition  can  be  wasted  by  untrained  men 
and  the  difficulty  of  refilling  the  belts  under  fire  become 
at  once  apparent.  .  .  .  Control  of  fire  under  excitement  will 
not  come  by  intuition  but  only  through  persistent  training. 
In  this  connection  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  methods  for  main- 
taining the  supply  of  ammunition  on  the  firing  line  do  not 
seem  to  have  kept  pace  with  our  progress  in  other  matters.'' 

The  attempts  made  in  1911  and  1913  to  assemble  one 
paltry  division  of  Regular  troops  thoroughly  prepared  for 
war  afforded  to  the  world  the  edifying  spectacle  of  a  great 
nation  composed  of  one  hundred  million  people  virtually 
destitute  of  real  military  strength  or  the  means  to  malce  the 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  421 

1913] 

few  soldiers  whom  it  could  muster  efficient  as  a  fighting  force. 

A  camp  ^of  instruction  for  Eegular  Cavalry  was  assem- 
bled at  Winchester,  Va.,  about  July  18th,  and  continued 
until  September  30,  1913.  The  troops  composing  this  camp 
were  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  Eleventh  Cavalry,  and  the  First 
and  Third  Squadrons  of  the  Fifteenth  Cavalry.  Camps  of 
instruction  for  the  Field  Artillery  were  held  during  the 
summer  at  Tobyhanna,  Pa.,  Fort  Riley,  Kansas,  and  Fort 
Sill,  Oklahoma.^1^ 

The  Army  rendered  signal  service  in  the  relief  of  suffer- 
ers from  the  floods  occurring  in  March  in  the  valleys  of  the 
Ohio  and  Mississippi  —  Majors  J.  E.  Xormoyle  and  James 
A.  Logan,  Jr.,  handling  the  situation  with  the  same  skill 
and  success  that  they  had  shown  the  year  before ;  after  the 
tornadoes  which  devastated  Omaha,  Nebraska,  and  Lower 
Peach  Tree,  Alabama,  during  the  spring ;  and  in  fighting 
forest  fires  in  California  during  Julv  and  in  the  Adiron- 
dacks  during  September.^^^ 

Among  the  most  notable  events  of  the  year  from  a  mili- 
tary standpoint  w^as  the  assembling  in  Washington  of  most 
of  the  generals  who  would  be  charged  with  the  execution  of 
the  scheme  for  the  organization  of  the  land  forces  deter- 
mined upon  in  July  and  August,  1912,  to  which  allusion 
has  been  made  on  pages  110-411.  A  series  of  conferences, 
beginning  on  January  13th  and  presided  over  by  Secretary 
Stimson,  discussed  the  plan  in  question  in  all  its  aspects,* 
and  on  February  6,  1913,  by  virtue  of  General  Orders  Xo. 
9,  the  mobile  army  within  the  L^nited  States  was  given  a 
tactical  organization  into  brigades  and  divisions,  and  for 
purposes  of  military  administration  the  territory  of  the 
L'nited  States  and  its  possessions  was  re-organized  into  six 
"geographical  departments,"  four  within  the  country  —  des- 
ignated as  the  Eastern,  Central,  Western  and  Southern  De- 


*  To  the  kindness  of  Secretary  Stimson  the  author  was  indebted  for 
the  honour  of  being  the  only  civilian  invited  to  attend  these  confer- 
ences. 


422     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

partments  —  and  two  in  the  insular  possessions  —  the  Philip- 
pine Department  and  the  Hawaiian  Department. ^^^ 

Second  only  in  importance  to  the  foregoing  was  the  in- 
auguration of  two  camps  for  the  military  instruction  of  col- 
lege undergraduates  of  seventeen  years  of  age  or  over,  who 
were  physically  qualified  and  properly  recommended. 
These  were  established  during  the  month  of  July  at  Gettys- 
burg, Pa.,  and  at  the  Presidio  of  Monterey,  Cal.,  and  lasted 
for  six  weeks,  the  purpose  being 'to  foster  a  patriotic  spirit, 
to  make  known  the  true  military  history  of  the  United 
States  and  its  needs,  and  to  train  young  men,  as  the  report 
of  the  Chief  of  Staff  for  1913  said,^^^ 

"  in  military  maneuvers,  tactics,  care  of  troops,  camp  sanitation, 
and  rifle  practice,  resulting  in  their  better  preparation  to  dis- 
charge their  military  duty  to  their  country  should  it  ever  have 
to  call  upon  them  in  time  of  need,  thereby  saving  the  great  waste 
in  valuable  lives  and  money  which  has  always  occurred  at  the 
beginning  of  previous  wars  due  to  the  ignorance  in  such  matters 
of  the  newly  created  officers  and  men." 

The  instruction  and  military  exercises,  conducted  by  Regular 
officers,  were  restricted  to  the  forenoon,  with  occasional  lec- 
tures during  the  afternoon,  and  the  students  were  required  to 
pay  for  their  transportation  as  well  as  for  their  subsistence 
and  clothing,  the  two  latter  items  averaging  about  $15.  The 
camp  at  Gettysburg  was  attended  by  159  young  men  drawn 
from  63  universities  and  colleges ;  the  camp  at  Monterey  was 
comprised  of  85  students  from  27  educational  institutions. ^^^ 
The  Chief  of  Staff  very  properly  declared  ^-^^  that 

"  The  instruction  given  at  these  camps  has  been  of  the  great- 
est value  to  the  young  men  participating,  and  will  tend  not 
only  to  give  them  some  ideas  of  our  military  situation  and  policy, 
but  it  will  also  tend  to  establish  nuclei  of  information  in  the 
student  bodies  of  the  various  universities  represented." 

The  students  attending  these  camps  "  formed  an  association 


*  The  author  had  an  opportunity  to  see  something  of  the  work  done 
in  the  camp  at  Gettysburg  and  the  honour  of  delivering  an  address  to 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  423 

1913] 

with  the  title  of  "  The  Society  of  the  JSTational  Reserve  Corps 
ioi  the  United  States/'  and  secured  for  their  advisory  com- 
Viittee  such  men  as  the  presidents  of  Harvard,  Yale,  the  Col- 
lege of  the  City  of  INTew  York,  Lehigh,  Michigan,  California, 
Alabama  and  the  Virginia  Military  Institute.^^^ 

Another  important  innovation  was  the  establishment  of  a 
"  School  of  Musketry ''  at  Fort  Sill,  Oklahoma,  by  virtue  of 
War  Department  Bulletin  K'o.  19,  dated  June  9,  1913.  It 
was  created  for  the  purpose  of  giving  "  instruction  in  small- 
arms  firing  "  and  was  to  form  "  part  of  the  command  of  Eort 
Sill."  There  had  formerly  existed  a  similar  institution  at 
Monterey,  California,  but  it  was  merely  extemporized  and 
^vas  never  formally  established  either  by  executive  order  or 
operation  of  law.  The  career  of  the  School  of  Musketry  at 
Fort  Sill  has  been  distinctly  spasmodic,  since  no  regular 
course  could  be  given  owdng  to  the  absence  of  the  necessary 
instructors  with  the  troops  stationed  on  the  Mexican  border. 
It  was,  however,  utilized  during  the  summer  of  1913  for 
joint  Regular  and  militia  training. 

In  February,  1913,  the  aviation  school  at  Augusta, 
Georgia,  was  transferred  to  Texas  City  in  order  to  partici- 
pate in  the  field  operations  of  the  Second  Division  and  to  af- 
ford an  opportunity  to  study  and  perfect  the  employment  of 
the  aeroplane  under  actual  field  conditions.  Tw^o  flights  of 
240  miles  without  a  stop  were  made,  and  the  sketch  maps 
drawn  by  the  reconnoitering  officer  were  quite  complete  in  the 
details  shown.  In  1913  the  fifteen  aeroplanes  constituted 
the  equipment  of  the  Army  aviation  corps,  and  contracts 
were  made  for  six  more,  but  there  were  no  dirigibles  of  any 
sort;  while  the  $125,000  appropriated  by  Congress  for  mili- 
tary aeronautics  was  ludicrously  small  as  compared  with  the 
$7,400,000  spent  during  the  year  by  France,  $5,000,000  by 

them  on  July  26,  1913,  on  the  subject  of  the  unpreparedness  of  the 
United  States  for  war.  He  was  greatly  impressed  with  the  splendid 
types  of  young  men  who  composed  that  camp  and  with  the  zeal  and 
interest  which  they  showed  in  their  work. 


424     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

Germany  and  Russia,  $3,000,000  by  England,  and  indeed 
less  than  the  $400,000  expended  by  Mexico. 

The  introduction  of  scientific  management  in  the  various 
arsenals  effected  considerable  saving  to  the  Government  in 
the  cost  of  production,  as  v^ell  as  inuring  to  the  advantage  of 
the  workmen  in  the  shape  of  increased  pay,  the  bonus  dur- 
ing August,  1913,  at  the  Watertown  Arsenal  amounting  to 
an  average  of  $9  to  $10  per  man.  Indeed,  the  premiums  over 
and  above  the  regular  wages  paid  out  at  that  arsenal  during 
the  seventeen  months  from  January  1,  1912,  to  May  31, 
1913,  were  no  less  than  $22,000.^^^ 

The  policy  of  the  War  Department  to  separate,  insofar  as 
practicable,  general  prisoners  convicted  of  offences  punishable 
by  imprisonment  in  a  penitentiary  from  those  convicted  of 
offences  of  a  purely  military  character  was  promulgated  by 
General  Orders  No.  56  under  date  of  September  17,  1913.^^^ 
On  each  working  day,  which  under  the  former  regime  would 
have  been  given  over  entirely  to  hard  labour,  one-half  of  the 
time  was  to  be  devoted  to  a  special  course  of  rigid  military 
training,  with  the  object  of  making  the  men  efficient  soldiers 
and  expert  in  some  one  feature.  The  prisoners  were  to  be 
enrolled  in  disciplinary  companies  under  the  command  of 
specially  selected  officers,  were  designated  by  name  instead  of 
by  number,  and  were  given  an  appropriate  uniform  in  lieu 
of  the  usual  prison  garb.  The  design  of  this  new  system  — 
which  was  founded  upon  that  employed  in  the  ^'  detention 
barracks  "  of  the  British  army  —  was  that 

^^  such  prisoners  as  are  restored  to  the  colors  will  go  back,  not 
stigmatized  as  men  who  have  worn  stripes  and  numbers  or  as 
convicts  who  have  done  penal  servitude,  but  as  men  who  have 
been  subjected  to  a  special  and  rigid  regimen  of  military  in- 
struction and  training,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  supply  them 
with  new  standards  of  conduct  and  to  enable  them  to  render  ef- 
ficient service  from  the  moment  of  rejoining."  ^^^ 

The  gun  batteries  for  the  home  ports  of  the  United  States 
were  practically  all  installed  with  the  exception  of  those  for 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  425 

1913] 

the  entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay  and  San  Pedro,  California, 
the  latter  of  which  had  recently  been  added  to  the  list  by  the 
National  Coast-Defense  Board.  The  defences  at  Oahu  in 
Hawaii  Avere  likewise  nearly  completed,  and  satisfactory 
progress  was  made  on  the  works  at  the  entrance  to  Manila 
Bay  and  at  El  Fraile  and  Caballo  islands,  as  well  as  in  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone,  but  in  the  case  of  the  last  the  guns  had 
not  yet  been  shipped.  At  Oahu  and  Panama  no  barracks 
for  the  troops  had  been  provided  by  Congress,  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  accordingly  submitted  estimates  involving  ex- 
penditures of  $1,753,600  for  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and 
$1,268,580  for  the  Canal  Zone.32i 

The  strength  of  the  Organized  Militia  numbered,  accord- 
ing to  the  returns  made  during  the  first  five  months  of  1913, 
9,110  ofiicers  and  111,162  enlisted  men,  a  decrease  of  32 
officers  and  1,048  men  over  1912,  caused  in  many  instances 
by  the  elimination,  in  compliance  with  law,  of  organizations 
and  personnel  below  the  moderate  standard  set  by  the  War 
Department.  Officers'  camps  of  instruction  were  held  in 
many  States  and  continued  to  demonstrate  their  value  as  ad- 
juncts to  theoretical  training.  Camps  of  instruction  were 
also  held  by  most  of  the  States,  save  in  the  case  of  the  militia 
cavalry  and  field  artillery  which  participated  in  joint  camps 
for  those  arms  with  the  Regular  troops.  In  a  few  States 
there  were  divisional  or  brigade  camps  or  manoeuvres,  and  in 
a  number  of  cases  —  notably  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  New 
Jersey  and  Massachusetts  —  considerable  attention  was  paid 
to  fire  problems.  The  target  practice  of  the  militia  showed 
but  slight  improvement  during  the  year  —  a  fact  largely  at- 
tributable to  the  mistaken  tendency  of  developing  rifle  teams 
composed  in  the  main  of  commissioned  officers,  instead  of  en- 
couraging the  target  practice  of  the  enlisted  men  in  accord- 
ance with  the  policy  of  the  War  Department.  Although  the 
law  of  March  3,  1911,  had  authorized  an  increase  of  200  in 
the  number  of  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  so  widespread 
and  incessant  was  the  demand  by  the  States  for  inspector-in- 


426     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

structors  that  it  was  impossible  to  comply  with  them,  and 
thus,  once  again,  was  demonstrated  the  detrimental  effect  of 
the  habitual  course  pursued  by  Congress  in  providing  only 
200  officers,  notwithstanding  612  had  been  asked  for  and  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  had  recommended  the 
latter  number  as  necessary  for  the  needs  of  the  service.  The 
excessive  cost  of  the  attendance  of  militia  officers  and  men 
at  garrison  schools,  coupled  with  the  inadequate  results  ob- 
tained, compelled  a  discontinuance  of  this  permission.  A 
system  of  accountability  was  also  introduced  regulating  the 
supplies  in  the  possession  of  the  militia  by  the  demands  for 
them,  and  thus  enabling  the  Federal  Government  to  know  at 
any  moment  the  amount  on  hand  in  each  State.^^^  Secretary 
Garrison  stated  in  his  annual  report  that  ^^^ 

"  Eeluctance  on  the  part  of  many  States  to  provide  sanitary 
organizations  in  their  Organized  Militia  is  regretted.  Properly 
organized  sanitary  units  are  so  important  in  field  service  and  so 
difficult  to  provide  within  the  limited  time  available  after  the 
need  for  their  existence  arrives  that  every  effort  should  be  made 
to  provide,  equip,  and  train  these  organizations  in  time  of  peace. 

"  The  national  importance  of  a  reserve  system  for  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  can  not  be  questioned.  The  minimum  strength  at 
which  militia  organizations  are  maintained  in  time  of  peace  will 
render  necessary  a  great  and  immediate  increase  in  a  national 
emergency,  and  this  fact  demands  the  presence  of  a  system  of  re- 
serves from  which  trained  men  may  be  secured  for  this  increase. 
Without  some  such  system,  not  only  will  such  increase  be  ren- 
dered exceedingly  difficult,  but  even  when  accomplished  the  ef- 
ficiency of  the  organizations  will  have  been  reduced  to  a  minimum 
by  the  introduction  of  an  untrained  element  double  in  number 
the  trained  personnel. 

"  The  cooperation  of  the  governors  of  the  several  States  hav- 
ing been  secured,  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  entire  Or- 
ganized Militia  into  military  divisions  has  been  initiated.  It 
remains  now  for  the  Organized  Militia  to  complete  their  organi- 
zations, both  in  number  and  in  strength,  so  as  to  render  these 
divisions  such  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name. 

"  The  War  Department  has  issued,  during  the  year,  instruc- 
tions calling  for  compliance  with  the  militia  law  in  the  matter 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  427 

1913] 

of  organization.  Proper  organization  as  required  by  law  is  ab- 
solutely necessary  if  the  Organized  Militia  is  to  be  counted  on 
as  a  dependable  military  Federal  asset  in  time  of  national  need, 
and  the  organfzations  existing  as  such  in  name  only  will  be  re- 
quired to  complete  their  component  elements  or  lose  Federal 
recognition  of  their  character  as  such  organizations."  ^^* 

The  Secretary  of  War  recommended 

(1)  That  every  effort  be  made  to  popularize  the  military  serv- 
ice, to  arouse  enthusiasm  in  a  definite  national  military  policy, 
to  spread  military  knowledge  among  the  people  at  large  and  to 
create  a  reserve  force  "  to  the  end  that  there  shall  be  in  all  walks 
of  civil  life  an  increasingly  large  number  of  men  with  sufficient 
military  training  to  make  them  better  prepared  for  the  service 
of  their  country  should  the  call  ever  need  to  be  made." 

(2)  A  continuance  of  the  Students'  Military  Instruction 
camps. 

(3)  A  revision  of  that  part  of  the  Army  Appropriation  Act 
of  August  24,  1912,  which  created  a  reserve  for  the  Eegular 
Army,  the  regulations  for  which  had  been  promulgated  by  Gen- 
eral Orders  Xo.  11,  dated  February  11,  1913,  and  by  General 
Orders  Xo.  26  on  April  15,  1913. 

Apropos  of  this  Army  reserve  Mr.  Garrison  pointed  out  that 
about  21,000  men  had  enlisted  in  the  Eegular  establishment  bcr 
tween  Xovember  1,  1912,  and  August  31,  1913,  of  whom  61  ap- 
plied to  be  furloughed  to  the  reserve  at  the  expiration  of  their 
three  years'  service,  and  that  on  August  31,  1913,  the  reserve 
"  consisted  of  8  men." 

He  stated  that  he  had  interviewed  many  officers  and  men  at 
most  of  the  Army  posts  and  had  discovered  "  that  the  men  were 
dissatisfied  with  the  present  enlistment  contract "  and  that  "  one 
trouble  with  the  present  law  undoubtedly  is  that  it  does  not 
offer  as  great  financial  inducement  to  the  man  who  enlists  so 
as  to  pass  into  the  reserve  as  it  does  to  the  one  who  does  not 
so  enlist,  particularly  during  the  first  six  years  of  his  service." 

(4)  The  necessity  for  legislative  action  in  order  to  maintain 
the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point  at  its  maximum  capacity 
authorized  by  law,  instead  of  having  80  vacancies  such  as  existed 
on  September  1,  1913. 

Mr.  Garrison  asserted  that  '^  This  matter  has  been  repeatedly 
brought  to  the  attention  of  Congress,  but  so  far  without  any 
effective  legislation." 


428     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1913 

(5)  Appropriations  for  more  field  artillery  and  ammunition. 

(6)  Provision  for  sufficient  horses  for  the  cavalry  and  field 
artillery  of  the  organized  militia. 

(7)  An  increase  in  the  number  of  Eegular  officers  in  order  to 
supply  the  demands  of  the  States  for  inspector-instructors  for 
their  militia.^^^ 

On  May  26,  1913,  The  ^^ational  Remount  Association  ^^e 
held  a  second  "  Army  Service  Test "  for  officers  at  Benning, 
D.  C,  under  conditions  somewhat  more  severe  than  those  in 
1912.     The  cup  was  won  by  Lieutenant  St.  John  Greble. 

In  the  autumn  occurred  two  distinctly  important  events 
so  far  as  the  Organized  Militia  was  concerned.  They  were 
thus  described  in  the  report  of  the  chief  of  the  Division  of 
Militia  Affairs  for  1914:^27 

"  In  October  of  1913  the  annual  convention  of  the  N'ational 
Guard  Association  was  held  at  Chicago,  and  by  invitation  was 
attended  by  the  commissioned  personnel  of  the  Division  of  Militia 
Affairs.  The  principal  subjects  of  discussion  before  this  conven- 
tion were : 

"  A.  The  proposed  militia  pay  bill. 

'^B.  Circular  No.  8,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1913,  gov-, 
erning  the  organization  of  the  Organized  Militia  in  conformity 
with  Eegular  Army  organization. 

"  C.  Circular  No.  2,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1913,  defin- 
ing what  constitutes  field  or  camp  service  for  instruction  in 
the  Organized  Militia. 

"  D.  The  substitution  of  State  for  Federal  personnel  in  the 
Division  of  Militia  Affairs. 

"  In  the  early  proceedings  of  the  convention  many  addresses 
voicing  the  disagreement  of  the  speakers  with  the  Federal  policy 
in  its  relation  to  the  Organized  Militia  were  made  at  length,  and 
in  the  heat  of  argument  several  unwarranted  and  unjust  charges 
against  the  War  Department  were  made.  These  statements 
placed  the  representatives  of  the  War  Department  in  an  embar- 
rassing position. 

"  It  should  not  be  inferred  that  the  militia  officers  attacking 
the  War  Department  represent  the  true  spirit  or  opinion  of  the 
National  Guard,  or  even  of  the  National  Guard  Association,  for 
such,  it  is  believed,  is  not  the  case. 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  429 

1913-1914] 

"  It  is  noted  with  satisfaction  that  this  opposition  to  the  War 
Department  was  lacking  at  the  recent  convention  held  at  Bos- 
ton, Mass.,  September  14,  1914,  in  which  the  delegates  passed 
a  resolution  to  cooperate  with  the  War  Department.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  with  cordial  cooperation  existing  between  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Organized  Militia  and  the  War  Department 
more  satisfactory  results  can  be  obtained  than  in  the  past.'' 

MILITAEY  LEGISLATION  DURING  1914 

The  military  legislation  passed  during  the  second  session  of 
the  Sixty-third  Congress  —  which  convened  on  December  1, 

1913,  and  adjourned  sine  die  on  October  24,  1914  —  was 
somewhat  voluminous  and  in  part  distinctly  important.  The 
appropriations  for  urgent  deficiencies,  approved  on  April  6, 

1914,  contained  nothing  out  of  the  ordinary  in  respect  to  the 
military  establishment,  although  it  allotted  $55,000  for  sub- 
marine-mine structures  and  $194,350  '^  for  the  construction 
of  field  fortifications  "  for  the  Panama  Canal  ^^^ —  both 
items  scarcely  what  might  be  termed  generous.  The  usual 
annual  appropriations  for  the  Military  Academy  ^^^  were  ap- 
proved on  April  15th  and  were  followed  by  one  of  the  most 
important  legislative  enactments  in  our  military  history,  in 
which  the  reiterated  recommendations  of  several  Secretaries 
of  War  were  at  last  embodied  into  law  after  the  measure 
had  undergone  considerable  vicissitudes. ^^^  It  was  entitled 
"  An  Act  To  provide  for  raising  the  volunteer  forces  of  the 
United  States  in  time  of  actual  or  threatened  w^ar/'  was  ap- 
proved by  the  President  on  April  25,  1914,^^^  and  is  so  ex- 
tremely important  as  to  w^arrant  its  insertion  here  in  full, 
notwithstanding  its  length.     It  ran  as  follows : 

''  Be  it  enacted  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the 
land  forces  of  the  United  States  shall  consist  of  the  Regular 
Army,  the  organized  land  militia  while  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  and  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may  au- 
thorize. ■ 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be  raised,  organized, 
and  maintained,  as  in  this  Act  provided,  only  during  the  exist- 


430     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

ence  of  war,  or  while  war  is  imminent,  and  only  after  Congress 
shall  have  authorized  the  President  to  raise  such  a  force :  Pro- 
vided, That  the  term  of  enlistment  in  the  volunteer  forces  shall 
be  the  same  as  that  for  the  Eegular  Army,  exclusive  of  reserve 
periods,  and  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  composing  such  vol- 
unteer forces  shall  be  mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United 
States  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  President  shall  have  is- 
sued a  proclamation  announcing  the  termination  of  the  war  or  the 
passing  of  the  imminence  thereof. 

"Sec.  3.  That  when  volunteer  forces  are  to  be  raised  the 
President  shall  issue  his  proclamation,  stating  the  number  of 
men  desired  for  each  arm,  corps,  and  department,  within  such 
limits  as  may  be  fixed  by  law,  and  he  shall  prescribe  such  rules 
and  regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Act,  as 
may  be  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  examining,  organizing,  and 
receiving  into  the  service  the  men  called  for :  Provided,  That 
the  power  to  organize  volunteer  forces  shall  include  the  power 
to  provide,  within  such  limits  as  are  or  may  be  prescribed  by 
law,  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  all  grades  and  classes,  and 
the  trained  nurses,  male  and  female,  that  may  be  necessary  in 
the  various  arms,  corps,  and  departments :  Provided  further, 
That  when  three-fourths  of  the  prescribed  minimum  enlisted 
strength  of  any  company,  troop,  or  battery,  or  when  three- 
fourths  of  the  prescribed  minimum  enlisted  strength  of  each 
company,  troop,  or  batter}^  comprised  in  any  battalion  or  regi- 
ment of  the  organized  land  militia  of  any  State,  Territory,  or 
the  District  of  Columbia,  organized  as  prescribed  by  law  and 
War  Department  regulations,  shall  volunteer  and  be  accepted 
for  service  in  the  Volunteer  Army  as  such  company,  troop,  bat- 
tery, battalion  or  regiment,  such  organization  may  be  received 
into  the  volunteer  forces  in  advance  of  other  organizations  of  the 
same  arm  or  class  from  the  same  State,  Territory,  or  District, 
and  the  officers  in  the  organized  land  militia  service  with  such 
organization  may  then,  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  law,  be 
appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  as  officers  of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Vol- 
unteer Army  and  be  assigned  to  the  same  grades  in  the  said 
organization  or  elsewhere  as  the  President  may  direct :  Pro- 
vided further.  That  all  enlisted  men  received  into  the  service 
of  the  volunteer  forces  shall,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  taken  from 
the  several  States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia 
in  proportion  to  the  respective  populations  thereof :     Provided 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  431 

1914] 

further,  That  when  the  raising  of  a  volunteer  force  shall  have 
been  authorized  by  Congress,  and  after  the  organized  land  militia 
of  any  arm  or  class  shall  have  been  called  into  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States,  volunteers  of  that  particular  arm 
or  class  may  be  raised  and  accepted  into  said  service  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  this  Act  regardless  of  the  extent  to  which 
other  arms  or  classes  of  said  militia  shall  have  been  called  into 
said  service. 

"  Sec.  4.  That  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be  subject  to  the 
laws,  orders,  and  regulations  governing  the  Eegular  Army  in 
so  far  as  such  laws,  orders,  and  regulations  are  applicable  to 
officers  or  enlisted  men  whose  permanent  retention  in  the  mili- 
tary service,  either  on  the  active  list  or  on  the  retired  list,  is 
not  contemplated  by  existing  law;  and  no  distinction  shall  be 
made  between  the  Eegular  Army,  the  organized  militia  while  in 
the  military  service  of  the  United  States,  and  the  volunteer  forces 
in  respect  to  promotion  or  to  the  conferring  upon  officers  or  en- 
listed men  of  brevet  rank,  medals  of  honor,  certificates  of  merit, 
or  other  rewards  for  distinguished  service,  nor  in  respect  to  the 
eligibility  of  any  officer  of  said  Army,  militia,  or  volunteer  forces 
for  service  upon  any  court-martial,  court  of  inquiry,  or  military 
commission :  Provided,  That  the  organization  of  all  units  of 
the  line  and  of  the  signal  troops  of  the  volunteer  forces  shall 
be  the  same  as  that  prescribed  by  law  and  regulations  for  the 
corresponding  units  of  the  Eegular  Army:  Provided  further, 
That  when  military  conditions  so  require  the  President  may 
organize  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  into  brigades  and 
divisions  and  such  higher  units  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and 
the  composition  of  units  higher  than  the  regiment  shall  be  as 
he  may  prescribe:  Provided  further,  That  to  each  regiment  of 
Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Artillery,  and  to  each  battalion  of  En- 
gineers and  Signal  Corps  troops  organized  under  this  Act,  there 
shall  be  attached  the  same  personnel  of  the  Medical  Department 
as  are  attached  to  like  organizations  of  the  Eegular  Army :  Pro- 
vided further.  That  the  organization  of  the  coast  defenses,  of 
machine-gun  detachments,  establishments  of  the  Medical  De- 
partment, remount  depots,  military  trains,  secret-service  agencies, 
military  prisons,  lines  of  communication,  including  their  supply 
depots,  and  of  other  adjuncts  that  may  be  necessary  in  the  prose- 
cution of  war,  and  the  organization  of  which  is  not  otherwise 
provided  for  by  law,  shall  be  as  the  President  may  from  time 
to  time  direct. 


432     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

"  Sec.  5.  That  except  as  otherwise  provided  herein  the  Presi- 
dent is  authorized,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate,  to  appoint  all  volunteer  officers  required  by  this  Act, 
but  the  number  and  grade  of  such  officers  shall  not  exceed  the 
number  and  grade  of  like  officers  provided  for  a  like  force  of 
the  Regular  Army:  Provided,  That  all  appointments  below  the 
grade  of  brigadier  general  in  the  line  of  the  volunteer  forces  shall 
be  by  commission  in  an  arm  of  the  service  and  not  by  commis- 
sion in  any  particular  regiment;  and  officers  in  each  arm  of  the 
service  shall  be  assigned  to  organizations  of  that  arm,  and  trans- 
ferred from  one  organisation  to  another  in  that  arm,  as  the  in- 
terests of  the  service  may  require,  by  orders  from  the  Secretary 
of  War:  Provided  further,  That  no  officer  above  the  grade  of 
colonel  shall  be  appointed  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act. 

"  Sec.  6.  That  to  provide  the  staff  officers  that  will  be  neces- 
sary in  the  various  staff  corps  and  departments  in  time  of  war 
or  while  war  is  imminent,  and  that  are  not  otherwise  provided 
for  in  this  Act,  the  President  is  authorized  to  appoint,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  such  number  of 
volunteer  staff  officers  of  grades  authorized  by  law  for  the  Regu- 
lar Army  as  he  may  find  necessary  for  such  corps  and  depart- 
ments :  Provided,  That  the  total  number  of  such  staff  officers 
so  appointed,  including  all  such  officers  of  the  organized  militia 
called  into  the  military  service  of  the  United  States,  shall  not 
exceed  the  ratio  of  one  officer  to  two  hundred  enlisted  men  for 
all  militia  and  volunteer  forces  called  into  the  military  service 
of  the  United  States:  Provided  further.  That  the  number  of 
volunteer  staff  officers  appointed  in  any  grade  in  the  various  staff 
corps  and  departments  shall  not  exceed  in  any  staff  corps  or 
department  the  proportionate  strength  of  regular  officers  of  the 
corresponding  grade  as  established  by  law  for  the  corresponding 
staff  corps  or  department  of  the  Regular  Army :  Provided  fur- 
ther, That  the  President  may  appoint,  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  volunteer  chaplains  at  the  rate  of 
one  for  each  regiment  of  Volunteer  Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field 
Artillery,  and  one  for  every  twelve  companies  of  Volunteer 
Coast  Artillery  raised,  with  rank  corresponding  to  that  estab- 
lished by  law  for  chaplains  in  the  Regular  Army. 

"  Sec.  7.  That  in  appointing  the  volunteer  officers  author- 
ized by  this  Act  the  President  may  select  them  from  the  Regular 
Army,  from  those  duly  qualified  and  registered  pursuant  to 
section  twenty-three  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  January 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  433 

1914] 

twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  tliree,  from  the  country  at 
large,  from  the  organized  land  militia  of  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, and,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  various  governors, 
from  the  organized  land  militia  of  the  several  States  and  Ter- 
ritories in  proportion,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  their  respective 
populations,  and  as  far  as  compatible  with  the  interests  of  the 
military  service,  from  the  localities  from  which  the  troops  with 
which  the  officers  appointed  upon  said  recommendation  are  to 
serve  shall  have  been  recruited:  Provided,  That  in  appoint- 
ments from  the  country  at  large  preference  shall  be  given  those 
who  shall  have  had  honorable  service  in  the  Regular  x\rmy,  the 
National  Guard,  or  the  volunteer  forces,  or  who  shall  have  been 
graduated  from  educational  institutions  in  which  military  in- 
struction is  compulsory :  Provided  further,  That  at  the  same 
time,  not  to  exceed  one  Regular  Army  officer  shall  hold  a  volun- 
teer commission  in  any  one  battalion  of  volunteer  engineers  or 
signal  troops,  or  in  any  one  battalion  of  Volunteer  Field  Artil- 
lery; and  not  to  exceed  four  Regular  Army  officers  shall,  at 
the  same  time,  hold  commissions  in  any  one  regiment  of  Vol- 
unteer Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  or  Infantry,  or  in  any  twelve 
companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  including  their  field  and  staff: 
And  provided  further,  That  Regular  Army  officers  appointed  as 
officers  of  Volunteers  under  this  Act  shall  not  thereby  vacate 
their  Regular  Army  commissions  nor  shall  they  be  prejudiced 
in  their  relative  or  lineal  standing  therein  by  reason  of  their 
service  under  their  volunteer  commissions. 

"  Sec.  8.  That  the  temporary  vacancies  created  in  any  grade 
not  above  that  of  colonel  among  the  commissioned  personnel  of 
any  arm,  staff  corps,  or  department  of  the  Regular  Army,  through 
appointments  of  officers  thereof  to  higher  volunteer  rank,  shall 
be  filled  by  temporary  promotions,  according  to  seniority  in  rank 
of  officers  holding  commissions  in  the  next  lower  grade  in  said 
arm,  staff  corps,  or  department;  and  all  temporary  vacancies 
created  in  any  grade  by  temporary  promotions  shall  in  like  man- 
ner be  filled  from,  and  thus  create  temporary  vacancies  in,  the 
next  lower  grade;  and  the  vacancies  that  remain  thereafter  in 
said  arm,  staff  corps,  or  department,  that  can  not  be  filled  by 
temporary  promotions,  as  prescribed  in  this  section,  may  be  filled 
by  the  temporary  appointment  of  officers  of  such  number  and 
grade  or  ^Tades  as  shall  maintain  said  arm,  corps,  or  department 
at  the  full  commissioned  strength  authorized  by  law :  Provided, 
That  in  the  Staff  Corps  and  departments  subject  to  the  pro- 


434     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

visions  of  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  of  the  Act  of 
Congress  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one, 
and  Acts  amendatory  thereof,  temporary  vacancies  that  can  not 
be  filled  by  temporary  promotions,  as  hereinbefore  prescribed, 
shall  be  filled  by  temporary  details  made  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed in  said  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  and  Acts 
amendatory  thereof,  and  the  resulting  temporary  vacancies  in 
the  branches  of  the  Army  from  which  the  details  are  so  made 
shall  be  filled  as  hereinbefore  in  this  section  prescribed :  Pro- 
vided, That  officers  temporarily  promoted  or  appointed  under 
the  terms  of  this  section  shall  be  so  promoted  or  appointed  by 
the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
for  terms  that  shall  not  extend  beyond  the  termination  of  the 
war  or,  if  war  shall  not  occur,  beyond  the  passing  of  the  im- 
minence thereof,  as  defined  by  the  President's  proclamation,  and 
upon  the  expiration  of  said  terms  said  officers  shall  be  discharged 
from  the  positions  held  by  them  under  their  temporary  promo- 
tions or  appointments:  Provided  further,  That  officers  tem- 
porarily promoted  under  the  provisions  of  this  section  shall  not 
vacate  their  permanent  commissions,  nor  shall  they  be  prejudiced 
in  their  lineal  or  relative  standing  in  the  Eegular  Army  under 
permanent  commissions,  by  reason  of  their  services  under  tem- 
porary commissions  authorized  by  this  section. 

"  Sec.  9.  That  all  returns  and  muster  rolls  of  organizations 
of  the  volunteer  forces  and  of  militia  organizations  while  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States  shall  be  rendered  to  The  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army,  and  upon  the  muster  out  of  such  organiza- 
tions the  records  pertaining  to  them  shall  be  transferred  to  and 
filed  in  The  Adjutant  General's  Office.  And  regimental  and  all 
other  medical  officers  serving  with  volunteer  troops,  or  with  mili- 
tia organizations  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  in  the  field  or 
elsewhere,  shall  keep  a  daily  record  of  all  soldiers  reported  sick 
or  wounded,  as  shown  by  the  inorning  calls  or  reports,  and  shall 
deposit  such  reports,  with  other  reports  provided  for  in  this 
section,  in  The  Ajutant  General's  Office,  as  provided  for  herein 
for  other  reports,  returns,  and  muster  rolls. 

"  Sec.  10.  That  in  time  of  war  or  while  war  is  imminent  all 
organizations  of  the  land  forces  in  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  recruited  and  maintained  as  near  their 
prescribed  strength  as  practicable.  For  this  purpose  the  neces- 
sary rendezvous  and  depots  shall  be  established  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  the  enlistment  and  training  of  all  recruits,  and  in 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  435 

1914] 

order  that  officers  may  be  available  for  recruiting  duty  the  Presi- 
dent is  authorized,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate,  to  appoint  officers  of  Volunteers  of  the  proper  arm  of 
the  service,  additional  to  those  elsewhere  herein  authorized,  in 
numbers  not  to  exceed  at  the  rate  of  one  major,  four  captains, 
five  first  lieutenants,  and  five  second  lieutenants  for  each  or- 
ganized regiment  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  or  Infantry,  each 
three  battalions  of  Engineers,  or  each  twelve  companies  of 
Coast  Artillery;  that  for  purposes  of  instruction  and  discipline 
the  troops  at  recruit  depots  herein  authorized  may  be  organized 
into  companies  and  battalions,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  with  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  of  such 
grades  and  numbers  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  President.  The 
recruit  rendezvous  and  recruit  depots  herein  prescribed  shall  be 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  shall  render 
their  reports  and  returns  to  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army : 
Provided,  That  to  maintain  the  organized  land  militia  organiza- 
tions in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States  at  their  maxi- 
mum strength  the  recruiting  rendezvous  and  depots  in  any  State 
or  Territory  may,  at  the  request  of  the  governor  thereof,  enlist 
and  train  recruits  for  the  organized  land  militia  organizations 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States  from  said  State  or  Territory. 
"  Sec.  11.  That  in  the  organization  of  a  recruiting  system, 
after  Congress  shall  have  authorized  the  raising  of  volunteer 
forces,  the  President  is  authorized  to  employ  retired  officers, 
noncommissioned  officers,  and  privates  of  the  Eegular  Army, 
either  with  their  rank  on  the  retired  list  or,  in  the  case  of  en- 
listed men,  with  increased  noncommissioned  rank;  or  he  may, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  appoint  and 
employ  retired  officers  below  the  grade  of  colonel,  with  increased 
volunteer  commissioned  rank  not  to  exceed  in  the  case  of  any 
officer  one  grade  above  that  4ield  by  him  upon  the  retired  list, 
or  retired  enlisted  men  with  volunteer  commissioned  rank  not 
above  the  grade  of  first  lieutenant :  Provided,  That  retired  of- 
ficers and  enlisted  men  while  thus  employed  shall  not  be  eligible 
for  transfer  to  the  field  units,  but  shall  receive  the  full  pay 
and  allowances  of  the  respective  grades  in  which  they  are  serving, 
whether  volunteer  or  regular,  in  lieu  of  their  retired  pay  and 
allowances:  Provided  further.  That  upon  the  termination  of 
the  duty  or,  in  case  of  those  given  volunteer  rank,  upon  muster 
out  as  volunteers  said  retired  officers  and  enlisted  men  shall 
revert  to  their  retired  status. 


436      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

"  Sec.  12.  That,  except  as  otherwise  specifically  prescribed 
by  law,  all  officers  provided  for  in  this  Act  shall  be  subject  to 
such  assignments  of  duty  and  such  transfers  as  the  President 
may  direct :  Provided,  That  medical  officers  of  Volunteers  when 
detailed  as  consulting  surgeons  shall  not  exercise  command  over 
the  hospitals  to  which  they  may  be  assigned  for  duty,  except 
that  by  virtue  of  their  commissions  they  may  command  all  en- 
listed men:  Provided  further,  That  medical  inspectors  shall  be 
detailed  for  duty  with  each  army,  field  army,  or  army  corps,  and 
division,  and  for  the  base  and  lines  of  communications,  and  that 
no  officer  shall  be  detailed  for  duty  as  a  medical  inspector  except 
he  be  experienced  in  military  sanitation. 

"  Sec.  13.  That  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  volunteer 
forces  shall  be  in  all  respects  on  the  same  footing  as  to  pay,  al- 
lowances, and  pensions  as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  correspond- 
ing grades  in  the  Eegular  Army. 

"  Sec.  14.  That  all  laws  and  parts  of  laws  in  conflict  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  be,  and  the  same  are  hereby,  re- 
pealed." 

Rarely,  if  ever,  in  its  history  has  Congress  shown  such  a 
sincere  desire  to  profit  by  the  lessons  of  our  former  wars  and 
to  avoid  the  mistakes  made  in  military  legislation  in  the  past. 
The  law  just  quoted  was  replete  with  excellent  provisions 
which,  had  they  been  in  force  in  April,  1898,  would  have 
prevented  most  of  the  disorders  and  blunders  committed  dur- 
ing the  Spanish-American  War,  including  the  confusion  so 
prevalent  in  many  of  the  large  camps  where  the  medical  of- 
ficers not  infrequently  acted  in  defiance  of  the  commanding 
officers.  The  two  apparent  defects  were  in  reality  wise  pre- 
cautions. The  limitation  of  the  term  of  enlistment  of  vol- 
unteers to  that  of  the  Regular  Army  "  exclusive  of  reserve 
periods  ''  was  founded  upon  the  intent  to  make  both  strictly 
uniform,  leaving  to  subsequent  legislation  to  determine  the 
proper  length  of  service  according  to  circumstances.  The 
interdiction  against  the  appointment  by  the  President  of  any 
volunteer  officer  above  the  grade  of  colonel  was  made  for  the 
express  purpose  of  preventing  a  repetition  of  the  wholesale 
nomination  of  incompetent  generals  such  as  occurred  during 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  437 

1914] 

the  initial  stages  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  as  well  as  to 
insure  that  the  high  commands  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities 
should  be  entrusted  to  Regular  officers  alone.  As  a  rule,  the 
services  of  volunteer  general  officers  are  not  required  when 
volunteers  are  first  called  out,  since,  as  is  obvious,  the  pre- 
liminary instruction  is  almost  wholly  regimental  and  can  be 
more  effectually  superintended  by  a  retired  colonel  of  the 
Regular  Army  than  by  a  newly-appointed  volunteer  Briga- 
dier-General. It  is  only  when  the  regimental  organizations 
have  been  filled  and  sufficiently  instructed  to  be  formed  into 
brigades  and  divisions  that  the  services  of  volunteer  generals 
are  needed. 

The  next  Congressional  measure  of  importance  was  the 
Army  Appropriation  Act  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30, 
1915,  approved  April  27,  1914,^^^  w^hich  contained  the  fol- 
lowing items  of  interest : 

(1)  An  allotment  of  $250,000  for  airships  and  other  aerial 
craft. 

(2)  The  restriction  "  That  hereafter  no  officer  or  enlisted  man 
in  active  service  who  shall  be  absent  from  duty  on  account  of 
disease  resulting  from  his  own  intemperate  use  of  drugs  or  al- 
coholic liquors  or  other  misconduct  shall  receive  pay  for  the 
period  of  such  absence,  the  time  so  absent  and  the  cause  thereof 
to  be  ascertained  under  such  procedure  and  regulations  as  may 
be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War:  Provided  further,  That 
an  enlistment  shall  not  be  regarded  as  complete  until  the  soldier 
shall  have  made  good  any  time  in  excess  of  one  day  lost  by 
unauthorized  absences,  or  on  account  of  disease  resulting  from 
his  own  intemperate  use  of  drugs  or  alcoholic  liquors  or  other 
misconduct,  or  while  in  confinement  awaiting  trial  or  disposition 
of  his  case  if  the  trial  results  in  conviction,  or  while  in  con- 
finement under  sentence:  Provided  further,  That  the  reviewing 
authority  may  suspend  the  execution  of  a  sentence  of  dishonor- 
able discharge  until  the  soldier's  release  from  confinement;  but 
the  order  of  suspension  may  be  vacated  at  any  time  and  the 
execution  of  the  dishonorable  discharge  directed  by  the  officer 
having  general  court-martial  jurisdiction  over  the  command  in 
which  the  soldier  is  held,  or  by  the  Secretary  of  War:  And 
provided  further.  That  the  authorized  enlisted  strength  of  the 


438      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

Army  and  of  organizations  thereof  shall  be  exclusive  of  soldiers 
under  sentences  which  include  confinementand  dishonorable  dis- 
charge." 

(3)  The  proviso  "That  the  enlisted  force  of  the  Quarter- 
master Corps  shall  consist  of  not  to  exceed  fifteen  master  elec- 
tricians, six  hundred  sergeants  (first  class),  nine  hundred  and 
seventy-five  sergeants,  six  hundred  and  twenty-five  corporals, 
two  thousand  five  hundred  privates  (first  class),  one  thousand 
one  hundred  and  ninety  privates,  and  ninety-five  cooks,  all  of 
whom  shall  receive  the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  enlisted  men 
of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  and 
shall  be  assigned  to  such  duties  pertaining  to  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe." 

(4)  Important  modifications  in  respect  to  the  detail  of  line 
officers  contained  in  the  proviso  which  read  as  follows : 

''Provided,  That  hereafter  whenever  the  number  of  officers 
holding  permanent  appointments  in  any  staff  corps  or  staff  de- 
partment of  the  Army,  except  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  shall 
have  been  reduced  below  four  and  a  vacancy  shall  occur  in  an 
office  above  the  grade  of  colonel  in  said  corps  or  department, 
any  officer  of  the  Army  with  rank  above  that  of  major  who  shall 
have  served  creditably  for  not  less  than  four  years  by  detail  in 
said  corps  or  department  under  the  provisions  of  section  twenty- 
six  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  February  second,  nineteen 
hundred  and  one,  shall,  in  addition  to  officers  otherwise  eligible, 
be  eligible  for  appointment  to  fill  said  vacancy :  Provided  fur- 
ther, That  hereafter  whenever  the  President  shall  deem  it  in- 
advisable to  reappoint,  at  the  end  of  a  four-year  term,  any  of- 
ficer who,  under  the  provisions  of  section  twenty-six  of  the  Act 
approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  or  Acts 
amendatory  thereof,  has  been  appointed  for  such  a  term,  in  any 
staff  corps  or  staff  department,  to  an  office  with  rank  above  that 
of  colonel,  but  whose  commission  in  the  lower  grade  held  by  him 
in  said  staff  corps  or  staff  department  at  the  time  of  his  appoint- 
ment under  said  Act  to  an  office  of  higher  grade  has  been  va- 
cated, the  President  may,  by  and  with  jthe  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  appoint  said  officer  to  be  an  officer  of  the  grade 
that  he  would  have  held,  and  to  occupy  the  relative  position  that 
he  would  have  occupied,  in  said  staff  corps  or  staff  department 
if  he  had  not  been  appointed  to  said  office  with  rank  above  that 
of  colonel ;  and  if  under  the  operation  of  this  proviso  the  num- 
ber of  officers  of  any  particular  grade  in  any  staff  corps  or  staff 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  439 

1914] 

department  shall  at  any  time  exceed  the  number  authorized  by 
law  other  than  this  Act,  no  vacancy  occurring  in  said  grade  shall 
be  filled  until  after  the  total  number  of  officers  therein  shall  have 
been  reduced  below  the  number  so  authorized :  And  provided 
further,  That  after  September  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  four- 
teen, in  time  of  peace,  whenever  any  officer  holding  a  permanent 
commission  in  the  line  of  the  Army,  with  rank  of  colonel,  lieu- 
tenant colonel,  or  major,  shall  not  have  been  actually  present 
for  duty  for  at  least  two  years  of  the  last  preceding  six  years 
with  a  command  composed  of  not  less  than  two  troops,  batteries, 
or  companies  of  that  branch  of  the  Army  in  which  he  shall  hold 
said  commission,  such  officer  shall  not  be  detached  nor  permitted 
to  re;main  detached  from  such  command  for  duty  of  any  kind 
except  as  hereinafter  specifically  provided;  and  all  pay  and  al- 
lowances shall  be  forfeited  by  any  superior  for  any  period  dur- 
ing which,  by  his  order  or  his  permission,  or  by  reason. of  his 
failure  or  neglect  to  issue  or  cause  to  be  issued  the  proper  order 
or  instructions  at  the  proper  time,  any  officer  shall  be  detached 
or  permitted  to  remain  detached  in  violation  of  any  of  the  terms 
of  this  Act ;  but  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  held  to  apply  in  the 
case  of  any  officer  for  such  period  as  shall  be  actually  necessary 
for  him,  after  having  been  relieved  from  detached  service,  to 
join  the  organization  or  command  to  which  he  shall  belong  in 
that  branch  in  which  he  shall  hold  a  permanent  commission; 
nor  shall  anything  in  this  .Act  be  held  to  apply  to  the  detach- 
ment or  detail  of  officers  for  duty  in  connection  with  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal  until  after  such  canal  shall  have 
been  formally  opened,  or  in  connection  with  the  Alaska  Eoad 
Commission  or  the  Alaska  Eailroad  or  the  Bureau  of  Insular 
Affairs ;  and  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  prevent  the  redetail  of 
officers  above  the  grade  of  major  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  various 
staff  corps  and  departments  as  provided  for  by  section  twenty- 
six  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  February  second,  nineteen 
hundred  and  one:  Provided  further,  That  whenever  the  service 
record  of  any  field  officer  is  to  be  ascertained  for  the  purposes 
of  this  Act,  all  duty  actually  performed  by  him  during  the  last 
preceding  six  years,  in  a  grade  below  that  of  major,  in  connec- 
tion with  any  statutory  organization  of  that  branch  of  the  Army 
in  which  he  shall  hold  a  permanent  commission,  or  as  a  staff 
officer  in  any  coast-defense  or  coast-artillery  district,  shall  be 
credited  to  him  as  actual  presence  for  duty  with  a  command 
composed   as   hereinbefore  prescribed:     And   'provided  further. 


440     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

That  temporary  duty  of  any  kind  hereafter  performed  with 
United  States  troops  in  the  field  for  a  period  or  periods  the  ag- 
gregate of  which  shall  not  exceed  sixty  days  in  any  one  calendar 
3^ear,  and  duty  hereafter  performed  in  command  of  United  States 
Army  mine  planter  by  an  officer  assigned  to  a  company  from 
which  this  detachment  is  drawn,  and  duty  hereafter  performed 
in  command  of  a  machine-gun  platoon  or  a  machine-gun  unit, 
by  any  officer  who,  before  assignment  to  such  duty,  shall  have 
been  regularly  assigned  to,  and  shall  have  entered  upon  duty 
with,  an  organization  or  a  command  the  detachment  of  certain 
officers  from  which  is  prohibited  by  the  Act  of  Congress  approved 
August  twenty-fourth,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve,  or  by  this 
Act,  shall,  for  the  purposes  of  said  Acts,  hereafter  be  counted  as 
actual  presence  for  duty  with  such  organization  or  command." 
This  lengthy  provision  sought  to  unravel  the  tangle  caused 
by  too  hasty  and  ill-digested  legislation  contained  in  the  law  of 
August  24,  1912. 

(5)  An  appropriation  of  $1,250,000  for  the  participation  of 
the  organized  militia  in  joint  encampments  and  manoeuvres 
with  Regular  troops. 

(6)  Authorization  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  acquire  a  tract 
of  land,  either  near  TuUahoma,  Tennessee,  or  near  Anniston, 
Alabama,  "  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  permanent  maneu- 
ver camp  for  the  troops  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  to 
establish  and  maintain  thereon  camps  of  instruction  for  rifle  and 
artillery  ranges  and  for  the  mobilization  and  assembling  of  troops 
from  such  States  as  may  be  designated  by  the  Secretary  of  War." 

(7)  In  the  allotment  for  horses  for  cavalry,  artillery,  en- 
gineers, etc.,  it  was  specifically  provided  "  That  no  part  of  this 
appropriation  shall  be  expended  for  polo  ponies  except  for  West 
Point  Military  Academy,  and  such  ponies  shall  not  be  used  at 
other  place ;  "  and  "  That  hereafter  no  part  of  this  or  any  other 
appropriation  shall  be  expended  for  defraying  expenses  of  officers, 
enlisted  men,  or  horses  in  attending  or  taking  part  in  horse 
shows  or  horse  races;  but  nothing  in  this  proviso  shall  be  held 
to  apply  to  the  officers,  enlisted  men,  and  horses  of  any  troop, 
battery,  or  company  which  shall,  by  order  or  permission  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States, 
attend  any  horse  show  or  any  State,  county,  or  municipal  fair, 
celebration,  or  exhibition." 

(8)  The  Secretary  of  War  was  "authorized  to  issue,  without 
expense  to  the  United  States,  for  use  in  target  practice.  United 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  441 

1914] 

States  magazine  rifles  and  appendages  therefor  not  of  the  ex- 
isting service  model  and  not  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of 
a  proper  reserve  supply,  together  with  forty  rounds  of  ball 
cartridges  suitable  to  said  arm,  for  each  range  at  which  target 
practice  is  had,  not  to  exceed  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
rounds  per  year  per  man  participating  in  target  practice,  to 
rifle  clubs  organized  under  the  rules  of  the  National  Board  for 
the  Promotion  of  Eifle  Practice  and  to  schools  having  a  uni- 
formed corps  of  cadets  and  carrying  on  military  training,  in 
sufficient  number  for  the  conduct  of  proper  target  practice/^ 

(9)  Appropriations  were  made  of  $2,100,000  for  field  artil- 
lery and  of  $3,000,000  for  ammunition  for  the  organized  militia. 

The  act  of  June  27,  1914,  carrying  appropriations  for 
fortifications,  contained  some  paltry  amounts  for  the  insular 
possessions  and  stipulated  that  no  expenditure  should  be 
made  "  for  powder  other  than  small-arms  powder  at  a  price 
in  excess  of  53  cents  a  pound,"  ^^^  while  the  Agricultural 
Appropriation  act,  approved  June  30th,  set  apart  only 
$30,000  ^'  for  experiments  in  the  breeding  and  maintenance 
of  horses  for  military  purposes."  ^^*  On  July  17th  there 
was  approved  ^'  An  Act  To  permit  sales  by  the  supply  de- 
partments of  the  Army  to  certain  military  schools  and  col^ 
leges,"  ^^^  and  on  the  following  day  there  became  a  law  "  An 
Act  To  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  aviation  service  of  the 
Army,  and  for  other  purposes,"  ^^^  the  opening  section  of 
which  provided 

"  That  there  shall  hereafter  be,  and  there  is  hereby  created, 
an  aviation  section,  which  shall  be  a  part  of  the  Signal  Corps 
of  the  Army,  and  which  shall  be,  and  is  hereby,  charged  with 
the  duty  of  operating  or  supervising  the  operation  of  all  military 
air  craft,  including  balloons  and  aeroplanes,  all  appliances  per- 
taining to  said  craft,  and  signaling  apparatus  of  any  kind  when 
installed  on  said  craft;  also  with  the  duty  of  training  officers 
and  enlisted  men  in  matters  pertaining  to  military  aviation." 

The  remaining  part  of  this  law  may  thus  be  summarized : 

Section  2.  (a)  The  aviation  section  shall  consist  of  not  more 
than  60  officers  and  260  enlisted  men,  apart  from 
those  assigned  from  the  Signal  Corps,  and  the 


442     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

said  corps  shall  be  augmented  by  those  in  the 
aviation  section. 

(b)  The  tour  of  service  for  line  officers  below  the 
rank  of  captain  shall  be  four  years;  the  proviso 
of  the  law  of  February  2,  1901,  respecting  de- 
tails shall  apply  to  them;  and  proficient  avia- 
tors may  be  re-detailed. 

(c)  Aviation  students  sufficient  in  number  to  main- 
I  tain  the  section  at  full  strength.  Such  avia- 
tion students  "  shall  be  selected  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  chief  signal  officer  from 
among  unmarried  lieutenants  of  the  line  of  the 
Army  not  over  thirty  years  of  age  "  for  duty 
not  to  exceed  one  year,  and  if  proved  inefficient 
they  are  not  to  be  re-assigned. 

(d)  It  was  expressly  ''Provided,  that  no  person,  ex- 
cept in  time  of  war,  shall  be  assigned  or  de- 
tailed against  his  will  to  duty  as  an  aviation 
student  or  aviation  officer." 

Section  3.  (a)  Aviation  officers  were  to  be  divided  into  two 
classes,  viz:  junior  military  aviators  and  mili- 
tary aviators;  and  the  Secretary  of  AYar  was 
empowered  within  60  days  to  rate  as  junior 
military  aviators  officers  below  rank  of  captain 
who  have  shown  special  qualifications. 

(b)  Each  aviation  student  while  on  active  duty  was 
to  receive  "  an  increase  of  25  per  centum  in  the 
pay  of  his  grade  and  length  of  service  under  his 
line  commission." 

(c)  Each  duly  qualified  junior  military  aviator  was 
to  have  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances  of  one 
grade  higher,  provided  it  was  not  higher  than 
that  of  first  lieutenant.  "  While  on  duty,  re- 
quiring him  to  participate  regularly  and  fre- 
quently in  aerial  flights,  he  shall  receive  in 
addition  an  increase  of  50  per  centum." 

(d)  Xot  more  than  fifteen  officers  shall  at  any  time 
be  rated  as  military  aviators. 

(e)  Each  military  aviator  while  so  serving  was  to 
have  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances  of  one  grade 
higher  than  his  own  —  provided  not  higher  than 
first  lieutenant  —  and  to  receive  an  increase  of 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  443 

1914] 

75  per  centum  in  his  pay  while  making  regular 
and  frequent  flights. 

(f)  The  aviation  enlisted  men  were  to  consist  of 
12  master  signal  electricians,  12  first-class  ser- 
geants, 24  sergeants,  78  corporals,  8  cooks,  82 
first-class  privates  and  44  privates. 

(g)  Not  more  than  forty  of  the  above  were  to  be 
rated  as  aviation  mechanicians. 

(h)  Twelve  enlisted  men  shall  be  instructed  in  the 
art  of  flying  at  the  same  time,  and  shall  receive 
an  increase  in  pay  amounting  to  50  per  cent. 

(i)  Examination  and  qualification  certificates  to 
be  issued  by  The  Adjutant-General  were  re- 
quired in  case  of  aviation  officers,  junior  mili- 
tary aviators,  military  aviators  and  aviation 
mechanicians. 

(j)  Except  in  the  case  of  officers  then  on  aviation 
duty  and  rated  as  junior  military  aviators,  no 
person  who  had  not  served  as  an  aviation  student 
for  a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  was  to  be  detailed  for  service  as  an  avia- 
tion officer,  "  and  no  person  shall  receive  the 
rating  of  military  aviator  until  he  shall  have 
served  creditably  for  at  least  three  years  as  an 
aviation  officer  with  the  rating  of  junior  mili- 
tary aviator." 

(k)  An  amount  equal  to  one  year's  pay  was  to  be 
paid  to  the  widow  of  any  officer  or  enlisted  men 
killed  as  a  result  of  an  aviation  accident  not 
arising  from  his  own  misconduct,  or  to  any 
other  person  designated  by  him  in  writing. 

(1)  Such  payment  was  to  be  in  lieu  of,  and  a  bar 
to,  any  other  allowance  for  death  in  service. 

Those  who  are  interested  in  examining  the  details  of  this 
law  will  find  it  set  forth  in  full  in  footnote  337  on  pages 
715-718.33^ 

The  Deficiencies  Appropriation  Act,  approved  Julv  29, 
1914,  ratified  the  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  trans- 
ferring submarine  mines  to  the  value  of  $17,075.78  from 
the  United  States  to  the  Philippines  for  the  protection  of 


444     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

the  harbours  in  those  islands;  ^^^  and  the  Sundry  Civil  act, 
approved  on  August  1st,  allotted  $1,124,475  "  for  fortifica- 
tions and  the  armament  thereof  for  the  Panama  Canal."  ^^^ 
One  of  the  tv^o  Joint  Resolutions  which  concern  us  was  ap- 
proved on  April  22nd  ^^^  and  recited  that 

"  In  view  of  the  facts  presented  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  in  his  address  delivered  to  the  Congress  in  joint  session 
on  the  twentieth  day  of  April,  nineteen  hundred  and  fourteen, 
with  regard  to  certain  affronts  and  indignities  committed  against 
the  United  States  in  Mexico:     Be  it 

''  Resolved  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled.  That  the  Presi- 
dent is  justified  in  the  employment  of  the  armed  force  of  the 
United  States  to  enforce  his  demand  for  unequivocal  amends  for 
certain  affronts  and  indignities  committed  against  the  United 
States. 

''  Be  it  further  resolved,  That  the  United  States  disclaims  any 
hostility  to  the  Mexican  people  or  any  purpose  to  make  war  upon 
Mexico." 

In  contrast  to  this  ridiculous  document  —  which,  by  failing 
to  set  forth  the  facts  justifying  the  employment  of  armed 
force,  placed  the  United  States  in  a  distinctly  unfavourable 
light  in  its  subsequent  action  —  was  the  joint  resolution  ap- 
proved on  August  5,  1914,^^^  which  appropriated  $2,500,000 
to  bring  home  the  Americans  stranded  in  Europe  as  a  result 
of  the  outbreak  of  war  on  the  continent,  and  which  provided 
that 

"  In  the  execution  of  the  provisions  hereof  the  President  is  au- 
thorized to  employ  any  officers,  employees,  and  vessels  of  the 
United  States  and  use  any  supplies  of  the  ISTaval  and  Military 
Establishments  and  to  charter  and  employ  any  vessels  that  may 
be  required." 

MILITAKY  EVENTS  DURING  1914 

According  to  the  latest  returns  made  in  1914  the  actual 
strength  of  the  Regular  Army  was  4,572  officers  and  88,444 
enlisted  men.  It  was  noteworthy  during  the  fiscal  year, 
as  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  pointed  out,^^^ 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  445 

1914] 

*'  That  the  health  of  the  Army  has  been  exceptionally  good. 
The  last  year  has  afforded  the  lowest  recorded  noneffective  rate 
in  the  history  of  the  Army;  a  reduction  of  nearly  20  per  cent, 
in  nonefficiency  from  sickness  and  injury  has  resulted.  There 
were  only  four  cases  of  typhoid  fever  in  the  Army,  including 
the  Philippines'  Scouts.  Two  of  these  were  cases  of  recruits 
of  four  and  five  days'  service,  respectively,  who  had  not  been 
immunized.  Venereal  diseases  have  decreased  about  25  per  cent. 
The  rate  for  alcoholism  is  the  lowest  since  1873.  The  health  of 
troops  in  camps  over  a  long  period  of  time  has  been  extraordi- 
narily good  on  account  of  the  high  efficiency  of  camp  sanitation." 

As  the  actual  condition  of  the  land  forces,  both  Eegiilar  and 
Militia,  will  be  dealt  with  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter,  only 
such  events  and  features  as  do  not  fall  within  that  category 
will  be  mentioned  here. 

The  military  operations  in  the  Philippines  during  the  year 
were  confined  to  a  few  encounters  with  hostile  Moros  in  the 
island  of  Jolo,  the  principal  one  occurring  at  Bud  Tandu  on 
March  Ist.^^^     The  thankless  task  of  patrolling  the  Mexican 
frontier  for   1,703  miles  from  Brownsville,   Texas,   to  the 
vicinity  of  San  Diego,  California,  was  performed  by  359  offi- 
cers and  8,260  enlisted  men,  assigned  from  the  Southern  and 
Western  Departments  under  the  command  of  Generals  Bliss 
and  Murray  respectively.     On  April  9,  1914,  the  Mexicans 
seized  and  held  as  prisoners  an  American  paymaster  and  sev- 
eral sailors  who  had  landed  in  a  Navy  launch  at  the  Iturbide 
bridge  at  Tampico.     Bear  Admiral  Mayo,  commanding  the 
squadron  off  that  port,  inmiediately  demanded  their  release 
and  a  salute  of  twenty-one  guns  to  the  American  flag  by  way 
of   apology.     The  prisoners  were  liberated,   but   President 
Huerta  absolutely  refused  to  permit  a  salute  to  be  fired. 
The  affair  precipitated  a  message  to  Congress  delivered  by 
'  President  Wilson  in  person  on  April  20th  and  resulted  in 
the  joint  resolution  mentioned  on  page  444  authorizing  him 
to  employ  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  to  compel 
proper  amends  for  the  affront.     The  entire  Atlantic  fleet 
under  the  command  of  Rear  Admiral  Fletcher  had  mean- 


446     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

while  been  despatched  to  the  east  coast  of  Mexico,  and  on  April 
22nd  that  officer  disembarked  a  force  of  marines  and  sailors 
at  Vera  Cruz  in  order  to  forestall  the  landing  by  the  German 
ship  Kronprinzessin  Cecilie  of  a  large  consignment  of  arms 
destined  for  Huerta.  A  spirited  fight  ensued,  resulting  in 
the  killing  of  four  Americans  and  the  wounding  of  twenty. 
For  several  days  and  until  a  house-to-house  search  had  con- 
fiscated all  arms,  there  was  desultory  fighting  which  further 
increased  the  American  casualties.  As  it  was  manifest  from 
the  start  that  the  Navy  cou.ld  not  cope  with  the  situation 
single-handed,  tentative  orders  were  issued  by  the  War  De- 
partment for  the  5th  Brigade  of  the  2nd  Division  and  its 
re-enforcements  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  proceed  to 
Vera  Cruz.  On  April  23rd,  in  compliance  with  the  Presi- 
dent's directions,  Brigadier  General  Funston  was  instructed 
to  sail  at  once  from  Galveston  with  four  regiments  of  in- 
fantry and  as  much  of  the  cavalry  and  field  artillery  re-en- 
forcements as  could  be  embarked  on  four  Army  transports. 
Next  day  he  started  with  182  officers  and  3,047  men,^**  fol- 
lowed on  the  26th  by  the  first  battalion  of  the  4th  Field  Ar- 
tillery from  Texas  City.  On  the  latter  date  orders  were 
issued  to  him  to  relieve  the  naval  forces  occupying  Vera 
Cruz  and  he  was  informed  that  the  first  brigade  of  the  U.  S. 
Marine  Corps  would  be  placed  under  his  command.  On 
April  28th,  General  Funston  reached  Vera  Cruz,  disem- 
barked, took  over  the  command  of  the  city  at  noon  on  the 
30th,  and  was  shortly  joined  by  the  rest  of  his  troops.^^^ 
Upon  their  arrival  his  force  consisted  of  225  officers  and 
3,832  men,  to  which  were  added  113  officers  and  3,333  men 
from  the  Marines  of  the  fleet,  thus  making  a  total  of  7,503 
officers  and  men.  He  promptly  occupied  the  immediate 
suburbs  of  Vera  Cruz  and  extended  his  lines  so  as  to  include 
El  Tejar,  some  9  miles  distant,  whence  the  supply  of  fresh 
water  for  the  city  was  derived. ^^^ 

The  fall  of  Zacatecas  on  June  24th  robbed  General  Huerta 
of  all  power  of  resistance,  and  on  July  15th  he  and  General 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  447 

1914] 

Blanquet  resigned  and  went  into  exile,  Francisco  Carbajal 
acting  in  his  stead  in  the  interim  between  Huerta's  de- 
parture for  Europe  and  the  surrender  of  the  government  on 
August  12th  to  General  Obregon  as  the  representative  of 
Carranza.  The  peace  which  followed  was  soon  interrupted 
bv  a  revival  of  the  former  rivalry  between  Carranza  and 
Villa,  but  a  convention  of  all  the  revolutionary  chiefs  early 
in  November  proclaimed  General  Gutierrez  as  provisional 
president,  with  the  approval  of  Villa.  Opposition  by  Car- 
ranza led  to  a  renewal  of  hostilities,  but  the  stronghold  of 
Querataro  surrendered  to  Villa  without  a  fight  and  Car- 
ranza's  forces  fell  back  toward  Vera  Cruz.  On  November 
23rd  the  American  forces  were  withdrawn  and  brought  back 
to  Texas,  although  part  of  the  fleet  remained  in  the  port  in 
order  to  protect  American  and  foreign  interests.  Thus 
ended  an  occupation  which,  from  a  military  standpoint,  was 
little  short  of  a  farce  and,  from  the  point  of  view  of  interna- 
tional comity,  wholly  unwarranted.  The  conduct  of  General 
Funston  and  his  troops  was  marked  by  great  tact  in  the  dif- 
ficult position  in  which  they  were  placed,  but  their  situation 
w^as  at  no  time  enviable.  By  the  end  of  the  occupation  the 
enlisted  men  of  his  combined  forces  numbered  only  3,434 
soldiers  and  2,500  marines,  a  total  of  5,934.  A  large  por- 
tion of  his  original  command  had  had  to  be  left  at  Galveston 
in  April  for  want  of  sufficient  transports  to  carry  it  to  Vera 
Cruz.  Certain  elements  which  properly  belonged  to  it  — 
such  as  parts  of  its  field  artillery,  cavalry  and  transportation 
—  could  not  be  sent  with  it ;  ^^^  and,  moreover,  the  four 
infantry  regiments,  which  at  war  strength  should  have  had 
51  officers  and  1,863  enlisted  men  each,  a  total  of  204  officers 
and  7,452  men,  ''  had  approximately  140  officers  and  2,790 
men  " — '^  in  other  words,  only  one-third  as  many  men  as 
they  should  have  had  if  the  regiments  had  been  full."  ^^^ 
Had  circumstances  required  a  prompt  movement  into  the 
interior  directly,  or  indeed  at  any  time,  after  his  arrival  at 
Vera    Cruz,    General   Funston   would   have   found    himself 


448      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

obliged  to  improvise  such  means  as  could  be  obtained  on  the 
spot,  and  the  sequel  might  readily  have  ended  disastrously 
had  the  Mexican  factions  combined  against  him,  as  they 
would  unquestionably  have  done.  For  the  third  time  in 
three  years  was  presented  the  spectacle  of  one  of  the  greatest 
Powers  in  the  world  unable  to  assemble  even  a  paltry  force 
of  Regulars  thoroughly  equipped  for  luar  or  for  such  over- 
seas expeditions  as  the  United  States  may  at  any  moment  be 
called  upon  to  undertake. 

Late  in  April,  1914,  the  disturbances  in  the  coal  regions 
of  Colorado  required  the  sending  of  Regular  troops,  which 
remained  there  throughout  the  year  but  effectually  put  an 
end  to  the  disorders.  Similar  conditions  in  Butte,  Mon- 
tana, early  in  September,  and  in  the  coal  regions  of  Arkansas 
early  in  l^ovember,  necessitated  the  presence  of  Regulars. 
The  dearth  of  troops  within  the  United  States  compelled  a 
withdrawal  of  all  those  formerly  stationed  in  various  national 
parks  which  had  to  be  left  to  the  control  of  the  Interior  De- 
partment.^^^  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  mistaken  idea  has  in- 
sisted upon  the  retention  of  Regular  troops  in  such  places, 
where  they  do  not  belong  and  where  the  duty  is  such  as  is 
properly  performed  by  constabulary  under  the  supervision  of 
the  Interior  Department. 

So  successful  were  the  results  that  attended  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Students'  Military  Instruction  camps  at  Gettys- 
burg and  Monterey  in  1913  that  steps  were  promptly  taken, 
not  only  to  repeat  them,  but  to  add  two  additional  camps  to 
be  held  at  various  periods  during  the  months  of  June,  July 
and  AufiTist.^^^  The  increased  interest  evoked  bv  this 
splendid  movement  may  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that  the  num- 
ber of  students  attending  them  in  1913  was  244,  while  in 
1914  there  were  677,  divided  as  follows : 

Camp  at  Burlington,  Vermont,  July  6th  to  August  7th, 

inclusive    348 

Camp  at  Asheville,  North  Carolina,  same  dates 120 

Camp  at  Ludington,  Michigan,  &ame  dates 114 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  449 

1914] 

Camp  at  Monterey,  California,  June  26tli  to  July  31st, 

inclusive     85  ^^^ 

On  l^ovember  4,  1914,  the  War  Department  announced  that 

four  such  camps  would  be  held  during  the  summer  of  1915, 

viz.:  from  July  5th  to  August  8th,   inclusive,   at   or  near 

Chickamauga  Park,  Georgia,  Plattsburg  Barracks,  New  York, 

and  Ludington,  Michigan;  and  from  June  25th  to  August 

1st,  inclusive,  at  or  near  the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco.^^^ 

The  War  Department  had  contemplated  combined  Regular 
and  Militia  manoeuvres  to  be  held  in  the  vicinity  of  Wash- 
ington and  San  Franciso,  but  the  demand  for  troops  in  Mex- 
ico, on  the  southern  frontier  and  in  various  coal  regions  com- 
pelled their  abandonment,  as  well  as  that  of  a  cavalry  camp 
of  instruction  at  Winchester,  Virginia,  similar  to  that  of 
the  preceding  year.  For  the  same  reason  the  camps  for 
medical  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  and  the 
schools  of  instruction  for  field  artillery  officers  at  Fort  Sill 
and  Fort  Riley  had  to  be  cancelled.  A  joint  camp  of  instruc- 
tion for  field  artillery  was  however  held  at  Tobyhanna,  Penn- 
sylvania, a  number  of  State  encampments  took  place,  and  the 
usual  joint  exercises  for  coast  defence  occurred  in  the  sea- 
board States  during  June,  July,  August  and  September.  ^^^ 

The  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1914,  was  marked  by  great 
activity,  and  better  and  sounder  progress  toward  the  creation 
of  a  really  efficient  field  force  was  undoubtedly  made  than  in 
any  other.  Most  notable  of  all  was  the  introduction  of  a 
divisional  system  to  conform  to  the  plan  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  respect  to  a  correct  tactical  formation  of  the  land 
forces  which  had  been  inaugurated  by  Secretary  Stimson 
early  in  1913  and  which,  as  has  been  remarked,  constituted 
the  greatest  stride  in  the  direction  of  proper  military  or- 
ganization ever  made  in  our  history.  Of  lesser  importance 
only  were  the  simultaneous  meetings  in  January,  1914,  of 
the  l^ational  Militia  Board  and  the  Association  of  Adju- 
tants-General of  the  Organized  Militia,  at  which  various  fea- 
tures relating  to  that  body  were  discussed  and  definite  con- 


450     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

elusions  reached ;  and  it  is  gratifying  to  record  that  most  of 
the  recommendations  of  the  National  Militia  Board  met  with 
the  approval  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  of  the  War 
Department.  It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that  the  action 
of  Congress  in  limiting  to  two  hundred  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  made  by  the  Act  of 
March  3,  1911  —  notwithstanding  that  612  had  been  asked  for 
and  were  imperatively  needed  —  was  manifested  in  the  dearth 
of  officers  who  could  be  assigned  to  duty  with  the  Organised 
Militia  as  inspector-instructors.  As  the  detached-service 
law  had  been  extended  to  include  the  field  officers  and  troops 
on  the  Mexican  border,  the  difficulty  of  finding  the  number 
of  officers  and  enlisted  men  for  whom  "the  State  organiza- 
tions clamoured  and  to  w^hom  they  w^ere  justly  entitled  in 
their  sincere  efforts  to  improve  their  training  was  even 
greater  than  in  the  preceding  year.^^^  Other  features  re- 
lating to  the  condition  of  the  Organized  Militia  will  be 
treated  of  in  detail  in  the  ensuing  chapter. 

On  February  25,  1914,  the  Tables  of  Organization  pre- 
pared by  the  General  Staff  were  approved  and  published  for 
the  information  and  government  of  the  Regular  Army  and 
^National  Guards.  These  tables  were  based  on  the  new  and 
revised  Field  Service  Regulations  issued  on  March  19,  1914, 
and  particularly  notable  for  the  vastly  improved  pro- 
visions in  respect  to  administration  and  supply  which  were 
prepared  in  the  main  by. Major  James  A.  Logan,  Jr.,  who, 
having  spent  two  years  in  the  French  Ecole  de  I'lntendance, 
was  thus  able  to  introduce  many  of  the  features  which  have 
made  the  French  system  the  acknowledged  superior  of  all 
others.  The  introductory  notice  to  the  new  Field  Service 
Regulations,  signed  by  Major  General  Leonard  Wood  as 
Chief  of  Staff,  contains  the  following  important  observations : 

"  Officers  and  men  of  all  ranks  are  given  a  certain  inde- 
pendence in  the  execution  of  the  tasks  to  which  they  are  as- 
signed and  are  expected  to  show  initiative  in  meeting  the  dif- 
ferent   situations    as   they   arise.     Every   individual,    from    the 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  451 

1914] 

highest  commander  to  the  lowest  private,  must  always  remem- 
ber that  inaction  and  neglect  of  opportunities  will  warrant 
more  severe  censure  than  an  error  in  the  choice  of  the  means." 

A  memorable  mission  was  that  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  War,  Henry  S.  Breckinridge,  who  sailed  early  in  August 
in  the  U.  S.  cruiser  Tennessee,  accompanied  by  a  large  staff 
of  officers,  to  carry  aid  to  the  many  thousands  of  Americans 
who  had  been  marooned  in  Europe  by  the  outbreak  of  war 
and  were  experiencing  great  difficulty  in  returning  to  the 
United  States.^  ^^ 

By  virtue  of  War  Department  General  Orders  No.  21, 
dated  December  16,  1914,  instructions  were  given  for  the 
convening  on  the  following  day  at  Washington  of  a  board 
composed  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Major-General 
Leonard  Wood,  commanding  the  Eastern  Department ;  Brig- 
adier General  William  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance;  Briga- 
dier General  E.  IL  Weaver,  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery;  Brig- 
adier General  D.  C.  Kingman,  Chief  of  Engineers,  and 
Captain  Frank  S.  Cocheu,  General  Staff  Corps.  The  instruc- 
tions ran  as  follows: 

"  The  board  is  directed  in  view  of  the  increased  size,  caliber, 
and  offensive  power  of  guns  now  on  or  contemplated  to  be 
placed  on  naval  vessels  and  the  caliber,  mounting,  range,  and 
offensive  power  of  our  coast-defense  guns,  either  now  in  such 
defenses  or  contemplated  to  be  placed  therein,  to  consider 
whether  or  not  we  should  make  any  change  in  our  coast  de- 
fenses and  their  armament;  and  if  so,  what  changes  are  recom- 
mended ?  " 

After  sitting  only  three  days,  so  expeditiously  was  the  busi- 
ness transacted  that  on  December  19,  1914,  the  board  ren- 
dered a  unanimous  report,  which  contained  the  ensuing  im- 
portant findings  and  recommendations: 

"  That  the  old  type  12-inch  guns  and  mortars  are  not  equal 
in  range  and  power  to  the  major-caliber  guns  afloat ; 

"  That  by  such  minor  changes  in  the  carriages  of  the  old 
type  12-inch  gun  at  present  emplaced  as  will  permit  an  eleva- 
tion of  15  degrees,  and  by  the  provision  of  a  certain  proportion 


452     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1914 

of  lighter  projectiles  of  approximately  700  pounds  weight,  an 
eifective  range  of  about  20,000  yards  can  be  given  these  guns; 
that  these  changes  should  be  made; 

"  That  the  great  majority  of  our  14-inch  guns,  with  certain 
slight  changes  which  have  already  been  ordered  and  by  the 
supply  of  a  portion  of  the  projectiles  of  lighter  weight  than  the 
heaviest  now  furnished,  are  suitable  in  power  and  range  to 
meet  any  that  may  now  be  brought  against  them; 

"  That  the  present  emplacements  are,  as  a"  whole,  satisfactory, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  some  of  the  older  magazines, 
which  should  be  more  thoroughly  protected  against  plunging 
fire;  that  this  protection  should  be  furnished. 

"  That  a  policy  should  be  adopted  of  providing,  through  an- 
nual appropriations,  for  such  modernizing  of  fortifications  as 
will  result  in  keeping  pace  with  the  improvement  in  armament 
afloat. 

"  That  in  the  case  of  those  works  where  modernizing  in- 
volves very  extensive  changes  in  emplacements,  gun  carriages, 
etc.,  it  will  be  policy  to  construct  new  works  and  provide  new 
armaments  adequate  for  the  demands  of  the  situation. 

"  That  the  old  works  should  be  held,  when  practicable  and 
desirable,  as  a  secondary  line  of  defense. 

"  That  wherever  it  may  be  necessary  to  construct  new  works, 
especially  at  important  points,  such  as  the  entrances  of  our 
principal  harbors,  naval  bases,  etc.,  the  major-caliber  gun 
should  be  at  least  a  16-inch  45-caliber  gun,  mounted  so  as  to 
have  the  greatest  possible  protection  and  an  all-around  fire 
where  it  may  be  necessary  to  have  such  fire. 

"  That  the  mortars  to  be  installed  in  future  should  be  of  not 
less  than  12-inch  caliber,  with  a  range  of  at  least  21,000  yards. 

"  That  this  weapon  should  be  the  numerically  preponderant 
type  in  our  coast  defenses,  as  it  is  cheap,  has  a  long  life,  can  be 
easily  protected,  is  very  effective  against  ships,  and  can  be  used 
as  a  valuable  adjunct  for  the- land  defense.  It  must  not,  how- 
ever, at  any  important  point  be  adopted  to  the  exclusion  of 
high-power  direct-fire  guns. 

"  The  general  policy  with  reference  to  seacoast  defense  should 
be  to  have  the  armament  there  emplaced  of  greater  range  and 
power  than  any  which  can  be  brought  against  it."  ^^^ 

On  December  1,  1914,  a  meeting  was  held  in  i^ew  York 
for  the  purpose  of  organizing  The  National  Security  League, 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  453 

1914-1915] 

the  object  of  which  was  to  make  known  to  the  people  at 
large  the  lamentable  condition  in  respect  to  the  defenceless- 
ness  of  the  United  States  both  on  land  and  sea.  This  or- 
ganization, which  comprises  some  of  the  most  distinguished 
men  in  the  United  States,  has  already  shown  extraordi- 
nary activity  and  made  its  influence  felt  in  a  widespread 
manner. 

MILITARY  LEGISLATION"  AND  EVENTS  UNTIL 

JUNE  1,  1915 

The  military  legislation  passed  at  the  third  session  of  the 
Sixty-third    Congress  —  which    convened    on    December    1, 

1914,  and  came  to  a  close  on  March  3,  1915  —  fell  within  the 
latter  year  and  embodied  quite  a  number  of  important  fea- 
tures. The  first  measure  deserving  of  particular  attention  ^^^ 
was  "  An  Act  To  regulate  details  of  majors  in  the  Ordnance 
Department,"  which  was  approved  on  February  24,  1915, 
and  provided 

"  That  majors  may  be  detailed  in  the  Ordnance  Department, 
under  section  twenty-six  of  the  Act  approved  February  second, 
nineteen  hundred  and  one^  and  Acts  amendatory  thereof,  with- 
out a  compulsory  period  of  service  out  of  that  department."  ^^® 

The  next,  the  Sundry  Civil  Expenses,  approved  March  3, 

1915,  contained  various  appropriations  under  the  caption 
of  War  Department ;  allotted  $50,000  to  be  expended  "  for 
the  erection  of  a  building  at  the  Watertown  Arsenal  for 
the  installation  of  machinery  to  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of 
projectiles,"  provided  the  Secretary  of  War  deemed  such  a 
step  to  "  be  to  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States " ; 
and  applied  $2,639,048.30  ^^  for  fortifications  and  armament 
thereof  for  the  Panama  Canal."  ^^^  On  the  same  day  was 
approved  the  usual  annual  appropriation  act  for  fortifica- 
tions, which  is  chiefly  notable  for  the  niggardly  sums  set 
apart  for  the  installation  of  search-lights,  fire-control  and  sub- 
marine mines  both  in  the  United  States  and  the  insular 
possessions,  and  the  limitation  of  the  price  to  be  paid  for 


454     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

powder    "  other   than   small-arms   powder "    to    53    cents    a 
pound.^^^ 

On  March  4,  1915,  the  President  affixed  his  signature  to 
seven  bills  which  contained  provisions  relating  to  the  mili- 
tary branch  of  the  service.  The  first,  the  Appropriation  Act 
for  the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial  expenses  of  the 
Government  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1916,  con- 
tained nothing  out  of  the  ordinary,^^^  whereas  the  Army 
Appropriation  Act  covering  the  same  period  ^^^  was  replete 
w4th  important  features  which  were,  in  substance,  as  fol- 
lows: ^^^ 

(1)  An  allotment  of  $15,000  "for  the  actual  and  necessary- 
expenses  of  officers  of  the  Army  on  duty  abroad  for  the  pur- 
pose of  observing  operations  of  armies  of  foreign  States  at  war, 
to  be  paid  upon  certificates  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the 
expenditures  were  necessary  for  obtaining  military  informa- 
tion." 

(2)  An  appropriation  of  $300,000  for  airships  and  other 
aerial  craft  and  for  "  motor-propelled,  passenger-carrying  ve- 
hicles, which  may  be  necessary  for  the  aviation  section,"  with 
the  proviso  "  That  not  more  than  $500  of  the  foregoing  shall  be 
used  for  the  cost  of  special  technical  instruction  of  officers  of 
said  section." 

(3)  Directions  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  appoint  a  commis- 
sion of  three  Army  officers  to  report  on  the  advisability  of  the 
acquisition  by  the  Government  of  land  for  an  aviation  school 
and  training  ground. 

(4)  Authorization  to  the  President  "to  detail  officers  of 
the  Army,  active  or  retired,  for  duty  with  the  Panama-Pacific 
International  Exposition  without  extra  compensation."  ^^* 

(5)  The  proviso,  under  the  heading  Pay  of  Enlisted  Men, 
"  That  hereafter  pay  and  allowances  shall  not  accrue  to  a  sol- 
dier under  sentence  of  dishonorable  discharge,  during  such 
period  as  the  execution  of  the  sentence  of  discharge  may  be 
suspended  under  authority  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved 
April  twenty-seventh,  nineteen  hundred  and  fourteen.  .  .  ." 

(6)  The  stipulation,  under  the  caption  of  Quartermaster 
Corps,  "  That  hereafter  the  Secretary  of  AVar  is  authorized 
to  appoint  such  number  of  quartermaster  sergeants.  Quarter- 
master Corps,  not  to  exceed  the  number  provided  for  by  law,  as 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  455 

1915] 

he  may  deem  necessary  for  the  interest  of  the  service,  said 
quartermaster  sergeants  to  be  selected  from  the  most  competent 
noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Army,  who  shall  have  served 
therein  at  least  five  years,  three  of  such  service  having  been  ren- 
dered as  noncommissioned  officers,  and  whose  character  and  edu- 
cation shall  fit  them  to  take  charge  of  public  property  and  to 
act  as  clerks  and  assistants  to  the  proper  officers  of  the  Army  in 
charge  of  public  property." 

(7)  A  modification  of,  and  an  increase  in,  the  aforesaid  corps 
made  by  the  proviso  "  That  the  enlisted  force  of  the  Quarter- 
master Corps  shall  consist  of  not  to  exceed  fifteen  master  elec- 
tricians, three  hundred  and  eighty  sergeants  (first  class),  one 
thousand  two  hundred  and  forty  sergeants,  six  hundred  corporals, 
two  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty  privates  (first  class), 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  privates,  and  ninety-five  cooks,  all  of 
whom  shall  receive  the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  enlisted  men 
of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  and 
shall  be  assigned  to  such  duties  pertaining  to  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  as  the  Secretary  of  War  ma}"  prescribe." 

(8)  Apropos  of  Eetired  Officers  it  was  ''Provided,  That  here- 
after the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  transfer  to  the  active 
list  of  the  Army  any  officer  under  fifty  years  of  age  and  with 
rank  not  above  that  of  captain  who  may  have  been  transferred 
heretofore  or  who  may  be  transferred  hereafter  for  physical  dis- 
ability from  the  active  to  the  retired  list  of  the  Army  by  the  * 
action  of  any  retiring  board :  Provided,  That  such  officer  shall 
stand  a  satisfactory  medical  and  professional  examination  for 
promotion  as  now  provided  for  by  law:  Provided  further.  That 
the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  within  two  years 
of  the  approval  of  this  Act,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  to  transfer  to  the  active  list  of  the  Army  any 
officer  who  may  have  been  transferred  heretofore  for  physical  dis- 
ability from  the  active  to  the  retired  list  of  the  Army  by  the 
action  of  any  retiring  board :  Provided,  That  such  officer  shall 
be  transferred  to, the  place  on  the  active  list  which  he  would 
have  had  if  he  had  not  been  retired,  and  shall  be  carried  as  an 
additional  number  in  the  grade  to  which  he  may  be  transferred 
or  at  any  time  thereafter  promoted:  Provided  further,  That 
such  officer  shall  stand  a  satisfactory  medical  and  professional 
examination  for  promotion  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary 
of  War:     Provided  further,  That  any  officer  who  may  have  al- 


456      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

ready  been  transferred  from  the  retired  to  the  active  list,  shall 
receive  the  benefits  of  this  Act." 

(9)  Under  the  heading  of  Miscellaneous,  it  was  ''Provided, 
That  hereafter,  at  places  where  there  are  no  public  quarters 
available,  commutation  for  the  authorized  allowance  therefor 
shall  be  paid  to  commissioned  officers,  acting  dental  surgeons, 
veterinarians,  members  of  the  Nurse  Corps,  and  pay  clerks  at 
the  rate  of  $12  per  room  per  month ;  and,  when  specifically  au- 
thorized by  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  enlisted  men  at  the  rate  of 
15  per  month,  or  in  lieu  thereof  he  may,  in  his  discretion, 
rent  quarters  for  the  use  of  said  enlisted  men  when  so  on 
duty. 

'^  Provided  further,  That  hereafter  the  Secretary  of  War  may 
determine  where  and  when  there  are  no  public  quarters  available 
within  the  meaning  of  this  or  any  other  Act." 

(10)  The  status  of  certain  officers  in  one  of  the  colonial  or- 
ganizations was  fixed  by  the  proviso  "  That  the  permanent  cap- 
tains of  the  Porto  Eico  Eegiment  of  Infantry  now  holding  com- 
missions as  such  in  said  regiment  shall  be  recommissioned  as  cap- 
tains of  Infantry  of  the  United  States  Army,  to  take  rank  on 
the  lineal  list  of  officers  of  Infantry  immediately  after  the  junior 
officers  of  the  same  grade  whose  total  commissioned  service  equals 
or  exceeds  theirs :  Provided  further.  That  those  officers  of  the 
Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry,  recommissioned  as  captains  of 
Infantry,  whose  total  commissioned  service  is  less  than  that  of  any 
officer  of  Infantry  of  the  next  lower  grade,  shall  not  advance  on 
the  lineal  list  of  captains  of  Infantry,  nor  on  the  relative  list  of 
officers  of  the  United  States  Army,  until  such  time  as  there  no 
longer  remains  on  the  lineal  list  of  officers  of  Infantry  any 
officer  of  the  next  lower  grade  of  equal  or  greater  length  of  total 
commissioned  service  and  shall  take  rank  in  the  grade  of  captain 
on  the  lineal  list  of  officers  of  Infantry  and  on  the  relative  list 
of  officers  of  the  United  States  Army  immediately  after  the 
juniors  in  rank  of  such  officers  of  Infantry  of  equal  or  greater  total 
commissioned  service:  Provided,  That  for  the  purpose  of  this 
Act  total  commissioned  service  shall  include  commissioned  service 
in  the  Regular  Army,  in  the  Volunteers,  in  the  Porto  Rico  Pro- 
visional Regiment  of  Infantry,  and  in  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment 
of  Infantry,  and  that  the  commissioned  service  of  those  officers 
of  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry  who  were  officers  of  the 
Porto  Rico  Provisional  Regiment  of  Infantry,  shall  be  counted 
as  continuous  and  uninterrupted  between  the  twenty-ninth  day 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  457 

1915] 

of  June,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  and  the  thirty-first  day  of 
December,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight.'^ 

(11)  $200,000  were  appropriated  for  the  care  of  horses  and 
materiel  for  Field  Artillery  of  the  Organized  Militia,  and  it  was 
''  Provided,  That  for  the  purpose  of  this  section  the  total  num- 
ber of  horses  shall  not  exceed  thirty-two  to  any  one  battery  or 
four  to  each  battalion  or  regimental  headquarters,  and  that  such 
horses  shall  be  used  exclusively  for  Field  Artillery  purposes : 
And  provided  further,  That  the  men  to  be  so  compensated,  not 
to  exceed  five  for  each  battery,  shall  be  duly  enlisted  therein  and 
shall  be  detailed  by  the  battery  commander  under  such  regula- 
tions as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe,  and  shall  be  paid 
by  the  United  States  disbursing  officer  in  each  State  provided  for 
in  the  Act  of  January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three, 
entitled,  '  An  Act  to  promote  the  efficiency  of  the  militia,  and 
for  other  purposes,'  as  amended:  And  provided  further.  That 
the  funds  appropriated  by  section  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one, 
Eevised  Statutes,  and  by  the  Act  entitled  '  An  Act  to  promote 
the  efficiency  of  the  militia,  and  for  other  purposes/  approved 
May  twenty-seventh,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  as  amended, 
shall  be  available  for  the  purchase,  under  such  regulations  as 
the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe,  of  horses  conforming  to 
the  Regular  Army  standards,  said  horses  to  remain  the  property 
of  the  United  States  and  to  be  for  the  sole  continuous  use  of  the 
Field  Artillery  of  the  Organized  Militia :  And  provided  fur- 
ther. That  the  Secretary  of  War  may,  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  issue  to  the  Field  Artillery  organizations  hereinbefore 
mentioned  and  without  cost  to  the  State  condemned  Army  horses 
which  are  no  longer  fit  for  service  but  may  still  be  suitable  for 
purposes  of  instruction,  the  same  to  be  sold  as  now  provided  by 
law  when  the  latter  purpose  has  been  served." 

(12)  To  give  authority  of  law  to  the  newly-established  sys- 
tem of  punishment  for  purely  military  offenses  it  was  ''  Provided, 
That  the  United  States  military  prison  at  Fort  Leavenworth, 
Kansas,  shall  hereafter  be  known  as  the  United  States  disci- 
plinary barracks  and  the  branches  of  said  prison  as  branches  of 
such  barracks :  Provided  further,  That  the  authority  now  vested 
in  the  Secretary  of  War  to  give  honorable  restoration  to  duty, 
in  case  the  same  is  merited,  to  general  prisoners  confined  in  the 
United  States  disciplinary  barracks  and  its  branches  shall  be  ex- 
tended so  that  such  restoration  mav  be  given  to  general  pris- 
oners confined  elsewhere,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  be,  and 


458      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  establish  a  system  of  parole  for  pris- 
oners confined  in  said  barracks  and  its  branches,  the  terms  and 
conditions  of  such  parole  to  be  such  as  the  Secretary  of  War 
may  prescribe." 

(13)  In  making  appropriations  for  horses,  the  law  expressly 
stipulated  that  their  number  "  shall  be  limited  to  the  actual 
needs  of  the  mounted  service  "  and  that  no  polo  ponies  were  to 
be  bought  for,  or  used  elsewhere  than  at,  the  Military  Academy. 
Additional  impetus  was  given  to  the  breeding  of  horses  for 
military  purposes  by  providing  "  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is 
authorized  to  expend  $2,110.32,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be 
necessary,  of  the  amount  appropriated  herein,  for  the  completion 
of  the  purchase  of  certain  lands  included  in  the  reservation  of 
the  Front  Eoyal  (Virginia)  Eemount  Depot,  which  was  acquired 
under  authority  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  March  third, 
nineteen  hundred  and  eleven,  namely  tracts  twenty-two,  twenty- 
five,  and  twenty-eight,  aggregating  one  hundred  and  ninety-three 
and  seven-eighths  acres,  more  or  less,  and  for  the  release  of  all 
claims  against  the  United  States  for  the  use  and  occupation 
thereof,  the  said  sum  being  the  amount  necessary  to  complete 
the  purchase  of  the  said  tracts  under  the  proposed  compromise 
of  the  suit  now  pending  for  the  condemnation  of  the  same." 

(14)  Under  the  caption  of  Barracks  and  Qviarters,  Philippine 
Islands,  it  was  ''Provided  further,  That  on  and  after  October 
first,  nineteen  hundred  and  fifteen,  no  officer  or  enlisted  man  of 
the  Army  shall,  except  upon  his  own  request,  be  required  to 
serve  in  a  single  tour  of  duty  for  more  than  two  years  in  the 
Philippine  Islands,  nor  more  than  three  years  in  the  Panama 
Canal  Zone,  except  in  case  of  insurrection  or  of  actual  or  threat- 
ened hostilities:  Provided  further,  That  the  foregoing  pro- 
vision shall  not  apply  to  the  organization  known  as  the  Philippine 
Scouts." 

(15)  $2,090,000  w^ere  appropriated  for  field  artillery  for  the 
organized  militia  and  $2,900,000  for  the  manufacture  of  reserve 
ammunition  for  the  same,  but  with  the  proviso  that  not  more 
than  $100,000  could  be  utilized  for  purchasing. 

(16)  In  spite  of  the  excellent  results  in  the  shape  of  increased 
production  and  diminution  of  cost  obtained  by  the  Ordnance 
Department  through  the  introduction  of  the  "  Taylor  system  "  of 
scientific  management  in  certain  arsenals,  the  opposition  of  the 
Labor  Unions  secured  the  insertion  of  the  following  proviso : 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  459 

1915] 

"That  no  part  of  the  appropriations  made  in  this  bill  shall 
be  available  for  the  salary  or  pay  of  any  officer,  manager,  superin- 
tendent, foreman,  or  other  person  having  charge  of  the  work  of 
any  employee  of  the  United  States  Government  while  making  or 
causing  to  be  made,  with  a  stop  watch  or  other  time-measuring 
device,  a  time  study  of  any  job  of  any  such  employee  between  the 
starting  and  completion  thereof  or  of  the  movements  of  any  such 
employee  while  engaged  upon  such  work;  nor  shall  any  part  of 
the  appropriations  made  in  this  bill  be  available  to  pay  any 
premium  or  bonus  or  cash  reward  to  any  employee  in  addition  to 
his  regular  wages,  except  for  suggestions  resulting  in  improve- 
ments or  economy  in  the  operation  of  any  Government  plant; 
and  no  claim  for  services  performed  by  any  person  while  violat- 
ing this  proviso  shall  be  allowed/' 

(17)  A  meritorious,  although  somewhat  tardy,  rewarding  of 
former  service  was  brought  about  by  the  stipulation 

"  That  the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  ap- 
point, by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  any 
brigadier  general  of  the  Army  on  the  retired  list  who  has  held 
the  rank  and  command  of  major  general  of  Volunteers  and  per- 
formed the  duties  incident  to  that  grade  in  time  of  actual  war- 
fare, and  has  been  honorably  discharged,  and  who  served  with 
credit  in  the  Eegular  or  Volunteer  forces  during  the  Civil  War 
prior  to  April  ninth,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-five,  to  the 
grade  of  major  general  in  the  United  States  Army  and  place  him 
on  the  retired  list  with  the  pay  of  brigadier  general  on  the  re- 
tired list ;  and  any  officer  now  on  the  retired  list  of  the  Army  who 
served  with  credit  for  more  than  two  years  as  a  commissioned 
officer  of  Volunteers  during  the  Civil  War  prior  to  April  ninth, 
eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-five,  and  who  subsequently  served 
with  credit  for  more  than  forty  years  as  a  commissioned  officer  of 
the  Regular  Army,  including  service  in  command  of  troops  in 
five  Indian  campaigns,  the  War  with  Spain,  and  the  Philippine 
insurrection,  and  to  whom  the  Congressional  medal  of  honor 
for  most  distinguished  conduct  in  action  has  been  twice  awarded, 
and  who  has  also  been  brevetted  for  conspicuous  gallantry  in  ac- 
tion, and  place  him  on  the  retired  list  of  the  Army  with  the 
rank  and  retired  pay  of  one  grade  above  that  actually  held  by 
him  at  the  time  of  his  retirement  from  active  service  in  the  Eegu- 
lar Army." 

(18)  After  a  long  period  of  striving  to  improve  the  military 


460     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

laws  of  the  Army,  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  office  succeeded 
in  getting  the  ensuing  law  enacted : 

"Sec.  2.  That  chapter  six,  Title  XIV,  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  amended 
to  read  as  follows : 

"  2.  Persons  sentenced  to  confinement  upon  conviction  by 
courts-martial  or  other  military  tribunals  of  crimes  or  offenses 
which,  under  some  statute  of  the  United  States  or  under  some 
law  of  the  State,  Territory,  District,  or  other  jurisdiction  in 
which  the  crime  or  offense  may  be  committed,  are  punishable  by 
confinement  in  a  penitentiary,  including  persons  sentenced  to 
confinement  upon  conviction  by  courts-martial  or  other  military 
tribunals  of  two  or  more  acts  or  omissions,  any  one  of  which, 
under  the  statute  or  other  law  hereinbefore  mentioned,  consti- 
tutes or  includes  a  crime  or  offense  punishable  by  confinement  in 
a  penitentiary,  may  be  confined  at  hard  labor,  during  the  en- 
tire period  of  confinement  so  adjudged,  in  any  United  States, 
State,  Territorial,  or  District  penitentiary,  or  in  any  other  peni- 
tentiary directly  or  indirectly  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States;  and  all  persons  sentenced  to  confinement  upon 
conviction  by  courts-martial  or  other  military  tribunals  who  are 
not  confined  in  a  penitentiary  may  be  confined  and  detained  in 
the  United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks. 

"  3.  The  government  and  control  of  the  United  States  Dis- 
ciplinary Barracks  and  of  all  offenders  sent  thereto  for  confine- 
ment and  detention  therein  shall  be  vested  in  the  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
who  shall  from  time  to  time  make  such  regulations  respecting  the 
same  as  may  be  deemed  necessary,  and  who  shall  submit  annually 
to  Congress  a  full  statement  of  the  financial  and  other  affairs 
of  said  institution  for  the  preceding  fiscal  year. 

"  4.  The  officers  of  the  United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks 
shall  consist  of  a  comma-ndant  and  such  subordinate  officers  as 
may  be  necessary,  who  shall  be  detailed  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
from  the  commissioned  officers  of  the  Army  at  large.  In  addi- 
tion to  detailing  for  duty  at  said  disciplinary  barracks  such  num- 
ber of  enlisted  men  of  the  Staff  Corps  and  departments  as  he  may 
deem  necessary,  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  assign  a  sufficient 
number  of  enlisted  men  of  the  line  of  the  Army  for  duty  as 
guards  at  said  disciplinary  barracks  and  as  noncommissioned 
officers  of  the  disciplinary  organizations  hereinafter  authorized. 
Said  guards,  and  also  the  enlisted  men  assigned  for  duty  as  non- 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  461 

1915] 

commissioned  officers  of  disciplinary  organizations,  shall  be  de- 
tached from  the  line  of  the  Army,  or  enlisted  for  the  purpose; 
and  said  guards  shall  be  organized  as  infantry,  with  noncom- 
missioned officers,  musicians,  artificers,  and  cooks  of  the  number 
and  grades  allowed  by  law  for  infantry  organizations  of  like 
strength :  Provided,  That  at  least  one  of  said  guards  shall  have 
the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  battalion  sergeant  major. 

^'  5.  The  commandant  of  the  United  States  Disciplinary  Bar- 
racks shall  have  command  thereof  and  charge  and  custody  of  all 
offenders  sent  thereto  for  confinement  and  detention  therein; 
shall  govern  such  offenders  and  cause  them  to  be  employed  at 
such  labor  and  in  such  trades  and  to  perform  such  duties  as 
may  be  deemed  best  for  their  health  and  reformation  and  with  a 
view  to  their  honorable  restoration  to  duty  or  their  reenlist- 
ment  as  hereinafter  authorized;  shall  cause  note  to  be  taken 
and  a  record  to  be  made  of  the  conduct  of  such  offenders;  and 
may  shorten  the  daily  time  of  hard  labor  of  those  who  by  their 
obedience,  honesty,  industry,  and  general  good  conduct  earn  such 
favors  —  all  under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War 
may  from  time  to  time  prescribe. 

^^  6.  The  Secretary  of  War  shall  provide  for  placing  under 
military  training  those  offenders  sent  to  the  United  States  Dis- 
ciplinary Barracks  for  confinement  and  detention  therein  whose 
record  and  conduct  are  such  as  to  warrant  the  belief  that  upon 
the  completion  of  a  course  of  military  training  they  may  be 
worthy  of  an  honorable  restoration  to  duty  or  of  being  per- 
mitted to  reenlist ;  may  provide  for  the  organization  of  of- 
fenders so  placed  under  military  training  into  disciplinary  com- 
panies and  higher  units,  organized  as  infantry,  with  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  except  color  sergeants,  selected  or  appointed  from 
the  enlisted  men  assigned  to  duty  for  that  purpose  pursuant 
to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  four  hereof;  and  may  provide 
for  uniforming,  arming,  and  equipping  such  organizations. 

"  7.  Whenever  he  shall  deem  such  action  merited  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  may  remit  the  unexecuted  portions  of  the  sentences 
of  offenders  sent  to  the  United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks  for 
confinement  and  detention  therein,  and  in  addition  to  such  re- 
mission may  grant  those  who  have  not  been  discharged  from  the 
Army  an  honorable  restoration  to  duty,  and  may  authorize  the 
reenlistment  of  those  who  have  been  discharged  or  upon  their 
written  application  to  that  end  order  their  restoration  to  the 
Army  to  complete  their  respective  terms  of  enlistment,  and  such 


462     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

application  and  order  of  restoration  shall  be  effective  to  revive 
the  enlistment  contract  for  a  period  equal  to  the  one  not  served 
under  said  contract. 

"  8.  The  Secretary  of  War  may,  from  time  to  time,  designate 
any  building  or  structure  or  any  part  thereof  under  the  control 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  pertaining  to  the  military  establish- 
ment as  a  branch  disciplinary  barracks  for  the  confinement  and 
detention  of  offenders  whom  it  is  impracticable  to  send  to  the 
United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kan- 
sas; and  all  branch  disciplinary  barracks  and  all  offenders  sent 
thereto  for  confinement  and  detention  therein  shall  be  subject 
to  the  laws  respecting  the  United  States  Disciplinary  Barracks 
at  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  and  the  offenders  sent  thereto  for 
confinement  and  detention  therein." 

The  act  making  appropriations  for  the  Agriculture  De- 
partment for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1916,  allotted 
only  $25,000  "  for  experiments  in  the  breeding  and  mainte- 
nance of  horses  for  military  purposes,''  ^^^  while  a  similar 
measure  for  the  Military  Academy  ^^^  and  the  Deficiencies 
Appropriation  Act  ^^'^  contained  nothing  worthy  of  particular 
mention. 

The  fifth  measure,  entitled  "  An  Act  To  provide  for  recog- 
nizing the  services  of  certain  officers  of  the  Army,  ^avy,  and 
Public  Health  Service  for  their  services  in  connection  with 
the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal,  to  extend  to  certain 
of  such  officers  the  thanks  of  Congress,  and  for  other  pur- 
poses "368  provided 

"  That  the  thanks  of  Congress  are  hereby  extended  to  the  fol- 
lowing officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States  who, 
as  members  of  the  late  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  have  ren- 
dered distinguished  service  in  constructing  the  Panama  Canal,  to 
wit:  Colonel  George  W.  Goethals,  chairman  and  chief  engineer; 
Brigadier  General  William  C.  Gorgas,  sanitary  expert ;  Colonel 
H.  F.  Hodges,  Lieutenant  Colonel  William  L.  Sibert,  and  Com- 
mander H.  H.  Eousseau. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  advance  in  rank 
Colonel  George  W.  Goethals  to  the  grade  of  major  general  of  the 
line,  United  States  Army;  Brigadier  General  William  C.  Gorgas 


From  1902  to  June  1,  ^915  463 

1915] 

to  the  rank  of  major  general  in  the  Medical  Department,  United 
States  Army;  Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 
William  L.  Sibert  to  the  grade  of  brigadier  general  of  the  line, 
United  States  xA.rmy;  and  Commander  H.  H.  Eousseau  to  the 
grade  of  rear  admiral  of  the  lower  Nine,  United  States  Navy. 

'^  Sec.  3.  That  such  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  as  were 
detailed  for  duty  with,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  on  the 
Isthm.us  of  Panama  for  more  than  three  years,  and  who  shall  not 
have  been  advanced  in  rank  by  any  other  provision  of  this  billj^ 
shall  be  advanced  one  grade  in  rank  upon  retirement :  Provided^ 
That  any  officer  of  the  Army  or  Navy  now  on  the  retired  list 
with  similar  service  shall  be  immediately  advanced  one  grade  in 
rank  on  the  retired  list  of  the  Army  or  Navy. 

*^  Sec.  4.  That  the  President  is  further  authorized,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  appoint  such  officers 
of  the  Public  Health  Service  as  were  detailed  for  duty  with  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  for 
more  than  three  years  to  the  grade  next  above  that  at  present  held 
by  such  officers. 

"  Sec.  5.  That  the  numbers  in  such  grades  provided  for  in 
sections  two  and  four  of  this  Act,  except  where  vacancies  oc- 
curring in  any  grade  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  can  be  filled 
by  such  officers  in  a  lower  grade  as  are  entitled  to  the  benefits  of 
this  Act,  shali  be  teraporarily  increased  during  the  time  such 
offices  may  be  held :  Provided,  That  the  officer  who  may  be  ad- 
vanced and  appointed  major  general  in  the  Medical  Department, 
United  States  Army,  shall  thereupon  become  the  head  of  such 
department,  and  the  operation  of  so  much  of  section  twenty-six 
of  the  Act  of  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  as 
limits  the  term  of  office  of  the  head  of  the  Medical  Department, 
United  States  Army,  shall  be  suspended  during  the  incumbency 
of  the  head  of  the  department  who  may  be  appointed  under  this 
Act :  Provided,  That  whenever  the  head  of  the  Medical  Depart- 
ment appointed  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  become 
separated  from  the  active  list  of  the  Army,  by  retirement  or 
otherwise,  the  extra  office  or  grade  to  which  he  shall  have  been 
so  advanced  or  appointed  shall  cease  and  determine,  and  there- 
after the  rank  of  the  head  of  the  Medical  Department,  United 
States  Army,  shall  be  that  of  a  brigadier  general :  Provided  fur- 
ther, That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  operate  to  interfere  with 
or  retard  the  promotion  to  which  any  officer  would  be  entitled 
under  existing  law :     And  provided  further,  That  the  officers  ad- 


464     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

[1915 

vanced  to  higher  grades  under  this  Act  shall  be  junior  to  the 
officers  who  now  rank  them  under  existing  law  when  these  officers 
have  reached  the  same  grade. 

"  Sec.  6.  That  at  any  time  after  the  passage  of  this  Act  any 
officer  of  the  Army  or  Navy  to  be  benefited  by  the  provisions  of 
this  Act  may,  on  his  own  application,  be  retired  by  the  President 
at  seventy-five  per  centum  of  the  pay  of  the  rank  upon  which  he 
is  retired." 

The  last  was  ^^  An  Act  Authorizing  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  make  certain  donations  of  condemned  cannon  and  cannon 
balls  "  to  a  long  list  of  organizations  and  institutions,  civic 
and  otherwise,  cities,  towns  and  villages,  and  it  wisely 

''  Provided,  That  no  expense  shall  be  incurred  by  the  United 
States  through  the  delivery  of  any  of  the  foregoing  condemned 
military  equipment :  And  provided  further,  That  each  and 
every  article  of  condemned  military  equipment  covered  by  this 
Act  shall  be  subject  at  all  times  to  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.''  ^^^ 

Such  were  the  achievements  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress  at 
its  third  session.  On  the  other  hand,  it  failed  almost  wholly 
to  respond  to  the  growing  demand  of  the  country  for  better 
national  defence,  which  had  been  awakened  by  the  object-les- 
sons given  by  the  gigantic  war  that  had  embroiled  half  of 
the  civilised  world.  A  fair  example  of  its  failure  was  the 
action  of  the  House  of  Representatives  on  January  22,  1915, 
when  the  following  amendments  to  the  Army  Appropriation 
Bill  offered  by  Hon.  Augustus  P.  Gardner  of  Massachusetts 
were  either  defeated  by  an  oveswhelming  vote  or  rejected  on  a 
point  of  order  : 

(1)  An  appropriation  of  $1,300,000  for  the  Aviation  Corps. 

(2)  An  increase  in  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps. 

(3)  An  increase  in  the  allotment  for  small-arms  ammunition 
from  $100,000  to  $30,000,000. 

(4)  An  increase  in  the  appropriation  for  Field  Artillery  from 
$2,090,000  to  $4,000,000. 

(5)  An  increase  of  the  allotment  for  Field  Artillery  ammuni- 
tion from  $2,900,000  to  $5,000,000."'' 


From  1902  to  June  1,  1915  465 

1915] 

And  every  one  of  these  increases  was  imperatively  needed 
hy  the  Army. 

In  addition  to  the  Students'  Military  Instruction  Camps 
already  alluded  to,  steps  are  at  present  being  taken  by  Major 
General  Leonard  Wood,  commanding  the  Department  of  the 
East,  to  establish  a  Military  Instruction  Camp  for  business 
and  professional  men  to  be  held  at  Plattsburg,  'New  York, 
from  August  10  to  September  6,  1915. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE    CONDITION    OE    THE    LAND    EOECES 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AT  THE 
BEGINNING  OF  1915 


OE 


ACCORDING  to  the  latest  statistics  obtainable,  dated 
April  20,  1915,  the  authorized  strength  of  the  Regular 
Army  —  exclusive  of  the  6,000  men  allowed  for  the  Quarter- 
master Corps  and  the  4,012  for  the  Hospital  Corps  —  was 
4,833  officers  and  87,877  enlisted  men,  while  that  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Scouts  was  182  officers  and  5,733  men,  thus  making 
a  total  of  5,015  officers  and  93,610  men.^  The  actual 
strength  on  May  26,  1914,  according  to  the  latest  returns  in 
the  office  of  The  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  was  as  fol- 
lows ;  ^ 


Mobile  Army 

In  the  United  States   

In  Alaska     . 

In  Porto   Rico    

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 

In  Hawaii    , 

In  the    Philippines    

In  China    , 


Total     

Coast  Artillery  Corps 

In  the  United  States 

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 

In  Hawaii    

In  the  Philippines 


Total 


Officers 


1,989 

15 

34 

132 

245 

303 

30 

2,748 

588 
34 
34 
37 

693 


Enlisted 
men 


34,798 
424 
595 

4,458 
7,298 
9,294 
1,195 

58,062 

15,647 

1,038 

952 

1,664 

19,301 


Total 


36,787 
439 
629 
4,590 
7,543 
9,597 
1,225 

60,810 

16,235 

1,072 

986 

1,701 

19,994 


Grand  total 


3,441 


77,363 


80,804 


1  Army  List  and  Directory,  April  20,  1915,  p.  7. 

2  Letter  of  The  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  to  the  author,  dated 
May  26,  1914. 

466 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     467 


Combining  the  movable  and  fixed  troops  according  to  their 
geographical  distribution,  the  forces  of  the  Regular  Army 
were  stationed  thus : 


Officers 


Enlisted 
men 


Total 


In  the  United  States 

In  Alaska    

In  Porto    Rico    

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 

In  Hawaii 

In  the  Philippines 

In  China 


Total 


2,577 

15 

34 

166 

279 

340 

30 

3,441 


50,445 

424 

595 

5,496 

8,250 

10,958 

1,195 

77,363 


53,022 

439 

629 

5,662 

8,529 

11,298 

1,225 

80,804 


The  mobile  troops  are  supposedly  stationed  in  fifty-seven 
posts  scattered  all  over  the  United  States ;  ^  but,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  statement  issued  by  The  Adjutant  General's  office 
on  April  30,  1915,  shows  that  in  all  the  vast  extent  of  terri- 
tory from  Buffalo  and  Fort  Oglethorpe,  Georgia,  on  the  east 
to  Seattle  on  the  west,  and  from  the  Canadian  boundary  on 
the  north  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Mexican  frontier  on  the  south, 
there  were  no  Regular  troops  in  their  permanent  barracks 
except  four  troops  of  cavalry  at  Fort  Sheridan,  Illinois;  four 
troops  and  one  Signal  company  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  one 
troop  at  Fort  Riley,  Kansas;  two  troops  at  Fort  Robison, 
Nebraska;  one  regiment  of  field  artillery  at  Fort  Sill,  Okla- 
homa; four  troops  of  cavalry  at  Fort  Meade,  South  Dakota; 
and  two  troops  at  Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Wyoming. 

For  the  purposes  of  command  the  United  States  and  its 
possessions  are  divided  into  the  following  departments: 

The  Eastern"  Departme^^t,  embracing  the  New  England 
.  States,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  the  District  of  Columbia,  Virginia,  West  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Tennessee, 
Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  the  post  of  Fort  Lo- 
gan H.  Eoots  in  Arkansas,  the  coast  defences  of  New  Orleans 

3  statement  issued  by  The  Adjutant-General's  office,  April  30,  1915. 
A  complete  list  of  all  the  garrisoned  posts  is  given  in  the  Army  List 
and  Directory,  published  every  month. 


468     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

and  Galveston,  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  Porto  Eico  and  the 
islands  and  keys  in  its  vicinity.     Headquarters  at  Governor's 
Island,  N.  Y.  ' 
The   Central   Department,   including   the    States   of    Ohio, 
Michigan,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  North  Da- 
kota,   South    Dakota,    Iowa,    Missouri,    Kansas,    Nebraska, 
Wyoming  (except  the  Yellowstone  Park)  and  the  post  at  Fort 
Missoula,  Montana.     Headquarters  at  Chicago. 
The  Soutpiern  Department,  comprising  the  States  of  Texas, 
Louisiana  and  Arkansas  —  except  the  coast  defenses  of  Galves- 
ton and  New  Orleans  and .  Fort  Logan  H.  Eoots  —  Oklahoma, 
New  Mexico  and  Arizona.     Headquarters  at  Fort  Sam  Hous- 
ton, Texas. 
The  Western  Department,  embracing  the  States  of  Washing- 
ton,   Oregon,    Idaho,    Montana  —  except    Fort    Missoula  — 
Wyoming  —  except      the      Yellowstone      Park  —  California, 
Nevada,  Utah  and  Alaska.     Headquarters  at  San  Francisco. 
The  Hawaiian  Department,  including  the  Hawaiian  Islands 

and  their  dependencies.  Headquarters  at  Honolulu. 
The  Philippine  Department,  comprising  all  the  islands  of 
the  Philippine  archipelago.  Headquarters  at  Manila.* 
With  the  exception  of  the  troops  in  the  overseas  garrisons 
in  the  last  two  departments  and  on  the  Panama  Canal  Zone, 
virtually  all  the  organisations  in  the  United  States  are  main- 
tained on  a  peace  footing  which  is  much  below  war  strength. 
In  other  words, 

Now  has   on   a         Should  have  at 
Peace  footing  War  strength 

A  company  of  infantry  ....  65  150 

A  troop  of  cavalry 71  .       100 

A  battery  of  artillery 133  190 

A  company  of  coast  artillery  lO^t  104 ' 

On  April  20,  1915,  the  Regular  Army  consisted  of  three 
battalions  of  engineers  and  a  detachment  at  West  Point; 
twelve  companies  of  Signal  Corps  troops,  seven  field  hospi- 
tals, eight  ambulance  companies  and  one  evacuation  hospital ; 
fifteen  regiments  of  cavalry ;  six  regiments  of  field  artillery ; 
170  companies  of  coast  artillery;  thirty  regiments  of  infan- 

4  Army  List  and  Directory,  April  20,  1915,  pp.  3-4. 
|5  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  p.  7. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     469 

try  and  the  Porto  Rico  regiment  of  infantry,  as  well  as  the 
Philippine  Scouts.^  On  April  20,  1915,  according  to  the 
statement  issued  by  The  Adjutant-General  there  were  sta- 
tioned, 

In  the  United  States  :  Eight  companies  of  engineers,  7  companies 
of  Signal  Corps  tj*oops,  12  regiments  of  cavalry,  4  regiments 
of  field  artillery,  20  regiments  of  infantry,  composing  the 
Mobile  Army,  and  141  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

In  Porto  Eico:     The  Porto  Rico  regiment  of  infantry. 

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone :  One  company  of  engineers,  3  regi- 
ments of  infantry  and  9  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

In  Alaska :     Two  companies  of  infantry. 

In  Hawaii :  One  company  of  engineers,  1  company  of  Signal 
troops,  1  regiment  of  cavalry,  1  regiment  of  field  artillery, 
3  regiments  of  infantry,  and  9  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

In  the  Philippines :  Two  companies  of  engineers,  2  companies 
of  the  Signal  Corps,  2  regiments  of  cavalry,  1  regiment  of 
field  artillery,  3  regiments  and  1  battalion  of  infantry,  and 
11  companies  of  coast  artillery. 

At  Tientsin,  China :     Two  battalions  of  infantry. 

Notwithstanding  the  small  size  of  the  Regular  forces  in 
continental  United  States,  the  policy  of  the  War  Department 
to  maintain  the  overseas  garrisons  at  full  war  strength  — 
a  very  sound  policy  since  it  will  be  almost  impossible  to  re- 
enforce  them  for  some  time  after  the  outbreak  of  war  and 
then  only  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances  —  must  re- 
quire a  further  reduction  in  them.  As  the  Secretary  of  War 
very  pertinently  pointed  out  in  his  report  for  1914,^ 

"  it  will  be  necessary  in  the  very  near  future  to  take  from  the 
United  States  and  put  into  the  Philippines  13  companies  of 
Coast  Artillery,  1,950  men ;  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  3  regiments 
of  Infantry,  1  battalion  of  Field  Artillery,  and  2  companies  of 
Coast  Artillery,  6,380  men;  and  in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  1 
regiment  of  Infantry,  1  squadron  of  Cavalry,  1  battalion  of  Field 
Artillery,  1  company  of  Engineers,  and  12  companies  of  Coast 
Artillery,  4,774  men.  .  .  .  This  will  leave  in  the  United  States 


6  Army  List  and  Directory,  April  20,  1915,  pp.  15-48. 

7  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  p.  10. 


470     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

proper  12,610  Coast  Artillery  troops  and  24,602  of  the  mobile 
arm,  the  latter  being  then  not  much  more  than  twice  the  size 
of  the  police  force  of  the  city  of  New  York." 

As  the  Coast  Artillery  must  of  necessity  remain  stationary 
in  the  fortifications  which  it  is  their  duty  to  man,  the  only 
force  that  can  be  transferred  from  place  to  place  to  repel 
attacks  by  an  enemy  seeking  to  land  or  penetrate  w^ithin  our 
borders  is  the  Mobile  Army,  which  will  shortly  be  reduced  to 
24,602,  as  Mr.  Garrison  has  stated.     It  is  an  astounding 

PROOF  OF  OUR  UNPREPAREDNESS  AT  THE  PRESENT  MOMENT 
THAT  SUCH  A  FORCE  WOULD  BE  SMALLER  THAN  THE  ACTUAL 
STRENGTH    OF    THE    REGULAR   ARMY    AT    ANY    TIME    SINCE   THE 

CLOSE  OF  1861  —  save  in  April,  1865,  w^hen  it  numbered  only 
22,310,^  but  when  we  had  more  than  a  million  volunteers 
who  were  Regulars  in  everything  but  name  —  notwithstand- 
ing THAT  IN  THOSE  53  YEARS  OUR  POPULATION  HAS  INCREASED 
FROM  ABOUT  31,000,000  TO  100,000,000. 

OFFICEES 

The  importance  of  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  train 
and  lead  troops  is  too  well  known  to  need  dwelling  upon  here, 
and,  furthermore,  has  been  demonstrated  on  every  hand  in 
the  present  European  war  in  which  the  casualties  among  the 
officers  has  been  little  short  of  appalling.  The  Army  is  com- 
pelled by  law  to  detach  many  officers  from  the  troops  with 
which  they  properly  belong,  in  order  to  perform  certain 
duties  imposed  by  law,  such  as  river  and  harbour  work,  train- 
ing the  organized  militia,  giving  instruction  at  universities, 
colleges  and  other  schools,  recruiting,  etc.  In  his  report  as 
Chief  of  Staff,  dated  ^November  15,  1914,  General  Wother- 
spoon  pointed  out  ^  that 

"  There  are  in  the  line  of  the  United  States  Eegular  Army 

8  The  actual  strength  of  the  Regular  Army  each  year  down  to  June, 
1902,  is  given  by  Heitman,  IT,  p.  626. 

»  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (Major  General  W.  W.  Wotherspoon) 
for  1914,  pp.  3-4. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     471 

(including  Coast  Artillery),  not  including  the  two  battalions  of 
the  Porto  Eico  regiment,  65  regimental  and  758  troop,  battery, 
and  company  organizations.  Of  these  officers,  according  to  latest 
returns,  93  field  and  675  company  officers  are  at  present  absent 
from  their  commands  on  detached  service,  on  leave,  (5r  sick. 
This  important  branch  of  the  Army  is  therefore  at  the  present 
time  28.656  per  cent,  short  of  the  officers  who  are  deemed  neces- 
sary under  existing  laws  for  its  instruction,  training,  and  disci- 
pline. As  the  department  draws  mainly  upon  the  units  of  the 
forces  in  the  United  States  proper  for  officers  for  detached  serv- 
ice, maintaining  as  far  as  possible  the  full  complement  of  officers 
with  the  organizations  on  foreign  service,  the  percentage  of  regi- 
mental and  company  officers  absent  from  their  organizations  is  far 
higher  for  those  organizations  in  the  United  States  than  the 
above  percentage  would  indicate." 

For  years  each  Secretary  of  War  has  done  everything  in 
his  power  to  impress  upon  Congress  the  detrimental  effect 
which  this  shortage  of  officers  is  bound  to  exercise  upon  the 
military  service  in  time  of  peace,  quite  irrespective  of  the 
disastrous  results  in  time  of  war,  but  our  national  legislature 
salved  its  own  conscience  by  throwing  a  sop  to  the  Army  in 
the  shape  of  an  increase  of  two  hundred  officers  made  by 
the  Act  of  March  3,  1911,  in  spite  of  the  imperative  ne- 
cessity for  several  times  that  number. 

EXGINEEE  CORPS 

Three  battalions  of  engineers  and  a  small  detachment  on 
duty  at  West  Point  make  up  the  quota  of  that  arm,  which  is 
virtually  deprived  of  the  services  of  sixty  officers  detached  to 
the  work  of  improving  rivers  and  harbours.  On  February 
27,  1915,  the  Engineer  Corps  attained  the  full  strength  of 
officers  authorized  by  the  law  of  February  27,  1911.^^ 

CAVALEY 

!N'ext  are  the  two  arms  which  constitute  "  the  eves  of  an 
army  ''  in  warfare.  Fifteen  regiments  of  cavalry,  numbering 
only  about  15,000  officers  and  men,  may  appear  superfluous 


10  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  p.  63. 


472     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in  view  of  the  present  composition  of  the  military  establish- 
ment; but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  if  the  Regular 
Armv  and  the  Ors^anized  Militia  were  raised  to  full  war 
strength  and  formed  into  the  divisions  necessary  to  consti- 
tute the  seven  field  armies  that  we  should  have  to  have  in 
time  of  war,  and  if  the  organization  were  made  on  the  basis- 
of  75  cavalrymen  to  every  1,000  infantry  as  required  by 
our  Field  Service  Regulations/^  the  cavalry  would  still  be 
many  thousands  short  of  what  it  ought  to  number.  ^^ 

AEROPLANES  AND  DIRIGIBLES 

The  equipment  of  our  aviation  service  is  little  short  of 
ridiculous.  Brigadier  General  Scriven,  the  Chief  Signal 
ofiicer  of  the  Army,  and  his  assistant,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Reber,  testified  before  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs- 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  on  December  8,  1914,  that 
the  United  States  then  possessed  only  119  aviators  and  21 
aeroplanes ;  that  an  aeroplane  costs  from  $2,000  to  $2,400  to 
build,  exclusive  of  the  motor  '^  which  has  a  standard  price 
of  about  $2,500" ;  that  it  requires  fully  a  year  to  construct 
one ;  that  European  nations  possess  and  spent  in  their  budgets- 
for  1914  for  aircraft:       y 

Aeroplanes         Dirigibles         Expenditures 

France    500  11  $12,800,000 

Russia    500  4  22,500,000 

Great  Britain    250  8  1,080,000 

Germany    500  20  45,000,000 

Austria 100  3  3,000,000 

Italy  150  2  800,000 

The  United  States  has  21  aeroplanes,  no  dirigibles  and  spent 
$250,000.^3 

11  Tables  of  Organization  (based  on  Field  Service  Regulations,  1914) ^ 
United  States  Army,  1914,  p.  3. 

12  See  Huidekoper,  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized  Militia 
To-day,  footnote  4  on  pp.  8-9. 

13  Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  on  the  bill  mak- 
ing appropriations  for  the  support  of  the  Army  for  the  fiscal  year  1916, 
pp.  643,  646,  648-649,  653-654. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     473 

FIELD  ARTILLEEY 

In  all  wars,  since  the  invention  of  cannon,  the  value  of 
artillery  as  a  sine  qua  non  to  success  has  been  admitted,  and 
the  present  European  war  has  additionally  corroborated  this 
fact.  According  to  the  latest  authoritative  statistics  obtain- 
able, in  1913  Kussia  had  6,000  field  guns,  Germany  about 
5,000  and  France  4,800 ;  ^*  and  in  nearly  all  the  European 
armies  the  number  of  guns  per  1,000  infantrymen  is  at 
least  five  and  often  six  or  more.-^^  On  December  8,  1914, 
according  to  the  testimony  of  Brigadier  General  Crozier, 
the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  the  United  States  possessed  only  658 
three-inch  field  pieces,  and,  even  when  the  guns  under  con- 
struction and  those  provided  for  by  the  present  appropria- 
tion have  been  finished,  the  number  of  guns  of  all  calibres 
will  not  be  more  than  912.^^  The  minimum  estimate  of 
what  would  be  needed  has  been  placed  at  323  batteries  of 
four  guns  each,  a  total  of  1,292  guns,^''^  while  the  maxi- 
mum estimate,  made  by  the  late  Chief  of  Staff,  was 
2,834,^^  which  is  undoubtedly  what  would  be  required  in  a 
war  against  a  great  Power.  On  December  23,  1914,  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  acknowledged  that  we  had  only  63 J/^  completed, 
modem  field  guns  and  howitzers  altogether.'^  ^  The  United 
States  has  nothing  larger  in  calibre  than  the  6-inch  howitzer, 
and  only  forty  of  those  either  in  existence  or  appropriated 
for ;  ^^  yet  every  one  knows  that  in  the  present  European  w^ar 

14  Testimony  of  Major  General  Wood,  Chief  of  Staff,  on  December  9, 
1913. — Hearings  before  Subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appro- 
priations on  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  bill  for  1915,  p.   13. 

15  Huidekoper,  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized  Militia  To- 
day, p.  4. 

16  Testimony  of  Brigadier  General  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  on 
December  8,  1914. —  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916, 
pp.  678-679  and  685. 

17  Ibid.,  pp.  678-679. 

18  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (General  Wotherspoon )  for  1914,  p.  12. 

19  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  Representative  Gardner,  Decem- 
ber 23,  1914. —  Extension  of  Remarks  of  Hon.  Augustus  P.  Ga/rdner  of 
Massachusetts  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  January  llf,  1915,  p.  12. 

20  General  Crozier's  testimony. —  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation 
bill  for  1916,  p.  686. 


474     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

great  use  is  being  made  of  heavier  guns  tlian  these.  The 
Chief  of  Ordnance  also  testified  that,  even  when  the  design 
has  been  decided  upon  and  the  forgings  delivered,  the  actual 
construction  of  a  gun  requires  about  four  months;  that  a 
battery  costs  about  $85,000;  that  if  $2,100,000  were  appro- 
priated annually  it  would  still  require  eight  years  before  the 
United  States  would  have  1,292  guns;  that  the  Ordnance 
Department,  which  manufactures  the  harness  for  artillery,  is 
behind  on  this  item;  and  that,  moreover,  it  has  only  two  or 
three  range-finders  and  is  not  in  a  position  as  yet  to  make 
any.^^  The  reader  must  distinctly  bear  in  mind  that  the 
manufacture  of  artillery  is  at  best  a  slow  process,  necessitat- 
ing months  and  years  to  acquire  any  large  amount,  and,  ac- 
cording to  General  Wood^s  statement,  the  Government  ar- 
senals cannot  turn  out  more  than  500  guns  per  annum  even 
working  three  shifts  a  day.^^ 

FIELD  ARTILLERY  AMMUOTTION 

In  no  other  respects  is  the  military  unpreparedness  of  the 
United  States,  so  apparent  as  in  the  matter  of  reserve  artillery 
ammunition.  The  minimum  number  of  rounds  per  gun  re- 
quired in  the  German  army  is  2,800,^^  while  our  ow^n  Field 
Service  Eegulations  for  1914  prescribe  1,856  rounds.^ ^  Dis- 
regarding the  other  field  pieces  possessed  by  the  American 
Army  and  assuming  that  the  568  three-inch  guns  w^ere  alone 
supplied  with  1,856  rounds  each,  the  number  required  would 
be  no  less  than  1,054,208 ;  yet  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  con- 
fessed on  December  8,  1914,  that  all  the  United  States 

THElN"  had   "  WAS  ABOUT   580,000   EOUI^DS   FOR   THE   FIELD  AH- 


2iIJ)id.,  pp.  677,  685,  679,  669  and  659. 

22  Testimony  of  Major  General  Leonard  Wood,  Chief  of  Staff,  on 
December  4,  1913. —  Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 
House  of  Representatives,  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1915, 
p.  93. 

23  Huidekoper,  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized  Militia  To- 
day, p.  5. 

24  Tables  of  Organization  (based  on  Field  Service  Regulations,  1914) 
United  States  Army,  1914,  p.  7. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     475 

TILLEKY^   FOE   THE   GUNS   OF  ALL  DIFFERENT    CALIBERS."       He 

also  acknowledged  that  he  had  received  trustworthy  informa- 
tion of  one  battery  in  the  present  European  war  which  had 
fired  ^^2,400  rounds  for  each  gun  in  four  days,"  but  stated 
that  ^^  those  were  exceptional  circumstances."  ^^  The  author, 
however,  knows  of  a  case  in  w^hich  two  German  guns  fired  227 
times  wdthin  two  hours, —  a  fact  attested  by  counting  the 
empty  shells  when  the  position  was  abandoned  —  and  the 
official  reports  of  various  commanders  bear  witness  to  the 
enormous  expenditure  of  artillery  ammunition  made  im- 
perative by  the  conditions  of  modern  warfare.^^  //  the  63Jf. 
field  guns  of  all  calibres  which  the  United  States  possessed  in 
December,  1914,  fired  only  915  times  each,  they  would  more 
than  exhaust  the  present  reserve  supply  of  field  artillery  am- 
munition amounting  to  580,000  rounds,  and  it  is  a  conserva- 
tive  estimate  that  tiuo  days  of  such  firing  as  is  a  common  oc- 

25  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  p.  689. 

26  The  author  of  this  book,  in  his  article  "  The  Truth  concerning  the 
United  States  Army,"  gave  (footnote,  pp.  6-7)  the  following  data  re- 
specting the  Russo-Japanese  War: 

*'  General  Rohne,  in  the  Jahrbiicher  fur  die  deutsche  Armee  und  Ma- 
rine, for  January-June,  1906,  pages  2  and  3,  stated  that  '  in  the  battle 
of  Taschichao,  July  11-24,  one  battery  of  8  guns  fired  4,178  rounds,, 
that  is  522  rounds  per  gun.  ...  At  Liao-yang  the  artillery  of  the  1st 
and  3d  Siberian  Corps  fired  108,000  rounds  on  two  days,  that  is  at  the 
rate  of  6,750  rounds  for  each  battery,  840  rounds  for  each  gun  and 
420  rounds  for  each  gun  for  each  day  of  the  battle  .  .  .' 

"  Lieutenant  Ulrich,  of  the  German  Army,  who  was  with  the  Russian 
Army,  gives  on  page  187  of  the  Jahrbiicher  filr  die  deutsche  Armee  und 
Marine,  for  January- Jime,  1906,  his  data  for  the  four  days'  action 
at  the  Shaho,  September  29th  to  October  2nd,  both  inclusive,  showing 
that  the  minimum  number  of  rounds  -fired  by  the  Russian  guns  was  100 
rounds  per  day  and  the  maximum  364%  per  day. 

"  In  the  Siceigersche  Zeitschrift  fiir  Artillerie  und  Genie,  for  June, 
1910,  is  a  table  showing  that  the  Russians  used  the  following  field  ar- 
tillery ammunition: 

"At  the  battle  of  Taschichao  on  July  24,  1904,  the  2d  Battery  of 
the  9th  East  Siberian  Artillery  Brigade  fired  4,178  rounds,  which  is 
at  the  rate  of  522  rounds  per  gun  per  day. 

"  At  the  battle  of  Liao-yang  on  August  30,  1904,  16  batteries  of  the 
1st  and  3d  East  Siberian  Corps  fired  100,000  rounds  or  422  rounds 
per  gun  per  day. 

"  At  Mukden  on  March  3,  1905,  the  1st  Battery  of  the  9th  Artillery 
Brigade  fired  4,034  rounds  or  504  rounds  per  gun  per  day." 


476      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

currence  in  the  battles  of  the  present  time  would  suffice  to  con- 
sume the  entire  amount  now  on  hand.  When  it  is  considered 
that  the  total  supply  possessed  by  the  United  States  would  go 
no  farther  than  two  days  at  the  most  for  the  existing  field 
guns,  and  that  no  account  is  taken  of  the  quantity  which  would 
be  needed  if  any  troops  in  addition  to  the  present  Regular 
Army  w^ere  called  into  service,  the  conditions  need  no  further 
commentary.  But  on  top  of  that  it  must  be  distinctly  re- 
membered that,  as  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  stated,  even  if  every 
source  of  supply  were  utilized,  only  ''  about  400,000  rounds  '' 
could  be  manufactured  in  the  first  six  months;  that  only 
130,000  rounds  could  be  turned  out  each  month  thereafter; 
that  a  million  rounds  might  be  made  in  a  year;  that  we 
need  about  a  million  and  a  quarter ;  and  that  '^  it  takes  over 
a  year  to  get  that  much  if  we  were  to  go  at  it  with  unlim- 
ited appropriations.''  As  a  matter  of  fact,  General  Crozier 
had  to  confess  that  ''  no  permanent  ammunition  trains  have 
been  provided,''  and  that  at  the  present  rate  of  appropria- 
tion by  Congress  it  would  require  eight  years  to  complete 
1,292  guns  and  their  ammunition  trains,  and  about  four 
years  to  supply  1,800  rounds  to  the  field  guns  of  various 
calibres  —  with  the  exception  of  the  6-inch  howitzers  to  which 
it  was  contemplated  to  give  only  1,000  rounds  —  and  then 
only  on  condition  that  the  various  plants  throughout  the 
country  ivere  kept  "  going  night  and  day  "  in  manufacturing 
artillery  ammuniiionP  In  view  of  these  facts  it  is  scarcely 
to  be  wondered  that  the  former  Chief  of  Staff,  General 
Wotherspoon,  stated  ^^  that 

"  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  large  numbers  of  guns  and 
large  masses  of  ammunition  are,  in  active  war,  liable  to  capture 
and  destruction,  and  that  to  start  into  field  oppration^  with  the 
expectation  that  the  proportions  given  will  he  maintained  with- 
out large  sources  of  manufacture,  would  he  fallacious.     As  the 


27  Hearings,  pp.  679,  689-690.  The  statement  that  "  No  permanent 
ammunition  trains  have  been  provided  "  will  be  found  in  the  Report  of 
the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  1914,  p.  22. 

28  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (General  Wotherspoon)  for  1914,  p.  12. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     ^11 

factories  and  works  in  this  country  which  can  produce  munitions 
of  war  of  the  above  character  are  exceedingly  limited,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  a  full  supply  of  this  type  of  materiel  must  he  stored  and 
ready  for  use  before  war  is  undertaken/* 

'Nor  is  it  less  surprising  that  Secretary  Garrison  should 
have  declared  ^^  that 

''  We  have  nothing  like  sufficient  artillery  and  artillery  ammuni- 
tion. This  has  been  urgently  presented  in  all  of  the  recent  re- 
ports of  the  head  of  this  Department  and  the  Chiefs  of  Staif,  and 
Congress  has  from  time  to  time  recently  increased  the  appropria- 
tions for  these  purposes.  There  is  universal  agreement  among 
all  who  know,  that  artillery  is  an  essential  feature  of  modern 
warfare,  and  that  a  proper  proportion  thereof  to  any  army  is 
indispensable  if  success  is  to  he  even  hoped  for.  It  is  impera- 
tive that  the  manufacture  of  artillery  and  artillery  ammunition 
should  progress  as  rapidly  as  is  possible  until  a  proper  reserve 
thereof  has  been  obtained.'' 

MACHINE-GUNS  AND  SMALL-ARMS 

After  considerable  experimentation  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment has  found  it  advisable  to  discontinue  the  manufacture 
of  the  service  model  of  machine-gun  and  has  adopted  the 
gun  made  by  the  Vickers  Company  of  London  as  the  better 
weapon.  Of  the  old  model  —  Gatling  and  Colt  automatic 
guns  —  there  were  1,380  in  December,  1914,  but  many  were 
obsolete  and  only  1,000  could  be  counted  upon  as  serviceable. 
Moreover,  they  are  liable  to  over-heating  because  they  are 
not  surrounded  by  a  water-jacket  as  is  the  Vickers  gun.  The 
former  estimate  of  1,801  machine-guns  required  by  the 
Army  has  within  the  past  year  been  cut  down  to  1,361,  on 
the  basis  of  four  per  regiment.^^  This  is  manifestly  far 
too  low,  as  the  French  among  others  have  increased  the  num- 
ber of  machine-guns  per  regiment  to  more  than  forty  during 
the  present  war,  owing  to  their  great  power  of  destruction. 
Only  125  machine-guns  were  manufactured  for  the  Ameri- 


29  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  pp.  8-9. 

30  Testimony  of   General   Crozier,    Chief   of   Ordnance. —  Hearings   on 
the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  pp.  674-675. 


478     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

can  army  during  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1914,^^  and 
the  supply  of  ammunition  for  them  is  fixed  at  21,400  rounds 
per  gun. 

A  more  satisfactory  condition  is  found  in  respect  to  in- 
fantry rifles,  of  which  the  United  States  possessed  on  June 
30,  1914,  slightly  less  than  700,000  of  the  most  modern 
Springfield  pattern,  as  well  as  between  300,000  and  400,000 
of  the  old  Krag-Jorgensen  rifles.  ^^  During  the  preceding 
year,  25,545  United  States  rifles,  calibre  .30,  model  of  1903, 
(or  Springfield)  were  manufactured,^^  which  is  at  the  rate 
of  about  82  per  working  day,  whereas  that  one  small-arms 
factory  has  a  capacity  of  500  rifies  per  diem.^"^  The  Chief 
of  Ordnance  declared  that  a  reserve  of  800,000  small-arms 
was  desired,^^  which  would  be  sufficient  to  arm  any  force 
such  as  the  country  would  be  likely  to  need  for  the  first 
months  of  war.  It  will,  however,  be  necessary  to  increase 
the  last  appropriation  —  which  was  only  $250,000  —  if  the 
remaining  100,000  rifles  are  to  be  secured  within  several 
years. 

SMALL-ARMS  AMMUNITION 

The  reserve  supply  of  small-arms  ammunition  in  December 
lOlJ/-  was  only  195,000,000  rounds.^^  Our  Field  Service 
Regulations  prescribe  1,360  rounds  for  each  infantryman  — 
that  is,  100  in  his  belt,  120  in  the  combat  train  which  goes 
with  the  troops,  120  in  the  ammunition  train  which  follows 
behind  the  supply  trains,  340  rounds  in  the  advance  depot 
from  which  it  can  be  sent  forward  to  the  troops,  and  680 
in  the  depot  at  the  base  of  supplies. ^'^  In  other  words, 
195,000,000  would  not  he  sufficient  to  supply  an  army  of 


31  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  1914,  p.  46. 

32  General  Crozier's  testimony. —  Hearings,  p.  666. 

33  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  1914,  p.  45. 

34  General  Crozier's  testimony. —  Hearings,  p.  667. 
S5lbid.,  p.  666. 

s^Ibid.,  p.  660. 

37  Tables  of  Organization   (based  on  Field  Service  Regulations,  1914), 
United  States  Army,  1914,  p.  7. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     479 

lJf.5j522  infantrymen  with  1,360  rounds  each.  In  modem 
warfare  the  consumption  of  rifle  ammunition  is  something 
colossal,  and  the  average  expenditure  of  350  rounds  per  man 
by  the  Russians  at  the  battles  of  Mukden  and  Liao-yang,  as 
given  by  General  Kuropatkin,^^  has  often  been  exceeded,  so 
far  as  can  be  ascertained,  in  the  hard-fought  actions  of  the 
present  European  war.  The  1,360  rounds  prescribed  for 
American  infantrymen  would,  in  all  probability ,  be  exhausted 
in  four  days'  fighting,  and,  just  in  proportion  as  our  forces 
are  engaged  in  larger  numbers  than  145,522,  the  insufficiency 
of  rifle  ammunition  will  necessarily  make  itself  felt.  More- 
over, no  allowance  whatsoever  is  made  for  the  machine-guns, 
which  are  supposed  to  have  21,400  rounds  each.  Assuming 
that  the  United  States  put  into  the  field  a  force  of  about 
450,000  —  the  number  contemplated  by  the  General  Staff 
as  a  minimum  required  in  a  great  war,  to  which  allusion  has 
been  made  on  page  412,  this  force  properly  organized  would 
number  450,615  rifles  and  982  machine-guns,^^  and  would 
require  612,836,400  rounds  for  the  infantry  and  21,014,800 
for  the  machine-guns,  a  total  of  633,851,200  rounds  of  small- 
arms  ammunition.  When  it  is  realized  that  the  present 
sources  of  supply  are  the  Frankford  Arsenal  and  certain 
private  manufacturers ;  that  all  of  them  combined  could  not 
malvC  more  than  15,000,000  rounds  for  the  first  two  months, 
or  more  than  double  that  amount  in  subsequent  months ;  that 
30,000,000  rounds  '^  would  be  the  limit  of  the  powder-making 
capacity  of  the  country  " ;  that  even  at  that  rate  it  would 
require  "  between  six  and  seven  months  to  duplicate  "  the 
present  reserve  supply  of  195,000,000  rounds;  and  it  would 
require  "  about  a  year  and  a  half ''  to  build  a  new  Govern- 
ment factory  to  make  ammunition  at  the  rate  of  15,000,000 
rounds  a  month  —  all  of  which  was  stated  by  the  Chief 
of  Ordnance  to  the  Military  Affairs  Committee  of  the  House 

38  Kuropatkin,  The  Russian  Army  and  the  Japanese  War,  II,  pp.  149, 
150,  and  229;  Huidekoper,  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized 
Militia  To-day,  pp.  3-4. 

39  General  Crozier's  testimony. — Hearings,  p.  661. 


480     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

of  Eepresentatives  on  December  8,  1914  ^^ —  one  may  arrive 
at  a  fairly  just  estimate  of  American  preparedness  for  war  in 
the  matter  of  small-arms  ammunition. 

PISTOLS 

As  all  officers  —  every  one  in  the  cavalry  and  certain  non- 
commissioned officers  of  infantry  —  are  required  to  carry  pis- 
tols, they  form  an  item  to  be  considered.  On  June  30, 
1914,  the  Ordnance  Department  had  1,300  in  store;  34,000 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Eegular  troops;  and  28,000  either 
in  the  possession  of,  or  about  to  be  issued  to,  the  militia. 
Thirty-one  thousand  were  under  manufacture  at  the  Spring- 
field arsenal,  of  which  it  was  expected  that  the  ^avy  and 
Marine  Corps  would  purchase  3,500  during  the  year,  so  that 
including  everything  there  would  be  a  supply  of  about  93,000 
in  December,  1915.^^ 

COAST  ARTILLEEY 

The  Coast  Artillery  Corps  is  composed,  as  has  been  seen, 
of  693  officers  and  19,301  enlisted  men,  a  total  of  19,994,  and 
is  organized  into  170  companies  of  104  men  each,  always 
maintained  at  war  strength.  The  maximum  strength  author- 
ized by  law  is  748  officers  and  19,321  men,^-  so  that  this 
corps  is  actually  55  officers  and  20  men  short  of  what  it  ought 
to  be.  This  shortage  appears  at  the  first  glance  quite  in- 
significant, but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  of  great  import.  The 
policy  adopted  by  the  War  Department  prescribes  that  the 
Coast  Artillery  Corps  of  the  Regular  Army  shall  furnish 
sufficient  force  to  man  completely  all  of  the  guns,  mortars, 
mines  and  accessory  materiel  of  the  insular  possessions  and 
in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  as  well  as  all  of  the  mines  in 


40  Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, on  the  bill  making  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the 
Army  for  the  fiscal  year  1916,  pp.  661-662. 

41  Testimony  of  General  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance. — Hearings,  pp. 
667-668. 

42  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery,  United  States  Army,  for 
1914,  p.  14. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     481 

continental  United  States,  whereas  the  troops  required  to 
man  the  guns  and  mortars  in  the  United  States  are  to  be 
supplied,  half  by  the  Regular  Coast  Artillery  —  which  is, 
moreover,  to  have  exclusive  control  of  their  accessory  equip- 
ment —  and  half  by  the  Coast  Artillery  of  the  Organized 
Militia.  To  carry  out  this  thoroughly-sound  policy,  the  de- 
fences now  constructed  or  appropriated  for  will  require  the 
folloAving  troops: 

In  the  United  States  Officers  Men 

Regular  Coast  Artillery  for  one-half  of  the 

gun   defenses    740         18,531 

Eegular  Coast  Artillery  for  all  mines,  power 

and  light  plants 309  5,544 

In  the  insular  possessions  and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 

Regular  Coast  Artillery  for  all  gun  defenses      220  5,040 

Regular  Coast  Artillery  for  all  mines,  power 

and  light  plants   43  1,194 

Total  Regular  Coast  Artillery 1,312         30,309 

Total  Militia  Coast  Artillery  to  man  one-half 

the  guns  and  mortars  in  the  United  States      740         18,531 

Total  force  of  Regulars  and  Militia 

required    2,052         48,840  ^^ 

Apropos  of  this  table,  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  says  in 
his  report  for  1914:  ^"^ 

"  From  the  foregoing  it  will  be  seen  that  the  present  au- 
thorized strength  of  the  regular  Coast  Artillery  Corps  is  short 
dGJf  officers  and  10,988  enlisted  men  of  the  strength  required 
to  man  our  coast  defenses  under  the  adopted  plan  outlined  above. 

"  The  defenses  outside  the  continental  United  States  are  prac- 
tically ready  for  their  garrisons,  and  when  fiiese  are  provided 
there  will  remain  for  home  gun  defenses  176  officers,  and  7 ,5JfS 
enlisted  men,  which  is  about  one-third  of  one  relief. 

"  In  order  to  provide  for  our  primary  home  defenses,  to  wit. 
Coast  Defenses  of  Portland,  Boston,  Narragansett  Bay,  Long 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  14. 
44  Ibid.,  p.  15. 


482     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Island  Sound,  Eastern  N'ew  York,  Southern  New  York,  Chesa- 
peake Ba}^  Pensacola,  San  Francisco,  and  Puget  Sound,  there 
are  required  662  officers  and  16,251  enlisted  men. 

"  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  there  are  now  provided  about  one- 
fou?'th  of  the  officers  and  one-half  of  the  enlisted  men  necessary 
for  this  purpose.  Unless  provision  be  made  in  the  near  future 
for  additional  Coast  Artiller}^  personnel,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
reduce  the  garrisons  to  mere  caretaker  detachments  at  some 
of  the  defenses  of  lesser  importance,  including  Portsmouth,  Dela- 
ware, Charleston,  Savannah,  Key  West,  New  Bedford,  Potomac, 
Tampa,  Columbia,  Baltimore,  Cape  Fear,  and  Mobile." 

It  is  quite  worth  while  to  bear  in  mind  what  General 
Weaver  has  emphasized,  viz:  that  whe7i  the  troops  necessary 
for  the  fortifications  in  our  overseas  possessions  have  been 
sent  to  those  stations,  there  will  remain  only  ah  out  one-third 
of  the  number  required  for  the  defences  of  the  United  States; 
and  that  means  that,  apart  from  being  an  utterly  inadequate 
force,  these  troops  must  remain  continually  on  duty,  day 
and  night,  in  time  of  war,  without  any  men  to  relieve  them. 
It  is  the  consensus  of  opinion  among  the  best  informed  coast 
artillery  officers  than  we  ought  to  have  at  least  one  full  re- 
lief, in  addition  to  extra  skilled  soldiers  needed  to  man  the 
mines  and  searchlights.^^  Further  comment  is  superfluous, 
since  the  facts  just  given  tell  the  entire  story  as  to  w^hether 
American  defences  are  properly  manned  or  not,  and  whether 
the  nation  is  getting  a  quid  pro  quo  for  the  money  paid  for  the 
construction  of  costly  fortifications. 

For  the  purpose  of  command,  continental  United  States 
is  divided  into  three  Coast  Artillery  districts,  constituted  as 
follows : 


45  Compare  the  statement  prepared  by  the  author  of  this  book  on 
December  22,  1914,  in  answer  to  the  assertion  of  Representative  Swagar 
Shirley  of  Kentucky  that  "  The  continental  United  States  is  not  only 
well  fortified,  but  is  perhaps  better  fortified  than  any  country  in  the 
world."  The  author's  refutation  of  this  assertion  will  be  found  in  the 
Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  pp.  3-5. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     483 

North  Atlantic  Coast  Artillery  District, 
Headqtuirters  at  Fort  Totten,  N.  Y. 

Coast  defenses  of  Companies. 

Portland 12 

Portsmouth    1 

Boston    12 

'New  Bedford 1 

Narragansett  Bay 8 

Long  Island  Sonnd 12 

Eastern  New  York 6 

Southern  New  York   14 

Total 66  of  104  men 

each  and,  including  enlisted  specialists,  numbering  about  7,300 
men. 

South  Atlantic  Coast  Artillery  District, 
Headquarters  at  Charleston,  S.  C. 

Coast  defenses  of  Companies. 

The  Delaware 4 

Baltimore 3 

The  Potomac 2 

Chesapeake  Ba}^   10 

Cape  Fear   3 

Charleston    3 

Savannah   4 

Key  West 1 

Tampa    2 

Pensacola   5 

Mobile    2 

New  Orleans 2 

Galveston   2 

Total    43  companies 

numbering,  including  enlisted  specialists,  virtually  4,700  men. 

Pacific   Coast   Artillery  District, 
Headquarters  at  Fort  Miley,  Cal. 

Coast  defenses  of  Companies. 

San  Diego   2 

San  Francisco 17 


484     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  Columbia 4 

Piiget  Sound 13 

Total    36  companies 

numbering,  inclusive  of  enlisted  specialists,  approximately  4,000 
men.**^ 

In  our  overseas  possessions  there  are 

In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  Hdqrs.  at  Cristobal  9  companies 

In  Hawaii,  Hdqrs.  at  Fort  Euger 9  '^ 

In  the  Philippines,  defenses  of  Manila  and  Subig 

Bays,  Hdqrs.  at  Fort  Mills 11  *' 


Total    29  companies, 

numbering,  as  has  been  seen  on  page  466,  3,654  enlisted  men 


47 


There  are,  moreover,  29  coast-defence  commands  which 
comprise  55  garrisoned  forts  and  39  ungarrisoned  forts,^^  the 
latter  being  guarded  by  "  caretaker  detachments  "  detailed 
from  the  nearest  garrisoned  fort,  for  the  very  good  reason 
that  there  do  not  exist  sufficient  troops  to  occupy  them. 

THE  CONDITION  OF  AMERICAN  FOETIFICATIONS 

The  Chief  of  (5oast  Artillery  stated  in  his  report  for  1914 
that  "  all  of  the  defensive  projects  for  the  coasts  of  the  United 


46  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  pp.  12-13. 

47  Statement  issued  by  The  Adjutant-General's  office  on  April  30,  1914. 

48  Forts  garrisoned  hy  the  Coast  Artillery    {55). 

Preble,  Williams,  McKinley,  Levett,  Constitution,  Banks,  Warren, 
Strong,  Revere,  Andrews,  Rodman,  Adams,  Greble,  H.  G.  Wright,  Terry, 
Totten,  Hamilton,  Wadsworth,  Hancock,  Mott,  Du  Pont,  Howard,  Wash- 
ington, Hunt,  Monroe,  Caswell,  Moultrie,  Scriven,  Dade,  Key  West  Bar- 
racks, Barrancas,  Pickens,  Morgan,  Jackson  Barracks,  Crockett,  Rose- 
crans,  Baker,  Miley,  Barry,  W^infield  Scott,  Worden,  Ward,  Casey, 
Flager,  Columbia,  Stevens,  Wint,  Ruger,  De  Russy,  Kamehameha,  Arm- 
strong, Amador,  Sherman  and  De  Lesseps. 

Ungarrisoned  forts    (39) 

Baldwin,  Lyon,  Stark,  Foster,  Heath,  Standish,  Wetherill,  Getty, 
Kearney  Michie,  Mansfield,  Schuyler,  Slocum,  Delaware,  Carroll,  Small- 
wood,  Armistead,  Wool,  Sumter,  Fremont,  De  Soto,  Taylor,  McRee, 
Gaines,  Jackson,  St.  Philip,  San  Jacinto,  Travis,  Pio  Pico,  McDowell, 
Whitman,  Canby,  Frank,  Hughes,  Drum,  Randolph,  Grant,  Guantanamo 
and  San  Pedro, 

Testimony  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery. —  Hearings  on  the  Army 
Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  pp.  612-613. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     485 

States  and  its  over-sea  possessions  which  have  heretofore  been 
approved  have  been  carried  to  completion,  with  a  few  excep- 
tions," *^  and  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Aifairs  of  the  House  of  Representatives  on  December  5, 
1914,  he  asserted  that  1,299  guns  had  already  been  mounted 
and  that  51  were  appropriated  for.^^  On  the  other  hand,  he 
called  attention  to  the  fact 

"  That  most  of  the  guns  that  are  mounted  in  our  coast  fortifica- 
tions—  that  is,  those  of  8-inch,  10-inch,  and  12-inch  caliber  — 
date  back  to  a  design  that  was  made  in  the  early  nineties  and 
late  eighties.  The  guns  designed  then  and  mounted  in  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  nineties  are  not  what  are  to-day  considered  full- 
powered  guns/'  '"'^ 

The  range  of  guns  being  one  of  the  most  important  factors 
in  war,  the  House  of  Representatives,  by  Resolution  Xo.  698, 
adopted  on  January  14,  1915,  called  upon  the  Secretary  of 
War  for  information  in  respect  to  our  seacoast  cannon.  On 
the  following  day  Mr.  Garrison  replied  in  a  communication 
to  the  Speaker  of  the  House,  in  which  he  stated  ^^ 

(1)  That  there  were  no  guns  mounted  in  the  fortifications  of 
the  United  States  proper  of  a  calibre  larger  than  12  inches. 

(2)  That  the  range  of  the  12-inch  guns  mounted  on  the 
standard  disappearing  carriage  was  not  more  than  13,000  yards, 
hut  that  the  range  of  the  12-inch  guns  mounted  on  barbette 
carriages  was  approximately  18,000  yards. 

(3)  That  the  British  dreadnaughts  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
type  were  equipped  with  15-inch  45-calibre  guns,  and  that  their 
range  was  approximatel}^  21,000  yards. 

(4)  That  "  It  is  true  that  the  range  of  the  guns  just  men- 
tioned exceeds  by  over  4  miles  the  range  of  the  gims  as  mounted 
in  the  defense  of  the  United  States  proper,  either  on  the  At- 
lantic or  Pacific  coast ;  but  it  is  not  true  that  the  range  of 
those  guns  need  remain  thus  restricted,  since  by  a  slight  change 
in  the  mounting  their  range  will  be  practically  equal  to  that 
of  the  1 5-inch  45-calibre  guns  above  referred  to." 

49  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  p.  16. 

50  Hearings,  p.  612. 

51  General  Weaver's  testimony. —  Hearings,  p.  615. 

52  House  of  Representatives,  Document  No.  1492,  63d  Congress,  third 
session. 


486     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

That  the  range  of  the  American  12-inch  barhette  guns  can 
be  thus  increased  by  modifying  their  mounting  is  unques- 
tioned, but  one  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  it  ^vas 
admitted  by  our  leading  ordnance  experts  and  military  offi- 
cials that  such  an  augmented  range  could  only  be  obtained 
at  the  expense  of  diminishing  the  weight  of  the  projectile  and 
hence  its  penetrating  power.^^  The  net  result  is  therefore 
in  favour  of  the  heavier  British  guns. 

A  table  prepared  by  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  on  Decem- 
ber 8,  1914,  and  submitted  to  the  House  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs  ^^  showed  that  on  that  date  1,299  guns  had  been 
mounted  and  51  were  in  the  process  of  construction  —  only 
one  of  the  latter  being  of  16-inch  calibre;  that  three  14-inch 
guns  had  been  mounted  —  that  is,  outside  of  the  United 
States  —  and  21  appropriated  for;  that  433  modern  12-inch 
guns  were  in  position  and  11  under  construction;  while  the 
remaining  863  already  mounted  and  18  appropriated  for  were 
old-fashioned  12-inch  or  calibres  ranging  down  to  3-inch. 
Since  high-powered  guns  have  a  life  of  only  240  rounds  —  or, 
if  used  at  the  maximum,  100  rounds  ^^ —  it  is  therefore  self- 
evident  that  the  armament  of  our  fortifications  is  sadly  in 
need  of  being  modernized. 

Apart  from  the  utter  insufficiency  of  officers  and  troops 
needed  to  man  the  seacoast  fortifications  properly,  General 
Weaver  declared  that,  owing  to  different  conditions,  it  would 
be  impossible  to  transfer  even  trained  Coast  Artillery  troops 
to  a  new  station  and  expect  efficient  service  until  they  had 
been  given  time  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  new  circumstances ; 
that  '^  it  would  be  just  as  reasonable  to  suggest  putting  In- 
fantry soldiers  aboard  a  cruiser  or  battleship  to  serve  the 
guns,  as  it  would  be  to  suggest  putting  them  in  a  fort  for 
that  purpose  " ;  that  some  of  the  batteries  are  exposed  in  the 

53  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  1914,  p.  33;  Hearings  before 
Subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appropriations  in  charge  of  the 
Fortifications  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  pp.  6-9,  61-65. 

54  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  p.  612. 

55  General  Crozier's  testimony. — Hearings,  p.  688. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     487 

rear ;  and  that  the  principle  upon  which  our  fortifications  are 
constructed  is  based  upon  the  assumption  ''  that  there  shall 
he  assigned  to  every  coast-defense  fortification  a  certain  num- 
ber of  mobile  troops/'  known  as  ''  artillery  supports,"  in  order 
to  protect  it  against  land  attack. ^^ 

SEAECHLIGHTS,  FIEE-CONTJIOL  AND  SUBMAEINE 

MINES 

The  auxiliaries  —  without  which  fortifications  are  little 
more  than  useless  —  are  in  a  state  of  deficiency  scarcely  less 
conspicuous  than  the  personnel.  According  to  the  last  report 
of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery,  the  installation  of  search-lights 
was  then  "  approximately  50  per  cent,  completed '' ;  yet  Con- 
gress appropriated  only  $150,000  for  the  year  ending  June 
30,  1916,  and  prescribed  that  it  was  to  be  ^'  for  the  defenses 
of  our  most  important  harbors."  The  installation  of  the 
equipment  for  generating  and  distributing  power  in  the  sea- 
coast  fortifications  is  about  25  per  cent,  finished,  and  the  mu- 
nificent sum  of  $50,000  w^as  the  extent  of  Congressional  gen- 
erosity on  this  score.  There  are  twenty-nine  coast  defence 
commands,  and  General  Weaver  reported  in  September,  1914, 
that  ^'  seven  .  .  .  have  received  a  standard  fire  control  in- 
stallation '' ;  that  "  the  standard  installation  for  Eort  Monroe, 
Va.,  is  about  95  per  cent,  completed  " ;  and  that  ^'  the  fire- 
control  features  of  the  coast  defense  system  may  be  said  to 
be  approximately  60  per  cent,  completed.''  Congress  ap- 
parently thought  that  ample  progress  was  being  made  in  this 
respect  since  it  allotted  only  $130,000  for  this  accessory  during 
the  ensuing  year.  The  submarine  mine  structures  w^ere  re- 
ported by  the  Chief  of  the  Coast  Artillery  as  "83  per  cent, 
completed,"  so  Congress  voted  $26,000  "  for  the  purchase, 
manufacture,  and  test  of  submarine-mine  materiel.'''^  ^^     The 


56  Testimony  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery. —  Bearings,  pp.  620-622. 

57  Report  oi  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  p.  16.  The  ap- 
propriations mentioned  in  this  paragraph  were  contained  in  the  For- 
tifications Act,  approved  March  3,  1915. —  Public —  No.  264  —  63d  Con- 
gress   (H.  R.  21491),  pp.   1-3. 


488     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

report  of  the  late  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Wotherspoon,  made 
as  recently  as  November  15,  1914,  discloses  that  not  more 
than 

''  the  amount  of  explosive  necessary  to  load  and  operate  the 
mines  now  provided  at  our  various  coast  defenses  for  one  charge 
is  complete.  The  deficiencies  in  the  matter  of  fire  control  and 
searchlights  are  of  the  most  serious  character.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  proper  fire  conti'ol  and  searchlight  installation  is  only  main- 
tained in  a  limited  number  of  first-class  defense  areas,  the  re- 
mainder of  the  fire-control  systems  and  searchlight  equipment 
being  deficient  or  improvised."  ^^ 

COAST  AETILLEEY  AMMUNITIOISr 

The  conditions  in  respect  to  the  ammunition  to  be  kept  in 
reserve  for  emergencies  are  not  one  whit  more  reassuring. 
On  December  8,  1915,  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillerv  confessed 

7  7  tJ 

to  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  that 

''  Of  ammunition  for  continental  JJnited  States  we  have  now  on 
hand  and  under  manufacture  73  per  cent,  of  the  allowance  fi.xed 
hy  the  National  Coast  Defense  Board.  That  allowance  for  con- 
tinental United  States  is  the  number  of  rounds  that  any  given 
gun  would  fire  at  the  maximum  rate  of  firing  in  one  hour.''  ^^ 

Let  the  reader  realize  fully  what  this  astounding  revelation 
means.  It  means  that  the  guns  of  the  fortifications  in 
THE  United  States  firing  at  the  limiIt  of  their  cAPAcitY 

WOULD  EXPEND  EVERY  BIT  OF  AMMUNITION  THAT  THEY  POS- 
SESS WITHIN  45  MINUTES.  And  the  present  Chief  of  Staff, 
General  Scott,  submitted  to  the  same  committee  a  statement 
showing  that  if  the  mortars  were;  similarly  fired  they 

WOULD    exhaust    the     LAST    ROUND    OF    AMMUNITION     IN     30 

MINUTE s.^^  One  shudders  to  contemplate  what  would  happen 
if  our  fortifications  w^ere  subjected  to  such  a  gruelling  bom- 
bardment for  wrecks  as  those  in  the  Dardanelles  have  recently 


58  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff    (General  Wotherspoon )    for   1914,  p. 
6. 

59  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  p.  617. 
Qolhid.,  p.  700. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     489 

undergone.  And  a  further  proof  of  the  blindness  of  Congress 
to  the  utter  inadequacy  of  our  seacoast  ammunition  is  to  be 
found  in  General  Scott's  announcement  to  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs  that,  at  the  present  rate  of  appro- 
priation —  which  is  only  $400,000  —  the  necessary  amount 
will  not  be  obtained  until  '^  in  about  four  years."  ^^ 

FOETIFICATIONS  NEEDED 

General  Weaver  stated  in  his  report  for  1914  that  the  con- 
struction of  the  seacoast  batteries  at  Fort  MacArthur,  San 
Pedro,  California,  was  progressing,  but  that  San  Diego 
needed  further  defences,  and  he  strongly  emphasized  the 
fact  that  "  the  fortification  of  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake 
Bay  is  of  primary  importance."  ^^  Nine  years  ago  the  Na- 
tional Coast-Defense  Board  —  the  '^  Taft  Board  " —  declared 
in  its  report  that 

^'  Commercially  and  strategically  Chesapeake  Bay  is  to-day, 
as  it  always  has  been,  of  the  very  first  importance.  With  the 
entrance  as  it  is  now,  unfortified,  a  hostile  fleet,  should  it  gain 
control  of  the  sea,  can  establish,  without  coming  under  the  fire 
of  a  single  gun,  a  base  on  its  shores,  pass  in  and  out  at  pleasure, 
have  access  to  large  quantities  of  valuable  supplies  of  all  kinds, 
and  paralyze  the  great  trunk  railway  lines  crossing  the  head 
of  the  bay."  «^^ 

Today  —  May,  1915 — that  statement  is  exactly  as  true  as 
when  it  was  penned,  and  the  defencelessness  of  the  entrance 
to  the  Chesapeake  at  the  present  time  is  one  of  the  marvels 
of  the  age  on  the  subject  of  our  unpreparedness.  Although 
the  land  has  been  purchased  at  Cape  Henry,^^  none  has  been 
acquired  at  Cape  Charles,  no  fortifications  have  been  begun, 

61  Ibid.,  p.  700. 

62  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  p.  16. 

63  Report  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board,  dated  February  1, 
1906,  p.  11. 

64  Testimony  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Garrison,  February  3, 
1915. —  Hearings  before  subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appro- 
priations in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  bill,  1916,  pp. 
35-36. 


490     Military  TJnpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

not  a  gun  is  in  position^  not  an  emplacement  is  in  the  course 
of  construction,  nor  has  one  solitary  cent  been  appropriated 
for  any  defences  there.  The  reiterated  warnings  of  the  Taft 
Board,  of  Secretaries  of  War,  of  Chiefs  of  Artillery  and 
Coast  Artillery,  have  fallen  upon  deaf  ears  for  these  nine 
years,  and  to-day  the  entrance  to  the  Chesapeake  —  one  of  the 
most  important  inland  waterways  in  the  United  States  —  lies 
absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  a  hostile  fleet.  Yet  Representa- 
tive Swagar  Shirley  of  Kentucky,  the  chairman  of  the  House 
committee  in  charge  of  fortifications,  publicly  announced  on 
November  28,  1914,  that  "  the  continental  United  States 
is  not  only  well  fortified,  but  is  perhaps  better  fortified  than 
any  country  in  the  world."  ^^ 

FORTIFICATIONS  OF  THE  INSULAR  POSSESSIONS 

The  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  stated  in  his  annual  report 
for  1914  that  in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  the 

''  Battery  construction  at  both  ends  of  the  canal  is  rapidly  be- 
ing carried  to  completion.  Much  of  the  armament  lias  been 
delivered  to  the  Governor,  Panama  Canal,  and  its  installation 
is  progressing  at  a  satisfactory  rate. 

''  Power  plants. —  The  generating  equipment  is  now  being  de- 
livered and  its  installation  is  being  rapidly  accomplished. 

'^  Fire  control. —  If  the  remainder  of  the  funds  needed  for  this 
purpose  are  appropriated  at  the  next  session  of  Congress,  the 
fire-control  system  for  all  the  armament  inclnded  in  the  pro- 
ject should  be  completed  during  the  fiscal  year  1915. 

''  Searchlights. —  Funds  have  been  appropriated  for  the  pur- 
chase of  all  the  searchlights  required  for  the  defense  of  the 
canal,  and  the  supply  of  those  now  on  hand  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  recent  action,  which  should  produce  the  desired  result. 

'''  Ammunition. —  Ammunition  for  the  armament  now  made 
for  service  has  been  shipped  to  the  Canal  Zone."  ^^ 

65  Representative  Shirley's  statement  was  published  in  the  Evening 
Star,  Washington,  D.  C,  on  November  28,  1914.  He  was  confronted 
with  this  statement  by  Representative  Augustus  P.  Gardner  at  a  hear- 
ing before  the  House  subcommittee  in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Ap- 
propriation bill  on  February  3,  1915,  but  made  no  disclaimer.  This 
statement  was  published  in  the  Hearings  on  that  bill,  p.  3. 

66  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  pp.  16-17. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     491 

'  The  one  16-incli  gun  thus  far  manufactured  and  intended 
for  the  Panama  Canal  is  still  en  route,  and  the  shipment  of 
the  4.7  howitzers  was  not  expected  to  begin  until  the  spring 
of  1915.^^  On  January  5,  1915,  Colonel  Winslow  testified 
before  the  House  committee  that  43  of  the  projected  power 
plants  had  been  shipped,  leaving  seven  still  to  be  sent  for  the 
Atlantic  end  of  the  canal,  and  that  the  stages  of  installation 
varied  from  10  to  90  per  cent.,  but  that  they  would  be  fin- 
ished by  June  30,  1915.^^  The  total  amount  needed  for  fire- 
control  was  estimated  at  $633,301.30,  and  Colonel  Goethals 
stated  to  the  committee  that  such  an  appropriation  would  per- 
mit this  work  to  be  finished  by  September  1,  1915,^^  where- 
upon Congress  generously  voted  the  entire  amount.  ^"^  Colo- 
nel Goethals  also  announced  that  the  searchlights  would  be 
installed  and  "  everything  in  connection  with  the  fortifica- 
tions ''  completed  "  by  the  first  of  September."  "^^ 

The  ^National  Coast-Defense  Board  allotted  to  the  guns  in 
the  fortifications  overseas  the  amount  of  ammunition  which 
would  be  consumed  in  firing  at  the  maximum  rate  for  two 
hours  "''^ —  in  other  words,  an  allowance  double  that  pre- 
scribed for  continental  United  States  and  also  exclusive  of 
the  amount  given  for  target  practice. '^^  The  testimony  of 
the  Chief  of  Ordnance  on  January  5,  1915,^"*  showed  that  the 
status  of  the  seacoast  ammunition  for  the  Panama  Canal 
fortifications  was  as  follows: 


67  General  Crozier's  testimony. — Bearings  concerning  Estimates  for 
construction  and  fortification  of  the  Pana/ma  Canal  for  the  fiscal  yea/r 
1916,  p.  247. 

6»Ibid.,  pp.  221-222. 

69  Ibid.,  p.  252. 

70  In  the  Sundry  Civil  bill,  approved  March  3,  1915,  p.  72. 

71  Hearings  on  the  fortification  of  the  Panama  Canal  for  1916,  p.  227. 

72  General  Weaver's  testimony. —  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropria- 
tion hill  for  1916,  p.  617. 

73  The  target-practice  allowance  is:  for  the  16-inch  guns,  14  rounds; 
for  the  14-inch  guns,  20  rounds;  for  the  6-inch  guns,  20  rounds;  and 
for  the  mortars,  I214  rounds. —  Testimony  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance. 
Hearings  on  the  fortification  of  the  Panama  Canal  for  1916,  p.  237. 

'^^Ibid.,  pp.  246-247. 


492     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 


Rounds  already 

Rounds  under 

Rounds  to  be  ap' 

shipped 

manufacture 

propriated  for 

16-incli  guns    ....  none 

35 

35 

14-inch  guns    ....    250 

350 

195 

4.7  howitzers    ....  none 

over  3,100 

7,600 

12-inch  mortars  ..2,500 

the  remainder 

none 

On  February  3,  1915,  the  Secretary  of  War  declared  to  the 
House  Subcommittee  in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appro- 
priation bill  that 

"  Approximately  78  per  cent,  of  the  ammunition  supply  needed 
for  all  the  contemplated  armament  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  on 
hand  or  under  manufacture.  The  current  estimates  under  the 
sundry  civil  bill  provided  funds  for  bringing  the  supply  up  to 
about  89  per  cent,  of  that  required.  The  ammunition  supply 
to  date  for  the  foreign  possessions  has,  in  general,  kept  pace 
with  the  armament  as  installed."  "^^ 

The  conditions  in  respect  to  fortifications  and  war  materiel 
in  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  are  therefore  distinctly  superior 
to  those  in  the  United  States.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  an  hour  and  foety-six  minutes 

WOULD  SUFFICB  TO  EXHAUST  THE  LAST  ROUND  OF  AMMUNITION 
IF  THE  GUNS  WERE  FIRED  AT  THEIR  MAXIMUM  RATE^   and  that 

there  exist  no  defences  against  a  land  attack  hy  a  hostile  force 
disemharJcing  on  the  Pacific  side  at  a  point  about  60  miles 
south  of  Panama  and  advancing  along  the  plateau. 

Oahu,  Hawaii 

The  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  in  his  report  for  1914  thus 
summed  up  the  conditions  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands :  "'^ 

"  Battery  construction. —  All  the  seacoast  batteries  included 
in  the  original  project  have  been  completed.  In  accordance  with 
the  scheme  recommended  by  a  board  of  officers  of  which  Brig.- 
Gen.  M.  M.  Macomb  was  president,  these  defenses  have  been 
strengthened  during  the  last  year  by  the  addition  of  a  mortar 

75  Testimony  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  February  3,  1915. —  Hearings 
before  the  Subcommittee  of  the  House  Committee  on  Appropriations  in 
charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  hill  for  1916,  p.  26. 

76  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  p.  17. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     493 

battery,  the  completion  of  which  will  require  an  additional  ap- 
propriation. 

''Searchlights. —  The  searchlights  for  these  coast  defenses 
have  been  supplied,  and  their  installation  is  progressing  at  a 
satisfactory  rate. 

''  Power  plants. —  Completed. 

''Ammunition. —  The  full  allowance  of  ammunition  for  these 
defenses  is  now  on  hand  or  will  be  provided  from  available 
funds. 

"  Fire  control. —  The  fire-control  system  can  be  completed 
Avith  funds  on  hand,  except  as  to  coincidence  range  finders  for 
emergency  stations. 

"  Submarine-mine  structures. —  All  work  under  this  heading 
has  been  completed." 

General  Weaver  also  gave  the  following  satisfactory  account 
of  the  conditions  in  the 

"  Philippine  Islands. 

"  Battery  construction. —  All  the  seacoast  batteries  for  the  de- 
fenses in  the  Philippine  Islands  are  practically  completed,  ex- 
cept one  mortar  battery  and  the  supply  and  mounting  of  the 
armament  at  Fort  Drum,  El  Fraile.  Satisfactory  progress  is 
being  made  on  tlie  completion  of  these  batteries. 

"Searchlights. — Four  searchlights  now  being  supplied  will 
complete  the  searchlight  project  for  these  coast  defenses. 

"  Pov:er  plants. —  Practically  all  the  power  generating  and  dis- 
tributing equipment  for  these  coast  defenses  has  been  installed, 
with  the  exception  of  that  for  Fort  Drum,  El  Fraile,  which  is 
now  being  purchased. 

"  Fire  control. —  The  fire-control  installation  will  be  com- 
pleted during  the  coming  year,  except  as  to  coincidence  range- 
finders  for  emergency  stations.' 


??  7- 


He  likewise  gave  the  ensuing  resume  under  the  heading  of 

"  Suh marine-mine   defense. 

"  Experiment. —  Experiments  with  satisfactory  results  have 
been  continued  in  certain  important  harbors  with  a  view  to 
improving  the  materiel. 

7T  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


494      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

"  Cable. —  It  is  being  supplied  as  rapidly  as  funds  permit, 
and  is  the  only  important  item  of  equipment  short. 

''  Mine  planters. —  The  work  of  these  has  been  more  satis- 
factory than  in  preceding  years,  but  there  are  not  enough  of 
them.  Additional  ones  are  needed  for  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 
and  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

''  Distribution  box  boats. —  Future  boats  of  this  class  should 
■be  larger  than  the  present  ones. 

''  Torpedo  depot. —  This  depot  has  performed  its  function 
satisfactorily  during  the  past  year."  '^ 

On  February  3,  1915,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  testifying 
before  the  House  subcommittee  in  charge  of  the  Fortifica- 
tions Appropriation  bill,  put  the  status  of  the  ammunition 
in  our  Pacific  possessions  in  a  nutshell  by  declaring  that  ''  ap- 
proximately 71  per  cent,  of  the  prescribed  allowance  has  been 
supplied  for  the  Hawaiian  and  Philippine  armament."  ^^ 

MEDICAL  DEPAETMEXT 

On  N'ovember  27,  1914,  the  actual  strength  of  the  Medical 
Department  was 

Medical  Corps  (exclusive  of  20  vancacies)    ....  421 

Dental  Corps 67 

Medical  Eeserve  Corps,  active   97 

"             ''       inactive 1,249  1,346 

Contract  surgeons 15 

Total    1,852 

The  Dodge  Commission  which  investigated  the  conduct  of 
the  War  Department  during  the  war  with  Spain  wdsely 
recommended  that  sufficient  medical  supplies  be  kept  on  hand 
to  equip  a  force  four  times  that  of  the  standing  Army. 
Although  the  present  authorized  strength  of  the  Regular 
establishment  is  100,000,  General  Gorgas,  the  Surgeon  Gen- 
eral, testified  on  December  5,  1914,  before  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs  that  "  our  resen^e  at  present  would 

78/6tcZ.,  pp.  17-18. 

79  Hearings  before  Subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  p.  26. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     495 

equip  200,000  men  "  but  that  these  supplies  had  been  consid- 
erably reduced  by  the  needs  of  the  forces  in  the  field,  on  the 
Mexican  border  and  at  Vera  Cruz.  He  also  stated  that  there 
were  only  19  motor-ambulances;  that  in  time  of  war  it  would 
take  "  perhaps  six  or  eight  months  "  to  accumulate  the  medi- 
cal supplies  needed ;  and  that,  owing  to  their  being  in  imits, 
as  well  as  prepared  and  specially  adapted  for  field  service, 
they  cannot  be  bought  in  open  market  "  but  must  of  necessity 
be  manufactured.''  He  likewise  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  none  of  the  States  have  a  full  equipment  in  the  medical 
corps.  ^^ 

EQUIPMENT  AND  EESERVE  SUPPLY  DEPOTS   ' 

Within  the  past  ^^^q  years  new  equipment  had  been  adopted 
both  for  the  infantry  and  cavalry  —  the  former  especially 
being  perhaps  the  most  satisfactory  yet  devised  in  any  army. 
Experiments  are  also  being  made  with  a  view  to  improving  the 
outfits  for  the  pack  trains.  As  a  part  of  wisdom  the  Ord- 
nance Department  has  sought  to  use  up  all  old  equipment 
before  issuing  the  new,  but  of  the  former  some  $150,000 
worth  still  remains  on  hand,  in  addition  to  what  has  been 
supplied  to  the  militia,  which  has  none  of  the  new  equipment. 
The  Army  has  at  present  no  armoured  car  nor  does  there 
exist  any  law  permitting  the  Government  to  commandeer 
automobiles  in  time  of  war  as  is  universally  done  in  Europe.  ^^ 
In  December,  1914,  Secretary  Garrison  approved  a  policy 
whereby  reserve  supplies  of  every  sort  sufficient  to  equip  the 
National  Guard  at  war  strength  will  be  placed  with  such 
States  as  have  suitable  storage  space  in  their  armouries.  These 
supplies  are  to  be  under  lock  and  key,  accessible  only  to  Regu- 
lar officers,  and  not  to  be  served  out  to  the  States  until  the  be- 
ginning of  war.     In  the  case  of  States  lacking  in  proper 

80  Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  bill  for  1916,  pp.  71,  629, 
631-633. 

81  General  Crozier's  testimony. —  Bearings  on  the  Army  Appropria- 
tion hill  for  1916,  pp.  669-673  —  and  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
for  lOlJf,  p.  32. 


496     Militartf  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

armouries,  these  stores  will  be  deposited  in  the  nearest  Eegu- 
lar  Army  depot.^^  The  adoption  of  this  policy  —  which  is 
universal  throughout  the  great  armies  of  the  world  —  marks  a 
great  stride  in  the  right  direction,  but  it  will  still  be  necessary 
for  Congress  to  make  much  larger  appropriations  than  hereto- 
fore if  the  desired  amount  of  supplies  is  to  be  procured.  A 
fair  instance  of  the  deficiencies  in  the  matter  of  war  materiel 
is  to  be  found  in  tabulated  statement  prepared  by  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance  on  January  20,  1915,  and  transmitted  to  the  Presi- 
dent six  days  later  by  the  Secretary  of  War.^^  It  is  based 
upon  the  conservative  estimate  of  the  Greble  board  —  which 
was  appointed  on  February  20,  1911,  ^^  to  consider  questions 
concerning  the  types  of  field  guns  and  ammunition  supply 
therefor" — and,  summarized,  is  as  follows: 


To  be  on 
hand  at  the 
outbreak  of 
war,  as  es- 
timated by 
the  Tables 
of  Organ- 
ization and 
by  the 
Greble 
Board 


Actually  on 
hand  or  un- 
der manu- 
facture, 
January  1, 
1915 


Shortage 


Rounds  of  rifle  ball  cartridges, 
model  1906    

Number  of  Field  Artillery  guns 
and    howitzers    

Rounds  of  Field  Artillery  ammu- 
nition     

Sets  of  Artillery  harness 


513,130,640 

1,292 

1,713,240 
21,104 


231,186,596 
743 

224,097 

9,808 


282,244,044 

549 

1,489,143 
11,296 


ISTot  less  startling  is  the  contrast  between  the  number  of 
batteries  of  field  artillery  of  four  guns  each  which  the  United 
States  ought  to  have  and  what  it  actually  possesses,  as  the 
ensuing  table  shows: 

82  Testimony  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  December  5,  1914. — 
Hearings,  p.  633.  ^ 

83  Equipment  requisite  for  Army  in  time  of  war.     Senate  Document 
No.  718y  63d  Congress,  3d  Session,  pp.  4-5. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     497 

Eecommended  Actually  on 

by  the  Greble  hand  Janu- 

Board  ary  1,  1915 
2.95-inch  mountain  guns  (obsolete)   .  .   IsTone  20 

3-inch  mountain  howitzers 27  1 

3-inch  guns 195  126 

3.8-incli  howitzers 36  2 

4.7-inch  guns 15  9-J 

4.7-inch  howitzers 35  9J 

6-inch  howitzers 15  8  ®* 

According  to  the  report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for 
1914,^^  the  small  arms  and  personal  equipments  required  for 
the  recruits  needed  to  bring  the  Regular  Army  up  to  war 
strength  as  prescribed  by  the  Field  Service  Regulations  have 
been  stored  at  the  various  recruit  depots,  thus  permitting 
their  being  armed  and  equipped  before  joining  their  com- 
mands. The  requisite  horse  equipments  are  also  on  hand  at 
the  various  supply  arsenals.  On  October  1,  1914,  the  major 
part  of  the  small-arms,  personal  and  horse  equipments  neces- 
sary for  the  Organized  Militia  at  war  strength  were  packed, 
marked  and  ready  for  shipment  to  the  State  mobilization 
camps.  However,  since  orders  had  been  received  to  furnish 
the  new  infantry  equipment  of  the  1910  model  to  all  infan- 
try organizations  and  to  all  Coast  Artillery  companies  of  the 
militia  destined  to  be  formed  into  provisional  regiments  for 
active  service,  it  was  found  necessary  to  break  up  some  of 
the  sets  intended  for  future  militia  in  order  to  make  this 
issue,  and  to  replace  them  by  old  equipment.  Most  of  the 
small-arms  and  equipments  for  this  purpose  for  the  States  in 
the  Eastern  Department  east  of  Kentucky  and  north  of  ^orth 
Carolina  had  then  been  stored  at  the  Army  Field  Supply 
Depot  Xo.  1  at  Philadelphia,  while  those  for  the  remaining 
States  within  the  Eastern  Department  and  for  each  one  of 
the  other  departments  in  the  United  States  had  been  placed 
at  the  respective  supply  arsenals. 

84  Ihid.,  p.  6. 

85  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  for  1914,  pp.  20-21. 


498     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

General  Crozier's  report  showed  a  decidedly  bad  state  in 
respect  to 

''  Volunteers. —  The  small  arms,  personal  and  horse  equip- 
ments essentially  required  for  the  volunteer  branch  of  the  Army 
are  on  hand,  under  manufacture  or  covered  by  current  funds 
available  for  their  manufacture,  except  a  considerable  number 
of  horse  equipments  which  are  still  required  to  complete  the 
equipments  of  the  volunteer  Field  Artillery.  In  addition  to  the 
shortage  of  horse  equipment  for  Field  Artillery  troops,  there 
is  a  complete  deficiency  of  horse  equipment  required  for  other 
branches  of  the  volunteer  service  in  case  of  emergency,  such 
as  staff  departments,  mounted  detachments,  mounted  engineers, 
mounted  Signal  Corps  troops,  and  Hospital  Corps  troops  ac- 
companying mounted  detachments.'^ 

On  December  4,  1914,  the  Quartermaster  General  stated 
to  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  that  in  the 
principal  Army  depots  located  at  Philadelphia,  St.  Louis  and 
San  Francisco  there  existed  a  sufficient  supply  of  clothing  and 
shoes  to  '^  equip  more  than  100,000  men  and  maintain  this 
equipment  for  from  four  to  six  months  "  ;  that,  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  clothing,  shoes,  etc.,  were  of  the  correct  sizes, 
150,000  to  175,000  men  could  be  fitted  out;  that  the  plant 
at  Philadelphia  was  capable  of  manufacturing  a  thousand 
garments  per  diem;  and  that  the  reserve  supply  of  these  items 
was  better  than  he  had  ever  known  them  to  be.  On  the  other 
hand,  General  Aleshire's  testimony  developed  certain  con- 
spicuous deficiencies,  insomuch  as  he  showed  that  the  Army 
has  only  13  pack  trains  of  65  animals  each  in  the  United 
States  and  nine  in  the  Philippines;  that  there  were  only 
2,720  escort  or  army  wagons  in  the  United  States  and  617  in 
the  Philippines,  while  the  number  of  motor  trucks  in  both 
was  only  76  —  the  whole  forming  a  totally  inadequate  amount 
to  supply  an  army  in  time  of  war  — ;  and  that  of  the  fleet 
of  eleven  Army  transports,  the  Meade  was  forty  years  old 
and  the  Croolc  thirty-two. ^^ 

86  Testimony  of  the  Quartermaster  General,  December  4,  1914. — 
Hearings  on  the  Army  Appropriation  hill  for  1916,  pp.  529-531,  437,  440, 
447-448,  466  and  452. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     499 

EEMOUXT  DEPOTS 
The  breeding  of  horses  for  military  purposes  —  conducted 
jointly  by  the  War  and  Agriculture  Departments  since  1910 
—  has  been  marked  by  decided  success,  hampered  mainly  by 
the  limited  appropriations  for  this  purpose.  A  distinct  im- 
provement in  the  type  of  remount  has  been  made  as  a  result  of 
careful  selection  and  breeding,  but  the  military  service  cannot 
derive  the  full  benefit  of  this  admirable  institution  until  it  is 
given  additional  assistance  by  Congress.  The  value  of  such 
breeding  establishments  has  been  too  well  demonstrated  in 
Europe  to  permit  of  any  question  as  to  their  efiicacy.  The 
number  of  remount  depots  now  possessed  by  the  United 
States  is  limited  to  three,  which  are  situated  at  Front  Eoyal, 
Virginia,  Fort  Reno,  Oklahoma,  and  Fort  Keogh,  Montana, 
and  the  number  of  animals  received  through  them  during  the 
fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1914,  was  1,838  horses  and  231 
mules.  ^^ 

OEGAI^IZED  MILITIA. 
According  to  the  latest  returns  made  in  1914  the  Organized 
Militia  or  j^ational  Guards  of  the  various  States  numbered 
8,323  officers  and  119,087  enlisted  men,  a  total  of  127,410,^^- 
divided  as  follows: 

Officers  Men 
Mobile  forces  (Engineers,  Cavalry,  Field  Ar- 
tillery and  Infantry)   .' 7,018         106,911 

Staff  and  non-combatant  branches 855  5,026 

Coast  Artillery 450  7,150 

Total 8,323         119,087 

Of  the  Organized  Militia  there  were  present  at  the  annual 
inspection  in  1914, 

Mobile  forces 6,553  85,541 

Staff  corps 692  4,090 

Coast  Artillery 439  5,989 

Total    7,684  95,620 

87  Report  of  the  Quartermaster  General  for   1914,  pp.  59-60. 

88  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff   (General  Wother spoon ) ,  November  15, 
1914,  p.  6. 


500     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in  other  words,  only  81.07  per  cent,  of  the  total  strength,  the 
number  absent  being  639  officers  and  23,467  men. 

The  number  who  attended  camps  of  instruction  was, 

Mobile  force    5,904  77,353 

Staff   corps    568  3,744 

Coast  Artillery   423  6,135 

Total    6,895  87,232 

or  73.87  per  cent.,  1,428  officers  and  31,855  men  being  absent. 

Officers  Percent- 

and  men  age 

In  organizations  armed  with  rifles 111,140 

Participating  in  rifle-practice    (season  of 

1913)    66,974  52.56 

Qualified    as    second-class    marksmen    or 
better    42,599  33.43 

The  regulations  of  the  War  Department  are  that  organiza- 
tions of  the  National  Guard  shall  take  part  in  at  least  24 
drills  per  annum j  but,  although  the  reports  show  that  in  the 
bulk  of  the  States  the  units  met  these  requirements,  in  the 
major  part  of  the  organizations  a  considerable  number  of 
men  failed  to  comply.  Indeed  the  total  of  those  who  neg- 
lected to  attend  the  24  drills  amounted  to  no  less  than  37,874 
out  of  the  119,087  enlisted  men.  The  Chief  of  Staff  also  as- 
serted that  it  was  "  a  safe  conclusion  that  not  a  single  unit 
at  its  maximum  strength  marched  a  distance  of  ten  miles 
fully  equipped  and  armed."  When  it  is  additionally  re- 
membered that  in  the  Organized  Militia  the  number  of  com- 
panies, troops,  batteries,  etc.,  amounts  to  2,000  and  that  1,120 
of  them  are  below  the  prescribed  minimum  strength,  a  fair 
estimate  can  be  made  of  the  value  of  the  ^N^ational  Guard 
as  a  military  asset  and  of  how  much  dependence  could  be  put 
upon  it  if  pitted  against  trained  regulars. ^^ 

89  Ibid.,  pp.  6-7. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     501 

Organization  of  the  Militia, 

The  report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the 
United  States,  embodying  the  broad  principles  of  a  correct 
military  policy  and  tactical  organization,  and  put  into  effect 
by  Secretary  Stimson's  order  on  February  6,  1913  —  as  has 
been  seen  on  pages  421  and  426  —  contemplated  the  formation 
of  16  divisions  at  war  strength  —  of  which  the  Regular  x\rmy 
was  to  furnish  four  and  the  Organized  Militia  twelve  —  as 
well  as  the  field  army  troops  and  cavalry  suitable  for  four  nor- 
mal field  armies  into  which  the  twelve  tactical  divisions  of  mi- 
litia might  be  organized  in  time  of  war.  This  number  was  as- 
signed to  the  militia,  since  it  gave  a  fair  strength  of  first-line 
troops  and  because  every  indication  pointed  to  the  improbabil- 
ity of  any  marked  increase  in  the  personnel  of  the  various 
National  Guards.  The  governors  agreed  to  the  scheme,  but 
up  to  the  present  time  little  has  been  achieved  in  carrying 
out  this  correct  divisional  organization.  There  are,  however, 
two  notable  exceptions:  the  6th  division  (I^ew  York)  is  prac- 
tically complete  and  the  Tth  division  (Pennsylvania),  al- 
though lacking  in  auxiliary  troops,  is  well  on  the  way  to  the 
desired  organization.  All  the  others  are  sadly  deficient  in 
at  least  one  of  the  auxiliary  arms,  and  all  but  the  16th  (Mon- 
tana, Idaho,  Washington,  California,  Nevada  and  Utah)  have 
a  decided  excess  of  infantry.  The  present  status  of  these 
12  militia  divisions  taken  collectively  is  as  follows : 

Deficiency         Excess 

Batteries  of  field  artillery 78  0 

Troops  of  cavalry 61  7 

Companies  of  infantry 0  316 

Companies  of  engineers 25  11 

Companies  of  Signal  troops 3  9 

Ximiber  of  field  hospitals    12  0 

NumI.er  of  ambulance  companies 34  0 

For  a  field  army  the  only  cavalry  available  consisted  of  tAvo 
troops  in  the  5th  division  (N^ew  England)  and  one  squadron 


502      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in  the  6th  (New  York),  but  this  is  offset  by  a  shortage  of  61 
troops  elsewhere;  the  only  engineers  are  2  battalions  in  the 
6th  division  and  2  companies  in  the  11th  (Ohio  and  Michi- 
gan), counterbalanced  by  a  deficiency  of  25  companies  in  the 
others.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.  When  a  divisional 
district  is  comprised  of  a  single  State,  the  military  authorities 
have  an  interest  in,  and  are  responsible  for,  a  proper  co-ordi- 
nation of  the  various  elements;  but  when  such  a  district  is 
composed  of  two  or  more  States,  the  authorities  of  each  fol- 
low their  own  dictates.  Infantry  is  much  cheaper  to  main- 
tain than  the  other  arms;  the  Federal  Government  neither 
prescribes  the  proportion  of  auxiliary  units  required  nor  can 
it  compel  the  States  to  spend  the  money  allotted  to  them  in 
a  manner  which  would  insure  a  properly  balanced  force ;  and 
many  of  the  States  made  no  effort  in  the  eleven  years 
which  elapsed  between  January  21,  1903,  and  January  1, 
1914,  to  repeal  such  laws  as  conflicted  with  the  standards  set 
by  the  Government.  Indeed  so  lax  were  they  that  on  December 
31,  1913,  the  shortage  of  troops  as  compared  with  the  Federal 
requirements  reached  the  serious  number  of  nearly  16,000 
men  —  approximately  the  amount  which  would  form  an  in- 
fantry division  at  war  strength  —  and  the  War  Department 
had  no  alternative  than  to  reduce  the  minimum  of  enlisted 
strength,^^  since  the  shortage  was  such  that  the  organizations 

90  Minimum,  of  enlisted  strength  for  the  Organized  Militia  as  revised 
and  published  by  the  War  Department  in  1914: 

Infantry,    company    65  men 

Field  Artillery,  battery    133 

Cavalry,  troop 65 

Engineers,  company   65 

Signal  Corps: 

Type  A,  company   75 

Type  B,  company   74 

Type  C,  company   40 

Type  C,  company   67 

Sanitary  troops: 

Ambulance  company 43 

Field  hospital    33 

Coast  Artillery,  company   65 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     503 

were  "  of  no  value  as  a  military  asset  to  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment," 60  per  cent.,  of  the  engineer  and  infantry  com- 
panies, 70  per  cent,  of  the  cavalry,  80  per  cent,  of  the  coast 
artillery  and  practically  all  of  the  field  artillery  being  below 
the  existing  minimum.  ^^  As  General  Mills  stated  in  his  re- 
port for  1914  as  the  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs, 


92 


"  Many  States  have  solved  the  problem  of  disposing  of  officers 
made  supernumerary  through  the  operation  of  Circular  No.  8 
which  prescribed  the  tactical  organization  for  the  militia  and 
which  went  into  effect  on  January  1,  1914,  by  maintaining  a 
military  organization  separate  from  and  additional  to  the  Or- 
ganized Militia.  Such  forces  are  maintained  for  purely  State 
purposes,  and  are  made  up  generall}^  of  officers  formerly  be- 
longing to  the  Organized  Militia,  and  of  officers  of  the  Organized 
Militia  carrying  additional  State  rank.  It  is  believed  that  the 
legal  standing  of  these  State  troops  is  doubtful,  that  they  do 
not  contribute  to  the  efficiency  of  the  Organized  Militia,  and 
that  they  represent  a  useless  expense  to  the  State.  Neverthe- 
less, the  War  Department  has  interposed  no  objection  to  their 
maintenance,  which,  it  is  hoped,  is  only  a  temporary  expedient." 

In  consequence  of  the  standard  prescribed  by  the  Federal 
Government,  a  considerable  change  has  taken  place  in  the  or- 
ganization of  the  infantry  of  the  National  Guards,  resulting 
in  a  reduction  of  the  higher  and  an  increase  in  the  lower  units. 
The  infantry  of  the  Organized  Militia  was  composed,  accord- 
ing to  the  last  returns  in  1914,  of  2  divisions,  25  separate 
brigades,  37  separate  regiments,  19  separate  battalions  and  22 
separate  companies,  all  virtually  complete  and  organized  in 
pursuance  with  law,  the  total  strength  being  6,328  officers  and 
95,109  enlisted  men.  The  actual  number  of  militia  infantry 
regiments  to  be  utilized  in  the  scheme  embodied  in  the  Organi- 
zation of  the  Land  Forces  is  108  and,  as  there  exist  130,  the 
excess  amounts  to  22  regiments.  This  excess  exercises  a  dis- 
tinctly detrimental  effect,  since  many  States  persist  in  main- 


91  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  for  1914,  pp.  199- 
208. 

92  Ihid.,  p.  209. 


504     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

taining  more  regiments  of  infantry  than  they  can  fill  to  the 
proper  strength,  and  the  personnel  of  most  of  the  organizations 
naturally  falls  below  the  requisite  strength  which  they  ought 
to  possess.  Another  result  is  that  the  officers  are  deprived  of 
the  opportunity  of  handling  men  in  the  numbers  which  they 
would  be  called  upon  to  lead  in  war.  This  defect  could  easily 
be  remedied  if  the  States  would  reduce  the  number  of  regi- 
ments to  the  quota  required  of  the  divisional  district  to  which 
they  belong  and  would  maintain  the  residue  at  full  strength.  ^^ 

On  October  1,  1914,  the  cavalry  organizations  of  the  'Nsl- 
tional  Guards  consisted  of  3  regiments,  8  squadrons,  2  bands, 
1  machine-gun  detachment  and  91  troops,  aggregating  4,940 
officers  and  men  —  a  distinct  shortage  in  proportion  to  the 
number  they  ought  to  possess.  The  greater  expense  of  main- 
tenance had  deterred  many  of  the  States  from  organizing 
units  of  the  mounted  arm,  and  the  allotment  of  funds  has 
not  been  made  in  proportion  to  the  expense  that  would  be 
incurred  in  bringing  it  up  to  the  proper  standard.  The  re- 
sult is  that  many  of  the  officers  and  troops,  whose  zeal  is  most 
commendable,  are  obliged  to  maintain  their  own  mounts  at 
private  expense.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  latest  available  sta- 
tistics show  that  the  States  ow^n  only  211  mounts,  whereas  the 
organizations  and  troopers  owtl  1,376,  and  146  are  available 
from  various  other  sources.  The  injustice  of  this  system 
is  manifest,  although  the  States  do  provide  mounts  for  their 
cavalry  at  the  annual  encampments  and  a  few  supply  mounts 
for  several  additional  assemblies  every  year.  In  many  in- 
stances the  armoury  facilities  are  wholly  inadequate  or  lack- 
ing altogether,  and  the  cavalry  drill  regulations,  issued  in 
1896,  are  sadly  out  of  date  and  in  need  of  revision. ^^ 

The  field  artillery  of  the  Organized  Militia  had  taken  on  a 
new  lease  of  life  since  1913,  ten  new  batteries  having  been 
organized,  one  disbanded  and  the  War  Department  withdrew 

Q^Ihid.,  pp.  218-219. 

Qilhid.,  pp.  223-228;   Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff   (General  Wother 
spoon)    for   1914,   p.   7. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     505 

its  recognition  from  one.  The  new  batteries  and  two  regi- 
ments in  Xew  York  and  one  in  Minnesota  have  been  fullv 
organized  and  equipped,  and  the  battalion  organizations  in 
Georgia  and  Alabama  completed.  This  arm  of  the  service 
now  consists  of  3  regiments,  10  battalions  and  19  separate 
batteries,  a  total  of  65  batteries,  of  which  46  are  combined 
into  tactical  groups,  thus  greatly  increasing  their  value  as  a 
military  asset,  owing  to  the  ease  with  which  they  may  be  mo- 
bilized, concentrated  and  utilized.  Of  the  remaining  19 
batteries,  Pennsylvania  has  three  and  is  about  to  complete  a 
battalion  organization;  Xew  Jersey  and  Missouri  have  two 
apiece ;  while  the  other  twelve  are  scattered  all  over  the  coun- 
try in  such  a  way  as  to  render  difficult  the  organization  w^hich 
alone  would  make  them  efficient.  The  present  distribution 
is  shown  in  the  table  at  the  top  of  the  next  page. 

This  table  shows  the  regrettable  fact  that  the  6th  division 
(Xew  York)  alone  had  its  full  quota  of  field  artillery,  with- 
out w^hich  infantry  in  modern  warfare  stands  as  little  chance 
as  sheep  in  shambles ;  the  other  divisions  have  percentages 
ranging  from  seventeen  in  the  case  of  the  10th  division  to 
sixty-six  in  the  13th.  The  Chief  of  the  Division  of 
Militia  Affairs  declared  in  his  report  for  1914  that  ^'  there 
are  batteries  in  the  Organized  Militia  to-day  which  for  two 
-years  have  had  no  field  service,  practice  marches,  service  prac- 
tice, or  the  use  of  horses  except  for  an  occasional  street 
parade  " ;  that  "  the  strength  of  many  of  the  batteries  con- 
tinues to  be  far  below  the  required  number  of  enlisted  men  '' ; 
that  ^^  29  organizations  had  no  horses  except  at  camp " ; 
and  that  30  ''  failed  to  have  mounted  drills  of  any  kind 
except  at  camp  ''  during  the  preceding  fiscal  year  —  nearly 
all  of  which  was  attributable  to  a  lack  of  support  on  the  part 
of  the  States.^^  Apropos  of  this  last.  General  Mills  very 
pertinently  remarks  ^^  that 


95  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Afifairs,  for  1914,  pp.  229- 
238. 

96  7&iU,  pp.  221.-222. 


506      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 


Division 

States  comprising  division  district 

Organ- 
ized 

Short- 
age 

Fifth 

Sixth 
Seventh 

Maine,  New  Hampshire   (1  battery), 
Vermont,    Massachusetts     ( 1    bat- 
talion), Rhode  Island   (1  battery), 
Connecticut    ( 1   battery) 

New    York    

Pennsylvania   (3  batteries)    

6 

12 

3 

6 
3 
2 
5 
6 

8 

4 

5 

5 

6 

none 

9 

Eighth 

New  Jersey   (2  batteries),  Delaware, 
Maryland,  Virginia    (1  battalion). 
West  Virginia,  District  of  Colum- 
bia   ( 1  battery )    

6 

Ninth 
Tenth 
Eleventh 

North      Carolina,      South     Carolina, 
Georgia    ( 1   battalion ) ,  Florida . .  . 

Kentucky,      Tennessee,      Mississippi, 
Alabama   (1  battalion,  2  batteries) 

Michigan    ( 1  battalion,  2  batteries ) , 
Ohio    ( 1   battalion )    

9 
10 

7 

Twelfth 

Illinois     (1    battalion),    Indiana     (1 
battalion )     

6 

Thirteenth 
Fourteenth 

North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Minne- 
sota   (1    regiment),   Wisconsin    (1 
battery ) ,  Iowa   ( 1  battery )    

Wyoming,  Colorado   (1  battery),  Ne- 
braska,  Kansas    (1   battery),  Mis- 
souri   (2  batteries)    

4 
8 

Fifteenth 

New  Mexico    (1  battery),  Oklahoma, 
Texas      ( 1      battery ) ,      Arkansas, 
Louisiana    ( 1  battalion)     

7 

Sixteenth 

Montana,     Washington,     Oregon      ( 1 
battery),     Idaho,      California      (1 
battalion),  Nevada,  Utah    (1   bat- 
tery),   Arizona    

7 

Total     

65 

79 

"  Without  going  into  all  the  details  of  what  constitutes  the 
support  which  every  battery  has  a  right  to  expect  of  the  military 
authorities  of  its  State  it  will  perhaps  be  sufficient  to  point  out 
that  materiel  which  is  not  adequately  housed  and  cared  for  will 
deteriorate,  that  a  mounted  organization  unprovided  with  horses 
and  facilities  for  mounted  drill  is  a  mounted  organization  in 
name  only,  and  that  the  Artillery  organization  which  has  not 
had  facilities  for  learning  how  to  shoot  and  opportunities  for 
demonstrating  its  ability  to  shoot  is  an  Artillery  organization 
in  name  only.  No  matter  how  interested  and  capable  the  militia 
Field  Artillery  officers  may  be,  adequate  results  can  not  be 
accomplished  unless  adequate  support  is  given." 

In  view  of  the  all-important  role  played  by  artillery  in  the 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     507 

present  European  war,  the  condition  of  this  arm  of  the  militia 
is  scarcely  pleasant  to  contemplate. 

The  number  of  militia  companies  of  engineers  last  reported 
was  twenty-two,  with  a  strength  of  78  officers  and  1,246  en- 
listed men.  The  lack  of  proper  distribution,  territorially 
considered,  prevails  as  in  former  years ;  '^  seven  divisions 
have  no  Engineer  troops,  two  have  more  than  the  required 
quota,  and  three  have  one  or  more  organizations,  but  less 
than  the  proper  quota." 

There  are  also  twenty-two  companies  of  Signal  Corps 
troops,  eight  more  than  are  required  for  the  twelve  militia 
divisions,  but  their  distribution  is  quite  as  faulty  as  in  the 
case  of  the  engineers,  although  the  number  approximating  to 
the  Regular  Army  type  —  which  is  designated  by  the  letter 
A  —  is  sufficient  for  the  needs  of  12  divisions.  ^^ 

The  sanitary  troops  of  the  Organized  Militia  are  organ- 
ized into  26  field  hospitals,  14  ambulance  companies  and  156 
detachments,  and  number  869  Medical  Corps  officers  and 
3,554  Hospital  Corps  men,  a  gain  of  90  officers  and  450  men 
over  the  previous  year,  but  confined  to  37  States  while  the 
other  14  showed  a  decrease.  Twelve  tactical  divisions  prop- 
erly organized  will  require  36  field  hospitals  and  48  am- 
bulance companies,  but  there  exist  only  26  of  the  former  and 
14  of  the  latter,  and  besides  '^  the  efficiency  of  the  sanitary 
troops  in  regard  to  organization,  training  and  equipment 
...  is  far  from  having  reached  that  standard  which  is 
necessary  if  its  immediate  use  in  war  be  considered."  A 
fair  example  of  the  dependence  to  be  placed  on  these  troops  — 
upon  whom  will  devolve  the  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in 
time  of  war  —  may  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that,  at  the  annual 
inspection  in  1914,  out  of  869  commissioned  medical  officers, 
only  615  were  present  and  254  —  or  more  than  one-third  — 
were  absent,  while  of  the  3,554  enlisted  men,  624  or  one- 
sixth  absented  themselves.  So  incomplete  are  the  company 
and  detachment  rosters,  that  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  the 

97  lUd.,  pp.  242-246. 


508     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

number  of  drills,  practice  marches  or  other  instruction  given 
during  the  year.  Of  the  12  militia  divisions,  only  one  (the 
11th,  Ohio  and  Michigan),  has  a  full  quota  of  field  hospitals 
and  ambulance  companies ;  the  others  are  lacking  in  many  of 
these  important  units.  West  of  the  Mississippi  there  are 
but  seven  field  hospitals  and  two  ambulance  companies,  while 
the  7th  (Pennsylvania),  8th,  13th  and  15th  divisions  —  to 
their  shame  be  it  said  —  have  no  ambulance  companies  at  all. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  exclusive  of  the  ^National  Guard  of  the 
District  of  Columbia,  "^  there  are  hut  307  ambulances  in  the 
entire  Organized  Militia,  which  is  269  short  of  the  mini- 
mum number  that  would  he  required  in  case  these  troops 
were  ordered  for  active  duty  in  the  field/'  In  some  States 
the  units  are  fairly  well  equipped,  in  others  not  so;  many 
are  without  overcoats  and  shoes,  and  even  more  are  short  of 
the  proper  medical  supplies.  The  blame  is  easily  placed, 
for  General  Mills  declares  that  ^^  There  appears  to  be  reluct- 
ance on  the  part  of  many  of  the  States  to  requisition  for  a 
proper  supply  to  meet  the  requirements  of  their  organiza- 
tions for  field  service."  ^^ 

Instruction  and  training  of  the  mobile  forces  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia. 

After  a  careful  study  of  the  needs  of  the  Organized  Militia, 
the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that,  in  a  general  system  of  practical  field  instruction  cover- 
ing three  years, 

"the  first  year  should  be  given  to  regimental  encampments 
wherein  the  instruction  should  be  principally  for  companies  and 
battalions,  ending  with  that  of  the  regiment. 

"  The  second  year  should  be  given  to  regimental  or  brigade 
encampments,  the  instruction  to  be  principally  for  battalions 
and  regiments,  ending  with  that  of  the  brigade  where  such  an 
organization  exists. 

"  The  third  year  should  be  given  to  a  joint  maneuver,  the 
troops  in  each  divisional  district  being  assembled  and  instruction 

98  Ibid.,  pp.  247-252. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     509 

given  to  the  division  first  in  marches,  combined  with  the  prob- 
lems of  supply  and  of  security  and  information,  and  culminating 
in  the  contact  and  battle  operations  of  two  divisions  where  prac- 
ticable." 

In  the  hope  of  standardizing  the  methods  of  instruction  in 
the  Organized  Militia,  it  expressed  its  views  in  Circular  No. 
3,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914,  emphasizing  the  fact 
that  '^  the  ideas  set  forth  are  advisory  only,"  but  as  yet 
there  exists  no  data  to  shov^  how  far  the  States  have  fallen 
in  with  these  recommendations. 

Theoretical  and  practical  instruction  indoors  has  been 
given  for  some  years,  but  considerable  handicap  has  been 
experienced  in  the  inadequacy  of  the  militia  armouries- 
The  reports  for  1914  show  that  there  were  2,000  militia  or- 
ganizations and  that  the  state  of  their  armouries  was  as 
follows : 

Number 

Drill  hall  inadequate  for  indoor  drills    602 

Use  as  an  armoury  interfered  with  by  use  for  non-mili- 
tary purposes   146 

Armouries  not  affording  proper  protection  for  U.   S. 

Government  property   303 

Not  equipped  with  indoor  shooting  ranges 331 

Neither  equipped  for  indoor  gallery  practice  and  with- 
out room  therefor 118 

Location,   construction  or  equipment   such   as   to   dis- 
courage enlistment  or  re-enlistment 1,460 

State  encampments  were  held  as  usual  in  1914  but,  as  has 
been  seen  in  the  preceding  chapter,  joint  Regular  Army  and 
Militia  manoeuvres  had  to  be  abandoned  owing  to  the  with- 
drawal of  so  many  Regular  organizations  for  service  along 
the  Mexican  border  and  at  Vera  Cruz.  There  was  also  a 
notable  falling  off  in  the  number  of  camps  of  instruction  for 
infantry  officers  of  the  militia  as  compared  with  the  two 
previous  years.  In  this  last  instance  was  afforded  a  fresh 
example  of  how  the  failure  to  do  justice  to  others  may  work 
harm  to  ourselves  and  our  friends.     The  neglect  of  Con- 


510     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

gress  to  provide  a  sufficient  amount  of  officers  for  the  Regular 
Army  made  it  impossible  to  furnish  the  number  of  inspector- 
instructors  demanded  by  the  National  Guards  in  their  effort 
to  improve  their  training,  and  the  extension  of  the  lav^  re- 
specting detached  service  to  the  field  officers  and  troops  on 
the  southern  frontier  rendered  the  situation  worse  than  be- 
fore. On  top  of  that  Congress  failed  to  appropriate  funds 
to  meet  the  travelling  expenses  of  these  officers,  with  the  re- 
sult that  only  such  States  as  paid  their  expenses  got  any 
officers.^^  The  Army  List  and  Directory  for  April  20,  1915, 
shows  only  117  officers  on  the  active  list  of  the  Army  on  duty 
Avith  the  militia,  and  the  nvimber  of  retired  officers  so  detailed 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  April  23,  1901,  was  not 
more  than  eighteen. -^^^  The  target  practice  was  "  far  from 
satisfactory '' ;  in  many  instances  the  firing  was  conducted 
without  proper  instruction  and  only  38.3  per  cent,  of  the  mi- 
litia ^'  have  reached  that  stage  of  proficiency  which  marks 
them  as  suitable  for  battle  purposes."  If  there  is  one  thing 
an  infantryman  ought  to  be  able  to  do  properly  it  is  to  shoot, 
and  these  conditions  need  no  further  commentary.  In  the 
past  the  trouble  has  been  due  to  the  desire  of  each  State  to 
win  the  rifle  trophy,  and  too  much  time  has  been  devoted  to 
a  small  number  of  special  marksmen  rather  than  to  the  devel- 
opment of  the  privates  in  the  regiments  as  a  whole.  Of  the 
field  artillery,  twelve  batteries  had  no  practice  at  firing  at 
all  during  1913  and  1914,  only  155  men  qualified  as  first- 
class  gunners  and  a  paltry  thirty  men  as  second-class  gun- 
ners.-^^^ 

Shortage  of  the  mobile  forces  of  the  Organized  Militia  in 

troops  and  materiel. 

In  his  report  as  Chief  of  Staff  for  the  period  between  April 


Q^IMd.,  pp.  211-215,  220-221,  10. 

100  Army  List  and  Directory,  April  20,  1915,  pp.  70-73. 

101  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  for  1914,  pp.  9, 
256-257,  301,  238. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     511 

22  and  ^N'ovember  15,  1914,  General  Wotherspoon  de- 
clared ^^2  that 

"  As  organized  the  militia  is  deficient  in  the  following  units 
to  make  it  a  properly  balanced  and  efficient  field  force : 

Cavalry,  number  of  troops   54 

Field  artillery,  number  of  batteries 79 

Engineers,  number  of  companies 14 

Ambulance  companies   34 

Field  hospitals    12  " 

and  he  went  on  to  unfold  the  following  unpalatable  truths: 

''As  to  the  materiel  necessary  to  'put  this  force  into  the  field 
and  maintain  it  there  for  a  period  of  six  months,  there  is  a  very 
decided  deficiency  in  many  important  respects.  For  instance, 
thefe  are  hut  550  horses  available  for  the  use  in  drill  and  in- 
struction of  the  cavalry,  which  aggregates  Jf-,9JfO  officers  and  en- 
listed men.  The  deficiency  in  horses  for  the  field  artillery  is 
even  greater  than  that  of  the  cavalry.  There  are  no  animals  for 
the  signal  or  sanitary  troops.  As  regards  wagon  transportation, 
the  militia,  as  now  organized  is  deficient  l,93Jf  wagons.  Should 
the  militia  he  assemhled  into  divisions  and  separate  brigades, 
the  deficit  ivoidd  he  5,836  wagons.  There  are  no  draft  animals, 
available.  These  deficiencies  in  materiel  are  very  important,  in- 
asmuch as  they  must  be  supplied  before  the  Organized  Militia 
forces  can  he  made  available  for  field  operations. 

"  As  regards  field  artillery  materiel  for  the  Organized  Militia, 
should  this  force  be  called  into  service  with  its  present  number 
of  batteries,  th^e  total  amount  of  ammunition  necessary  there- 
for would  he  1,300,000  rounds  of  3-inch  ammunition,  based  on 
an  average  of  5,000  rounds  per  gun,  which  is  equivalent  to  the 
best  standards  of  supply  of  this  character  of  ammunition  in 
foreign  armies.     To  completely  equip  the  proper  number  of 

BATTERIES  FOR  THE  12  MILITIA  DIVISIONS,  INCLUDING  THE  AUX- 
ILIARY DIVISIONS,  THERE  WOULD  BE  REQUIRED,  IN  ADDITION  TO 
MATERIEL  NOW  IN  THE  HANDS  OF  THE  ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  316 
FIELD  GUNS  AND  1,322,384  ROUNDS  OF  AMMUNITION." 


L.V, 


102  Report  of  the   Chief   of   Staff    (General   Wotherspoon)    for    1914, 
pp.  7-8. 


512      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Militia  Coast  Artillery. 

The  militia  Coast  Artillery  force  is  composed  of  123 
companies  mimbering  441  officers  and  7,122  enlisted  men, 
divided  as  follows: 

Companies       Officers  Men 

Maine    11  42  652 

New  Hampshire 4  16  214 

Massachusetts 12  47  718 

Ehode   Island    17  65  988 

Connecticut 13  44  697 

Xew  York 32  104  1,839 

North  Carolina   6  20  354 

Georgia   4  14  143 

California 12  41  713 

Oregon    8  33  521 

Washington    4  15  283 

Total   123  441  7,122 

The  following  States  have  no  militia  Coast  Artillery  troops, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  border  on  the  sea  and  have 
fortifications  constructed  for  the  defence  of  their  coasts  and 
of  the  approaches  to  their  principal  cities  and  harbours,  viz: 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaw^are,  Maryland,  Virginia, 
South  Carolina,  Florida,  Alabama,  Louisiana  and  Texas. 
Of  these  States  the  first  three  have  never  organized  militia 
Coast  Artillery;  the  last  seven  did  formerly  possess  compa- 
nies of  this  branch  of  the  service,  but  for  reasons  best  known 
to  themselves  saw  fit  to  disband  them.^^^ 

As  has  been  seen  on  page  481,  the  policy  of  the  War  De- 
partment is  that  the  militia  shall  furnish  sufficient  Coast 
Artillery  troops  to  man  one-half  of  the  guns  and  mortars  of 
the  fortifications  in  continental  United  States.  As  the  num- 
ber required  w^ould  be  740  officers  and  18,531  men,  it  follows 


103  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1914,  p.  15.  Also  Gen- 
eral Weaver's  testimony  before  the  Military  Affairs  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  December  5,  1914. —  Hearings  on  the  Army 
Appropriation  hill  for  1916,  pp.  618-619. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     513 

that  the  militia  is  no  less  than  299  officers  and  11,409  men 
short  of  being  able  to  furnish  the  quota  which  could  be  prop- 
erly exacted  of  it.  The  returns  for  1914  show  that  the  aver- 
age  enlisted  strength  of  the  militia  Coast  Artillery  companies 
was  only  58  men  —  which  is  seven  below  the  prescribed  mini- 
mum strength  —  but,  even  were  these  companies  raised  to  a 
war  strength  of  104  men,  the  total  militia  force  would  still 
be  5,739  short  of  their  proper  quota  for  the  defences  of  the 
United  States.  The  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Af- 
fairs reported  ^^^  that 

"  Eepeated  efforts  to  induce  the  delinquent  States  to  meet  their 
obligation  to  supply  Coast  Artillery  troops  have  met  with  no 
satisfactory  response.  This  condition  is  aggravated  by  the  fact 
that  the  States  can  give  no  good  reason  for  their  failure.  In 
view  of  the  great  national  importance  of  this  question  the  facts 
are  emphasized  in  order  that  the  AVar  Department  may  be  in- 
formed of  the  deficiency  which  can  not  be  corrected  without  re- 
course to  measures  which  have  not  heretofore  been  considered 
advisable.  If  the  War  Department  can  dictate  to  the  States 
concerning  the  character  of  the  militia  organized  in  the  several 
States,  then,  and  then  only  can  the  coast  States  be  induced  to 
furnish  their  quota  of  Coast  Artillery.  If  the  several  States 
are  to  control  tliis  national  question  rather  than  the  General 
Government,  the  War  Department  must  then  look  to  some  source 
other  than  the  Organized  Militia  for  any  additional  Coast  Ar- 
tillery.'^ 

General  Weaver  expressed  to  the  House  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs  his  opinion  that 

'^  the  difficulty  is  due  chiefly  to  the  fact  that  the  adjutant  gen- 
erals of  the  States  are  not  always  kindly  disposed  toward  the 
Coast  Artillery  organizations.  They  do  not  like  to  expend  the 
funds  appropriated  by  the  States  and  by  the  United  States  for 
the  support  of  the  militia  for  Coast  Artillery  troops.^'  '^^^ 

The  very  nature  of  their  duties  demands  that  a  high  de- 
gree of  technical  training  be  given  to  Coast  Artillery  troops. 

104  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  for  1914,  p.  277. 

105  Hearings,  p.  618. 


514     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

It  is  therefore  disappointing  to  be  compelled  to  record  that 
during  the  fiscal  year  ending  in  1914  "  the  attendance  at 
target  practice  averaged  only  slightly  more  than  forty-one 
enlisted  men  per  company '' —  just  a  sufficient  number  to 
bring  the  companies  up  to  the  minimum  strength  which 
would  entitle  them  to  pay  from  the  Federal  Government  — 
and  that  the  attendance  at  armoury  drills  was  even  smaller. 
Adequate  instruction  and  combined  work  are  thus  rendered 
well-nigh  impossible  and  individual  instruction  extremely 
difficult.  The  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs 
frankly  asserted  that 

"  To  secure  the  minimum  attendance  at  exercises  some  States 
have  resorted  to  the  expedient  of  disbanding  certain  companies 
and  distributing  their  personnel  among  the  remaining  com- 
panies. This  was  simply  a  means  of  evading  regulations 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War." 

Many  of  the  organizations  have  conducted  target  practice 
with  safety  and  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy  —  indeed  some  of 
the  results  were  quite  creditable  to  the  troops  concerned. 
Camps  of  instruction  were  attended  by  195  officers  and  173 
men,  and  459  officers  and  6,287  men  participated  in  joint 
coast  defence  exercises  with  the  Regular  troops  during  1914 ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  so  slender  was  the  attendance  and  to 
such  a  limited  extent  was  the  dummy  armament  installed  in 
the  armouries  used  that  it  is  a  moot  question  whether  the 
Government  would  be  justified  in  further  expenditure  on 
this  score  until  circumstances  change  for  the  better.  The 
conditions  now  prevailing  in  the  militia  Coast  Artillery 
are  thus  comprehensively  summed  up  by  General  Mills : 

"  The  efficiency  of  organizations  by  no  means  measures  up  to 
that  of  individuals.  Small  enlisted  strength,  the  still  smaller 
and  irregular  attendance  at  drills,  together  with  from  30  to  50 
per  cent,  new  enlisted  men  each  year,  keeps  the  companies  in- 
efficient as  organizations.  Militia  Coast  Artillery  companies 
as  they  normally  exist  are  not  qualified  to  serve  their  guns  against 
an  enemy.  They  must  have  time  to  fill  the  ranks,  organize,  and 
drill.     In  this  respect  the  militia  Coast  Artillery  fails  to  meet 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     515 

expectations.  It  should  be  stated,  however,  in  justice  to  many 
earnest  and  well-qualified  officers  and  enlisted  men  who  carry 
on  their  work  in  the  face  of  adverse  and  at  times  very  discour- 
aging conditions,  that  the  low  strength  results  from  causes  which 
appear  to  be  beyond  the  immediate  control  of  those  most  con- 
cerned/' 106 

KESEEVE  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  AND  OF  THE 
ORGANIZED  MILITIA 

The  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army,  inaugurated  by  Section 
two  of  the  Army  Appropriation  Act,  approved  August  24, 
1912,  amounted  on  June  1,  1915,  to  exactly  seventeen 
men.^^*^  The  Organized  Militia  has  no  reserve  whatsoever 
and  never  has  had.  Apropos  of  the  necessity  for  the  latter, 
the  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  very  pertinently 
observes  in  his  report  for  1914  ^^^  that 

'^  A  reserve  system  is  essential  for  the  war  efficiency  of  an  army 
whose  organizations  in  time  of  peace  are  maintained  at  a  speci- 
fied minimum,  and  in  time  of  war  raised  to  a  prescribed  maxi- 
mum strength.  Without  a  reserve  of  trained  men  from  which 
organizations  can  be  promptly  placed  on  a  war  footing,  it  is 
evident  that  rapid  mobilization  and  immediate  action  will  be 
impossible,  due  to  the  delay  in  enlisting,  training,  and  equipping 
recruits  for  war.  Such  period  of  delay  can  not  be  less  than  three 
months  and,  judging  by  the  past  experience,  is  more  likely  to 
be  six ;  and  even  then  the  men  will  not  have  been  properly 
trained.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  a  trained  reserve  of  men  is 
necessary  for  the  Organized  Militia  if  its  immediate  and  effec- 
tive use  in  war  is  contemplated." 

LEGISLATIVE  MEASURES  SUGGESTED  TO  OH  IN- 
TRODUCED IN  CONGRESS,  BUT  NOT  AS 
YET  ENACTED  INTO  LAW. 

(1)   The  establishment  of  a  Council  of  National  Defense. 
A  bill  for  this  purpose  was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  April  7,  1913    (H.  R.  1833,  63rd  Congress,  first 

106  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  for  1914,  pp.  277- 
281. 

107  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  office. 

108  Report  of  the  Chief,  Divi'sion  of  Militia  Affairs,  for  1914,  p.  339. 


516     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

session)    by   Representative  Eichard   Pearson   Hobson,  but   no 
definite  action  was  taken  to  put  it  into  operation. 

(2)  An  increase  of  one  thousand  in  the  number  of  officers 
of  the  Regular  Army. 

A  bill  to  that  effect  (Senate  No.  6966)  was  introduced  on  De- 
cember 16,  1914,  by  Senator  Chamberlain,  Chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate,  but  it  died  a  nat- 
ural death  with  the  close  of  the  third  session  of  the  63rd  Con- 
gress on  March  3,  1915. 

Another  bill  (Senate  6978)  providing  for  an  increase  of  1,000 
officers  was  introduced  by  Senator  Lodge  on  December  17,  1914, 
but  suffered  a  similar  fate. 

(3)  An  increase  in  the  enlisted  strength  of  the  Regular  Army. 

Such  a  step  was  provided  for  in  Senate  bill  No.  6966  just  men- 
tioned, which  was  also  framed  "  to  authorize  the  maintenance  of 
organizations  of  the  mobile  army  at  their  maximum  strength.'' 
The  method  proposed  was  to  increase  the  Regular  Army  by 
25,000  men,  but,  although  this  increase  is  imperatively  needed, 
the  bill  contained  a  fundamental  defect  in  that  it  completely 
failed  to  provide  for  an  expansive  organization  such  as  every 
other  great  Power  has  found  to  be  the  only  proper  system  for 
organizing  armies,  which  are  to  be  maintained  on  a  reduced 
footing  in  time  of  peace,  but  raised  to  their  maximum  strength 
in  time  of  war. 

The  bill  introduced  by  Senator  Lodge  on  December  17,  1914 
(Senate  No.  6978),  also  authorized  the  President  "to  fill  up  to 
their  full  strength  the  existing  organizations  which  compose  the 
aggregate  mobile  army  force." 

(4)  A  modification  of  the  existing  law  in  respect  to  a  Re- 
serve for  the  Regular  Army,  in  order  to  produce  such  a  force  of 
reserves  as  ought  readily  to  be  obtained  under  a  properly  formu- 
lated measure. 

A  bill  for  that  purpose  (Senate  No.  6965)  was  introduced 
during  the  63rd  Congress,  but  it  contained  such  defects  that  the 
effort  was  made  to  eradicate  them  by  a  new  measure  which  was 
transmitted  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  Senator  Chamberlain  on 
January  4,  1915. 

Senator  Lodge's  bill  (Senate  6978),  mentioned  above,  au- 
thorized the  President  to  discharge  at  the  end  of  18  months  en- 
listed men  who  were  proficient  in  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  and 
prescribed  that  such  men  "  shall  constitute  a  reserve  and  shall 
be  subject  to  be  called  back  to  military  service  in  time  of  war." 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     517 

(5)  The  creation  of  a  reserve  for  the  Organized  Militia. 
Provision  for  such  a  reserve  is  contained  in  Sections  5,  6  and  7 

of  the  so-called  Militia  Pay  bill  (Senate  No.  6217,  63rd  Con- 
gress, third  session)  introduced  by  Senator  Chamberlain  on 
August  6,  1914. 

A  bill  (H.  li.  20327)  was  also  introduced  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  on  December  23,  1914,  by  Representative  Brit- 
ten. It  authorized  the  addition  of  "  one  hundred  thousand 
men  to  the  existing  personnel  of  the  Army  by  the  organizing  of 
regiments  of  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  able-bodied  males  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  be- 
come citizens  of  the  United  States  for  a  special  enlistment  term 
not  to  exceed  four  months."  It  also  prescribed  "  That  the  men 
enlisted  .  .  .  shall,  upon  discharge,  constitute  a  citizen  soldiery 
to  be  held  in  reserve  for  a  period  of  ten  years  subject  to  call  for 
military  duty  in  time  of  war." 

(6)  The  creation  of  a  reserve  of  officers  for  the  Regular  Army. 
A  bill  for  that  purpose  was  introduced  during  the  last  session 

of  the  63rd  Congress  (Senate  No.  6968)  but,  like  the  others,  was 
not  passed. 

More  comprehensive  was  the  bill  (Senate  No.  6936)  intro- 
duced by  Senator  Weeks,  "  to  provide  for  commissioned  officers, 
for  the  reserve  and  volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States  in  time 
of  actual  or  threatened  war,"  but  it  likewise  suffered  the  same 
fate. 

(7)  An  increase  in  the  authorized  strength  of  the  Coast  Ar- 
tillery Corps  of  the  Regular  Army. 

A  bill  to  that  end  (Senate  No.  6967)  was  introduced  by  Sena- 
tor Chamberlain  on  December  16,  1914,  but  never  became  a 
law.  Much  as  this  increase  is  needed,  it  ought  not  to  be  made 
until  a  general  enlargement  of  the  Regular  Army  takes  place, 
otherwise  the  military  establishment  will  be  worse  balanced  than 
it  is  at  present. 

(8)  A  modification  of  the  existing  Militia  law,  in  order  to 
correct  certain  radical  defects  contained  therein. 

Such  changes  are  embodied  in  the  so-called  Militia  Pay  bill 
(Senate  No.  6217,  63rd  Congress,  third  session)  introduced  by 
Senator  Chamberlain  on  August  6,  1914. 

Even  this  bill  needs  certain  amendments  in  order  that  the 
Federal  Government  may  exercise  the  control  over  the  Organized 
Militia  necessary  to  bring  about  that  efficiency  which  the  Gov- 
ernment has  an  unquestioned  right  to  demand  of  troops  that  are 


518     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

to  be  utilized  in  time  of  war  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

(9)  An  increase  in  the  number  of  officers  of  the  Signal  Corps. 
This  augmentation  was  embodied  in  a  bill  (Senate  Xo.  6964) 

introduced  by  Senator  Chamberlain  on  December  16,  1914. 

(10)  The  creation  of  a  Transportation  Eeserve  Corps  com- 
posed of  volunteers  —  engineers,  chauffeurs,  etc. —  such  as  Aus- 
tria possesses. 

(11)  Authority  of  law  for  the  establishment  and  continuance 
of  the  Students'  Military  Instruction  Camps,  and  proper  ap- 
propriation therefor. 

(12)  Sufficient  appropriations  in  order  that  the  shortage  in 
guns,  ammunition,  supplies  of  every  sort,  transport,  etc.  of  all 
branches  of  the  military  establishment,  as  well  as  of  the  Or- 
ganized Militia,  may  be  rectified,  and  that  the  United  States 
may  possess  everything  needed  in  the  event  of  war. 

(13)  The  abolition  of  many  of  the  posts  scattered  all  over  the 
country  and  the  concentration  of  the  Eegular  Army  in  large 
garrisons,  thus  putting  an  end  to  the  present  absurd  method  of 
administration,  which  entails  a  great  deal  of  unnecessary  expense 
as  well  as  making  impossible  a  rapid  and  effective  concentration 
of  the  troops  in  case  of  emergency.^ 


109 


EXCESSIVE  COST  OF  MAINTENANCE  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AEMY 

According  to  the  latest  statistics  available,  the  peace 
strength  and  cost  of  maintenance  of  the  principal  European 
armies  was :  — 

Officers  and  Cost  of  Maintenance 

Men  1913-1914 

Russia     1,284.000  $377,233,000 

Germany 799,999  167,990,240 

France  "^ 869,403  287,298,310 

Austria-Hungary   472,716  121,211,200 

Great  Britain 267,664  139,918,250 

Italy    250,860  ^^^  66,976,700  "^ 

In  1914  the  figures  for 

the      United      States 

Army  were     92,482  ^^^  97,013,965.87  "^ 

109  The   Hearing  before   the   Committee   on   Military   Affairs,   United 
States  Senate,  Sixty-third  Congress,  third  session,  on  National  Defense 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     519 

In  the  case  of  our  Regular  forces,  the  figures  given  are  for 
the  support  of  the  Army  alone  and  are  even  exclusive  of  the 
expenditures  for  the  Military  Academy.  It  will  thus  be 
seen  that  the  American  army  is  far  more  expensive  in  pro- 
portion to  its  size  than  any  of  the  others,  and  that  each 
man  costs  more  than  $1,000  per  annum.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  our  Regulars  —  which  are  in  reality  a  national  police  — 
are  more  expensive  than  the  police  forces  of  the  leading 
cities  of  the  United  States  as  the  following  table  will  demon- 
strate : 


City 

Population 

Size  of  po- 
lice force, 
officers  and 
men 

Cost  of 
maintenance 

New    York    

Chicago    

Philadelphia     

St,  Louis 

Cleveland     

5,250,000 
2,500,000 
1,650,000 
800,000 
775,000 
686,092 
614,486 
595,528 
450,000 
423,417 
401,000 
353,297 
300,000 

12,222 

4,443 

3,967 

1,940 

859 

1,590 

1,293 

1,073 

929 

838 

705 

715 

544 

$17,996,038.90 

6,622,654.90 

4,371,180.07 

2,064,750.00 

967,564.44 

Boston    

Detroit     

2,449,612.33 
1,475,235.00 

Baltimore    

San   Francisco    

Buffalo     

1,260,543.71 
1,527,620.00 
1,074,165.89 

Cincinnati    

Washington     

818,778.31 
935,171.14 

Jersey  City 

824,133.61 

Total    

14,798,820 

31,118 

$42,387,448,30  n* 

Bills  contains  many  of  the  above  suggestions  and  sets  forth  some  of  the 
bills  in  full. 

110  The  author's  article  entitled  The  Armies  of  Europe  in  The  World's 
Work  for  September,  1914,  pp.  23,  41,  44,  45  and  46.  The  statistics  rela- 
tive to  the  peace  strength  of  the  various  European  armies  were  the 
latest  and  most  authentic  then  obtainable. 

111  Statesman's  Year  Book  for  1914,  pp.  1244,  903,  828,  641,  56  and 
1030. 

112  Including  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  3,809,  and  the  Hospital  Corps, 
4,055. —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  p.  7. 

113 /6id.,  pp.  16-18. 

11*  The  statistics  in  the  above  table  were  obtained  from  the  Directory 
of  Police  and  Prisons,  compiled  by  Major  Richard  Sylvester,  president 
of  the  International  Police  Association,  and  issued  on  June,  1914,  sup- 
plemented by  information  furnished  to  the  author  of  this  book  by  the 
chiefs  of  police  of  these  thirteen  cities. 


520     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

In  other  words,  approximately  one-sixth  of  the  population 
of  the  United  States  maintains  for  its  protection  a  regular 
force  sixty  per  cent,  of  the  size  of  the  total  number  of  the 
Regular  Army  now  in  the  United  States  and  within  Y,000 
men  of  the  present  mobile  army.  In  order  to  supply  the 
overseas  garrisons  with  their  proper  quota  the  mobile  army 
will  shortly  be  reduced  to  24,602  —  as  has  been  seen  on  page 
470  —  and  the  policemen  of  thirteen  cities  will  then  outnum- 
ber it  more  than  7,000.  Moreover,  the  cost  of  maintaining 
those  police  forces  is  only  43.3  per  cent,  of  what  was  spent 
during  the  fiscal  year  1913-1914  for  the  Regular  Army.  A 
fresh  proof  is  thus  afforded  of  the  truth  of  the  declaration  of 
the  Comte  de  Guibert,  one  of  the  greatest  military  organizers 
in  France  during  the  eighteenth  century,  that  *^*^  what  costs 
dearly,  at  the  present  as  well  as  in  the  future,  is  a  mediocre 
armyj^  ^^^ 

THE  MANUFACTUEE  OF  CERTAIN  WAR  MATERIEL 

We  Americans  are  prone  to  boasting  that,  regardless  of 
what  might  happen  in  the  shape  of  a  coalition  against  us,  the 
United  States  could  not  be  materially  affected.  It  may, 
therefore,  afford  something  of  a  shock  to  our  pride  to  dis- 
cover that  the  manufacture  of  war  materiel  and  powder 
would  be  decidedly  hampered  if  it  should  become  impossible 
to  import  certain  ingredients,  such  as  ferro-manganese,  ferro- 
nickel,  the  optical  glass  for  field-glasses  and  telescopes,  nickel, 
nitrate  of  sodium,  tungsten  and  wolfram  ore  —  the  bulk,  if 
not  the  total  supply,  of  which  is  imported  from  abroad.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  so  serious  were  the  conditions  deemed  in 
ISTovember  and  December,  1914,  when  Great  Britain  estab- 
lished an  embargo  against  the  importation  of  certain  in- 
gredients of  steel  produced  in  British  colonial  possessions, 
that  the  steel  manufacturers  of  the  United  States  were  very 
urgent  that  this  embargo  should  be  lifted  for  their  benefit. 


115  Comte  de  Guibert,  Defense  du  svsteme  de  guerre  moderne,  IV,  p. 
276. 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     521 

It  is  understood  that  their  representations  resulted  in  private 
arrangements  being  made  between  them  and  the  British 
Government,  whereby  their  requirements  were  supplied,  on 
condition  that  they  w^ould  not  export  to  countries  at  war  with 
Great  Britain  either  the  ingredients  in  raw  form  or  the 
manufactured  products.  In  the  making  of  steel  the  alloy 
upon  which  our  steel  manufacturers  are  most  dependent  is 
ferro-manganese,  w^hich  has  heretofore  been  largely  imported 
from  India.  At  the  present  time  this  source  of  supply  has 
been  supplanted  by  Brazil,  but  the  mines  of  this  latter  coun- 
try are  as  yet  comparatively  undeveloped.  Should  this 
source  be  shut  off,  our  manufacturers  would  be  reduced  to 
naaking  ferro-manganese  out  of  American  ore,  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  manganese  content  would  be  lower  than  in 
the  case  of  Indian  or  Brazilian  ore,  and  the  steel  could  only 
be  produced  with  distinct  trouble  and  inconvenience,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  increased  cost. 

In  the  matter  of  powder  the  situation  would  be  much  more 
serious.  From  Chile  is  derived  almost  all  our  supply  of 
sodium  nitrate,  from  which  nitric  acid  is  made,  and  the  lat- 
ter is  an  essential  in  the  manufacture  of  gun-cotton,  which  in 
turn  is  the  principal  ingredient  of  smokeless  powder.  The 
extraction  of  nitrates  from  the  atmosphere  is  not  only  scien- 
tifically but  commercially  practicable,  and  is  in  general  ope- 
ration in  Germany.  In  the  United  States  not  more  than  one 
such  plant  exists.  From  abroad  has  hitherto  come  the  bulk 
of  our  carbolic  acid,  out  of  which  is  made  picric  acid,  one 
of  our  most  powerful  explosives.  Toluol  and  nitric-toluol, 
by-products  of  petroleum,  have  been  almost  wholly  imported, 
but  since  the  beginning  of  the  present  European  w^ar  their 
manufacture  has  been  commenced  to  a  moderate  degree  in 
this  country. 

Allusion  to  the  fact  that  the  American  army  possesses  ex- 
traordinarily few  range-finders  has  already  been  made  on 
page  474.  Not  only  in  this  item,  but  in  field-glasses  and 
telescopes,  the  Ordnance  Department  is  at  present  labouring 


522      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

under  a  serious  handicap,  since  the  American  manufacturers 
are  dependent  for  their  supply  of  glass  for  lenses  upon  Ger- 
many, from  which  it  cannot  be  imported  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances. ^^^ 

In  every  walk  of  American  life  the  value  of  specially 
trained  men  is  recognized,  save  in  the  matter  of  public 
office,  the  diplomatic  sen^ice  and  our  land  forces.  Unlimited 
as  our  military  resources  unquestionably  are.  Congress  has 
thus  far  failed  utterly  to  foster  and  develop  them,  so  that  they 
may  actually  be  a  source  of  weakness  insomuch  as  they  invite 
attack  by  a  stronger  Power  than  we.  By  contrast  with  our 
military  resources,  undeveloped  though  they  be,  our  actual 
military  strength  is  the  feeblest  of  all  the  great  nations  with 
which  we  consider  ourselves  entitled  to  rank,  as  the  following 
table  will  show:  ^^^ 


Area  in 
square  miles 

Population 

Size  of  land  forces 

Country 

Peace 
strength 

Total  war 
strength  of 
trained  men 

Russia     

Germany    

France     

Great    Britain 
and  colonies . . 

Austria-Hun- 
gary      

Italy    

Japan     

Turkey     

Switzerland    . .  . 

United  States   . 

8,647,657 
208,830 
207,054 

11,467,294 

261,035 
110,550 
147,655 

1,186,874 
15,976 

3,026,789 

160,095,200 
64,903,423 
38,961,945 

396,294,752 

49,418,596 
32,475,253 
53,875,390 
35,764,876 
3,741,971 
98,781,324 

1,284,000 
799,999 
869,403 

269,464 

472,716 
250,860 
250,000 
420,000 
140,000 
97,760t 

5,962,306 
4,000,000 
3,878,000 

961,330* 

4,320,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
1,200,000 
275,000 
225,170$ 

*  Including  160,000  Indian  troops. 
t  Including  5.278  Philippine  Scoiits. 
1  Including  127,410  Organized  Militia. 

116  The  above  facts  were  kindly  furnished  to  the  author  by  the  Hon. 
Chandler  Anderson,  Special  Counsellor  of  the  State  Department;  by 
General  Crozier,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  and  his  assistant,  Colonel  Bab- 
bitt; and  by  Mr.  Julian  Kennedy,  the  former  general  superintendent 
for  Carnegie,  Phipps  and  Company,  who  has  been  connected  with  nearly 
every  important  steel  plant  in  the  United  States  and  Europe. 

117  The  statistics  given  in  the  table  showing  the  area,  population, 
peace  and  war  strengths  of  eight  European  nations,  Japan  and  the 
United  States  are  a  combination  of  those  given  in  the  table  on  page 


Condition  of  Land  Forces  Beginning  of  1915     523 

The  above  estimate  of  the  war  strength  of  the  United 
States  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  every  one  of  the 
8,323  officers  and  119,087  enlisted  men  of  the  Organized 
Militia  would  respond  to  a  call  to  arms  —  in  other  words, 
upon  a  miracle.  If  war  were  declared  in  the  near  future, 
the  number  of  troops  now  in  the  United  States  upon  whom 
the  defence  of  this  country  would  devolve  would  be  limited  to 

Officers  Enlisted  men  Total 

Mobile  Army 1,989                  34,798  36,787 

Coast  Artillerv    588                 15,647  16,235 

Organized  Militia   8,323               119,087  127,410 

Grand  Total    10,900  169,532         180,432 

And  that  is  absolutely  all.  The  only  recourse  left  would  be 
to  call  out  volunteers,  and  to  organize,  train,  equip,  and  pre- 
pare them  to  take  the  field  would  require,  at  the  lowest  pos- 
sible estimate,  six  months.  Sufficient  facts  have  been  set 
forth  in  this  chapter  to  afford  a  fair  comprehension  of  the 
value  of  the  Organized  Militia  as  a  military  asset.  It  has 
also  been  conclusively  shown  that  the  United  States  does  not 
possess  sufficient  ammunition  for  an  army  of  145,522  in- 
fantrymen for  four  days'  fighting  nor  enough  artillery  am- 
munition to  last  our  634  field  guns  for  two  days  —  not  to 
mention  innumerable  other  items  in  which  we  are  lamentably 
deficient.     The  reader  is  left  to  draw  his  own  conclusions. 

10  of  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  and  of  those  con- 
tained in  the  author's  article,  The  Armies  of  Europe  in  The  World's 
Work  for  September,  1914- 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

THE   LAXD   FORCES    OE   THE   UXITED    STATES 
AS  THEY  OUGHT  TO  BE  ORGAXIZED 

THE  term,  '^  a  fooTs  paradise,"  describes  to  perfection 
the  dreamland  in  which  Americans  have  slumbered 
for  years  in  their  complacent  indifference  to  national  de- 
fence. We  as  a  people  have  not  yet  learned  to  think  nation- 
ally, being  much  too  engrossed  in  our  own  individual,  local 
or  State  interests;  and  rarely  in  our  career  have  we  demon- 
strated from  a  military  standpoint  that  we  understood  the 
true  meaning  of  our  national  motto,  E  plurihus  unum.  It 
is  scarcely  flattering  to  one's  pride  to  confess  that  the  latter 
part  of  the  proverb,  "  One  for  all  and  all  for  one,"  is  seem- 
ingly beyond  the  comprehension  of  our  people,  whose  every- 
day actions  belie  wholly  their  loud  but  spasmodic  outbursts 
of  what  is  termed  patriotism  —  a  principle  which  we  appar- 
ently do  not  understand  as  it  is  known  in  many  another  coun- 
try. True  patriotism  is  not  the  sort  which  is  proclaimed 
from  the  housetops  to  the  accompaniment  of  waving  flags 
and  boisterous  cheers,  but  the  unobtrusive  kind  which  real- 
izes that  '''  Drudgery  is  the  gray  angel  of  Success  "  and  there- 
fore labours  unremittingly  for  long  years  in  order  to  be  pre- 
pared when  the  emergency  arises. 

There  is  reason  to  be  grateful  that  the  present  European 
war,  which  has  involved  half  the  world,  has  at  last  aroused  the 
American  people  to  a  partial  realization  that  our  means  of 
national  defence  are  lamentably  inadequate.  We  now  stand 
at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  On  one  hand,  the  road  which 
we  have  been  following  for  years  stretches  toward  national 
calamity  and  possible  loss  of  national  existence;  the  other 
road  leads  to  increased  national  strength,  prosperity,  prestige 

524 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      525 

and  continued  success.  The  time  has  come  for  Americans 
to  decide  which  road  they  shall  take,  and  to  remember  that 
the  Scriptural  parable  anent  the  five  wise  and  five  foolish 
virgins  is  peculiarly  applicable  to  our  nation. 

The  average  American  who  has  had  no  military  training 
or  who  has  not  studied  military  history  thoroughly  is  ob- 
sessed by  the  conviction  that  the  principles  governing  the  or- 
ganization of  armies  are  extraordinarily  complex  —  so  intri- 
cate and  difficult  as  to  be  beyond  the  grasp  of  the  ordinary 
person.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the  truth.  The  fun- 
damental principles  which  underlie  all  proper  military  organ- 
ization are  quite  as  simple  as  A  B  C.  To  fit  them  to  a  multi- 
plicity of  conditions  and  requirements  does  assuredly  demand 
profound  knowledge  of  a  purely  technical  character,  and  di- 
versity of  opinion  is  bound  to  exist  in  respect  to  the  best 
method ;  but  the  subject  is  one  which  can  be  grasped  —  in  the 
main  essentials  at  least  —  by  any  one  of  average  intelligence. 
In  this  chapter  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  enter  into  minute 
details,  but  only  to  indicate  in  broad  outline  the  basic  princi- 
ples upon  which  American  land  forces  ought  to  be  organized. 

The  first  essential  transcends  the  mere  question  of  mill-- 
tary  organization  in  that  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of 
law,  viz:  that  every  citizen  has  a  right  to  the  protection  of 
life,  liberty  and  property.  Since  this  protection  is  indis- 
solubly  bound  up  in  the  maintenance  of  proper  legal  author- 
ity, which  is  in  turn  dependent  upon  uninterrupted  national 
existence,  it  follows  that  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  high  Gov- 
ernment officials,  and  to  an  equal  degree  of  the  members  of 
the  national  legislature,  to  safeguard  the  destinies  of  the 
nation.  From  the  latter  flows  another  duty  which,  although 
inseparable  from  high  office,  has  rarely,  as  our  history  shows, 
been  fulfilled  by  Congress,  to  wit:  that  adequate  national 

DEFENCE.  IS  ONE  OF  THE  CARDINAL  DUTIES  OF  EVERY  STATES- 
MAN^ and  that  there  is  an  obligation  to  perform  such  a  duty 
absolutely  irrespective  of  party  politics  or  factional  differ- 
ences. 


526     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Much  clamour  is  made  in  these  days  about  "  our  rights," 
but  complete  mystification  seems  to  reign  as  to  the  basis 
from  which  all  rights  spring.  The  true  principle  has  rarely 
been  better  enunciated  than  in  the  declaration  of  Giuseppe 
Mazzini,  one  of  the  liberators  of  modern  Italy,  that  ""  The 
origin  of  every  right  is  in  a  duty  fulfilled/'  If,  therefore, 
we  are  to  be  entitled  to  the  right  to  demand  that  our  Gov- 
ernment protect  our  lives,  liberties  and  property  in  time  of 
war,  we  must  fulfil  our  duty  toward  that  Government;  and 
no  principle  is  more  in  keeping  with  a  republican  form  of 
government,  no  doctrine  is  more  truly  democratic,  than  the 
second  essential,  which  asserts  that  every  able-bodied  male 

CITIZEN    OWES   MILITARY   SERVICE    TO    HIS    COUNTRY.        Indeed, 

the  principle  of  compulsory  service  is  no  more  a  violation 
of  the  policy  and  traditions  of  the  American  people  than  is 
the  payment  of  taxes  under  compulsion. 

The  third  is  contained  in  the  question,  "  Do  the  people 
want  adequate  national  defence  ?  "  In  all  ages  this  question 
has  had  to  be  met  and  answered  by  the  ruling  power,  be  it 
tribal  chief,  prince,  sovereign  or  people.  Under  the  form 
of  government  of  a  constitutional  monarchy,  republic  or 
democracy,  the  dictum  of  the  people  prevails,  and  the  repre- 
sentatives in  authority  reflect,  generally  speaking^  the  domi- 
nant public  opinion.  Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid 
upon  the  historical  fact  that  no  nation  has  ever  possessed  a 
great  army  and  navy  or  has  wielded  great  influence  unless 
the  people  wished  it  so. 

The  fourth  of  the  great  underlying  principles  is  that  of 
undivided  responsibility  of  the  Government  for  the  public 
weal.  Since  the  days  of  primeval  man,  national  disaster  has 
invariably  resulted  in  the  blame  being  laid  —  and  very  prop- 
erly —  at  the  door  of  the  ruling  power.  As  war  represents 
the  limit  of  stress  to  which  human  beings  and  human  insti- 
tutions can  be  subjected,  it  follow^s  that  the  responsibility 
of  the  Government  is  even  greater  than  under  ordinary  cir- 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      527 

cumstances.  The  motto,  "  United  we  stand,  divided  we 
fall/'  has  been  exemplified  countless  times  throughout  his- 
tory, which  further  teaches  that  war  can  only  be  conducted 
with  a  reasonable  assurance  of  success  if  the  Government 
be  unhampered  and  if  it  receive  the  united  support  of  the 
people.  The  more  despotically  the  combined  power  and  re- 
sources of  a  nation  are  wielded  in  time  of  war,  the  greater 
the  chances  of  victory  — a  stern  fact  too  often  demonstrated 
by  history  to  admit  of  any  well-founded  doubt  as  to  its 
truth.  Per  contra,  how  seriously  the  destinies  of  a  nation, 
may  be  imperilled  by  interference  with  the  unrestricted  ex> 
ercise  of  power  by  the  Government  during  the  war  has  been 
repeatedly  shown  in  this  book.  In  this  respect  there  has 
been  a  striking  contrast  in  the  relations  between  the  States 
and  the  United  States  with  regard  to  the  land  forces  on  one 
hand  and  the  naval  service  on  the  other.  Thus  far  Congress 
has  been  wise  enough  to  hold  jealously  to  its  constitutional 
prerogative  '^  to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy/'  instead  of 
delegating  any  part  of  its  right  to  the  various  States  and 
thus  giving  them  the  power  to  interfere  in  naval  as  they  can, 
and  do,  in  military  affairs.  For  that  reason  the  record  of 
American  land  forces  suffers  sadly  when  compared  with  the 
splendid  annals  of  the  Navy.  N^o  one  has  yet  had  the 
temerity  to  advocate  that  a  naval  militiaman  is  competent 
to  command  a  battleship,  a  squadron  or  a  fleet.  To  cite  a 
better  example  of  that  efiiciency  which  can  only  be  attained 
when  the  Government  wields  despotic  power  in  time  of  war 
than  is  being  given  at  this  very  moment  by  Germany  would 
be  impossible.  By  contrast,  the  Report  on  the  Organization 
of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States  points  out  the  un- 
deniable fact  that 

"  Our  traditional  theory  of  a  small  Eegular  Army  and  a  great 
war  army  of  citizen  soldiers  is  not  yet  embodied  as  a  definite  in- 
stitution.    The  mobilization  of  our  citizen  soldiery  to-dAy 

WOULD     NOT     RESULT     IX     A     WELL-KNIT     NATIONAL     ARMY.      It 


528      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

WOULD  BE  AN  UNCOORDINATED  ARMY  OF  50  ALLIES,  WITH  ALL 
OP  THE  INHERENT  WEAKNESSES  OF  ALLIED  FORCES,  EMPHASIZED 
BY  THE  UNUSUAL  NUMBER  OF  THE  ALLIES.''  ^ 

The  difference  between  German  efficiency  and  American  in- 
efficiency in  this  respect  needs  no  commentary. 

The  fifth  great  principle  is  that  World-Power,  with  its  ac- 
companying rank,  prestige  and  possessions,  necessarily  entails 
great  responsibilities.  The  American  people  have  danced 
too  long  without  paying  the  piper,  but  they  must  now  decide 
whether  or  not  they  are  ready  to  assume  the  responsibili- 
ties inseparable  from  their  present  status  among  the  nations 
of  the  world.  If  so,  they  must  be  prepared  to  make  sacri- 
fices and  expenditures  accordingly,  or  to  relinquish  a  great 
part  of  what  has  been  acquired  since  the  Spanish-American 
War  and  the  sudden  development  of  the  United  States  into 
a  World-Power. 

In  entering  upon  the  subject  of  military  organization,  it 
should  clearly  be  borne  in  mind  that  any  plan  for  the  organi- 
zation of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  has  to  be 
based  upon  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  these  forces  are, 
and  must  necessarily  be,  divided  into  two  distinct  parts, 
namely:  (1)  The  Army  stationed  in  the  overseas  posses- 
sions, and  (2)  the  Army  within  the  territorial  limits  of  con- 
tinental United  States.  In  the  case  of  troops  comprising  the 
overseas  garrisons,  the  problem  is  comparatively  simple  and 
the  principles  to  be  followed  are  obvious.  Each  one  has 
a  distinct  strategic  and  tactical  mission  to  perform,  each  is 
destined  to  operate  within  a  restricted  field,  but  all  of  them 
are  liable  to  be  isolated  for  considerable  periods,  particularly 
in  the  critical  stages  at  the  beginning  of  war.  It  is  there- 
fore evident  that  in  each  case  Regular  troops,  thoroughly 
equipped  and  provided  with  an  abundance  of  war  materiel 
and  supplies  of  every  sort,  should  be  maintained  in  suffi- 
cient force  to  defend  such  possessions  as  are  of  vital  impor- 

1  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States, 
p.  19. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      529 

tance  against  an  enemy  likely  to  attack  any  one  of  them 
until  the  American  Navy  has  secured  command  of  the  sea 
in  its  vicinity.  These  garrisons  must  accordingly  be  self- 
supporting  and  in  nowise  dependent  upon  assistance  from 
outside  for  a  number  of  weeks  at  the  very  least.  These 
facts  should  be  taken  into  account  in  organizing  them  and 
in  providing  them  with  an  abundance  of  such  supplies  as 
will  enable  them  to  perform  their  role  efficiently.  The  pres- 
ent conditions  with  respect  to  the  troops  in  the  first  category 
were  thus  admirably  set  forth  in  the  report  of  the  late  Chief 
of  Staff,  General  Wotherspoon :  ^ 

"  In  looking  over  the  strength  of  our  garrisons  in  foreign  pos- 
sessions it  becomes  at  once  manifest  that  the  garrisons  we  are 
maintaining  there  or  propose  to  maintain  there  under  the  scheme 
of  our  Army  as  it  exists  at  present  are  entirely  inadequate  to  the 
needs  of  those  possessions.  That  an  effective  defense  against 
an  enterprising  enemy  in  the  Philippines  could  be  made  with  a 
deficiency  of  33  per  cent,  of  the  manning  details  of  the  coast  de- 
fenses of  Manila  and  Subig  Bay  and  with  a  mobile  force  of  a 
little  over  7,000  American  troops,  supplemented  by  less  than 
6,000  Philippine  Scouts,  is  manifestly  impossible ;  that  the  great 
waterway  of  the  Panama  Canal  can  not  be  protected  against  the- 
operations  of  a  first-class  military  power  by  the  present  or  pro- 
posed garrison  we  contemplate  placing  there  without  the  power 
and  ability  to  reenforce  it  rapidly  by  troops  from  the  United 
States  is  equally  manifest;  that  we  can  retain  our  valuable 
Territory  of  Alaska  in  its  isolated  position  against  an  enemy 
with  any  military  power  by  placing  there  a  garrison  of 
less  than  500  men  verges  on  the  ridiculous  unless  we  have 
ample  forces  at  home  to  occupy  that  Territory  in  the  very 
earliest  stages  of  an  impending  conflict.  As  regards  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  all  military  persons  will  recognize  that  the 
proposed  garrison  in  this  possession  is  far  below  what  it  should 
be  to  meet  a  serious  attack  unless,  in  this  case,  again,  we  have 
an  adequate  force  on  the  Pacific  coast  ready  to  despatch  to  these 
islands  when  trouble  is  impending.  It  must  therefore  be 
frankly  admitted  that  the  present  garrisons  of  these  outlying 

2  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staif  (General  Wotherspoon)  for  1914,  pp. 
8-9. 


530      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

possessions  are  entirely  inadequate  for  the  purpose  for  which 
they  have  been  sent  there,  and  that  without  a  material  change  in 
conditions  at  home  we  have  no  available  resources  from  which  to 
reenforce  them,  even  should  time  be  given  us  to  do  so.  As  the 
Philippines  are  too  distant  from  the  United  States  to  be  reen- 
forced  when  war  is  impending,  it  would  seem  necessary  that  the 
garrison  of  those  islands  should  be  at  least  a  full  manning  detail 
for  the  Coast  Artillery  defenses  and  one  complete  division  at  full 
war  strength  plus  the  necessary  administrative  staff.  As  to  our 
other  outlying  possessions,  it  may  be  said  that  the  garrisons  pro- 
posed for  those  possessions,  with  the  exception  of  Alaska,  may 
be  considered  adequate  only  under  the  contingency  that  we  have 
available  in  the  United  States  sufficient  thoroughly  trained 
troops  in  excess  of  our  home  needs  to  warrant  us  in  heavily  re- 
enforcing  the  peace  garrisons." 

The  unvarnished  truth  is  that,  instead  of  a  paltry  force 
of  11,298  officers  and  men  at  present  in  the  Philippines, 
we  ought  to  have  a  division  at  full  war  strength  —  22,665  — 
and  24  companies  of  Coast  Artillery  —  2,496  —  making  a 
total  of  25,161.  In  the  Hawaiian  Islands  the  existing 
strength  of  8,529  ought  to  be  replaced  by  at  least  14,389 
mobile  troops  and  ten  companies  of  Coast  Artillery  —  1,400 

—  a  total  of  15,789.  In  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  the  pres- 
ent force  of  5,662  should  be  strengthened  to  the  number 
of  7,890  mobile  troops  and  18  companies  of  Coast  Artillery 

—  1,994  —  a  total  of  9,834  at  the  very  lowest  estimate  pos- 
sible.^    As  a  matter  of  fact,  about  16,000  officers  and  men 


3  "  The  minimum  garrisons  required  for  the  maintenance  of  national 
interests  beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States  are  as  follows: 

"  The  Philippines. —  4  regiments  of  Infantry  at  maximum  statutory 
strength  (150  men  per  company),  2  regiments  of  Cavalry  at  maximum 
statutory  strength  (100  men  per  troop),  2  battalions  of  Field  and 
Mountain  Artillery  (6  batteries),  2  companies  of  Engineers,  2  com- 
panies of  Signal  troops  (one  of  these  a  field  company),  24  companies  of 
Coast  Artillery,  52  companies  of  Philippine  Scouts,  1  ambulance  com- 
pany, 1  field  hospital,  with  detachments  pertaining  to  the  Ordnance 
Department  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Hospital  Corps  on  duty  with  or- 
jganizations.  .  .  . 

"  Oahu. —  ...  6  regiments  of  Infantry  at  maximum  statutory 
strength  (150  men  per  company),  1  regiment  of  Cavalry  at  maximum 
statutory  strength   (100  men  per  troop),  3  battalions  of  Field  Artillery 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      531 

would  be  nearer  the  requirements  for  that  most  important 
possession.  Guantanamo  will  also  need  a  proper  garrison  in 
due  time. 

Our  principal  concern  is  with  the  second  category,  viz: 
the  land  forces  within  the  territorial  limits  of  continental 
United  States.  Since  the  days  of  the  Revolution  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  has  been  that  the  military  establish- 
ment in  time  of  peace  shall  consist  of  a  small  Regular  Army, 
and  that  the  ultimate  war  force  of  the  nation  is  to  be  a  great 
army  of  citizen  soldiers.  The  fundamental  theory  of  this 
military  organization  is  sound  both  economically  and  politi- 
cally, but,  as  has  been  seen  throughout  our  history,  the  in- 
stances when  it  has  been  put  into  effect  in  the  proper  manner 
have  been  extremely  few  and  far  between.  The  maintenance 
of  armies  in  time  of  peace  imposes  heavy  financial  burdens, 
and  wisdom  dictates  that  expenditures  for  this  purpose 
should  be  kept  as  low  as  is  consistent  with  effectiveness  for 
war.  Unfortunately,  the  mistake  has  nearly  always  been 
made  in  such  a  cheese-paring  policy  during  the  periods  of 
peace  that  efficiency  at  the  outbreak  of  war  — when  it  is  most 
essential  —  has  been  sacrificed  in  a  wholesale  manner.  Re- 
liance on  citizen-soldiery  is  seriously  handicapped  by  one 
great  limitation,  namely,  that  this  force  is  virtually  a  negligi- 
ble quantity  as  a  military  asset  until  it  has  undergone  a  long 
period  of  training  sufficient  to  meet  trained  soldiers.  Our 
history  is  replete  with  the  achievements  of  the  volunteer 
soldier  after  he  has  received  the  training  necessary  for  war, 
but  it  contains  no  instance  when  raw  levies  have  been  suc- 


(9  batteries),  1  company  of  Engineers,  1  field  company  of  Signal  troops, 
10  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  1  ambulance  company,  1  field  hos- 
pital, .  .  . 

"  Panama. —  .  .  .  The  minimum  peace  garrison  necessary  for  the  de- 
fense of  the  canal  is  as  follows:  3  regiments  of  Infantry  at  the  maxi- 
mum strength  in  Chapter  VI  of  this  report,  1  battalion  of  Field  Ar- 
tillery (3  batteries),  1  squadron  of  cavalry,  1  signal  company,  1  en- 
gineer company,  1  ambulance  company,  1  field  hospital,  18  companies 
of  Coast  Artillery," —  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces 
of  the  United  States,  pp.  8-9. 

The  figures  are  taken  from  the  Tables  of  Organization,  1914. 


532      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

cessfully  employed  in  general  military  operations.  The 
American  people  have  apparently  not  as  yet  realized  that  a 
man  with  a  uniform  on  his  hack  and  a  musket  in  his  hand 
is  not  a  dependable  soldier,  nor  have  they  awakened  to  the  un- 
derstanding that  none  of  the  great  European  or  Asiatic  Pow- 
ers loould  attempt  to  combat  us  with  an  improvised  army, 
hut  would  employ  only  troops  trained  to  the  highest  possible 
degree.  For  years  the  German  military  authorities  have 
claimed  that  they  can  embark  an  army  corps  in  three  days 
and,  assuming  that  they  control  the  sea  and  allowing  sixteen 
days  to  cross  the  Atlantic,  could  land  fully  250,000  regulars 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States  within 
five  weeks.  It  is  also  well  known  that,  should  we  be  un- 
fortunate enough  to  come  to  blows  with  Great  Britain,  she 
could  put  approximately  the  same  number  of  trained  troops 
on  our  northern  frontier  in  thirty  days. 

The  first  problem  to  be  considered  is  the  size  of  the  force 
likely  to  attack  us  —  a  factor  that  would  determine  the  size 
of  our  own  —  and  what  method  would  most  speedily  produce 
the  forces  necessary  to  insure  our  safety  by  repelling  such  an 
attack  effectively.  The  consensus  of  opinion  among  military 
men  abroad  as  well  as  here  is  that  no  other  nation  would 
make  such  an  attempt  with  less  than  from  400,000  to  500,000 
of  its  best  troops.  The  United  States  must  therefore  have 
at  least  an  equal  number  similarly  trained  and  ready  for 
service  at  the  outset  of  hostilities.  Insomuch  as  all  other 
great  military  Powders  possess  reserves  of  men  who  have  done 
service  with  the  colours  and  are  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
as  well  trained  as  the  first-line  troops,  they  would  experience 
little  difficulty  in  maintaining  their  force  at  its  initial  full 
strength  and  in  replacing  the  losses,  which  the  experience  of 
modern  war  has  demonstrated  beyond  peradventure  amounts 
in  the  first  six  months  of  war  to  fifty  per  cent,  of  the 
strength  of  any  given  unit. 

How  then  shall  the  United  States  acquire  a  force  of  thor- 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      533 

oughly  trained  troops  sufficient  to  meet  such  a  situation  — 
and  one  which  may  arise  at  any  moment  ?  In  the  first  place, 
this  country  will  be  obliged  to  maintain  a  Regular  Army 
which,  on  a  peace  footing,  numbers  at  least  250,000  enlisted 
men.  The  term  of  enlistment  should  be  definitely  fixed  at 
seven  years  —  not  more  than  two  years  to  be  spent  in  active 
service  with  the  colours  and  not  less  than  ^yq  with  the  re- 
serve, except  in  the  case  of  the  non-commissioned  officers  who 
form  the  most  invaluable  asset  and  nucleus  in  any  army. 
Although  no  soldier  should  be  f urloughed  to  the  reserve  until 
he  has  completed  one  year  of  active  training,  at  any  time  be- 
tween the  expiration  of  his  first  year  and  the  termination  of 
his  second  year,  if  he  has  proved  himself  thoroughly  pro- 
ficient in  the  duties  of  a  soldier  of  the  branch  of  the  service 
in  which  he  enlisted,  he  should  at  once,  upon  certification  of 
that  fact  by  the  proper  officers  and  under  proper  restrictions, 
be  transferred  to  the  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army.  A  mili- 
tary establishment  of  250,000  enlisted  men  would,  under  the 
conditions  outlined  above,  graduate  125,000  per  annum. 
Deducting  approximately  one-third  of  that  number  for 
deaths,  re-enlistments,  discharge  for  disability,  courts-mar- 
tial and  other  causes,  would  give,  at  a  conservative  estimate, 
84,000  in  round  numbers  passing  to  the  reserve  each  year. 
Obviously  the  law  would  not  operate  until  the  end  of  the 
second  year  of  enlistment,  but  at  the  beginning  of  the  third 
year  the  available  trained  soldiers  would  amount  to  250,000 
in  the  Regular  Army  and  84,000  in  the  reserve,  a  total  of 
334,000 ;  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  year  to  418,000 ;  at 
the  commencement  of  the  fifth  year  to  502,000 ;  the  sixth 
year  to  586,000,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  seventh  year  to 
670,000  men,  at  which  figure  the  active  Regular  Army  and 
its  reserves  would  be  maintained.  If  present  indications  be 
any  criterion,  such  a  force  ought  to  be  amply  sufficient  for 
many  years  to  come.  The  crux  of  the  whole  question  lies  in 
"  the  principle  that  a  nations  military  'power  is  to  he  meas- 


534      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ured  not  hy  the  total  numher  of  its  male  citizens  capable  of 
hearing  arms,  hut  hy  the  numher  of  trained  soldiers  with 

/hich  it  can  meet  a  given  emergency.''^  * 
The  reason  why  such  stress  is  laid  upon  a  reserve  for  the 
Regular  Army  is  because  it  is  the  only  method  yet  devised 
to  perform  certain  imperative  functions.  In  the  first  place, 
a  reserve  of  soldiers  who  have  had  training  in  active  service 
with  the  colours  permits  the  first-line  army  to  be  maintained 
in  time  of  peace  on  a  reduced  footing  and  at  the  minimum 
cost,  without  impairing  its  efficiency  in  war.  At  the  out- 
break or  impending  of  hostilities,  such  trained  reserves  are 
utilized  by  European  nations  to  expand  their  active  armies 
to  full  war  strength.  The  United  States  has  never  possessed 
a  proper  reserv^e  and  the  shifts  to  which  it  has  been  put  in 
consequence  have  been  abundantly  rehearsed  in  this  book. 
Great  Britain,  whose  military  system  is  similar  to  ours,  did 
not  adopt  the  policy  of  reser^^es  until  for  lack  of  them  her 
army  broke  down  in  the  Crimean  War.  Her  highly-trained, 
long-service  army  melted  away  almost  at  the  outset  of  hos- 
tilities; no  method  existed  to  renew  its  strength  save  with 
untrained  men,  and  she  discovered  by  bitter  experience  that 
without  reserves  her  army  was  by  no  means  fitted  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  war.^ 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  the  only  scheme  extant  for  mak- 
ing good  the  losses  in  war  and  for  maintaining  the  troops 
at  the  front  at  their  full  fighting  strength.  This  is  most 
important  insomuch  as 

''  It  is  the  experience  of  modern  ivarfare  that  any  given  unit 
loses  at  least  50  per  cent,  of  its  strength  in  the  first  six  months 
of  ivar.  If  this  loss  is  not  replaced,  there  is  50  per  cent,  de- 
terioration in  the  power  of  the  unit;  and  if  it  is  replaced  hy  raw 
men,  the  quality  of  the  force  as  a  highly  trained  team  is  de- 
stroyed.^^ ® 


4  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States, 
p.  14. 

5  Compare  ibid.,  p.   31. 

6  lUd.,  p.  29. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      535 

There  is  in  the  United  States  a  law  forbidding  the  adultera- 
tion of  food  and  no  one  questions  the  soundness  of  the  prin- 
ciple upon  which  it  is  based.  Yet  at  the  beginning  of  every 
single  one  of  our  wars,  the  want  of  trained  reserves  has 
caused  the  quality  and  efficiency  of  our  Regular  Army  to  be 
adulterated  by  increasing  its  number  by  raw  recruits.  It 
is  obvious  that  just  in  proportion  as  untrained  men  are 
poured  into  a  trained  organization,  its  strength  is  weakened, 
but,  in  spite  of  the  folly  of  such  a  procedure,  we  have  per- 
sisted in  following  it  on  every  possible  occasion.  The  merit 
of  a  reserve  of  trained  soldiers  lies  in  the  fact  that,  aside 
from  the  two  principal  functions  just  enumerated,  it  in 
nowise  deteriorates  the  strength  of  the  troops  of  the  first- 
line  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  maintains  them  at  their  existing 
standard.  A  reserve  for  the  Regular  Army  is  a  purely  busi- 
ness proposition,  the  economic  value  of  which  consists  in  re- 
ducing the  per  capita  cost  of  the  Army  and  in  increasing 
its  efficiency.  Moreover,  it  insures  the  maximum  efficiency 
with  the  minimum  amount  of  cost  and  labour,  and  every  busi- 
ness man  knows  that  experience  has  proved  that  the  nearer 
men  and  machines  are  run  to  their  full  capacity  the  lower 
the  proportionate  cost.  There  is  accordingly  every  reason 
—  military,  economic  and  financial  —  to  justify  the  enlarge- 
ment of  a  reserve  for  the  Regular  Army  to  a  point  where  it 
will  fulfil  its  mission  in  keeping  with  the  needs  of  our 
national  defence. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  least  six  divisions  ought  to  be 
maintained  at  war  strength  in  continental  United  States  — 
exactly  as  the  French  keep  their  corps  stationed  along  the 
Rhine  frontier  in  time  of  peace  at  full  strength  and  as  we 
do  wdth  the  troops  in  the  overseas  garrisons.  These  135,990 
officers  and  men  ^  would  therefore  be  instantly  available 
at  the  outbreak  of  war  or  for  overseas  expeditions,  as  is  the 
British  Home  army.     Indeed,  wisdom  would  dictate  that  all 


~  An  American  division  at  war  strength  numbers  22,665 .  officers  and 
enlisted  men. 


536     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

units  of  the  Regular  Army  ought  to  be  maintained  at  war 
strength.  The  reserves  could  then  be  utilized  for  the  dual 
purpose  of  keeping  the  troops  in  time  of  war  up  to  their 
full  fighting  strength  and  of  forming  additional  organiza- 
tions, together  with  depot  troops  destined  to  make  good  the 
wastage  which  invariably  occurs  in  actual  hostilities. 

The  question  as  to  whether  the  soldiers  in  the  reserve 
should  be  paid  or  not  has  been  much  discussed,  but  can  be 
dismissed  in  a  few  words.  The  household  proverb  that 
"  You  cannot  get  something  for  nothing  "  applies  with  par- 
ticular force  in  this  case.  In  a  military  system  like  that  of 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  men  enlist  in  the  Army 
because  they  prefer  the  career  of  a  soldier  to  other  voca- 
tions; the  service  is  purely  voluntary  and  not  compulsory 
as  in  the  case  of  European  armies.  One  might  as  well  ex- 
pect men  dependent  upon  their  wage  or  salary  to  work  gratis 
as  to  expect  soldiers  to  give  their  service,  even  a  reserve, 
without  some  remuneration.  They  are  paid  in  the  Regular 
Army  in  order  that  the  country  may  avail  itself  of  them, 
and  they  should  assuredly  be  paid  when  they  pass  into  the 
reserve,  if  service  can  be  exacted  of  them  in  time  of  war. 
Although  the  pay  will  necessarily  be  only  a  part  of  what  they 
receive  in  active  service,  justice,  equity  and  the  plain  fact 
that  in  no  other  way  will  an  adequate  reser\'e  of  trained 
soldiers  be  secured,  all  demand  that  reservists  must  be  prop- 
erly recompensed. 

The  increase  of  the  Regailar  Army  to  250,000  men  should 
be  made  with  due  regard  to  the  respective  function  to  be  dis- 
charged by  each  arm  of  the  service.  The  infantry,  which 
is  the  backbone  of  an  army,  will  then  be  sufficiently  strong 
for  all  purposes,  and  the  cavalry  and  artillery  will  not  be 
hopelessly  deficient  when  volunteers  and  Organized  Militia 
are  employed.  Another  great  shortage  will  thereby  be  recti- 
fied, insomuch  as  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps  will  be  increased 
from  its  present  force  of  19,994  to  a  sufficient  number  to 
permit  all  the  guns  and  mortars,  as  well  as  all  the  accessories 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces       537 

such  as  mines,  searchlights  and  fire-control  apparatus,  not 
only  in  the  overseas  possessions  but  in  continental  United 
States,  to  be  manned,  as  they  ought  to  be,  by  trained  Regu- 
lar troops.  The  comparatively  paltry  force  of  Militia  Coast 
Artillery  —  amounting,  as  has  been  seen  on  page  512  to 
only  7,563  officers  and  men  —  can  then  be  utilized  to  great 
advantage  by  distributing  them  as  additional  details  among 
the  fortifications  most  likely  to  be  attacked.  Aside  from 
correcting  the  defect  just  mentioned,  such  an  increase  in  the 
Regular  Coast  Artillery  would  perijiit  all  the  batteries  to 
be  manned,  instead  of  having  thirty-nine  forts  ungarrisoned, 
as  is  now  the  case  owing  to  lack  of  sufficient  troops.  This 
is  not  the  only  instance  in  which  the  United  States  has 
hitched  the  cart  in  front  of  the  horse  in  military  matters. 
The  folly  of  spending  vast  amounts  for  the  construction 
of  fortifications  and  at  the  same  time  failing  to  provide 
the  necessary  troops  to  man  them  is  too  evident  to  require 
further  comment.  In  addition  to  a  sufficient  number  of 
troops  to  man  all  forts  and  batteries,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  provide  coast  artillery  and  mobile  troops  in  order  to  pro- 
tect the  fortifications  against  raids  by  small  forces  landed 
from  an  enemy's  warships  or  transports.  Without  protec- 
tion by  adequate  mobile  forces  harbour  defences  can  read- 
ily be  taken  from  the  rear,  where  they  are  decidedly  vul- 
nerable. 

In  increasing  the  Regular  establishment  our  legislators 
must  not  lose  sight  of  the  necessity  for  extra  officers.  It 
is  an  absolute  impossibility  to  bring  troops  up  to  the  re- 
quisite standard  of  efficiency  unless  they  have  the  proper 
quota  of  officers  present  at  all  times  with  the  commands. 
The  handicap  under  which  our  Army  has  laboured  for 
years  for  want  of  sufficient  officers  on  duty  always  with 
troops  has  been  too  often  emphasized  to  need  repetition  here. 
Furthermore,  the  needs  of  such  detached  service  as  engineer 
officers  doing  improvement  work  on  rivers  and  harbours,  as 
inspector-instructors  with  the  Organized  Militia,  as  instruc- 


538      Military  Un  pre  pa  redness  of  the  United  States 

tors  in  various  educational  institutions,  etc..  must  be  con- 
sidered and  due  account  taken  of  the  number  required  for 
such  duty  —  especially  since  it  is  specifically  exacted  by  law 
and  cannot  be  legally  escaped.  Aside  from  these  is  the  ne- 
cessity for  the  creation  of  a  reserve  corps  of  officers  in  order 
to  provide  beforehand  the  requisite  nimiber  which  will  be 
needed  when  the  volunteer  or  reserve  forces  are  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States. 

In  connection  with  the  subject  of  officers,  it  is  highly  im- 
perative that  some  system  of  elimination  and  selection  should 
be  immediately  introduced  into  the  Regular  Army.  At 
present  there  exists  no  relation  between  efficiency  and  pro- 
motion, the  latter  being  based  on  seniority  alone.  Indeed 
one  is  almost  tempted  to  declare  that  in  the  Army  the  system 
is  one  of  promotion  by  senility.  TThile  experience  is  one 
of  the  most  valuable  weapons  in  the  hands  of  a  general  offi- 
cer, there  is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  in  the  American 
AiTQy  officers  reach  the  rank  of  major,  lieutenant-colonel, 
colonel  and  general  Ions:  after  thev  ouffht  to,  with  the  result 
that  the  service  suffers  from  superannuation  and  consequent 
lack  of  initiative  which,  with  the  rarest  of  exceptions,  is 
only  to  be  found  in  younger  men.  Moreover,  much  dead- 
wood  is  permitted  to  remain  in  active  service  to  the  de- 
cided detriment  of  the  Army  and  the  discouragement  of 
the  more  zealous  and  efficient  officers. 

One  of  the  most  important  reforms  to  be  made  in  re- 
spect to  the  mobile  army  within  continental  United  States 
is  to  put  a  definite  end  to  the  present  dispersion  of  the 
troops  all  over  the  country,  as  a  result  of  which  the  American 
Army  is  absurdly  administered  from  almost  every  conceiv- 
able standpoint  except  that  of  the  communities  in  which 
the  various  posts  are  situated.  The  time  has  come  when 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  must  be  made  paramount 
to  those  of  petty  localities,  and  the  present  system  of  whole- 
sale and  totally  unnecessary  expense  terminated.  It  is  an 
absolute  impossibiliiy  that  the  Army  can  be  economically 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      539 

administered  or  attain  that  efficiency  which  it  ought  to  pos- 
sess unless  fully  four-fifths  of  the  garrisons  and  posts  in  the 
country  are  abolished.  Obviously  a  howl  will  be  set  up  by 
every  community  which  will  be  deprived  of  the  revenue 
emanating  from  the  expenditures  of  the  troops  stationed  in 
its  midst,  but  the  question  must  now  be  squarely  faced,  and 
our  legislators  must  determine  whether  the  country  is  to 
continue  to  be  milked  for  the  sole  benefit  of  certain  local 
interests.  The  War  College,  after  a  careful  study,  has  esti- 
mated that  a  saving  of  about  $5,500,000  per  annum  would 
be  effected  if  the  present  mobile  force  were  concentrated  in 
eight  posts.  Broadly-speaking,  the  Army  should  be  so  dis- 
tributed as  to  insure 

(1)  Proper  tactical  training  of  the  infantry,  cavalry  and  field 
artillery  combined. 

(2)  Rapidity  of  concentration  of  the  Army  upon  the  north- 
ern or  southern  frontier  or  upon  the  Atlantic  or  Pacific  coasts. 

(3)  The  best  use  of  the  Eegular  Army  as  a  model  for  the 
general  military  training  of  the  Xational  Guard. 

(4)  The  most  advantageous  employment  of  the  Eegular  Army 
as  a  nucleus  for  the  war  organization  of  the  Organized  Militia 
and  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may  authorize. 

(5)  An  economical  administration  giving  the  maximum  re- 
turn for  the  money  expended. 

(6)  A  peace  organization  in  keeping  with  effectiveness  in  war 
—  in  other  words,  one  which  will  permit  the  xA.rmy  as  a  whole 
to  be  instantaneously  available  for  active  operations  either  within 
or  without  the  United  States. 

The  troops  should  be  stationed  only  at  strategic  points  which 
are  additionally  centres  favourable  for  transportation,  ad- 
ministration and  supply,  and  in  general  terms  their  location 
should  be  as  follows: 

(1)  Two  or  perhaps  three  groups  covering  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board and  situated  on  a  line  between  the  St.  Lawrence  and  At- 
lanta. 

(2)  Two  or  three  groups  covering  the  Pacific  coast  and  sta- 
tioned on  a  line  between  Puget  Sound  and  Los  Angeles. 


540      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

(3)  Two  groups  as  a  minimiim  between  the  Great  Lakes  and 
the  Mexican  border,  which  would  serve  as  a  fire  reserve  for  the 
groups  on  the  Atlantic  or  Pacific  coast  as  well  as  nuclei  for  the 
development  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  volunteers  to  be  or- 
ganized in  the  interior  of  the  country  where  they  would  be  im- 
mune from  attack.^ 

Unless  some  such  scheme  is  put  into  effect,  the  full  benefit 
cannot  be  derived  from  the  tactical  organization  introduced 
by  Secretary  Stimson  in  1913  —  the  merit  of  which,  as  has 
been  repeatedly  stated,  cannot  be  overestimated  —  the 
American  people  will  never  get  a  quid  pro  quo  for  their 
money,  and  the  Army  will  never  reach  that  efiSciency  which 
the  nation  has  a  right  to  expect  from  its  military  establish- 
ment. Moreover,  not  until  the  Regular  troops  are  concen- 
trated in  groups  not  smaller  than  brigades  will  our  Army 
officers  be  afforded  an  opportunity  to  perfect  themselves  in 
leading  forces  of  such  size  as  they  would  necessarily  be 
called  upon  to  command  in  time  of  w-ar.  At  the  present 
they  are  deprived  of  such  practice,  and,  if  the  United  States 
were  now  suddenly  plunged  into  war  against  a  powerful  ad- 
versary, there  is  every  indication  that  reverses,  serious  if  not 
fatal,  would  be  bound  to  occur  until  our  officers  had  been 
taught  by  bitter  experience  the  lessons  which  the}''  ought  to 
have  mastered  in  time  of  peace.  In  such  an  event,  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  every  unsuccessful  general  would  be 
made  the  scapegoats  of  public  wrath,  even  though  they  w^ere 
in  nowise  responsible  for  the  pernicious  system  bequeathed 
to  them  and  even  though  they  might  have  moved  heaven 
and  earth  to  abolish  it;  while  the  American  people  would 
as  usual  be  blind  to  the  fact  that  the  real  responsibility  lay 
at  their  own  doors  for  permitting  the  continuance  of  a  sys- 
tem under  which  a  Napoleon  himself  would  be  po^verless  to 
achieve  success. 

So  little  has  been  done  by  Congress  in  the  matter  of  ap- 

8  Compare  Report  on   the   Organization   of  the  Land   Forces   of   the 
United  States,  p.  21. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      511 

propriations  for  guns,  ammunition,  supplies  and  war  ma- 
teriel of  almost  every  sort  and  description  such  as  would  be 
needed  in  time  of  war,  that  it  may  be  safely  said  that  the  sur- 
face has  scarcely  been  scratched.  If  the  reader  has  any 
doubts  on  this  score,  let  him  examine  the  facts  set  forth  in 
Chapter  XXIII  and  soberly  compare  what  our  national  leg- 
islature has  done  for  national  defence  with  the  preparations 
for  the  present  European  war  made  by  Germany.  That 
country  has  demonstrated  by  its  achievements,  not  only  the 
imperative  necessity  for  such  measures,  but  that  ovenvhelm- 
ing  superiority  of  numbers  and  resources  can,  to  a  large 
measure,  be  offset  and  nullified  when  pitted  against  thorough 
preparation  for  war.  With  such  an  object  lesson  staring 
us  in  the  face,  it  is  pertinent  to  ask  how  long  the  American 
people  are  going  to  remain  supine  and  blind  to  what  the 
consequences  of  inadequate  preparation  for  war  may  readily 
entail  ? 

Passing  from  the  Regular  military  establishment,  consid- 
eration must  next  be  given  to  the  land  forces  constituting  the 
second,  and  indeed  principal,  line  of  defence.  Heretofore 
this  has  been  the  Organised  Militia,  either  per  se  or  as  the 
principal  source  from  which  officers  and  men  of  any  mili- 
tary training  could  be  drawn,  save  the  isolated  instances  of 
former  Regular  soldiers  offering  their  services  in  time  of 
emergency.  The  Act  of  May  27,  1908,  specifically  pre- 
scribed that  ^^  the  Organized  Militia  shall  be  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  in  advance  of  any  volunteer 
force  which  it  may  be  determined  to  raise.''  This  was  one 
of  the  most  flagrant  pieces  of  folly  ever  injected  into  the 
m^ilitary  legislation  of  this  country.  So  long  as  it  remains 
on  the  statute  books  there  need  be  no  hope  of  our  possessing 
a  sound  military  organization  suitable  to  the  stress  of  war. 
Indeed,  there  is  grave  reason  to  doubt  whether  a  really  effi- 
cient citizen-soldiery  can  be  created  under  the  militia  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution,  especially  if  the  National  Guard 
is  to  unite  the  dual  function  of  a  national  reserve  and  of 


542      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

State  constabulary.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  fact  none  the 
less  remains  that  as  a  military  asset  the  Organized  Militia 
is  today  woefully  deficient  —  as  has  been  seen  in  the  previous 
chajDter  —  and,  moreover,  as  Major  Palmer  strikingly  pointed 
out  in  his  admirable  article  on  The  Militia  Pay  Bill  in  the 
Infantry  Journal  for  ^N'ovember-December,  1914,  suffers 
markedly  by  comparison  with  analogous  military  forces  of 
other  English-speaking  nations. 

"  The  United  States  with  a  population  of  about  92,000.000  has 
a  force  of  about  122^000  organized  militia,  or  1,324  citizen  sol- 
diers to  each  million  of  population. 

"  The  United  Kingdom  with  a  population  of  about  41,000,000 
has  in  its  well  organized  territorial  army  317,000  citizen  soldiers 
none  of  whom  are  paid.  This  means  7,770  citizen  soldiers  to 
each  million  of  population.  If  the  young  men  of  the  United 
States  would  enlist  in  the  same  relative  numbers  as  the  young 
men  of  Great  Britain  we  could  have  a  citizen  soldiery  of 
711,622   men.  ... 

"  The  Dominion  of  Canada  with  a  population  of  a  little  more 
than  7,000,000  has  a  national  citizen  soldiery  of  about  64,000 
men,  none  of  whom  are  paid.  If  our  3'oung  men  should  enlist 
in  the  same  relative  numbers  we  would  have  a  force  of  about 
826,000  men.  .  .  . 

"  The  Federation  of  Australia  with  a  population  of  about 
4,455,000  has  a  partially  trained  citizen  soldiery  of  about  88,000,^ 
none  of  whom  are  paid.  If  our  young  men  should  enlist  in  the 
same  relative  numbers,  we  should  have  1,802,651  citizen  sol- 
diers. .  .  . 

"  Why  is  it  that  where  one  young  American  enters  the  organ- 
ized militia,  more  than  five  young  Englishmen  enter  the  territo- 
rial army,  more  than  six  young  Canadians  enter  the  Dominion 
militia,  and  more  than  fifteen  young  Australians  enter  their  na- 
tional citizen  soldiery?  It  cannot  be  solely  because  our  men  are 
not  paid,  because  neither  the  Englishman,  the  Canadian  nor  the 
Australian  is  paid  for  the  time  he  gives  for  military  training. 
Can  it  be  because  the  young  American  is  less  patriotic  than  his 


9  "  This  was  the  number  before  compulsory  service  became  effective. 
Under  compulsory  military  service  it  is  expected  that  the  force  will 
attain  a  strength  of  250,000."— Farmer,  p.  348. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      543 

fellows ^of  the  English  speaking  race,  that  we  must  pay  him  to 
perform  a  duty  as  a  free  and  voluntary  patriotic  service  ? '' 

The  answer  is  to  be  sought  at  the  foundations  upon  which 
the  Xational  Guard  is  built  and  organized.  It  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  primarily  a  State  force  which  can  be  employed, 
in  quelling  local  disturbances ;  that  it  has  a  long  enlistment 
and  a  period  of  training  spread  over  three  years,  confined 
largely  to  armoury  drills  instead  of  brief  intensive  training 
such  as  is  given  to  the  Swiss  or  Australian  soldiery.  Xot 
less  fundamental  is  the  objection  to  the  Organized  Militia 
on  the  ground  that  it  cannot  legally  be  employed  outside  the 
confines  of  the  United  States;  and,  worst  of  all,  the  Consti- 
tutional limitations  respecting  its  use  are  in  conflict  with  the 
basic  principle  that  in  time  of  war  the  Government  of  a 
nation  shall  be  clothed  with  despotic  power  to  wield  the  en- 
tire national  resources  for  the  benefit  of  public  welfare,  with- 
out let  or  hindrance  by  any  part  of  that  nation.  As  Major 
Palmer  pertinently  observes :  ^^ 

"  The  immense  mass  of  modern  military  forces  and  the  speed 
of  modern  military  operations  require  a  cooperation  or  team 
work  that  can  be  secured  only  by  permeating  the  entire  force 
with  a  unified  military  doctrine  in  time  of  peace  and  this  is 
possible  only  when  the  war  making  power  is  also  the  war  pre- 
paring power.  This  cannot  be  secured  by  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment requesting  each  of  the  forty-eight  sovereigns  to  adopt  its 
military  doctrine.  Each  of  these  forty-eight  sovereigns  has  a 
prior  claim  on  the  emplo^inent  of  the  militia,  maintains  it  for 
its  own  uses.^and  has  its  own  doctrine  as  to  its  employment  and 
training  in  peace.'' 

There  are  two  solutions  in  respect  to  the  Organized  Militia 
as  at  present  constituted.  Either  it  must  be  taken  wholly 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  several  States  and  placed  under  the 
absolute  control  of  the  Federal  Government,  or,  if  it  is  to 
remain  in   State  control,   it  must  be  appraised  at  its  true 


'^^  Infantry  Journal  for  Xovember-December,   1914,  p.  244. 


544     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

value  as  a  military  asset  and  relegated  to  the  third  line  of 
defence.  In  the  latter  event  a  force  of  United  States  Vol- 
unteers must  be  created,  and  it  will  be  difficult  to  improve 
upon  the  features  of  the  law  of  March  2,  181)9,  that  brought 
into  being  the  volunteer  regiments,  the  worth  of  which  was 
so  conclusively  demonstrated  during  the  Philippine  insur- 
rection. It  is  highly  probable  that  many  of  the  best  officers 
and  men  of  the  Organized  Militia  would  enlist  in  such  a 
Federal  force,  and,  if  the  provisions  of  the  above-mentioned 
law  were  closely  followed,  the  rejection  of  candidates  not 
up  to  the  requisite  standard  would  be  simple.  Such  a  force 
could  be  made  to  conform  to  any  requirements  that  the  Gov- 
ernment deemed  best  to  exact,  and,  by  the  time  that  six 
months  of  hostilities  had  elapsed,  it  could  take  its  place  in 
the  fighting  line  side  by  side  with  the  Regular  Army  with- 
out there  being  any  grounds  for  misgivings  as  to  its  effi- 
ciency. 

The  officers  and  men  enrolled  in  this  force  of  United 
States  Volunters  or  Second-Line  Army  should  receive  an  in- 
tensive training  similar  to  that  given  to  the  Swiss,  whose 
governmental  system  is  closely  akin  to  our  own  but  whose 
militia  system  is  vastly  superior  to  ours.  A  proof  of  the 
merit  of  their  method  lies  in  the  fact  that  in  24  hours  they 
can  mobilize  an  efficient  army  of  220,000  soldiers  fully 
trained  and  equipped,  most  of  whom  are  fair  shots  and  all 
of  whom  are  accustomed  to  using  the  army  rifle.  Behind 
this  first  line  is  a  reserve  composed  of  270,000  men,  of  whom 
70,000  are  thoroughly  armed,  and  the  entire  force  cost  only 
$8,594,200  for  the  year  1913-1914^^ — something  of  a  con- 
trast to  the  $97,013,965.87  spent  by  the  United  States  for 
the  maintenance  of  a  Regular  Army  of  only  92,482.^^  The 
initial  instruction  of  the  Swiss  militia  soldiers  is  given  in 
the  recruits'  schools,  and  is  followed  by  periods  of  training 
amounting  to  65  days  for  the  infantry,  engineers  and  foot 


11  Statesman's  Year  Book  for  1914,  p.  1338. 

12  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  pp.  10,  16-18. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces       545 

artillery,  75  days  for  the  field  artillery,  and  90  days  for  the 
cavalry.  The  subsequent  trainings,  known  as  ''  repetition 
courses,"  are  confined  to  eleven  days  annually,  but  all  sol- 
diers under  the  rank  of  sergeant  are  excused  from  further 
schooling  after  having  attended  seven  courses  —  or  eight  in 
the  case  of  the  cavalry.  One  of  the  notable  features  of  the 
Swiss  system  is  the  requirement  that  every  man  exempted 
for  any  reason  from  military  service  shall  pay  a  special  tax 
for  national  defence,  the  amount  being  proportioned  to  his 
income  or  wealth.  This  principle  was  enforced  by  the 
United  States  in  resorting  to  the  draft  during  the  War  of  the 
Eebellion,  and  might  well  be  adopted  again,  particularly 
since  its  application  is  quite  as  just  in  time  of  peace  as  in 
war. 

There  is  little  question  that  the  organization  of  such  a 
Federal  force,  with  an  intensive  training  similar  to  that  just 
outlined,  would  appeal  to  the  best  officers  and  men  of  the 
Organized  Militia,  as  well  as  to  the  young  men  who  have 
attended  the  Students'  Military  Instruction  Camps  during 
the  past  two  years.  The  fact  that  such  a  force  was  national. 
and  therefore  not  liable  to  be  called  out  for  police  duty  in 
strikes  and  riots  —  a  task  which  is  necessarily  irksome ;  that 
the  training  is  intensive  and  not  dragged  out  for  three  years ; 
that  such  a  Federal  force  is  organized  for  war,  and  that  the 
man  who  enrolls  himself  in  it  will  learn  in  a  comparatively 
short  time  to  be  a  soldier,  removes  nearly  all  of  the  objec- 
tions which  now  deter  men  from  entering  the  National 
Guards  of  the  various  States.  The  existence  of  such  a  force 
would  go  a  long  way  to  postpone  conscription,  which  in- 
evitably overtakes  every  nation  that  embarks  upon  war  with- 
out an  adequate  military  force. 

The  Organized  Militia  should  constitute  the  third  line  of 
defence  so  long  as  it  retains  its  present  status  as  a  State 
force.  It  is  high  time  that  an  end  were  put  to  the  present 
preposterous  conditions  which  have  been  permitted  to  con- 
tinue entirely  too  long,  and  that  the  American  people  real- 


546     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ized  the  facts  about  the  I^ational  Guard.  How  woefully 
deficient  it  now  is,  in  spite  of  all  that  has  been  done  to  im- 
prove it,  has  been  chronicled  in  detail  in  Chapter  XXIII. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Federal  Government  vir- 
tually supports  the  militia  of  the  forty-eight  States  hut  it 
does  not,  and  under  the  Constitution  cannot,  control  them. 
Since  1903  Congress  has  spent  in  round  numbers  $60,000,000 
for  their  support,  yet  it  is  powerless  to  enforce  regulations 
for  the  proper  care  of  arms  and  property  belonging  to  the 
United  States  and  entrusted  to  the  care  of  the  militia,  or 
to  prevent  their  loss  and  destruction  through  negligence. 
Except  on  sufferance,  the  Government  has  no  real  control 
over  the  training  of  the  militia,  and  no  control  whatsoever 
over  their  organization.  In  the  event  of  war,  it  can  ex- 
ercise nothing  more  than  a  divided  control  and,  under  no 
circumstances,  can  the  militia  be  ordered  outside  of  conti- 
nental United  States.  In  every  war  in  our  history  the  State 
militia  as  such  has  been  a  dismal  failure.  It  would  be  im- 
possible to  cite  a  better  proof  that  the  system  is  at  fault 
than  the  fact  that  these  same  men,  when  organized  into  na- 
tional volunteers  and  given  proper  training,  have  almost  al- 
ways become  efficient  troops,  with  a  record  often  glorious. 
All  the  more  reason  why  the  Federal  Government  should  at 
once  cease  to  support  troops  which  it  cannot  control  and 
which  are  not  at  its  disposal  until  their  status  is  changed  at 
the  beginning  of  war  or  when  hostilities  are  imminent. 
What  their  employment  has  entailed  in  the  way  of  waste, 
confusion,  political  generals  and  crass  inefficiency  has  been 
sufficiently  rehearsed  in  former  pages,  and  the  time  has  come 
to  realize  that  the  appointment  of  inexperienced  and  un- 
qualified officers  to  command  men  in  time  of  war  is  a  crime 
akin  to  treason  as  well  as  to  murder.  To  continue  the 
present  system  is  to  prolong  what  is  nothing  short  of  a  farce. 
The  United  States  should  certainly  withdraw  all  financial 
support  from  the  Organized  Militia  as  at  present  constituted, 
and  permit  the  States  to  support  and  control  such  forces  as 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      547 

they  deem  best.  It  is  not  unlikely  that,  under  such  circum- 
stances, they  would  find  that  small  forces  will  suffice  for  their 
needs,  especially  if  their  character  be  analogous  to  that  of 
the  Pennsylvania  constabulary  which,  although  considerably 
smaller  than  it  ought  to  be,  has  thus  far  proved  itself  fully 
able  to  cope  with  any  internal  situation. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  States  should  voluntarily  agree 
to  permit  their  Organized  Militia  to  pass  under  the  absolute 
control  of  the  Federal  Government  and  should  allow  its 
status  to  be  changed  to  complete  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  there  is  little  doubt  that  its  efficiency  could  soon  be 
increased  at  least  two-fold.  Better  yet  would  be  a  Consti- 
tutional amendment  placing  all  troops  intended  to  be  used  in 
war  under  the  control  of  the  Federal  Government.  The 
plain  truth  is  that  there  is  no  more  ground  for  the  States  to 
maintain  land  forces  which  are  destined  to  he  employed  in 
national  service  in  time  of  war  than  for  them  to  maintain 
navies  independently  of  the  United  States.  The  Federal 
Government  could  then  raise  the  troops  to  the  proper  stand- 
ard, instead  of  being  obliged  to  lower  the  standard  to  suit 
the  troops,  as  it  did  in  the  case  of  the  Organized  Militia  dur- 
ing January,  1914.  In  that  event,  the  necessity  for  a  Fed- 
eral Volunteer  Army  such  as  outlined  in  the  preceding  pages 
would  be  immeasurably  lessened,  particularly  if  a  law  were 
passed  permitting  the  drafting  of  the  necessary  men  in  each 
Congressional  district  where  the  number  of  men  who  volun- 
teered for  military  service  fell  short  of  the  quota  allotted  to 
that  district.  Such  a  measure  would  possess  all  the  merits 
of  the  system  which  now  prevails  in  Australia  —  where  com- 
pulsory service  is  exacted  of  all  males  not  physically  unfit, 
beginning  at  the  age  of  12  years  and  lasting  until  twenty- 
five —  but  without  the  objections  which  would  infallibly  be 
raised  against  it.  The  term  of  enlistment  in  such  a  Federal 
Militia  should  be  for  seven  years,  with  a  period  of  intensive 
training  amounting  to  about  six  weeks  in  the  first  year  and 
at  least  a  fortnight  in  each  of  the  remaining  six.     Local  pride 


548     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in  sucli  a  force  and  the  identification  of  the  organizations 
with  the  communities  in  which  thej  are  raised  could  be  per- 
petuated by  adding  to  the  designation  of  the  number  and  arm 
that  of  the  locality  to  which  the  troops  belong,  as  for  example 
the  100th  Infantry  (Pennsylvania.) 

Emphasis  has  already  been  laid  on  the  undeniable  fact 
that  "  A  nation's  military  power  is  to  be  measured  not  by  the 
total  number  of  its  male  citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms, 
but  by  the  number  of  trained  soldiers  with  which  it  can 
meet  a  given  emergency."  The  author  ventures  to  suggest 
that,  if  it  be  desired  to  ascertain  how  much  of  a  military 
asset  the  United  States  now  possesses  in  the  Organized  Mi- 
litia as  at  present  constituted,  the  modus  operandi  is  simple. 
Let  the  President  call  out  the  militia  by  proclamation  and, 
when  they  have  assembled  at  the  rendezvous  in  their  re- 
spective States,  let  each  officer  and  man  announce  whether 
or  not  he  will  volunteer  for  war  service.  That  done,  a  thor- 
ough inspection  can  be  made  by  carefully  selected  Regular 
officers,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  how  many  officers 
and  men  are  up  to  the  standard  of  dependable  troops  who 
have  received  sufficient  training  to  enable  them  to  take  the 
field  at  once.  Such  a  procedure  would  scarcely  exceed  the 
cost  of  a  joint  summer  manoeuvre,  and  the  American  people 
would  then  know  exactly  what  could  be  counted  upon  from 
the  Organized  Militia. 

If  the  land  forces  are  organized  as  has  been  indicated 
above,  they  would  consist  of 

(1)  A  Eegular  Army  of  250,000  men. 

(2)  A  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army  amounting  eventually  to 
4^0,000  men. 

(3)  United  States  Volunteers. 

(4)  The  Organized  Militia  or  National  Guard. 

It  is  probable  that,  if  the  proper  precautions  be  taken  in 
the  creation  of  these  four  lines  of  defence,  the  yield  would 
be  at  least  1,200,000   men,  of  whom   670,000  would  have 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      549 

had  training  in  the  EegTilar  Army,  and  the  rest  a  founda- 
tion of  schooling  which,  if  supplemented  by  six  months  of 
training  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  would  transform 
them  into  excellent  troops  fully  fit  for  war. 

One  of  the  great  reforms  needed  in  our  military  service  is 
in  the  present  system  of  recruiting,  which  is  based  upon  a 
shifting  army,  and  is  both  w^asteful  and  expensive  when  com- 
pared with  that  which  most  military  nations  have  found  nec- 
essary to  adopt.  The  principal  justification  for  the  existing 
system  is  in  the  fact  that  it  does  its  work  well  considering 
the  handicaps  due  to  a  shifting  and  widely  dispersed  Army. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  desired  reform  will  be  diffi- 
cult to  effect  until  the  Regular  troops  are  concentrated  in 
large  forces  in  a  few  garrisons  or  posts.  Once  that  has  been 
accomplished,  all  recruiting  for  organizations  should  be  done 
in  the  locality  or  area  in  which  they  are  stationed,  thus 
eliminating  a  large  measure  of  the  expense  now  arising  from 
the  necessity  of  transporting  recruits  long  distances  from 
the  place  where  they  are  accepted.  Moreover,  all  terms  of 
enlistment  should  begin  and  end  at  certain  fixed  dates,  instead 
of  occurring  at  any  time  during  the  year  as  under  the  pres- 
ent system.  If  all  men  who  have  finished  their  legal  service 
with  the  colours  were  transferred  to  the  reserve  about  the 
first  of  I^ovember,  and  if  all  recruits  were  sent  to  join  their 
organizations  at  the  same  time,  much  confusion  would  be 
avoided,  the  winter  could  be  devoted  to  training  the  recruits, 
and  the  following  summer  and  autumn  to  higher  military 
training,  without  the  interruption  caused  by  a  continual  in- 
flux of  recruits.  An  added  advantage  would  lie  in  the  op- 
portunity thereby  given  to  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  to  handle  large  numbers  of  men  in  the  same  stage  of 
training,  thus  insuring  better  results  than  are  possible  under 
the  existing  system.  The  indications  are  that  it  would  be 
impracticable  to  confine  to  one  date  the  period  when  recruits 
join  the  colours;  but,  even  if  such  periods  occurred  every 


550     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

three  or  four  months,  the  labour  would  be  greatly  simplified 
and  the  resultant  efficiency  much  higher  than  can  now  be 
attained. 

The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  has  officially  declared 
that,  even  if  the  entire  population  of  the  United  States  were 
utilized  as  a  recruiting  field,  the  indications  are  that  the 
Regular  Army  cannot  be  recruited  by  voluntary  enlistment 
beyond  140,000  men.  This  is  a  serious  condition,  but  there 
exist  two  solutions.  Either  the  military  service  must  be 
made  more  attractive  to  the  average  man  than  it  now  is,  or 
else  drafting  or  compulsory  service  must  be  exacted.  The 
first  is  obviously  the  simpler  solution,  but  it  is  bound  to  en- 
tail greater  expense  and  the  public  will  have  to  be  brought  to 
a  realization  that  the  men  who  are  the  bulwark  of  national 
defence  are  entitled  to  far  greater  recognition  than  they  now 
receive.  The  labour  market  is  full  of  men  who  would  doubt- 
less be  glad  to  follow  the  career  of  the  soldier  provided  they 
received  compensation  commensurate  with  that  which  they 
can  earn  in  civil  pursuits.  The  whole  question  can  be  put 
in  a  nutshell  by  declaring  that  a  nation  which  needs  a  large 
military  force  for  its  defence  is  confronted  by  two  alterna- 
tives, namely,  an  expense  necessarily  heavy  if  it  depends 
upon  voluntary  enlistment  for  the  soldiers  required,  or  the 
exaction  of  compulsory  service  on  the  part  of  the  able-bodied 
males. 

It  is  impossible  to  lay  too  much  stress  upon  the  absolute 
necessity  from  a  military  standpoint  of  an  organization  the 
basic  principles  of  which  have  never  been  more  comprehen- 
sively enunciated  than  by  Secretary  of  War  Calhoun  in  1820, 
when  he  declared  '^  that,  at  thei  commej^cbment  of  hostili- 
ties^  THEEEi  SHOULD  BE   NOTHING  EITHER   TO   NEW  MODEL  OR 

TO  CREATE."  For  this  fundamental  reason  all  organization 
which  is  to  be  sound  must  take  place  in  time  of  peace,  other- 
wise it  cannot  be  in  working  order  when  war  arises.  In 
this  connection  emphasis  is  again  placed  upon  the  imperative 
necessitv  for  a  reserv^e  force  of  trained  officers,  in  order  that 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      551 

they  may  be  available  the  instant  the  new  and  augmented 
forces  are  called  into  service.  The  difficulty  which  Great 
Britain  has  encountered  in  obtaining  trained  and  experienced 
officers  for  her  volunteers  in  the  present  European  war  ought 
to  be  a  lesson  by  which  Americans  should  profit. 

The  crux  of  the  whole  question  is  in  the  matter  of  train- 
ing. Without  trained  reserves  it  is  utterly  impossible  to 
mobilize  an  army  for  war  with  any  degree  of  promptness. 
Without  trained  officers  long  periods  of  schooling  are  neces- 
sary to  bring  soldiers  up  to  even  a  moderate  degree  of  effi- 
ciencv.  Without  trainine:  men  are  worse  than  useless  in 
w^ar.  From  a  military  point  of  view  the  problem  of  obtain- 
ing men  in  time  of  war  would  be  tremendously  simplified 
if  military  drill,  military  hygiene  and  the  elements  of  rifle 
shooting  were  made  compulsory  in  every  public  and  private 
school,  as  well  as  in  every  college  and  university  in  the 
United  States.  Properly  conducted,  such  training  might 
readily  be  made  as  little  irksome  as  is  the  work  of  the  Boy 
Scouts  or  of  the  young  men  who  have  attended  the  Students' 
Military  Instruction  camps ;  and  the  youngsters  in  these  two 
categories  have  taken  to  the  work  wdth  genuine  avidity.  In 
the  author's  opinion  the  school,  college  or  university  which 
is  the  first  to  require  every  male  student,  not  physically  or 
mentally  incapacitated,  to  take  a  course  in  military  training 
before  a  diploma  is  given  him  will  perform  a  great  public 
service  and  set  an  example  which  many  of  our  educational 
institutions  will  be  glad  to  follow.  The  author  appreciates 
that  his  advocacy  of  such  an  innovation  is  open  to  attack  by 
a  host  of  carping  critics  who  will  indulge  in  the  hackneyed 
clamour  against  "  militarism,''  but  it  is  too  much  to  ask  such 
people  to  realize  that,  great  as  may  be  the  advantage  of  such 
training  to  the  country  in  time  of  crisis,  greater  far  will  be 
the  benefit  conferred  upon  the  individual  in  his  everyday 
life.  If  sound  bodies,  well-developed  physiques,  knowledge 
of  hygiene,  the  lessons  of  self-control,  and  the  inculcation  of 
obedience  and  of  that  patriotism  which  actuates  the  individ- 


552     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ual  to  make  sacrifices  for  his  country  are  of  no  benefit  to  a 
nation,  then  the  scheme  has  no  justification.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  such  a  course  of  training  produces  better  men  physi- 
cally and  better  citizens,  merely  by  curbing  the  spirit  of 
disobedience  which  has  made  the  American  deservedly  a  by- 
ward  for  lawlessness  and  lack  of  true  patriotism,  and  if  it 
can  accomplish  for  the  boys  a  part  of  what  it  does  for  the 
men  in  our  Eegular  Army  to  whom  we  point  with  pride,  no 
really  valid  objection  can  be  raised  against  it.  One  of  the 
ablest  of  American  political  economists  has  openly  declared 
that  "  the  efiiciency  of  factory  labor  in  Germany  has  been 
greatly  increased  through  this  military  education,  and  that 
the  young  men  who  have  been  through  this  military  training 
become  much  more  efficient  in  the  field  of  production  in 
later  years  than  they  w^ould  have  been  had  they  not  been' 
obliged  to  undergo  this  training  at  all."  ^^  "  The  proof  of 
the  pudding  is  in  the  eating,"  and  in  certain  ways  we  Ameri- 
cans can  derive  no  little  profit  from  the  example  of  German 
efficiency  and  the  comparative  inefficiency  of  British  land 
forces  thus  far  in  the  present  European  war. 

Part  and  parcel  of  the  system  of  military  education  of 
w^hich  the  United  States  stands  in  dire  need  are  the  Stu- 
dents' Military  Instruction  camps  inaugurated  in  1913. 
This  innovation  —  which  was  one  of  the  best  measures  of  re- 
cent years  —  requires  nothing  more  than  additional  develop- 
ment to  make  it  an  institution  which  will  exercise  a  beneficial 
influence  far  beyond  present  expectations.  The  intensive 
training  given  has  already  laid  the  foundations  for  a  small 
number  of  good  soldiers,  and  the  most  proficient  can,  if  given 
additional  training,  be  utilized  as  lieutenants  or  even  as  cap- 
tains in  any  volunteer  force  which  might  be  raised  in  time 
of  war. 

One  of  the  most  important  steps  which  must  be  taken  in 
the  near  future  is  the  creation  of  a  Council  of  National 


13  Some  Economic  Aspects  of  War,  by  Henry  C.  Emery,  professor  of 
Economics  at  Yale,  pp.  20-21. 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      553 

Defense.  Obviously  most  of  its  meetings  ought  to  be  held 
in  Washington,  and  its  work  would  be  greatly  assisted  if 
the  Naval  War  College,  now  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  were 
also  transferred  to  the  seat  of  the  Government  and  thus 
permit  constant  joint  conferences  with  the  Army  War  Col- 
lege. In  this  manner  comprehensive  plans  for  the  co-ordi- 
nation of  the  land  and  naval  forces  could  be  formulated  and 
the  chances  of  defeat  owing  to  lack  of  concerted  action  vastly 
diminished.  In  this  connection  it  is  not  'amiss  to  point  out 
that  a  suitable  fleet  of  submarines  would  go  far  to  deter  an 
enemy  from  attempting  to  land  a  large  force  of  troops  at 
any  of  the  many  points  along  our  coasts  where  it  is  out  of 
question  to  erect  fortifications. 

To  those  who  have  studied  the  existing  conditions  the 
necessity  for  a  complete  re-organization  of  the  War  De- 
partment is  apparent.  The  military  branch  of  the  Govern- 
ment is  at  present  saddled  with  burdens  which  do  not  prop- 
erly belong  to  it.  Secretaries  of  War  are  driven  to  distrac- 
tion by  duties  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  military. 
There  ought  to  be  one,  if  not  two  additional  Assistant  Secre- 
taries of  War,  whose  functions  are  divided  according  to  the 
requirements  of  the  service,  and  certainly  one  of  these  ought 
to  be  a  permanent  official.  The  Keep  Commission  found  ten 
years  ago  that  many  of  the  methods  of  the  War  Department 
might  be  improved  ^^  but,  although  great  progress  has  been 
made  in  this  respect,  much  still  remains  to  be  done  in  the 
matter  of  increasing  the  efficiency  and  diminishing  the  ex- 
pense. All  river  and  harbour  work  ought  to  be  placed 
w^here  it  belongs,  i.  e.,  under  the  Department  of  the  Interior, 
to  w^hich  engineer  officers  can  be  loaned  while  engaged  in  in- 
ternal improvements.  National  Parks  and  reservations 
should  likewise  be  transferred  to  the  Interior  Department, 
and  the  work  of  policing  them  done  by  a  constabulary  instead 

14  Letter  from  John  C.  Scofield,  Chief  Clerk  of  the  War  Department, 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  October  9,  1905,  and  relating  to  the 
questions  propounded  by  the  Keep  Commission. 


554     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

of  by  Regular  troops.  The  United  States  ought  to  have  a 
Colonial  Department,  with  a  Cabinet  officer  at  its  head,  and 
the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  should  be  put  under  it,  in  place 
of  being  administered,  as  at  present,  by  the  War  Department. 
In  a  dozen  other  ways,  reforms  might  be  instituted  that 
w^ould  vastly  improve  that  branch  of  the  Government  which 
is  charged  with  the  conduct  of  military  affairs. 

Too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  upon  the  following,  viz: 

• 

( 1 )  The  absolute  necessity  of  organizing-  all  American  national 
resources  so  thoroughly  as  to  render  them  instantly  available  upon 
the  outbreak  of  war. 

(2)  The  enlargement  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point 
to  its  maximum  capacity. 

(3)  The  advisability  of  giving  to  the  young  men  at  the  vari- 
ous military  schools  additional  training  in  order  to  render  them 
fit  to  become  officers.  Such  training  ought,  obviously,  to  take 
place  at  the  non-productive  period  of  their  lives  —  in  other 
words,  before  they  embark  in  business,  professions  or  other  voca- 
tions. 

(4)  The  extension  of  the  system  of  Military  Instruction 
Camps  so  as  to  embrace  a  large  number  of  men  up  to  the  age  of 
45  years. 

(5)  The  names  and  addresses  of  all  men  who  have  received 
intensive  military  training  such  as  would  fit  them  to  become 
officers  or  dependable  soldiers  ought  to  be  registered  at  the  War 
Department. 

(6)  All  military  finance  ought  to  be  placed  on  the  budget  sys- 
tem. 

It  is  impossible  to  emphasize  too  strongly  the  fact  that  all 
the  improvements  so  imperatively  needed  by  our  land  forces 
require  time.  American  indifference  to  national  defence 
has  permitted  many  a  golden  moment  to  escape,  and  we  as  a 
people  have  apparently  no  appreciation  of  the  Scriptural 
warning  that  peace  can  only  be  enjoyed  so  long  as  one  is 
armed  and  prepared  to  defend  one's  possessions,  and  that 
when  one  encounters  a  stronger  force,  destruction  is  the  in- 


Suggested  Organization  of  Land  Forces      555 

evitable  consequence.-^^  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  arguments 
of  pacifists  are  absolutely  controverted  by  the  Bible,  which 
lays  great  stress  upon  adequate  defence  and  upon  the  disas- 
ter which  is  bound  to  overtal^e  those  who  refuse  to  heed  the 
warnings  to  be  prepared  against  war.^^  The  reason  is  not 
far  to  seek.  The  fundamental  law  of  life  is  the  law  of  strife, 
and  in  the  supreme  test  might  nearly  always  prevails.  The 
American  people  have  but  two  alternatives  —  either  to  profit 
by  the  lessons  taught  every  day  by  the  present  European 
struggle  and  thus  to  avert  the  horrors  inseparable  from  war, 
or  to  learn  these  lessons  by  the  bitterest  experiences  which 
human  beings  can  undergo.  Adequate  'preparation  for  war 
has  never  yet  in  history  been  made  after  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  luithout  unnecessary  slaughter,  unjustifiable  ex- 
pense and  national  peril.     It  is  oxly  ix  tpie  years  of  peace 

THAT  A  XATIOX  CAN  BE  MADE  BEADY  TO  FIGHT.        Germany  haS 

been  the  last  to  demonstrate  this  truth,  whereas  England  has 
afforded  a  convincing  proof  of  the  well-nigh  insuperable  diffi- 
culties that  confront  anv  nation  wiiich  fails  to  realize  this 


15  "  ^Mien  a  strong  man  armed  keepetli  his  palace,  his  goods  are  in 
peace : 

But  when  a  stronger  than  he  shall  come  upon  him,  and  overcome 
him,  he  taketh  from  him  all  his  armour  wherein  he  trusted,  and  divideth 
his  spoils."' — Luke,  xi,  21  and  22. 

16  "  Then  said  he  imto  them.  But  now,  he  that  hath  a  purse,  let  him 
take  it,  and  likewise  his  scrip:  and  he  that  hath  no  sword,  let  him 
sell  his  garment  and  buy  one.'' —  Luke,  xxii,  36. 

"  Again  the  Avord  of  the  Lord  came  unto  me,  saving. 

"  Son  of  man,  speak  to  the  children  of  thy  people,  and  say  unto  them, 
\Mien  I  bring  the  sword  upon  a  land,  if  the  people  of  the  land  take  a 
man  of  their  coasts,  and  set  him  for  their  watchman : 

"  If  when  he  seeth  the  sword  come  upon  the  land,  he  blow  the  trumpet, 
and  warn  the  people; 

"  Then  whosoever  heareth  the  sound  of  the  trumpet,  and  taketh  not 
warning;  if  the  sword  come,  and  take  him  away,  his  blood  shall  be 
upon  his  own  head. 

"He  heard  the  sound  of  the  trumpet,  and  took  not  warning:  his 
his  blood  shall  be  upon  him.  But  he  that  taketh  warning  shall  de- 
liver  his  soul. 

"  But  if  the  watchman  see  the  sword  come,  and  blow  not  the  trumpet, 
and  the  people  be  not  warned;  if  the  sword  come,  and  take  any  per- 
son from  among  them,  he  is  taken  away  in  his  iniquity:  but  his  blood 
will  I  require  at  the  watchman's  hand." — Ezekiel,  xxxiii,  1-6. 


556     MUifary  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

fact.  In  the  present  juncture  the  very  minutes  are  precious, 
and  Americans  would  do  well  to  bear  in  mind  Napoleon's  ex- 
hortation to  Colonel  Colbert  whom  he  sent  on  March  11, 
1803,  on  a  mission  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia:  "Go,  sir, 
gallop,  and  don't  forget  that  the  world  was  made  in  six 
days.     You  can  ask  me  for  anything  you  like  except 

TIME." 

Under  the  American  system  of  government  reforms  and 
improvements  in  our  military  organization  and  in  our  land 
forces  must  be  effected  by  Congress.  Senators  and  repre- 
sentatives but  reflect  the  will  of  their  constituents,  and,  if 
the  American  people  genuinely  desire  adequate  national  de- 
fence, the}^  need  only  to  make  known  their  wishes  in  no  un- 
certain terms.  In  1806,  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  the 
great  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  declared  that 
"  Bonaparte,  is  the  only  man  in  Europe  who  knows  the  value 
of  time."  It  behooves  us  Americans  to  take  that  saying  to 
heart  and  to  remember  that  few  truths  have  ever  been  ut- 
tered greater  than  that  contained'  in  Lord  Brougham's  splen- 
did motto : 

"  Lose  not  the  opportunity ;  by  the  forelock  take 
That  subtle  power  of  never-halting  Time, 
Lest  the  mere  moment's  puttin^r  off  should  make 
Mischance  almost  as  grave  as  Crime." 


NOTES 

CHAPTER  I 

1.  President  Wilson,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  on  December 
8,  1914,  declared  that,  "  We  must  depend  in  every  time  of  national  peril, 
in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  not  upon  a  standing  army,  nor  yet  upon 
a  reserve  army,  but  upon  a  citizenry  trained  and  accustomed  to  arms." 

2.  Brevet  Major  General  Emory  Upton,  The  Military  Policy  of  the 
United  States,  p.  305.  This  was  published  by  the  War  Department  in 
1904,  thanks  to  the  interest  and  efforts  of  Secretary  Root,  the  editing 
being  done  by  Major  General  Joseph  P.  Sanger,  assisted  by  Major  Wil- 
liam D.  Beach  and  Captain  Charles  D.  Rhodes.  General  Upton's  book 
is  one  of  the  most  masterful  works  of  the  sort  ever  written  in  any 
language. 

3.  Trevelyan,  The  American  Revolution,  I  (part  II),  pp.  182-194; 
Bradley,  The  Fight  with  Fra/nce  for  North  America,  pp.  8-15,  25-26, 
113,  149-151,  233;  Comte  de  Paris,  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America, 
I  (chapter  on  The  Volunteers  of  the  Eighteenth  Century),  pp.  3-8; 
Sparks,  The  Writings  of  Washington,  vols.  I  and  II  abound  in  refer- 
ences to  the  Colonial  militia,  especially  II,  pp.  123-124,  149-151,  158-160, 
172-177,  194-196,  207,  219,  22.3-226  and  2.50;  Brady,  Colonial  Fights  and 
Fighters,  pp.   170,   172,  185-186,  198,  212,  230  and  245. 

4.  Huidekoper,  Some  Ir^iportant  Colonial  Military  Operations  (His- 
torical Papers  of  the  Society  of  Colonial  Wars  in  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, No.  8,  1914),  p.  36.  Compare  Carrington,  Battles  of  the 
American  Revolution,  p.  6. 

5.  Parkman,  A  Half  a  Century  of  Conflict,  II,  p.  159.  Also  Sydney 
George  Fisher,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  1,  pp.  16  and 
206-207. 

6.  This  "  was  intended  to  be  the  most  complete  non-importation,  non- 
exportation  and  non-consumption  agreement  that  had  yet  been  at- 
tempted."—Fisher,  I,  p.  234. 

7.  Fisher,  I,  pp.  217-239;  Fiske,  The  American  Revolution,  I,  pp. 
110-111;  Lossing,  Pictorial  Field-Book  of  the  Revolution,  I,  p.  157. 

/^T^isher,  I,  pp.  230  and  293;   Fiske,  I,  p.  109;   Lossing,  I,  pp.  515- 
oltff  Upton,  p.  1. 
/9y  Upton,  p.  1;   Carrington,  pp.  9-10. 

CHAPTER  II 

1.  Carrington,  p.  11;   Fiske,  pp.   121-126;   Upton,  p.  1. 

2.  Upton,  p.   1 ;   Carrington,  p.  84. 

3.  Upton,  p.  1. 

4.  The  British  force  numbered  about  3,000;  the  Americans,  1,500. — 
Alphabetical  List  of  Battles,  IJSJf  to  1900,  p.  226.  This  work  was  com- 
piled from  official  sources  by  Newton  A,  Strait. 

5.  Upton,  p.  2;  Carrington,  pp.  92-111;  Lossing,  I,  pp.  540-547; 
Fiske,  I,  pp.  138-144. 

6.  Upton,  p.  2;  Carrington,  p.  116;  Fiske,  I,  p.  146.     Owing  to  the  dis- 

557 


558     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

satisfaction  of  the  British  Ministry,  Gage  was  superseded  by  General 
Howe. 

7.  Upton,  p.  2. 

8.  "  Fear  of  a  standing  army  and  corresponding  jealousy  of  military 
dictation,  were  additional  reasons  for  making  the  Continental  Con- 
gress rely  upon  its  own  judgment  in  legislation  pertaining  to  army 
matters." —  Upton,  p.  4. 

9.  These  companies  were  "  to  consist  of  1  captain,  2  lieutenants,  1  en- 
sign, 4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  1  clerk,  1  drummer,  1  fifer,  and  58  pri- 
vates." They  "  were  to  be  formed  into  regiments  and  battalions,  each 
with  1  colonel,  1  lieutenant-colonel,  2  majors,  1  adjutant,  and  1  quar- 
termaster, all  officers  above  the  rank  of  captain  being  appointed  by  the 
provincial  assemblies  or  conventions,  or  if  in  recess  by  the  committees 
of  safety.  The  militia  could  only  be  called  out  with  the  consent  of  the 
State  legislatures.  They  were  specially  intended  for  home  defense  and 
to  make  head  against  forays  of  the  enemy  in  the  absence  of  the  Regular 
or  Continental  Army." —  Upton,  p.  8. 

10.  "  Such  of  the  minute  men  as  desired  it  were  to  be  relieved  by 
drafts  from  the  whole  body  of  the  militia  once  in  four  months." —  Upton, 
p.  8. 

11.  Upton,  p.  8. 

12.  Four  hundred  commissions  were  sent  to  General  Schuyler  for  the 
Northern  District  alone. 

13.  The  returns  show  that  up  to  November  19th  only  966  men  had 
enlisted. 

14.  The  militia  were  to  report  in  camp  by  December  10th  and  to  re- 
main in  service  until  January  15,  1776. —  Upton,  p.  6. 

15.  "  Nothing  can  surpass  the  impatience  of  the  troops  from  the  New 
England  colonies  to  get  to  their  firesides.  Near  three  hundred  of  them 
arrived  a  few  days  ago,  unable  to  do  any  duty;  but  as  soon  as  I  ad- 
ministered that  grand  specific,  a  discharge,  they  instantly  acquired 
health,  and  rather  than  be  detained  a  few  days  to  cross  Lake  George, 
they  undertook  a  march  from  here  of  two  hundred  miles  with  the  great- 
est alacrity.  .  .  .  Our  army  requires  to  he  put  on  a  different  footing." — 
General  Schuyler  to  Washington,  date  not  given  but  probably  the  end 
of  November  or  beginning  of  December,  1775.  Sparks,  The  Writings  of 
George  Washington,  III,  footnote  on  p.  191. 

16.  "  The  reason  of  my  giving  you  the  trouble  of  this,  is  the  late  ex- 
traordinary and  reprehensible  conduct  of  some  of  the  Connecticut  troops. 
Some  time  ago,  apprehending  that  some  of  them  might  incline  to  go 
home,  when  the  time  of  their  enlistment  should  be  up,  I  applied  to  the 
officers  of  the  several  regiments  to  know  whether  it  wouhl  be  agreeable 
to  the  men  to  continue  until  the  1st  of  January,  or  until  a  sufficient 
number  of  other  forces  could  be  raised  to  supply  their  place,  who  in- 
formed me,  that  they  believed  the  whole  of  them  would  readily  stay 
till  that  could  be  effected.  Having  discovered  last  week,  that  they  were 
very  uneasy  to  leave  the  service,  and  determined  upon  it,  I  thought  it 
expedient  to  summon  the  general  officers  at  headquarters,  and  invite  a 
delegation  of  the  general  court  to  be  present,  that  suitable  measures 
might  be  adopted  for  the  defense  and  support  of  our  lines.  The  result 
was  that  3,000  of  the  minute  men  and  militia  of  this  province,  and 
2,000  men  from  New  Hampshire,  should  be  called  in  by  the  10th  inst. 


Notes  559 

for  that  purpose.  With  this  determination  the  Connecticut  troops  were 
made 'acquainted,  and  requested  and  ordered  to  remain  here,  as  the  time 
of  most  of  them  would  not  be  out  before  the  10th,  when  they  would  be 
relieved.  Notwithstanding  this,  yesterday  morning  most  of  them  re- 
solved to  leave  the  camp.  Many  went  off,  and  the  utmost  vigilance 
and  industry  were  used  to  apprehend  them,.  Several  got  awaj^  with 
their  arms  and  ammunition." —  Washington  to  Governor  Trumbull, 
December  2,  1775.     Sparks,  III,  pp.  182-183. 

17.  Upton,  p.  7. 

18.  "I  had  like  to  have  forgotten  what  sits  heaviest  upon  my  mind, 
the  new  arrangement  of  officers. 

"  Although  we  have  now  enough  to  constitute  the  new  corps,  it  has 
employed  the  general  officers  and  myself  ever  since  Thursday  last,  and 
we  are  nearly  as  we  began.  Connecticut  wants  no  Massachusetts  men 
in  her  corps,  Massachusetts  thinks  there  is  no  necessity  for  a  Rhode 
Islander  to  be  introduced  into  hers,  and  New  Hampshire  says  it  is  very 
hard  that  her  valuable  and  experienced  officers,  who  are  willing  to  serve, 
should  be  discarded,  because  her  own  regiments  under  the  new  estab- 
lishment, can  not  provide  for  them.  In  short,  after  a  few  days'  labour, 
I  expect  that  numbers  of  officers  who  have  given  in  their  names  to 
serve,  must  be  discarded  from  the  Massachusetts  corps,  where  the 
regiments  have  been  numerous,  and  the  number  in  them  small,  and  that 
of  Connecticut  will  be  completed  with  a  fresh  recruit  of  officers  from 
her  own  government." —  Washington  to  Joseph  Reed,  November  8,  1775. 
Sparks,  III,  p.  150-151. 

19.  A  committee  was  appointed  to  consult  with  Washington  and  the 
colonies  of  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  Massachusetts  and  New  Hamp- 
shire. It  Vnet  at  Cambridge  on  October  18,  1775,  conferred  with  dele- 
gates from  the  four  Colonies  and,  after  a  consultation  with  Wash- 
ington and  his  council  of  war,  reported  "  that  the  army  around  Bos- 
ton ought  not  to  be  less  than  20,370  men,  organized  into  20  regiments 
of  8  companies  each,  exclusive  of  the  artillery  and  riflemen."  Congress 
apportioned  these  26  regiments  as  follows:  Sixteen  to  Massachusetts, 
5  to  Connecticut,  2  to  Rhode  Island,  and  3  to  New  Hampshire.  It  was 
hoped  that  the  regiments  might  be  largely  recruited  from  the  troops  then 
around  Boston,  the  vacancies  being  ff lied  by  new  levies." —  Upton,  p.  4. 

20.  On  November  4,  1775,  Congress  recommended  the  enactment  of 
laws  prescribing  "  a  punishment  of  not  less  than  $30  nor  more  than 
$50  upon  such  as  knowingly  harbor  deserters "  and  if  unable  to  pay 
the  fine  "  to  be  punished  with  whipping,  not  exceeding  30  lashes  for 
each  offense." —  Upton,  p.  7. 

21.  See  below,  pp.   147-149. 

22.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  9. 

23.  Carrington,  pp.  127-129. 

24.  "  At  this  juncture  three  of  Arnold's  captains  refused  to  serve  im- 
der  him  any  longer.  Their  time  of  service  would  expire  at  the  end 
of  the  month,  and  there  was  every  indication  that  open  mutiny  would 
replace  the  harmony  which  had  thus  far  prevailed.  An  earnest  appeal 
from  Montgomery  restored  them  to  duty." —  Carrington,  p.  134. 

25.  Ibid,  p.  134. 

26.  Carrington,  pp.  121-125,  130-137;  Lossing,  I,  pp.  190-200;  Fiske, 
I,    pp.    165-168;    Upton,   p.    9. 


560      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

27.  Upton,  p.  9. 

28.  Upton,    p.    10. 

29.  Sparks,   III,  pp.  246-247,  and  footnote,  pp.   253-254. 

30.  Sparks,  III,  pp.  278-279. 

31.  "During  these  operations  the  militia  of  the  neighborhood  were 
called  in  for  the  short  space  of  three  days." —  Upton,  p.  12. 

32.  "  During  the  first  half  of  1776  the  Continental  Army  was  in- 
creased piecemeal.  January  4,  10,  and  16,  an  additional  battalion 
was  authorized  from  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  North  Carolina,  re- 
spectively; January  14,  4  battalions  were  called  for  from  New  York; 
March  25,  2  battalions  were  authorized  in  South  Carolina;  May  16, 
2  battalions  were  called  for  from  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut,  re- 
spectively, with  a  term  of  enlistment  for  two  years,  provided  the  men 
loould  consent;  May  18,  a  regiment  of  rifles  was  authorized  from  Vir- 
ginia; July  24,  the  regiment  of  South  Carolina  Rangers  was  taken  into 
the  Continental  establishment;  June  27,  a  regiment  of  rifles  was 
created,  partly  composed  of  independent  companies  to  be  enlisted  for 
three  years." — Upton,  pp.    12-13. 

33.  This  step,  being  taken  too  late,  proved  futile  since  the  Amer- 
icans had  to  evacuate  Canada  on  June  18th. 

34.  Of  these  New  Jersey  was  to  furnish  3,300,  New  York  3,000,  Con- 
necticut 5,500,   and  Massachusetts  2,000. 

35.  This  camp  was  destined  for  the  protection  of  the  middle  colonies 
and  was  to  consist  of  10,000  militia,  Pennsylvania  supplying  6,000, 
Maryland  3,400,  and  Delaware  600. 

"  On  the  19th  of  July  the  flying  camp  was  further  increased  by  4  bat- 
talions of  militia  from  Pennsylvania,  3  from  New  Jersey,  and  2  bat- 
talions of  Continentals  from  Virginia." —  Upton,  p.  12.  * 

36.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  13. 

37.  On  June  12th,  Congress  formally  appointed  a  permanent  commit- 
tee, entitled  the  Board  of  War  and  Ordnance,  to  which  all  military  ques- 
tions were  to  be  referred  and  whose  functions  were  similar  to  those  of 
a  Secretary  of  War. 

38.  Admiral  Howe  reported  that  he  landed  15,000  men  on  August 
22nd  and  a  corps  of  Hessians  on  the  25th  —  a  total  of  "  upward  of 
twenty  thousand  "  according  to  Sir  George  Collier.  The  total  British 
force  amounted  to  31,625  —  24,464  being  "  eft'ectives  fit  for  duty"  as 
stated  by  General  Clinton  in  the  House  of  Commons. —  Carrington,  pp. 
199-200. 

39.  The  official  returns  of  the  American  army  on  August  3rd  gave  a 
total  of  17,225,  but  only  10,514  present  for  duty.  On  August  26th,  its 
total  nominal  strength,  "  including  the  sick,  non-effectives  of  all  kinds, 
and  those  without  arms,  was  a  little  over  twenty-seven  thousand  men." 
"The  force  on  Long  Island  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  was  not  quite 
eight  thousand  men,  inclusive  of  Stirling's  brigade,  which  crossed  the 
river  in  the  morning." —  Carrington,  pp.   196,  197  and  204. 

40.  Carrington,  pp.  207-219;  Upton,  p.  13. 

41.  Sparks,  IV,  p.  73:  Upton,  pp.  13-14. 

42.  Carrington,  220-228;   Upton,  p.  14. 

43.  Sparks,  IV,  pp.  113-115. 

44.  Ihid.,  IV,  pp.  115-116. 

45.  The  resolution  of  September  16th  directed  "  that  88  battalions  be 


I 


Notes  561 

enlisted  as  soon  as  possible  to  serve  during  the  present  war."  A 
bounty  of  $20  was  offered  to  every  non-commissioned  officer  and  man  so 
enlisting  and  land,  ranging  from  500  acres  for  a  colonel  down  to  100 
acres  for  non-commissioned  officers  and  soldiers,  was  promised  to  all 
who  served  until  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  The  States  were  to  make 
original  appointments  of  officers  or  those  to  fill  vacancies,  the  actual 
commissions  being  issued  by  Congress.  The  jealousy  and  discontent 
aroused  in  the  Continental  troops  during  the  previous  year  by  the 
same  system  were  thus  perpetuated." — Upton,  p.  17. 

46.  On  November  21st,  Congress  authorized  the  States  to  enlist  men 
"  for  three  years,"  but  timidly  volunteered  the  opinion  that  it  would 
be'  to  the  advantage  of  the  service  if  the  enlistments  were  for  the 
period  "  during  the  war." 

47.  No  less  than  seven  resolutions  were  devoted  to  bounties,  viz: 
those  of  January  19th,  June  26th,  July  16th,  September  16th,  October  8th, 
October  30th,  and  November  12th.  The  bounties  were  doubled  between 
January  and  July,  and  again  doubled  on  September  16th. 

48.  "  If,  in  the  days  of  the  Revolution,  an  officer's  promojtion  could 
not  be  urged  even  by  a  Washington,  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  with 
certain  State  governors,  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  the  combined 
recommendations  of  division,  corps,  and  army  commanders  were  power- 
less to  influence  the  advancement  of  officers  of  kno^\^l  skill  and  ability." 
—  Upton,   p.    18. 

49.  The  American  force,  which  had  evacuated  Montreal  on  June  18th, 
(footnote  33)  had  been  followed  by  a  British  force  under  Carleton  to 
Crown  Point  from  which  it  fell  back  to  Canada  on  November  2nd.  One 
of  Howe's  objects  was  to  prevent  this  body  from  re-enforcing  Washing- 
ton at  New  York. 

50.  The  general  returns  made  at  Trenton  on  December  1st  showed 
that  Washington's  "  command  consisted  of  four  brigades,  including 
sixteen  regiments,  and  numbered  with  officers  and  staff,  four  thousand 
three  hundred  and  thirty-four,  of  whom  one  thousand  and  twenty-nine 
were  sick,  and  two-thirds  of  the  sick  absent." —  Carrington,  p.  256. 

51.  Upton,  p.   19. 

52.  Washington's  report  of  December  28,   1776. 

53.  American  State  Papers,  XIII,  p.  15,  and  Upton,  p.  20. 

54.  Upton,  p.  20.  C.  Stedman,  who  served  on  the  British  General 
Staff  under  Howe,  Clinton,  and  Cornwallis,  in  his  History  of  the  Origin, 
Progress  and  Termination  of  the  American  War,  I,  p.  317,  gives  the 
maximum  British  force  during  1776  as  27,700. 

55.  Recommended  by  Washington  in  his  letter  of  December  20,  1776, 
to  the  President  of  Congress  (Sparks,  IV,  pp.  234-235).  The  88  bat- 
talions voted  on  September  16th  (page  560,  footnote  45)  were  thus  aug- 
mented by  twentj'-two. 

56.  "  This  Congi-ess,  having  maturely  considered  the  present  crisis, 
and  having  perfect  reliance  on  the  wisdom,  vigor,  and  uprightedness 
of  General  Washington,  do  hereby 

*'  Resolve,  That  General  Washington  shall  be,  and  he  is  hereby  vested 
with  full,  ample,  and  complete  powers  to  raise  and  collect  together,  in 
the  most  speedy  and  effectual  manner,  from  any  or  all  of  these  United 
States,  sixteen  battalions  of  infantry,  in  addition  to  those  already 
voted  by   Congress;    to  appoint  officers  for   the  said  battalions  of   in- 


562      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

fan  try;  to  raise,  officer,  and  equip  three  thousand  light-horse,  three 
regiments  of  artillery,  and  a  corps  of  engineers,  and  to  establish  their 
pay;  to  apply  to  any  of  the  States  for  such  aid  of  the  militia  as  he 
shall  judge  necessary;  to  form  such  magazines  of  provisions,  and  in 
such  places,  as  he  shall  think  proper;  to  displace  and  appoint  all  of- 
ficers under  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  and  to  fill  up  all  vacancies 
in  every  other  department  in  the  American  Army;  to  take,  wherever 
he  may  be,  whatever  he  may  want  for  the  use  of  the  Army,  if  the  in- 
habitants will  not  sell  it,  allowing  a  reasonable  price  for  the  same;  to 
arrest  and  confine  persons  who  refuse  to  take  the  Continental  currency, 
or  are  otherwise  disaft'ected  to  the  American  cause;  and  to  return  to 
the  States,  of  which  they  are  citizens,  their  names,  and  the  nature  of 
their  offenses,  together  with  the  witnesses  to  prove  them.  That  the 
foregoing  powers  be  vested  in  General  Washington,  for  and  during 
the  term  of  six  months  from  the  date  hereof,  unless  sooner  determined 
by  Congress," 

57.  Washington's  report  of  that  date  emphasized  the  fact  that  only 
981  were  regTilars  and  that  the  terms  of  service  of  the  militia  would 
expire  on  March  31st. 

58.  By  May  24th,  his  force  had  been  increased  to  7,500. 

59.  On  July  28th,  Congress  recommended  to  the  Executive  Council  of 
Pennsylvania  ''  to  call  out  4,000  militia  in  addition  to  those  already 
called  forth,"  and  on  August  24th  it  "  urgently  recommended  to  the  State 
of  Maryland  to  immediately  call  out  not  less  than  2,000  select  militia 
to  repel  the  invasion  of  the  States  of  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and 
Delaware."  It  likewise  requested  Pennsylvania  to  furnish  the  army 
with  4,000  and  Delaware  with  1,000  militia,  and  eight  counties  in  Vir- 
ginia near  Chesapeake  Bay  were  asked  to  contribute  one-third  of  their 
forces.  These  urgent  calls  produced  exactly  one  small  brigade  of  militia 
for  the  army  at  the  Brandywine. 

60.  "  Early  in  the  year  delegates  from  the  New  England  States, 
which  met  for  consultation  in  regard  to  their  joint  interests  at  Provi- 
dence, recommended  that  the  States  represented  should  add  a  bounty 
of  thirty-three  and  one-third  dollars  to  the  Continental  bounty  of  $20 
already  authorized  for  the  88  battalions  created  in  1776.  Massachusetts 
and  Xew  Hampshire  doubled  this  extra  bounty,  making  a  total  of 
eighty-six  and  two-thirds  dollars  for  each  recruit.  Thus  icithin  a  year 
the  hounty  had  become  more  than  twenty-fold  greater. 

"  This  increase  at  once  put  a  stop  to  re-enlistments  in  the  old  regi- 
ments, as  the  men  naturally  went  home  to  secure  the  State  bounty,  and 
would  not  take  the  smaller  sum  offered  by  Congress.  Further  than  this, 
the  large  State  bounties  shook  the  allegiance  of  the  soldier  to  his 
colors."  Desertions  became  so  numerous  that  on  April  Gth,  Washing- 
ton had  to  issue  a  proclamation  "  offering  free  pardon  to  all  .  .  .  who 
shall  voluntarih"  surrender  themselves  to  any  officer  of  the  Continental 
Army  or  join  their  respective  corps  before  the  15th  day  of  May  next." — 
Upton,  p.  28. 

61.  On  July  31st,  Congress  recommended  "  the  executive  authorities 
of  the  United  States  to  divide  their  respective  States  into  districts 
and  to  appoint  a  proper  person  in  each  district  to  fill  up  the  regi- 
ments .  .  ." 

"  It  also  recommended  that  the  legislative  authorities  should  desig- 


Notes  563 

nate  in  their  respective  States  convenient  places  of  rendezvous  for  re- 
cruits and  deserters.  .  .  ." 

"  This  division  of  States  into  districts  and  establishments  of  ren- 
dezvous or  depots,  had  some  analogy  to  the  territorial  distribution  and 
recruitment  of  troops  now  adopted  by  every  European  nation." —  Upton, 
p.  28. 

62.  September  17,  1777. 

63.  "  To  stimulate  recruiting,  Congress  on  the  14th  of  April  recom- 
mended that  each  State  legislature  '  enact  laws  exempting  from  actual 
service  any  two  of  the  militia  who  should,  within  the  time  limited  by 
such  laws,  furnish  one  able-bodied  recruit  to  serve  in  any  battalion 
of  the  Continental  Army  for  three  years  or  during  the  war ;  said  ex- 
emption to  continue  during  the  term  of  enlistment,  the  recruit  to  have 
the  Continental  bounty  and  other  allowances.' 

"  It  is  also  recommended  '  that  State  legislatures  enact  laws  com- 
pelling all  such  persons  as  are  by  laws  exempted  from  bearing  arms 
or  performing  military  duties,  other  than  such  as  are  specified  in  the 
foregoing  resolution,  to  furnish  such  number  of  able-bodied  soldiers  as 
said  legislature  shall  deem  a  proper  equivalent  for  such  exemption; 
such  soldiers  to  be  entitled  to  the  Continental  bounty  and  other  alloic- 
ances  over  and  above  such  gratuities  as  they  may  receive  from  those 
who  procure  them  to  enlist.'  " 

In  other  words,  the  Government,  although  not  ready  to  recommend 
a  draft,  took  a  step  in  that  direction  by  obligating  certain  indi\iduals 

—  not   States  —  to   furnish   a   certain   number   of   troops. —  Upton,    pp. 
27-28. 

64.  Washingt07i  to  Thomas  Wharton,  October  17,  1777.  Sparks,  V, 
pp.  95-97. 

65.  Approximately  18,000  men. —  Carrington,  p.  306;  Fiske,  I,  p.  309. 

66.  "  The  nominal  strength  of  the  American  army  .  .  .  was  fourteen 
thousand  men,  but  the  effective  force  did  not  exceed  eleven  thousand." 

—  Carrington,   p.   366. 

67.  On  December  19th.  On  the  23rd  Washington  reported  that  "  only 
8,200  men  were  present  fit  for  duty." 

68.  5,763  officers  and  men. 

69.  According  to  Gates'  report  of  October  16th,  his  army  numbered 
9.093  regulars  and  4,123  militia,  a  total  of  13,216  present  for  duty. 
The  value  of  trained  troops  was  demonstrated  anew  by  the  success 
achieved. 

More  than  to  any  other  officer  present  —  Gates  included  —  was  the 
credit  for  this  notable  victory  due  to  the  gallant  Benedict  Arnold,  then 
the  hero  of  the  American  troops. 

70.  Xotwithstanding  the  attempt  to  relieve  him  made  by  Clinton 
from  New  York. —  Fiske,  I,  pp.  334-335;  Carrington,  pp.  356-361. 

An  extremely  interesting  account  of  the  battle  of  Saratoga  is  given 
by  Sir  Edward  Creasy  in  his  Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World, 
pp.  297-324. 

71.  Each  State  could,  with  the  assent  of  Congress,  maintain  its  own 
army  and  na\y  in  time  of  peace,  while  the  power  to  carry  on  war  was 
made  to  depend  upon  the  concurrence  of  at  least  nine  States.  The 
power  "  to  raise  men,  and  clothe,  arm  and  equip  them  at  the  expense 
of   the  United    States "   being  relinquished   to   the   several    States,   the 


564     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

national  Treasury  was  thus  placed  at  the  mercy  of  every  State  agent. 
Moreover,  since  Congress  was  prohibited  from  enlisting  a  soldier,  levy- 
ing a  tax  or  enforcing  a  requisition  for  men  or  money,  any  legislature 
could  neutralize  the  power  of  any  other  State,  "  if  not  defeat  the  chief 
object  of  the  Confederation." — ^  Upton,  p.  32. 

72.  Ihid. 

73.  American  State  Papers,  XII,  p.   15;   Upton,  p.   27. 

74.  He  arrived  at  Valley  Forge  on  February  27th,   1778. 

75.  Carrington,    p.    403. 

76.  Upton,  p.  33. 

77.  The  character  of  the  men  thus  obtained  was  markedly  inferior 
to  the  previous  recruits  —  many  of  them  being  deserters. 

78.  At  Valley  Forge,  11,800  —  including  the  sick  and  those  subject 
to  call  upon  emergency;  at  Wilmington,  1,400;  on  the  North  River, 
1,800.—  Sparks,  V,  p.  360,  footnote. 

79.  Washington  estimated  the  total  strength  of  the  enemy  at  16,000 
(Sparks,  ibid.)  but,  according  to  the  original  returns  in  the  British 
Record  Office,  the  effective  British  forces  on  March  26,  1778,  were 
33,576,  divided  as  follows:  at  Philadelphia,  19,530;  at  New  York, 
10,456;    in  Rhode  Island,   3,770. 

80.  Vide  Washington's  letter  to  John  Barrister,  April  21,  1778. 
Sparks,  V,  pp.  321-322. 

81.  Free  negroes  had  been  accepted  for  service  since  the  beginning 
of  the  Revolution.  The  enlistment  of  slaves  was  practised  both  by  the 
North  and  the  South  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

82.  Washington  to  Benjamin  Harrison,  December  30,  1778.  Sparks, 
VI,  p.  152. 

83.  In  conformity  with  a  further  resolution,  $80,000  were  placed  in 
the  hands  of  William  Palfrey,  Paymaster-General  of  the  Army,  to  dis- 
burse these  bounties. 

84.  This  fleet,  which  carried  4,000  troops,  sailed  from  Toulon  on 
April  13th,  but  owing  to  contrary  winds  it  did  not  pass  Gibraltar  until 
May  15th,  reaching  the  Delaware  Capes  on  July  8th,  just  too  late  to  pre- 
vent Admiral  Howe's  escape. 

85.  The  opposing  forces  were  about  equal.  The  British  lost  in  killed, 
wounded  and  missing,  365;  the  Americans  362. 

86.  800  Hessians  deserted  during  this  retreat.  Clinton's  losses  from 
various  causes  from  the  time  he  evacuated  Philadelphia  until  he  reached 
New  York  "  were  little  less  than  two  thousand  men." —  Carrington,  p. 
458. 

87.  Arriving  on  July  22nd. 

88.  The  British  garrison  consisted  of  6,000  men  under  General  Pigott, 
supported  by  seven  frigates. 

89.  Sullivan  unwisely  detained  the  French  fleet  in  the  offing  and 
neglected  the  proper  military  courtesies  to  his  ally  while  he  was  ma- 
turing his  plan  for  the  land  operations.  Moreover,  he  had  notified  the 
French  Admiral  that  he  would  not  attack  until  August  10th.  The  pre- 
cipitate landing  of  the  Americans  thus  disconcerted  the  plans  already 
agreed  upon. 

90.  On  August  5th,  part  of  the  French  fleet  entered  Newport  harlxiur. 

91.  According  to  the  circular   issued  by  Sullivan   on  July  23rd,  his 


Notes  565 

command  consisted  of  8,974  officers  and  men.     The  French  troops  num- 
bered 4,000. 

92.  Stedman,  II,  p.  32. 

93.  D'Estaing's  letter  to  Sullivan,  August  20th,  and  his  report  to  the 
President  of  Congress. 

94.  Carrington,  p.  453.  D'Estaing's  course  gave  rise  to  much  in- 
dignation on  the  part  of  the  American  public  and  to  the  charge  that 
he  had  basely  deserted  Sullivan  —  a  charge  utterly  unjustified  in  view 
of  his  orders  to  make  the  port  of  Boston  in  case  of  severe  injury  by 
storm  or   in  action. 

95.  Arriving  on  September  first. 

96.  Numbering  3,500  men  who  left  New  York  on  November  27th  under 
convoy  of  Commodore  Hyde  Parker,  later  the  British  commander  at  the 
battle    of    Copenhagen. 

97.  Upton,  p.  34;  Carrington,  pp.  459-460. 

98.  32,893  Continentals  and  18,153  militia,  a  total  of  51,046.— Amer- 
ican State  Papers,  I    (Military  Affairs)    and  XII,  p.  16;   Upton,  p.  34. 

99.  Original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office,  quoted  by  Carring- 
ton, footnotes  on  pp.  411  and  462. 

100.  On  January  23rd,    1779. 

101.  March  0th. 

102.  The  apportionment  of  these  88  battalions  among  the  States  is 
given  by  Upton,  p.  39. 

103.  The  resolution  ran  thus: 

"  That  a  bounty  of  two  hundred  dollars  out  of  the  Continental 
Treasury  shall  be  granted  to  each  recruit  who  after  January  23d  hath 
enlisted  or  shall  enlist  during  the  war,  or  in  case  the  State  shall  have 
granted  as  great  or  greater  bounty  the  said  two  hundred  dollars  for 
each  recruit  shall  be  passed  to  the  credit  of  the  State  for  whose  quota 
he   shall   be   raised." 

104.  On  May  3rd. 

105.  Virginia  reserved  to  herself  the  bounty  and  clothing  given  by 
Congress,  which  was  tantamount  to  confiscating  them. 

106.  Contained  in  his  letter  of  June  9,  1779,  to  the  Board  of  War. — 
Sparks,  VI,  footnote  pp.  198-199. 

107.  On  June  22nd. 

108.  See  above,  p.  22.  In  January,  1779,  paper  currency  advanced 
from  seven  to  one  as  compared  with  specie  to  nine  to  one;  by  the  end 
of  the  year  it  stood  at  forty-five  to  one. 

109.  Reconnmended  by  the  resolution  of  May  15,  1778.  See  above,  p. 
22. 

110.  Resolution  of  August  17th,  which  further  instituted  the  pay- 
ment of  pensions  to  widows  of  officers  and  men  killed  in  service. 

111.  Upton,  p.  43. 

112.  So  much  so  that,  on  October  21,  1780,  Congress  deemed  it  urgent 
to  repeat  its  resolution. 

113.  Washington  to  the  Committee  of  Congress,  January  15,  1779. — 
Sparks,  VI,  p.  160. 

114.  American  State  Papers,  XII,  p.  17;  Report  of  General  Knox,  Sec- 
retary of  War,  American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  vol.  I;  Upton, 
p.  40. 


566     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  quotas  required  amounted  to  38,624.  Only  two-thirds  were  fur- 
nished to  the  Continental  Army,  the  strength  of  which  was  10,000  men 
less  than  the  preceding  year. 

115.  Tlie  maximum  of  the  British  effective  strength  that  year  was 
reached  on  December  1st.  In  New  York  and  its  dependencies  were  28,756 
troops;  in  Georgia,  3,930;  in  west  Florida,  1,787,  a  total  of  34,473. — 
Original  returns  in  the  Bi'itish  Record  Office. 

116.  It  numbered  2,600  men,  who  Avere  convoyed  from  New  York  by 
Sir  George  Collier's  fleet.  It  landed  at  New  Haven  on  July  5th,  spent 
four  days  in  destruction,  crossed  to  Huntington,  Long  Island,  for 
stores,  returned  on  the  11th,  destroyed  Norwalk  and  was  back  in  New 
York  on  the   13th. 

117.  July  16th. 

118.  On  August  19th,  by  a  force  of  400  under  Major  Henry  Lee. 
Paulus  Hook  is  situated  opposite  New  York  where  Jersey  City  now 
stands. 

119.  On  December  29,  1778.     See  above,  p.  24. 

120.  July  20,  1779. 

121.  This  expedition  consisted  of  2,000  troops  and  500  marines.  It 
sailed  from  New  York  late  in  April  and  reached  Hampton  Eoads  on 
May  9th. —  Carrington,  p.  466. 

122.  Carrington,  p.  465. 

123.  "  The  whole  British  force  in  Savannah,  including  a  few  militia, 
some  Indians  and  three  hundred  negroes,  was  two  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  fifty." — Lossing,  II,  p.  739,  footnote  1. 

124.  Memoirs  of  Generals  Lee  and  Moultrie. 

125.  2,823  French  and  2,127  Americans,  a  total  of  4,950. 

126.  On  October  2yth. 

127.  December  26th. 

128.  7,500  was  the  number  reported  in  London  and  given  by  Carring- 
ton, pp.  483,  494-495.  The  convoy  consisted  of  14  ships  under  Ad- 
miral Arbuthnot. 

129.  Upton,  p.  39;  Carring"ton,  pp.  476-483;  Lossing,  II,  pp.  734-739. 

130.  The  States  were  required  to  furnish  80  battalions  amounting 
to  41,760  men;  the  number  enlisted  was  only  26,826. —  American  State 
Papers,  and  Upton,  p.  47. 

131.  In  April,  May,  June,  and  July,  1780,  paper  currency  stood  at 
sixty  as  compared  with  specie;  in  November  it  reached  one  hundred. 
In  May,  1781,  it  ceased  to  circulate  entirely.  "When  this  fatal  re- 
sult could  no  longer  be  averted.  Congress,  in  March,  1780,  tried  to  set 
on  foot  a  new  scheme  of  finance,  and  with  five  millions  of  specie  sought 
to  redeem,  at  the  rate  of  forty  to  one,  the  two  hundred  millions  of  cur- 
rency which  represented  the  labor  and  privations  of  a  patriotic  people 
during  five  years  of  war." — Upton,  p.  50. 

132.  "In  1180  the  cost  of  a  hat  loas  $400,  a  suit  of  clothes  $1,600, 
ivhile  the  year's  pay  of  a  captain  ivould  not  buy  a  pair  of  shoes." — 
Upton,  p.  51. 

133.  October   21st. 

134.  Passed  August  17,   1779.     See  above,  p.  25. 

135.  On  the  reduced  footing  contemplated,  the  Army  was  to  consist 
of  49  regiments  of  infantry,  4  of  cavalry,  4  of  artillerj-,  and  one  of 


Notes  567 

artificers.     The  quotas  assigned  to  the  various  States  need  not  be  set 
forth  here;  they  will  be  found  in  Upton,  p.  48. 

136.  The  plundering  of  the  national  Treasury  —  alluded  to  in  foot- 
note 71  —  progressed  to  such  an  extent  that  Congress  authorized,  in 
July,  1779,  the  States  to  scrutinize  and  in  case  of  misbehavior  to  dis- 
charge persons  in  the  departments  of  the  Quartermaster  or  Commissary 
General.  This  step  was  one  of  those  leading  to  the  reorganization  of 
the  Quartermaster's  department  in  July,  1780.  "  The  new  system  was 
adopted  in  opposition  to  the  report  of  a  Congressional  committee  which 
had  perfected  a  plan  after  full  consultation  with  Washington  and 
Greene.  It  established  no  check  to  corruption,  but  rather  increased  it  by 
recognizing  the  paramount  authority  of  the  States,  under  the  Confed- 
eration, in  every  matter  pertaining  to  the  supply  of  men  and  means 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war." — Upton,  p.  51. 

137.  Congress,  seeing  that  its  credit  was  diminishing  owing  to  the 
extent  to  which  paper  currency  had  been  emitted,  endeavoured  to  re- 
plenish the  Treasury  through  the  medium  of  taxes  levied  by  the  States, 
but,  when  these  failed  to  produce  the  desired  result,  it  had  no  other 
alternative  tlian  to  requisition  from  the  States  the  supplies  actually 
needed.  The  responsibility  was  thus  shifted  to  the  States  and  their 
credit  with  the  people  was  but  little  stronger  than  that  of  Congress. 
Within  a  short  time  public  faith  both  in  Continental  and  State  cur- 
rencies had  vanished,  and  people  refused  to  part  with  their  property 
for  valueless  money.  It  then  became  necessary  to  resort  to  forcible  im- 
pressment, which  was  sanctioned  by  Congressional  resolution  and  State 
laws. 

When  dictatorial  powers  were  first  conferred  upon  Washington  in 
1776  (see  footnote  56)  he  was  authorized  "to  take,  wherever  he  may 
be,  whatever  he  may  want  for  the  use  of  the  Army,  if  the  inhabitants 
will  not  sell  it,  allowing  a  reasonable  price  for  the  same,"  and  he  was 
additionally  empowered  to  arrest  and  confine  any  person  refusing  to 
accept  Continental  money  or  disaffected  toward  the  American  cause. 
In  the  second  grant  of  dictatorial  powers  in  1^77  (see  page  20)  he 
was  authorized  within  a  distance  of  70  miles  from  his  headquarters  "  to 
take,  wherever  he  may  be,  all  such  provisions  and  other  articles  as  may 
be  necessary  for  the  comfortable  subsistence  of  the  army  under  his 
command,  paying  or  giving  certificates  for  the  same." 

Aside  from  the  manifest  injustice  of  these  impressment  laws,  they 
exercised  a  pernicious  influence  upon  the  discipline  of  the  troops  who 
often  yielded  to  the  temptation  to  plunder  in  the  most  outrageous  fash- 
ion. To  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  the  inhabitants,  the  officers 
had  no  alternative  except  to  inflict  illegal  and  summary  punishment  — 
a  course  which  Washingion  was  obliged  to  sanction  in  order  to  put  an 
effectual  cheek  to  the  licentiousness  indulged  in  by  the  soldiers. 

Vide  Greene,  JAfe  of  Nathanael  Greene,  II,  pp.  207-208,  and  Upton, 
pp.  52-53. 

138.  Upton,  p.  53. 

139.  A  statement  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  then. 

140.  Sparks,  VII,  pp.    162-165.' 

141.  On  September  15th. 

142.  Sparks,  VII,  pp.  205-206. 


568      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

143.  See  above,  p.  27. 

144.  It  was  not  until  March  12th  that  the  British  established  them- 
selves across  the  narrow  neck  between  the  Ashley  and  Cooper  Rivers, 
but  Clinton  deferred  action  until  he  had  been  joined  by  General  Pat- 
terson and  1,400  men  from  Savannah. 

145.  On   the  night  of  April   first. 

146.  On  April  18th,  Lord  Cornwallis  arrived  from  New  York  with  3,000 
troops  to  re-enforce  Clinton. 

147.  2,200  regulars  and  1,000  militia  are  the  figures  quoted  by  Car- 
rington,  p.  404.     Lossing  does  not  give  its  strength. 

148.  The  schedule  made  by  Deputy  Adjutant-General  John  Andr6 
enumerates  5,618  prisoners. 

149.  Carrington,  pp.  493-497;   Lossing,  II,  pp.  762-767. 

150.  On  June  5th. 

151.  Carrington,  pp.  506-509. 

152.  This  force,  numbering  1,400,  had  left  Morristown,  N.  J.,  on 
April  16th',  going  by  water  to  Petersburg,  Va.,  and  reaching  Bufialo 
Ford  and  Deep  River,  N.  C,  on  July  6th. 

153.  The  victor  of  Saratoga.     See  above,  p.  20. 

154.  "  On  the  thirteenth  of  June,  Congress,  without  consulting  Wash- 
ington, appointed  General  Gates  to  the  command  of  the  Southern  De- 
partment. He  had  spent  the  winter  at  his  home  in  Virginia,  but  eagerly 
accepted  this  high  command.  His  old  confidant  and  companion  in  arms, 
Charles  Lee,  sententiously  forewarned  him  on  his  departure :  '  Take 
care  that  you  do  not  exchange  northern  laurels  for  southern  willows.'  " 
—  Carrington,  p.  492. 

155.  The  British  numbered  2,239  men,  according  to  Cornwallis'  re- 
port, while  the  American  returns  made  the  night  before  the  battle 
showed  a  force  of  only  3,052  —  a  fact  of  which  General  Gates  was  in 
total  ignorance  until  that  moment. 

156.  Cornwallis  reported  his  losses  as  324  killed,  wounded  and  miss- 
ing. The  exact  loss  of  the  Americans  was  never  ascertained  but,  so  far 
as  can  be  estimated,  it  consisted  of  736  officers  and  men,  1,000  prisoners, 
8  field  pieces,  2,000  muskets  and  the  entire  baggage  train.  Generals  de 
Kalb,  Gregory,  and  Rutherford  were  killed. —  Carrington,  pp.  517-518; 
Lossing,  II,  p.  673,  and  footnote  2  on  p.  674. 

157.  Carrington,  p.  517. 

158.  Out  of  400  men,  Sumter  had  50  killed  and  300  captured. —  Car- 
rington, pp.  511,  512  and  518;  Lossing,  II,  p.  660. 

159.  Composed  of  1,125  men.^  Lossing,  II,  p.  634. 

160.  Numbering  about  1,600  men. 

161.  Carrington,  pp.  520-521 ;   Lossing,  II,  pp.  631-635, 

162.  At  Blackstock's  plantation,  on  the  Tiger  River,  November  20th. 

163.  "The  remnants  of  General  Gates'  army  were  being  re-organized 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  before  the  departure  of  that  officer  to  answer 
before  a  Court  of  Inquiry  ordered  by  Congress,  as  to  the  disaster  of 
Camden,  he  had  collected  a  nominal  force  of  two  thousand  three  hundred 
and  seven  men,  more  than  half  of  whom  were  militia,  and  as  after- 
wards stated  by  General  Greene,  '  but  eight  hundred  in  the  whole  force 
were  properly  clothed  and  equipped.'  " —  Carrington,  p.  522. 

164.  Carrington,  pp.  486-488. 

165.  "The  soldiers  had  not  been  paid  for  five  months;  their  families 


Notes  569 

were    suffering;    recruiting    was    almost    suspended." — Carrington,    p. 
488. 

166.  "  On  the  twenty-fifth  of  May  two  Connecticut  regiments  mutinied, 
declaring  that  they  would  march  home,  '  or  at  least  gain  subsistence 
by  the  point  of  the  bayonet.'" — Ihid.,  p.  491. 

167.  According  to  the  original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office, 
the  English  had  17,324  effective  troops  in  New  York  on  May  1,  1780. 
At  the  beginning  of  April,  Washington's  force  amounted  "  to  only 
10,400  rank  and  file,"  of  which  about  2,800  had  but  four  weeks  longer 
to  serve. —  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  April  2,  1780. 
Sparks,  VI,  p.  6. 

168.  In  a  letter  to  Joseph  Jones,  dated  Morristown,  31  May,  1780, 
Washington  set  forth  some  plain  truths  about  the  prevailing  conditions : 

"  Certain  I  am,  unless  Congress  speaks  in  a  more  decisive  tone,  unless 
they  are  vested  with  powers  by  the  several  States  competent  to  the  great 
purposes  of  war,  or  assume  them  as  matter  of  right,  and  they  and  the 
States  respectively  act  with  more  energy  than  they  hitherto  have  done, 
that  our  cause  is  lost.  We  can  no  longer  drudge  on  in  the  old  way.  By 
ill  timing  the  adoption  of  measures,  by  delays  in  the  execution  of  them, 
or  by  unwarrantable  jealousies,  we  incur  enormous  expenses  and  derive 
no  benefit  from  them.  One  State  will  comply  with  a  requisition  of  Con- 
gress; another  neglects  to  do  it;  a  third  executes  it  by  halves;  and  all 
differ  either  in  the  manner,  the  matter,  or  so  much  in  point  of  time, 
that  we  are  always  working  up  hill;  and,  while  such  a  system  as  the 
present  one  or  rather  want  of  one  prevails,  we  shall  ever  be  unable  to 
apply  our  strength  or  resources  to  any  advantage. 

"...  I  see  one  head  gradually  changing  into  thirteen.  I  see  one 
army  branching  into  thirteen,  which,  instead  of  looking  up  to  Congress 
as  the  supreme  controlling  power  of  the  United  States,  are  considering 
themselves  as  dependent  on  their  respective  States.  In  a  word,  I  see 
the  powers  of  Congress  declining  too  fast  for  the  consideration  and  re- 
spect, which  are  due  to  them  as  the  great  representative  body  of 
America,  and  I  am  fearful  of  the  consequences." —  Sparks,  VII,  pp.  67- 
68. 

169.  On  May  12th. 

170.  On  June  6th  by  General  Knyphausen,  and  on  the  21st  by  Clinton. 

171.  Carrington,  p.  504. 

172.  Carrington,  p.  523. 

173.  On    September   23rd,   and   October   2nd,   respectively. 

174.  September  25th. 

175.  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  November  28,  1780. — 
Sparks,  VII,  pp.  313-315. 

176.  Washington  to  General  Greene,  December  13. —  Sparks,  VII,  p. 
321. 

177.  21,015  Continentals  and  22,061  militia,  a  total  of  42,076.— 
American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  vol.  I;   Upton,  pp.  47-48. 

As  has  already  been  seen  (footnote  130)  the  men  furnished  to  the 
Continental  Army  were  only  about  half  the  quotas  required.  It  is  also 
noteworthy  that  the  militia  —  the  majority  of  which  was  used  in  the 
South  —  outnumbered  the  regulars,  and  that  the  total  of  the  troops 
under  arms  was  slightly  over  1,000  more  than  the  number  furnished 
during  1779. 


570      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

178.  Washington,  in  writing  to  John  Banister  on  April  21,  1778,  said: 
"  There  are  one  or  two  points  more,  upon  which  I  will  add  an  ob- 
servation or  two.  The  first  is,  the  indecision  of  Congress  and  the  delay 
used  in  coming  to  deterlninations  on  matters  referred  to  them.  .  .  . 
The  other  point  is,  the  jealousy  which  Congress  unhappily  entertains  of 
the  army,  and  which,  if  reports  are  right,  some  members  labor  to  es- 
tablish. You  may  be  assured,  there  is  nothing  more  injurious,  or  more 
unfounded.  This  jealousy  stands  upon  the  commonly  received  opinion, 
which  under  proper  limitations  is  certainly  true,  that  standing  armies 
are  dangerous  to  a  State.  The  prejudices  in  other  countries  have  only 
gone  to  them  in  time  of  peace,  and  these  from  their  not  having  in  gen- 
eral cases  any  of  the  ties,  the  concerns,  or  interests  of  citizens,  or  any 
other  dependence,  than  what  flowed  from  their  military  employ;  in 
short,  from  their  being  mercenaries,  hirelings.  It  is  our  policy  to  be 
prejudiced  against  them  in  time  of  icar;  though  they  are  citizens,  hav- 
ing all  the  ties  and  interests  of  citizens,  and  in  most  cases  property 
totally  unconnected  with  the  military  line. —  Sparks,  V,  p.  328. 

179.  In  conformity  with  the  Congressional  resolution  of  October  3, 
1780.     See  above,  p.  27  and  footnote  135. 

189.     See  p.  33. 

181.  "The  winter  brought  not  much  relaxation  from  toil,  and  none 
from  suffering.  The  soldiers  were  perpetually  on  the  point  of  starva- 
tion, were  often  entirely  without  food,  were  exposed,  without  proper 
clothing,  to  the  rigors  of  winter ;  and  had  now  served  almost  twelve 
months  without  pay. 

"  This  situation  was  common  to  the  whole  army,  whether  in  the 
northern  or  southern  service;  and  had  been  of  such  long  continuance, 
that  scarcely  the  hope  of  a  change  could  be  indulged," —  John  Marshall, 
Life  of  George  Washington,  IV,  p.  392. 

182.  Six  regiments. 

183.  1,300  men  and  six  guns. 

184.  "1.  To  discharge  all  those,  who  had  enlisted  indefinitely  for 
three  years,  or  during  the  war;  the  fact  to  be  inquired  into  by  three 
commissioners  to  be  appointed  by  the  executive,  and  to  be  ascertained, 
where  the  original  enlistment  could  not  be  produced,  by  the  oath  of  the 
soldier.  2.  To  give  immediate  certificates  for  the  depreciation  of  their 
pay,  and  to  settle  arrearages  as  soon  as  circumstances  would  admit. 
3.  To  furnish  them  immediately  with  certain  specified  articles  of  cloth- 
ing, which  were  greatly  wanted." —  Sparks,  VII,  p.  359,  footnote. 

185.  The  mutineers  stipulated  that  they  should  appoint  three  addi- 
tional commissioners  to  determine,  in  conjunction  with  the  others, 
what  soldiers  were  to  be  discharged. 

186.  In  punishment.  Congress  disbanded  the  Pennsylvania  troops, 
and  the  six  regiments  which  that  State  was  required  to  furnish  were 

_   not  assembled  before  March,   1781. 

Accounts  of  this  mutiny  are  given  by  Sparks,  VII,  pp.  359-387; 
Fiske,   II,  pp.  240-242;    Ca'rrington,  pp.   537-538;    Upton,   pp.   55-56. 

187.  January  24th  to  28th,   1781. 

188.  Sparks,  VII,  pp.  380-382,  385-388,  560-566;  Fiske,  II,  pp.  242- 
243;  Upton,  p.  56. 

189.  Carrington,  p,  538, 

190.  On    December    1,    1780,    Clinton    had    17,729    effective   troops   in 


Notes  571 

New  York  according  to  the  original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office. 

191.  The  slenderness  of  Washington's  force,  the  blockade  of  the 
French  at  Newport  and  the  non-arrival  of  their  second  division  com- 
pelled the  allies  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  the  north.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  Carrington  points  out  (p.  535),  "the  French  army  in  America 
sustained  an  important  relation  to  this  period.  It  prevented  General 
Clinton  from  risking  the  offensive,  and  to  the  same  extent  lessened  the 
zeal  of  the  New  England  people  in  the  preparation  for  troops  for  the 
new  campaign,  because  the  urgency  of  their  employment  did  not  appear 
immediate  and  absolute." 

192.  Who  had  wintered  at  Winnsborough  (see  above,  p.  32).  Accord- 
ing to  official  returns,  his  force  on  January  15,  1781,  numbered  3,224. 

193.  "  Tarleton's  entire  force  consisted  of  about  eleven  hundred  well- 
disciplined  men,  and  in  every  particular  he  had  the  advantage  of  Mor- 
gan."—  Lossing,  II,  p.  638. 

194.  Cornwallis  reported  a  loss  of  100  killed  and  529  captured,  but 
omits  mention  of  his  wounded.  In  addition  Tarleton  lost  2  colors,  2 
guns,  35  wagons,  100  horses,  and  800  muskets.  The  American  casualties 
were  confined  to  12  killed  and  60  wounded. —  Carrington.  p.  545 ;  Loss- 
ing, II,  p.  042. 

195.  General  Leslie  with  1,100  men  from  Charleston  joined  him  on 
January  18th  and  19th. 

196.  Including  Morgan's  command,  it  numbered  1,703  men.  In  a 
letter  to  Sumter,  dated  January  15,  1781,  General  Greene  remarked 
that  "  More  than  half  our  members  are  in  a  manner  naked ;  so  much 
so  that  we  can  not  put  them  on  the  least  kind  of  duty.  Indeed  there  is 
a  great  number  that  have  not  a  rag  of  clothes  on  them  except  a  little 
piece  of  blanket,  in  the  Indian  form,  around  their  waists." 

197.  On  December  19,  1780,  Lieutenant-Colonels  Simcoe  and  Dundas 
were  attached  to  the  expedition,  as  Clinton  did  not  place  any  too  much 
reliance  on  Arnold. 

198.  Carrington,  pp.  548-549;  Lossing,  II,  pp.  433-436. 

199.  His  army  then  consisted  of  4,004  men,  of  which  1,490  were  regu- 
lar infantry  and  161  regular  cavalry. —  Carrington,  p.  556. 

200.  Numbering  "  twenty-four  hundred  men,  chiefly  veterans." — 
Lossing,  II,  p.  606. 

201.  The  consensus  of  opinion  among  wTiters  is  that  the  British 
never  fought  more  splendidly  than  at  Guilford  Court  House.  Compare 
Stedman,  II,  pp.  385-386;  Marshall,  IV,  p.  379. 

202.  Greene,  III,  pp.  196-205;  Stedman,  II,  375-385;  Carrington,  pp. 
556-564;  Lossing,  II,  pp.  606-612. 

203.  The  British  loss  was  544  killed  and  wounded,  Cornwallis  and 
Leslie  being  the  only  general  officers  not  wounded.  The  total  American 
casualties  were  1,311.  The  921  missing  in  Greene's  force  were  generally 
accounted  for  as  having  fled  to  their  homes. —  Carrington,  pp.  562-564 ; 
Lossing,  II,  pp.  609-612.  Greene,  III,  p.  205,  places  the  total  casualties 
at  1,255. 

204.  Carrington,  p.  564. 

205.  Fort  Watson,  on  the  Santee  River,  capitulated  to  Lee  and  Marion 
on  April  23rd. 

206.  Near  Camden,  South  Carolina. 

207.  Carrington,  pp.  570-574;  Lossing,  II,  pp.  678-680. 


572      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

208.  Lossing-  estimated  Greene's  forces  as  "  about  fifteen  hundred 
men";  Carrington  gives  it  as  1,446.  Both  agree  in  placing  Rawdon's 
command  at  "about  900  men."  The  American  casualties  were  271,  the 
British,  258. 

209.  Stedman,   II,   p.   401. 

210.  Sumter  occupied  Orangeburg  on  May  11th;  Fort  Mott  surren- 
dered to  Lee  and  Marion  on  the  12th;  and  Lee  reduced  Granby  on  the  15th. 

211.  Carrington,  p.  574. 

212.  On  June  21st. 

213.  To  about  2,600  men. 

214.  On  August  22nd. 

215.  Lossing,  II,  pp.  700-704;  Carrington,  pp.  578-582.  The  latter 
says  that  "  the  American  army  was  superior  in  numbers,  and  was  well- 
officered."  According  to  Strait,  p.  227,  Greene  had  2,000  men,  and  lost 
555  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing. 

The  casualties  of  the  British  —  then  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Stuart,  who  had  succeeded  Lord  Rawdon  —  were  "  85  killed,  70 
wounded,  and  538  made  prisoners." 

216.  This  officer  had  arrived  in  the  Chesapeake  on  March  26th  with 
2,000  troops  from  New  York  and  instructions  from  Clinton  to  report  to 
Cornwallis. 

217.  Carrington,  p.  565. 

218.  On  May  20th.  There  he  made  his  junction  with  Phillips'  force 
which  had  arrived  on  the  8th  but,  as  this  general  had  died  on  the  13th, 
the  command  of  his  troops  had  been  assumed  for  the  interim  by  Ar- 
nold. Cornwallis  brought  1,435  men  with  him,  Arnold  had  1,553  of 
his  own,  and  2,116  formerly  under  Phillips,  and  on  May  26  Leslie 
joined  him  with  2,278  from  Portsmouth  and  Norfolk,  thus  making  the 
total  force  under  Cornwallis  7,382, 

219.  1,200  Pennsylvania  Continentals  and  1,000  militia  under  Baron 
von  Steuben  and  General  Muhlenberg. —  Muhlenberg,  Life  of  Major 
General  Peter  Muhlenberg,  pp.  246  and  407. 

220.  On  February  20th  Lafayette  was  sent  from  the  Hudson  with  part 
of  the  Pennsylvania  line  which  had  mutinied  (see  page  33)  to  capture 
Benedict  Arnold.  On  April  29th  he  reached  Richmond,  and  on  May  18th 
he  received  orders  to  assume  command  in  Virginia. 

221.  On  April  19th,  Lieut.-Colonel  Simcoe  with  the  Queen's  Rangers 
landed  at  Burwell's  Ferry  and  on  the  20th  attacked  Williamsburg. 
The  Virginia  militia  posted  at  both  places  fled  ignominiously. —  Car- 
rington, p.  589;  Lossing,  II,.  p.  543;  Simcoe's  Journal,  pp.  189-192; 
Tower,  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  in  the  American  Revolution,  II,  p. 
291. 

222.  Whose  command  consisted  of  about  800  Pennsylvania  Conti- 
nentals and  some  militia. 

223.  On  July  6th. 

224.  Washington's  diary  and  memorandum  on  the  conference. 
—  Sparks,  VIII,  pp.  54,  517-519. 

225.  July  21st  to  23rd.  On  July  2nd  and  3rd  a  demonstration  had  been 
made  against  New  York  by  General  Lincoln,  supported  by  Washington. 
On  the  6th  Rochambeau's  army  effected  its  junction  with  the  x\meri- 
cans. 

226.  Washington's  diary. —  Sparks,  VIII,  p.  134. 


Notes  573 

227.  On  August  Ist,  Cornwallis  had  9,433  troops  in  Virginia;  on  Sep- 
tember 1st,  8,885,  according  to  the  original  returns  in  tlie  British  Record 
Office. 

228.  His  fleet  consisted  of  28  ships  of  the  line,  besides  frigates  and 
transports. 

229.  When  Admiral  Rodney,  who  commanded  the  British  naval 
forces  in  the  West  Indies,  heard  of  de  Grasse's  proposed  movement,  he 
promptly  sent  Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  14  ships  of  the  line  to 
intercept  him.  Hood  outsailed  the  French,  reached  the  Chesapeake 
three  days  before  de  Grasse's  arrival,  looked  into  Delaware  Bay  and 
reached  New  York  on  August  28th.  Admiral  Graves,  his  superior,  had 
only  5  ships  fit  for  service,  but,  assuming  command  of  the  combined 
fleet,  sailed  from  New  York  on  August  31st,  hoping  to  intercept  Admiral 
Comte  de  Barras,  who,  he  had  been  informed,  had  started  from  New- 
port for  the  Chesapeake  on  the  27th. 

230.  This  Admiral  had  7  ships  of  the  line  and  14  transports  carrying 
800  marines  under  General  de  Choisy,  as  well  as  siege  guns  and  stores 
of  utmost  importance  to  the  Allies.  De  Barras  only  arrived  on  Sep- 
tember   10th. 

231.  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  pp.  388-392. 
Mahan  pertinently  remarks  (p.  392)  that  "On  the  French  side  De 
Grasse  must  be  credited  with  a  degree  of  energy,  foresight,  and  deter- 
mination surprising  in'  view  of  his  failures  at  other  times." 

232.  The  first  troops  arrived  on  the  18th.  The  total  force  was 
12,000  regulars  and  militia  in  excess  of  4,000. 

233.  About  2,000  men.     It  left  New  York  on  September  4th. 

234.  September  6th. 

235.  Officers  and  men,  7,073,  to  which  were  added  900  officers  and 
sailors,  a  total  of  7,973,  according  to  the  statement  of  the  commissary 
of  prisoners  based  on  the  original  muster  rolls. 

Cornwallis,  being  ill,  was  not  present  at  the  surrender. 

236.  Fiske,  II,  p.  283. 

237.  Among  the  trophies  were  75  brass  guns,  69  iron  guns,  18  German 
and  6  British  regimental  standards,  a  military  chest  containing  £2,113, 
4  ships,  30  transports,  15  galleys  and  many  smaller  vessels. 

238.  Just  as  he  did  when  he  endeavoured  to  relieve  Bourgoyne  in 
1777.     See  above,  footnote  70. 

239.  See  above,  pages  19,  21-25,  27,  34. 

240.  The  quotas  required  of  the  States  for  1781  amounted  to  33,408 
men.  Of  these  only  13,292  Continentals  and  7,298  militia,  a  total  of 
20,590,  were  furnished.  In  addition  to  the  above,  8,750  militia  were 
employed,  making  a  grand  total  of  29,340. —  American  State  Papers,  I, 
pp.  14-19;  Upton,  p.  57. 

241.  Original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office. 

242.  Fiske,  II,  p.  284. 

243.  January  20,  1783,  when  the  preliminaries  of  peace  between  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Spain  were  signed  at  Versailles,  and  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  at  Paris. 

Preliminary  articles  between  England  and  the  United  States  had 
previously  been  signed  at  Paris  on  November  30th. 

244.  King  George  vowed  that  he  would  not  give  up  Georgia  or  the 
cities    of    Charleston    and    New    York.     Lord    Rockingham,    however, 


^^^, 


574      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

brought  such  pressure  to  bear  that  Savannah  was  evacuated  on  July 
11,  1782,  and  Charleston  on  December  14th,  New  York,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  retained  by  the  British  until  November  25,  1783. 

245.  In  1782,  33,408  troops  were  required  of  the  States  and  18,006 
furnished;  in  1783  Qut  of  33,808  only  13,477  were  supplied. —  American 
State  Papers,  I,  pp.  14-19;  Upton,  p.  58. 

246.  Which  had  officially  announced  a  cessation  of  arms  on  April  11th. 

247.  Sparks,  VIII,  Appendix  XIII. 

248.  Lodge,  8tory  of  the  Revolution,  Appendix  II,  pp.  583-588. 

249.  Sparks,  VIII,  pp.  491-496. 

250.  Upton,  p.  64;  Fiske,  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History, 
p.  53. 

251.  Fiske,  p.  53;  Sparks,  VIII,  pp.  504-505. 

CHAPTER  III 

1.  1776. 

2.  See  above,  page  19. 

3.  Page  19. 

CTJpton,    p.    61.     Compare    Washington's    declarations,    pp.    17    and 
'^    footnote  178. 

5.  See  above,  page  9,  footnote. 

6.  Returns  and  estimates  of  the  Secretary  of  War;  American  State 
Papers,  1,  pp.   14-19;   Upton,  p.  58. 

The  number  of  soldiers  furnished  to  the  Continental  Army  during  the 

Revolution  was  as  follows: 

Massachusetts    67,907    New  Jersey   10,726 

Connecticut    31,939    North  Carolina 7,263 

Virginia    26,678    South  Carolina   6,417 

Pennsylvania     25,678    Rhode   Island    5,908 

New  York    17,781    Georgia     2,679 

Maryland    13,912    Delaware    2,386 

New  Hampshire   12,497  

Total   231,771 

In  the  figures  given  by  Carrington,  p.   653,  Massachusetts  is  stated 

as  having  furnished  09,907,  so  that  his  total  is  233,771. 

7.  American  State  Papers,  I,  pp.  14-19;  Upton,  p.  58. 

8.  Original  returns  in  the  British  Record  Office,  quoted  by  Carrington, 
pp.  93,  301,  321,  462,  483,  502  and  646. 

9.  Upton,  p.  66;  Ingersoll,  The  Second  War,  I,  p.  14.  The  cost  per 
capita  Avas  $123  as  against  $96  for  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

10.  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  for  1913,  p.  9.  His  re- 
port for  1914  does  not  mention  this  item. 

11.  Upton,  p.  59. 

12.  Upton,  pp.  66-67;  Carrington,  pp.  647-656;  Huidekoper,  Is  the 
United  States  Prepared  for  War?  p.  21,  North  American  Review  for 
February  and  March,  1906,  and  republished,  in  May,  1907,  in  pamphlet 
form,  with  an  introduction  by  Hon.  William  H.  Taft. 

CHAPTER  IV 

1.  Circular  letter  addressed  to  the  Governors  of  all  the  States  on 
disbanding  the  army,  dated  Newburg,  8  June,  1783. —  Sparks,  VIII,  p. 
450. 


Notes  575 

2.  On  June  2,  1784,  Congress  resolved 

"  That  the  conimanding  officer  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  directed  to  dis- 
charge the  troops  now  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  except  twenty- 
five  privates  to  guard  the  stores  at  Fort  Pitt  and  fifty-five  to  guard 
the  stores  at  West  Point,  and  other  magazines,  with  a  proportionate 
number  of  officers;  no  officer  to  remain  in  service  above  the  rank  of 
captain,  and  those  privates  to  be  retained  who  were  enlisted  on  the  best 
terms:  Provided:  That  Congress  before  its  recess  shall  not  take  other 
measures  respecting  the  disposition  of  those  troops." 

3.  Upton,  p.  69. 

4.  On  the  following  day,  June  3,  1784,  Congress  passed  this  pre- 
aonble  and  resolution: 

"  Whereas  a  body  of  troops  to  consist  of  700  noncommissioned  officers 
and  privates,  properly  officered,  are  immediately  and  indispensably  nec- 
essary for  securing  and  protecting  the  northwestern  frontiers  of  the 
United  States,  and  for  garrisoning  the  posts  soon  to  be  evacuated  by  the 
troops  of  his  Britannic  Majesty: 

"  Resolved,  That  it  be  and  it  is  hereby  recommended  to  the  States 
hereafter  named,  and  as  most  conveniently  situated,  to  furnish  forth- 
with from  their  militia,  700  men,  to  serve  for  twelve  months,  unless 
sooner  discharged,  in  the  following  proportions:  Connecticut,  165; 
New  York,  165;  New  Jersey,  110;  Pennsylvania,  260;  making  in  the 
whole  700. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  take  order  for  forming  the  said 
troops  when  assembled  into  one  regiment  to  consist  of  eight  com- 
panies of  infantry  and  two  of  cavalry,  arming  and  equipping  them  in  a 
soldier-like  manner." 

5.  On  April  1,  1785,  Congress  resolved 

"  That  it  is  necessary  that  a  body  of  troops  consisting  of  700  non- 
commissioned officers  and  privates  be  raised  for  the  term  of  three  years 
unless  sooner  discharged,  for  the  protection  of  the  Northwestern 
frontiers,  to  defend  the  settlers  on  the  land  belonging  to  the  United 
States  from  the  depredations  of  the  Indians  and  to  prevent  unwarranted 
intrusion  thereon,  and  for  guarding  the  public  stores." 

On  April  7th  and  12th,  further  legislation  designated  the  States  to  fur- 
nish the  recruits  and  defined  the  organization  of  this  new  regular 
regiment  which  eventually  became  the  Third  United  States  Infantry. 

6.  October  20,  1786. 

7.  1,340  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates,  enlisted  for  three 
years. 

8.  "  To  consist  of  2,040."  This  scheme  of  a  Legion  was  suggested  by 
General  Anthony  Wayne. 

9.  Of  infantry  and  artillery,  New  Hampshire  was  required  to  furnish 
260  men,  Massachusetts  660,  Rhode  Island  120,  and  Connecticut  180, 
while  Maryland  and  Virginia  were  each  to  supply  60  cavalry. 

10.  An  attempt  to  overawe  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts  was 
made  at  Springfield  in  September,  1786,  by  a  body  of  600  men  led  by 
Daniel  Shavs,  many  of  them  veterans  and  all  of  them  clamourins:  for 
the  cancellation  of  debts,  being  determined  to  resist  taxation  under  the 
State  laws.  After  drilling  for  two  months  at  Worcester  and  committing 
innumerable  depredations,  this  force,  swelled  to  2,000,  marched  on 
Springfield,  hoping  to  seize  from  the  Federal  arsenal  the  necessary  arms 


576     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

to  enforce  their  demands.  On  January  25,  1787,  an  attack  was  made, 
but  a  hot  artillery  lire  from  1,200  militia  under  General  Shepherd  pro- 
duced a  panic  in  their  ranks,  and  a  vigorous,  pursuit  by  4,400  militia 
under  General  Lincoln  —  which  had  been  called  out  by  Governor  Bow- 
doin  but  had  to  be  equipped  by  private  subscription  —  resulted  in  the 
capture  and  dispersal  of  the  rebels. —  Fiske,  Critical  Period  of  American 
History,  pp.   195-198. 

Upton  fittingly  remarks  (p.  71)  that  "the  present  exposed  condi- 
tion of  all  our  great  arsenals  finds  its  condemnation  in  the  history  of 
this  brief  rebellion." 

It  was  apropos  of  this  outbreak  that  John  Adams  declared  that 
"  National  defense  is  one  of  the  cardinal  duties  of  a  statesman." 

11.  October  3,   1787. 

12.  These  troops,  together  with  the  2  companies  of  artillery  pre- 
viously raised,  were  organized  into  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a 
battalion  of  artillery. 

13.  Fiske,  pp.  203-238. 

14.  On  July  26,  1788,  eleven  States  had  ratified  the  Constitution  and 
it  thus  became  the  supreme  and  organic  law  of  the  land.  North  Caro- 
lina did  not  ratify  it  until  November  21,  1789,  nor  Rhode  Island  until 
May  29,  1790.— Fiske,  p.  385. 

15.  Namely,  Article  I,  Sections  1,  4,  7,  8,  and  10;  Article  II,  Sec- 
tions 1,  2,  and  3;   Article  IV,  Section  4;   and  Article  VI. 

16.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  74. 

17.  The  Act  approved  August  7,   1789. 

18.  John  F.  Callan,  The  Military  Laws  of  the  United  States,  pp.  85- 
86. 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  87. 

20.  "  As  the  Continental  troops  during  the  Revolution  were  never 
maintained  in  sufficient  strength,  it  was  necessary  to  fall  back  on  the 
militia  to  meet  current  emergencies,  and  when  Indian  wars  had  to  be 
dealt  with  after  the  Revolution  the  same  system  was  continued  as  in- 
volving the  least  expense.  Thus,  as  events  soon  proved,  a  short- 
sighted and  mistaken  economy  was  to  jeopardize  the  lives  and  prop- 
erty of  our  hardy  settlers  on  the  frontier." — Upton,  p.  75. 

21.  Numbering  respectively  962  and  321   officers  and  men. 

22.  His  force  was  composed  of  320  regulars  and  1,133  militia.  On 
October  22,  1790,  he  attacked  the  Miami  village  near  Fort  Wayne,  In- 
diana, using  only  60  regulars  and  340  militia.  The  Court  of  Inquiry 
exonerated  Harmar  but  found  that  the  militia  misbehaved,  disobeyed 
orders  and  left  the  Regulars  to  be  sacrificed.  The  evidence  also  showed 
that  many  of  the  militia  were  "  old,  infirm  men  and  young  boys  "  or 
"  substitutes." 

Upton  trenchantly  observes  (pp.  77-78)  that  "The  story  of  this  ex- 
pedition must  convince  us  that  the  characteristic  features  of  our  Revo- 
lutionary military  policy  were  in  no  wise  dependent  upon  the  magni- 
tude of  the  operations  involved.  Whether  from  indifference  or  in- 
ability to  appreciate  the  value  of  discipline  and  instruction,  we  have 
never  yet  been  able  to  utilize  the  principle  of  expansion  now  so 
successfully  applied  in  military  organization  by  other  civilized 
nations. 

"  Under  the  law  of  April,  1790,  the  President  could  not  add  a  single 


Notes  bll 

soldier  to  the  Regular  Army,  while  his  authority  to  call  our  raw 
troops  perhaps  largely  composed  of  "  old,  infirm  men,  and  young  boys," 
with  officers  to  match,  was  solely  limited  by  his  discretion.  At  this 
very  time,  by  increasing  the  enlisted  strength  of  each  company  from 
76  to  200,  the  three-battalion  regiment  of  infantry  and  the  battalion 
of  artillery  were  capable  of  expansion  to  more  than  3,200  men.  In- 
stead of  being  able  to  adopt  this  simple  and  economical  expedient,  the 
President  had  no  other  alternative  than  to  call  out  militia,  the  records 
of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  bearing  eloquent  testiniony  as  to  the  result." 

23.  Act  of  March  3,  1791.     The  enlisted  men  were  limited  to  912. 

24.  "  Sec.  8.  That  if  the  President  should  be  of  opinion  that  it  will 
be  conducive  to  the  public  service  to  employ  troops  enlisted  under  the 
denomination  of  levies,  in  addition  to,  or  in  place  of,  the  militia  which, 
in  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  him  by  law,  he  is  authorized  to  call 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  him  to 
raise,  for  a  term  not  exceeding  six  months  (to  be  discharged  sooner  if 
the  public  service  will  permit),  a  corps  not  exceeding  two  thousand 
noncommissioned  officers,  privates,  and  musicians,  with  a  suitable 
number  of  commissioned  officers.  And  in  case  it  shall  appear  probable 
to  the  President  that  the  regimient  directed  to  be  raised  by  the  afore- 
said act,  and  by  this  act,  will  not  be  completed  in  tijne  to  prosecute  such 
military  oi>erations  as  exigencies  may  require,  it  shall  be  lawful  for 
the  President  to  make  a  substitute  for  the  deficiency  by  raising  such 
farther  number  of  levies  or  by  calling  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  such  a  body  of  militia  as  shall  be  equal  thereto." 

"  Section  12  gave  $3  bounty  to  each  enlisted  man  of  the  '  levies,'  and 
section  14  gave  recruiting  officers  $2  for  each  man  enlisted  in  the  regu- 
lars."—  Upton,  p.  79;  Callan,  pp.  90-91. 

25.  "  During-  the  Revolution  the  regular  troops  or  Continentals  were 
largely  supplemented  by  militia,  and  it  will  be  remembered  that  the 
latter,  having  little  or  no  respect  for  officers  of  their  own  choosing, 
would  not  submit  to  the  restraints  of  discipline  and  never  could  be 
depended  upon. 

"  This  fact  was  distinctly  recognized  in  the  law  just  quoted,  which 
took  the  radical  step,  far  in  advance  of  our  Revolutionary  war  policy, 
of  creating  an  entirely  new  class  of  troops  to  support  the  regular  army 
in  case  of  emergency." —  Ihid. 

26.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  79. 

27.  By  the  Act  of  May  8,    1792. 

28.  On  Xovember  4,  1791,  St.  Clair's  mixed  force  of  regulars  and 
militia,  numbering  only  1,400  effectives,  was  attacked  in  Darke  County, 
Ohio,  by  a  force  of  Indians  of  nearly  equal  strength  and  routed  with 
a  loss  of  632  killed  and  264  wounded.  The  Investigating  Committee 
appointed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  reported  that  "  the  militia 
appear  to  have  been  composed  principally  of  substitutes  and  totally 
ungovernable  and  regardless  of  military  duty  and  subordination"; 
that  "  the  attack  was  unexpected.  ...  It  comimenced  upon  the  militia 
who  were  in  advance  of  the  main  army,  and  who  fled  through  the 
main  army  without  firing  a  ^n.  This  circumstance  threw  the  troops 
into  some  disorder,  from  which  it  appears  they  never  recovered  during 
the  action."  The  committee  also  found  that  "  the  want  of  discipline 
and  experience  of  the  troops  "  was  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  the 


578      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United^  States 

defeat  for  which  General  St.  Clair  was  in  no  respect  to  blame, —  Upton, 
p.   79. 

29.  By  the  Act  of  March  5,  1792,  of  which  Sections  2  and  3  created 
the  "  Legion  of  the  United  States,"  to  which  the  organization  of  the 
militia  was  to  conform.  The  legional  organization  was  adopted  on 
December  27,  1792,  divided  the  militia  into  the  "  advanced  corps " — 
comprising  all  youths  of  18,  19  and  20  years  —  the  "main  corps" — all 
men  between  the  ages  of  21  and  45  —  and  the  "  reserve  corps,"  which 
embraced  those  from  46  to  60,  all  corps  to  receive  certain  specified 
annual   instruction. —  Callan,    pp.    92-94. 

30.  F.  B.  Heitman,  Historical  Register  and  Dictionary  of  the  United 
States  Army,  II,  p.  562. 

31.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  562-571.  No  complete  returns  are  given  of  the 
actual  strength  of  the  army  until  December,   1816. 

32.  Act  of  March  5,  1792. 

33.  Act  of  May  30,   1796. 

34.  Act  of  July   16,   1798. 

35.  Act  of  March  3,  1799.  This  sudden  increase  was  caused  by  the 
imminence  of  war  with   France. 

36.  Act.    of   May    14,    1800. 

37.  Act  of  March   16,   1802. 

38.  Act  of  April  12,   1808. 

39.  "  Sec.  1.  That  each  and  every  free,  able-bodied,  white  male  citi- 
zen of  the  respective  States,  resident  therein,  who  is  or  shall  be  of 
the  age  of  eighteen  years,  and  under  the  age  of  forty-five  years  (except 
as  hereinafter  excepted)  shall,  severally  and  respectively,  be  enrolled 
in  the  militia  by  the  captain  or  commanding  officer  of  the  company, 
within  whose  bounds  such  citizen  shall  reside,  and  that  within  twelve 
months  after  the  passing  of  this  act.  And  it  shall  at  all  times  here- 
after, be  the  duty  of  every  such  captain  or  commanding  officer  of  a 
company,  to  enroll  every  such  citizen,  as  aforesaid,  and  also  those  who 
shall,  from  time  to  time,  arrive  at  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  or,  being 
the  age  of  eighteen  years  and  under  the  age  of  forty-five  years  (except 
as  before  excepted),  shall  come  to  reside  within  his  bounds;  and  shall, 
without  delay,  notify  such  citizen  of  the  said  enrollment,  by  a  proper 
noncominissioned  officer  of  the  company,  by  whom  such  notice  may  be 
proved.  That  every  citizen  so  enrolled  and  notified,  shall,  within  six 
months  thereafter,  provide  himself  with  a  good  musket  or  firelock, 
a  sufficient  bayonet  and  belt,  two  spare  flints,  and  a  knapsack,  a  pouch, 
with  a  box  therein  to  contain  not  less  than  twenty-four  cartridges, 
suited  to  the  bore  of  his  musket  or  firelock,  each  cartridge  to  contain 
a  proper  quantity  of  powder  and  ball;  or,  with  a  good  rifle,  knap- 
sack, shot  pouch,  and  powderhorn,  twenty  balls  suited  to  the  bore  of 
his  rifle,  and  a  quarter  of  a  pound  of  powder ;  and  shall  appear  so 
armed,  accoutered,  and  provided,  when  called  out  to  exercise  or  into 
service;  except,  that  when  called  out  on  company  days'  exercise  only, 
he  may  appear  without  a  knapsack.  That  the  commissioned  officers 
shall,  severally,  be  armed  with  a  sword  or  hanger  and  spontoon;  and 
that  from  and  after  five  years  from  the  passing  of  this  act  all  muskets 
for  arming  the  militia,  as  herein  required,  shall  be  of  bores  sufficient 
for  balls  of  the  eighteenth  part  of  a  pound,  and  every  citizen  so  enrolled 
and  providing  himself  with  the  arms,  ammunition,  and  accouterments 


Notes  579 

required  as  aforesaid,  shall  hold  the  same  exempted  from  all  suits, 
distress,  executions,  or  sales  for  debt  or  for  the  payment  of  taxes." — 
Callan,   pp.   95-96. 

40.  I.e.,  certain  officers  of  the  Federal  Government,  pilots,  ferry- 
men and  others,  in  addition  to  those  whom  the  States  might  ex- 
empt. 

41.  "  Sec.  3.  That  within  one  year  after  the  passing  of  this  act  the 
militia  of  the  respective  States  shall  be  arranged  into  divisions,  brig- 
ades, regiments,  battalions,  and  companies,  as  the  legislature  of  such 
States  shall  direct;  and  each  division,  brigade,  and  regiment  shall  be 
numbered  at  the  formation  thereof  and  a  record  made  of  such  numbers 
in  the  adjutant-general's  office  in  the  State;  and  when  in  the  field,  or 
in  service  in  the  State,  each  division,  brigade,  and  regiment  shall, 
respectively,  take  rank  according  to  their  numbers,  reckoning  the  first 
or  lowest  highest  in  rank.  That,  if  the  same  be  convenient,  each 
brigade  shall  consist  of  four  regiments,  each  regiment  of  two  bat- 
talions, each  battalion  of  five  companies,  each  company  of  64  privates. 
That  the  said  militia  shall  be  officered  by  the  respective  States  as 
follows : 

"  To  each  division,  one  major-general  and  two  aids-de-camp,  with  the 
rank  of  major;  to  each  brigade,  one  brigadier-general,  with  one  brigade 
inspector,  to  serve  also  as  brigade  major,  with  the  rank  of  a  major;  to 
each  regiment,  one  lieutenant-colonel  commandant;  and  to  each  bat^ 
talion,  one  major;  to  each  company,  one  captain,  one  lieutenant,  one 
ensign,  four  sergeants,  four  corporals,  one  drummer,  and  one  fifer  or 
bugler.  That  there  shall  be  a  regimental  staff,  to  consist  of  one  adju- 
tant and  one  quartermaster,  to  rank  as  lieutenants;  one  paymaster, 
one  surgeon,  and  one  surgeon's  mate,  one  sergeant-major,  one  drum 
major,   and  one  fife  major," 

42.  Callan,  pp.  95-100: 

43.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  85. 

44.  The  fruits  of  this  pernicious  law  were  reaped  in  the  War  of 
1812,  when  further  criticism  of  this  measure  will  be  made. 

45.  The  Act  of  February  28,  1795,  "  to  provide  for  calling  forth  the 
militia "  prescribed  in  Section  4,  "  that  no  officer,  non-commissioned 
officer,  or  private,  of  the  militia,  shall  he  compelled  to  serve  more  than 
three  months  after  his  arrival  at  the  place  of  rendezvous,  in  any  one 
year." — Callan,  p.    109. 

This  law  was  still  in  operation  in  1861  when  its  inconveniences  were 
seriously  felt. 

46.  By  the  Act  of  April  27,   1798. 

47.  Acts   of   May  3    and   4,    1798. 

48.  Act    of   May   28,    1798. 

49.  Upton,  pp.  87-88. 

50.  By  the  Act  of  March  2,  1799.  These  five  laws  are  given  by 
Callan,  pp.    119-125'  and    131-133. 

51.  Twenty-four  regiments  of  infantry,  1  regiment  and  1  battalion 
of  riflemen,  1  battalion  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  and  3  regiments 
of  cavalry.  The  enlistment  of  these  troops  was  for  a  term  not  to 
exceed  3  years,  and  no  officer,  with  the  exception  of  captains  and 
lieutenants  on  recruiting  duty,  was  to  receive  pay  until  actually  called 
into   service. 


580     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Had  these  troops  been  raised,  the  Regular  Army  would  have  been 
augmented  to  a  strength  of  about  40,000  men. 

52.  Jefferson  relates  in  his  diary,  under  date  of  January  14,  1799, 
that  "  Logan,  observing,  that  notwithstanding  the  pacific  declarations 
of  France,  it  might  still  be  well  to  keep  up  the  military  ardor  of  our 
citizens,  and  to  have  the  militia  in  good  order ;  '  the  militia,'  said 
Pickering,  '  the  militia  never  did  any  good  to  this  country,  except  in 
the  single  affair  of  Bunker  Hill;  that  ice  must  have  a  standing  army 
of  P-fty  thousand  men,  tohich  being  stationed  in  different  parts  of  the 
continent,  might  serve  as  rallying  points  for  the  militia,  and  so  render 
them  of  some  service.'  " —  The  Ana^,  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson 
(edited  by  Paul   Leicester   Ford),   I,   p.   347. 

53.  The*^  War   of   the   Rebellion. 

54.  As  was  done  in  the  Spanish-American  War. 

55.  Upton,  p.   88. 

56.  On  December  19,  1801,  the  actual  strength  of  the  army  was  248 
officers,  9  cadets  and  3,794  enlisted  men,  a  total  of  only  4,051. 

57.  By  Section  27. —  Callan,  p.  148;  The  Centennial  of  the  United 
States  Military  Academy,  I,  pp.  2,  211,  222-223.  It  was  formally 
opened   on   July   4,    1802,   with   ten    cadets. 

58.  Ibid,  I,  pp.  2  and  226;   Callan,  pp.  224-225. 

59.  V\)  to  March,    1812,   only   88   cadets   had  been   graduated. 

60.  Letter  to  Elbridge  Gerry,  January  26,  1799,  in  The  Woi'ks  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  Federal  edition  (collected  and  edited  by  Paul  Lei- 
cester Ford)  IX,  pp.  17-18.  Also  Morse,  Thomas  Jefferson  (American 
Statesmen  Series),  pp.  88-92,  114-117,  124-131,  168-169;  Curtis,  The 
True  Thomas  Jefferson,  pp.  164,  302-303,  305-306;  Foley,  The  Jeffer- 
sonian   Cyclopedia,   pp.    130-133,   252,    833-834. 

61.  On   December   8,    1801. 

62.  This  Avas  quite  in  harmony  with  one  of  his  "  two  favorite  ideas," 
namely,  that  of  "  never  keeping  an  unnecessary  souldier." —  The  Anas, 
June   4,    1792.     The  Wo7'ks   of   Thomas  Jefferson,   I,   p.   227. 

The  authorized  streng-th  of  the  army  during  1801  was  4,436;  its 
actual  strength  at  the  end  of  the  year  was  only  4,051.  See  above, 
footnote  56. 

63.  Two  years  earlier  he  had  announced:  "I  am  relying,  for  in- 
ternal defence,  on  our  militia  solely,  till  actual  invasion  .  .  .  and  not 
for  a  standing  army  in  time  of  peace." —  Letter  to  Elbridge  Gerry, 
January  26,   1799.     The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX,  p.   18. 

64.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  oj  the  Presidents,  I,  p.  329; 
The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX,  pp.  336-337. 

65.  For  example,  in  his  fifth,  sixth  and  eighth  annual  messages. 
In  the  last  he  maintained  that  "  For  a  people  who  are  free,  and  who 
mean  to  remain  so,  a  well  organized  and  armed  militia  is  their  best 
security." — Richardson,  I,  p.  455;  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson, 
XI,  pp.  68-69. 

Jefferson's  written  statements  concerning  his  views  on  the  militia 
and  his  opposition  to  a  standing  army  are  given  by  Foley,  Xos.  522- 
546,  558,  and  5177  to  5233,  pp.  54-55,  56,  and  550-554. 

66.  Fifth  annual  message,  December  3,  1805.  Richardson  I,  pp. 
382-383. 


Notes  581 

67.  In  order  to  utilize  first  those  between  the  ages  of  18  and  26. 
See  his  fifth  annual  message;  his  draft  for  "An  Act  for  classing  the 
militia  and  assigning  to  each  class  its  particular  duties,"  dated  Decem- 
ber, 1805;  and  his  letter  to  John  Armstrong,  Minister  to  France,  dated 
May  2,   1808. 

Jefferson's  scheme  was  that  "  a  militia  of  young  men  will  hold 
on  until  regulars  can  be  raised,  and  will  be  the  nursery  which  will 
furnish  them." — Letter  to  William  A.  Burwell,  January  15,   1806. 

Similarly  his  letter  to  John  Armstrong  just  alluded  to,  in  which 
he  said:  "  We  are  raising  some  regulars  in  addition  to  our  present 
force  for  garrisoning  our  seaports,  and  forming  a  nucleus  for  a  militia 
to  gather  to." 

The  above  will  be  found  in  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  Federal 
edition,   X,   pp.    191-192,    213-217,   223,    and   XI,   pp.    30-31. 

68.  For  example,  in  President  Wilson's  second  annual  message  to 
Congress,    December    8,    1914.     See   Chapter    I,   footnote    1. 

69.  See  page  66. 

70.  By  the  Act  of  March  16,  1802,  which  limited  its  strength  to  241 
officers  and  3,046  enlisted  men. —  Callan,   pp.    141-142. 

Yet  it  was  less  than  three  weeks  before  that  Jefferson  had  declared 
that  "  None  hut  an  armed  nation  can  dispense  with  a  standing  army. 
To  keep  ours  armed  and  disciplined,  is  therefore  at  all  times  important." 
— Letter  to  (name  omitted),  February  25,  1803.  The  Writings  of 
Thomas  Jefferson  (edited  by  H.  A.  Washington),  IV,  p.  469.  Ford 
evidently  considered  this  unaddressed  letter  not  sufficiently  well-authen- 
ticated and  did  not  insert  it  in  his  edition. 

71.  Act  of  March  3,  1803.  This  force  was  to  be  enlisted  for  a  year 
onh^  This  law  was  substantially  re-enacted  on  April  18,  1806,  with  the 
proviso  that  it  was  to  continue  in  force  for  two  years  but  that  the 
service  of  the  troops  so  called  out  was  to  be  restricted  to  six  months. 
—  Callan,  pp.    151-168,  and   198. 

72.  Upton,  p.  91. 

73.  By  the  Act  of  February  24*,  1807,  which  authorized  the  acceptance 
of  30,000.  On  August  9,  1807,  Jefferson  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  General  Dearborn :  "  I  received  yesterday  yours  of  the  7th, 
with  the  proposition  for  substituting  32,000  twelve-month  volunteers 
instead  of  15,000  regulars  as  a  disposable  force,  and  I  like  the  idea 
very  much.  ...  I  repeat  that  I  like  it  greatly." —  The  Works  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  X,   footnote  on  p.  475. 

74.  From   their   respective   States. 

75.  Act  of  April  12,   1808. 

76.  Act  of  December  24,   1811. 

77.  (1)  The  Act  of  January  2,  1812,  empowered  the  President  to 
accept  6  companies  of  volunteers  or  rangers,  to  be  enlisted  for  a  year 
for   the   protection   of  the  frontiers. 

(2)  The  Act  of  January  11th  increased  the  Reg-ular  Army  by  10 
regiments  of  infantry,  2  of  artillery  and  one  of  light  dragoons,  the 
term  of  ser\dce  being  five  years.  The  arm.y,  when  augmented  by  this 
force,  was  supposed  to  number  35,603,  but,  notwithstanding  the  induce- 
ments in  the  shape  of  bounties,  so  slow  was  the  recruiting  that  its 
actual    strengih   in   July,    1812,    was   only    6,686. 


582      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

(3)  The  Act  of  February  6th  authorized  the  President  to  accept  com- 
panies of  volunteers,  not  to  exceed  30,000,  and  to  organize  them  into 
battalions,   regiments   and   brigades. 

(4)  The  Act  of  February  24th  empowered  him  to  mount  the  regi- 
ment of  light  artillery  recruited  in   1808. 

(5)  The  Act  of  April  8th  directed  the  President  to  reduce  to  18 
months  the  period  of  enlistment  fixed  at  five  years  by  the  Act  of  1811, 
provided  the  number  of  men  thus  enlisted  did  not  exceed   15,000. 

The  hitter  lessons  of  the  Revolution  as  to  the  folly  of  short  enlist- 
ments were  thus  cast  to   the  imnds. 

(6)  The  Act  of  April  10th  substantially  reiterated  that  of  March 
3,  1803.     See  above,  p.  51  and  footnote  71,  page  581. 

The  above  laws  are  given  by  Callan,  pp.   211-222. 
78.  Upton,  pp.   92  and  94. 


CHAPTER  V 

1.  James,  Military  Occurrences  heticeen  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  I,  p.   56. 

2.  Resulting  from  the  laws  of   1802,   1808  and  1811. 

3.  By  the  Act  of  June  26,  1812,  which  remodeled  the  regiments  on 
the  basis  of  ten  companies  each. —  Callan,  p.  230. 

4.  Acts  of  February  24,   1807,  and  February  6,  '1812. 

5.  Act  of  July  6,  1812.  This  force,  although  called  "volunteers," 
would  have  been  equivalent  to  a  second  Regular  Army  except  for  the 
limitation  in  the  enlistment  to  one  year.  The  measure  failed  and  its 
only  effect  was  to  deter  enlistments  in  the  sole  organization  that  would 
have  been  effective. 

6.  Had  Congress  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  declared  that  all  men 
otced  their  country  military  service  and  raised  the  Army  to  35,000  by 
volunteering  or  by  drafting  for  se^'vice  "  during  the  tear,"  such  a  force 
after  six  months'  training  could  easily  have  occupied  Canada  and 
terminated  the  tvar  in  one  campaign.     Compare  Upton,  p.  96. 

7.  Opinion  delivered  by  Theophilus  Parsons,  Samuel  Sewell,  and 
Isaac  Parker,  the  three  judges  of  the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court 
to  whom  the  Governor  referred  the  matter. —  American  State  Papers, 
I,  p.  324. 

8.  Upton,    p.    97. 

Hart,  Formation  of  the  Union,  p.  215,  says  that  "The  general  gov- 
ernment had  no  means  of  enforcing  its  construction  of  the  Constitution. 
It  did,  however,  ^^^thdraw  garrisons  from  the  New  England  forts,  leav- 
ing those  States  to  defend  themselves;  and  refused  to  send  them,  their 
quota  of  the  arms  which  were  distributed  among  the  States.  This 
attitude  was  so  well  understood,  that  during  the  first  few  months  of 
the  war,  English  cruisers  had  orders  not  to  capture  vessels  owned  in 
New  England.  As  the  war  advanced,  these  orders  were  withdrawn, 
and  the  territory  of  Massachusetts  in  the  District  of  Maine  was  invaded 
by  British  troops.  An  urgent  call  for  protection  was  then  made  upon 
the  general  government;  but,  even  in  this  crisis,  Massachusetts  would 
not  permit  her  militia  to  pass  under  the  control  of  national  military 
officers." 


Notes  583 

9.  Pages  47-48. 

10.  Upton,    pp.    97-98. 

11.  On  the  march  from  Urbana,  Ohio,  to  Detroit,  part  of  Hull's 
militia  mutinied  and  the  4th  United  States  Infantry  had  to  be  em- 
ployed to  bring  them  to  order.  Upon  reaching  Detroit,  180  Ohio 
militia  mutinied  and  refused  to  cross  the  river,  "  alleging  as  a  reason 
that  they  were  not  obliged  to  serve  outside  of  the  United  States." — 
Hull's  Memoirs  of  the  Campaign  of  1812,   pp.   34-35. 

12.  About  300  regulars  and   1,500  volunteers  and  militia. 

13.  Upton,  p.  98.  How  much  value  the  enemy  placed  upon  the 
militia  is  evinced  by  the  fact  that  they  were  allowed  to  return  home, 
whereas  the  320  regulars  were  sent  to  Montreal  as  prisoners. 

14.  "  As  illustrating  the  reckless  extravagance  with  which  hos- 
tilities were  carried  on,  one  of  the  expeditions,  set  on  foot  for  this 
purpose,  deserves  special  mention.  It  was  commanded  by  General  Hop- 
kins and  consisted  of  4,000  Kentucky  mounted  militia,  who  reached 
Fort  Harrison  [Xote.  About  2  miles  from  the  present  city  of  Terre 
Haute,  Ind.]  on  the  10th  of  October,  whence  four  days  later  they  set 
out  for  the  Indian  villages  on  the  Wabash  and  Illinois  Rivers.  Once 
on  the  march  the  ardor  of  these  troops  began  to  cool  and  insub- 
ordination quickly  followed;  on  the  fourth  day  a  fire  on  the  prairie 
was  mistaken  for  a  ruse  of  the  enemy;  on  the  fifth  day,  totally  ignor- 
ing the  authority  of  their  officers,  the  disorderly  mass  abandoned  their 
general,  and,  retracing  their  steps,  dispersed  to  their  homes." — Upton, 
p.  99. 

15.  "While  these  movements  against  the  Indians  were  going  on, 
preparations  were  made  for  collecting  another  army  under  General 
William  Henry  Harrison  for  the  special  purpose  of  effacing  the  stain 
of  Hull's  surrender.  To  this  end  volunteers,  and  more  especially  mi- 
litia, came  forward  with  the  gTeatest  enthusiasm  and  offered  themselves 
in  such  numbers  that  it  became  necessary  to  decline  the  services  of  the 
larger  part,   who  returned  to  their  homes  grievously  disappointed. 

"  The  militia  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  assembled  at  Louisville  and 
at  Newport;  those  from  Virginia,  at  Urbana;  those  of  Pennsylvania, 
at  Erie.  From  these  several  points  the  troops  were  organized  into 
three  columns  with  a  supposed  total  of  not  less  than  10,000  men. 
Their  first  destination  was  the  Rapids  of  the  Maumee,  a  point  that 
was  not  reached  in  this  year's  campaign,  for  no  sooner  had  the  several 
columns  moved,  than  hunger,  nakedness,  and  mutiny  began  the  work 
of  dissolution.  The  left  column  from  Kentucky,  when  a  few  days  out, 
was  only  prevailed  upon  to  remain  by  the  personal  entreaties  of  the 
general  and  other  officers.  The  middle  column  from  Urbana,  after  a 
slight  engagement  with  the  Indians,  refused  to  obey  orders  for  a 
further  pursuit,  and  deliberately  returned  to  their  camp.  This  ended 
the  autumn  campaign,  though  Harrison  was  not  willing  to  acknowl- 
edge its  failure,  and  proposed  to  continue  operations  by  means  of  a 
winter  expedition  which  led  soon  after  to  a  painful  defeat." — Ihid. 

16.  691  men  according  to  the  returns  of  September  1st,  "  many  of 
them  without  shoes  and  all  clamorous  for  pay." — Van  Rensselaer, 
Affair  of  Queenstoicn,   p.    10. 

17.  The  force  in  the  \'icinity  of  Lewisto^vn  and  Fort  Niagara  num- 
bered on  October  12th,  900  regulars  and  2,270  militia. —  Returns  quoted 


584      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in    Wilkinson's    Memoirs,    I,    p.    580.     Even    the    regulars    were    com- 
paratively raw  troops. 

18.  160  regulars  and  90  militia  killed  and  wounded,  and  700  cap- 
tured.—  Records   of   the  Adjutant-General's   Office. 

The  British,  who  numbered  600  regulars  and  500  militia  and  Indians, 
lost  only  69  killed  and  69  wounded. —  James,  I,  p.  97. 

19.  Van  Rensselaer,  p.  10,  and  Appendix,  p.  62;  Armstrong,  yotices 
of  the  TFar  of  1812,  II,  pp.  100-107,  and  Appendix  Xo.  12,  pp.  207-219. 

20.  Xovember  28th,   1812. 

21.  James,   I,   pp.   391-392;    Thompson,   Late   War,   p.   82. 

22.  From  Black  Rock,  X.   Y. 

23.  Upton,  pp.   103-104;   Thompson,  p.   87. 

24.  Ingersoll,    The  Second  War,   I,   p.    101. 

25.  Upton,   pp.    104-105. 

26.  The  militia  numbered  49,187,  Massachusetts  furnishing  208  and 
Connecticut  none.  The  regulars  amounted  to  15,000. —  Records  of  the 
Adjutant-GeneraVs   Office,   and  Upton,   p.    105. 

27.  James,  I,  p.  56. 

28.  General  Bro^^'n,  subsequently  the  British  commander-in-chief,  in 
a  letter  dated  July  20,  1813,  estimated  the  British  regulars  at  less 
than  1,200  men  and  asserted  that  *"  at  no  time  did  the  command  of 
this  distinguished  chief  (General  Brock)  consist  of  less  than  one- 
third  of  old  men  and  boys,  fit  onlv  for  garrison  dutv." —  Armstrong, 
I,   p.    224. 

29.  Pages  48-49. 

30.  "  Instead  of  relying  upon  a  small  but  well-disciplined  regular 
establishment,  this  law  entrusted  the  safety  and  honor  of  a  nation  to 
armies  of  militia  supported  by  the  several  States  during  the  long 
intervals  of  peace.  These  armies,  though  elaborately  organized  on 
paper  into  battalions,  brigades,  and  divisions,  were  only  to  receive 
such  drill  and  instruction  as  the  various  States  might  think 
proper.  .  .  . 

"  Led  to  a  certain  extent  by  those  who  had  gained  actual  military 
experience  during  the  Revolution  or  on  the  Indian  frontier,  endowed 
with  perhaps  more  average  intelligence  and  education  than  the  regu- 
lars; supplied  with  the  same  food,  clothing,  and  equipments  as  they 
were,  the  marked  inferiority  of  the  militia  troops  was  largely  due  to 
the  brief  period  of  their  service,  to  the  conviction  that  their  time 
would  soon  be  '  out,'  and  that  others  must  take  their  places  and  bear 
the  burdens   and  dangers  of  the  contest. 

•'  While  their  pay  was  no  greater  than  that  of  other  troops,  when 
we  deduct  the  time  lost  in  coming  and  going,  as  well  as  that  con- 
sumed in  partial  and  unavailing  instruction,  their  real  cost  to  the 
country    was    infinitely    greater."' —  Upton,    pp.    105-106. 

31.  This  advance  did  not  include  the  three  months'  pay,  a  bounty 
of  $16  and  160  acres  of  land  which  were  to  be  given  to  the  soldier 
upon  his  discharge. 

32.  Act  of  January  20,  1813,  It  illustrates  admirably  the  proverb, 
"  the  more  haste,  the  less  speed,"  for  at  the  end  of  February  the  total 
strength  of  the  Army  was  only  19,036. 

33.  See  pages  47-49,   53-54. 


Notes  585 

34.  Act    of    January    29,    1813.— Callan,    pp.    238-240. 

35.  Upton,   p.    107. 

36.  Harrison,  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  March  17, 
1813,  protested  that,  in  view  of  the  shortness  of  time  allowed  for 
training,  his  regulars  '*  would  be  very  little  superior  to  militia,"  thus 
giving  him  "  no  alternative  but  to  make  up  by  numbers  the  deficiency 
in   discipline." — Americaii   State   Papers,   I,   p.   452. 

37.  A  sequel  of  Harrison's  expedition  of  the  previous  autumn.  See 
footnote  15.  Winchester's  force  consisted  of  a  few  companies  of  regu- 
lars, a  battalion  of  rifles  and  the  1st  and  5th  Kentucky  militia,  a 
total   of   less   than    1,000. 

38.  His  force,  composed  of  British  regulars,  militia  and  Indians, 
was  numbered  1,000.  Winchester  lost  397  killed,  27  wounded,  and  522 
captured,  a  total  of  946. 

39.  Upton,   p.    109. 

40.  From  April  28th  to  May  9th,   1813. 

41.  With  a  force  of  983  regulars  and  militia  and  1,200  Indians  under 
Tecumseh. —  James,  I,  p.   195. 

42.  1,200  strong.  A  detachment  of  800  surprised  Proctor's  guns  but, 
in  disobedience  of  orders,  attacked  the  British  camp  and  were  routed 
with  a  loss  of  45  killed  and  605  taken  prisoners,  only  150  escaping. — 
General  Clay's  official  Report,  quoted  by  Fay,  American  TFar,  p.  93. 

43.  875,  of  whom  605  were  captured,  as  against  a  British  loss  of 
only  101. —  Thompson,  p.  114;  James,  I,  p.  200. 

44.  Upton,   p.    110. 

45.  On  August  2nd. 

46.  Losing  96  out  of  391  regulars,  while  the  American  casualties 
were  confined  to  one  killed  and  7   wounded. 

47.  On  September  10th  the  brilliant  victory  of  Commodore  Perry's 
impro\'ised  fleet  rid  Lake  Erie  of  the  British  ships  and  made  direct 
access  to  the  enemy's  stronghold  possible  by  water. 

48.  Harrison  estimated  his  force  at  slightly  more  than  3,000;  Proctor 
had   834    regulars   and   about    1,200   Indians. 

49.  Proctor  lost  34  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  600  prisoners;  33 
Indians  were  killed,  among  them  the  famous  chief  Tecumseh.  Har- 
rison's casualties  were  only   29. 

Accounts  of  this  action  are  given  in  General  HarHson's  Official 
Report,  quoted  by  Fay,  p.  138;  by  James,  I,  p.  279;  and  by  Upton,  p. 
111. 

50.  Upton,  p.    111. 

51.  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Harrison,  dated 
April   14,   1813. —  American  State  Papers,  I,  p.  453. 

52.  Upton,  p.    111. 

53.  Comprising  the  theatre  from  Prescott  on  the  St.  La^^Tence  River 
to  Lake  Erie.  The  British  force  in  this  region  early  in  February, 
1813,  was  estimated  by  the  Secretary"  of  War  to  be  2,100  men,  against 
whom,  he  asserted,  it  would  be  necessary  to  use  not  '*  less  than  6,000 
eff"ective  regular  troops,  because  in  the  first  enterprise  of  a  second 
campaign,  nothing  must,  if  possible,  be  left  to  chance." —  American 
State  Papers,  I,  p.  439. 

54.  In  one  night  attack  Generals  Winder  and  Chandler  were  captured. 


586      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

"  In  another,  Colonel  Boerstler,  believing  himself  to  be  surrounded  by 
a  superior  force,  surrendered  with  542  men,  of  whom  nearly  500  were 
regulars." — Upton,    p.    112. 

55.  Less   than    1,200   strong. 

56.  An  important  depot  of  naval  stores  where  a  new  ship,  the 
General  Pike,   was  in   the  course   of   construction. 

57.  50  killed  and  211  wounded;   the  American  casualties  were  157. 

58.  "  My  orders  were  that  the  troops  should  lie  close  and  reserve 
their  fire  until  the  enemy  had  approached  so  near  that  every  shot 
might  hit  its  object.  It  is,  however,  impossible  to  execute  such  orders 
with  raw  troops,  unaccustomed  to  subordination.  My  orders  were,  in 
this  case,  disobeyed;  the  whole  line  fired,  and  not  without  effect;  but 
in  the  moment  while  I  was  contemplating  this,  to  my  utter  astonish- 
ment, thei/  rose  from  their  cover  and  fled.  Colonel  Mills  fell  gallantly, 
in  brave  but  vain  endeavors  to  stop  his  men.  I  was,  personally,  more 
fortunate.  .  .  ." —  General  Broion's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
quoted  by  Fay,  p.   102. 

59.  With  the  object,  as  he  alleged,  that  the  enemy  might  be  "  shut 
out  from  any  hopes  or  means  of  wintering  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort 
George." — American   State   Papers,   I,   p.   468. 

60.  "  Tlie  best  and  most  subordinate  militia  that  have  yet  been  on 
this  frontier,  finding  that  their  wages  were  not  ready  for  them,  became, 
with  some  meritorious  exceptions,  a  disaffected  and  ungovernable  mul- 
titude."—  General  McClure's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  Amer- 
ican State  Papers,  I,  p.  486. 

61.  Upton,   p.    115. 

62.  "  Not  more  than  650  men,  of  regulars,  militia  and  Indians  landed 
at  Black  Rock.  To  oppose  these  we  had  from  2,500  to  3,000  militia. 
All,  except  very  few  of  them,  behaved  in  the  most  cowardly  manner. 
They  fled  without  discharging  a  musket." —  General  Cass  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  January  12,  1814.     American  State  Papers,  I,  p.  487. 

63.  "  Who  had  been  but  a  short  time  in  service  and  had  not  been 
exercised  with  that  rigid  discipline  so  essential  to  constitute  the  sol- 
dier. They  had  indeed  been  taught  various  evolutions,  but  a  spirit 
of  subordination  was  foreign  to  their  views." —  Official  report  of  Colo- 
nel Purdy,  J^th  'New  York.     American  State  Papers,  I,  pp.  479-480. 

64.  Only  half  of  this  force  came  into  action  at  all. 

65.  Official  returns,  quoted  in  Wilkinson's  Memoirs,  III,  Appendix 
VII. 

66.  Upton,   p.    113. 

67.  Upton,   p.    113. 

68.  Page  53. 

69.  This  brigade  had  been  duly  mustered  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  and  was  stationed  at  Plattsburg  as  the  reserve  of 
Hampton's  force  then  in  Canada. 

70.  Ingersoll,  II,  p.  26. 

71.  On  November  15,  1813,  certain  Vermont  officers  replied  to  Chit- 
tenden that 

"  When  ordered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  it  becomes 
our  duty  to  march  to  any  section  of  the  Union,  not  confined  to  the 
narrow  limits  of  the  town  or  State  in  which  we  reside.  We  are 
under  a  paramount  obligation  to  our  common  country  and  the  great 


Notes  587 

Confederacy  of  States;  and  while  in  actual  service,  your  Excellency's 
power  over  us,  as  governor  of  Vermont,  is  suspended.  It  legally  ordered 
into  service  of  the  United  States,  your  Excellency  has  no  power  to 
order  us  out  of  it.  An  invitation  or  order  to  desert  the  standard  of 
our  country  will  never  be  obeyed  by  us,  although  it  proceeds  from  the 
captain-general  and  governor  of  Vermont." —  Ingersoll,  II,  p.  26. 

72.  December  26,  1812,  and  March  20,  1813.  The  former  was  lim- 
ited to  the  Chesapeake  and  Delaware   Bays. 

73.  See  page  582,  footnote  8. 

74.  Frenchtown,    Havre-de-Grace,    Georgetown,    and    Fredericktown. 

75.  See  below,  p.  61. 

76.  With  only   1,500  men. —  James,  II,  pp.  57-58. 

77.  Losing  81  men. —  Official  reports  of  Admiral  Warren  and  Sir 
Sidney  Beckicith,  Quartermaster-General. —  James,  II,  p.  114,  Appendix 
XIII. 

The  American  force,  consisting  of  480  militia  and  150  sailors  and 
marines,  came  out  imscathed.  According  to  Thompson  (p.  213)  no 
less  than  10,000  militia  hastened  to  the  assistance  of  Norfolk. 

78.  Upton,  pp.   116-117;   Lossing,  pp.  667-683. 

79.  Upton,  p.   118. 

80.  Parton,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  I,  pp.  459-462;  Lossing,  pp. 
767,   768  and  773;   Upton,   pp.    118-119. 

81.  No  accurate  data  concerning  the  number  of  these  troops  is 
obtainable. 

82.  Records  of  the  Adjutant-General's  office;   Upton,  p.  120. 

83.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.   120. 

84.  Page  62. 

85.  The  pay  of  a  private  for  three  months  was  only  $24. 

86.  Under  this  Act  of  January  27,  1814,  $2,012,439.33  was  paid  out 
in  bounties  between  January  27th  and  October  26,  1814.  The  num- 
ber of  recruits  available  on  April  1st  was  only  3,337 ;  the  number 
obtained  between  February  1st  and  October  1st  being  13,898. —  Amer- 
ican State  Papers,   I,  p.   519. 

87.  On  October  26th,  the  Secretary  of  War  reported  to  the  Senate 
Military  Committee  that  ''  many  of  the  militia  detached  for  six  months 
have  given  a  greater  sum  for  substitutes  than  the  bounty  allowed  by 
the  United  States  for  a  recruit  to  serve  for  the  war.'" — American  State 
Papers,  I,  p.   519. 

88.  Callan.    pp.    251-255. 

89.  "  The  failure  of  this  scheme  of  recruitment  was  more  especially 
due  to  that  feature  of  our  system  which,  by  tolerating  two  kinds  of 
troops,  encourages  citizens  and  townships  to  offer  greater  bounties 
to  the  militia  than  the  Government  is  willing  or  able  to  pay  to  recruits 
for  the  Regular  Army." —  Upton,  p.  122. 

90.  According  to  Heitman,  II.  pp.  576-577,  the  authorized  strength 
of  the  Army  under  the  Act  of  March  30,   1814,  was  62,674. 

91.  Upton,  p.  123. 

92.  The  American  casualties  were  335,  the  British  604. —  Lossing,  p. 
810. 

93.  Out  of  about  3,000  men,  the  Americans  lost  748  in  killed  and 
wounded;  the  British,  who  had  3,300  regulars,  1,200  militia  and  500 
Indians,  lost  878. 


588      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

94.  Upton,   p.    124;    Lossing,   pp.   804-840. 

95.  Wilkinson's   Memoirs,   III,   Appendix  XI. 

96.  About  4  miles  below  Rouse's  Point,  N.  Y. 

97.  Upton,   p.    124;    Lossing,   pp.   790-791. 

98.  General  Macomb's  Official  Report,  quoted  by  Fay,  p.  241. 

99.  In  which  he  lost  242  men  and  800  captured. —  Prevosfs  Official 
Report,  quoted  by  James,  II,  p.  446. 

100.  James,  II,  pp.  206,  223  and  463;  Upton,  pp.  124-125. 

101.  Ingersoll,  II,  p.   133. 

102.  It  was  not  until  1827  that  the  question  as  to  the  control  of 
militia  in  the  event  of  a  Presidential  call  was  finally  adjudicated  in 
the  case  of  Martin  vs.  Mott,  when  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  decided  tnat  it  was  reserved  to  the  President  alone  to  determine 
when  the  exigency  arises  in  w^hich  he  has  the  constitutional  right  to 
call  out  the  militia,  and  that  his  decision  is  binding.  See  Kent's 
Commentaries,   I,   p.   279. 

103.  July  2nd,  4th,  9th,  12th,  and  17th.  The  details  are  given  by 
Upton,   pp.    126-127. 

104.  Xumbering  5,401,  including  400  regulars,  600  marines,  and  20 
sailors,  the  rest  being  militia  or  volunteers. —  Records  of  the  Adjutant- 
GeneraVs  Office,   and  AmeHcan  State  Papers,  I,  p.   526. 

105.  Armstrong,   II,   p.    152. 

106.  Admiral  Cockburn's  report,  quoted  by  James,  II,  p.  493.  The 
total  of  General  Ross'  force  was  3,500,  but  only  the  above  number  was 
engaged. 

107.  Records    of   the   Adjutant-General's   Office. 

108.  Lossing,  pp.  926-927;  Upton,  pp.  127-128.  On  August  29th  a 
detachment  of  seven  British  ships  captured  Alexandria,  Virginia. 

109.  E.g.,  Jefferson  to  J.  W.  Eppes,  September  9,  1814.  The  Works 
of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI,  p.  275. 

Upton,  pp.  129-133,  comments  very  adversely  upon  his  exercise  of 
conmiand  as  Secretary  of  War  throughout  1813  and  1814,  which  proved 
distinctly  detrimental  to  the  welfare  of  the  service,  but,  as  he  explains, 
"  the  failure  to  create  the  grade  of  General  in  Chief,  tempted,  if  it 
did  not  compel,  the  Secretary  to  assume,  in  the  Cabinet  and  in  the 
field,  the  position  of  generalissimo  of  our  forces." 

110.  September  27th.     See  Ingersoll,  II,  p.   113. 

111.  Lossing,  pp.  949-959;  Upton,  p.  129.  The  British  lost  319  killed 
and  wounded,   among  the  former  being  General  Ross. 

112.  Upton,   p.    123. 

113.  Continued  from  pages  60  and  61. 

114.  Lossing,    pp.    776-781;    Upton,   pp.    119-120. 

115.  Records  of  the  Adjutant-General's  Office. 

116.  Upton,   p.    133. 

117.  Had  it  not  been  for  our  naval  successes,  peace  upon  such  favor- 
able terms   could  never  have  been   obtained. 

118.  See  page  35. 

119.  Pages  51,  and  580-581,  footnotes  62-67. 

120.  Letter  to  James  Monroe,  dated  Monticello,  June  19,  1813.  The 
above  was  copied  from  the  original  in  the  Library  of  Congress.  It  is 
also  quoted  in  The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson  (Washington  edition), 
VI,  p.   131,  but  not  in  the  Ford  edition. 


Notes  589 

On  September  9,  1814,  he  wrote  in  a  similar  tenor  to  John  Wayles 
Eppes,  and  on  the  following  day  he  explained  to  John  Cooper  that 

**  In  the  beginning  of  our  government  we  were  willing  to  introduce 
the  least  coercion  possible  on  the  will  of  the  citizen.  Hence  a  system 
of  military  duty  was  established  too  indulgent  to  his  indolence.  This 
is  the  first  opportunity  we  have  had  of  trying  it,  and  it  has  completely 
failed." 

On  January  1,  1815,  he  wrote  to  Monroe:  "  But  you  have  two  more 
causes  of  uneasiness;  the  want  of  men  and  money.  For  the  former, 
nothing  more  wise  or  efficient  could  have  been  imagined  than  what 
you  proposed.  It  would  have  filled  our  ranks  with  regulars,  and  .  .  . 
it  would  have  rendered  our  militia,  like  those  of  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,   a  nation   of   warriors." 

Similarly  his  letter,  to  William  H.  Cranford,  Minister  to  France, 
dated   February   11,    1815. 

The  letters  to  Eppes,  Monroe,  and  Cranford  (1815)  will  be  found 
in  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI,  pp.  426,  443,  and  451-452.  The 
letter  of  September  10,  1814,  to  Cooper,  was  not  included  in  the  Ford 
edition  but  is  given  in  the  Washington  edition,  VI,  p.  379. 

121.  See  his  letters  from  January  2nd  to  May  31,  1781. —  The  Works 
of   Thomas  Jefferson,   III,   pp.    111-290. 

122.  Ibid,  III,  p.   192. 

123.  See  above,  pp.  50-51. 

124.  Lossing,   p.    936. 

125.  3,000  who  had  participated  in  the  operations  in  the  Chesapeake 
and  4,000  under  the  command  of  General  Keane  who  had  sailed  from 
Plymouth    in    September. 

126.  From  Negril  Bay  on  November  26,   1814. 

127.  This  squadron  had  made  three  desperate  attacks  upon  the 
American  privateer,  General  Armstrong,  under  the  command  of  Cap- 
tain Reid,  in  the  harbor  of  Fayal,  on  the  night  of  September  26-27, 
but  had  been  repulsed  and  so  crippled  that  it  did  not  reach  Jamaica 
until  ten  days  after  the  appointed  rendezvous.  This  delay  is  con- 
sidered to  have  saved  New  Orleans.  See  American  State  Papers,  XIV, 
p.  493,  and  Coggeshall,  History  of  American  Privateers,  p.  370. 

128.  Jackson    had   reached   New   Orleans    on    December    2nd,    1814. 

129.  December    14th,    23rd,   27th,    28th,    and    31st,   and   January    1st. 

130.  The  hero  of  Salamanca,  who  had  arrived  on  December  23rd  and 
superseded  General  Keane.  » 

131.  According  to  Captain  Gleig's  BHtish  Campaigns,  p.  419,  the 
British  forces  which  landed  below  New  Orleans  in  December,  1814,  and 
January,  1815,  numbered  14,250,  including  2,000  sailors  and  1,500 
marines. 

132.  "  The  main  body  was  posted  on  the  east  bank  behind  a  line  of 
intrenchments  from  5  to  8  feet  high,  and  extending  from  the  river 
on  the  right  to  an  impenetrable  cypress  swamp  on  the  left.  Those 
works  were  little  more  than  1,000  yards  long,  and  were  throAvn  up  on 
the  edge  of  a  canal,  which  served  as  a  wet  ditch,  the  water  of  which 
varied  in  depth  from  1  to  5  feet.  Along  the  front  of  this  short  line 
fifteen  guns  were  posted  in  nine  different  batteries  containing  from 
one  to  three  guns  each.  Of  these  batteries  four  were  served  by  the 
regular  artillery  and  infantry,  two  by  the  former  marines  and  sailors 


590      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

of  the  U.  S.  S.  Carolina,  and  one  by  trained  privateersmen.  In  sup- 
port of  these  batteries  there  were  two  regiments  of  regular  infantry 
and   detachment  of   marines." —  Upton,   p.    134. 

133.  884,  including  66  marines.  Moreover,  most  of  the  regulars 
were  new  recruits  commanded  by  young  officers.  The  militia  were 
distinctly  indifferent.  Of  the  Kentucky  brigade,  2,250  men,  who 
arrived  shortly  before  the  battle,  "  not  one  man  in  ten  was  well  armed, 
and  only  one  man  in  three  had  any  arms  at  all." —  Parton,  Life  of 
Andrew  Jackson,  II,  p.  168. 

134.  Lossing,  p.    1043. 

135.  700  were  killed,  1,400  wounded,  and  500  made  prisoners.  Among 
the  killed  was  General  Gibbs;  Generals  Pakenham  and  Keane  were 
wounded,  the  former  mortally.  The  regimental  casualties  were  tre- 
mendous, the  93d  Highlanders  losing  786  out  of  1,100  officers  and  men. 

The  Americans,  on  the  other  hand,  came  out  almost  unscathed,  their 
losses  being  confined  to  8  killed  and  13  wounded. —  Lossing,  pp.  1046 
and   1049;    Upton,  p.   135. 

136.  About  4,900  men. 

137.  Some  time  after  the  fighting  had  begun  on  the  plain  of  Chal- 
mette  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river. 

138.  Parton,  II,  p.  213.  Jackson  subsequently  told  the  fugitives  that 
"  the  want  of  discipline,  the  want  of  order,  the  total  disregard  to 
obedience,  and  a  spirit  of  insubordination,  not  less  destructive  than 
cowardice  itself,  are  the  causes  which  led  to  the  disaster,  and  they 
must  be  eradicated,  or  I  must  cease  to  command." —  Goodwin,  Life  of 
Andrew  Jackson,  p.   153. 

139.  Lossing,  pp.    1042,   1043,   1045  and  1049. 

140.  Ihid.,  pp.   1051  and   1053. 

141.  Upton,  pp.  135-136. 

142.  Records  of  the  Adjutant-General's  Office;    Upton,  p.   137. 
The  terms  of  enlistment  were  as  follows: 

One  year   or   more,   including  sailors   and   marines. 63,179 

Six    months    or    more 66,325 

Three  months  or  more 125,643 

One  month  or  more 125,307 

Less  than  one  month 147,200 


Total 527,654 

143.  About  55,000  British  regulars,  1,810  militia,  and  9,825  Indians, 
a  total  of  66,635. —  Brannan's  Letters  and  Gleig's  British  Campaigns, 
quoted  by  Upton,  p.   138. 

Our  largest  force  was  235,839  in  1814  (see  page  65),  whereas  the 
British  maximum,  attained  in  the  same  year,  was  only  16,500. —  Arm- 
strong, I,  p.  220. 

144.  Annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  June  30,  1914, 
p.  236. 

145.  The  annual  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30, 
1913,  p.  9,  shows  that  $45,923,014.46  had  been  paid  out  in  pensions  for 
the  War  of  1812;  his  report  for  1914,  p.  33,  adds  $27,532.40,  making  a 
total    of   $45,950,546.86. 


Notes  591 

146.  Regulars.  Militia  and  Volunteers. 
Revolution 231,771  104,087 

War  of  1812 56,032  471,622 

(See  page  40.) 

147.  See  pages  20  and  38. 

148.  Page  57  and  page  585,  footnotes  48  and  49. 

149.  Upton,  p.  139. 

CHAPTER  VI 

1.  By  the  Act  of  March  3,   1815.— Callan,  pp.  266-267. 

2.  The  Topographical  department  and  those  of  the  Adjutant-General, 
Inspector-General  and  Quartermaster-General  were  abolished,  some  very 
inefficient   substitutes  replacing  them. 

3.  Such  as  failure  to  recognize  the  value  of  special  training  in  the- 
staff  departments  and  prescribing  that  the  staff'  could  be  filled  up  by 
men  from  private  life. 

4.  Washington  had  recomimended  this   thirty  years  earlier. 

5.  The  correspondence,  which  need  not  be  quoted  here,  is  given  by 
Parton,  II,  pp.  373-374,  and  Upton,  pp.   146-147. 

6.  Forty  officers  and  men  of  the  4th  and  7th  U.  S.  Infantry,  under 
Lieut.   Scott,   and  seven  women. 

7.  Report  of  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee. —  American  State 
Pavers,  II,  pp.  739-741.  Additional  information  respecting  the  organi- 
zation of  troops  without  the  sanction  of  Congress  will  be  found  in  the 
Report  of  the  House  Committee,  Artierican  State  Papers,  II,  p.  99. 

8.  The  regulars  —  4th  and  7th  Infantry,  and  the  4th  battalion  of 
artillery  —  numbered  about  1,000 ;  the  volunteers,  militia  and  Indians 
amounted  to  5,911,  making  a  total  of  6,911. —  Letter  of  the  Adjutant- 
General  to  the  author,  dated  April  22,  1915,  and  American  State 
Papers,  Military  Affairs,  II,  p.   104. 

The  figures  given  by  Upton,  p.   149,  are  incorrect. 

9.  Page   149. 

10.  The  mobilization  of  modern  armies  conforms  strictly  to  this 
principle. 

11.  American   State   Papers,   II,   p.    189. 

12.  (1)  Neglect  to  furnish  sufficient  officers  in  the  grades  of  colonel, 
lieutenant-colonel  and  major  to  insure  uniform  operation  in  each  depart- 
ment; (2)  failure  to  replace  by  supernumeraries  the  captains  and  lieu- 
tenants detailed  from  the  line;  and  (3)  no  requirement  in  peace  time 
that  line  officers  detailed  to  the  staff  should  return  to  their  com- 
mands periodically. 

13.  Among  other  things,  it  provided  for  permanent  chiefs  for  the 
departments  of  the  Adjutant-General,  Quartermaster-General,  and  Com- 
missary-General, the  minor  grades  being  filled  from  the  line. 

The  essence  of  Calhoun's  scheme  was  that  the  Army  could  be  increased 
to  11,558  "  without  adding  an  additional  officer  or  a  single  company," 
or  to  19,035  by  adding  only  288  officers. —  American  State  Papers,  II, 
pp.  190-193. 

14.  Ihid,  II,  pp.   194  and  452;    Callan,  306-309. 

15.  "  Had  Congress  given  him  the  authority  to  increase  each  com- 
pany of  artillery  and  infantry  to   100  enlisted  men,  the  reduction  of 


592      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

the  Army  by  one-half  would  still  have  enabled  him  in  time  of  war  to 
augment    it   to   more   than    11,000   men." — Upton,   p.    152, 

16.  Created  by  the  Act  of  May  14,   1812.— Callan,  pp.  226-227. 

17.  By  the  Act  of  April  5,   1832.— Ibid.,  pp.  322-323. 

18.  American  State  Papers,  III,  pp.  820-822,  and  IV,  p.  91. 

19.  Until  the  organization  of  the  General  Staff  on  February  14,  1903 
(see  page  292),  the  chiefs  of  bureau  grew  more  and  more  to  regard  the 
Secretary  of  War  rather  than  the  commanding  general  as  their  sole 
and  legitimate  military  superior.  There  thus  arose  a  system  peculiarly 
American  which  more  than  once  worked  to  the  detriment  of  the  military 
service.     Compare   Upton,   pp.    158-159. 

20.  The  Indians  lost  68  killed  and  wounded;  the  volunteers  1  killed 
and  8  wounded. 

21.  Heitman,  II,  p.   394. 

22.  The  Indians  lost  loiO;  the  casualties  of  the  American  force  — 
which  consisted  of  400  regulars  and  900  Illinois  volunteers  under  Gen- 
eral Atkinson  —  were  only  24. —  Report  of  Major  General  Macomb, 
commanding   the   armrv.     American   State   Papers,    V,    pp.    29-30. 

23.  On  June  16tli  the  Government,  in  order  to  avoid  calling  out  unne- 
cessary volunteers  and  militia,  ordered  all  the  regulars  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Mississippi  to  concentrate  at  the  scene 
of  action  under  General  Scott.  Five  of  the  six  companies  of  artillery 
from  Fort  Monroe  reached  Chicago,  "  a  distance  of  1,800  miles,  in  the 
short  space  of  eighteen  days,  a  rapidity  which  is  believed  to  be  unprece- 
dented in  military  movements.  The  loss  by  cholera  in  that  detachment 
alone  was  equal  to  one  out  of  every  three  men." —  A7nerican  State  Papers, 
V,  p.  18. 

The  ravages  of  this  disease  precluded  General  Scott  and  the  troops 
from  the  east  from  participating  in  the  campaign. 

24.  Regulars,  1,341;  volunteers,  4,638,  a  total  of  5,979. —  Records  of 
The  Adjutant-General's  Office. 

25.  General  Macomb's  report. 

26.  By  the  Act  of  June   15,    1832. —  Callan,   pp.   325-326. 

27.  Again  Congress  reverted  to  the  principle  of  militia,  a  mistaken 
policy    which    has    already   been    discussed. 

28.  Act  of  March  2,  1833,  which  fixed  the  authorized  strength  of 
the  Army  at  7,194  officers  and  men. —  Heitman,  II,  pp.  584-585. 

29.  On  November  30,  1835,  the  Army  numbered  7,198  officers  and  men, 
but  only  3,888  men  were  present  for  duty.  In  the  Eastern  Department, 
comprising  the  Atlantic  coast  and  almost  all  the  territory  east  of  the 
Mississippi,   were  only  1,534  under  General  Scott. 

Notwithstanding  our  population  was  in  excess  of  15,000,000,  the 
entire  seacoast,  the  Canadian  frontier  and  all  the  outlying  settlements 
were  protected  by  less  than  4,000  troops.  The  52,000  square  miles  of 
Florida  were  guarded  by  536  regulars. —  American  State  Papers,  V,  p. 
633-639,  and  VI,  p.  57."^ 

30.  Letter  of  Governor  Eaton  of  Florida  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
March   8,    1835. —  American  State  Papers,  VI,   p.   493. 

31.  Governor  Call  to  the  President,  December  22,  1835. —  Ibid.,  VI, 
p.  1026. 

32.  Of  the  110  officers  and  men  from  the  2nd  and  3rd  Artillery  and 
the  4th  Infantry,  only  three  escaped  alive. 


Notes  593 

33.  Official  Report  of  Major  General  Macomb,  commanding  the  Army, 
and  Governor  Call's  Report,  January  9,  1836, —  American  State  Papers, 
VI,  p.  817,  and  VII,  p.  218. 

34.  On  January  21,  1836.  His  instructions  are  given  in  the  Amer- 
ican State  Papers,  VII,   p.   216. 

35.  This  officer,  who  commanded  the  Western  Department,  had  not 
waited  for  orders  from  Washington,  but  called  on  the  governor  of 
Louisiana  for  militia,  sailed  for  Tampa  on  February  3rd  with  1,140 
regulars  and  volunteers,  pushed  on  to  Fort  King  unknown  to  General 
Scott  and  thence  to  the  Withlacoochee  where  he  was  besieged  from  the 
27th  until  March  6th. —  American  State  Papers,  VI,  p.  244. 

36.  Ibid.,  VII,  p.  225. 

37.  They  were  estimated  to  number  "  from  1,200  to  2,000  warriors." 
—  Ibid.,  VII,  pp.  218  and  278. 

38.  To  the  Adjutant-General,  April  30,  1836. —  Ibid.,  VII,  pp.  278-279. 

39.  See  Upton,  p.  168. 

40.  Callan,   pp.  336-337. 

41.  See  page  48. 

42.  The  6th  section  of  this  act  also  provided  a  regiment  of  regular 
dragoons  to  be  disbanded  whenever  the  public  service  permitted.  The 
Act  of  July  4,  1836,  increased  the  Medical  and  Pay  departments.  As 
a  result  of  these  acts,  the  authorized  strength  of  the  Army  became 
7,957.  Its  actual  strength  in  Xovember,  1836,  was  only  6,283. —  Upton, 
p.  168;   Heitman,  II,  pp.  586,  587  and  626. 

43.  Scott  to  the  Ad  jut  ant- General,  June  12th,  14th  and  21st. —  Ameri- 
can State  Papers,  326,  328  and  333. 

44.  Estimated  by  Scott  to  number  from  3,000  to  5,000.— Ibid.,  VII, 
p.  951. 

45.  Ibid.,  VII,  p.  337. 

46.  Regulars,  1,757;  militia  and  volunteers,  23,541;  Creek  Indians, 
organized  and  mustered  as  volunteers  during  the  summer,  2,544,  a 
total  of  27, M2.— Ibid.,  VI,  pp.  1053,  1060  and  1061;  Upton,  pp.  171-172. 

47.  Upton,  p.   173. 

48.  General  Taylor's  Official  Report,  January  4,  1838. —  American 
State  Papei-s,  VII,  pp.  987-988. 

The  Missouri  legislature  appointed  a  committee  to  investigate  Tay- 
lor's charges  and,  upon  receiving  its  report,  passed  a  series  of  joint 
resolutions  taking  direct  issue  with  Taylor. —  Barnes,  Commonwealth  of 
Missouri,  p.  237. 

49.  In  his  annual  report  for  1837,  in  which  he  pointed  out  that  15,000 
were  scarcely  sufficient  to  guard  a  frontier  of  8,500  miles  and  to  afford 
adequate  protection  against  45,000  Indian  warriors,  emphasizing  the 
fact  that  if  danger  were  apprehended  from  such  a  regular  force  "  it  is 
effectually  to  be  guarded  against  by  a  proper  organization  of  the 
militia." 

His  argument  in  favour  of  an  increase  in  the  staff  was  due  to  the 
evils  of  detached  service  inaugurated  by  the  law  of  1821.  See  page 
72  and  footnote  12,  page  591. 

50.  By  one  regiment  of  infantry,  a  company  to  each  artillery  regi- 
ment and  by  raising  the  enlisted  strength  of  the  companies  in  both 
these  arms. —  Callan,  pp.  341-351. 

51.  Act  of  July  7,  1838.— Callan,  pp.  351-352. 


594     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

An  anal^'sis  of  these  two  acts  is  given  by  Upton,  pp.  181-182. 

52.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  588-589. 

53.  Upton,  p.  184. 

54.  Nine  regiments  and  the  entire  artillery  of  the  army  was  stationed 
in  Florida;  the  other  four  were  distributed  along  the  western  frontier. 

55.  Act  of  March  3,  1839.—  Callan,  pp.  353-354. 

56.  Autobiography  of  General  Wmfield  Scott,  II,  p.  333. 

57.  Upton,  p.  185. 

58.  This  treaty  was  promulgated  in  his  General  Order  of  May  18, 
1839. 

59.  On  the  Caloosahatchee  RiVer  on  July  23rd,  the  victims  being  18 
of  the  40  men  under  Colonel  Harney,  who  sought  to  establish  a  trading 
post. 

60.  For  a  graphic  description  of  them,  see  Sprague,  History  of  the 
Florida  War,  p.  283. 

61.  For  example,  by  Governor  McDonald  of  Georgia. 

62.  ■     Officers.  Men.  Total. 

Florida  War,  1835  to  1842 1,504  26,803  28,307 

Creek  War,  1836  to  1838 734  9,617  10,351 

Cherokee  War,  1836  to  1838 542  8,952  9,494 

Total    2,780        '45,372         48,152 

Note. —  There  were  no   active  hostilities   in   the   Cherokee  War,   but 

troops  had  to  be  called  out  to  enforce  the  emigration  of  this  tribe  west 

of  the  Mississippi. 

63.  The  maximum  force  of  the  Regular  Army  at  any  time  during  the 
war. 

64.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  1914,  p.  237. 

65.  Upton,  p.    192. 

66.  By  the  Act  of  August  23,  1842. 

67.  This  was  accomplished  in  the  line  by  converting  one  regiment  of 
dragoons  into  riflemen  and  by  reducing  the  number  of  privates  in  each 
company.  The  Commissary-General  of  purchases  was  abolished  and 
his  functions  merged  with  those  of  the  Quartermaster-General.  The 
inspectors-general,  surgeons  and  assistant  surgeons  were  also  reduced. 

CHAPTER  VII 

1.  Upton,  p.  195. 

2.  On  March  2,   1836. 

3.  As  a  result  of  the  victory  won  by  General  Sam  Houston  with  800 
Texans  over  General  Santa  Anna  with  5,000  Mexicans  at  the  battle  of 
San  Jacinto  on  April  21,  1836. 

The  independence  of  Texas  was  recognized  in  1837  by  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Belgium. 

4.  By  Texas. 

5.  McMaster,  A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  VI,  pp. 
256-257,  VII,  pp.  325,  356-369,  391-396  and  406;  Ladd,  The  War  with 
Mexico,  pp.  22,  26-35. 

6.  This  was  in  accordance  with  the  treaty  between  Mexico  and  Texas 
in  1836. 

7.  This  officer,  who  commanded  the  First  Military  Division  at  New 


Notes  '  595 

Orleans,  had  been  ordered  on  June  15th  to  proceed  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Sabine  River  or  some  other  place  suitable  for  an  advance  to  the  Rio 
Grande.  During  July  he  sailed  with  1,500  troops,  arriving  early  in 
August  and  establishing  his  headquarters  near  Corpus  Cristi. 

8.  Orders  dated  August  6th,  23rd,  and  30th,  1845. —  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, Executive  Document,  ^'o.  60,  30th  Congress,  first  session,  pp. 
83-85,  88-89. 

In  the  last  order  the  Secretary  of  ^Yar  said: 

"  You  have  been  ad%'ised  that  the  assembling  of  a  large  Mexican  army 
on  the  borders  of  Texas,  and  crossing  the  Rio  Grande  with  a  consider- 
able force,  will  be  regarded  by  the  Executive  here  as  an  invasion  of  the 
United  States  and  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  .  .  . 

"  In  case  of  war,  either  declared  or  made  manifest  by  hostile  acts, 
your  main  object  will  be  the  protection  of  Texas;  but  the  pursuit  of 
this  object  will  not  necessarily  confine  your  action  within  the  territory 
of  Texas.  Mexico  having  thus  commenced  hostilities  you  may,  in  your 
discretion,  should  you  have  suflBcient  forces  and  be  in  a  condition  to  do 
so,  cross  the  Rio  Grande,  disperse  or  capture  the  forces  assembling  to 
invade  Texas,  defeat  the  junction  of  troops  uniting  for  that  purpose, 
drive  them  from  their  positions  on  either  side  of  the  river,  and,  if 
deemed  practicable  and  expedient,  take  and  hold  possession  of  Mata- 
moras  and  other  places  in  the  country." 

9.  On  August  26th,  1845. 

10.  On  August  28th. 

11.  "To  execute  the  laws  of  the  union,  suppress  insurrections,  and 
repel  invasions." — Article  I,  Section  8,  paragraph  I4. 

12.  Pages   59-60,    63-64. 

13.  House  Executive  Document,  Yo.  60,  pp.  91-92. 

14.  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc,  No.  2Jf,  31st  Congress,  1st  session,  p.  8-a,  table. 

15.  On  March  29tli,   1846. 

16.  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc.,  No.  60,  pp.  132-133. 

17.  General  Scott  in  his  annual  report  in  November,  1845,  recom- 
mended the  expansion  of  the  companies  to  100  privates.  Had  this  been 
adopted,  Taylor's  73  companies  could  have  been  raised  to  7,300  men 
or  8,000  with  the  full  quota  of  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  etc., 
thus  giving  it  an  effective  strength  of  about  6,000. 

The  Secretary  of  War's  report  urged  "  that  authority  to  increase  the 
number  of  privates  in  a  company,  to  any  number  not  exceeding  eighty 
should  be  vested  in  the  President,  to  be  exercised  at  his  discretion,  with 
special  reference  to  what  the  public  interest  might  suddenly  require. 

"  This  mode  of  exlarging  the  army,  by  adding  to  the  rank  and 
FILE  OF  the  present  COMPANIES,  WILL  NOT,  it  is  believed,  IMPAIR,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  greatly  improve  their  comparative  efficiency,  and 
on  that  account  as  well  as  on  the  score  of  economy,  is  deemed  prefer- 
able TO  THAT  OF  EFFECTING  THE  SAME  OBJECT  BY  RAISING  NEW  REGI- 
MENTS at  this  time. 

"  It  is  only  in  view  of  a  probability  that  a  force  considerably  larger 
than  a  permanent  peace  establishment  might  soon  be  required  that  I 
should  prefer  the  mode  of  increasing  the  Army  by  raising  new  regi- 
ments, organized  on  our  present  reduced  scale.  This  scale  is  undoubt- 
edly too  low  for  actual  service  and  has  nothing  to  recommend  it  to  a 
preference  imder   any  circumstances  but  the  facility  it  affords  of 


596     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

EXPANDING  AN  ARMY  SO  ORGANIZED  BY  INCREASING  THE  RANK  AND  FILE, 
AND  OF  RENDERING  IT  EFFECTIVE  FOR  SERVICE  IN  A  SHORTER  PERIOD  THAN 
NEW  REGIMENTS  COULD  BE  RAISED,   ORGANIZED  AND  DISCIPLINED." Senate 

Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  Twenty-ninth  Congress,  first  session,  pp.  195-196. 

18.  Four  regiments  from  each  State. —  McMaster,  VII,  pp.  441-442. 
On  the  same  day,  in  reporting  Thornton's  skirmish.  General  Taylor 

declared  that 

"  If  a  law  could  be  passed  authorizing  the  President  to  raise  volun- 
teers for  twelve  months,  it  would  be  of  the  greatest  importance  for  a 
service  so  remote  from  support  as  this." — H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc.,  No.  60,  p.  141. 

19.  Where  he  had  established  a  base  of  supplies. 

20.  6,000  strong. 

21.  At  this  battle  Taylor's  forces  numbered  2,222  officers  and  men, 
but  only  1,700  were  engaged.  His  losses  in  the  two  actions  were  only 
170  killed  and  wounded,  whereas  the  Mexican  casualties  were  1,000. — 
General  Taylor's  Official  Report;  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc,  No.  2^,  table  B. 

Taylor  concluded  his  report  by  stating  that  "  The  causes  of  victory 
are  doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  superior  quality  of  our  officers  and 
men." —  Montgomery,  Life  of  General  Taylor,  p.  162. 

22.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  200. 

23.  Napier,  Peninsular  War,  II,  p.  113. 

The  maxim  as  given  by  Napoleon  is:  "In  war  three-fourths  are 
moral  affairs;  the  balance  of  the  actual  forces  is  only  the  other  fourth." 
—  Observations  on  Spanish  Affairs,  August  27,  1808.  Corresp.,  No. 
14,276. 

24.  Upton,  p.  201. 

The  troops  who  responded  to  the  call  of  Generals  Taylor  and  Gaines 
numbered  12,601,  vim:  men  enlisted  for  three  months,  1,390;  men  ille- 
gally enlisted  for  six  months  and  held  for  three,    11,211. 

25.  On  May  11,  1846. 

26.  He  evidently  took  his  cue  from  Taylor's  own  suggestion.  See 
page  80. 

27.  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc,  No.  196,  Tiventy-ninth  Congress,  first  session,  p.  6. 

28.  Act  of  May  13,  1846.— Callan,  pp.  367-368. 

29.  "  Unless  sooner  discharged,  according  to  the  time  for  which  they 
shall  have  been  mustered  into  service." 

Section  2  prolonged  to  6  months  the  term  of  militia  mustered  into 
United  States  service;  Section  3  required  the  volunteers  to  furnish 
their  ovra  clothing,  horses  and  equipment,  the  Government  supplying 
the  arms:  Section  4  gave  $42  in  lieu  of  clothing  allowed  to  regular 
troops;  Section  5  authorized  the  appointment  of  officers  in  conformity 
with  the  laws  of  their  respective  States,  Congress  evidently  forgetting 
that  these  troops  were  not  militia  but  a  Government  force;  and  Sec- 
tion 9  granted  the  same  allowances  as  to  regulars,  the  volunteer  caval- 
rymen receiving  40  cents  per  diem  as  a  compensation  for  their  horses. 

30.  On  the  governors  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Missouri,  Kentucky, 
Tennessee,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Arkansas  for  26  regi- 
ments. 

31.  Nine  regiments  and  one  battalion  of  volunteers  had  already  been 
called  for  "  to  serve  to  the  end  of  the  war,"  thus  demonstrating  that 
the  longer  enlistment  would  in  nowise  have  discouraged  those  who 
offered  themselves  for  service. 


Notes  597 

32.  Act  of  May  13,  1846.—  Callan,  p.  369. 

33.  See  above,  p.  78. 

34.  The  12,601  volunteers  who  responded  to  the  calls  of  Taylor  and 
Gaines  (footnote  24)  had  neither  equipment  nor  means  of  transport. 
They  were  therefore  obliged  to  remain  idly  near  their  supply  depots 
for  three  months,  never  fired  a  shot  and  lost  145  by  death,  only  25  less 
than  the  casualties  at  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

35.  Upton,  pp.  204-205. 

36.  Acts  of  May  15  and  19,  and  June  18  and  26,  1846. —  Callan,  pp. 
369-375. 

37.  The  authorized  strength  of  the  Army  under  the  five  acts  of  1846 
was  fixed  at  17,812. —  Heitman,  II,  pp.  590-591. 

Section  2  of  the  law  increasing  the  staff  departments  empowered  the 
President  "  to  call  into  service,  under  the  act  approved  May  13,  1846, 
each  of  the  general  officers  of  the  militia  as  the  service,  in  his  opinion, 
may  require,  and  to  organize  into  brigades  and  divisions  the  forces 
authorized  by  said  act,  according  to  his  direction." —  Callan,  p.  373. 

"  This  section  would  apparently  denote  that  Congress  regarded  the 
volunteers  under  the  Constitution  as  substantially  the  same  as  the 
militia,  and  that  conformably  with  the  law  of  1792  the  Governors  of 
States  had  an  equitable  right  to  the  appointment  of  all  the  officers, 
from  the  highest  to  the  lowest  grades.  This  partial  adhesion  to  the 
State  system  teas  the  means,  in  many  instances,  of  placing  the  fortunes 
of  the  country,  as  icell  as  the  lives  of  our  soldiers,  in  the  hands  of  gen- 
erals utterly  ignorant  of  the  military  art  at  a  time  ichen  the  Govern- 
ment had  at  its  disposal  numbers  of  competent  officers  icho  had  devoted 
their  lives  to  the  theory  and  practice  of  their  profession." — Upton, 
p.  205. 

38.  The  first  arrived  in  June. 

39.  "  Never  was  the  value  of  disciplined  men  more  triumphantly 
demonstrated  than  on  these  glorious  occasions;  and  since  we  have 
learned  that  General  Taylor  compels  the  volunteers  with  him  to  receive 
six  hours'  drilling  per  day  and  relieves  them  from  all  other  duties,  to 
make  soldiers  of  them,  we  venture  to  predict  that  they  too,  when  they 
meet  the  enemy,  will  add  to  the  reputation  of  our  arms.  '  Rough  and 
Ready '  will  first  make  them  soldiers  and  then  win  victories  with 
them."— Quoted  by  Upton,  p.  208. 

40.  "  While  some  20,000  Aolunteers  were  sent  to  the  theater  of  war, 
not  a  Avagon  reached  the  advance  of  General  Taylor  till  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Monterey." —  Stevens,  Campaigns  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  of 
Mexico,  p.  21. 

41.  Order  No.  108,  dated  Camargo,  August  28,  1846. 

42.  With  about  6,000  troops. 

43.  Early  on  the  morning  of  September  22,  1846. 

44.  The  Mexicans  at  this  battle  numbered  7,000  regulars  and  3,000 
militia,  and  their  loss  is  unknown. 

Taylor's  force  was  only  6,645.  The  regulars  lost  205  in  killed  and 
wounded;  the  volunteers,  282,  a  total  of  487. —  Ripley,  War  loith  Mexico, 
1,  pp.  198-199;  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc,  Xo.  24,  Thirty-first  Congress,  first  ses- 
sion, pp.   10  and  28. 

The  training  received  by  the  volunteers  was  evident  from  the  admir- 
able way  they  fought. 


598      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

45.  Except  for  the  major  part  of  the  artillery,  the  Mexicans  were 
permitted  to  retain  their  arms.  Such  favourable  terms  raised  a  storm 
of  indignation  in  the  United  States. 

46.  2,829  troops,  composed  of  volunteers  from  Illinois,  Kentucky, 
Arkansas,  and  Texas,  together  with  a  few  regulars.  Leaving  their 
camp  of  instruction  at  San  Antonio  de  Bexar  on  September  26th,  they 
proceeded  via  Presidio,  the  Rio  Grande,  and  Santa  Rosa  to  Monclova, 
where  Wool  reported  his  arrival  to  Taylor  and  was  ordered  to  advance 
in  Parras. 

47.  $6  to  be  paid  upon  enlistment  and  $6  upon  their  joining  their 
regiment. 

48.  The  authorized  strength  of  the  Army  had  been  fixed  at  17,812 
(see  above,  footnote  37),  but  on  December  5,  1846,  it  actually  numbered 
only  10,690.  The  deficiency  of  6,958  was  thus  explained  in  the  report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"  The  volunteer  service  is  regarded  generally  by  our  citizens  as  pref- 
erable to  that  in  the  Regular  Army,  and  as  long  as  volunteers  are  ex- 
pected to  be  called  for  it  will  be  difficult  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  regular 
regiments." 

49.  One  of  dragoons  and  nine  of  infantry. —  Callan,  p.  379. 

50.  No  law  for  retirement  then  existed  and  many  officers  were  dis- 
qualified by  age,  wounds,  etc.,  from  service  in  the  field. 

51.  160  acres  of  land  or  $100  in  Treasury  scrip  bearing  6  per  cent, 
interest.  To  soldiers  of  less  than  twelve  months'  service  was  granted 
a  bounty  of  40  acres  or  $25  in  scrip. 

52.  A  step  made  necessary  by  the  increase  in  the  line. 

53.  By  the  Act  of  March  3,  1847.  Of  the  staff  corps  the  departments 
of  the  Adjutant-General,  Pay  and  Ordnance  were  alone  augmented. 

54.  Two  to  each  regiment  of  artillery.  Authorization  was  also  given 
to  equip  two  light  batteries  in  each  regiment. 

55.  Section  3  empowered  the  President  to  organize  into  companies, 
battalions  and  regiments  as  many  of  the  volunteers  in  Mexico  as  would 
re-enlist  for  the  war,  and  Section  4  granted  such  men  a  bounty  of  $12. 
Section  5  authorized  him  to  accept  the  services  of  individuals  volun- 
teering in  order  to  fill  up  the  existing  vacancies  in  the  volunteer  regi- 
ments, and  Section  21  empowered  the  President,  in  case  any  regiments, 
regular  or  volunteer,  could  not  be  so  filled  to  war  strength,  to  consoli- 
date them  and  discharge  all  supernumerary  officers. 

These  provisions  made  manifest  the  difficulty  in  obtaining  volun- 
teers —  a  difficulty  which  past "  experience  had  proved  would  increase 
with  the  prolonging  of  the  war. 

56.  Section  3.     This  act  is  given  in  full  by  Callan,  pp.  383-387. 

57.  See  page  84. 

58.  General  Scott  sailed  from  New  York  on  November  30th,  touched 
at  New  Orleans,  from  which  he  sent  Taylor  the  order  alluded  to,  dated 
December   20th,  and  reached  Brazos  San  lago  on  January   12th,   1847. 

59.  1,465  regular  officers  and  men,  and  3,268  volunteers,  a  total  of 
4,733. —  Return  accompanying  General  Taylot-^s  first  report  to  General 
Scott,  January  15,  1847.  H.  R.,  Ex.  Doc,  No.  60,  Thirtieth  Congress, 
first  session,  p.  862,  footnote. 

60.  Taylor's  second  report  of  January  15th. —  IMd.,  p.  863. 

61.  In  conformity  with  Scott's  suggestion. 


Notes  599 

62.  An  intercepted  despatch  from  Scott  to  Taylor  had  apprized  the 
Mexican  commander  of  the  detachment  of  troops  to  Scott. —  McMaster, 
VII,  p.  455. 

63.  Taylor's  reports  of  February  4th,  7th,  and  24th. —  H.  R.,  Ex. 
Doc,  No.  60,  pp.  1109-1111,  and  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  Thirtieth  Con- 
gress, fi/rst  session,  p.   97. 

64.  Numbering  4,759,  of  whom  only  517  were  regulars. —  Taylor's 
Report  of  March  6,  184^-     Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  p.  142. 

The  Mexican  army  amounted  to  20,000. —  Ibid.,  p.  138. 

65.  The  volunteers  had  then  had  a  field  training  of  eight  months,  "  a 
period  twice  as  long  as  the  time  considered  necessary  to  transform  a 
recruit  into  a  regular  soldier." —  Upton,  p.  209. 

66.  500  killed  and  from  1,000  to  1,500  wounded,  in  addition  to  a 
large  number  of  desertions  estimated  at  more  than  3,000. 

The  American  losses  were  267  killed,  456  wounded  and  23  missing,  a 
total  of  only  746. —  Taylor's  Report  of  March  6th.  Senate  Ex.  Doc, 
No.  1,  pp.  138,  142  and  143;  Ripley,  I,  pp.  424  and  427. 

67.  General  Morales,  to  whom  the  idea  of  surrender  was  repugnant, 
had  feigned  illness  and  turned  the  command  of  the  place  over  to 
Landero. 

68.  Which  was  agreed  upon  at  9  p.  m.  on  March  27th.  The  Mexican 
officers  were  permitted  to  retain  their  swords,  horses  and  equipment, 
and  the  entire  army  liberated  on  parole  not  to  "  serve  again  until  duly 
exchanged." 

69.  5,000  strong,  with  400  guns,  small  arms,  stores,  etc. —  General 
Orders,  No.  80,  dated  March  30,  1847 ;  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  pp. 
239-240. 

70.  13,000  and  42   guns. —  Ladd,   p.   219. 

71.  Numbering  about  12,000. —  General  Scott's  Autobiography,  II, 
p.  240;  Ripley,  II,  pp.  17-18;  Mansfield,  Life  of  General  Winfield  Scott, 
p.  367. 

72.  60  miles  from  Vera  Cruz. 

73.  According  to  General  Scott's  report  of  April  23,  1847,  the  Mexi- 
cans numbered  "  12,000  or  more,"  and  lost  3,000  prisoners,  4  or  5,000 
stands  of  arms  and  43  pieces  of  artillery,  in  addition  to  "  1,000  to 
1,200"  casualties.  The  American  "force  present,  in  action  and  in  re- 
serve, was  8,500,"  the  losses  being  63  killed  and  367  wounded. —  Senate 
Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  pp.  264-274. 

74.  Scott  to  General  Taylor,  Jalapa,  April  24,  1847.  E.  R.,  Ex.  Doc, 
No.  60,  p.  948. 

75.  "  Fifty-four  guns  and  mortars,  iron  and  bronze,  of  various  cali- 
bres in  good  service  condition,  eleven  thousand  and  sixty-five  cannon 
balls,  fourteen  thousand  three  hundred  bombs  and  hand  grenades,  and 
five  hundred  muskets." —  General  Scott's  Report  of  April  22,  1847. 
Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  p.  300. 

76.  See  page  82. 

77.  "  The  general-in-chief  regrets  to  learn,  through  a  great  number 
of  undoubted  channels,  that,  in  all  probability,  not  one  man  in  ten  of 
those  regiments  will  be  inclined  to  volunteer  for  the  war." —  General 
Orders,  No.  135,  dated  Jalapa,  May  4,   1847. 

78.  General  Scott's  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  April  28th, 
May  6th,  and  June  4th. 


600      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

79.  "  There  must  be  only  one  army,  for  unity  of  command  is  the  first 
necessity  in  icar." —  Napoleon,  Notes  sur  VArt  de  la  Guerre,  Corresp., 
XXXI,  p.  418. 

80.  Upton,  pp.  211-212. 

81.  Six  companies  of  infantry  and  3  of  dragoons  —  nearly  all  re- 
cruits —  left  Vera  Cruz  on  June  4th  under  Colonel  Mcintosh,  but  were 
attacked  and  had  to  await  General  Cadwalader  and  500  men  who  joined 
them  two  days  later,  and  rallied  to  the  garrison  at  Jalapa.  Reaching 
Perote  on  the  21st,  the  combined  force  was  further  delayed  until  they 
were  joined  by  General  Pillow,  but  on  July  1st  they  resumed  their 
march,  reaching  Puebla  on  the  8th.  With  this  reinforcement  the  Army 
then  numbered  8,061  present  and  2,302  sick. —  Scott's  Report  of  July 
25,  1847. 

82.  All  that  remained  of  General  Franklin  Pierce's  command  of  3,000 
—  composed  of  new  regiments  and  recruits  for  the  old  army  —  which 
left  Vera  Cruz  on  July  19th,  and  arrived  at  Puebla  on  August  6th. 

83.  Upton,  p.  213.     Scott's  Autobiography,  II,  p.  420. 

84.  General  Scott's  report  of  September  18,  1847.  Senate  Ex.  Doc, 
No.  1,  p.  384. 

85.  Ladd,  p.  229. 

86.  Ripley,  II,  pp.   161,  169-184. 

87.  lUd.^ll,  pp.  187  and  210. 

88.  Scott's  force  "  did  not  number  over  4,500  " ;  his  losses  were  con- 
fined to  60  killed  and  wounded.  The  Mexicans  "  had  actually  engaged 
on  the  spot  7,000  men,  with  at  least  12,000  more  hovering  within  sight, 
and  striking  distance."  They  lost  700  killed,  813  prisoners  —  includ- 
ing 4  generals  and  88  officers  —  and  an  immense  amount  of  materiel. — 
General  Scott's  report  of  August  28,  18.'f7.  Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1, 
p.  308. 

89.  As  a  result  of  these  three  battles  —  which  in  reality  consisted  of 
five  distinct  successes  —  the  Mexican  army  lost  4,000  in  killed  and 
wounded,  3,000  captured,  including  8  generals  and  205  other  officers, 
37  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large  amount  of  small  arms,  stores,  etc. — 
General  Scott's  report  of  August  28,  1847. 

The  American  losses  on  August  19th  and  20th  were:  "  Killed,  137,  in- 
eluding  14  officers.  Wounded,  665,  including  49  officers.  Missing  (prob- 
ably killed),  38  rank  and  file.  Total,  1,052." — Scott's  report  of  Sep- 
temher  18,  1847.     Senate  Ex.  Doc,  No.  1,  pp.  313-314  and  384. 

90.  On  the  morning  of  the  20th  the  American  army  numbered  all 
told,  11,052,  but  owing  to  the  sick,  detachments  for  garrisons,  etc.,  there 
were  "  but  8,497  men  engaged." —  Scott's  reports  of  September  18th. 

91.  Scott's  report  of  August  28,  1847. 

92.  "  In  uur  nothing  has  been,  done  ichen  anything  still  remains  to 
be  done." —  Marshal  Berthier  to  Marshal  Soult,  transmitting  Napoleon's 
orders  the  day  after  Austerlitz. 

93.  In  which  one  Nicholas  P.  Trist,  President  Polk's  special  emissary 
with  Scott's  headquarters,  concurred. 

94.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  December  2,  1847. 

95.  Scott's  report  of  September  11,  1847. 

96.  The  entire  American  force  engaged  was  only  3,251,  while  its 
casualties  amounted  to  no  less  than  789. —  Scott's  report  of  September 
18,  1847 


Notes  601 

97.  IMd. 

98.  The  entire  American  force  available  for  these  operations  was 
only  8,180,  whereas  the  Mexicans  opposed  them  with  "  thirty-odd  thou- 
sand men." — Scotfs  report  of  September  18th. 

99.  "  General  Worth's  division  had  been  turning  some  minor  works 
north  of  Chapultepec  and  was  now  advancing  along  the  San  Cosme 
causeway.  This  formed  a  double  roadway  on  each  side  of  a  massive 
aqueduct  of  masonry  with  open  arches  and  pillars.  Quitman  was  pur- 
suing the  enemy  along  the  similar  causeway  of  Belen. 

"  As  Shields  was  charging  along  this  causeway  with  his  volunteers, 
who,  flushed  with  victory,  could  not  be  satisfied  w^ith  any  less  honor 
than  the  capture  of  the  city,  he  was  overtaken  by  an  aide  sent  by  Gen- 
eral Scott  to  detain  him  until  Worth  had  forced  an  entrance  through 
the  San  Cosme  gate.  Riding  up,  the  aide  saluted  the  impetuous  gen- 
eral — '  General  Scott  presents  his  compliments ' —  Shields  compre- 
hended at  once  his  message,  and  interrupted  him : 

"  '  I  have  no  time  for  compliments  just  now,'  and  spurred  on  out  of 
reach  of  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief." —  Ladd,  pp.  252-253. 

100.  General  Scott's  report  of  September  18th  in  which  he  gives  his 
losses  for  September  12th,  13th  and  14th  as  862  killed,  wounded  and 
missing.  For  the  operations  ending  in  the  capture  of  the  city,  his  total 
losses  were  "  2,703,  including  383  officers." 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  killed  or  wounded  "  more  than 
7,000  officers  and  men  "  of  the  Mexican  army,  captured  3,730  prisoners, 
"  including  13  generals,  of  whom  3  had  been  presidents "  of  Mexico, 
"  more  than  20  colors  and  standards,  75  pieces  of  ordnance,  besides  57 
wall-pieces,  20,000  small  arms,  an  immense  quantity  of  shots,  shells, 
powder,  &c.,  &c." 

101.  On  September  18th  the  Mexican  General  Rea  besieged  the  Amer- 
ican garrison  left  at  Puebla,  500  strong  with  1,800  sick.  On  October 
22nd  he  was  joined  by  Santa  Anna,  thus  bringing  the  Mexican  forces 
up  to  8,000.  On  October  1st  Santa  Anna  with  4,000  sought  to  crush 
General  Lane,  who  was  coming  up  from  Vera  Cruz  with  3,300  men,  but 
was  defeated  at  Huamantla,  and  on  the  12tli  Rea  retreated  from  Puebla, 
pursued  by  Lane  who  captured  his  entire  force  at  Atlixco  on  the  19tli. — 
General  Lane's  report  of  October  22,  18Iil. 

102.  On  December  4th  General  Scott  had  only  6,000  fit  for  duty,  while 
his  sick  numbered  2,041,  according  to  his  report  of  that  date. 

103.  On  October  18th  Lane  with  3,300  reached  Puebla,  and  on  De- 
cember 14th  was  joined  by  General  Patterson  with  2,600,  the  combined 
forces  reaching  Mexico  City  on  the  17th.  These,  together  with  other 
reinforcements,  brought  the  army  in  the  capital  up  to  '"  9,000  men,  or 
8,000"  fit  for  duty.— -S'con's  report  of  December  lit,  18^7. 

104.  This  treaty  stipulated  that  Mexico  was  to  be  evacuated  within 
three  months :  that  the  United  States  was  to  pay  $3,000,000  in  hand  and 
$12,000,000  divided  into  four  annual  instalments,  for  the  provinces  of 
New  Mexico  and  California  which  had  become  American  territory  by 
right  of  conquest.  The  United  States  was  also  to  assume  certain  Mexi- 
can debts  to  American  citizens,  amounting  to  $3,500,000.  The  Rio 
Grande  was  fixed  as  the  boundary,  Mexico  relinquished  all  claim  to 
Texas,  and  the  L'^nited  States  gained  territory  aggregating  522,955 
square  miles. 


602      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

105.  Ripley,  II,  p.  640. 

106.  Upton,  pp.  215-216  and  221. 

107.  Alphabetical  List  of  Battles,  1754-1900,  pp.  236-237.  This  work 
was  compiled  from  official  records  by  Newton  A.  Strait. 

108.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  June  30,  1914,  p.  237. 

109.  Reports  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,  1913,  p.  10, 
and  June  30,   1914,  p.  33. 

110.  Percentage  of  total  number 

War  of        Mexican  of  troops  employed 

1812  War  War  of  1812  Mexican  War 

Regular   56,032  31,024  9.3  30 

Militia 458,463  12,601  88.7  12 

Volunteers  and  rangers . .      13,159  60,659  2  58 

Total    527,654       104,284 

The  above  figures  differ  somewhat  from  those  given  by  Upton,  p.  221. 
Incidentally  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  larger  percentage  of  regulars 
was  used  in  the  Mexican  War  than  in  any  other,  the  Philippine  War 
alone  excepted. 

111.  Upton,  p.   195. 

112.  "In  the  first  war,  relying  upon  the  States  instead  of  appealing 
directly  to  the  people  as  intended  by  the  Constitution,  Congress  became 
a  witness  of  disasters  like  those  which  occurred  in  the  Revolution;  in 
the  second,  the  national  troops,  organized  and  supported  by  Congress, 
achieved  a  series  of  victories  unmarred  by  a  single  defeat. 

"  In  one  war,  an  army  of  more  than  6,000  raw  troops,  posted  in  the 
defense  of  our  own  capital,  fled  with  a  loss  of  but  19  killed  and  wounded; 
in  the  other  a  force  of  less  than  5,000  trained  volunteers,  supported  by 
a  few  regular  troops,  overthrew  a  Mexican  army  of  four  times  its 
number. 

"  In  one  war,  an  enemy  numbering  less  than  5,000  men  baffled  all  of 
our  efforts  at  invasion;  in  the  other  our  army,  with  less  than  6,000 
combatants,  entered  in  triumph  the  enemy's  capital." —  Upton,  p.  222. 

113.  "I  give  it  as  my  fixed  opinion  that  but  for  our  graduated  cadets 
the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  might,  and  probably 
would,  have  lasted  some  four  or  five  years,  with,  in  its  first  half,  more 
defeats  than  victories  falling  to  our  share;  whereas  in  less  than  two 
campaigns  we  conquered  a  great  country  and  a  peace  without  the  loss 
of  a  single  battle  or  skirmish." —  Cullum,  Biographical  Register  of  the 
Officers  and  Graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy,  I,  p.  11. 

114.  See  above,  pp.  86-87. 

115.  The  total  los'ses  of  the  American  army  in  the  battles  of  August 
and  September  which  ended  in  the  capture  of  the  City  of  Mexico  were 
2,703  (page  601,  footnote  100).  If  the  actions  of  September  12th,  13th 
and  14th,  in  which  the  casualties  were  862,  be  charged  up  to  Scott's 
consent  to  the  armistice,  the  net  result  is  still  1,841. 

116.  See  pages  86-87. 

117.  Scott's  Autobiography,  II,  p.  420. 

118.  Page  601,  footnote  102. 

119.  Page  601,  footnote  103. 

120.  Taylor  reached  his  maximum  force  —  6,645  —  at  Monterey   (page 


Notes  603 

597,  footnote  44);    Scott  attained  his — 13,500  —  at  Vera  Cruz,  mak- 
ing a  total  of  20,145. 

The  regulars  in  service  during  the  war  numbered 31,024 

Volunteers  (exclusive  of  men  enlisted  for  three  or  six  months)    60,659 


Total    91,683 

The  number  of  regulars  was  thus  nearly  five  times  that  of  Taylor's 
greatest  strength.  The  total  number  of  regulars  and  volunteers  who 
were  enlisted  for  twelve  months  or  for  the  war  was  nine  times  as  large 
as  the  effective  force  with  which  Scott  began  his  operations  against  the 
enemy's  capital  on  August  7,   1846.     See  pages  87-88. 

A  mass  of  statistics  relating  to  this  war  and  some  enlightening  de- 
ductions therefrom  are  given  by  Upton,  pp.  215-222. 

CHAPTER  VIII 

1.  Act  of  August  14,  1848,  which  fixed  the  number  of  privates  in  the 
dragoon  companies  at  50,  in  the  mounted  rifles  at  64  and  in  the  artil- 
lery and  infantry  at  42. —  Callan,  p.  397. 

2.  A  regiment  of  mounted  rifles,  two  companies  in  each  artillery  regi- 
ment, an  extra  major  to  the  old  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  small 
increase  to  some  of  the  staff  corps  were  the  only  additions  to  the  army 
as  organized  before  the  Mexican  War. 

3.  The  15  regiments  remaining  varied  in  strength  from  558  to  800 
men  each. 

4.  Section  2  empowered  the  President  "  by  voluntary  enlistment  to 
increase  the  number  of  privates  in  each  or  any  of  the  companies  of  the 
existing  regiments  of  the  army,  at  present  serving  or  which  may  here- 
after serve  at  the  several  military  posts  on  the  western  frontier,  and  at 
remote  and  distant  stations,  to  any  number  not  exceeding  74." — Callan, 
p.  408. 

5.  Callan,  pp.  435-436. 

This  law  fixed  the  strength  of  the  army  at  12,698. —  Heitman,  II, 
p.  597. 

Had  the  108  companies  on  the  frontiers  been  raised  to  their  full 
strength  as  authorized  by  this  and  previous  laws,  they  would  have  num- 
bered 17,861.  If  the  entire  army —  198  companies  —  had  been  similarly 
increased,  its  force  would  have  been  18,349.  x\s  a  matter  of  fact,  its 
actual  streng-th  in  November,  1855,  was  15,752. —  Upton,  pp.  223-224 ; 
Heitman,  II,  p.  626. 

6.  Callan,  pp.  451-452. 

7.  Page  48. 

8.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  224. 

9.  Texas  and  New  Mexico  Indian  War,  1849-1855;  California  Indian 
disturbances,  1851-1852;  Utah  Indian  disturbances,  1850-1853;  Rogue 
River  Indian  War  in  Oregon,  June  17  to  July  3,  1851,  August  8  to 
September,  1853;  March  to  June,  1856;  Oregon  Indian  War,  August 
and  September,  1854;  Yakima  Indian  War,  October  and  November, 
1855;  Klamath  and  Salmon  River  Indian  War  in  Oregon  and  Idaho, 
January  to  March,  1855;  Florida  Indian  War,  December  15,  1855,  to 
May,  1858.— Strait,  pp.  222-223. 


604      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

A  most  interesting  account  of  "  the  American  Army  among  the  In- 
dians," is  given  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Comte  de  Paris'  History  of  the 
Civil  War  in  America,  I,  pp.  59-75. 

CHAPTER  IX 

1.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  225. 

2.  Army  Register  for   1860,  p.  42. 

3.  Ex.  Doc,  No.  23,  Forty-fifth  Congress,  Third  Session;  Heitman, 
II,  p.  626. 

4.  Florida  on  January  7,  1861;  Mississippi  on  the  9th,  Alabama  on 
the  11th,  Georgia  on  the  20th,  Louisiana  on  the  26th,  and  Texas  on 
February  1st. 

5.  On  that  same  day,  February  4th,  a  Peace  Congress  met  in  Wash- 
ington.—  Nicolay,  The  Outbreak  of  Rebellion  ( Campaigns  of  the  Civil 
War  series) ,  p.  39. 

6.  Pollard,  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  with  a  Secret  History  of  the  Con- 
federacy, p.  91;  Nicolay,  pp.  1-16,  39-42. 

7.  On  April  8th  the  Confederate  President  issued  a  call  for  20,000 
volunteers  and  on  April  16th  for  34,000. —  Nicolay,  p.  79. 

8.  During  April,  1861,  all  the  militia  companies  from  the  District  of 
Columbia,  save  three,  had  to  be  mustered  into  service  with  the  express 
agreement  that  they  were  "  to  serve  within  the  District  and  not  go  be- 
yond it." —  Final  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  covering  the  period  from  March  11,  1863,  to  March  17, 
1866,  Part  I,  p.  7. 

9.  On  April  23rd  the  first  of  the  South  Carolina  regiments  started 
for  the  Potomac. 

10.  Report  of  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  pp.  205-206.  The 
President's  authority  was  based  on  Section  24  of  the  Act  of  March  3, 
1802. 

11.  Upton,  p.  227.  General  Barnard,  The  C.  S.  A.  and  the  Battle  of 
Bull  Run,  p.  42,  declared  that  "  it  was  a  favorite  notion  with  a  large 
class  of  northern  politicians  (and  the  people  too)  that  nothing  but  an 
imposing  display  of  force  was  necessary  to  crush  the  rebellion." 

12.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal-General,  Part  II,  p.  130;  Moore, 
Rebellion  Records,  I,  p.   155. 

13.  On  April  24th,  the  Virginia  Convention  decreed  that,  pending  a 
popular  vote  respecting  secession,  "  military  operations,  offensive  and 
defensive,  in  Virginia,  should  be  under  the  chief  control  and  direction 
of  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States." —  Swinton,  Campaigns  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  26. 

14.  Virginia  seceded  on  April  17th,  Tennessee  and  Arkansas  on  May 
6th,  and  North  Carolina  on  May  20th. 

15.  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  p.  161;  Swinton,  p.  30;  Ropes,  The  Story  of 
the  Civil  War,  I,  p.  121. 

16.  Act  of  February  28,  1795.     See  footnote  45,  Chapter  IV. 

17.  Upton,  p.  229. 

18.  Ropes,  I,  p.  Ill;  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  p.  171. 
Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  I,  pp.  7-8. 

19.  By  the  Act  of  August  6,  1861.     See  p.  99. 

20.  Colonel    Thomas,    the    Adjutant-General;    Major    McDowell,    As- 


Notes  605 

sistant  Adjutant-General;   and  Captain  Franklin  of  the  Topographical 
Engineers. 

21.  The  organization  of  regiments  into  three  battalions,  two  being 
kept  in  the  field  and  the  third  retained  at  the  regimental  depot  for 
drilling  and  recruiting. 

22.  Nos.  15  and  16. 

23.  Upton,  pp.  232-235. 

24.  See  pp.  55-69,   83,  87,  90-91. 

25.  Upton,  p.  235. 

26.  Sections  1,  2,  3  and  5.— Callan,  pp.  466-469. 

27.  Whether  the  troops  were  to  serve  for  only  six  months  or  more 
was  left  absolutely  to  the  discretion  of  the  President. 

28.  Section  4  empowered  the  President  to  appoint  6  Major  Generals 
and  18  Brigadier  Generals  who  might  be  selected  from  the  line  of  the 
army.  Except  in  case  a  State  failed  to  supply  its  quota  of  volunteers, 
"  the  governors  of  the  States  furnishing  volunteers  under  this  act  shall 
commission  the  field,  staff  and  company  officers  requisite  for  the  said 
volunteers." 

Section  6  stipulated  that  any  volunteer  wounded  or  otherwise  dis- 
abled in  service  should  be  entitled  to  all  benefits  accruing  to  those  dis- 
abled in  the  Regular  service.  In  the  event  of  the  death  of  a  volunteer 
in  service,  his  widow  or  legal  heirs  "  in  addition  to  all  arrears  of  pay 
and  allowances,  shall  receive  the  sum  of  one  hundred  dollars." 

Section  10  provided  that  in  the  case  of  vacancies  "  the  men  of  each 
company  shall  vote  in  their  respective  companies  for  all  officers  as  high 
as  captain,  and  vacancies  above  captain  shall  be  filled  by  the  votes  of 
the  commissioned  officers  of  the  regiment." 

According  to  Sections  1  and  2  the  President  might  have  called  out 
500,000  men  for  six  months,  if  he  saw  fit  to  do  so,  and  under  Section  4 
he  and  the  governors  could  have  sent  vast  armies  into  the  field  without 
one  single  officer  of  military  education  and  experience  to  command 
them.  The  laws  of  no  despotism  in  the  world  vest  in  the  ruler  such 
unlimited  power  to  work  evil. 

Moreover,  Section  ^  was  based  on  the  theory  of  a  Confederation  and 
the  troops  regarded  as  State,  not  national  forces,  so  that  their  com- 
missions were  to  issue  from  a  governor  and  not  from  the  President. 

The  election  of  officers  as  provided  in  Section  10  embodied  all  that 
was  most  subversive  of  military  discipline  and  efficiency. 

29.  "  Resolved,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  is 
hereby  authorized  to  accept  the  services  of  volunteers,  either  as  cavalry, 
infantry,  or  artillery,  in  such  numbers  as  the  exigencies  of  the  public 
service  may,  in  his  opinion,  demand,  to  be  organized,  as  authorized  by 
the  act  of  the  22nd  of  July,  1861;  Provided:  That  the  number  of  troops 
hereby  authorized  shall  not  exceed  five  hundred  thousand. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  volunteers  authorized  by  this  act  shall  be  armed 
as  the  President  may  direct;  they  shall  be  subject  to  the  rules  and 
articles  of  w^ar,  and  shall  be  upon  the  footing,  in  all  respects,  with 
similar  corps  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  shall  be  mustered  into 
the  service  for  '  during  the  war.' 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  President  shall  be  authorized  to  appoint,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  for  the  command  of  the 
volunteer  forces,  such  number  of  major-generals  and  of  brigadier-gen- 


606      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

erals  as  may,  in  his  judgment,  be  required  for  their  organization." — 
Callan,  pp.  471-472. 

30.  Nine  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  cavalry,  and  one  of  artillery. 

31.  Section  6. 

32.  Section  5. 

33.  "  Sec.  8.  That  the  enlistments  for  the  regiments  authorized  by 
this  act  shall  be  in  charge  of  the  officers  detailed  for  that  purpose  who 
are  appointed  to  said  regiments  from  civil  life,  and  officers  of  the  Regu- 
lar Army  shall  be  detailed  by  the  commanding  general  to  such  service 
in  the  volunteer  regiments  now  in  the  field  as  will  in  his  judgment  give 
them  the  greatest  military  efficiency;  and  that  the  commanding  general 
may,  in  his  discretion,  employ  said  officers  with  any  part  of  the  regular 
forces  now  in  the  field,  until  the  regiments  authorized  by  this  act  have 
been  fully  recruited,  and  detail  any  of  the  officers  now  in  the  regular 
army  to  service  with  the  volunteer  regiments  now  in  the  field,  or  which 
may  hereafter  be  called  out,  with  such  rank  as  may  be  offered  them  in 
said  volunteer  regiments,  for  the  purpose  of  imparting  to  them  military 
instruction  and  efficiency." — Callan,  p.  476. 

34.  See  above,   footnote  28,   page  605. 

35.  Act  of  August  3,  1861,  Section  1. 

36.  By  virtue  of  the  Acts  of  July  29  and  August  3,  1861,  the  author- 
ized strength  of  the  Regular  Army  was  fixed  at  39,273  officers  and  men. — 
Heitman,  II,  pp.  598-601. 

No  increase  in  its  strength  was  made  throughout  the  war  or  until 
July  28,  1866. 

37.  Gallon,  pp.  480-487. 

38.  See  above,  footnote  28.  On  August  1st  the  property  holders  of 
New  York  memorialized  the  President,  complaining  against  a  system  so 
*'  fatal  to  military  discipline." —  Swinton,  p.  63. 

39.  "  Resolved,  That  vacancies  hereafter  occurring  among  the  commis- 
sioned officers  of  the  volunteer  regiments  shall  be  filled  by  the  governors 
of  the  States,  respectively,  in  the  same  manner  as  original  appoint- 
ments, and  so  much  of  the  tenth  section  of  the  act  approved  July  22, 
1861,  as  is  inconsistent  herewith,  be,  and  the  same  is,  hereby  repealed." 
—  Callan,  pp.  488-489. 

40.  "  That  all  the  acts,  proclamations,  and  orders  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  after  the  4th  of  March,  1861,  respecting  the  Army 
and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  calling  out  or  relating  to  the  militia 
or  volunteers  from  the  States,  are  hereby  approved  and  in  all  respects 
legalized  and  made  valid,  to  the  same  extent  and  with  the  same  effect 
as  if  they  had  been  issued  and  done  under  the  previous  express  author- 
ity and  direction  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States." —  Callan,  p.  490. 

41.  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  II,  p.  119. 

42.  Upton,  p.   257. 

43.  "  In  1792  Congress  organized  the  militia  and  declared  in  favor 
of  obligatory  military  service,  on  the  theory  that  the  militia  were  the 
bulwark  of  the  nation.  Subsequently  Indian  difficulties  and  armed 
conflicts  with  two  foreign  nations  compelled  it  to  raise  and  support  a 
regular  army.  Both  of  these  organizations  in  1861  it  summarily  re- 
jected. Instead  of  expanding  tlie  Regular  Army,  and  making  it  the 
chief  instrument  in  executing  the  national  will,   it  violated  the  prac- 


Notes  607 

tice  of  every  civilized  nation  by  calling  into  existence  an  army  of  a 
million  untrained  officers  and  men.  But  it  may  be  replied  that  far 
from  rejecting  the  army,  Congress,  on  the  contrary,  tripled  its  strength 
by  increasing  its  organization  from   13,024  to  39,273. 

"  This  increase  was  mere  expansion  on  paper.  Give  men  a  choice 
between  regulars,  volunteers,  and  militia,  and  they  icill  invariably  se- 
lect the  organization  whose  laxity  of  discipline  is  greatest.  The  Rebel- 
lion gave  another  proof  of  this  truth.  By  January  1,  1863,  the  Army 
attained  a  maximum  of  only  25,436,  which  was  less  than  3  per  cent,  of 
the  total  force  then  in  the  field. 

"  Yet  this  feeble  proportion  gives  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  part  the 
Army  was  to  play  in  the  great  struggle.  We  shall  find  on  further  in- 
vestigation that  the  total  number  of  men  recruited  for  the  Army,  even 
after  a  resort  to  conscription,  was  less  than  three-thousandths,  one- 
third  of  1  per  cent,  of  the  millions  who  poured  forth  in  new  and  un- 
tried organizations. 

"  This  disappearance  of  the  Regular  Army  as  a  factor  was  due  to  the 
mistaken  confidence  of  Congress  in  the  system,  of  voluntary  enlistments. 
The  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812  had  made  it  evident  that  being 
the  chief  cause  of  national  iceakness  they  could  not  be  relied  upon  in 
a  long  war.  Two  wars  further  conclusively  proved  that  the  patriotism 
of  the  people  should  not  be  judged  by  the  sole  test  of  their  willingness 
to  serve  in  the  ranks.  .  .  . 

"  It  should  not,  therefore,  surprise  us  that  under  a  system  so  im- 
provident, voluntary  enlistments  finally  proved  a  failure." — Upton,  pp. 
257-258. 

44.  By  virtue  of  the  President's  call  of  May  3rd  and  the  Congressional 
acts  of  July  22nd  and  25th,  the  North  furnished  700,680  volunteers. — 
Phisterer,  Statistical  Records  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States  (Cam- 
paigns of  the  Civil  War  Series ) ,  p.  4. 

45.  Mr.  Lincoln's  call  of  April  15th  produced  no  less  than  91,816  men 
for  three  months'  service. —  Ibid,  p.  3. 

46.  Upton,  p.  243;  Alexander,  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  p. 
15. 

47.  This  expedition,  devised  by  General  Benjamin  Butler  for  the 
purpose  of  capturing  the  Confederate  posts  at  Bethel,  was  composed 
of  six  volunteer  regiments  and  a  battalion.  General  Pierce  was  never 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service  and  had  no  right  to  any  com- 
mand. The  Confederate  force,  composed  of  North  Carolina  and  Vir- 
ginia troops  about  1,100  strong,  was  commanded  by  Colonel  D.  H.  Hill. 
—  Swinton,  pp.  31-33. 

48.  Ibid,  p.  33. 

49.  Swinton,  pp.  38,  39  and  46;  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  222-220;  Re- 
port of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  III ;  pp.  196- 
197;  Ropes,  I,  pp.  129-131. 

50.  Confederates  29,949,  Union  28,568. —  Report  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee, II,  p.  249;  Upton,  p.  246. 

51.  McDowell  had  only  800  regulars.  On  the  day  of  the  battle  some 
of  the  volunteers  had  been  in  service  less  than  a  month;  the  terms  of 
all  the  militia  were  on  the  eve  of  expiring.  The  force  was  an  unknown 
quantity,  and  discipline  and  cohesion  were  notable  for  their  absence. — 


608      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  I,  pp.  175-194;  Report  of  the  Joint 
Committee,  III,  p.  38;  Swinton,  pp.  42-44;  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  227- 
228. 

52.  The  Union  forces  engaged  consisted  of  896  officers,  17,676  men  and 
24  guns.  Beauregard,  having  been  joined  by  Johnston  from  the  Shen- 
andoah, had  18,053. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  194-195. 

53.  The  Union  army  lost  460  killed,  1,124  wounded,  1,312  captured 
or  missing,  a  total  of  2,896.  The  Confederates  had  387  killed,  1,582 
woimded,  and  13  captured  or  missing,  a  total  of  1,982. —  Ibid.  Alex- 
ander, pp.  50-51,  gives  the  Confederate  losses  as  2,708. 

It  was  at  this  battle  that  General  Thomas  J.  Jackson  won  his  ap- 
pellation of  "  Stonewall  Jackson." —  Long,  Memoirs  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  p. 
108. 

Interesting  accounts  of  this  action  are  also  given  by  Longstreet,  From 
Manassas  to  Appomattox,  pp.  42-57,  and  by  Gordon,  Reminiscences  of 
the  Civil  War,  pp.  37-46. 

54.  Official  report  of  Major  Sykes.     Moore,  II,  pp.  24-25. 

55.  Official  reports  of  General  McDowell  and  General  Heintzelman, 
Ibid,  II,  pp.  2-7  and  25-27. 

56.  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston's  Statement.  Battles  and  Leaders, 
I,  p.  252. 

57.  Ropes,  I,  p.  157. 

58.  Upton,  p.  243. 

59.  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  pp.  58  and  60. 

60.  Defeat  of  the  Union  forces  and  death  of  General  Lyon  at  Wilson's 
Creek,  August  10th;  surrender  of  Lexington,  Missouri,  September  20th; 
disastrous  repulse  at  Ball's  Bluff,  October  21st;  indecisive  action  at  Bel- 
mont, November  7th;  and  victory  of  Drainesville,  December  20th,  1861. 

61.  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  254-256. 

62.  McClellan's  Oifn  Story,  p.  200. 

63.  Of  the  five  Major  Generals  appointed  up  to  September  18,  1861, 
four  were  selected  from  civil  life;  of  71  Brigadier  Generals,  24  were 
civilians. 

At  the  commencement  of  hostilities  there  were  1,054  graduates  of 
West  Point,  168  of  whom  joined  the  Rebellion.  Although  there  were 
more  than  600  captains  and  lieutenants  in  the  Regular  Army  who  might 
advantageously  have  been  utilized  in  the  highest  grades  of  the  volun- 
teer regiments,  Congress,  by  the  Act  of  July  22,  1861,  prevented  any  use 
being  made  of  them  in  that  capacity  if  the  governor  of  a  State  choose  to 
make  his  own  appointments  (pages  98  and  605).  This  policy,  which  re- 
sulted in  keeping  professional  officers  in  the  lower  grades  of  the  Army, 
was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  greatest  blunders  committed  during  the  war. 

Compare  Upton,  pp.  236,  237,  261  and  263;  Ctillum,  I,  pp.  12-14. 

64.  Quaere?     Certainly  not  from  a  military  standpoint. 

65.  Report  of  the  Provost-Marshal-General,  I,  pp.  102  and  160. 

66.  Jones,  War  Statistics;  Draper,  II,  p.  165. 

67.  Aside  from  the  appropriation  for  the  Regular  Army  for  1861,  it 
was  necessary  to  make  an  additional  appropriation  of  $208,392,488,77 
on  February  25,  1862,  supplemented  by  $30,000,000  on  May  14th  for 
further  pay  for  the  volunteers. —  Upton,  p.  267. 


Notes  609 

CHAPTER  X 

1.  Act  approved  January  31,  1862. 

2.  "  That  the  President  of  the  United  States,  when  in  his  judgment 
the  public  safety  may  require  it,  be,  and  he  is  hereby  authorized  to  take 
possession  of  any  or  all  the  telegraph  lines  in  the  United  States,  their  of- 
fices and  appurtenances;  to  take  possession  of  any  or  all  the  railroad 
lines  in  the  United  States,  their  offices,  shops,  buildings,  and  all  their 
appendages  and  appurtenances;  to  prescribe  rules  and  regulations  for 
the  holding,  using,  and  maintaining  of  the  aforesaid  telegraph  and 
railroad  lines  ...  to  place  under  military  control  all  the  officers,  agents, 
and  employes  ...  so  that  they  shall  be  considered  as  a  post  road  and 
a  part  of  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States,  subject  to  all 
the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  rules  and  articles  of  war.  .  .  ." —  Callan, 
p.  492. 

3.  "  Seo.  3.  That  no  volunteers  or  militia  from  any  state  or  territory 
shall  be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  on  any  terms 
or  conditions  confining  their  service  to  the  limits  of  said  state  or  terri- 
tory, or  their  vicinities,  beyond  the  number  of  ten  thousand  in  the 
state  of  Missouri,  and  four  thousand  five  hundred  in  the  state  of  Mary- 
land, heretofore  authorized  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  or 
secretary  of  war,  to  be  raised  in  said  states." —  Callan,  p.  495. 

4.  See  above,  page  95. 

5.  Act  of  April  16,  1862.— Callan,  pp.  501-503. 

6.  Act  of  May  14,  1862.— /6t6?,  pp.  503-504. 

7.  Act  of  July  2,  1862.—  See  Callan,  p.  509. 

8.  Section  one  authorized  the  appointment  by  the  President  of  40 
surgeons  and  120  assistant  surgeons  of  volunteers,  who  were  to  be  ex- 
amined by  a  medical  board  convened  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  It 
further  forbade  the  filling  of  vacancies  in  those  grades  except  "  on  the 
ground  of  merit  only."  Section  2  abolished  brigade  surgeons  and 
placed  all  surgeons  of  volunteers  under  the  supervision  of  the  Surgeon- 
General. 

Section  3  permitted  the  appointment  of  an  additional  assistant  sur- 
geon in  each  volunteer  regiment,  but  specified  no  examination  for  proper 
qualification.  The  list  was  thus  opened  to  every  incompetent,  and  it 
was  not  until  they  had  been  weeded  out  that  this  evil  was  checked. 

9.  Callan,  pp.  509-510. 

10.  Approved  July  14,  1862. 

11.  Callan,  pp.  519-523. 

12.  Section  12.     Ihid,  p.  528. 

13.  "  An  act  to  amend  the  Act  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the 
laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrection,  and  repel  invasion,  approved 
February  twenty-eighth,  seventeen  hundred  and  ninety-five,  and  the  Act 
amendatory  thereof,  and  for  other  purposes." — Callan,  pp.  531-535. 

14.  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  434. 

15.  See  above,  pages  98  and  605. 

16.  Sections  one,  two,  three,  and  four. 

17.  For  the  appointment  of  a  Judge- Advocate-General  and  a  similar 
officer  for  each  field  army,  for  the  trial  for  minor  offenses  by  a  field- 
officer,  etc.     Sections  5,  6  and  7. 

A  new  organization  was  also  given  to  the  cavalry  by  Section  11. 


610      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

18.  Section  9. 

19.  Resolution  25,  approved  April  4,  1862. —  Callan,  p.  539. 

20.  Resolution  37,  approved  June  21,  1862. —  Ibid. 

21.  Resolution  52,  approved  July  12,  1862.— Callan,  p.  540. 

22..  Compare  Mulholland,  The  Military  Order  of  the  Congress  Medal 
of  Honor  Legion  of  the  United  States,  pp.  50-51. 

The  Victoria  Cross  was  created  by  Royal  edict  on  January  29,  1856. 

23.  Upton,  p.  436. 

24.  Phisterer,  p.  4. 

25.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  10;  Part  II, 
pp.  102  and  103. 

26.  The  quotas  amounted  to  334,835 ;  the  number  of  men  actually  fur- 
nished was  431,958. —  Ibid,  p.  160;  Phisterer,  pp.  4-5. 

27.  Which  could  readily  have  been  prevented  had  there  existed  a  Gen- 
eral Staff  to  tell  them  the  proper  measures  to  take  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. 

28.  A  principle  laid  down  by  the  Act  of  May  8,  1792.     See  p.  48. 

29.  Actually  87,588  out  of  quotas  amounting  to  334,835. —  Phisterer, 
p.  5. 

30.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  I,  pp.  10-11. 

31.  No  attempt  will  be  made  in  this  campaign  or  in  those  of  the  three 
ensuing  years  to  do  more  than  sketch  in  briefest  outline  the  most  im- 
portant operations. 

32.  Upton,  p.  269. 

33.  Battles  and  Leaders,  1,  pp.  368-372 ;  Personal  Recollections  of  Gen- 
eral U.  S.  Grant,  I,  pp.  284-293. 

34.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  398-428;  Grant,  I,  pp.  294-315;  Swin- 
ton.  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  pp.  56-85;  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  471- 
498;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  18-35. 

The  casualties  of  the  Union  forces,  army  and  navy  —  the  former  of 
which  numbered  about  27,000  —  were  2,886 ;  those  of  the  Confederates 
under  General  Pillow,  231  killed,  1,007  wounded  and  13,829  captured. — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  p.  429;  Upton,  p.  270. 

35.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  640-645;  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  562- 
590. 

36.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  692-711;  Comte  de  Paris,  I,  pp.  591- 
608;  Ropes,  I,  pp.  243-245. 

37.  Morse,  Abraham  Lincoln  (American  Statesmen  Series),  I,  p.  343; 
Comte  de  Paris,  I,  p.  616;  McClellan's  Own  Story,  p.  225. 

38.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  647-652. 

39.  Swinton,  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  92;  Battles 
and  Leaders,  II,  p.  284;  Alexander,  p.  62. 

40.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  pp.  465-593;  Grant,  I,  pp.  338-370;  Ropes, 
II,  pp.  68-69;  Swinton,  Decisive  Battles,  pp.  86-138;  Comte  de  Paris,  I, 
pp.  515-561. 

The  Union  army  numbered  about  59,000,  its  casualties  being  13,047; 
the  Confederate  army  amounted  to  about  40,335  and  its  losses  were 
10,Q99.— Battles  and  Leaders,  1,  pp.  538-539;  Upton,  pp.  272-273; 
Memoirs  of  General  W.  T.  Sherman,  I,  p.  247;  Ropes,  II,  89. 

41.  Battles  and  Leaders,  I,  p.  445. 

42.  Comte  de  Paris,  II,  pp.  153-175;  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  22- 
99;  III,  pp.  551-555. 


Notes  611 

43.  May  5th,  May   7th,  May  27th   and  June    1st,   1862,  respectively. 

44.  Upton,  p.  269;  Comte  de  Paris,  II,  pp.  1-72;  Battles  and  Leaders, 
II,  pp.  160-263;  Alexander,  pp.  63-108;  McClellan's  Own  Story,  pp.  252- 
410;  Longstreet,  pp.  72-102;  Gordon,  pp.  47-59. 

45.  Upton,  p.  275. 

46.  Alexander,  p.   109;   Long,  p.   160. 

47.  At  McDowell  on  May  8th;  Front  Royal,  May  23rd;  Winchester, 
May  25th ;  Charlestown  and  Harper's  Ferry,  May  28th ;  Cross  Keys,  June 
8th;  ending  with  Port  Republic  on  the  9th. —  Alexander,  pp.  94-108; 
Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  282-298. 

48.  Alexander,  p.  112. 

49.  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  p.  317;  Ropes,  p.  164. 

50.  Oflicial  Records,  XI,  Part  II,  p.  238;  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  p. 
315;  Ropes,  p.  159. 

51.  Mechanicsville  on  June  26th;  Gaines'  Mills,  June  27th;  Savage 
Station,  June  29th;  White  Oaks  Swamp  and  Charles  City  Cross  Roads, 
June  30th. 

52.  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  180-187,  319-427;  Comte  de  Paris,  II, 
pp.  73-148;  Swinton,  pp.  140-165;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  170-212;  Alexander, 
pp.  107-174;  McClellan's  Oicn  Story,  pp.  410-440;  Long,  pp.  170-177; 
Longstreet,  pp.   120-152;   Gordon,  pp.  70-79. 

The  Union  losses  were  1,734  killed,  8,062  wounded  and  6,053  captured 
or  missing,  a  total  of  15,849. 

The  Confederates  had  3,286  killed,  15,909  wounded  and  949  missing 
or  captured,  the  total  being  20,135. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  315 
and  317;  Alexander,  p.  171. 

McClellan,  p.  440,  agrees  with  the  above  estimate  of  the  Union  losses, 
but  gives  those  of  the  Confederates  at   19,749. 

53.  Near  Alexandria,  Virginia. 

54.  On  August  4th  Burnside  with  8,000  men  —  who  had  been  with- 
drawn from  North  Carolina  (p.  110)  to  Fort  Monroe  —  reached  Aquia 
Creek,  and  on  the  14th  McClellan  started  his  movement  from  Harrison's 
Landing. 

On  June  26th  General  Pope  (p.  110)  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  Virginia  composed  of  the  forces  under  Fremont,  Banks 
and  McDowell,  and  next  day  fixed  his  headquarters  at  Washington,  but 
it  was  not  until  August  1st  that  he  started  to  concentrate  his  army  in 
the  direction  of  Gordonsville. 

On  July  11th  the  command  of  the  Union  armies  was  given  to  General 
H.  W.  Halleck  as  General-in-Chief,  but  he  did  not  reach  Washington 
from  the  West  until  the  22nd. 

55.  On  July  27th.— Alexander,  p.  180. 

56.  Jackson  had  about  24,000  troops;  Banks  about  17,900. —  Ibid, 
p.  180;  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  p.  496. 

57.  The  Union  losses  were  2,381;  the  Confederate,  1,365. —  Battles  and 
Leaders,  II,  p.  496. 

58.  Pope's  army  was  so  scattered  that  he  went  into  action  with  only 
35,000  ( Ropes,  II,  p.  282 ) ,  but  he  subsequently  concentrated  his  forces 
to  the  number  of  from  63  to  65,000.  The  total  Confederate  strength 
was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  54,000'. —  Ibid,  II,  pp.  497-500;  Alexander, 
pp.  204,  211;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  275,  282. 

The  losses  in  this  battle  have  never  been  separately  reported. 


612      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

59.  Alexander,  p.  218;   Long,  pp.  182-200;  Longstreet,  pp.  153-198. 

60.  Ropes,  II,  p.  329. 

61.  Upton,  p.  276;  Long,  pp.  207-209.  The  Union  losses  in  this  cam- 
paign from  the  Rappahannock  to  the  Potomac  were  14,462,  the  Confed- 
erate 9,474. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  499-500.  Alexander,  p.  219, 
gives  Lee's  losses  as  9,112. 

62.  The  Army  of  the  Mississippi  numbered  23,077  and  its  casualties 
amounted  to  2,520;  the  Army  of  West  Tennessee  under  Van  Dorn 
was  "  about  22,000  men  "  and  its  losses  4,838.—  Official  Records,  XVII, 
Part  I,  pp.  246  and  378;  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  p.  760. 

63.  Accounts  of  this  campaign  are  given  by  the  Comte  de  Paris,  II, 
pp.  360-417;  Battles  and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  717-759;  Grant,  Memoirs,  I, 
pp.  394-421;  Greene,  The  Mississippi  {Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War 
series),  pp.  29-54;  Upton,  pp.  276-277. 

64.  This  was  due  to  the  dispersion  by  Halleck's  orders  of  the  army 
of  120,000  which  had  entered  Corinth  on  May  30th,  coupled  with  the 
bold  offensive  of  Bragg.  These  two  factors  reduced  the  Union  armies 
in  the  West  to  a  passive  defensive. —  Grant,  I,  pp.  383,  394-395 ;  Greene, 
p.  35;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  95,  218  and  384. 

65.  Upton,  p.  277. 

66.  Ropes,  II,  p.  325. 

67.  By  virtue  of  the  order  dated  September  2,  1862. —  McClellan,  p. 
536. 

68.  There  were  also  actions  at  Fox's  Gap  and  South  Mountain  that 
same  day. 

69.  According  to  McClellan's  own  report,  his  command  numbered 
87,164.  Lee's  force  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  35,255. — Battles  and 
Leaders,  II,  p.  603;  Taylor,  Four  Years  with  Lee,  quoted  by  Alexander, 
pp.  244-245. 

Ropes,  II,  pp.  382-383,  estimates  Lee's  strength  at  58,000. 

70.  The  Union  losses  were  12,410;  the  Confederates'  11,172. —  Battles 
and  Leaders,  II,  pp.  600  and  603. 

71.  On  September  19th. —  Alexander,  pp.  269-270. 

72.  October  26th  to  November  2nd. —  Ropes,  II,  p.  440. 

73.  Arriving  on  November  9th. —  Comte  de  Paris,  II,  p.  559. 

The  Union  losses  in  this  campaign  of  Antietam  were  27,767  (including 
12,564  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry  on  September  15th)  ;  that  of  the  Con- 
federates, 13,609.— Alexander,  pp.  273-275. 

McClellan's  Own  Story,  pp.  548-617,  gives  his  version  of  this  cam- 
paign.    See  also  Longstreet,  pp.  199-291;  Gordon,  pp.  80-91. 

74.  By  General  Orders,  No.  182. —  Swinton,  p.  227 ;  Battles  and  Lead- 
ers, III,  p.  104;  McClellan's  Own  Story,  pp.  648,  651  and  652. 

This  ended  McClellan's  career,  about  which  there  has  been  much  con- 
troversy. That  he  was  an  able  organizer  is  generally  admitted.  Per- 
haps had  he  not  had  so  many  raw  troops  to  train  and  organize,  he  might 
have  shone  more  brilliantly  as  a  general  in  the  field. 

75.  Swinton,  p.  233. 

76.  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  70-147;  Comte  de  Paris,  II,  pp.  559- 
605;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  447-472;  Alexander,  pp.  285-313;  Long,  pp.  233-239; 
Longstreet,  pp.  297-317. 

According  to  General  Burnside's  return  for  December  10th,  his  army 


Notes  613 

numbered  116,683;  a  return  of  the  same  date  gives  Lee's  forces  as  con- 
sisting of  78,513. 

The  Union  losses  were  12,653,  the  Confederate  5,337. —  Battles  and 
Leaders,  III,  pp.   145-147;   Alexander,  pp.  284,  285,  and  313. 

77.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  under  General  Buell  was  fully  "  54,000 
strong";  the  Confederates  under  Bragg  about  17,000. —  Battles  and 
Leaders,  III,  p.  30;  Bragg's  report,  quoted  by  Ropes,  II,  p.  408. 

Buell's  losses  were  4,211;  Bragg's,  3,396. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  ibid. 

78.  Comte  de  Paris,  II,  pp.  498-534;  Ropes,  II,  pp.  424-433;  Swinton, 
Ticelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  pp.  178-225. 

Rosecrans'  army  consisted  of  about  47,000  men,  Bragg  had  nearly 
38,000. —  ^yar  of  the  Rebellion  Records,  XXIX,  pp.  663  and  674 ;  Ropes, 
II,   pp.  424-425. 

The  former's  losses  were  bout  9,500  killed  and  wounded  and  3,700  cap- 
tured ;  Bragg's  casualties  were  about  9,000  and  900  prisoners. —  War  of 
the  Rebellion  Records,  XXIX,  p.  681;  Ropes,  II,  p.  433. 

79.  On  October  25th. —  Grant's  Memoirs,  I,  p.  421. 

80.  Grant,  I,  pp.  422-438;  Sherman,  I,  pp.  279-293;  Swinton,  Twelve 
Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  pp.  262-279;  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp. 
462-470,  551-560.  Sherman  had  about  33,000  men  and  lost  1,776;  Pem- 
berton's  effective  strength  was  "  about  25,000  "  and  his  casualties  con- 
fined to  207. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  p.  471. 

81.  Antietam. 

82.  Ropes,  II,  pp.  473-474. 

CHAPTER  XI 

1.  "Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled.  That  hereafter  each 
regiment  of  cavalry  organized  in  the  United  States  service  may  have  two 
assistant  surgeons,  and  each  company  or  troop  of  cavalry  shall  have 
from  sixty  to  seventy-eight  privates."  Approved  January  6,  1863. — 
Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  p.  178. 

2.  Act  approved  February  7,  1863. —  Ibid,  II,  p.  179. 

3.  Act  of  February  9,  IS63.— Ibid,  II,  p.  179. 

4.  Act  of  February  16,  1863.— Ibid,  II,  p.  180. 

5.  By  the  resolution  of  July  12,  1862. 

6.  By  the  Act  of  July  5,  1862.     See  page  106. 

7.  Four  Major  Generals  and  nine  Brigadier  Generals. 

8.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  p.  180. 

9.  Section  one  abolished  the  topographical  engineers  as  a  distinct 
branch  and  merged  them  into  the  Corps  of  Engineers. 

Section  3  provided  that  no  officer  below  field  rank  should  be  pro- 
moted until  he  had  passed  a  satisfactory  examination  before  a  board  of 
three  officers  senior  in  rank. 

Section  4  made  an  increase  of  19  officers  in  the  Ordnance  Department, 
with  similar  stipulations  as  to  promotion. 

Section  6  provided  that  all  payments  for  advance  bounties  to  men 
discharged  before  the  expiration  of  their  legal  service  shall  be  charged  to 
the  individuals  unless  provided  with  a  surgeon's  certificate. 

10.  "  Sec.  7.     And  be  it  further  enacted.  That  upon  any  requisition 


614     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

hereafter  being  made  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  militia, 
any  person  who  shall  have  volunteered  or  been  drafted  for  the  service 
of  the  United  States  for  the  term  of  nine  months,  or  a  shorter  period, 
may  enlist  into  a  regiment  from  the  same  State  to  serve  for  a  term 
of  one  year ;  and  any  person  so  enlisting  shall  be  entitled  to  and  receive 
a  bounty  of  fifty  dollars,  to  be  paid  in  time  and  manner  provided  by  the 
act  of  July  twenty-second,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-one,  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  bounty  provided  for  by  that  act." —  Report  of  the  Provost 
Marshal  General,  II,  p.  181. 

11.  Ibid.,  II,  p.    182. 

12.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  12-13. 

13.  Ibid.,  p.  13. 

Under  the  first  category  are  included  Sections  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  8,  9, 
10,  11,  12  and  17;  in  the  second.  Sections  12,  13,  15,  16,  17,  20,  33  and 
34;  in  the  third  category  were  Sections  7,  21  to  31  both  inclusive,  and 
38. 

The  question  of  substitutes  was  dealt  with  by  Sections  13  and  17;  that 
of  re-enlistment  by  Section  18;  while  sundry  other  provisions  fell  under 
Sections  19,  20,  32,  35,  36  and  37.— Ibid.,  Part  II,  pp.  182-188. 

14.  The  Act  of  May  8,  1792.     See  page  48. 

15.  "  That  all  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and 
persons  of  foreign  birth  who  shall  have  declared  on  oath  their  intention 
to  become  citizens  under  and  in  pursuance  of  the  laws  thereof,  between 
the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty-five  years,  except  as  hereinafter  excepted, 
are  hereby  declared  to  constitute  the  national  forces,  and  shall  be  liable 
to  perform  military  duty  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  when  called 
out  by  the  President  for  that  purpose." 

16.  By  Section  33. 

17.  "  Sec.  13.  And  be  it  further  enacted.  That  any  person  drafted  and 
notified  to  appear  as  aforesaid  may,  on  or  before  the  day  fixed  for  his 
appearance,  furnish  an  acceptable  substitute  to  take  his  place  in  the 
draft;  or  he  may  pay  to  such  person  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may 
authorize  to  receive  it,  such  sum,  not  exceeding  three  hundred  dollars,  as 
the  Secretary  may  determine,  for  the  procuration  of  such  substitute, 
which  sum  shall  be  fixed  at  a  uniform  rate  by  a  general  order  made  at 
the  time  of  ordering  a  draft  for  any  State  or  Territory,  and  thereupon 
such  person  so  furnishing  the  substitute,  or  paying  the  money,  shall  be 
discharged  from  further  liability  under  that  draft.  And  any  person 
failing  to  report  after  due  servjce  of  notice  as  herein  prescribed,  without 
furnishing  a  substitute,  or  paying  the  required  sum  therefor,  shall  be 
deemed  a  deserter,  and  shall  be  arrested  by  the  provost  marshal,  and 
sent  to  the  nearest  military  post  for  trial  by  court-martial,  unless,  upon 
proper  showing  that  he  is  not  liable  to  do  military  duty,  the  board  of 
enrolment  shall  relieve  him  from  the  draft." 

"  Sec.  17.  And  be  it  further  enacted.  That  any  person  enrolled  and 
drafted  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  act,  who  shall  furnish  an 
acceptable  substitute,  shall  thereupon  receive  from  the  board  of  enrol- 
ment a  certificate  of  discharge  from  such  draft,  which  shall  exempt  him 
from  military  duty  during  the  time  for  which  he  was  drafted;  and  such 
substitute  shall  be  entitled  to  the  same  pay  and  allowances  provided  by 
law  as  if  he  had  been  originally  drafted  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States." 


Notes  615 

18.  "  Sec,  18.  And  he  it  further  enacted,  That  such  of  the  volunteers 
and  militia  now  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  may  re-enlist  to 
serve  one  year,  unless  sooner  discharged,  after  the  expiration  of  their 
present  term  of  service,  shall  be  entitled  to  a  bounty  of  fifty  dollars, 
one-half  of  which  is  to  be  paid  upon  such  re-enlistment,  and  the  balance 
at  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  re-enlistment.  And  such  as  may  re-en- 
list to  serve  for  two  years  unless  sooner  discharged,  after  the  expiration 
of  their  present  term  of  enlistment,  shall  receive  upon  such  re-enlist- 
ment, twenty-five  dollars  of  the  one  hundred  dollars  bounty  for  re-en- 
listment provided  by  the  fifth  section  of  the  act  approved  twenty-second 
of  July,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-one,  entitled  "  An  act  to  authorize 
the  employment  of  volunteers  to  aid  in  enforcing  the  laws  and  protecting 
public  property.'  " 

19.  Part  I,  p.  19. 

20.  American  Statesmen  series,  II,  pp.  196-199. 

21.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  32-34,  Part 
II,  pp.  224-225. 

Authorization  to  suspend  this  writ  had  been  given  by  Congress  by  an 
act  approved  March  3,  1803. 

22.  Section  14  of  the  Enrolment  Act  prescribed  that  "  all  persons 
drafted  and  claiming  exemption  from  military  duty  on  account  of  dis- 
ability, or  any  other  cause,  shall  present  their  claims  to  be  exempted 
to  the  board,  whose  decision  shall  be  final." 

23.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  p.  160,  and  Part 
II,  p.  223 ;  Phisterer,  p.  5. 

24.  Of  this  number  252,564  were  examined. 

25.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  28,  29  and  174. 

26.  Ibid.,  p.  29. 

27.  Ibid.,  Part  I,  pp.  29-40,  Part  II,  p.  227-228. 

28.  Joint  resolution  approved  December  23,  1863. 

29.  On  the  express  condition  '*  that  no  bounties  except  such  as  are 
now  provided  by  law  shall  be  paid  to  any  persons  enlisted  after  the 
fifth  day  of  January  next."' 

30.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  pp.   188-189. 

31.  Comte  de  Paris,  III,  p.  2. 

32.  The  numerous  desertions  due  to  the  discouragement  of  the  men 
were  summarily  punished  and  some  of  the  culprits  shot;  regular  fur- 
loughs were  ins'  ituted ;  the  grand  divisions  —  a  cumbersome  system  in- 
vented by  Burnside  —  were  abolished  and  the  army  organized  into  six 
army  corps  each  with  a  distinctive  badge;  the  three  divisions  of  cavalry 
were  consolidated  into  a  corps  under  General  Stoneman  and  at  last 
were  given  an  opportunity  to  show  that  it  was  in  nowise  inferior  to 
its  adversaries. —  Ibid.,  Ill,  pp.  3-6;  Swinton,  pp.  267-268;  Alexander, 
pp.   319-320. 

33.  According  to  the  official  returns  for  April  30,  1863,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  numbered  "  about  130,000  "  with  404  guns;  the  Confederate 
returns  for  March  31st  gave  an  efiective  total  of  57,112.  Adding  the  in- 
crease received  during  April,  Lee's  army  was  ''  not  less  than  60,000." — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  237  and  239 ;  Alexander,  pp.  320-322. 

34.  "■  Unfortunately,  there  were  in  its  ranks  nearly  twenty-three  thou- 
sand men  whose  term  of  service  expired  in  May.  These  consisted  of 
thirty-three  Xew  York  regiments  and  two  from  Maine,  which  .  .  .  had 


616     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

enlisted  for  two  years  at  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities  in  April,  1861; 
also  eight  regiments  of  Pennsylvania,  mustered  into  service  for  nine 
months  only  by  the  call  for  troops  which  followed  Pope's  disaster  in 
August,  1862.  .  .  .  The  soldiers  appertaining  to  the  first  category, 
trained  up  to  the  hardships  of  war  by  two  years'  campaigning,  were 
about  to  leave  a  great  void  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  the  law  was 
explicit;  they  were  to  be  set  free  on  the  1st  of  May,  1863,  and  if  the 
Federal  general  desired  to  make  use  of  them,  he  had  to  fight  before  that 
time.  A  large  number  of  these  soldiers  were  undoubtedly  disposed  to 
re-enlist,  but  they  wanted  to  avail  themselves  of  the  expiration  of  their 
term  of  service  in  order,  first  of  all,  to  enjoy  a  little  vacation,  and  then 
to  obtain  the  bounties  by  re-enlistment  which  were  offered  by  the  States 
and  the  government  to  the  newly-enlisted  recruits." —  Comte  de  Paris, 
III,  p.  6.     The  italics  are  his. 

35.  Alexander,  p.  323. 

36.  "  The  enemy  must  either  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  be- 
hind his  defences,  and  give  battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  de- 
struction awaits  him." 

37.  Lee's  Official  Report,  quoted  by  Alexander,  p.  328. 

38.  His  wounded  arm  had  to  be  amputated,  but  pneumonia  set  in  and 
on  May  10th  he  died. —  Alexander,  p.  341. 

39.  The  Union  losses  during  the  campaign  of  Chancellorsville  were 
17,287;  the  Confederate,  12, 4:Q3.— Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  237-238; 
Alexander,  pp.  360-362. 

40.  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  152-233 ;  Comte  de  Paris,  III,  pp. 
14-123;  Swinton,  pp.  267-307;  Ropes  (finished  by  Livermore),  III,  pp. 
149-204;  Long,  pp.  246-265;  Longstreet,  pp.  328-330;  Alexander,  pp. 
315-360;  Gordon,  pp.  92-104. 

41.  See  above,  pages  12-13. 

42.  Into  three  corps,  each  of  three  divisions  of  infantry  of  four  bri- 
gades each,  and  five  battalions  of  artillery  with  16  guns  each.  Ewell 
succeeded  Jackson  in  command  of  the  2nd  Corps  and  A.  P.  Hill  received 
the  new  3rd  Corps. —  Alexander,  p.  367;  Longstreet,  pp.  334-335. 

43.  Ewell  and  Longstreet.  Part  of  the  former's  command,  after  cap- 
turing Winchester  on  the  15th,  crossed  the  river  that  same  day  and  oc- 
cupied Hagerstown  and  Sharpsburg. —  Longstreet,  pp.  339-340. 

44.  At  Edward's  Ferry  near  Leesburg. 

45.  Military  blunders  are  usually  punished  by  defeat  and,  incidentally, 
Stuart  got  a  good  beating  at  the  hands  of  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  at  Han- 
over on  June  30th. 

46.  As  General  Alexander  aptly  declares,  p.  374,  "  Hooker's  Chan- 
cellorsville campaign  had  been  lost  by  the  absence  of  his  cavalry,  and 
Lee's  Gettysburg  campaign  was  similarly  compromised." 

47.  So  rapid  had  been  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  that  on  June 
29th  Ewell  had  got  beyond  Carlisle  and  was  on  the  point  of  capturing 
Harrisburg  when  he  was  recalled;  Hill  was  at  Fayetteville  and  Long- 
street  at  Chambersburg. —  Longstreet,  pp.  348-349. 

48.  Meade's  preference  was  for  General  Reynolds,  commanding  the  1st 
Corps. 

49.  Buford's  cavalry. 

50.  In  the  above  narrative  we  have  followed  closely  the  admirable  sum- 
mary given  by  Alexander,  pp.  363-383. 


Notes  617 

51.  So  far  as  can  be  estimated  Meade's  force  at  the  battle  numbered 
about  93,500,  and  Lee's  something  over  70,000. —  Battles  and  Leaders, 
III,  p.  440;  Alexander,  pp.  368-370. 

5-2.  The  following  authorities  were  also  consulted:  Battles  and  Lead- 
ers, III,  pp.  239-433;  Comte  de  Paris,  III,  pp.  610-696;  Swinton,  pp.  308- 
372;  Swinton,  Twelve  Decisive  Battles,  pp.  311-355;  Alexander,  pp.  363- 
446;  Doubleday,  Chancellorsvile  and  Gettysburg  {Campaigns  of  the  Civil 
War  series),  pp.  87-210;  Ropes,  III,  Book  II,  pp.  415-498;  Long,  pp.  275- 
297;  Longstreet,  pp.  351-428;  Gordon,  pp.  135-176. 

53.  Alexander,  pp.  435-442;   Longstreet,  pp.  426-430;   Gordon,  p.  172. 

54.  Alexander,  p.  440. 

Both  General  Longstreet  and  General  Alexander  —  the  latter  of  whom 
acted  as  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  1st  Corps  and  under  Lee's  direction 
gave  the  order  for  the  ill-fated  charge  of  Pickett's  division  on  the  third 
day  of  the  battle  —  personally  assured  the  author  that,  had  Meade  or- 
ganized a  vigorous  pursuit  after  Gettysburg,  the  Southern  army  would 
have  been  annihilated  or  captured  in  toto  before  it  got  over  the  Potomac. 

55.  Swinton,  pp.  373-401. 

56.  Page  113. 

57.  Vicksburg  was  of  the  utmost  strategic  importance  because  it  oc- 
cupied the  first  heights  adjacent  to  the  river  below  Memphis  and  was 
the  only  point  then  connecting  the  Confederacy  on  both  sides  of  the 
Mississippi.  So  long  as  it  was  held,  the  Federals  could  not  control  the 
river. 

58.  On  January  29th,  1863,  Grant  arrived  at  Young's  Point,  opposite 
Vicksburg,  and  assumed  command  of  all  the  troops  next  day. —  Grant, 
Memoirs,  I,  p.  441. 

59.  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  had,  according  to  his  own  report, 
about  20,000  troops.  His  defeat  at  Jackson  prevented  the  relief  of 
Vicksburg. 

60.  Delivered  on  May  19th  and  22nd. 

61.  Grant's  army  ranged  from  33,000  at  the  start  of  the  campaign 
to  75,000  at  the  close,  and  his  losses  amounted  to  9,362.  Pember- 
ton's  maximum  force  was  "  over  40,000."  The  number  comprised  in 
the  capitulation  —  including  non-combatants  —  was  29,491. —  Battles 
and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  549-550.  Grant  says  {Memoirs,  I,  p.  572), 
that  "  At  Vicksburg,  31,600  prisoners  were  surrendered,  together 
with  172  cannon,  about  60,000  muskets  and  a  large  amount  of  ammuni- 
tion." 

62.  The  above  narrative  follows  the  accounts  as  given  by  Grant  in  his 
Memoirs,  I,  pp.  437-574;  in  Battles  and  Leader's,  III,  pp.  493-537,  which 
also  contains  some  other  interesting  articles  on  this  campaign;  Sher- 
man, I,  pp.  304-334;  James  Harrison  Wilson,  Under  the  Old  Flag, 
I,  pp.   173-222;   Gordon,  pp.   177,   185-187. 

63.  Grant,  Memoirs,  I,  pp.  567-568. 

64.  Compare  Sherman,  I,  p.  334. 

65.  Grant,  Memoirs,  I,  pp.  574-575. 

66.  During  August  and  the  first  half  of  September,  1863. 

67.  By  a  telegram  from  Halleck,  dated  October  3rd,  which  reached 
Grant  at  New  Orleans  on  the  10th.     He  left  that  day  for  Cairo. 

68.  Grant,  I,  pp.  578-584. 

69.  On  September  19th  and  20th.     See  Longstreet,  pp.  438-460. 


618      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

70.  Gist,  The  Army  of  the  Cumherlamd  {Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War 
series),  p.  227. 

71.  Roseeran's  forces  were  about  56,965  and  his  losses  in  killed, 
wounded  and  captured,  16,179.  Bragg's  army  is  estimated  at  71,551, 
and  his  casualties  amounted  to  17,804. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp. 
673  and  675.  The  figures  given  by  Gist,  p.  228,  vary  only  slightly  from 
the  above,  except  that  Bragg's  losses  are  placed  at  20,950.  On  the  other 
hand,  Alexander,  p.  464,  gives  the  Confederate  casualties  as  16,199. 

Longstreet,  p.  458,  gives  Roseeran's  army  at  60,867  and  Bragg's  at 
59,242,  their  respective  losses  being  16,550  and  17,800. 

72.  Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  E.  Sheridan,  I,  p.  289. 

73.  Gist,  pp.  23-242. 

74.  Ihid.,  p.  234;  Grant,  II,  pp.  17-18. 

75.  Sheridan,  I,  p.  302. 

76.  Sherman  had  advanced  from  Vicksburg,  starting  on  September 
22nd  and  23rd. 

77.  On  October  16th.  Rosecrans  was  given  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio. 

78.  In  September.  Hooker's  force  consisted  of  the  11th  and  12tii 
Corps  amounting  to  some  15,000. 

79.  His  assault  has  been  poetically  called  "  the  battle  above  the 
clouds." 

.  80.  Then  commanding  the  2nd  division,  Fourth  Corps  ( Gen.  Granger ) , 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

81.  Grant,  II,  pp.  19-88;  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  679-727; 
Sheridan,  I,  pp.  302-324;  Gist,  pp.  242-262;  Alexander,  pp.  473-480; 
Comte  de  Paris,  IV,  pp.  246-315;  Sherman,  I,  pp.  347-379;  Wilson,  I, 
pp.   263-303. 

82.  Grant's  effective  strength  at  this  battle  was  60,000;  his  losses, 
5,815. 

Bragg's  forces  were  somewhere  between  30,000  and  41,000,  while  his 
casualties  amounted  to  6,687. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  729-730; 
Grant,  II,  p.  95;  Alexander,  p.  480. 

83.  Grant,  II,  p.  85. 

84.  "  First,  in  sending  away  his  ablest  corps  commander  with  over 
twenty  thousand  troops;  second,  in  sending  away  a  division  of  troops 
on  the  eve  cf  battle;  third,  in  placing  so  much  of  a  force  on  the  plain 
in  front  of  his  impregnable  position.  ...  It  was  his  own  fault  that  he 
did  not  have  more  men  present.  .  .  .  Knoxville  was  of  no  earthly  use 
to  him  while  Chattanooga  was  in  our  hands.  If  he  should  capture 
Chattanooga,  Knoxville  with  its  garrison  would  have  fallen  into  his 
hands  without  a  struggle." —  Grant,  II,  pp.  85,  95  and  96. 

85.  On  November  29th. 

86.  Grant,  II,  pp.  92-98;  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  pp.  731-751;  Alex- 
ander, pp.  480-491;  Comte  de  Paris,  IV,  pp.  223-245;  Gist,  pp.  256-257; 
Sherman,  I,  pp.  364-367,  379-382;  Longstreet,  pp.  490-511;  Wilson,  I, 
pp.  307-314. 

"  Longstreet's  command  probably  numbered  20,000,"  while  Burnside 
had  "  about  12,000  eftective  men."  The  former's  losses  were  1,392,  the 
latter's,  only  693. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  III,  p.  752 ;  Alexander,  pp. 
491-492. 

87.  Grant,  II,  p.  99. 


Notes  619 


CHAPTER  XII 

1.  See  pages  120-121,  and  615. 

2.  "  Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  money  paid  by  drafted 
persons  under  the  act  for  calling  out  the  national  forces,  and  for  other 
purposes,  approved  March  third,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-three,  or 
that  may  be  paid  under  any  act  for  like  purposes,  shall  be  paid  into 
the  treasury  of  the  United  States,  and  shall  be  drawn  out  on  requi- 
sitions, as  are  other  public  moneys,  for  the  expenses  of  the  draft  and 
for  the  procuration  of  substitutes;  for  which  purposes  the  money  so 
paid  is  hereby  appropriated. 

"  Approved  January  16,   1864." 

3.  Page  117. 

4.  Final  Report,  Part  II,  pp.  40-41. 

5.  Just  as  had  happened  during  the  Revolution. 

6.  "  Ward  of  a  city,  town,  township,  precinct,  or  election  district,  or 
of  a  county,  where  the  county  is  not  divided  into  wards,  towns,  town- 
ships, precincts,  or  election  districts." 

7.  Sections  2  and  3. 

8.  Sections  4  and  5. 

9.  Section  10.  Section  6  dealt  with  enrolment,  Sections  7,  8  and  9 
with  seamen  and  marines,  and  Section  11  prescribed  that  the  classes  of 
men  between  the  ages  of  20  and  35  and  between  35  and  45  should  be 
enrolled  simultaneously. 

10.  Section  12.  Section  13  provided  for  additional  surgeons,  and 
Section  14  for  examinations  of  drafted  men  at  various  places  within 
the  enrolment  districts. 

11.  Section   15. 

12.  Sections  20,  21  and  25. 

13.  Section  22.  The  fees  of  agents  and  attorneys  for  making  out 
claims  for  exemption  from  the  draft  were  fixed  at  $5.  Surgeons  and 
physicians  were  not  allowed  any  compensation  for  furnishing  certificates 
of  disability. 

14.  Section  23.  The  fine  ranged  between  $300  and  $10,000,  with  the 
question  of  imprisonment  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  court. 

15.  Section  24. 

16.  Sections  15  and  16. 

17.  Sections  18  and  19. 

18.  Section  17. 

19.  The  full  text  of  the  Act  of  February  24,  1864,  is  given  in  the 
Final  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  pp.  189-195. 

20.  The  Act  of  February  26,  1864,  revived  the  grade  of  Lieutenant- 
General. 

21.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  p.  195. 

22.  Ibid.,  II,  pp.  195-196. 

23.  Ibid.,  II,  pp.  197-198. 

24.  As  the  States  had  outbid  the  Government  in  the  matter  of  boun- 
ties, as  has  been  seen  (pages  128-129),  the  latter  was  evidently  resolved 
to  go  them  one  better.  One  of  the  principal  blunders  of  the  Revolution 
was  thus  about  to  be  repeated  ad  nauseam. 

25.  Section  6. 


620     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Section  3  permitted  recruiting  agents  to  be  sent  into  any  of  the 
rebellious  States  except  Arkansas,  Tennessee  and  Louisiana.  Section  4 
allowed  drafted  men,  substitutes  and  volunteers  to  select  such  organiza- 
tions of  their  own  States  as  were  not  filled  to  the  maximum.  Section  5 
required  the  discharge  of  minors  under  18  years  and  the  dismissal  from 
service  of  any  officer  knowingly  enlisting  any  one  under  sixteen.  Sec- 
tion 7  abolished  travelling  pay  but  allowed  transportation  to  and  from 
the  place  of  rendezvous.  Section  8  credited  those  in  the  naval  service 
enlisted  prior  to  February  24,  1864,  to  the  quota  of  their  district. 
Section  9  permitted  an  absent  person  a  reasonable  notice  upon  his  re- 
turn of  his  having  been  drawn  by  draft,  and  Sections  10  and  11  speci- 
fied that  the  present  act  should  in  nowise  alter  Section  17  of  the  Act 
of  February  24,  1864,  or  existing  laws  relative  to  substitutes. 

26.  In  his  letter  of  April  21,  1778,  to  John  Bannister,  and  his  de- 
spatch of  August  20,  1780,  to  the  President  of  Congress,  See  page 
23,  footnote,  and  pages  28-30. 

27.  See  pages  95-98,  104  and  120. 

28.  Pages  120,  131  and  149. 

29.  Page  120. 

30.  Final  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  42 
and  160. 

31.  The  quotas  assigned  to  the  States  amounted  to  467,434,  but  only 
317,092  were  actually  furnished,  although  commutation  was  paid  by 
52,288  additionally. —  Ihid.,  I,  p.  160;  Phisterer,  p.  6. 

32.  The  State  quotas  totalled  186,981,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
259,515  men  were  actually  furnished,  exclusive  of  the  32,678  by  whom 
commutation  was  paid. —  Ihid.,  I,  p.  160;  Phisterer,  pp.  6-7. 

33.  Out  of  quotas  amounting  to  113,000,  83,652  were  furnished. — 
Ibid.,  I,  p.  160;  Phisterer,  p.  7,  gives  83,612. 

During  July,  1864,  other  calls  were  made  on  New  York  and  Pennsyl- 
vania for  4,000  troops  for  100  days'  service. 

34.  To  346,746.     The  terms  of  service  were  one,  two  or  three  years. 

35.  Two  hundred  and  four  thousand,  five  hundred  and  sixty-eight  out 
of  quotas  amounting  to  290,000. 

36.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  43-47,  Part  II, 
pp.  240-241,  243-244;   Phisterer,  pp.  8-9. 

37.  Grant,  II,  pp.  114-121. 

38.  Morse  states,  II,  p.  278,  that  "  It  is  said  that  Grant,  before  ac- 
cepting the  new  rank  and  taking  Virginia  as  his  special  province,  stipu- 
lated that  he  was  to  be  absolutely  free  from  all  interference,  especially 
on  the  part  of  Stanton.  Whether  this  agreement  was  formulated  or 
not,  it  was  put  into  practical  effect.  No  man  hereafter  interfered  with 
General  Grant.  Mr.  Lincoln  occasionally  made  suggestions,  but  strictly 
and  merely  as  suggestions.  He  distinctly  and  pointedly  said  that  he 
did  not  know,  and  did  not  wish  to  know,  the  general's  plans  of  cam- 
paign." 

39.  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  202-204. 

40.  Grant,  II,  pp.  129-133;  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  339-342. 

41.  Then  at  Dalton,  Georgia.  Sherman's  effective  strength  on  May  1, 
1864,  was  98,797;  Johnston's  on  April  30th,  52,992. —  Battles  and  Lead- 
ers, IV,  pp.  289  and  281;  Sherman,  II,  pp.  23-24. 

42.  Meade's    army    numbered    "  102,869    present    for    duty    with    242 


Notes  621 

gxms,"   "  Lee's   total   force   was   about   64,000,   and   he  had   about   274 
guns." —  Alexander,  pp.  496-497. 

43.  Butler,  with  a  maximum  force  of  about  36,000,  was  to  move 
from  Fort  Monroe  up  the  James  River  toward  Richmond  and  Peters- 
burg; Sigel  with  some  15,000  men  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  was  to 
move  on  Staunton,  and,  upon  being  joined  by  Crook  with  9,000  from 
West  Virginia  and  by  Aver  ell,  was  to  threaten  Lynchburg  which  was 
of  vital  importance  to  Lee  at  Richmond. 

In  the  West,  Banks  with  about  25,000  men  was  to  advance  from  New 
Orleans  against  Mobile. 

44.  At  Germanna  Ford  and  Ely's  Ford. 

45.  Grant's  report.  In  his  Memoirs,  II,  p.  204,  he  asserts  that 
"  More  desperate  fighting  has  not  been  witnessed  on  this  continent  than 
that  of  the  5th  and  0th  of  May." 

46.  Grant's  report  and  Memoirs,  II,  p.  227 ;    Sheridan,  I,  p.  372. 

47.  "  On  the  25th  General  Sheridan  rejoined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  the  raid  on  which  he  started  from  Spottsylvania,  having  destroyed 
the  depots  at  Beaver  Dam  and  Ashland  stations,  four  trains  of  cars, 
large  supplies  of  rations,  and  many  miles  of  railroad- track;  recaptured 
about  four  hundred  of  our  men  on  the  way  to  Richmond  as  prisoners  of 
war;  met  and  defeated  the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Yellow  Tavern;  carried 
the  first  line  of  works  around  Richmond  (but  finding  the  second  line 
too  strong  to  be  carried  by  assault),  recrossed  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy  at  Leadow  Bridge  under  heavy  fire,  and  moved  by  a 
detour  to  Haxall's  Landing,  on  the  James  River,  where  he  communi- 
cated with  General  Butler.  This  raid  had  the  effect  of  drawing  off  the 
whole  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  force,  making  it  comparatively  easy  to 
guard  our  trains." —  Grant's  report.  Also  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  372-393 ; 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  188-193. 

48.  About  34  miles. 

49.  Grant's  report  of  July  22,  1865,  which  says:  "On  the  3rd  of 
June  we  again  assaulted  the  enemy's  works  in  the  hope  of  driving  him 
from  his  position.  In  this  attempt  our  loss  was  heavy,  while  that  of 
the  enemy,  I  have  reason  to  believe,  was  comparatively  light." 

50.  To  Charlottesville  in  order  to  destroy  the  Virginia  Central  Rail- 
road and  the  canal  on  the  James  River  by  which  Lee  was  receiving 
large  supplies.  Sheridan  was  to  rally  to  him  the  force  under  Hunter  — 
who  had  succeeded  Sigel  —  and,  after  accomplishing  his  mission,  was 
to  rejoin  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. —  Grant's  report;  Grant,  Memoirs, 
II,  pp.  282-283;  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  414-416. 

51.  "On  the  1st  of  June  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  at  and  about  Cold 
Harbor,  numbered  103,875  '  present  for  duty,'  and  General  W.  F. 
Smith  brought  from  the  Army  of  the  James  about  10,000."  Grant's 
losses  from  June  1st  to  12th  were  1,844  killed,  9,077  wounded,  and  1,816 
captured  or  missing,  a  total  of  12,737. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  187. 

"  The  Confederate  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War  gives 
1,200  wounded  and  500  missing  from  June  1st  to  12th." — Alexander, 
p.  542.  Humphreys,  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '6^  and  '65  (Campaigns 
of  the  Civil  War  series),  p.  192,  says  that  "the  actual  number  was 
probably  much  greater."  Phisterer,  p.  216,  gives  the  Confederate  losses 
for  those  twelve  days  at  1,700. 

General  Grant  evidently  forgot  Napoleon's  injunction,  "  Do  not  attack 


622      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

in  front  positions  ivhich  you  obtain  hy  turning  them." —  Precis  des 
Guerres  du  Marechal  Turenne,  18th  observation,  Corresp.  XXXII,  p.  133. 
In  his  report  of  July  22nd,  Grant  acknowledged  that  "  It  Avas  the 
only  general  attack  made  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  which  did  not 
inflict  upon  the  enemy  losses  to  compensate  for  our  own  losses." 

52.  Grant's  report. 

53.  During  these  forty-three  days  terminating  on  June  19,  1864,  gener- 
ally known  as  "  the  Wilderness  campaign,"  Grant's  maximum  strength 
was  about  118,000  of  all  arms.  His  losses  from  May  otli  to  June  loth,  both 
inclusive,  were  no  less  than  54,929,  and  those  from  June  15th  to  19th, 
10,586,  making  a  grand  total  of  65,515. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p. 
182;  Phisterer,  p.  217;  Humphreys,  p.  224.  According  to  Alexander, 
p.  559,  they  were  62,750.  On  tlie  other  hand.  Grant  gives  (II,  p.  290) 
a  statement  of  losses  from  May  5th  to  June  12th,  inclusive,  compiled 
in  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  which  sets  forth  his  casualties  in  de- 
tail and  placed  the  total  killed,  wounded  and  missing  at  39,259. 

Lee  had  about  95,000  —  including  24,000  under  Beauregard,  who  was 
charged  to  oppose  Butler  and  was  subsequently  reinforced  to  about 
30,000.  Owing  to  incomplete  returns,  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  accu- 
rately the  Confederate  losses,  but  they  were  undoubtedly  in  excess  of 
20,000.—  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  184 ;  Alexander,  pp.  529,  532,  542 
and  559;  Phisterer,  pp.  216-217;  Swinton,  p.  492;  Humphreys,  p.  225; 
Long,  p.  348. 

In  other  words,  Grant's  losses  were  nearly  three  times  as  great 
as  Lee's. 

54.  Until  April  3,  1865. 

55.  During  the  rest  of  the  year  Grant's  army  varied  in  strength  from 
77,321  — on  July  31st  —  to  110,364  on  December  31st;  while  Lee's 
minimum  was  34,077  (August  31st)  and  his  maximum  66,533  (De- 
cember 20th ) . 

That  there  was  a  good  deal  of  hard  fighting  is  evinced  by  the  fact 
that  Grant's  losses  from  June  to  December,  both  inclusive,  were  no  less 
than  47,554. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  593-594.  The  Confederate 
casualties  during  the  same  period  were  between  12  and  14,000. —  Alex- 
ander, p.  575. 

56.  Sherman,  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  249.  Other  interesting 
accounts  of  the  operations  in  Virginia  during  1864  will  be  found  in 
Ibid.,  IV,  pp.  97-246,  533-589;  Grant,  II,  pp.  176-343;  Sheridan,  I,  pp. 
357-500;  Alexander,  pp.  493-581;  Humphreys,  pp.  1-307;  Swinton,  pp. 
402-553;  Long,  pp.  322-351,  369-404;  Longstreet,  pp.  551-581;  Gordon, 
pp.  234-286;  Wilson,  I,  pp.  405-532. 

57.  On  May  4th  Butler  began  his  advance  from  Fort  Monroe  up  the 
James,  occupying  City  Point  and  Bermuda  Hundred  next  day  and  de- 
stroying part  of  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railroad  on  the  7th. 
On  the  13th  and  14th  he  captured  a  portion  of  the  Confederate  de- 
fences at  Drewry's  Bluff,  but  on  the  16th  he  was  attacked  and  "  drew 
back  into  his  intrenchments  between  the  forks  of  the  James  and  Appo- 
mattox rivers.  .  .  .  His  army,  therefore,  though  in  a  position  of  great 
security,  was  as  completely  shut  off  from  further  operations  directly 
against  Richmond  as  if  it  had  been  in  a  bottle  strongly  corked." — 
Grant's  report  of  July  22,  1865. 

Crook  gave  his  cavalry  column  to  Averell,  who  destroyed  part  of  the 


Notes  623 

Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad  and  joined  his  chief  at  Union  on 
May  15th.  Sigel  moved  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  was  defeated  with 
heavy  loss  at  New  Market  on  June  15th  and  retreated  behind  Cedar 
Creek. 

Hunter  —  who  succeeded  him  by  Grant's  demand  —  was  victorious  at 
Piedmont  on  June  5th,  united  with  Crook  and  Averell  at  Staunton  on 
the  8th  and  invested  Lynchburg  on  the  ICth.  After  some  skirmishing 
during  the  next  two  days,  the  lack  of  ammunition  forced  him  to  retreat. 
—  Grant's  report.     Also  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  480-492. 

58.  Near  Frederick,  Maryland. 

Early  had  about  10,000,  Wallace  6,050. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV, 
p.  499. 

59.  Ihid.,  IV,  p.  498;  Sheridan,  I,  p.  459,  quite  agrees  with  this  state- 
ment. 

60.  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  460-461;  Pond,  The  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1864 
{Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  series),  pp.  94-110. 

61.  On  July  2nd  Sheridan  had  finished  his  second  raid  (footnote  50) 
"  after  marching  and  fighting  for  fifty  consecutive  days."  A  third  ex- 
pedition begun  on  July  26th  was  discontinued  owing  to  the  impossibility 
of  "  carrying  Petersburg  by  assault."  On  July  31st  he  was  selected 
by  Grant  to  command  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  which  "  at  this  time 
was  of  vast  importance  to  Lee's  army." — Sheridan,  I,  pp.  414-461. 
Also  Grant,  II,  pp.  316-322. 

62.  Sheridan,  I,  p.  467;  Pond,  p.  120. 

63.  The  return  for  August,  1864,  showed  56,618  officers  and  men  pres- 
ent for  duty. —  Pond,  p.  265. 

64.  On  August  15th  Early's  maximum  force  was  about  20,000. — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  352;   Sheridan,  I,  p.  471. 

65.  On  August  17th  Sheridan  was  joined  by  General  James  H.  Wil- 
son with  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division. —  Wilson,  I,  pp.  533  and  539. 

66.  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  475-499. 

67.  On  September  10th  Sheridan  had  about  43,000  officers  and  men 
in  the  field,  exclusive  of  garrisons  amounting  to  some  7,000.  His  losses 
at  Winchester  were  5,018,  Early's  3,611. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV, 
pp.  531-532. 

68.  The  Union  casualties  w^ere  only  528,  the  Confederate,  1,235. — 
Ibid. 

69.  Sheridan's  losses  in  this  battle  were  5,665.  Early  had  1,860 
killed  and  wounded,  in  addition  to  1,200  captured. —  Ibid.;  Pond,  p.  239. 

70.  This  successful  campaign  cost  the  Union  forces  16,952  in  casual- 
ties. 

Some  of  the  authorities  consulted  are  Sheridan,  I,  pp.  462-500,  II, 
pp.  1-104;  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  500-530;  Pond,  pp.  1-273;  Grant, 
II,  pp.  316-321,  327-340;  Wilson,  I,  pp.  548-563;  Gordon,  pp.  314- 
372. 

71.  Sherman  on  The  Grand  Strategy  of  the  Last  Tear  of  the  War. — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  250. 

72.  According  to  the  returns  of  May  1,  1864,  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland (Major  General  Thomas)  had  60,773  present  for  duty  and  130 
guns;  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  (Major  General  McPherson)  24,465 
and  96  guns;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  (Major  General  Schofield) 
13,559  and  28  guns. —  Sherman,  II,  pp.  23-24.     On  June  1st  his  effective 


624      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

strength   was   112,819,   and  on  the  8th  the   17th  Corps  joined  him. — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  289. 

73.  On  April  30th  Johnston's  army,  "  present  for  duty,"  numbered 
52,992  and  144  guns;  on  June  10th  its  strength  was  70,878. —  Battles 
and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  281-282. 

74.  These  were  only  the  major  actions.  During  the  month  of  June, 
*'  not  a  day,  not  an  hour,  not  a  minute  was  there  a  cessation  of  lire." — 
Sherman  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  252. 

75.  General  McPherson  was  killed  on  July  22nd.  General  0.  0. 
Howard  succeeded  him  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

76.  Sherman  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  254. 

77.  Sherman  to  Halleck,  August  7,  1864. —  Sherman,  II,  p.  101. 

78.  Sherman's  losses  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  were  31,687;  the 
Confederate  casualties  —  including  12,983  prisoners  —  amounted  to 
34,979. —  Sherman,  II,  pp.  133-134;  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  289 
and  292. 

79.  25  miles  southwest  of  Atlanta. 

80.  From  Dallas  a  force  was  sent  to  destroy  the  railway  above  Mari- 
etta and  French's  division  to  capture  Allatoona,  but  the  latter  was 
repulsed  by  Corse  (4th  division,  15th  Corps)  on  October  5th. —  Battles 
and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  254,  322-323;  Sherman,  II,  pp.  144-150. 

81.  "  The  army  had  undergone  many  changes  since  the  capture  of 
Atlanta.  .  .  .  These  five  corps  were  very  much  reduced  in  strength,  by 
detachments  and  by  discharges,  so  that  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  Hood 
I  had  only  about  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  with  two  small 
divisions  of  cavalry  (Kilpatrick's  and  Garrard's)." — Sherman,  II,  pp. 
145-146. 

82.  217  miles  from  Atlanta  and  105  south- southwest  from  Nashville. 

83.  The  official  returns  for  November  10th  show  an  aggregate  strength 
of  59,545.— Sherman,  II,  pp.  172-173. 

84.  "  According  to  the  great  Napoleon,  the  fundamental  maxim  for 
successful  war  is  to  '  converge  a  superior  force  on  the  critical  point  at 
the  critical  time.'  In  1864  the  main  '  objectives  '  were  Lee's  and  John- 
ston's armies,  and  the  critical  point  was  thought  to  be  Richmond  or 
Atlanta,  whichever  should  be  longer  held.  Had  General  Grant  over- 
whelmed and  scattered  Lee's  army  and  occupied  Richmond  he  would 
have  come  to  Atlanta;  but  as  I  happened  to  occupy  Atlanta  first,  and 
had  driven  Hood  off  to  a  divergent  line  of  operations  far  to  the  west, 
it  was  good  strategy  to  leave  him  to  a  subordinate  force,  and  with  my 
main  army  to  join  Grant  at  Richmond.  The  most  practicable  route  to 
Richmond  was  nearly  a  thousand  miles  in  distance,  too  long  for  a  single 
march;  hence  the  necessity  to  reach  the  sea-coast  for  a  new  base.  Sa- 
vannah, distant  three  hundred  miles,  w^as  the  nearest  point." —  Sherman 
in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  255. 

85.  The  above  narrative  follows  closely  the  admirable  article  by  Gen- 
eral Sherman  just  alluded  to,  supplemented  Sherman's  Memoirs,  II, 
pp.  5-232;  the  various  accounts  given  in  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the 
Civil  War,  IV,  pp.  260-344  and  663-683;  Cox,  Atlanta  (Campaigns  of 
the  Civil  War  series),  pp.  1-239;  Cox,  The  March  to  the  Sea  —  Franklin 
and  Nashville  (Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  series),  pp.  1-61;  Swinton, 
Twelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  pp.  385-425;  Wilson,  II,  pp.  3-20. 

86.  The  arrival  of  Forrest's  cavalrv  on  November   15th  gave  an  asr- 


Notes  625 

gregate  strength  to  Hood's  Army  of  Tennessee  of  53,938. —  Battles  and 
Leaders,  IV,  p.  474;  Cox,  pp.  11-12. 

87.  Sehofield  had  about  28,000  troops.  His  losses  were  only  2,326, 
whereas  Hood's  casualties  were  6,252,  including  two  generals. —  Ibid., 
IV,  pp.  257,  444  and  473;  Cox,  pp.  96-97;  Phisterer,  p.  218. 

88.  The  available  Union  force  in  and  about  Nashville  on  December  15, 
1864,  was  at  least  55,000;  Thomas  had  about  43,260  engaged  in  the 
battle.  His  losses  were  only  3,057,  while  Hood's  were  at  least  15,000, 
the  majority  being  taken  prisoners. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  258, 
473  and  474;  Cox,  p.  127;  Phisterer,  p.  218. 

Some  of  the  authorities  consulted  for  this  campaign  are  Battles  and 
Leaders,  IV,  pp.  425-471;  Cox,  pp.  81-136;  Grant,  II,  pp.  377-386; 
Swinton,  Twelve  Decisive  Battles,  pp.  426-477;  Wilson,  II,  pp.  23-157. 

CHAPTER  XIII 

1.  Medical  directors  of  armies  in  the  field  consisting  of  two  or  more 
army  corps,  and  of  military  departments  with  hospitals  containing 
4,000  beds  or  upwards  were  to  have  the  rank,  pay  and  emoluments  of 
a  colonel  of  cavalry;  medical  directors  of  army  corps  or  of  departments 
with  less  than  4,000  beds,  those  of  a  lieutenant-colonel  of  cavalry. 
"  But  this  increased  rank  and  pay  shall  only  continue  to  medical  officers 
while  discharging  such  special  duties;  and  the  assignments  from  time 
to  time  to  such  duty  shall  be  at  least  two  thirds  of  them  made  from 
the  surgeons  and  assistant  surgeons  of  volunteers."  Approved  Febru- 
ary 25,  1865. —  Final  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II, 
p.  198. 

2.  Section  2  inflicted  a  fine  of  from  $250  to  $1,000  for  demanding  or 
receiving  a  reward  for  information  respecting  a  prisoner  in  the  jail 
of  the  District  of  Columbia. 

3.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  II,  pp.  203-205. 

4.  Acts  of  March  3,  1863,  of  February  24,  1864,  and  of  July  4,  1864. 
See  above,  pages  115-118,  129-130,  131-132. 

5.  Sections  3  and  11. 

Section  one  fixed  the  pay  of  soldiers  acting  as  officers'  servants  and 
forbade  non-commissioned  officers  to  act  in  such  capacity.  Section  2 
provided  that  soldiers  in  the  volunteer  service  should  receive  the  same 
clothing  as  those  in  the  Regular  Army. 

6.  Section  4. 

Section  5  prescribed  that  colored  men  mustered  into  service  in  South 
Carolina  by  Generals  Hunter  and  Saxton  should  have  the  same  pay  and 
rations  as  other  volunteers. 

7.  Sections  6  and  7. 

8.  Section  8. 

9.  Section  9. 

Section  10  provided  that  only  generals  commanding  separate  armies 
in  the  field,  geographical  divisions  or  departments  were  entitled  to  the 
double  rations  allowed  by  the  Act  of  August  23,  1842. 

10.  Section  12. 

Sections  13,  14  and  15  dealt  with  credits  for  quotas  furnished. 

11.  Section   16. 

12.  Sections  17,  18  and  19. 


626      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

13.  Section  20. 

14.  Section  21.  Congress  had  at  last  determined  to  tolerate  no  non- 
sense and  had  learned  that  war  involves  drastic  measures. 

Section  22  repealed  the  3rd  Section  of  the  Act  of  July  4,  1864. 

15.  Section  23. 

Section  24  made  a  slight  amendment  in  Section  15  of  the  Act  of 
February  24,   1864. 

16.  Section  25. 

17.  Section  26. 

Section  27  was  the  enacting  clause.  This  act,  which  was  approved 
March  3,  1865,  is  given  in  extenso  in  the  Final  Report  of  the  Provost 
Marshal  General,  Part  II,  pp.  199-203. 

18.  Humphreys,  p.  311;  Alexander,  pp.  585-586;  Gordon,  pp.  378-382. 

19.  Sherman,  II,  pp.  272,  292-293.  On  February  1st  his  army  num- 
bered 60,079,  on  March  1st  b1,QlQ.—  Ihid.,  II,  pp.  269-270;  Battles  and 
Leaders,  IV,  p.  698. 

20.  See  pp.  136-137.  Johnston's  command  consisted  of  the  rem- 
nants of  Hood's  army  which  had  been  hurriedly  brought  from  Tupelo, 
Mississippi,  the  forces  under  Hardee,  Wheeler  and  Hampton,  and  such 
troops  as  could  be  drawn  from  various  scattered  garrisons.  At  its 
maximum  it  numbered  31,243. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  768. 

21.  Alexander,  pp.  588  and  590;  Long,  pp.  404-406;  Longstreet,  p.  592. 
Grant's  "  effective  force,  by  his  latest  returns,  was  101,000  infantry, 

9000  artillery,  14,700  cavalry,  total  124,700,  with  369  guns.  Lee's 
forces  by  his  latest  return,  Feb.  28,  were  46,000  infantry,  5000  artil- 
lery, and  6000  cavalry,  total  57,000,  from  which  3000  should  be  de- 
ducted for  desertions  in  March." — Alexander,  p.  590.  Also  Battles 
and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  751  and  753. 

22.  Alexander,  pp.  588-589;  Gordon,  pp.  394-413;  Battles  and  Leaders, 
IV,  pp.  579-589;  Longstreet,  pp.  594-595. 

23.  With  about  10,000  troops.— Sheridan,  II,  p.  112. 

24.  Ihid.,  II,  pp.  112-125. 

Sixteen  hundred  officers  and  men,  11  guns,  17  battle  flags,  etc.,  were 
captured  from  Early  on  March  2nd. —  Ihid.,  II,  p.  116;  Grant's  report  of 
July  22,  1865. 

25.  Sherman  arrived  in  person  at  City  Point  on  March  27th  and  had  a 
conference  with  Grant  that  night,  at  part  of  which  Sheridan  was  pres- 
ent.—  Grant's  report;  Sherman,  II,  pp.  324-325;  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  131- 
133. 

26.  "  Grant,  on  this  occasion,  concentrated  practically  his  entire 
force  in  the  attack  upon  our  right,  whereas,  in  the  fall,  he  had  never 
attacked  upon  one  flank  without  some  demonstration,  at  least,  upon  the 
other." —  Alexander,  p.  590. 

27.  "  It  is  not  the  intention  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched 
position,  but  to  force  him  out,  if  possible." —  Grant  to  Sheridan,  March 
28,  1865. 

28.  Grant's  report;  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  149-154;  Humphreys,  pp.  330- 
342. 

29.  Grant's  report;  Grant,  Memoirs,  II,  pp.  443-446;  Sheridan,  II, 
pp.  156-165;  Humphreys,  pp.  342-356;  Battles  and  Leaders,  TV,  pp. 
708-714;  Long,  pp.  407-411;   Longstreet,  pp.  597-609;   Gordon,  pp.  414- 


Notes  627 

428;  Alexander,  p.  591;  Swinton,  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac, pp.  596-COl ;  Swinton,  Tivelve  Decisive  Battles,  pp.  488-506. 

So  far  as  can  be  ascertained  the  Union  loss  was  confined  to  884, 
whereas  the  Confederates  had  upward  of  5,000  hors  de  combat,  aside 
from  the  loss  of  6  guns  and  13  colors. —  Phisterer,  p.  218;  Sheridan, 
II,  p.   165;    Humphreys,   pp.   353-354;    Alexander,  p.  591. 

At  the  close  of  the  battle  Sheridan  relieved  Warren  and  placed  Gen- 
eral Griffin  in  command  of  the  5th  Corps. 

30.  "  On  the  morning  of  the  3d  pursuit  was  commenced.  General 
Sheridan  pushed  for  the  Danville  Road,  keeping  near  the  Appomattox, 
followed  by  General  Meade  with  the  2d  and  6th  Corps,  while  General 
Ord  moved  for  Burkesville,  along  the  South  Side  of  the  Road;  the  9th 
Corps  stretched  along  that  road  behind  him." —  Grant's  report. 

31.  Grant,  II,  pp.  455-456. 

32.  Lee  had  ordered  a  large  store  of  supplies  to  be  sent  to  this  point 
from  Danville,  but  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  train  misunderstood  his 
instructions  and  failed  to  unload  them  at  Amelia.  As  a  result  they 
were  carried  on  to  Richmond  where  they  were  burned  in  some  of  the 
numerous  conflagrations  when  the  city  was  bombarded  and  evacuated. 
To  Lee's  famished  army  the  loss  of  these  provisions  was  irreparable. — 
Alexander,  p.  594;  Long,  p.  412. 

33.  Grant's  report. 

34.  Ibid.;  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  179-184;  Humphreys,  pp.  380-384. 

35.  Humphreys,  pp.  380-381. 

36.  Sheridan's  cavalry  —  except  one  division  —  and  the  5th  Corps  via 
Prince  Edward's  Court  House;  the  Army  of  the  James  (Ord)  and  the 
6th  Corps  (Wright)  and  one  cavalry  division  by  Farmville;  and  the 
2nd   Corps    ( Humphreys )    by  the  High  Bridge  Road. —  Grant's  report. 

37.  Humphreys,  pp.  388-391. 

38.  Grant's  report;  Grant,  Memoirs,  II,  pp.  478-480. 

39.  "  The  Confederates  began  the  retreat  from  Richmond  with  but 
one  ration,  and  when  no  supplies  were  met  at  Amelia  Courthouse,  they 
were  reduced  to  such  scant  store  as  could  be  collected  from  the  poor 
and  almost  exhausted  region  through  which  they  passed.  .  .  .  The 
misery  of  the  famished  troops  during  the  4th,  5th,  6th  and  7th  of  April 
passes  all  experience  of  military  anguish  since  the  retreat  from  the 
banks  of  the  Beresina.  '  Toward  evening  of  the  5th,'  says  one  eye-wit- 
ness, '  and  all  day  long  upon  the  6th,  hundreds  of  men  dropped  from 
exhaustion,  and  thousands  let  fall  their  muskets  from  inability  to  carry 
them  any  further.  The  scenes  of  the  5th,  6th,  7th  and  8th  were  of  a 
nature  which  can  be  apprehended  in  its  vivid  reality  only  by  men  who 
are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  harrowing  details  of  war.'  " —  Swinton, 
Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  613. 

Humphreys  says,  p.  386,  that  on  the  7th  "  At  Farmville  rations  were 
distributed  to  Lee's  army,  80,000  having  been  placed  there  to  await  its 
arrival." 

40.  "  The  next  day,  the  8th,  was  the  first  quiet  day  of  our  retreat. 
The  2nd  corps  followed  us  up  closely,  but  there  was  no  collision." — 
Alexander,  p.  600. 

41.  Grant's  report. 

42.  Long,  pp.  420-422;  Longstreet,  pp.  623-626;  Gordon,  pp.  436-437. 

43.  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  190-200. 


628     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

44.  Grant's  report;  Grant,  II,  pp.  485-486. 

45.  At  which  Generals  Grant,  Lee,  Sheridan,  Ord,  Ingalls,  Rawlins, 
Williams  and  Barnard,  Colonels  Porter,  Marshall  —  Lee's  Chief  of 
Staff  —  Babcock,  Parker,  Bowers,  Dent  and  Badeau,  and  other  mem- 
bers of  Grant's  staff  were  present. 

46.  "  Appomattox  C.  H.,  Va., 

Apl.  9th,   1865. 
Gen.  R.  E.  Lee, 

Comd'g  C.  S.  A. 
Gen:  In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter  to  you  of  the 
8th  inst.,  I  propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  N.  Va.  on 
the  following  terms,  to  wit:  Rolls  of  all  officers  and  men  to  be  made 
in  duplicate.  One  copy  to  be  given  to  an  officer  designated  by  me, 
the  other  to  be  retained  by  such  officer  or  officers  as  you  may  designate. 
The  officers  to  give  their  individual  paroles  not  to  take  up  arms 
against  the  Government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged, 
and  each  company  or  regimental  commander  sign  a  like  parole  for  the 
men  of  their  commands.  The  arms,  artillery  and  public  property  to  be 
parked  and  stacked,  and  turned  over  to  the  officer  appointed  by  me  to 
receive  them.  This  will  not  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the  officers,  nor 
their  private  horses  or  baggage.  This  done,  each  officer  and  man  will 
be  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  United 
States  authority  so  long  as  they  observe  their  paroles  and  the  laws  in 
force  where  they  may  reside. 

Very  respectfully, 

U.  S.  Grant, 

Lt.  Gen." 

47.  "  Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

April  9,  1865. 
General  :  —  I  received  your  letter  of  this  date  containing  the  terms 
of  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as  proposed  by  you. 
As  they  are  substantially  the  same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter 
of  the  8th  inst.,  they  are  accepted.  I  will  proceed  to  designate  the 
proper  officers  to  carry  the  stipulations  into  effect. 

R.  E.  Lee,  General. 
Lieut.-General  U.  S.  Grant." 

48.  Grant,  II,  pp.  486-495;  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  200-202;  Lee's  Memoirs, 
pp.  422-423;  Gen.  Horace  Porter  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  729- 
744. 

49.  Grant,  II,  p.  500;  Longstreet,  p.  631. 

They  were  divided  as  follows:  infantry,  22,349;  cavalry,  1,559;  ar- 
tillery, 2,576;  general  headquarters  and  miscellaneous  troops,  1,747. — 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  753. 

50.  Grant,  II,  p.  500. 

The  Union  losses  during  this  campaign  were  10,515. —  Battles  and 
Leaders,  IV,  p.  751. 

51.  See  above,  p.  134,  footnote. 

52.  First  against  McClellan  before  Richmond;  second  against  Pope  in 
front  of  Washington;  third  against  McClellan  in  Maryland;  fourth 
against  Burnside  before  Fredericksburg;    fifth   against  Hooker   on  the 


Notes  629 

Rappahannock;  sixth  against  Meade  in  Pennsylvania;  and  seventh 
against  Grant  in  Virginia. 

53.  Alexander,  p.  619,  who  gives  the  following  interesting  summary 
(pp.  618-619)  : 

"  This  last  campaign  endured  for  eleven  months,  during  which  the 
guns  were  scarcely  silent  a  single  day.  Lee's  army  at  its  greatest  num- 
bered less  than  85,000  men  {sic).  It  put  hors  de  combat  more  than 
262,000  Federals  within  the  period  mentioned. 

"  The  following  figures  are  from  the  official  archives,  in  the  War 
Record  Office  in  Washington,  showing  the  Federal  numbers  killed, 
wounded  and  missing  in  each  campaign,  with  a  deduction  of  2,000  from 
the  first  for  the  casualties  occurring  before  June  1,  1862. 

Aggregate 
Campaigns  Dates  Loss 

McClellan    June  1,  1862,  to  Aug.  8,  1862 22,448 

Pope June  26,  1862,  to  Sept.  2,  1862 16,955 

McClellan    Sept.  3,  1862,  to  Nov.  14,  1862 28,577 

Burnside    Nov.  15,  1862,  to  Jan.  25,  1863 13,214 

Booker Jan.  26,  1863,  to  Jan.  27,  1863 25,027 

Meade      June  28,   1863,  to  May  4,   1864 31,530 

Grant May  4,  1864,  to  April  9,  1865 124,390 


Aggregate   262,141 

"  These  figures  include  nothing  for  Longstreet's  corps  at  Chicka- 
mauga  and  Knoxville,  it  having  been  detached  from  Lee  from  Septem- 
ber 1,  1863,  to  April  30,  1864.  They  would  add  many  thousands  to  this 
list  of  casualties  could  they  be  included." 

General  Alexander  errs  in  stating  that  Lee's  maximum  force  was 
"  less  than  85,000  men."  In  June,  1862,  Lee  had  about  90,000  troops, 
and  two  years  later  his  force,  combined  with  that  of  Beauregard,  num- 
bered  close  to  95,000   (see  pages  111,  135  and  622,  footnote  53). 

54.  Page  141  and  footnote  25  on  page  626. 

55.  Sherman  replied  to  Johnston's  proposal  on  April  14th  and  on  the 
18th  an  agreement  was  reached  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  and  as 
a  basis  for  peace.  The  new  President,  Johnson  —  Lincoln  having  been 
assassinated  on  April  15th  —  and  Secretary  Stanton  very  unjustly  de- 
nounced Sherman  for  terms  which  were  only  conditional.  Their  disap- 
proval was  communicated  to  Sherman  by  Grant  in  person  on  the  24th, 
but  two  days  later  a  satisfactory  arrangement  was  made. —  Sherman, 
II,  pp.  346-363;  Grant's  report  and  Memoirs,  II,  pp.  514-517;  Battles 
and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  755-757. 

According  to  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  November  22,  1865, 
the  number  of  troops  under  Johnston  surrendered  and  paroled  was 
31,243. —  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  p.  768.  Ihid.,  p.  700,  gives  the  num- 
ber as  37,047  —  including  non-combatants;  Sherman,  II,  p.  370,  says 
that  there  were  36,817,  and  Phisterer,  p.  219,  gives  29,924. 

56.  Grant's  report;  Grant,  II,  pp.  518-522;  Wilson,  II,  pp.  189-334; 
Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  759-761. 

Wilson,  in  addition  to  taking  "  five  fortified  cities  and  towns," 
"  marched  825  miles  and  captured  10,052  prisoners,  35  colors  and  320 
guns  in  the  open  field  and  behind  fortifications."     His  losses  from  the 


630     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

time  he  left  Nashville  until  he  captured  Cobb  were  only  1,667. —  Wilson, 
pp.  293-294. 

57.  Grant's  report;  Grant,  II,  pp.  521-522. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

1.  See  above,  pages  94  and  96. 

2.  The  Union  loss  during  the  war  in  killed,  and  deaths  from  wounds, 
disease  or  other  cause  in  the  field  was  349,944,  and  30,156  died  while 
prisoners,  making  a  total  of  380,100  died. 

Two  hundred  and  twelve  thousand,  six  hundred  and  eight  were  cap- 
tured and  16,431  paroled  on  the  field,  while  no  less  than  199,105  de- 
serted.    The  grand  total  is  thus  808,244. 

No  authoritative  statistics  exist  of  the  number  of  Confederates  killed, 
but  more  than  133,821  died  of  wounds  or  disease  in  the  field  and  30,152 
while  prisoners.  Those  captured  numbered  476,169,  248,599  were  pa- 
roled and  at  least  104,428  deserted.  The  total  of  this  incomplete  list  is 
993,169. —  Figures  compiled  by  the  Adjutant-General's  office  and  quoted 
hy  Strait,  p.  145.  These  statistics  are  of  a  later  date  than  those  given 
by  Battles  and  Leaders,  IV,  pp.  767-768. 

3.  See  page  100  and  footnote  43  on  pp.  606-607. 

4.  Allusion  has  just  been  made  to  the  Union  losses  by  death,  of  which 
239,874  died  from  disease  or  causes  other  than  wounds  or  being  killed 
in  battle. 

"  It  is  authoritatively  stated  that  at  least  three-quarters  died  from 
disease  incident  to  a  soldier's  life,  what  we  call  preventable  diseases. 
In  this  connection  a  curious  fact  appears,  i.e.,  that  those  regiments 
which  suffered  the  greatest  battle  loss  suffered  least  from  disease.  This 
seems  to  indicate  that  for  those  who  were  longest  in  permanent  or  semi- 
permanent camps  there  was  more  danger  than  for  those  on  the  battle- 
field, hence  that  the  delay  incident  to  drilling  raw  men  in  camp  is  one 
of  the  prime  causes  of  mortality  from  disease.  From  this  may  be  de- 
duced the  argument  that  if  we  have  reserves  of  trained  men,  and  are 
thus  enabled  to  push  our  troops  rapidly  into  the  field,  and  into  contact 
with  the  enemy,  a  very  material  saving  in  life  will  be  made." —  Evan 
M.  Johnson,  Jr.,  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  9. 

5.  The  Final  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  p.  77, 
emphasizes  this  fact  and  states  that  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion, 

"  Under  the  head  of  deaths  by  disease  the  influence  of  superior  disci- 
pline in  securing  cleanliness  and  other  conditions  of  health  is  apparent. 
The  loss  of  the  regulars  is  only  42.27,  while  that  of  the  volunteers  is 
59.22  "  per  thousand. 

6.  According  to  the  return  made  by  General  Grant  for  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Tennessee  for  the  month  of  July,  1863,  the  average  strength 
of  his  divisions  present  for  duty  was  only  4,031,  whereas  the  minimum 
number  of  enlisted  infantrymen  in  a  division  —  exclusive  of  those  of 
the  other  arms  —  ought  to  have  been  13,500. —  Johnson,  p.  9. 

Grant  mentions  (II,  p.  322)  the  embarrassment  to  which  he  as  com- 
mander-in-chief was  put  in  August,  1864,  because  "  Sherman,  who  was 
now  near  Atlanta,  wanted  reinforcements." 

7.  For  example,  McDowell  at  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  Hooker 
at  Chancellor sville.     See  pages  100-101  and  121. 


* 


Notes  631 

Fortunately  Grant  at  Vicksburg  and  Sherman  at  Atlanta  were  more 
fortunate,  although  both  experienced  similar  pressure  from  a  like  cause. 

8.  As  they  did  in  18C3.     See  pages  116,  120  and  126. 

9.  As  provided  by  Section  6  of  the  Act  of  July  22,  1861.     Page  605. 

10.  On  October  24,  1863,  a  circular  issued  by  the  Provost  Marshal 
General  announced  that  $300  would  be  paid  to  all  new  recruits  enlisting 
for  3  years  in  old  organizations. 

11.  As  announced  by  General  Orders,  A'o.  191,  dated  June  23,  1863, 
and  ^0.  305  on  September  11,  1863. 

"  From  December  24,  1863,  to  April  1,  1864,  ...  a  bounty  of  three 
hundred  dollars  ($300)  was  paid  to  recruits  enlisting  for  three  years 
in  any  .three-years  organization  in  service  or  in  process  of  completion. 
.  .  .  From  July  19,  1864,  to  end  of  war,  authorized  by  Act  of  July  4, 
1864,  bounty  was  paid  as  follows: 

To  recruits  enlisting  for  one  year $100  00 

To  recruits  enlisting  for  two  years 200  00 

To   recruits    enlisting   for   three   years 300  00 . . 

"  From  November  28,  1864,  to  the  end  of  the  war,  in  accordance  with 
General  Orders  No.  287,  of  November  28,  1864,  a  special  bounty  of  three 
hundred  dollars  ($300)  from  the  draft  and  substitute  fund  was  paid 
to  men  enlisting  in  the  first  army  corps  upon  being  mustered  into 
service. 

"  This  bounty  was  in  addition  to  that  authorized  by  the  Act  of  July  4, 
1864." —  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  pp.  84-85. 

12.  See  pages  128  and  619.  In  1864  the  State  and  county  bounties  in 
New  York  City  aggregated  $677. —  Bassett,  A  Short  History  of  the 
United  States,  p.  573. 

13.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal,  Part  I,  p.  87. 

14.  Pages   117-119,   128-129. 

15.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  p.  76. 

16.  See  page  630,  footnote  2. 

17.  The  desertion  among  the  troops  from  Connecticut  reached  117.23 
per  thousand  and  112.22  for  New  Hampshire.  The  maximum  —  117.54 
—  was  attained  by  Kansas  but  "  more  than  half  the  male  population  " 
of  that  State  enlisted  and  the  number  of  families  dependent  upon  men 
in  service  was  much  larger  proportionately  than  in  the  case  of  the 
States  just  mentioned. —  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part 
I,  pp.  75-76. 

18.  See  pages  129-132,  139-141. 

19.  ( 1 )  A  furlough  of  at  least  30  days  granted  by  General  Order  of 
November  21,  1863,  to  officers  and  men  re-enlisting  for  3  years;  (2)  a 
bounty  of  $400  payable  in  instalments;  and  (3)  a  distinctive  badge  in 
the  shape  of  "  service  chevrons  "  and  the  title  of  veteran  volunteers. 

20.  Report  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  Part  I,  p.  58. 

21.  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United 
States,  1912,  p.  13. 

Grant,  in  relating  the  events  during  August,  1864,  says  (II,  pp.  322- 
323 )  that  "  Sherman,  who  was  now  near  Atlanta,  wanted  reinforce- 
ments. He  was  perfectly  willing  to  take  the  raw  troops  then  being 
raised  in  the  northwest,  saying  that  he  could  teach  them  more  soldier- 
ing in  one  day  among  his  troops  than  they  would  learn  in  a  week  in  a 
camp  of  instruction." 


632     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

22.  Phisterer,  p.  11;  Fox,  Regimental  Lists  of  the  American  Civil 
War,  p.  49. 

23.  Offioial  Records  in  the  Office  of  The  Adjutant-General ;  Memoran- 
dum Relative  to  the  Probable  Number  and  Ages  of  Army  and  Navy 
Survivors  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  4  (published  by  the  Military  Secretary's 
Office,  May  15,  1905)  ;  Reply  of  General  F.  C.  Ainsicorth,  The  Military 
Secretary,  dated  August  28,  1905,  to  the  author's  letter  of  inquiry,  in 
which  he  stated  that  the  "  Memorandum  Relative  to  the  Probable  Num- 
ber and  Ages  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Survivors  of  the  Civil  War,"  re- 
ferred to  within,  contains  the  latest  and  most  complete  statistical  in- 
formation now  obtainable  from  the  official  records  relative  to  the 
number  of  men  in  service  in  the  Union  Army  during  that  war." 

According  to  the  Memorandum,  "  As  shown  by  the  latest  official 
statistics,  the  number  of  men  furnished  by  the  different  States  and 
Territories  during  the  Civil  War,  under  calls  from  the  President,  was 
2,778,304.  Deducting  from  this  the  number  of  seamen  and  marines, 
105,963,  leaves  a  total  of  2,673,341  credited  to  the  Army." 

24.  The  maximum,  1,500,000,  is  given  by  A.  B.  Cassellman  of  the 
Pension  Office  in  the  Century  for  March,  1892,  p.  792.  The  minimum 
estimate  of  600,000  is  made  by  Southern  writers  like  Early,  Stephens 
and  Jones,  while  Wright  gives  from  600,000  to  700,000,  but,  as  General 
James  Harrison  Wilson,  I,  p.  557,  and  General  Charles  Francis  Adams, 
Studies;  Military  and  Diplomatic,  p.  282  et  seq.,  both  competent  au- 
thorities, declare,  the  Southern  figures  given  after  the  war  were  "  ha- 
bitually understated." 

Livermore,  Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil  »TFar,  pp.  40  and  63, 
reckons  the  numbers  between  1,227,890  and  1,406,180.  These  calcula- 
tions are  at  best  conjectural  since,  as  the  Military  Secretary  wrote,  on 
August  28,  1905,  to  the  author:  "No  compilation  has  ever  been  pre- 
pared by  this  [the  War]  Department  from  which  even  an  approxi- 
mately accurate  statement  can  be  made  concerning  the  number  of 
troops  in  the  Confederate  Army  and  it  is  impracticable  to  make  such 
a  compilation  because  of  the  incompleteness  of  the  collection  of  the 
Confederate  records  in  possession  of  the  Department."  General  Ains- 
worth  further  alluded  to  a  letter,  dated  December  2,  1894,  addressed  to 
Colonel  Livermore  by  Major  George  B.  Davis,  then  in  charge  of  the 
War  Records  Office,  in  which  the  latter  said  that  "  No  attempt  has 
ever  been  made  by  this  office  to  fix  the  total  numbers  of  the  Confederate 
Army,  because  of  the  incomplete  and  fragmentary  character  of  the  data 
in  our  possession."  Moreover,  as  the  Military  Secretary  wrote :  "  He 
referred  Colonel  Livermore  to  an  article  in  the  Century  War  Papers 
(Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Volume  IV,  page  768)  estimat- 
ing the  Confederate  forces  at  one  million,  and  this  reference  appears  to 
have  been  accepted  as  an  estimate  of  the  War  Records  Office." 

25.  Senate  Executive  Document,  No.  206,  Forty-sixth  Congress,  Sec- 
ond Session,  containing  a  letter  to  John  Sherman,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  to  Hon.  William  A.  Wheeler,  President  of  the  Senate,  dated 
June  10,  1880,  transmitting  a  "  Statement  showing  the  expenditures,  as 
far  as  ascertained,  necessarily  growing  out  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
from  July  1,   1861,  to  June  30,   1879,  inclusive." 

The  total  expenditures  were  not  less  than  $6,189,929,908.58,  of  which 


Notes  633 

$411,420,937.50  were  charged  to  the  Navy,   and  $407,192.80   to   Army 
pensions. 

26.  Reports  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,   1913,  p.   10, 
and  June  30,   1914,  p.  33. 


CHAPTER  XV 

1.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  reviewed  in  Washington  by  the 
President  on  May  23,  1865,  and  Sherman's  army  on  the  following  day. 

2.  On  May  17,  1865,  General  Sheridan  was  assigned  to  command  west 
of  the  Mississippi,  his  force  consisting  of  the  troops  under  Generals 
Canby  and  Reynolds,  the  4th  and  25th  Army  Corps,  with  orders  to  sup- 
press all  resistance  in  Louisiana  and  Texas.  Kirby  Smith's  surrender 
(page  144)  occurred  before  he  reached  New  Orleans,  but  he  promptly 
sent  his  cavalry  columns  under  Merritt  and  Custer  to  San  Antonio  and 
Houston  to  prevent  Confederate  soldiers  from  joining  Maximilian. 
Sheridan  then  concentrated  his  entire  force  on  the  Mexican  frontier, 
but  this  show  of  force  was  largely  neutralized  by  the  policy  of  the  State 
Department,  although  it  was  eventually  instrumental  in  causing  Na- 
poleon III  to  evacuate  Mexico. —  Sheridan,  II,  pp.  208-228. 

3.  On  October  31,  1861,  France,  Great  Britain  and  Spain  concluded 
the  Treaty  of  London  providing  for  concerted  action  to  compel  Mexico 
to  fulfil  certain  obligations  to  them.  In  December,  1861,  and  January, 
1862,  a  joint  expedition  landed  at  Vera  Cruz.  England  and  Spain 
shortly  withdrew  their  forces,  but  Napoleon  III,  determined  to  check 
the  Anglo-Germanic  preponderancy  and  to  exalt  the  Latin  race,  re- 
solved to  take  advantage  of  the  expected  breaking  up  of  the  United 
States  and  to  establish  a  monarchy  in  Mexico.  Re-enforcing  his  troops 
by  25,000,  General  Forey,  after  a  year's  fighting,  captured  Puebla  and 
entered  Mexico  City.  The  Archduke  Maximilian,  brother  of  the  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph  of  Austria,  was  inveigled  into  accepting  the  crown 
and  arrived  in  June,  1862,  but  the  new  Empire  had  a  desperate  struggle 
against  the  republican  forces,  financial  diffieulties  and  party  feuds. 
With  the  termination  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  and  the  demand  of- 
the  United  States  Government  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  troops. 
Napoleon  Third's  scheme  collapsed.  Early  in  1867  Mexico  was  evacu- 
ated but  Maximilian  refused  to  leave  his  post.  After  a  heroic  resistance 
he  was  surrounded  in  Queretaro,  captured,  tried  by  court-martial  at 
the  command  of  President  Juarez  and  shot  on  June  19,  1867. 

4.  The  strength  authorised  by  the  Acts  of  July  29  and  August  3, 
1861,     See  above,  page  606,  footnote  36. 

5.  This  act  (14  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  333)  fixed  the 
military  establishment  at  10  regiments  of  cavalry,  5  of  artillery  and 
45  of  infantry.     See  Heitman,  II,  pp.  602-605. 

6.  By  the  Act  of  July  25,  1866   (14  Stat.,  223). 

7.  15  Stat.,  318.  A  reduction  in  the  number  of  infantry  regiments 
from  45  to  25,  as  well  as  in  the  staff  departments,  was  made  by  this  law. 

8.  Act  of  July  15,  1870  (16  Stat.,  318)  which  fixed  the  authorized 
strength  at  35,353  officers  and  men. 

Section   2  provided  that  the  number   of  enlisted  men  should  be  re- 


634     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

duced  to  30,000  on  or  before  July  1,  1871.  Sections  7  and  8  stipulated 
that  the  number  of  Major  Generals  was  to  be  reduced  to  three  and  the 
Brigadier-Generals  to  six. —  Heitman,  II,  pp.  610-611. 

9.  The  Acts  of  June  16  and  23,  1874,  March  2  and  3,  1875,  and 
June  26,  1876. 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1875  (18  Stat.,  419,  478)  fixed  the  strength  and 
re-organization  of  the  Adjutant-General's  department,  as  well  as  the 
organization  of  the  band  at  the  Military  Academy. 

The  Act  of  June  26,  1876  (19  Stat.,  61)  increased  the  number  of 
Indian  scouts  authorized  for  the  Army  but  reduced  the  medical  corps. 

10.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  612-613. 

11.  By  the  Act  of  June  16,  1874. 

12.  See  page  98. 

13.  The  Act  of  July  5,  1884,  forbade  the  appointment  of  paymasters 
until  the  number  had  been  reduced  below  29  majors,  and  thereafter  the 
officers  in  the  pay  departments  were  not  to  exceed  35. 

The  Act  of  May  17,  1886,  empowered  the  President  to  promote  and 
commission  graduates  of  West  Point  as  additional  second  lieutenants 
when  no  vacancies  exist  in  that  grade. 

14.  Heitman,  II,  p.  626. 

15.  30  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  261. 

16.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  616-617. 
17. 

"  1862-1869.  War  against  the  Cheyenne,  Arapaho,  Kiowa  and  Co- 
manche Indians  in  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Colorado  and 
Indian   Territory. 

1865-1868.     Indian   War   in  southern   Oregon  and  Idaho,   and  north- 
ern California  and  Nevada. 

1865-1866.     Fenian  Raid,  New  York  and  Canada  border  disturbances. 

1867-1881.     Campaign  against  Lipan,  Kiowa,  Kickapoo  and  Comanche 
Indians,  and  Mexican  border  disturbances. 

1868-1869.     Canadian    River    expedition,    New    Mexico,    November    5, 
1868,  to  February  13,  1869. 
1871.     Yellowstone  expedition,   August  28  to  October   25,    1871. 

1871.  Fenian  troubles,  Dakota  and  Manitoba  frontier,  Septem- 

ber and  October,  1871. 

1872.  Yellowstone  expedition,   Dakota,   July  26  to   October   15, 

1872. 
1872-1873.     Modoc  campaign,  November  28,  1872,  to  June  1,  1873. 

1873.  Yellowstone    expedition,    Dakota,    June    4    to    October    4, 

1873. 
1874-1875.     Campaign   against   Kiowa,    Cheyenne   and   Comanche   In- 
dians in  Indian  Territory,  August  1,  1874,  to  February 
16,  1875. 

1874.  Sioux  expedition,  Wyoming  and  Nebraska,   February   13 

to  August  19,  1874. 
1874.     Black  Hills  expedition,   Dakota,   June  20  to   August   30, 
1874. 

1874.  Big  Horn   expedition,   Wyoming,    August    13   to   October 

10,  1874. 

1875.  Expedition   against   Indians   in   eastern  Nevada,    Septem- 

ber 7  to  27,  1875. 


Notes  635 

1876.     Sioux    expedition,    Dakota,    May    17    to    September    26, 
1876. 

1876.  Powder    River    expedition,    Wyoming,    November     1     to 

December  31,  1876. 

1876-1877.  Big  Horn  and  Yellowstone  expeditions,  Wyoming  and 
Montana,   February   17,   1876,  to  June   13,   1877. 

1876-1879.  War  with  Northern  Cheyenne  and  Sioux  Indians  in  In- 
dian Territory,  Kansas,  Wyoming,  Dakota,  Nebraska 
and  Montana. 

1877.  Labor    strikes    in    Pennsylvania    and   Maryland,    July    to 

October,   1877. 

1877.  Nez  Perce  campaign,  June  14  to  October  5,  1877. 

1878.  Bannock   and  Piute  campaign.   May   30  to   September   4, 

1878. 
1878.     Ute  expedition,  Colorado,  April  3  to  September  9,  1878. 
1879      Snake  or   Sheepeater  Indian  troubles,   Idaho,   August  to 
October,  1879. 
1879-1894.     Disturbances  of  settlers  in  Indian  and  Oklahoma  Terri- 
tories, "  Oklahoma  Boomers,"  and  the  Cherokee  Strip 
disturbances. 
1879-1880.     Ute  Indian  campaign  in   Colorado  and  Utah,   September 
21,  1879,  to  November  8,  1880. 
1885.     Chinese  miner  and  labor  troubles  in  Wyoming,   Septem- 
ber and  October,  1885. 
1890-1891.     Sioux  Indian   disturbances  in   South  Dakota,   November, 

1890,  to  January,  1891. 
1891-1893.     Garza  troubles,  Texas  and  Mexican  border  disturbances, 
"Tin  Horn  War." 
1892.     Miner  disturbances  in  Idaho,  July  to  November,  1892. 
1892-1896.     Troubles  with  renegade  Apache  Indians,  under  Kidd  and 
Massai  in  Arizona  and  Mexican  border. 
1894.     "  Industrial  Army,"  "  Commonwealers,"  "  Coxey-ites,"  and 
labor  disturbances. 

1894.  Railroad,    Pullman,    and    labor    strikes,    extending    from 

Illinois  to  Pacific  coast,  June  to  August,  1894. 

1895.  Bannock  Indian  troubles,  July  and  August,  1895." —  Heit- 

man,  II,  pp.   299-300. 
The  general  reader  who  is  interested  in  these  struggles  with  the  red- 
skin  is  recommended  to  a  most  interesting  book  by   Cyrus  Townsend 
Brady,  entitled  Indian  Fights  and  Indian  Fighters,  and  to  Lieutenant 
General  Nelson  A.  Miles'  Serving  the  Republic. 

18.  Vis;:  the  Army  Staff  College,  the  Army  Signal  School,  the  Army 
School  of  the  Line,  the  Army  Field  Engineer  School,  and  the  Army 
Field  Service  and  Correspondence  School  for  Medical  Oflficers. 

19.  The  suggestion  for  the  creation  of  such  a  board  originated  in  a 
letter  written  by  Captain  Eugene  Griffith  of  the  Engineer  Corps  —  a 
son-in-law  of  General  Hancock  and  subsequently  vice-president  of  the 
General  Electric  Company  —  which  was  published  in  the  Journal  of  the 
Military  Service  Institution. 

It  was  further  advocated  in  a  letter  of  Samuel  J.  Tilden  to  James  G. 
Carlisle,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  proposing  that  the 
Government  surplus  of  $150,000,000  be  used  for  seacoast  defenses. 


636     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

20.  See  below,  pages  314-315. 

21.  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  Office,  transmitted  to  the  author 
in  a  letter  from  The  Adjutant-General,  dated  March  27,  1915. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

1.  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay,  entitled  "  The  Experiences  of  our  Army 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  War  with  Spain:  What  practical  use  has  been 
made  of  them  and  how  may  they  be  further  utilized  to  improve  its 
fighting  efficiency." —  By  Captain  Charles  D.  Rhodes,  General  Staff, 
Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March-April,  1905,  p. 
180. 

The  above  strength  of  the  Army  on  April  1,  1898,  is  given  in  the 
Annual  Report  of  the  Adjutant  General,  November  1,  1898,  in  the  Re- 
port of  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  November  29,  1898,  p.  253. 

2.  73,000,000   persons. 

3.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  enlisted  personnel  had 
ever  been  so  well  trained  and  disciplined.  Compare  Lieutenant  General 
Nelson  A.  Miles,  Serving  the  Republic,  p.  270. 

4.  See  page  152.  Per  contra,  the  appropriations  for  target  practice 
had  been  unusually  generous,  and  the  result  was  demonstrated  in  the 
superior  marksmanship  of  the  Americans,  both  soldiers  and  sailors. 

5.  "  The  plan  required  an  expenditure  of  $100,000,000  for  the  construc- 
tion and  emplacement  of  the  following  guns:  8-inch,  98;  10-inch,  194; 
12-inch,  204;  12-inch  mortars,  1,037;  rapid-fire,  829;  making  a  total  of 
2,362  guns  and  mortars.  On  the  1st  of  April,  1898,  only  these  had  been 
emplaced;  8-inch,  9;  10-inch,  44;  12-inch,  10;  12-inch  mortars,  88; 
rapid-fire,  none. 

"  Thus  out  of  2,362  pieces  of  ordnance  contemplated  in  the  project 
of  1885,  only  151  were  in  position  April  1,  1898.  In  thirteen  years 
Congress  had  appropriated  for  this  great  national  work  less  than  one- 
fourth  of  the  sum  required  for  its  completion." —  R.  A.  Alger,  The 
Spanish- American  War,  p.  10. 

6.  See  above,  pages  47-49. 

7.  Alger,  p.  7. 

8.  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March-April,  1905, 
p.  188. 

9.  Secretary  Alger  states,  p.  13,  that  "  In  one  respect  alone  was  the 
War  Department  able  to  make  immediate  response  to  at  least  a  part 
of  the  sudden  demands  made  upon  it.  Including  those  already  in  the 
hands  of  the  regular  soldiers,  there  were  53,508  .30-caliber  Krag-Jor- 
gensen  rifles,  and  14,895  .30-caliber  Krag-Jorgensen  carbines.  This 
supply,  however,  was  barely  sufficient  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the 
increased  regular  army.  Nothing  was  left  for  the  volunteers  except 
.45-calibre  Springfield  rifles,  of  which  there  were  265,895.  For  these 
weapons,  and  for  the  7,893  Springfield  carbines,  also  in  our  arsenal, 
there  was  no  smokeless-powder  ammunition,  nor  was  any  immediately 
obtainable." 

10.  "For  the  8-inch  guns  there  were  only  twelve  rounds  each;  for 
the  10-inch,  twenty  rounds;  for  the  12-inch,  fifteen  rounds,  and  for  the 
mortars,  ten." — Alger,  p.   11. 

11.  Rhodes,  p.   188. 


Notes  637 

12.  Aloer,  pp.   11-12. 

13.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  The  War  with  Spain,  pp.  26-27. 

14.  This  letter,  "  dated  December  25,  1897,  and  addressed  to  a  friend, 
Senor  Canalejas,  had  been  stolen  in  Havana  by  some  one  in  the  Cuban 
interest,  and  sent  to  the  Cuban  Junta  in  New  York,  which  gave  it  to 
the  press  on  February  9,   1898." — Lodge,  p.  28. 

15.  The  final  paragraph  of  the  Act  approved  March  9,  1898  (30  Stat- 
utes at  Large,  pp.  273-274),  appropriated 

"  For  the  national  defense,  and  for  each  and  every  purpose  connected 
therewith,  to  be  expended  at  the  discretion  of  the  President  and  to  re- 
main available  until  January  first,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety -nine, 
fifty  million  dollars." 

16.  Page  153. 

17.  Major  E.  M.  Johnson,  Jr.,  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States,  p.  10. 

18.  "On  March  9th  Congress  appropriated  *  f  or  national  defence' 
the  sum  of  $50,000,000.  No  part  of  this  sum  was  available  for  offen- 
sive purposes  —  even  for  offensive  preparation.  The  fund,  though 
placed  at  the  President's  disposal,  remained  only  an  appropriation  '  for 
national  defence,'  and  he  confined  the  employment  of  it  literally  within 
that  limitation.  Under  this  interpretation  of  the  act,  it  was,  of  course, 
permissible  to  hasten  the  work  upon  our  coast  fortifications,  the  plans 
for  which  had  been  formulated  by  the  Endicott  Board  of  1885  and  duly 
sanctioned  by  Congress  at  that  time.  Allotments  were  made,  there- 
fore, out  of  the  $50,000,000  fund  to  the  Ordnance,  Engineer,  Quarter- 
master Medical  and  Signal  corps,  as  follows:  Ordnance  (about), 
$10,000,000;  Engineer,  $5,500,000;  Quartermaster,  $500,000;  Medical, 
$20,000;   Signal,  $226,400. 

"  All  of  this  was  for  purposes  of  coast  defence  —  guns,  mountings, 
emplacements,  transportation,  etc. —  not  a  cent  was  used  outside  of  the 
limits  fixed  by  Congress.  There  was  no  disturbance  of  the  status  of 
peace  before  the  declaration  of  war. 

"  Meanwhile,  the  War  Department  had  been  able  to  do  nothing  in  the 
way  of  accumulating  material  for  offensive  war  —  for  the  emergency 
which,  after  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  was  regarded  by  the  country 
at  large  as  inevitable.  Every  arsenal  in  the  country,  and  every  private 
establishment  capable  of  turning  out  guns,  carriages,  powder,  ammu- 
nition, etc.,  was  working  to  its  full  capacity,  day  and  night,  for  coast 
defence;  but  the  War  Department  could  not  purchase  or  even  contract 
for  any  of  the  material  so  soon  to  be  needed  for  the  new  army.  None 
of  the  bureaus  had  on  hand  reserve  supplies.  Being  unable  to  increase 
its  stock,  each  had  produced  only  enough  for  the  immediate,  every-day 
needs  of  the  regular  establishment  on  a  peace  basis." — Alger,  pp.  8-9. 

19.  "  When  the  diplomatic  relations  with  Spain  began  to  assume  a 
threatening  character,  orders  were  given  to  push  work  with  all  possible 
energy  and  to  mount  every  available  gun  as  fast  as  delivered.  Oper- 
ations were  carried  on  with  double,  and  in  some  cases  three  shifts  of 
workmen,  and  were  pushed  regardless  of  weather  and  climate." —  Re- 
port of  Brigadier  General  John  M.  Wilson,  Chief  of  Engineers,  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  dated  September  29,  1898,  in  the  Report  of  the  Secre- 
ta/ry  of  War  for  1898,  p.  197. 

20.  Sargent,  I,  p.  89. 


638      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

21.  Alger,  p.  9. 

22.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the  President,  dated  Novem- 
ber 29,  189'8,  pp.  4  and  197. 

23.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  for  1898,  p.  196,  who  goes  on 
to  say:  "In  consequence  of  the  war  with  Spain  and  the  possibility  of 
hostile  attacks  upon  our  coasts,  urgent  and  pressing  demands  were 
made  by  Senators  and  Representatives,  and  local  business  interests  for 
the  immediate  erection  of  sea  coast  batteries  at  numerous  points  not 
contemplated  in  the  general  scheme  of  national  defense." 

24.  The  Endicott  board  recommended  the  installation  of  2,362  mod- 
ern seacoast  guns.  At  the  beginning  of  1898  only  151  had  been  placed 
in  position  (see  page  153)  but  were  supplemented  by  185  by  the  end 
of  June. 

25.  Schley  hoisted  his  pennant  on  March  25th  but  did  not  sail  until 
May  13th,  1898. 

Cervera  had  meanwhile  left  Cadiz  on  March  14th,  reached  the  Cape 
de  Verde  Islands  on  April  2nd,  left  there  on  the  30th  and  arrived  off 
Martinique  on  May  11th. 

26.  Sargent,  I,  pp.  61  and  97. 

27.  "  The  experience  of  the  last  few  months,  I  trust,  will  be  valuable 
to  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United  States.  The  value  of 
proper  defenses  for  our  ports,  harbors,  and  seaport  cities,  of  ines- 
timable wealth,  had  been  demonstrated;  and  I  trust  that  the  system 
already  adopted  for  coast  defenses,  the  completion  of  which  has  been 
so  long  delayed,  may  be  carried  out  without  unnecessary  delay.  I  have 
urged  the  importance  of  this  in  my  annual  reports  for  the  last  thirteen 
years." —  Annual  Report  of  Major  General  Miles,  commanding  the  Army, 
dated  November  5,   1898,  p.  37. 

28.  Compare  Sargent,  I,  pp.  97-98. 

29.  Article  entitled  "  War  with  Spain  "  by  Lieutenant-General  Miles 
in  Harper's  Encyclopcedia  of  United  States  History,  VIII,  p.  294. 

30.  "  At  the  close  of  the  great  Civil  War  the  Government  had  a  mil- 
lion veterans  in  arms,  well  equipped  for  war  for  that  time.  The  great 
amount  of  war  material  then  in  the  possession  of  the  Government  was 
sold  or  gradually  used  up  by  issue  either  to  the  militia  of  the  States 
or  to  the  regular  forces  that  have  been  engaged  in  military  operations 
on  the  frontier  for  the  last  thirty  years.  The  supplies  and  materials 
that  were  not  sold,  but  stored,  were  gradually  reduced  to  the  minimum, 
and  the  war  with  Spain  found  this  country  with  a  very  small  army  — 
25,000  men  —  with  war  material  sufficient  only  to  equip  that  force  and 
furnish  it  with  a  small  amount  of  ammunition ;  but  the  tentage,  trans- 
portation, and  camp  equipage  was  insufficient  for  any  important  mili- 
tary operations;  in  fact,  quite  an  amount  of  valuable  transportation, 
including  ambulances,  had  been  disposed  of  within  the  last  few  years." 
—  Annual  Report  for  1898  of  General  Miles,  commanding  the  Army,  p.  4. 

31.  On  March  14th  Senator  Proctor  published  his  observations  on 
the  results  of  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba.  This  report  exercised  a  profound 
influence  upon  American  public  opinion. 

32.  Joint  Resolution,  No.  24,  Fifty-fifth  Congress,  Second  Session. — 
30  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  738-739. 

These  resolutions  are  also  given  in  full  by  Lodge,  pp.  237-238. 

33.  See  page  156. 


Notes  639 

34.  Even  in  the  heat  of  the  bitterly-contested  national  election  of 
1896  the  Cuban  question,  like  Banquo's  ghost,  would  "not  down." 
From  that  time  forward  it  became  a  burning  question  in  American 
politics. 

35.  Lodge,  pp.  32-33;  Sargent,  I,  p.  102;  Alger,  p.  9. 

36.  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Major  General  com- 
manding the  Army  for  1898,  pp.  4  and  9. 

This  order  for  concentration  was,  however,  somewhat  modified  and 
part  of  the  regular  infantry,  together  with  the  cavalry  and  artillery, 
were  sent  to  the  camp  established  at  Chickamauga  Park,  Georgia. 

37.  30  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  361,  Chapter  187. 

38.  Section  one  provided  "  that  all  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  persons  of  foreign  birth  who  shall  have  declared 
their  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States  under  and  in 
pursuance  of  the  laws  thereof,  are  hereby  declared  to  constitute  the 
national  forces,  and,  with  such  exceptions  and  under  such  conditions  as 
may  be  prescribed  by  law,  shall  be  liable  to  perform  military  duty  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States." 

39.  "  Sec,  2.  That  the  organized  and  active  land  forces  of  the  United 
States  shall  consist  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  militia 
of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States: 
Provided,  That  in  time  of  war  the  Army  shall  consist  of  two  branches 
which  shall  be  designated,  respectively,  as  the  Regular  Army  and  the 
Volunteer  Army  of  the  United  States." 

40.  Section  3  declared  the  Regular  Army  to  be  the  permanent  mili- 
tary establishment  maintained  both  in  peace  and  war. 

Section  4  will  presently  be  examined  in  detail  elsewhere. 

Section  5  prescribed  the  conditions  of  the  President's  proclamation 
and  the  rules  and  regulations  for  the  examination,  organization  and 
mustering  in  of  the  men  called  for,  the  quotas  to  be  proportioned  to 
the  population  of  the  States  and  Territories. 

Section  6  subjected  the  Volunteer  Army  and  militia  to  the  same  laws, 
orders  and  regulations  as  the  Regular  Army,  and  wisely  stipulated 
that  each  regiment  was  to  have  one  surgeon,  two  assistant  surgeons 
and  one  chaplain.     Other  parts  of  this  section  are  considered  below. 

A  model  of  its  sort  was  Section  7,  viz:  That  all  organizations  of  the 
Volunteer  Army  shall  be  so  recruited  from  time  to  time  to  maintain 
them  as  near  to  their  maximum  strength  as  the  President  may  deem 
necessary,  and  no  new  organization  shall  be  accepted  into  service  from 
any  State  unless  the  organizations  already  in  service  are  as  near  to 
their  maximum  strength  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  as  the  President 
may   deem   necessary. 

Section  8  provided  that  all  records  were  to  be  rendered  to  the  Adju- 
tant General  and  upon  disbandment  to  be  filed  in  the  Record  and  Pen- 
sion Office  of  the  War  Department.  All  regimental  and  medical  officers 
were  required  to  keep  complete  records  of  the  sick  and  wounded. 

Section  9  prescribed  the  organization  of  divisions  of  three  brigades, 
each  composed  of  three  regiments.  Army  corps  to  consist  of  not  more 
than  three  divisions  were  to  be  organized  by  the  President  when  three 
or  more  divisions  were  assembled  in  the  same  army. 

Section  10  specified  the  organization  of  the  staffs  of  army  corps,  di- 
visions  and   brigades,    and   wisely   permitted   these   staff   officers   to   be 


640     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

appointed  by  the  President  from  the  Regular  Army,  volunteers  or 
militia,  according  to  his  discretion. 

Section  11  was  most  admirable  in  that  it  allowed  the  President  to 
appoint  one  Major  General  for  each  army  corps  and  division,  and  one 
Brigadier  General  who  might  be  selected  from  the  Regular  Army. 

Section  12  placed  all  volunteers  on  the  same  footing  in  respect  to 
pay,  allowance  and  pensions  as  troops  of  corresponding  grades  in  the 
Regular  Army. 

Section  13  permitted  the  governors  to  select  field  officers  from  the 
Regular  service. 

Section  14  prescribed  the  convening  of  military  boards  composed  of 
three  to  six  volunteer  officers  to  examine  into  the  qualifications,  con- 
duct and  efficiency  of  any  commissioned  officer  in  that  department  or 
army.  Upon  adverse  report,  approved  by  the  President,  such  officer 
was  to  be  discharged  with  one  month's  pay  and  allowances. 

Section  15  was  the  enabling  clause. 

41.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War  no  difficulty  Avas  encoun- 
tered in  raising  nine  regiments  and  one  battalion  of  volunteers  "  to 
serve  to  the  end  of  the  war."  This  fact  demonstrated  that  the  longest 
term  of  enlistment  in  nowise  deterred  men  when  acting  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  enthusiasm  which  invariably  prevails  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities.     See  above,  footnote  31,  Chapter  VII,  page  596. 

42.  "  Sec.  4.  That  the  Volunteer  Army  shall  be  maintained  only 
during  the  existence  of  war,  or  while  war  is  imminent,  and  shall  be 
raised  and  organized,  as  in  this  Act  provided,  only  after  Congress  has 
or  shall  have  authorized  the  President  to  raise  such  a  force  or  to  call 
into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several 
States:  Provided,  That  all  enlistments  for  the  Volunteer  Army  shall 
be  for  a  term  of  two  years,  unless  sooner  terminated,  and  that  all 
officers  and  men  composing  said  army  shall  be  discharged  from  the 
service  of  the  United  States  when  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
called  into  service  shall  have  been  accomplished,  or  on  the  conclusion  of 
hostilities." 

43.  Pages  82,  86-87  and  90. 

44.  See  below,  pages  207-209. 

45.  "  Sec.  6.  That  the  Volunteer  Army  and  the  militia  of  the  States 
when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  shall  be  organized 
under,  and  shall  be  subject  to,  the  laws,  orders,  and  regulations  govern- 
ing the  Regular  Army:  Provided,  That  each  regiment  of  the  Volunteer 
Army  shall  have  one  surgeon,  two  assistant  surgeons,  and  one  chaplain, 
and  that  all  the  regimental  and  company  officers  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  governors  of  the  States  in  which  their  respective  organizations  are 
raised:  Provided  further,  That  when  the  members  of  any  company, 
troop,  battery,  battalion  or  regiment  of  the  organized  militia  of  any 
State  shall  enlist  in  the  Volunteer  Army  in  a  body,  as  such  company, 
troop,  battery,  battalion  or  regiment,  the  regimental,  company,  troop, 
battery  and  battalion  officers  in  service  with  the  militia  organization 
thus  enlisting  may  be  appointed  by  the  governors  of  the  States  and 
Territories,  and  shall  when  so  appointed  be  officers  of  corresponding 
grades  in  the  same  organization  when  it  shall  have  been  received  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States  as  a  part  of  the  Volunteer  Army: 
Provided  further.  That  the  President  may  authorize  the  Secretary  of 


Notes  641 

War  to  organize  companies,  troops,  battalions,  or  regiments,  possessing 
special  qualifications,  from  the  nation  at  large  not  to  exceed  three  thou- 
sand men,  under  such  rules  and  regulations,  including  the  appointment 
of  the  officers  thereof,  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War." 

Under  the  provisions  of  this  section,  the  1st,  2nd  and  3rd  United 
States  Volunteer  Cavalry  —  the  first  better  known  as  "  the  Rough 
Riders  " —  were  organized. 

46.  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay.  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Insti- 
tution for  March-April,  1905,  pp.  190-191. 

47.  This  is  a  stubborn  fact  which  Congress  has  apparently  never 
learned  from  the  beginning  of  its  career  until  the  present  moment. 

48.  On  June  5,  1898,  General  Miles  announced  by  telegraph  from 
Tampa  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the  14  regiments  of  volunteers 
there  assembled  "  have  never  been  under  fire.  Between  30  and  40  per 
cent,  are  undrilled,  and  in  one  regiment  over  300  men  had  never  fired 
a  gun." —  Report  for  1898  of  the  Major  General  commanding  the  Army, 
p.  12. 

49.  30  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1770. 

50.  "Chap.  189. —  An  Act  Declaring  that  war  exists  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 

"  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  First,  That  war  be, 
and  the  same  is  hereby,  declared  to  exist,  and  that  war  has  existed 
since  the  twenty-first  day  of  April,  anno  Domini  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-eight,  including  the  said  day,  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 

"  Second,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  hereby 
is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United 
States  the  militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  carry  this  Act  into  effect. 

"Approved,  April  25,  1898."— 30  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  364. 

51.  30  Stat.,  p.   364. 

52.  As  prescribed  by  the  Act  of  March  8,  1898.     See  page  151. 

53.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  618-619. 

54.  According  to  the  report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p.  257, 

In  May,  June     July  August 
1898 

Number  of  enlistments  in  Regular  Army.  .  .      9,569     9,311     6,586     3,400 

The  strength  of  the  Regular  Army    (exclu- 
sive of  the  Hospital  corps  of  5,365  men) 

was 38,760  46,346  50,893  53,323 

The  2nd  U.  S.  Infantry  received  some  200  recruits  but  many  of  the 

commanders  of  the  regiments  sent  to   Santiago  preferred  not  to  take 

the  new  recruits  owing  to  their  lack  of  instruction  and  the  dearth  of 

equipment  for  them. —  Sargent,  I,  p.  107,  footnote. 

55.  See,  for  example,  pp.  15,  41,  165,  205  and  271. 

56.  Section  one  fixed  the  number  of  officers  in  each  regiment  of 
infantry  which  was  to  consist  of  "  two  battalions  of  four  companies 
each,  and  two  skeleton  or  unmanned  companies;  the  organized  compa- 
nies to  be   constituted  as  now  authorized  by   law." 


642     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

57.  "  Sec.  2.  That  upon  a  declaration  of  war  by  Congress,  or  a 
declaration  by  Congress  that  war  exists  the  President,  in  his  discretion, 
may  establish  a  third  battalion  for  each  infantry  regiment,  consisting 
of  four  companies,  to  be  supplied  by  manning  the  two  skeleton  com- 
panies and  by  organizing  two  additional  companies  .  .  ." 

The  remainder  of  this  section  prescribed  the  method  of  filling  the 
vacancies  of  commissioned  officers  in  the  additional  companies  as  well 
as  in  the  cavalry,  artillery  and  infantry  above  the  grade  of  second  lieu- 
tenant. 

58.  By  Section  3  the  enlisted  strength  of  a  company  of  infantry,  in- 
cluding the  non-commissioned  ofpcers,  was  fixed  at  106;  that  of  a  troop 
of  cavalry  at  100;  each  battery  of  heavj'^  artillery  at  200;  and  of  field 
artillery  at  173;  and  each  company  of  engineers  at  150.  In  time  of 
war  the  Signal  corps  was  to  he  increased  by  ten  corporals  and  140 
privates. 

59.  Section  4.  According  to  the  report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for 
1898,  p.  254,  the  President  was  thus  enabled  to  appoint  84  second  lieu- 
tenants over  and  above  those  authorized  by  the  Act  of  March  8,  1898. 

60.  Section  5. 

61.  Section  6,  which  additionally  provided  that  no  increased  com- 
pensation should  be  given  for  "  extra  or  special  duty  "  and  "  that  any 
soldier  who  deserts  shall,  besides  incurring  the  penalties  now  attaching 
to  the  crime  of  desertion,  forfeit  all  right  to  pension  which  he  might 
otherwise  have  acquired." 

Section  7  prescribed  that  every  officer  exercising  a  command  above 
that  pertaining  to  his  grade  should  receive  pay  and  allowances  accord- 
ingly but  not  "  exceeding  that  of  a  brigadier  general."  Upon  the  termi- 
nation of  war,  the  Army  was  to  be  reduced  to  a  peace  footing  and  the 
measures  to  be  taken  to  effect  this  reduction  were  briefly  indicated. 

62.  Page  148,  footnote. 

63.  30  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  405. 

64.  "  To  consist  of  not  more  than  three  regiments  and  not  more  than 
three  thousand  five  hundred  men,  possessing  the  special  qualifications 
necessary  for  engineer  troops." 

65.  *'  Sec.  2.  And  the  President  is  further  empowered,  during  the 
present  war  under  the  Act  of  April  twenty-second,  eighteen  hundred 
and  ninety-eight,  to  authorize  the  Secretary  of  War  to  organize  an 
additional  volunteer  force  of  not  exceeding  ten  thousand  enlisted  men 
possessing  immunity  from  diseases  incident  to  tropical  climates;  the 
officers  thereof  to  be  appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate." 

66.  "  Sec.  3.  The  provisions  of  the  Act  of  April  twenty-second, 
eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  which  provide  that  volunteers  called 
out  by  proclamation  of  the  President  shall  be  apportioned  to  the  several 
States  and  the  provisions  of  said  Act  which  provide  that  the  Governors 
of  the  States  shall  appoint  officers  shall  not  apply  to  this  Act." 

67.  "  That  the  number  of  medical  officers  of  the  Army  be  increased  by 
the  addition  of  fifteen  assistant  surgeons  with  the  rank  of  first  lieu- 
tenant, to  be  appointed  after  examination  by  an  army  medical  examining 
board,  in  accordance  with  existing  regulations. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  in  emergencies  the  Surgeon-General  of  the  Army, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  may  appoint  as  many  con- 


Islotes  643 

tract  surgeons  as  may  be  necessary,  at  a  compensation  not  to  exceed 
one  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  per  month. 

"Approved,  May  12,  1898."— 30  Statutes,  p.  406. 

68.  "  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  organize  a  volunteer 
signal  corps,  for  service  during  the  existing  war,  which  corps  shall 
receive  the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  are  authorized  by  law  for  the 
Signal  Corps  of  the  Army."— 30  Stat.  L.,  p.  417. 

69.  30  Stat.,  p.  419. 

70.  30  Stat.,  pp.  1772-1773. 

71.  See  page  162. 

72.  30  Stat.,  p.  420. 

73.  30  Stat.,  p.  421. 

74.  See  page  160. 

75.  Section  one  amended  Section  10  of  the  Act  of  April  22,  1898,  by 
adding  the  following: 

"  And  provided,  That  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  shall  be  eligible 
for  such  staff  appointments,  and  shall  not  be  held  to  vacate  their 
offices  in  the  Regular  Army  by  accepting  the  same,  but  shall  be  entitled 
to  receive  only  the  pay  and  allowances  of  their  staff  rank:  Provided 
further,  That  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  receiving  commissions  in 
regiments  of  engineers,  or  any  other  commissions  in  the  Volunteer 
Army,  shall  not  be  held  to  vacate  their  offices  in  the  Regular  Army  by 
accepting  the  same,  but  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  only  the  pay  and 
allowances  of  such  volunteer  rank  while  serving  as  such." 

76.  "  Sec.  2.  That  section  thirteen  of  said  Act  is  amended  so  as  to 
read  as  follows: 

"  That  a  governor  of  any  State  or  Territory  may,  with  the  consent 
of  the  President,  appoint  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  in  the  grades  of 
field  officers  in  organizations  of  the  Volunteer  Army,  and  the  President 
may  appoint  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  in  the  grade  of  field  officers 
in  organizations  of  the  Volunteer  Army  raised  in  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia and  the  Indian  Territory,  and  in  the  regiments  possessing  spe- 
cial qualifications,  provided  for  in  section  six  of  an  Act  of  Congress 
approved  April  twenty-second,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  and 
in  section  two  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  May  eleventh,  eighteen 
hundred  and  ninety-eight;  and  officers  thus  appointed  shall  be  entitled 
to  retain  their  rank  in  the  Regular  Army:  Provided,  That  not  more 
than  one  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  shall  hold  a  commission  in  any 
one  regiment  of  the  Volunteer  Army  at  the  same  time:  And  provided 
further.  That  officers  so  appointed  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  only  the 
pay  and  allowances  of  their  rank  in  the  volunteer  organization." 

77.  The  Act  of  June  7th  (30  Stat.,  p.  433)  limited  the  number  of 
draft  horses  for  the  Army  to  5,000.  The  Act  of  June  9th  (30  Stat., 
p.  437)  carried  deficiency  appropriations  for  the  military  and  naval 
establishments. 

78.  30  Stat.,  p.  483. 

79.  30  Stat.,  p.  571. 

80.  30  Stat.,  p.  652.  The  corps  was  to  consist  of  one  Chief  of  Engi- 
neers, 126  officers  of  various  ranks  and  a  battalion  of  engineers. 

81.  30  Stat.,  pp.  666-668,  696-705. 

82.  By  three  Inspectors-General. —  30  Stat.,  p.  720. 

83.  So  as  to  "  consist  of  one  Chief  of  Ordnance,  with  the  rank,  pay 


644     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

and  emoluments  of  a  brigadier-general;    four   colonels,   five  lieutenant- 
colonels,  twelve  majors,  twenty-four  captains,  twenty  first  lieutenants." 

—  30  Stat.,  p.  720. 

84.  30  Stat.,  p.  721. 

85.  30  Stat.,  p.  728. 

86.  30  Stat.,  p.  729. 

87.  30  Stat.,  p.  730. 

88.  Page  160. 

89.  On  April  26th  General  Miles  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  the  militia  called  out  as  volunteers  be  kept  in  camp  for  60  days  in 
their  respective  States  in  order  to  equip  them  suitably  "  as  so  many 
States  have  made  no  provision  for  their  State  militia,  and  not  one  is 
fully  equipped  for  field  service."  He  also  recommended  that  "  while 
this  is  being  done,  the  general  officers  and  staff  officers  can  be  appointed 
and  properly  instructed,  large  camps  of  instruction  can  be  judiciously 
selected,  ground  rented,  and  stores  collected.  At  the  end  of  sixty  days 
the  regiments,  batteries,  and  troops  can  be  brigaded  and  formed  into 
divisions  and  corps,  and  proper  commanding  generals  assigned,  and  this 
great  force  may  be  properly  equipped,  molded,  and  organized  into  an 
effective  army  with  the  least  possible  delay." — Report  of  the  Major 
General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1898,  pp.  7-8. 

90.  "  During  the  war  camps  were  established  for  military  purposes 
at  Tampa,  Fla. ;  Mobile,  Ala.;  Camp  George  H.  Thomas,  Ga. ;  Camp 
Alger,  Va. ;  Camp  Poland,  Knoxville,  Tenn.;  Jacksonville,  Fla.;  Miami, 
Fla. ;  Fernandina,  Fla. ;  Camp  Wikoff,  N.  Y. ;  Camp  Hamilton,  near 
Lexington,  Ky. ;  Camp  George  G.  Meade,  Pa. ;  Camp  Wheeler,  Hunts- 
ville,  Ala.;  and  Camp  Shipp,  Anniston,  Ala." — Report  of  the  Quarter- 
master General  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  pp.  164, 
397-398. 

91.  Sargent,  I,  pp.  110-111. 

92.  Officers  Men  Total 
Volunteer  Army  on  May  30,  1898 6,224         118,580         124,804 

"       on    June    30th     7,169  153,355  160,524 

"       on   July   31st    8,633  203,461  212,094 

"       on  August  31st    8,785  207,244  216,029 

—  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p.  260. 

93.  The  Sixth  and  Seventh  Army  Corps  were  composed  of  U.  S.  Volun- 
teers. No  attempt  was  ever  made  by  the  military  authorities  to  organ- 
ize the  Sixth  Corps,  and  General  Wilson  and  his  staff  ordered  their 
services  to  General  Brooke  "  for  the  command  and  instruction  of  his 
First  Division."  The  latter  accepted  and  Wilson  ended  by  being  as- 
signed to  the  command  of  the  1st  division  of  the  First  Corps. —  See  also 
Wilson,  II,  pp.  418,  422-423. 

94.  Seven  expeditions  were  sent  to  Manila  between  May  25th  and 
July  29th,  inclusive.  Their  total  forces  numbered  641  officers  and 
15,058  enlisted  men. 

95.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General,  pp.  266-269. 

"  In  addition  to  these  eight  corps,  about  twelve  thousand  volunteers 
were  distributed   along  the  seacoast  from  New  Jersey  to  Maine;    five 


Notes  645 

regiments  of  United  States  volunteers  were  stationed  at  different  points 
in  the  South;  and  one  regiment  of  regular  infantry,  three  of  cavalry, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  artillery,  were  left  at  the  various  army 
posts  and  seacoast  forts  of  the  United  States." — Sargent,  I,  p.  112, 

96.  Report  of  the  Major  General,  commanding  the  Army,  1898,  p.  6. 

97.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  82. 

98.  Lieut.  A.  S.  Rowan  left  the  United  States  on  April  9th,  landed 
at  El  Portillo  —  about  70  miles  west  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  —  on  the 
24th,  joined  General  Garcia  of  the  Cuban  army,  continued  to  Manati, 
embarked  in  an  open  boat  for  Nassau  on  May  4th  and  returned  to  the 
United  States  on  the  13th. 

Lieut.  H.  H.  Whitney  left  Key  West  on  May  5th,  reached  Porto  Rico 
on  the  15th,  explored  the  southern  part  of  the  island  and  returned  on 
June  9th. 

"  Both  of  these  officers  penetrated  the  enemy's  country  and  obtained 
most  accurate  and  valuable  information  regarding  the  position  of  the 
military  and  naval  forces,  the  defenses,  and  the  topographical  and 
climatic  features  of  the  country,  all  of  which  was  of  great  value  in 
subsequent  military  operations." —  Report  of  the  Major  General  com- 
manding the  Army,  p.  10. 

99.  Ibid.,  Miles,  p.  272,  and  his  article  in  Harper's  Encyclopcedia  of 
American  History,  VIII,  p.  299. 

100.  Under  Colonel  R.  H.  Hall,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  H.  Dorst,  Lieut.  C.  P. 
Johnson  and  dthers.  Dorst  landed  at  Banes  on  the  north  coast  of  Cuba 
and  delivered  7,500  rifles,  1,000,000  cartridges,  5,000  uniforms  and  other 
supplies  much  needed  by  the  10,000  Cubans  under  General  Garcia. — 
General  Miles'  report,  pp.  10-11. 

101.  General  Miles'  report,  pp.  10  and  11,  and  his  article  in  Harper's 
Encyclopedia;  Sargent,  I,  pp.  114-115. 

102.  Miles,  Serving  the  Repithlic,  p.  272, 

103.  Ibid.,  pp.  272-273. 

104.  The  Adjutant-General  to  General  Wade,  commanding  troops  at 
Tampa,  telegram  dated  May  9,  1898,  6.7  p.m. —  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  p.  83. 

105.  Stephen  Bonsai,  The  Fight  for  Santiago,  introduction,  p.  xv, 
declares  that  "  Whether  well  founded  or  not,  it  was  the  opinion  in  the 
best  informed  army  circles  in  Tampa,  as  well  as  elsewhere  at  this  time, 
that  the  Administration  had  preferred  not  to  admit  openly  the  unfit- 
ness of  the  army  for  the  work  it  was  called  upon  to  perform,  but  had 
decided  to  plan  and  then  postpone  execution  from  time  to  time,  and  so 
conceal  from  the  public  the  real  causes  of  inaction  until  some  later 
and,  as  it  was  hoped,  some  far-distant  day." 

106.  The  Adjutant-General,  by  command  of  General  Miles,  to  Gen- 
eral Wade,  telegram  dated  May  10,  1898,  6.35  p.  m. —  Correspondence 
relating  to  the  War  loith  Spain,  vol,  I,  p.  11. 

107.  See  despatches  in  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  pp. 
83-84. 

108.  Ibid.,  pp.  86-87;  Sargent,  I,  p.  116.  ^ 

109.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  11;  General  Shafter's  report,  Septem- 
ber 13,  1898,  in  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  57.  This 
despatch  is  given  in  extenso  by  Sargent,  I,  p.  120. 


646     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

110.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  p.  87.  > 
In  his  book,  pp.   275-276,  General  Miles  says  that  "  The  reports  of 

affairs  at  Tampa,  Florida,  became  such  that  I  determined  to  take  the 
field  in  person. 

"  On  arriving  at  Tampa,  I  found  great  confusion  and  the  place 
crowded  with  an  indiscriminate  accumulation  of  supplies  and  war  ma- 
terials. The  confusion  w^as  occasioned  partly  by  the  want  of  rail  facili- 
ties and  partly  by  the  system  of  loading  and  invoicing  war  material. 
The  sidetracks  of  the  railroads  from  the  port  of  Tampa  to  Columbia, 
South  Carolina,  were  blocked  with  cars  and  trains,  and  this  caused 
great  difficulty  in  properly  equipping  an  expedition  for  effective  war 
service." 

111.  Reports  of  Generals  Miles  and  Shafter,  pp.  12  and  58;  Shafter 
to  the  Adjutant-General,  June  4th-5th,  p.  88. 

On  May  31st  the  Adjutant-General  wired  General  Shafter  asking 
when  he  would  sail.  On  June  4th  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed 
that  Sampson  "  urged  immediate  aid " ;  and  on  June  7th  he  wired 
Shafter  that  "  the  President  directs  you  to  sail  at  once  with  what 
force  you  have  ready." —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  pp.  87-89. 

113.  Sargent,  I,  pp.  122-123,  145-146. 

114.  "The  imperfect  facilities  at  Port  Tampa  made  the  task  most 
difficult.  While  the  wharf  is  a  good  one,  the  railroad  facilities  were 
inadequate,  and  the  failure  to  label  each  car  with  its  contents,  and  the 
congested  state  of  the  post-office  where  bills  of  lading  were  sent,  added 
to  the  embarrassment  of  the  situation." —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  p.  86. 

115.  "  Great  complaint  was  made  of  the  railroad  congestion  at  Tampa 
and  the  absolute  lack  of  ability  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos  at  that 
place  during  the  early  part  of  the  period  of  its  occupancy  by  troops. 
The  Major-General  Commanding  has  stated  that  supplies  for  70,000  men 
for  90  days  were  ordered  there,  and  the  confusion  on  the  railroad  when 
he  reached  Tampa  was  very  great,  1,000  cars  being  sidetracked,  some 
of  them  as  far  back  as  Columbia,  S.  C. 

"It  is  stated  that  in  the  hurry  and  rush  attending  the  commencement 
of  this  work  the  contents  of  cars  were  unknown  at  Tampa;  that  bills 
of  lading  were  not  forwarded,  and  that  it  seemed  impossible  for  a  time 
to  determine  where  absolutely  necessary  articles  were  located. 

"  Colonel  Birdfi,  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  testifies  that  thia 
was  corrected  later  on,  when  the  contents  of  cars  w^ere  clearly  marked 
upon  them  and  bills  of  lading  promptly  forwarded. 

"  The  condition  of  the  railroad  congestion  during  the  early  portion 
of  the  time  Tampa  was  occupied  by  troops  seems  unparalleled,  showing 
an  almost  inexcusable  lack  of  executive  ability  on  the  part  of  those 
charged  with  the  loading,  unloading  and  handling  of  the  trains. 

"  Colonel  Birdfi  and  General  Humphrey  testify  that  there  were  very 
poor  facilities  for  transferring  troops  and  supplies  arriving  at  Tampa 
via  the  Florida  Central  Railroad  to  the  Plant  System  leading  direct  ta 
Port  Tampa. 

"  Order  was  finally  brought  out  of  chaos,  the  cars  unloaded,  the  con- 
gestion overcome,  and  a  vast  amount  of  supplies  of  every  character 
delivered   at  this   immense   encampment." —  Report   of   the   Commission 


Notes  647 

appointed  hy  the  President  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War  De- 
partment in  the  War  with  Spain.  Senate  Document  No.  221,  56th 
Congress,  First  Session,  vol.  I,  pp.  132-133. 

116.  To  improvise  such  an  operation  expeditiously  is  humanly  im- 
possible. The  only  way  yet  discovered  to  insure  orderly  management 
and  prompt  movement  under  such  circumstances  is  to  have  a  compre- 
hensive plan  worked  out  in  time  of  peace  by  a  General  Staflf  such  as 
the  American  army  did  not  then  possess. 

117.  Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain,  I, 
pp.  13  and  174. 

118.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  86. 

119.  Ihid.,  p.  89. 

120.  General  Miles  to  the  President,  telegram  dated  June  7,  1898, 
9.34  P.  M.     Ihid.,  p.  90. 

121.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  siege  pieces  were  not  assembled  until 
late  on  the  4th. —  General  Shafter  to  the  Adjutant-General,  telegram 
dated  June  4-5,  1898,  6.32  a.  m.— Ibid.,  p.  88. 

122.  Theodore  Roosevelt,  The  Rough  Riders,  pp.  66-71. 

123.  Other  accounts  of  the  confusion  which  marked  Shafter's  em- 
barkation are  given  by  Alger,  pp.  65-75;  Bonsai,  pp.  44-54;  John  D. 
Miley,  In  Cuba  with  Shafter,  pp.  9-29. 

124.  Telegrams  to  the  Secretary  of  War  sent  on  June  8,  1898,  by 
General  Shafter  at  4.06  p.  m.  and  by  General  Miles  at  5.03  p.  m. —  Re- 
port of  the  Secretary  of  War,  pp.  90-91. 

125.  Compare  Sargent,  I,  p.  147.  The  author  of  this  book  who  has 
been  at  work  on  a  history  of  The  Campaign  of  Austerlitz  for  more  than 
seventeen  years  can  bear  witness  to  the  truth  of  this  statement. 

126.  The  Secretary  of  War's  telegrams  to  Generals  Shafter  and 
Miles,  June  8,  1898,  in  his  Report  for  1898,  p.  90. 

127.  Miles  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  June  9,  1898,  6.50  p.  m.;  Shafter's 
report,  p.  58. 

128.  The  Eagle  and  the  Nashville  had  mistaken  American  ships  in 
the  darkness  for  enemy  s  vessels. 

129.  Roosevelt,  pp.  72-73. 

130.  The  Adjutant-General  to  General  Shafter,  telegram  dated  June 
12,  1898. —  Correspondence  relating  to  the  War  icith  Spain,  I,  p.  40. 

131.  Composed  of  32  transports,  2  water  tenders  and  3  lighters. 

132.  Shafter's  report,  p.  58. 

133.  Comprising  the  3rd  Infantry,  20th  Infantry  and  one  squadron 
of  the  2nd  Cavalry. 

134.  Shafter's  report,  p.  58. 

135.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  12.  This  force  was  a  division  of  volun- 
teers under  Brigadier  General  Snyder. —  Shafter's  report,  p.  58. 

136.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  12.  In  his  book,  p.  276,  he  says: 
*'  Finding  that  General  Shafter  was  seriously  affected  by  the  intense 
heat,  I  telegraphed  for  authority  to  go  with  the  expedition,  but  the  re- 
quest was  unanswered." 

137.  See  above,  page  154. 

138.  General  Shafter's  report,  p.  59. 

139.  Henry  G.  Sharpe,  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army  in  the 


648      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Field,  pp.  87-89.  This  account  was  "  compiled  from  The  War  with 
Spain,  by  H.  C.  Lodge;  and  Main  Features  of  the  Spanish- American 
War,  by  Rear-Admiral  Pluddermann,  Imperial  German  Navy." 

140.  General  Shafter  explains  in  his  report,  p.  58,  that  "  while  pass- 
ing along  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  one  of  the  two  barges  we  had  in  tow 
broke  away  during  the  night,  and  was  not  recovered.  This  loss  proved 
to  be  very  serious,  for  it  delayed  and  embarrassed  the  disembarkation 
of  the  army." 

141.  Lodge  relates,  p.  112,  that  "at  last  the  transports,  on  June  14, 
made  their  way  down  the  bay,  pushed  on  the  next  day,  were  joined  near 
Key  West  by  some  dozen  ships  of  war  as  convoy,  and  then  on  the  16th 
were  fairly  on  their  way  to  Santiago.  Far  pleasanter  this  than  broil- 
ing in  Tampa  Harbor,  and  the  spirits  of  the  troops  improved.  Yet 
the  movement,  so  infinitely  better  than  the  hot,  still  waiting,  was  de- 
liberate enough.  Some  of  the  transports  were  very  old  and  very  slow, 
and  as  they  set  the  speed,  the  fleet  crept  along  about  eight  knots  an 
hour  over  a  sapphire  sea,  with  beautiful  star-lit  nights,  and  glimpses 
by  day  of  the  picturesque  shores  and  distant  mountains  of  Cuba.  On 
Sunday,  June  19,  they  were  off  Cape  Maisi,  and  at  daybreak  the  next 
morning  they  came  in  sight  of  the  waiting  war-ships  and  of  Santiago 
Harbor.  Then  came  consultations  between  General  Shafter  and  Ad- 
miral Sampson  and  the  Cuban  generals  Garcia  and  Castillo.  The  plan 
of  capturing  the  Morro  and  other  entrance  batteries,  as  the  admiral 
desired,  so  that  the  mine-field  could  be  cleared,  the  fleet  go  in,  destroy 
the  Spanish  cruisers,  and  compel  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  was  aban- 
doned. General  Shafter  decided  to  move  directly  upon  the  city,  and 
orders  were  given  to  make  the  landing  at  Daiquiri.  The  army  had 
neither  lighters  nor  launches.  They  had  been  omitted,  forgotten,  or 
lost,  like  an  umbrella,  no  one  knew  exactly  where;  so  the  work  of  dis- 
embarking the  troops  fell  upon  the  navy.  Under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire 
from  the  ships,  the  landing  began,  and  was  effected  without  any  re- 
sistance from  the  enemy." 

142.  Roosevelt  fully  agrees  with  this  statement,  declaring  (pp.  84-85) 
that  "  The  country  would  have  offered  very  great  difficulties  to  an  at- 
tacking force  had  there  been  resistance.  It  was  little  but  a  mass  of 
rugged  and  precipitous  hills,  covered  for  the  most  part  by  dense  jungle. 
Five  hundred  resolute  men  could  have  prevented  the  disembarkation 
at  very  little  cost  to  themselves.  There  had  been  about  that  number 
of  Spaniards  at  Daiquiri  that  morning,  but  they  had  fled  even  before 
the  ships  began  shelling." 

143.  General  Shafter  says  in  his  report,  p.  70,  that  "  At  Daiquiri 
the  landing  of  the  troops  and  stores  was  made  at  a  small  wooden  wharf, 
which  the  Spanish  tried  to  burn,  but  unsuccessfully,  and  the  animals 
were  pushed  into  the  water  and  guided  to  a  sandy  beach  about  200  yards 
in  extent.  At  Siboney  the  landing  was  made  on  the  beach  and  at  a 
small  wharf  erected  by  the  engineers. 

"  I  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  men  to  spare  to  construct  perma- 
nent wharves." 

144.  Interesting  accounts  of  this  disembarkation  are  given  by  Miley, 
pp.  52-79;  Bonsai,  pp.  77-84;  Richard  Harding  Davis,  The  Cuban  and 
Porto  Rican  Campaigns,  pp.  112-113. 

145.  Miley,  p.  77. 


Notes  649 

146.  General  Shafter's  report,  p.  61. 

147.  "  War  Between  Japan  and  Russia,   1904. 
(Compiled  from  the  Official  Despatches  and  from  the  Letters  of  the 

Newspaper  War  Correspondents.) 

"  One  of  the  most  detailed  descriptions  which  has  been  published,  on 
the  authority  of  eye-witnesses  of  reliability,  is  that  of  the  first  disem- 
barkation of  the  war  carried  out  at  Chemulpo  by  a  Japanese  Army, 
consisting  of  20,000  men,  with  2,500  horses,  several  batteries  of  field- 
guns,  together  with  an  enormous  mass  of  stores  estimated  at  100,000 
tons. 

"  On  the  night  of  8th  February,  an  advanced  guard  of  2,500  infantry 
was  disembarked  at  a  small  existing  jetty.  On  the  13th  February,  the 
Russian  war-vessels  Variag  and  Korietz,  having  been  destroyed  at  Che- 
mulpo by  Admiral  Uriu's  squadron  in  the  intervening  time,  two  Japa- 
nese transports  arrived  carrying  no  troops,  but  filled  Avith  supplies, 
and  having  Army  Medical  Corps  details,  and  about  1,000  coolies  for  the 
land  transport  service.  With  the  coolies  came  a  carpenter  corps  of 
100  men,  each  carrying  his  box  of  tools,  and  also  an  equal  number  of 
army  blacksmiths.  These  were  detailed  to  put  up  a  blacksmith's  shop 
close  to  the  head  of  the  landing  jetty,  and  some  of  the  carpenters  pro- 
ceeded to  lay  a  cleated  wooden  roadway  up  the  rough  stone  landing,  to 
facilitate  the  disembarkation  of  horses  and  artillery. 

"  The  Medical  Corps  of  300  men,  came  ashore  in  charge  of  the  sup- 
plies for  their  own  department;  small  trunks,  weighing  about  100 
pounds  each,  containing  necessaries  for  *  first  aid '  to  the  wounded,  etc. 
The  coolies  were  engaged  in  landing  a  vast  bulk  of  military  material, 
and  nothing  seems  to  have  been  forgotten.  The  Army  authorities  ap- 
pear to  have  trusted  in  no  way  to  local  supplies.  The  advanced  trans- 
ports also  brought  four  steam  launches,  a  hundred  flat-bottomed  boats, 
and  six  tank  water-boats,  rigged  with  hand-pumps.  During  the  next 
few  days,  under  the  direction  of  the  Japanese  Military  Engineers,  tem- 
porary landing  piers  were  erected,  adjoining  the  permanent  stone  jetty.' 

"  W^ooden  floats,  which  had  arrived  in  sections  in  the  transports, 
were  put  together,  and  cleated  gangways  were  placed  across  and  be- 
tween them,  forming  a  continuous  floor  with  railings  from  the  channel 
to  land.  Korean  junks  were  also  to  some  extent  utilized  in  a  similar 
manner.  Whilst  these  stages  were  in  progress,  supplies  were  coming 
ashore  continuously.  Some  of  the  difficulties  attending  the  landing  at 
Chemulpo  can  be  appreciated  when  it  is  understood  that  the  mean  rise 
and  fall  of  the  tide  is  30  feet,  and  that  for  a  considerable  portion  of 
each  24  hours  mud  flats,  in  many  cases  miles  in  extent,  lie  on  either 
side  of  the  narrow  channel  available  for  lighters  and  launches.  The 
currents  run  like  a  mill  race.  (All  that  can  be  said  in  favor  of  Che- 
mulpo Harbor  is,  that  it  was  better  as  a  landing  place  than  the  neigh- 
boring coasts.)  On  the  16th  February,  seven  transports  anchored  in 
the  harbor,  and  immediately  proceeded  to  land  men  and  horses.  The 
flat-bottomed  boats  were  taken  alongside,  the  horses  raised  in  slings, 
and  lowered  into  them,  each  boat  carrying  five  animals  and  bearing  a 
transport  department  flag,  giving  its  number  and  the  number  of  the 
landing  float  to  which  it  was  to  go.  On  arrival  at  the  float,  each 
horse-boat   was   brought   up    broadside    on;    the   troopers,    holding    the 


650     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

horses'  heads,  leaped  up  on  the  floats,  and  the  horses  made  the  3  feet 
or  4  feet  jump  from  the  bottom  of  the  boat  to  the  floor  of  the  temporary 
landing-stage,  without  hesitation  or  accident.  A  correspondent  counted 
20  animals  landed  in  10  minutes,  and  one  a  minute  would  be  a  fair 
average,  which  was  kept  up  for  hours  without  cessation.  Rice  mats 
were  thrown  down  to  deaden  the  noise.  At  the  same  time,  two  streams 
of  men,  fully  accoutred,  were  pouring  over  two  other  temporary  landing 
piers,  and  the  disembarkation  of  supplies  was  steadily  maintained  at 
the  permanent  stone  jetty.  Men  and  horses  were  rapidly  marched  to 
the  adjacent  railway  station,  where  long  lines  of  cars  were  in  readiness 
to  take  them  to  Seoul.  In  spite  of  all  difficulties,  the  whole  force,  to- 
gether with  an  immense  mass  of  stores,  was  thrown  on  shore  in  a  space 
of  barely  a  week  without  confusion  or  accident.  At  no  time  were  the 
approaches  to  the  landing-stages  in  the  slightest  degree  congested,  and 
all  eye-witnesses  affirm  that  men,  horses,  guns,  and  above  all,  the  im- 
mense bulk  of  100,000  tons  of  baggage,  were  cleared  away  as  if  by 
magic." 

"  Comments 

"  I  have  dwelt  somewhat  at  length  on  the  foregoing,  because  the  de- 
tails set  forth  an  almost  ideal  illustration  of  the  perfection  in  the  exe- 
cution of  naval-military  operations,  which  results  on  active  service 
from  methodical  peace  training. 

"  The  descent  was  completed  within  a  few  days  of  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  and  hence  owed  none  of  its  success  to  the  costly  teaching  of 
immediately  preceding  failures  in  the  same  campaign. 

"  In  the  years  preceding  the  struggle,  the  Japanese  had,  as  a  part 
of  their  unostentatious  preparations,  carefully  organized  and  practised 
a  thoroughly  efficient  system  of  disembarkation,  and  when  the  day  of 
trial  at  last  arrived,  this  difficult  and  complicated  operation  was  carried 
out  with  the  absolute  precision  which  is  usually  associated  with  the 
carefully  rehearsed  pageants  of  the  Military  Tournament  at  Islington. 

"  Everything  was  in  its  place,  and  every  man  knew  what  was  required 
of  him. 

"  Ample  appliances  and  labor  were  at  hand  for  the  construction  of 
new  stages  and  the  repair  of  those  in  existence,  and  it  was  thus  possible 
to  mitigate  confusion  by  appropriating  special  and  separate  landing- 
places  for  the  disembarkation  of  men,  horses,  and  stores  respectively. 
A  sufficient  supply  of  boats  was  also  available;  and  although  the  re- 
sources of  even  Japanese  ingenuity  have  not  as  yet  apparently  been 
able  to  hit  upon  any  more  expeditious  method  of  getting  horses  out  of 
transports  than  by  slinging  them,  yet  the  precision  and  method  which 
have  prevailed  have  rendered  it  possible  for  this  and  the  subsequent 
debarkations,  which  have  been  a  feature  of  the  war,  to  be  effected  with 
a  speed  and  freedom  from  untoward  events  hitherto  unsurpassed.  .  .  . 

"  Conclusion 

"  It  is  possible  that  the  prosperity  which  has  attended  the  combined 
efforts  of  the  fleets  and  armies  of  the  Mikado  may  blind  the  general 
public  in  this  country  to  the  careful  preparation  and  sustained  effort 
to  which  the  remarkable  success  achieved  has  been  entirely  due;   and 


Notes  651 

may  lead  to  the  impression  that  operations  which  have  been  carried 
through  with  such  apparent  ease  cannot  be  difficult  in  themselves,  that 
time  and  money  need  not,  therefore,  be  devoted  to  the  peace  rehearsal 
of  such  feats  by  our  own  forces,  and  that  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past, 
we  should  fall  back,  in  such  matters,  on  the  antiquated,  dangerous  and 
costly  policy  of  trusting  to  luck,  when  an  emergency  arises.  Now  there 
is  no  point  which  has  made  itself  more  clearly  apparent  than  this,  that 
up  to  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the  diplomacy  of  Russia  had  been  very 
much  in  advance  of  her  warlike  preparations;  whilst  as  regards  Japan, 
the  state  of  affairs  was  exactly  opposite,  her  rulers  having  been  wise 
enough  to  let  the  w^ork  of  preparation  keep  pace  with  the  words  of 
diplomacy.  The  whole  campaign,  therefore,  has  been  a  splendid  exam- 
ple of  the  triumph  in  combined  naval  and  military  operations  of  method 
and  peace  organization  over  illimitable  resources. 

"  But  the  lesson  can  be  given  in  an  even  more  concrete  form  than  is 
afforded  by  the  events  of  the  present  war  standing  by  itself.  If  any 
man  is  inclined  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  inferences  drawn,  let  him 
carefully  study  the  details  of  the  Japanese  disembarkation  at  Chemulpo 
in  February,  1904,  and  compare  its  features,  one  by  one,  with  the  similar 
operation  which  was  carried  through  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States 
at  Daiquiri,  in  June,  1898.  The  former  episode  was  purposely  selected 
for  quotation  in  the  first  part  of  this  essay,  because  it  is  an  example  of 
a  descent  executed  with  admirable  precision,  within  a  few  days  of  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  consequently,  too  soon  for  it  to  have  been 
possible  for  any  lessons  learned  during  the  existing  war  to  have  been 
applied.  The  disembarkation  at  Chemulpo,  therefore,  was  a  product  of 
peace  preparation,  and  of  peace  preparation  alone. 

"  To  fully  realize  the  tremendous  influence  which  national  foresight 
may  exercise  as  compared  with  numbers  and  wealth,  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  forces  employed  at  Daiquiri  were  engaged  in  executing 
the  mandate  of  a  great  state,  whose  resources  exceed  those  of  Japan  by 
many  millions,  alike  in  population  and  money.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen, 
whilst  the  most  essential  appliances,  such  as  horse  boats,  were  denied 
to  the  brave  men  of  the  United  States  Forces  at  Daiquiri,  at  Chemulpo, 
in  spite  of  the  comparative  slenderness  of  the  national  resources,  every 
detail,  down  to  signboards  for  the  Japanese  troop-boats  and  landing- 
stages,  and  rice  mats  for  the  horses'  feet,  were  at  hand  and  constantly 
available.  The  disposition  of  the  British  nation,  like  that  of  the  Ameri- 
cans before  1898,  and  of  the  Russians  up  to  1904,  has  ever  erred  on  the 
side  of  procrastination,  where  expenditure  and  preparation  for  national 
safety  are  concerned,  and  as  a  result  in  almost  every  campaign,  from 
the  expedition  to  Carthagena  in  1741,  down  to  the  present  day,  British 
sailors  and  soldiers,  when  called  upon  to  uphold  the  national  honor, 
have  been  placed  more  or  less  at  a  disadvantage,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
previous  peace  preparation.  Luck,  sheer  fighting  power,  the  like  un- 
preparedness  of  our  opponents  have  hitherto  averted  a  catastrophe;  but 
as  years  roll  by,  the  appliances  for  war  become  more  complicated,  and 
success  is  gradually  tending  to  depend  rather  on  scientific  and  system- 
atic training  than  on  personal  courage.  The  immunity  from  disaster, 
therefore,  which  has  hitherto  attended  our  arms,  may  and  probably 
will,  fail  us  at  a;  critical  moment,  if  the  object-lesson  of  Japanese  fore- 
sight   and    Russian    supineness    be   not    taken    to    heart." —  Henry    G. 


652     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Sharpe,  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army  in  the  Field,  pp.  90-94. 

148.  Shafter's  report,  p.  61;  Miley,  p.  82;   Bonsai,  p.  88. 

149.  General  Wheeler's  report  to  Shafter,  dated  June  26,  1898,  and 
quoted  in  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  Wa/r  for  1898,  p.  73,  and  in 
Wheeler,  p.  18. 

These  964  troops  comprised  nearly  all  of  his  command  who  had  then 
been  disembarked. 

150.  The  forces  in  the  three  Spanish  lines  numbered  about  2,078 
officers  and  men,  but  only  1,500  took  part  in  the  action. —  Statement  of 
the  Spanish  Government,  and  Sargent,  II,  p.  62,  and  Appendices  A  and 
S,  III,  pp.  159-160  and  218. 

On  the  other  hand,  Miley  says,  p.  84,  "  In  the  Spanish  official  reports 
the  strength  of  the  Spanish  forces  is  given  as  about  five  hundred  men," 
and  Bonsai,  p.  99,  estimates  them  as  "  between  five  and  six  hundred 
men,  all  told";  while  Roosevelt  declares,  p.  112,  that  there  were  "over 
twelve  hundred  men  in  all,  together  with  two  guns." 

151.  Bonsai,  p.  88;  Miley,  p.  83. 

152.  The  American  casualties  were  16  killed  and  52  wounded;  the 
Spanish  had  only  10  killed  and  18  wounded. —  Shafter's  report,  p.  61; 
Wheeler's  report;  Spanish  official  statement,  quoted  by  Sargent,  II,  p. 
63,  and  III,  p.  159;  Roosevelt,  pp.  112-114;  Miley,  p.  84. 

According  to  Shafter's  statement,  ibid.,  "  the  reported  losses  of  the 
Spaniards  were  9  killed  and  27  wounded." 

153.  The  authorities  consulted  for  the  engagement  at  Las  Guasimas 
are  General  Shafter's  report;  General  W^heeler's  report;  Wheeler,  pp. 
16-38,  who  includes  General  Young's  report  of  June  29,  1898,  and 
Colonel  Leonard  Wood's  report  of  June  25th;  Roosevelt,  pp.  91-115; 
Sargent,  II,  pp.  58-63  and  84;  Miley,  pp.  83-84;  Bonsai,  pp.  87-100; 
Lodge,  pp.  113-117;   Davis,  pp.   132-172. 

154.  Wheeler,  pp.  40-41. 

155.  General  Shafter  states  in  his  report,  p.  70,  that  "  In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  I  had  nearly  1,000  men  continuously  at  work  on  the  roads, 
they  were  at  times  impassable  for  wagons. 

"  The  San  Juan  and  Aguadores  Rivers  would  often  suddenly  rise  so 
as  to  prevent  the  passage  of  wagons,  and  then  the  eight  pack  trains 
with  the  command  had  to  be  depended  upon  for  the  victualling  of  my 
army,  as  well  as  the  20,000  refugees,  who  could  not,  in  the  interests  of 
humanity,  be  left  to  starve  while  we  had  rations. 

"  Often  for  days  nothing  could  be  moved  except  on  pack  trains.  .  .  . 

"  The  supply  of  quartermaster  and  commissary  stores  during  the 
campaign  was  abundant,  and,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  in  land- 
ing and  transporting  the  rations,  the  troops  on  the  firing  line  were  at 
all  times  supplied  with  its  coarser  components,  namely,  of  bread,  meat, 
sugar,  and  coff"ee. 

"  There  was  no  lack  of  transportation,  for  at  not  a  time  up  to  the 
surrender  could  all  the  wagons  I  had  be  used." 

An  interesting  account  of  the  difficulties  experienced  in  the  matter  of 
supply  is  given  by  Miley,  pp.  84-89. 

156.  On  June  25th  the  pack  trains  were  put  in  service,  but  next  day 
this  method  was  found  to  be  inadequate  to  furnish  the  necessary  sup- 
plies to  the  army  six  miles  away.  Although  more  than  66  wagons 
were  then  landed,  loaded  and  hurried  to  the  front,  the  lack  of  mules, 


I 


Notes  653 

the  illness  of  the  teamsters  and  the  dearth  of  men  to  fill  their  places 
resulted  in  many  wagons  remaining  in  the  holds  of  the  transports  until 
the  army  occupied  Santiago.  The  assignment  of  wagons  to  the  various 
commands  proved  unsatisfactory,  the  horses  and  mules  fell  sick,  and 
indeed  almost  every  conceivable  difficulty  was  encountered. 

157.  No  systematic  effort  was  made  to  repair  the  roads  and  to  open 
up  new  roads  until  the  27th,  when  this  work  was  entrusted  to  Captain 
Burr  and  the  Engineer  battalion. 

158.  General  Wheeler  asserts,  pp.  41-42,  that  on  the  26th  he  "  again 
received  instructions  not  to  advance  "  but  that  he  "  reconnoitered  close 
up  to  El  Caney,  and  learned  that  there  were  not  more  than  five  hun- 
dred Spafiiards  at  that  place."  Upon  describing  the  defenses  to  Gen- 
eral Shafter  and  urging  that  he  be  permitted  to  attack  the  place  with 
his  guns,  the  commander-in-chief  "  admitted  the  feasibility  of  this  plan, 
but  after  two  interviews  and  some  correspondence  informed  me  that  he 
had  determined  to  entrust  this  work  to  General  Lawton." 

Bonsai  declares,  p.  112,  that,  although  the  country  on  the  right  and 
left  was  reconnoitered,  "  the  centre,  the  Spanish  front,  where  the  heavy 
fighting  subsequently  occurred,  remained  unexplored,  and  was  almost 
completely  unknown  to  us  until  after  the  battle  of  San  Juan." 

159.  Shafter's  report,  p.  62.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  force  in  ques- 
tion was  a  column  under  General  Escario  and  was  composed  of  3,660 
officers  and  men.  It  was  reported  to  be  advancing  at  the  rate  of  12 
miles  per  diem,  to  be  only  54  miles  from  Santiago,  and  to  have  with  it 
an  abundance  of  beef  cattle  and  other  supplies. 

160.  "  The  position  of  El  Caney,  to  the  northeast  of  Santiago,  was  of 
great  importance  to  the  enemy,  as  holding  the  Guantanamo  road  as 
well  as  furnishing  shelter  for  a  strong  outpost  that  might  be  used  to 
assail  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  any  force  operating  against  San  Juan 
Hill.  .  .  . 

"  During  the  afternoon  I  assembled  the  division  commanders,  and  ex- 
plained to  them  my  general  plan  of  battle,  Lawton's  division,  assisted 
by  Capron's  light  battery,  was  ordered  to  move  out  during  the  after- 
noon toward  El  Caney,  to  begin  the  attack  there  early  the  next  morn- 
ing. After  carrying  El  Caney,  Lawton  was  to  move  by  the  Caney 
road  toward  Santiago,  and  take  position  on  the  right  of  the  line. 
Wheeler's  division  of  dismounted  cavalry,  and  Kent's  division  of  in- 
fantry, were  directed  on  the  Santiago  road,  the  head  of  the  column 
resting  near  El  Pozo,  toward  which  heights  Grimes's  battery  moved  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  with  orders  to  take  position  thereon  early 
the  next  morning,  and  at  the  proper  time  prepare  the  way  for  the  ad- 
vance of  Wheeler  and  Kent  on  San  Juan  Hill.  The  attack  at  this  point 
was  to  be  delayed  until  Lawton's  guns  were  heard  at  El  Caney  and  his 
infantry  fire  showed  that  he  had  become  well  engaged." —  Shafter's  re- 
port, pp.  61-62. 

161.  The  Spanish  forces  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Santiago  num- 
bered, so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  about  10,429. —  Sargent,  II,  pp. 
99-100. 

162.  Three  companies  of  the  Constitucion  regiment  and  one  of  gue- 
rillas, a  total  of  about  520  officers  and  men.  There  were  also  about 
100  inhabitants  who  took  a  hand  in  the  fighting.  The  Spaniards  had 
neither  artillery  nor  machine  guns. 


654     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

163.  Shafter's  report,  p.  62. 

164.  With  the  arrival  of  Bates,  the  force  under  Lawton  numbered 
6,653. 

165.  Miley  declares,  p.  105,  that  "  In  General  Lawton's  report  to 
General  Shafter  the  day  before,  he  had  stated  that,  in  his  opinion, 
El  Caney  would  fall  in  about  two  or  three  hours." 

166.  The  assailants  outnumbered  the  garrison  more  than  twelve  to 
one. 

167.  The  American  losses  were  81  killed  and  360  wounded,  a  total  of 
441. —  Records  of  the  Adjutant-General's  office. 

The  Spanish  casualties  were  about  235  killed  and  wounded,  120  taken 
prisoners  and  65  missing.  General  Vara  de  Rey  was  first  wounded, 
then  killed,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Punet,  who  succeeded  to  the  com- 
mand, was  only  able  to  escape  with  about  100  men. —  Sargent,  II,  pp. 
107-108,  and  III,  pp.  223-225. 

The  authorities  consulted  are  Shafter's  report;  Lawton's  report  of 
July  3rd  and  Bates'  report  of  July  8th,  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  1898,  I,  pp.  80-82;  Sargent,  II,  pp.  101-107;  Lodge,  pp.  119- 
124;   Miley,  pp.   105  and   112;    Bonsai,  pp.   114-116,   139-141. 

168.  The  War  with  Spain,  pp.  120-121. 

169.  On  June  28th  General  Shafter  had  cabled  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  he  had  not  unloaded  the  siege  guns  and  did  not  intend  to  take 
them  to  the  front  until  the  army  had  been  checked  or  needed  them;  that 
he  had  "  four  light  batteries  at  the  front,  and  they  are  heavy  enough 
to  overcome  anything  the  Spaniards  have." —  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  1898,  p.  99. 

170.  Lodge,  p.  123. 

171.  Shafter's  report;  Roosevelt,  pp.  129-130;  Miley,  p.  107. 

172.  Wheeler,  however,  returned  to  duty  during  the  day  and  ren- 
dered conspicuous   service  throughout  the  fight. 

173.  Sumner's  leading  brigade  reached  the  ford  about  10  A.  M. 
"  Then  a  captive  observation-balloon  was  brought  along  and  anchored 
at  the  ford  where  the  troops  were  crossing  and  were  massed  in  the  road. 
As  one  reads  the  official  statement  of  this  fact,  comment  and  criticism 
alike  fail.  That  such  a  thing  should  have  been  done  seems  incredible. 
The  balloon  simply  served  to  give  the  Spaniards  a  perfect  mark  and 
draw  all  the  rifle  and  artillery  fire  to  the  precise  point  where  our  men 
were  densely  crowded  in  the  narrow  road.  Fortunately  the  -balloon  was 
quickly  destroyed  by  the  enemy's  fire,  but  it  had  given  the  place  and  the 
range,  and  there  the  troops  remained  for  nearly  an  hour,  exposed  to 
heavj^  fire  from  the  forts  and  block-house.  .  .  .  There  the  men  staid, 
dropping  under  the  shots  of  the  Spaniards,  able  to  do  nothing,  waiting 
orders.  No  orders  from  headquarters  came;  the  situation  was  intoler- 
able; retreat  meant  not  only  defeat,  but  useless  and  continual  ex- 
posure to  a  slaughtering  fire." — Lodge,  pp.  124-125.  Compare  Bonsai, 
pp.  117-122;   Roosevelt,  pp.  130-137;  Davis,  pp.  200-214. 

174.  Shafter's  report,  p.  64. 

175.  Among  others  Brigadier  General  Hawkins,  who  greatly  distin- 
guished himself  throughout  the  action,  especially  in  the  manner  in 
which  he  rallied  his  troops  and  urged  them  forward  to  the  attack. 
Compare  Shafter's  report,  p.  64. 

176.  "Soon  after  the  Seventy-first  New  York  Regiment,  of  Hawkins' 


Notes  655 

Brigade,  came  up.  I  turned  them  into  the  bypath  indicated  by  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Derby,  leading  to  the  lower  ford,  sending  word  to  General 
Hawkins  of  this  movement.  This  would  have  speedily  delivered  them 
in  their  proper  place  on  the  left  of  the  brigade,  but  under  the  galling 
fire  of  the  enemy  the  leading  battalion  of  this  regiment  was  thrown  into 
confusion  and  recoiled  in  disorder  on  the  troops  in  the  rear.  At  this 
critical  moment  the  officers  of  my  staff  practically  formed  a  cordon  be- 
hind the  panic-stricken  men  and  urged  them  to  again  go  forward.  I 
finally  ordered  them  to  lie  down  in  the  thicket  and  clear  the  way  for 
others  of  their  own  regiment  who  were  coming  up  behind.  This  many 
of  them  did,  and  the  Second  and  Third  battalions  came  forward  in 
better  order  and  moved  along  the  road  toward  the  ford." — General 
Kent's  report  of  July  7th  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretarif  of  War  for 
1898,  p.  77.  See  also  Bonsai,  pp.  128-129,  footnote,  and  500;  Davis,  pp. 
238-239;  Sargent,  II,  pp.  114-115;  Lodge,  p.  127. 

177.  Lodge,  p.  125. 

178.  The  authorities  consulted  for  the  above  narrative  are  General 
Shafter's  report,  pp.  63-65;  General  Wheeler's  report;  General  Kent's 
report;  Colonel  Wood's  report;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt's  report; 
Wheeler,  pp.  42-48  and  110;  Roosevelt,  pp.  128-161;  Sargent,  II,  pp. 
108-122;  Lodge,  pp.  124-132;  Bonsai,  pp.  112-142;  Miley,  pp.  106-118. 

Durinor  the  dav  General  Duffield  with  the  33rd  Michigan  attacked 
Aguadores  and  thus  prevented  the  Spaniards  at  that  point  from  re- 
enforcing  Linares  at  Santiago. 

179.  The  losses  of  the  1st  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  on  July  first 
were  93  killed,  492  wounded  and  58  missing,  a  total  of  643,  according  to 
General  Kent's  report  of  July  7th  (Report  of  the  War  Department  for 
1898,  p.  78).  The  1st  Cavalry  brigade  lost  11  killed  and  126  wounded; 
the  2nd  brigade  35  killed  and  203  wounded,  a  total  of  375  for  the  Cavalry 
division.  (Wheeler,  p.  55,  and  report  of  Colonel  Wood,  commanding  the 
2nd  brigade  in  the  illness  of  General  Young,  quoted  in  Wheeler,  p.  75.) 

According  to  these  returns,  the  total  American  losses  in  the  battle  of 
San  Juan  on  July  first  were  1,018,  while  Roosevelt,  p.  171,  gives  them 
as  1,071. 

Lodge,  p.  130,  gives  these  casualties  at  1,614,  but  his  figures  are 
manifestly  incorrect  since  they  exceed  the  grand  total  of  1,156  for  the 
days  of  July  1st  to  3rd,  both  inclusive,  given  in  the  statement  of  the 
"  Casualties  in  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  Operations  against  Santiago, 
June  22  to  July  17,  1898,"  issued  by  the  Adjutant-General's  Office  on 
April  23,  1900. 

The  Spanish  forces  actually  engaged  in  this  battle  and  their  losses 
are  diflfieult  to  calculate  accurately.  There  were  —  as  has  been  seen 
above  (footnote  161) — 10,429  troops  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Santiago  and  the  harbor.  So  far  as  can  be  ascertained  only  1,197 
troops  took  part  in  the  actual  fighting  on  the  San  Juan  heights  and 
their  losses  were  something  under  360  men.  The  authorities  for  these 
figures  are  given  by  Sargent,  II,  pp.  129-130,  and  III,  pp.  159-160,  223- 
225. 

Miley  asserts,  p.  117,  that  "The  intrenchments  of  San  Juan  were  de- 
fended by  two  companies  of  Spanish  infantry,  numbering  about  two 
hundred  and  fifty  to  three  hundred  men.  About  eleven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  reinforcements  were   sent  them,  bringing  the  number   up   to 


656     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

about  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men."     Roosevelt  claims,  p.    170,  that 
there  were  "  about  4,500  Spaniards." 

180.  Miley,  p.  115. 

181.  Wheeler's  report  of  July  7th,  p.  75;  Wheeler,  pp.  53  and  118. 

182.  Reports  of  Generals  Shafter  and  Bates,  pp.  65  and  82. 

183.  Shafter's  report,  p.  65;  Miley,  p.  122. 

184.  Shafter's  report,  p.   65. 

185.  After  deducting  the  losses  suffered  at  El  Caney,  Bates'  brigade 
numbered  1,078  and  Lawton's  division,  4,987,  a  total  of  6,065,  ac- 
cording to  the  statement  issued  by  the  Adjutant-General's  Office  on 
April  23,   1900    (see  above,  footnote   179). 

As  1,018  were  put  hors  de  combat  at  San  Juan  on  July  first  out  of 
8,412,  the  troops  at  the  front  after  midday  on  the  2nd,  having  been  re- 
enforced  by  Bates  and  Lawton,  numbered  about  13,459. 

186.  Miley,  p.  124;  Bonsai,  pp.  253-257.  Compare  Sargent,  II,  pp. 
128-129;   Lodge,  p.   133. 

187.  Miley,  p.  124.  Also  Shafter's  report,  p.  65;  Wheeler,  p.  67, 
who  gives  the  hour  as  9  p.  m. 

188.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  102. 

189.  Shafter's  report,  p.   66. 

190.  Ibid.  According  to  Miley,  p.  130,  Toral's  reply  "  was  received 
at  6.30  p.  M.  that  day." 

191.  3,660  troops.     See  page  653,  footnote  159. 

192.  Shafter's  report,  p.  67. 

193.  Ibid.,  p.  66;  Miley,  pp.  130-131. 

194.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  pp.  102-104. 

195.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  pp.  103-104.  This  last 
despatch  was  received  at  Washington  on  July  3rd  at  7  P.  M.  and  31  min- 
utes later  the  ensuing  cable  came  from  Shafter: 

"  Early  this  morning  I  sent  in  a  demand  for  immediate  surrender  of 
Santiago,  threatening  bombardment  to-morrow.  Perfect  quiet  on  lines 
for  one  hour.  From  news  just  received  of  escape  of  fleet  am  satisfied 
place  will  be  surrendered. 

196.  Alger,  p.  172. 

197.  Shafter's  report,  pp.  67-68;  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War;  Sar- 
gent, III,  pp.  3-7,  13-19,  22-23,  28-31;  Miley,  pp.  134-147,  155-159. 

198.  On  the  9th  Brigadier  General  Wallace  F.  Randolph  reached 
Siboney  with  6  batteries  of  artillery  from  Tampa,  but  so  shocking  was 
the  condition  of  the  roads  that  he  was  unable  to  get  more  than  two 
batteries  into  position  before  July  14th. 

199.  The  American  warships  also  took  a  hand  in  this  bombardment. 

200.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  19,  which  goes  on  to  say:  "Before 
leaving  Washington  I  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  yellow  fever  had  de- 
veloped among  our  troops  and  by  this  time  learned  that  it  had  spread 
so  much  that  there  were  over  a  hundred  cases,  and  the  medical  officers 
were  undecided  as  to  the  extent  it  might  cripple  the  command.  This 
was  the  most  serious  feature  of  the  situation,  and  impressed  me  with 
the  importance  of  the  fact  that  prompt  action  should  be  taken,  and  I 
so  informed  the  authorities  by  cable,  suggesting  that  it  was  a  case  where 
discretionary  authority  should  be  granted." 

This  assumption  of  the  conduct  of  negotiations  was  based  upon  the 
President's  specific  instructions  to  proceed  to  Santiago  and  to  give  such 


Notes  657 

general  directions  as  he  deemed  best.  The  discretionary  authority 
which  he  requested  was  given  him  by  the  Secretary  of  War's  cable  of 
July  13th,  which  left  him  free  to  accept  surrender  or  to  deliver  an  as- 
sault according  as  he  judged  advisable.  See  Miles,  pp.  282,  286-288, 
294-295. 

201.  "At  the  appointed  time,  accompanied  by  Brig.  Gen.  J.  C.  Gil- 
more  and  Lieut.  Col.  Marion  P.  Maus,  of  my  staff,  Major-General 
Shafter,  two  of  his  staff  officers,  and  Major-General  Wheeler,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Wheeler,  aid-de-camp,  I  met  the  Spanish  general,  Toral,  with  two 
of  his  staff  officers  and  an  interpreter.  After  some  conversation  be- 
tween General  Toral  and  General  Shafter,  I  informed  General  Toral 
distinctly  that  I  had  left  W^ashington  six  days  before;  that  it  was  then 
the  determination  of  the  Government  that  this  portion  of  the  Spanish 
forces  must  either  be  destroyed  or  captured;  that  I  was  there  with 
sufficient  reenforcements  to  accomplish  that  object,  and  that  if  this  was 
not  the  case  any  number  of  troops  w'ould  be  brought  there  as  fast  as 
steamers  could  bring  them,  if  it  took  50,000  men.  I  told  him  that  we 
offered  him  liberal  terms,  namely,  to  return  his  troops  to  Spain;  and 
I  also  pointed  out  the  fact  that  this  was  the  only  way  in  which  his 
forces  could  return,  they  being  on  an  island  3,000  miles  away  from 
their  own  country  with  no  means  of  succor.  He  said  that  under  the 
Spanish  law  he  was  not  permitted  to  surrender  as  long  as  he  had  am- 
munition and  food,  and  that  he  must  maintain  the  honor  of  the 
Spanish  arms.  My  reply  was  that  he  had  already  accomplished  that; 
that  he  must  now  surrender  or  take  the  consequences,  and  that  I  would 
give  him  until  daylight  the  next  morning  to  decide.  He  appealed  for 
longer  time,  saying  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  communicate  with  his 
superiors,  and  upon  his  request  I  granted  him  until  12  o'clock  noon." — 
General  Miles'  report,  p.  20. 

That  afternoon  a  cable  was  received  from  the  Secretary  of  War  leav- 
ing the  question  of  accepting  a  surrender  or  of  making  an  assault  to 
the  discretion  of  General  Miles. 

202.  General  Miles  "  informed  General  Shafter  that  the  commissioners 
could  be  appointed  in  his  name.  I  directed  him  to  name  Generals  Law- 
ton  and  Wheel'er,  and  informed  him  that  he  could  also  be  one  of  the 
number,  but  he  appointed  his  staff  officer  instead,  Lieutenant  Miley,  a 
very  able  and  gallant  officer." — Miles,  p.  292. 

203.  "  After  the  great  physical  strain  and  exposure  of  July  1  and 
2,  the  malarial  and  other  fevers  began  to  rapidly  advance  throughout 
the  command,  and  on  July  4  the  yellow  fever  appeared  at  Siboney. 
Though  efforts  were  made  to  keep  this  fact  from  the  army,  it  soon  be- 
came known." —  General  Shafter's  report,  p.  70. 

204.  General  Miles'  report,  pp.  21-25;  Miles,  pp.  290-293. 

205.  Shafter's  report,  p.  69;  Miley,  pp.   162-182. 

206.  After  no  less  than  five  demands  for  surrender  had  been  made 
upon  it. 

207.  Generals  Wheeler  and  Law^ton,  and  Lieutenant  J.  D.  Miley  for 
the  American  forces,  and  General  Federico  Escario,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ventura  Fontan,  and  Robert  Mason,  the  British  Vice-Consul  who  acted 
as  interpreter,  on  behalf  of  the  Spanish. 

208.  This  document  is  given  in  extenso  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  1898,  pp.  122-123. 


658     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

209.  Miley  states,  p.  214,  that  "  In  round  numbers,  23,500  Spanish 
troops  in  the  Division  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  laid  down  their  arms,  and 
of  these,  13,000  were  in  garrisons  outside  of  Santiago." 

Some  of  the  prisoners  preferred  to  stay  in  Cuba.  The  total  number 
shipped  to  Spain  between  August  9th  and  September  17th  was  22,864, 
of  whom  22,137  were  troops  and  the  remainder  wives  and  children  of  of- 
ficers, priests  and  sisters  of  mercy. —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1898,  p.  5,  and  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  in  ibid.,  p.  274. 

According  to  Miley,  p.  227,  "  The  captured  ordnance,  arms,  and  am- 
munition included  100  cannon,  6,800  projectiles  of  all  calibres,  15,000 
pounds  of  powder,  25,114  small  arms,  made  up  of  Remington,  Spanish 
Mauser,  and  Argentina  Mauser  rifles;  and  5,279,000  rounds  of  small 
arms  ammunition  for  these  three  kinds  of  rifles.  Of  the  100  cannon, 
seven  were  modern  breech-loading  8-inch  rifles,  and  four  similar  guns 
with  a  calibre  of  6  inches.  These  guns  were  all  mounted  at  the  mouth 
of  the  harbor.  There  were  also  eighteen  rapid-fire  and  machine  guns 
distributed  among  the  forts  at  the  enrtance  to  the  harbor  and  the  de- 
fences immediately  around  the  city.  The  rest  of  the  cannon  were  obso- 
lete bronze  and  cast-iron  pieces.  The  rifle  with  which  the  Spanish 
troops  were  armed  was  the  Spanish  Mauser,  and  for  this  particular 
rifle  there  were  only  1,500,000  rounds  among  the  captured  ammunition." 

210.  Shafter's  report,  p.  69;  Miley,  pp.  185-186. 

211.  The  total  American  losses  throughout  this  campaign  were  21 
officers  and  222  enlisted  men  killed,  101  officers  and  1,344  men  wounded, 
an  aggregate  of  1,688. —  Casualties  in  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  Operations 
against  Santiago,  June  22  to  July  11,  1898,"  issued  by  the  Adjutant- 
General's  Office  on  April  23,  1900. 

212.  In  his  report  General  Shafter  stated,  p.  70,  "  The  discipline  of 
the  command  was  superb,  and  I  wish  to  invite  attention  to  the  fact 
that  not  an  officer  was  brought  to  trial  by  court-martial,  and,  as  far  as 
I  know,  no  enlisted  man.  This  speaks  volumes  for  an  army  of  this 
size,  and  in  a  campaign  of  such  duration." 

General  James  Harrison  Wilson  says,  II,  p.  429,  that  "  Shafter's  ex- 
pedition .  .  .  was  composed  mostly  of  well-trained  regulars,  according 
to  all  accounts  the  finest  body  of  men  the  country  had  ever  assembled." 

213.  As  has  been  seen  (page  188  and  page  657,  footnote  203)  yellow 
fever  had  made  its  appearance  on  July  4th. 

214.  Miley,  pp.  215-217.  The  removal  of  the  troops  to  new  camps 
was  done  in  compliance  with  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War  tele- 
graphed to  General  Shafter  on  July  13th  and  14th.  These  despatches 
are  given  by  Alger,  pp.  256-257. 

215.  Shafter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  July  18,  1898. 

216.  "Total  sick,  4,255;  total  fever  cases,  3,164;  new  cases  of  fever, 
653;  cases  of  fever  returned  to  duty,  722." — Shafter's  report  of  August 
first,  quoted  by  Alger,  p.  264. 

217.  With  Shafter  in  Cuba;  pp.  217-218. 

218.  The  Secretary  of  War  to  Shafter,  August  2nd.— Alger,  p.  262. 

219.  These  despatches  are  given  in  full  by  Alger,  pp.  262-266  and  268; 
Miley,  pp.  218-222;  Sargent,  III,  pp.  44-49. 

The  letter  signed  by  the  general  officers  was  unwisely  given  out  to 
the  Associated  Press  and  was  published  in  the  United  States  on  August 
4th,  thereby  causing  much  unnecessary  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the 


Notes  659 

families  of  the  officers  and  troops  then  in  Cuba.  This  leak  caused  a 
reprimand  to  be  administered  to  General  Shafter  on  the  same  day,  but 
the  culprit  was  never  discovered. 

220.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  5. 

221.  Contrary  to  the  prevalent  opinion,  the  "  round  robin  "  was  not 
the  motive  which  prompted  the  withdrawal  of  Shafter's  army  from 
Cuba,  although  it  doubtless  somewhat  expedited  that  step.  On  July  23rd 
Secretary  Alger  cabled  Shafter  that  "  As  soon  as  it  can  be  done  with 
safety,  it  is  the  intention  to  bring  the  entire  5th  Corps  North  for  rest 
and  recuperation."  On  the  26th  the  Surgeon-General  was  ordered  to 
proceed  to  Montauk  Point  and  to  report  on  its  suitability,  and  on  the 
28th  Shafter  was  notified  that  it  had  been  selected  for  his  "  command 
when  it  can  be  moved."  On  August  first,  in  response  to  Shafter's  recom- 
mendation of  the  26th,  he  was  ordered  "  to  send  some  of  Wheeler's 
dismounted  cavalry  on  the  Louisiana  to  New  York  " ;  on  the  same  day 
orders  were  given  for  the  necessary  contracts  to  prepare  Montauk 
Point,  and  on  August  2nd  the  contracts  were  approved  and  let. —  See 
Alger,  pp.  259-261,  269-273. 

222.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  p.  129;  Sargent,  III,  p.  50. 

223.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  p.  5. 

224.  Alger,  p.  270. 

225.  30  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  1742-1743. 
.226.  Page  176. 

227.  General  Miles'  report  for  1898,  p.  12. 

228.  His  plan  of  campaign  was  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
on  June  24th. 

229.  On  June  26th  the  Secretary  of  War  informed  him  that  "  By 
direction  of  the  President  an  expedition  will  be  organized  with  the  least 
possible  delay,  under  the  immediate  command  of  Major-General  Brooke, 
United  States  Army,  consisting  of  three  divisions  taken  from  the  troops 
best  equipped  in  the  First  and  Third  Army  Corps  and  two  divisions  from 
the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  for  movement  and  operation  against  the  enemy 
in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  The  command  under  Major-General  Shafter, 
or  such  part  thereof  as  can  be  spared  from  the  work  now  in  hand,  will 
join  the  foregoing  expedition,  and  you  will  command  the  forces  thus 
united  in  person.  .  .  ." 

230.  Shafter  to  the  Adjutant-General,  July  4,  1898. —  Miles'  report, 
p.  18. 

231.  Miles'  report,  pp.  18-19  and  25. 

232.  Page  188. 

233.  On  July  21st  General  Miles  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War: 
"  The  following  troops  are  with  me  aboard  transports  Guantanamo 

harbor  en  route  to  Puerto  Rico;  four  light  batteries,  3d  and  4th, 
Lomias  battery  B,  5th  Artillery,  6th  Illinois,  6th  Massachusetts,  275 
recruits  for  regiments  5th  Corps,  6th  Signal  Corps,  7th  Hospital  Corps 
—  3,4l5  all  told;  others  expected  daily." — Alger,  p.  303. 

General  Miles  says  in  his  report,  p.  29,  that  sickness  had  reduced 
his  "  effective  force  to  about  3,300  men." 

234.  General  Miles'  report,  pp.  29-31. 

235.  Garretson's  brigade  formed  part  of  the  provisional  division  un- 
der Brigadier  General  Guy  V.  Henry,  the  other  brigade  being  com- 
manded by  General  Schwan. 


660     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 


236.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  31;  General  Henry's  report  of  August 
21,  1898,  p.  248,  in  which  he  says:  "The  march  from  Guanica  to 
Ponce  demonstrated  a  lax  state  of  discipline  in  the  troops  of  General 
Garretson's  brigade,  so  at  Tallaboa  while  en  route  I  called  upon  him 
for  a  report  of  officers  who  had  demonstrated  their  inefficiency.  This 
action  resulted  in  the  resignation  at  Ponce  of  several  officers  of  the 
Sixth  Massachusetts  who  had  been  ordered  before  a  board  to  inquire 
into  their  efficiency.  Since  then  the  state  of  discipline  in  this  particu- 
lar regiment  has  much  improved." 

237.  This  1st  Brigade  of  the  1st  Division  sailed  from  Charleston  on 
July  21st  and  was  composed  of  the  16th  Pennsylvania  Volunteer  In- 
fantry, the  2nd  and  3rd  Wisconsin  Volunteer  Infantry,  companies  D 
and  M  of  the  6th  Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry,  under  Brigadier  General 
Oswald  H.  Ernst.  According  to  General  Wilson's  telegraphic  report 
of  July  20th,  it  numbered  3,571  officers  and  men. —  Report  of  the  Adju- 
tant-General in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  270,  and 
Alger,  p.   308,  footnote. 

238.  Under  the  Old  Flag,  II,  pp.  440-442. 

General  Wilson's  command  had  had  to  wait  for  a  fortnight  at  Charles- 
ton until  transports  arrived  and  had  sailed  for  Porto  Rico  "  entirely 
without  naval  escort  or  protection  of  any  kind." — Ibid.,  II,  p.  439. 

239.  This  change  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Dixie  had  entered  the 
harbor  of  Ponce  and  that  Commander  Davis  had  reported  "  that  it  was 
neither  fortified  nor  mined." — Miles'  report,  p.  31. 

240.  General  Wilson  asserts  elsewhere  (II,  p.  419)  that  "when 
charged  with  the  transfer  of  a  part  of  the  First  Division  by  ship  to 
Porto  Rico,  I  made  requisition  for  the  proper  flat-bottonied  scows  and 
motor  boats  to  disembark  my  command  promptly  and  expeditiously, 
but  my  requisitions  were  quietly  ignored,  and  the  expedition  was  sent 
to  an  unknown  coast  with  nothing  but  the  ship's  yawls  or  row  boats 
to  land  the  troops.  It  is  needless  to  add  that  the  landing  would  have 
been  greatly  delayed  if  not  rendered  impossible  had  the  enemy  been 
strong  and  determined  enough  to  make  a  stand  at  Ponce." 

241.  Compare  General  Wilson's  report  of  August  23rd,  in  General 
Miles'  annual  report  for  1898,  pp.  226-228. 

242.  General  Henry's  report  of  August  21,   1898,  p.  248. 

243.  On  July  28th,  General  Miles  issued  a  proclamation  "  to  the  in- 
habitants of  Porto  Rico,"  in  which  he  declared  that  "  the  chief  object 
of  the  American  military  forces  will  be  to  overthrow  the  armed  au- 
thority of  Spain  and  to  give  to  the  people  of  your  beautiful  island  the 
largest  measure  of  liberty  consistent  with  this  military  occupation." 
This  announcement  exercised  a  tremendous  effect  in  allaying  the  fears 
of  the  Porto  Ricans  and  in  establishing  the  most  amicable  relations. 

244.  "July  23  the  Philadelphia  City  .Troop,  Pennsylvania  Cavalry; 
A  and  C  New  York  Cavalry;  B,  Pennsylvania  Artillery;  Twenty-seventh 
Indiana  Light  Battery;  A,  Illinois  Artillery;  A,  Missouri  Artillery; 
Troop  H,  Sixth  United  States  Cavalry;  Company  F,  Eighth  United 
States  Infantry,  under  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  John  R.  Brooke,  United 
States  Army,  sailed  from  Newport  News,  arriving  at  Guayama  July 
31." — Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p.  270.  According  to 
Gen.  Brooke's  despatch  of  July  28th,  this  force  numbered  1,272. 

245.  "July  23  the  Eleventh  and  Nineteenth  United  States  Infantry; 


Notes  661 

Batteries  C  and  M,  Seventh  United  States  Artillery;  Troop  B,  Second 
Cavalry  and  Battery  B,  Fifth  Artillery,  making  a  total  of  80  officers 
and  2,831  enlisted  men,  under  command  of  Brig.  Gen.  Theodore  Schwan, 
United  States  Volunteers,  sailed  from  Tampa,  Fla.,  arriving  at  Ponce 
July  31."— /6ic?. 

This  brigade  numbered  1,447  according  to  General  Schwan's  report  of 
August  21,  1898,  in  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Major  General  command- 
ing, p.  249. 

246.  General  Brooke  relates  in  his  report  of  September  3,  1898,  Ibid., 
p.  139,  that  "On  disembarking  at  Arroyo  (which  point  was  indicated 
by  the  Major-General  commanding  the  Army  as  the  point  he  wished 
me  to  disembark  the  troops  then  with  me ) ,  I  found  another  very  serious 
difficulty.  No  provision  had  been  made  for  lighters  and  for  means  of 
towing  these  lighters  to  the  beach  from  the  ships,  necessarily  anchored 
in  water  sufficiently  deep  for  their  draft,  and  the  large  ships  were 
a  long  distance  from  the  shore.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  presence  of  the 
navy  the  landing  would  have  been  impracticable,  and  but  for  the  cir- 
cumstances that  a  number  of  local  lighters  were  available,  which,  had 
the  Spaniards  been  active,  might  have  been  destroyed,  the  assistance 
of  the  navy  would  have  been  of  no  avail  in  landing  our  artillery  and 
horses,  mules  and  wagons.  The  engineers  succeeded  in  constructing  a 
small  dock  by  the  sinking  of  two  lighters,  and  by  utilizing  some  inch 
boards  we  were  able  to  land  artillery  and  other  material  with  greater 
facility  than  was  possible  when  the  lighters  were  practically  beached  at 
other  points.  All  these  matters  should  lead  to  the  adoption  of  prac- 
tical means  to  accomplish  this  purpose,  and  particularly  should  every 
expedition  be  supplied  with  the  material  and  necessary  implements  to 
build  a  reasonable  dock  at  which  ships  might  be  unloaded.  This  could 
have  b«en  done  at  Arroyo  and  at  Ponce  had  the  material  and  labor 
been  at  hand,  and  would  greatly  have  facilitated  the  use  of  troops  and 
supplies  in  furthering  the  purpose  of  their  being  sent  here,  and  it  may 
be,  and  possibly  will  be,  necessary  in  the  future." 

247.  "July  28  the  Third  Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry,  Fourth  Ohio 
Volunteer  Infantry,  and  Fourth  Pennsylvania  Volunteer  Infantry,  mak- 
ing total  of  145  officers  and  3,581  enlisted  men,  under  command  of  Brig. 
Gen.  Peter  C.  Hains,  United  States  Volunteers,  sailed  from  Newport 
News,  Va.,  arriving  at  Arroyo  August  3." —  Report  of  the  Adjutant- 
General,  p.  270. 

248.  By  Troop  A  of  the  5th  Cavalry,  two  batteries  of  light  artillery 
and  two  companies  of  the  19th  Infantry. 

249.  General  Miles'  report,  pp.  42-43;  General  Schwan's  report,  p. 
249. 

250.  Major  General  John  R.  Brooke,  commanding  the  First  Army 
Corps,  had  the  first  column  composed  of  the  2nd  Brigade  of  the  1st 
Division  under  Brigadier  General  P.  C.  Hains.  It  was  composed  of  the 
4th  Pennsylvania  Volunteer  Infantry;  the  3rd  Illinois  Volunteer  In- 
fantry; the  4th  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry;  Troop  H  of  the  6th  Cavalry; 
the  Philadelphia  City  Troop;  Battery  B,  Pennsylvania  Artillery;  Bat- 
tery A,  Missouri  Artillery;  Battery  A,  Illinois  Artillery;  27th  Indiana 
Artillery;  a  battalion  of  the  Signal  Corps,  and  two  dynamite  guns. — 
General  Brooke's  report  of  August  18,  1898,  p.  140. 

The  second  column  u^der  General  James  Harrison  Wilson,  command- 


662     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ing  the  1st  Division  of  the  First  Corps,  was  composed  of  the  1st  Bri- 
gade of  that  division  (Brigadier  General  Oswald  H.  Ernest)  and  in- 
cluded the  16th  Pennsylvania  Volunteer  Infantry;  the  2nd  and  3rd 
Wisconsin  Volunteer  Infantry;  a  battalion  of  light  artillery  under 
Major  James  M.  Lancaster,  consisting  of  Battery  F  of  the  3rd  Artillery, 
and  Battery  B  of  the  4th  Artillery;  Captain  B.  T.  Clayton's  Troop  C 
of  New  York  Volunteer  Cavalry;  and  Captain  William  H.  Lamar's  Vol- 
unteer Signal  company. —  General  Wilson's  report,  p.  228. 

Brigadier  General  Guy  V.  Henry  had  part  of  the  "  Provisional  Di- 
vision "  composed  of  the  1st  Brigade  under  Brigadier  General  G.  A. 
Garretson,  which  included  one  battalion  of  the  19th  Infantry;  the  6th 
Massachusetts  Volunteer  Infantry;  the  6th  Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry; 
and  Troop  B  of  the  2nd  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

The  other  part  of  this  division  was  the  "  Independent  Brigade  "  under 
Brigadier  General  Theodore  Schwan  and  consisted  of  the  11th  Infantry; 
Troop  A  of  the  5th  Cavalry;  Battery  C  of  the  3rd  Artillery;  and  Bat- 
tery D  of  the  5th  Artillery. —  General  Schwan's  report,  p.  249. 

251.  Two  battalions  of  the  19th  Infantry;  1st  Illinois  Volunteers; 
Batteries  B  and  G  of  the  5th  Artillery;  Batteries  B  and  M  of  the  7th 
Artillery;  detachments  of  the  provisional  battalion  of  Engineers;  bat- 
alion  of  the  Signal  Corps  and  U.  S.  Engineers. —  Alger,  pp.  310-311. 

252.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  34;  General  Brooke's  report  of  Sep- 
tember 3,  1898,  pp.  139-140;  Lodge,  pp.  181-182. 

253.  Schwan's  loss  was  only  one  man  killed  and  16  wounded.  The 
Spanish,  who  numbered  1,362,  had  fully  15  killed  and  35  wounded. — 
General  Schwan's  report,  pp.  249  and  253 :  Strait,  p.  176. 

254.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  35;  Miles,  p.  302;  General  Schwan's 
report,  pp.  249-253. 

255.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  35 ;  Miles,  p.  302 ;  General  Wilson's  re- 
port, pp.  228-230  and  234 ;  Wilson,  II,  pp.  444  and  446 ;  General  Ernst's 
report  of  August  17,  1898,  pp.  241  and  242;  Colonel  Hulings'  report, 
242-243;   Lieutenant-Colonel  Biddle's  report,  pp.  237-239. 

None  of  Wilson's  command  were  killed  and  only  six  wounded. — 
Strait,  p.  175. 

256.  General  Miles'  report,  p.  36;  Wilson's  report,  pp.  230-232;  Wil- 
son, II,  pp.  445-449:   Lodge,  pp.   179-180. 

257.  General  Brooke's  report  of  August  18,  1898,  pp.  140-141;  Gen- 
eral Hains'  report,  p.   141. 

258.  General  Henry's  report  of  August  19,  1898,  pp.  246-247. 

259.  Schwan  had  only  6  men  wounded.  Of  the  Spanish,  who  num- 
bered 1,200,  at  least  17  were  killed,  14  wounded,  a  number  drowned, 
53  were  taken  prisoners,  and  200  rifles  as  well  as  a  considerable  amount 
of  ammunition  captured. —  General  Schwan's  report  of  August  22nd,  p. 
257;  Lieut.-Col.  Burke's  report,  p.  260. 

260.  General  Schwan's  report,  pp.  254-257 ;  General  Miles'  report,  p. 
235,  which  goes  on  to  say  "  From  August  7-15  General  Schwan's 
troops  marched  92  miles,  occupied  nine  towns,  made  prisoners  of  war 
of  162  regulars  (including  the  commander  of  the  military  department 
of  Mayaguez ) ,  captured  and  paroled  200  volunteers,  captured  much  val- 
uable material,  and  cleared  the  western  part  of  the  island  of  the 
enemy. 

"  Great  credit  is  due  to  the  troops  who  composed  and  the  general 


Notes  663 

who  commanded  the  expedition  for  well-sustained  and  vigorous  action 
in  the  face  of  most  trying  conditions." 

261.  Lodge,  pp.   185-187. 

262.  The  War  unth  Spain,  pp.  187-190. 

263.  Richard  Harding  Davis  very  trenchantly  remarks,  pp.  299-300, 
that  "  Porto  Rico  was  a  picnic  because  the  commanding  generals  would 
not  permit  the  enemy  to  make  it  otherwise.  The  Spaniards  were  will- 
ing to  make  it  another  nightmare  —  they  were  just  as  ready  to  kill  in 
Porto  Rico  as  in  Cuba  —  but  our  commanding  General  in  Porto  Rico 
was  able  to  prevent  their  doing  so.  A  performance  of  any  sort  always 
appears  the  most  easy  when  we  see  it  well  done  by  an  expert.  ...  A 
general  who  can  make  an  affair  of  letting  blood  so  amusing  to  his  men 
that  they  regard  it  as  a  picnic  is  an  excellent  general." 

264.  General  Miles  declares  in  his  report,  p.  36,  that  "  The  success 
of  the  enterprise  was  largely  due  to  the  skill  and  good  generalship  of 
the  officers  in  command  of  the  different  divisions  and  brigades.  Strategy 
and  skillful  tactics  accomplish  what  might  have  occasioned  serious  loss 
to  achieve  in  any  other  way.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  captured  was  nearly  ten  times  our  own,  which  was  only  3  killed 
and  40  wounded." 

General  Wilson  says,  II,  pp.  449-450,  that  "  The  Porto  Rico  campaign 
had  been  made  by  experienced  regular  officers,  with  but  few  newspaper 
men  at  hand  to  spread  exaggerated  reports  about  it  for  the  glorifica- 
tion of  popular  favorites.  As  far  as  Miles  and  his  subordinates  were 
concerned  they  had  managed  every  detail  methodically  and  efficiently. 
The  country  was  naturally  quite  as  difficult  as  Cuba  and  just  as  sickly, 
but  it  is  proper  to  say  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  typhoid  infection 
brought  from  the  States  and  slight  digestive  disturbances,  due  more  to 
the  native  fruits  than  to  climate,  the  troops  were  free  from  epidemics 
and  any  unusual  sickness.  The  records  showed  but  few  deaths  and  at 
no  time  over  twenty-three  per  cent,  from  all  causes  unfit  for  duty,  the 
larger  part  of  which  were  light  cases,  mostly  developed  after  the  cam- 
paign had  ended,  and  the  friendly  people,  with  pardonable  anxiety  to 
please  our  soldiers  and  satisfy  their  curiosity,  had  supplied  them  too 
freely  with  oranges,  pineapples,  and  bananas  and  with  the  rarer  and 
less  wholesome  varieties  of  tropical  fruits.  Withal,  there  was  no  lack 
of  hospitals,  medicines.  Red  Cross  nurses,  or  supplies,  and  no  cause 
for  alarm  at  any  time.  Although  our  occupation  continued  for  over 
two  months,  there  was  no  round  robin  and  no  necessity  for  withdraw- 
ing the  troops  to  Montauk  Point.  The  simple  fact  is  that  the  campaign 
and  occupation  of  Porto  Rico  in  July  and  August  were  managed  so  well 
that  the  officers  and  men,  as  well  as  the  people  of  the  island,  regarded  it 
as  a  continuous  picnic  or  gala  fiesta,  while  the  campaign  and  capture 
of  Santiago  at  practically  the  same  time  of  year  were  characterized  by 
sickness,  disorder,  and  general  mismanagement,  which  came  uncomfort- 
ably near  to  national  disaster  and  disgrace." 

265.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  7. 

A  graphic  account  of  the  Porto  Rican  campaign  is  given  by  Richard 
Harding  Davis,  pp.  296-360. 

266.  Alger,  p.  326:  Miles,  p.  271. 

267.  Report  of  Major  General  Merritt,  dated  August  31,  1898,  in  the 
Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  46. 


664     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

President  McKinley's  instructions  to  General  Merritt,  dated  May  18, 
1898,  are  given  in  part  by  James  H,  Blount,  The  American  Occupation 
of  the  Philippines,  pp.  51-52. 

268.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General,  p.  266. 

269.  "  The  first  expedition  for  Manila,  under  command  of  General 
T.  M.  Anderson,  United  States  Volunteers,  sailed  May  25,  consisting 
of  the  First  California  Infantry,  Second  Oregon  Infantry,  five  compa- 
nies Fourteenth  United  States  Infantry,  and  a  detachment  of  California 
Artillery — 115  officers  and  2,386  enlisted  men  —  arriving  off  Manila 
June  30. 

"  The  second  expedition,  under  the  command  of  Gen.  F.  V.  Greene, 
United  States  Volunteers,  sailed  June  15,  and  consisted  of  the  First 
Colorado,  First  Nebraska,  Tenth  Pennsylvania  Infantry,  four  companies 
Eighteenth  and  four  companies  Twenty-third  United  States  Infantry, 
two  batteries  Utah  Artillery,  and  detachment  of  United  States  Engi- 
neers—  a  total  of  158  officers  and  3,428  enlisted  men  —  arriving  at 
their   destination   July    17. 

"  The  third  expedition,  under  the  command  of  Generals  Merritt,  United 
States  Army,  commanding  corps,  and  MacArthur,  United  States  Volun- 
teers, sailed  June  27  and  29,  and  consisted  of  four  companies  of 
Eighteenth  and  four  companies  of  Tw^enty-third  United  States  Infantry, 
four  batteries  of  Third  United  States  Artillery,  one  company  United 
States  Engineers,  First  Idaho,  First  Wyoming,  Thirteenth  Minnesota, 
and  First  North  Dakota  Infantry,  the  Astor  Battery,  and  detachments 
of  Hospital  and  Signal  Corps,  a  total  of  197  officers  and  4,650  enlisted 
men,  which  arrived  at  their  destination  July  25  and  31. 

"  The  fourth  expedition,  imder  command  of  Gen.  E.  S.  Otis,  United 
States  Volunteers,  sailed  July  15,  and  consisted  of  six  troops  Fourth 
United  States  Cavalry,  two  batteries  Sixth  United  States  Artillery, 
five  companies  Fourteenth  United  States  Infantry,  and  detachments  of 
recruits,  a  total  of  42  officers  and  1,640  enlisted  men,  and  arrived  at  its 
destination   August   21. 

"  The  fifth  expedition,  under  command  of  Col.  H.  C.  Kessler,  of  the 
First  Montana  Infantry,  sailed  July  19,  and  consisted  of  the  First 
Montana  Infantry  and  detachment  of  recruits,  a  total  of  54  officers  and 
1,294  enlisted  men,  arriving  at  destination  August  24. 

"  The  sixth  expedition,  under  command  of  Gen.  H.  G.  Otis,  United 
States  Volunteers,  sailed  July  23,  and  consisted  of  eight  companies  of 
the  First  South  Dakota  and  detachments,  a  total  of  50  officers  and  846 
enlisted  men,  arriving  at  destination  August  24. 

"  The  seventh  expedition,  under  command  of  Lieut.  Col.  Lee  Stover, 
First  South  Dakota  Infantry,  sailed  July  29,  and  consisted  of  four 
companies  of  First  South  Dakota  and  detachment  of  recruits,  a  total 
of  25  officers  and  814  enlisted  men,  arriving  at  destination  August  31. 

"  The  total  forces  of  the  seven  expeditions  made  a  grand  total  of  641 
officers  and  15,058  enlisted  men.  Since  then,  on  October  19,  27,  28, 
and  30,  1898,  the  Twentieth  Kansas,  First  Tennessee,  and  First  Wash- 
ington Infantry  Volunteers,  and  a  battalion  of  California  Artillery 
were  sent  to  the  Philippines,  numbering  99  officers  and  2,565  enlisted 
men." — Report  of  the  Adjutant-General,  November  1,  1898,  in  Report 
of  the  War  Department  for  1898,  pp.  268-269. 

270.  Compare  Blount,  pp.  32,  38-40. 


I 


Notes  665 

271.  General  Merritt's  report,  pp.  47-49;  General  Anderson's  report 
(in  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Major  General  commanding,  for  1898), 
dated  August  29,  1898,  pp.  54-55;  General  Greene's  report  of  August  23, 
1898,  ihid.,  pp.  62-63;  Lodge,  pp.  208-310. 

272.  General  Merritt's  report,  p.  49;  General  Anderson's  report,  p. 
55;  General  Greene's  report,  pp.  63-65;  Lodge,  pp.  209-212, 

The  losses  of  the  2nd  brigade  from  July  30th  to  August  5th,  both 
inclusive,  were  15  killed  and  59  wounded  according  to  Greene's  report, 
p.  71,  which  states  that  the  Spanish  losses  "  from  August  1  to  13 
were  at  least  40  killed  and  100  wounded." 

273.  General  Merritt's  report,  p.  49. 

274.  On  August  1st,  by  General  Orders  No.  2,  the  forces  were  organ- 
ized as  the  1st  Division  of  the  8th  Corps  under  Brigadier  General  An- 
derson, composed  of  the  1st  brigade  under  MacArthur  and  the  2nd  bri- 
gade under  Greene. 

According  to  the  reports  of  the  two  brigade  commanders,  pp.  71  and 
84,  their  forces  numbered: 

Officers    Enlisted  Men    Total 

1st   Brigade    (MacArthur) 139  3,961  3,830 

2nd    Brigade    (Greene) 196  4,904  5,100 

Total     335  8,595  8,930 

275.  The  monitor  Monterey  joined  Admiral  Dewey  on  August  4th. 

276.  General  Merritt's  report,  pp.  54-55. 

This  officer  also  says  (Report,  p.  50)  that  "This  was  declined  on 
our  part  for  the  reason  that  it  could,  in  the  opinion  of  the  admiral  and 
myself,  lead  only  to  a  continuance  of  the  situation,  with  no  immediate 
result  favorable  to  us,  and  the  necessity  was  apparent  and  very  urgent 
that  decisive  action  should  be  taken  at  once  to  compel  the  enemy  to 
give  up  the  town,  in  order  to  relieve  our  troops  from  the  trenches  and 
from  the  great  exposure  to  unhealthy  conditions  which  were  unavoid- 
able in  a  bivouac  during  the  rainy  season." 

277.  Alger  relates,  pp.  338-339,  that  "  General  Merritt  had  planned 
and  conducted  his,  fight  irrespective  of  the  presence  or  attitude  of  the 
Filipinos,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  any  possible  misunderstanding  in  the 
future,  he  had  even  gone  so  far  on  the  night  of  August  12th  as  to  re- 
quest Aguinaldo  '  to  prevent  his  soldiers  from  joining  in  the  attack 
and  entering  the  city.'  In  spite  of  this  request,  however,  when  General 
Greene's  advance-guard  reached  the  walls  of  Manila,  they  were  followed 
there  by  a  considerable  force  of  the  natives,  who,  by  their  superior 
knowledge  of  the  roads,  rushed  ahead  of  our  troops  and  opened  fire  at 
once  upon  the  five  or  six  thousand  Spanish  soldiers  on  the  walls  of  the 
city,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  at  that  time  the  Spaniards  had  ceased 
firing,  and  the  white  flag  was  flying  from  the  fortifications.  This  un- 
provoked attack  precipitated  a  renewal  of  the  firing  upon  our  troops 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  resulting  in  the  death  of  one  and  wounding 
of  two  other  soldiers  of  the  1st  California  Volunteers.  After  quieting 
the  hostile  and  excited  Filipinos,  and  assuring  himself  that  there  was 
little  likelihood  of  further  trouble,  General  Greene  moved  his  brigade 
across  the  Pasig,  in  accordance  with  the  original  plan,  and  so  disposed 
his  troops  as  to  fully  protect  the  people  and  property  of  New  Manila. 
His  losses  were  one  enlisted  man  killed  and  five  wounded." 


1 


666     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

See  also  General  Greene's  report,  pp.  69-71. 

278.  Composed  of  General  Greene,  Captain  B.  P.  Lamberton,  U.  S.  N,, 
and  Lieutenant-Colonels  Whittier  and  Crowder  for  the  Americans,  and 
Auditor-General  de  la  Petra  and  Colonels  Carlos  and  Jose  for  the 
Spanish. 

279.  This  final  capitulation  is  given  in  General  Merritt's  report, 
pp.  55-56. 

280.  Ibid.,  p.  51. 

281.  The  authorities  for  the  attack  on  Manila  are  the  report  of  Gen- 
eral Merritt,  pp.  50-52;  Report  of  General  Anderson,  pp.  57-59;  Report 
of  General  Greene,  pp.  67-72;  Report  of  General  MacArthur,  pp.  79-82; 
Lodge,  pp.  215-221. 

282.  General  Anderson's  report,  p.  58;  General  Greene's  report,  p.  71; 
General  MacArthur's  report,  pp.  81  and  84. 

283.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p.  273;  Report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  6. 

284.  General  Anderson's  report,  p.  54. 

285.  General  Greene  asserts  (report,  p.  71)  that  "It  is  impossible 
to  give  any  accurate  figures  of  the  losses  of  the  Spaniards.  Deserters 
reported  that  the  day  after  the  first  attack  carts  containing  over  30 
dead  passed  through  the  streets  of  Malate  coming  from  the  trenches. 
The  Manila  papers  of  the  same  day  gave  the  names  of  37  wounded  and 
brought  to  the  hospitals.  On  the  13th  we  found  5  dead  in  the  trenches; 
how  many  were  removed  is  not  known.  The  Manila  newspapers  gave 
the  names  of  43  wounded  brought  to  the  hospitals.  It  is  probably  safe 
to  say  that  their  losses  from  August  1  to  13  were  at  least  40  killed 
and  100  wounded." 

286.  General  Merritt's  report,  p.  52. 

287.  Alger,  pp.  340-341. 

288.  General  Otis  had  arrived  on  August  21st  with  the  fourth  expe- 
dition of  1,682  officers  and  men.     See  above,  footnote  269. 

289.  General  Merritt's  report,  p.  52. 

290.  This^  treaty  of  peace  is  given  in  extenso  in  30  Statutes  at  Large, 
pp.  1754-1762,  and  in  Lodge,  pp.  267-276. 

291.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  for  1898,  pp.  145,  147  and  260. 

292.  Statistical  Exhibit  of  the  Strength  of  the  Volunteer  Forces 
called  into  service  during  the  War  with  Spain,  issued  by  the  Adjutant- 
General  on  December  13,  1899.     Also  Strait,  pp.  208-209. 

293.  In  Cuba,  155,302  regulars  and  41,518  volunteers,  a  total  of 
196,820;  in  Porto  Rico,  8,233  regulars  and  9,107  volunteers;  in  the 
Philippines,  14,000.     See  pages  154,  191  and  200. 

294.  Annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  June  30,  1914, 
p.  238. 

295.  Annual  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,  1913, 
p.   10,  and  June  30,   1914,  p.  33. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

1.  From  April  25  to  August  12,  1898. 

2.  General  Miles'  report  for  1898,  p.  37. 


Notes  667 

3.  Officers    Enlisted  Men    Total 

Killed     23  257  280 

Wounded    113  1,464  1,577 

Total     136  1,721  1,857 

Tlie  number  of  deaths  from  all  causes,  between  May  1st  and  Septem- 
ber 30th,  inclusive,  as  reported  to  the  Adjutant-General's  Office  up  to 
October  3rd,  were :  "  Killed,  23  officers  and  257  enlisted  men ;  died  of 
wounds,  4  officers  and  61  enlisted  men;  died  of  disease,  80  officers  and 
2,485  enlisted  men.  Total,  107  officers  and  2,803  enlisted  men,  being 
an  aggregate  of  2,910  out  of  a  total  of  274,717  officers  and  men,  or  a 
percentage  of  1  ^%000'" —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p. 
273. 

4.  See  page  201  and  table  on  page  275. 

5.  Las  Guasimas,   El   Caney  and   San   Juan. 

6.  On  June  30,  1898,  General  Shafter's  army  "  present  for  duty 
equipped "  numbered  869  officers  and  17,349  enlisted  men,  a  total  of 
18,218,  according  to  the  statement  issued  by  the  Adjutant-General  on 
April  23,   1900. 

7.  Out  of  the  26  regiments  and  one  squadron  composing  the  Fifth 
Corps,  only  three  regiments  were  volunteers,  viz:  the  71st  New  York, 
the  2nd  Massachusetts  and  the  Rough  Riders, 

General  Wheeler  declares,  p.  84,  that  "  the  71st  New  York  was  com- 
posed of  most  magnificent  material "  but  confesses  that  General  Francis 
Greene  told  him  "  that  more  than  three  hundred  of  that  regiment  had 
never  fired  a  shot."  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  withdrawal 
of  the  2nd  Massachusetts  from  the  firing-line  at  El  Caney  —  not 
through  any  fault  of  its  own  but  owing  to  its  having  been  equipped 
with  an  obsolete  small-arm  and  black  powder  —  as  well  as  to  the  tem- 
porary panic  which  seized  the  1st  battalion  of  the  71st  New  York  on 
the  way  to  the  foot  of  San  Juan  hill.  (See  p.  184,  footnote  176.)  The 
Rough  Riders  on  July  1st,  according  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt's 
report  of  July  4,  1898,  "  ^'ent  into  the  fight  about  490  strong." 

Without  the  slightest  wish  to  deprecate  from  the  merits  of  these 
volunteer  regiments,  there  is  no  gainsaying  the  fact  that  their  contri- 
bution to  the  fighting  which  culminated  in  the  success  of  the  Santiago 
campaign  was  by  no  means  so  great  as  their  henchmen  would  have  one 
believe. 

8.  General  Miles'  report,  pp.  15-16. 

9.  See  page  176. 

10.  Sargent,  II,  p.  49,  and  III,  pp.  179-189. 

11.  In  his  Annual  Report  for  1898,  pp.  16-17,  General  Miles  says: 

"  It  will  be  observed  that  General  Garcia  regarded  my  requests  as 
his  orders,  and  promptly  took  steps  to  execute  the  plan  of  operations. 
He  sent  3,000  men  to  check  any  movement  of  the  12,000  Spaniards  sta- 
tioned at  Holguin.  A  portion  of  this  latter  force  started  to  the  relief 
of  the  garrison  at  Santiago,  but  was  successfully  checked  and  turned 
back  by  the  Cuban  forces  under  General  Feria.  General  Garcia  also 
sent  2,000  men,  under  Perez,  to  oppose  the  6,000  Spaniards  at  Guanta- 
namo,  and  they  were  successful  in  their  object.  He  also  sent  1,000 
men,  under  General  Rios,  against  the  6,000  men  at  Manzanillo.     Of  this 


668     Military/  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

garrison,  3,500  started  to  reenforce  the  garrison  at  Santiago,  and  were 
engaged  in  no  less  than  thirty  combats  with  the  Cubans  on  their  Avay 
before  reaching  Santiago,  and  would  have  been  stopped  had  General 
Garcia's  request  of  June  27  been  granted.  With  an  additional  force 
of  5,000  men  General  Garcia  besieged  the  garrison  of  Santiago,  taking 
up  a  strong  position  on  the  west  side  and  in  close  proximity  to  the 
harbor,  and  he  afterwards  received  General  Shafter  and  Admiral 
Sampson  at  his  camp  near  that  place.  He  had  troops  in  the  rear,  as 
well  as  on  both  sides  of  the  garrison  at  Santiago  before  the  arrival  of 
our  troops." 

12.  Fifteen  Major  Generals,  46  Brigadier  Generals,  58  Assistant  Ad- 
jutants-General, 16  Inspectors-General,  3  Judge  Advocates,  43  quarter- 
masters, 21  commissaries  of  subsistence,  44  surgeons,  one  paymaster, 
22  engineers,  21  ordnance  officers,  12  signal  officers,  and  86  officers  of 
volunteer  regiments. —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1898,  p.  257. 

13.  Out  of  18,218  officers  and  men  "  present  for  duty  equipped  June 
30th,"  according  to  the  statement  issued  by  the  Adjutant-General  on 
April  23,  1900,  General  Shafter  concentrated  15,065  at  El  Caney  and 
San  Juan  on  July  first. —  Sargent,  II,  p.  134,  and  III,  p.  217. 

14.  General  Miles  relates,  p.  276,  that,  upon  his  arrival  at  Tampa  on 
June  first,  he  found  "  that  General  Shafter  was  seriously  affected  by 
the  intense  heat." 

On  July  3rd  Shafter  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War,  "  I  have  been 
unable  to  be  out  during  the  heat  of  the  day  for  four  days,  but  am  re- 
taining the  command."  On  the  following  day  he  wired  the  Adjutant- 
General:  "I  am  still  very  much  exhausted.  Eating  a  little  this  p.m. 
for  the  first  time  in  four  days."  On  July  6th  he  announced :  "  I  am 
not  at  present  so  much  ill  as  exhausted  from  the  intense  strain  that 
has  been  on  me  for  last  two  months.  I  am  also  suffering  from  an  attack 
of  gout  which  prevents  me  from  moving  about." — Report  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  for  1898,  pp.   102,   104  and  107. 

15.  See  page  153. 

16.  Effected  by  the  Act  of  August  24,  1912.     See  pages  400-401. 

17.  "  The  Staff  Departments 

"  If  the  military  emergency  following  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Spain  was  a  severe  test  of  the  troops  of  the  line,  it  was  even  more  so 
of  the  staff. 

"  Most  staff  corps  and  departments  were  at  the  outset  badly  weak- 
ened by  drains  on  their  personnel  for  service  with  volunteer  troops, 
and  again,  in  expanding  to  war  strength,  the  extra  officers  were  quite 
generally  supplied  from  volunteers  of  little  or  no  experience.  The 
crying  need  of  the  hour  was  more  trained  officers. 

"  The  Ordnance  Department  was  confronted  with  the  gigantic  task 
of  arming  and  equipping  an  army  of  over  250,000  men,  and  with  mak- 
ing good  the  deficiency  in  seacoast  ordnance  and  ammunition.  Reserve 
supplies  were  at  a  minimum.  As  is  well  known,  there  were  only 
enough  small  calibre  rifles  to  equip  the  Regular  Army,  and  in  many 
cases  the  States'  arms  and  equipments  were  in  such  lamentably  poor 
condition,  that  they  must  needs  be  replaced.  This  latter  drawback  was' 
so  much  in  evidence  that  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  that  period  has 
stated  that  the  volunteer  forces  would  probably  have  been  ready  for 
service  quite  as  quickly,  had  they  been  newly  equipped  by  the  national 


Notes  669 

government,  rather  than  -have  relied  on  the  defective  arms  and  equip- 
ments of  their  respective  States.  There  was  no  smokeless  powder  for 
the  Springfield  rifles,  and  of  powder  and  projectiles  for  the  fortifica- 
tions,  only   one-fifth   of  the  required  supply   was  on   hand. 

"  Such  unpreparedness  for  the  ever  possible  contingency  of  war  re- 
quired most  strenuous  effort  by  this  department,  and  it  may  be  said 
that  it  rose  to  the  occasion  with  most  commendable  results.* 

"  The  Engineer  Corps,  with  a  large  percentage  of  its  officers  in  charge 
of  civil  improvements,  hurried  the  completion  of  many  seacoast  works, 
and  began  the  installation  of  a  system  of  submarine  mines. f  Its  com- 
missioned strength  was  increased  from  109  to  127  officers. 

*'  The  Signal  Corps  was  suddenly  increased  from  a  peace  strength  of 
ten  officers  and  fifty  enlisted  men,  to  an  aggregate  of  1300  officers  and 
men,  and  in  spite  of  the  handicap  of  such  an  unforeseen  increase,  per- 
formed creditable  service  in  the  Santiago,  Porto  Rico  and  Philippine 
campaigns,  as  well  as  in  the  maintenance  of  submarine  cables.  Its 
personnel  was  shown  to  have  been  far  too  small  on  a  peace  footing,  but 
it  had  the  advantage,  as  it  will  ever  have,  of  being  able  to  draw  largely 
for  its  recruitment  on  civilian  telegraphers,  electricians  and  mechanics. 
Of  all  the  staff  corps  its  increase  was  perhaps  most  easily  acquired  at 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

"  The  Quartermaster's  Department  had  possibly  the  most  herculean 
task  before  it.  Without  reserve  supplies,  it  was  called  upon  to  fur- 
nish, within  three  and  one-half  months,  clothing,  equipage  and  field 
transportation  for  practically  275,000  men;  to  transport  thousands 
upon  thousands  of  soldiers  to  the  concentration  camps,  and  afterward 
to  their  homes;  and  to  organize  and  maintain  on  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  seaboards  a  transport  service  which  ultimately  extended  to  the 
West  Indies,  China  and  the  Philippines. 

"  From  April  1,  1898,  until  the  breaking  up  of  Camp  Wykoff,  no  less 
than  17,863  officers  and  435,569  men  had  been  transported  by  rail,  and 
up  to  September  15th  of  the  same  year,  92,836  had  been  transported  by 
ships.  Up  to  August  31st,  5130  field  ovens,  36,800  horses  and  mules, 
and  5179  wagons  had  been  purchased  by  the  department.  These  figures 
will  serve  to  show  the  immense  responsibilities  the  officers  of  this  staff 
department  had  to  face. 

"  At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  its  commissioned  personnel  was 
limited  by  law  to  but  fifty-seven  officers,  and  its  necessary  expansion 
had  to  be  made  either  by  the  detail  of  much  needed  officers  of  the  line, 
or  by  the  appointment  of  inexperienced  quartermasters  from  civil  life. 
Both  methods  were  resorted  to. 

"  That  the  nation  which  postpones  preparations  for  war  until  the 
actual  declaration  of  war  rarely  economizes,  is  to  be  inferred  from  the 
vast  appropriations  for  this  department.  During  the  year  1898  this 
mounted  up  to  $130,461,367.75,  a  large  part  of  which  could  doubtless 


*  By  August  31,  1898,  the  Ordnance  Department  had  increased  its 
daily  output  of  magazine  rifles  to  370,  and  of  small  arms  ammunition 
to  180,000  rounds.  It  had  procured  250,000  sets  of  infantry,  and  26,000 
sets  of  cavalry  equipments;  had  purchased  and  had  under  contract,  or 
under  manufacture,  336  rapid-fire  guns;  and  had  procured  a  total  of 
486  seacoast  guns  or  mortars. 

f  Duties  since  transferred  to  the  Artillery  Corps. 


b 


670     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

have  been  saved  to  the  government  by  previous  wise  legislation,  having 
in  view  a  prudent  accumulation  of  reserve  supplies  at  peace  prices,  and, 
as  will  be  discussed  later,  the  organization  of  an  army  service  corps 
to  handle  the  stores  which  this  immense  sum  represents. 

"  The  Subsistence  Department  had,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
twenty-two  officers,  and  by  the  act  of  April  22  and  July  7,  1898,  about 
120  additional  officers  were  added  to  the  establishment.  Its  work  in 
the  large  camps  of  concentration,  and  in  the  succeeding  campaigns  was 
highly  satisfactory,  and  demonstrated  its  efficiency.  Most  complaints 
of  insufficient  food  could  be  traced  to  ignorance  of  the  handling  of  the 
government  ration,  and  criticisms  of  the  quality  of  the  latter  were 
either  founded  on  misinformation  or  were  due  to  the  deterioration 
inseparable  from   every  period  of   field-service. 

"  No  army  of  its  size  was  ever  more  judiciously  and  abundantly  pro- 
vided with  food.  Special  foods  were  selected  for  troops  in  the  tropics, 
and  an  extra  sum  provided  for  the  purchase  of  delicacies  for  the  sick 
in  hospitals. 

"  The  need  of  an  army  service  was  also  felt  in  this  department,  and 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  government  would  have  been  saved  many  thou- 
sands of  dollars  through  the  more  efficient  handling  of  perishable  stores. 
"  The  Medical  Department  had  but  192  officers  to  begin  the  war,  and 
this  totally  inadequate  number  was  supplemented  by  the  make-shift 
policy  of  appointing  over  650  contract  surgeons,  and  by  adding  118 
volunteer  surgeons  —  forty-one  of  whom  were  officers  of  the  regular  es- 
tablishment. The  President  also  appointed  three  surgeons  for  each  of 
the  regiments  of  United  States  Volunteers. 

"  The  enlisted  personnel  was  so  insufficient  that  approximately  6000 
men  were  enlisted  or  transferred  to  the  corps  during  the  war  with 
Spain.  This  force  was  augmented  by  the  employment  of  over  1700 
female  nurses. 

"  The  mobilization  of  volunteer  troops  found  most  of  the  regiments 
w4th  defective  medical  equipment  or  without  it  altogether,  necessitating 
the  immediate  purchase  of  six  months'  medical  supplies  for  100,000  men. 
"  Except  during  the  Santiago  campaign  and  the  Philippine  insurrec- 
tion, the  duties  of  the  medical  corps  were  confined  principally  to  camp 
sanitation  and  camp  diseases.  The  large  percentage  of  sickness  during 
the  Spanish  War  and  Philippine  insurrection  must  not  be  taken  as  an 
indication  of  inefficiency  by  the  medical  corps,  except  perhaps,  in  ex- 
ceptional cases  where  laxity  in  sanitary  inspections  or  failure  to  an- 
ticipate requisitions  for  supplies  by  inexperienced  surgeons,  gave  legiti- 
mate cause  for  criticism.    . 

"  The  war  demonstrated  the  absurdly  inadequate  strength  of  the 
medical  corps  on  a  peace  footing,  and  the  need  of  a  highly  organized 
field-hospital  and  ambulance  corps  for  field-service.  In  no  staff  depart- 
ment, perhaps,  does  a  state  of  war  cause  such  a  revolution  in  organiza- 
tion as  in  the  Medical  Department,  and  on  no  other  does  the  weight  of 
censure  fall  so  heavily  for  mistakes  of  omission  and  commission. 

"  The  Inspector-General's  Department,  which,  of  all  others,  must 
needs  be  kept  filled  with  its  complete  quota  of  highly  trained  and  ex- 
perienced officers,  was  most  depleted  by  details  to  the  line.  Its  strength, 
already  insufficient  for  holding  a  large  army  of  volunteers  up  to  normal 
sanitary  and  tactical  standard  was  supplemented  by  the  appointment  of 


Notes  671 

twenty-five  officers  with  volunteer  commissions,  some  of  whom  had  had 
absolutely  no  experience  with  troops  prior  to  the  war,  and  who,  more- 
over, had  no  especially  natural  gift  for  such  service. 

"  The  Adjutant-General's  Department  at  the  outbreak  of  war  was 
the  only  staff  department  resembling  in  any  particular  the  General  Staff 
Corps  of  highly  organized  armies.  For  nine  years  preceding  1898,  a 
division  of  military  information  had  been  maintained  as  an  adjunct 
of  this  department,  but,  through  no  fault  of  its  officers,  had  been  so 
dwarfed  and  subordinated  to  the  routine  work  of  the  department,  that 
the  outbreak  of  war  with  Spain  found  it  without  accurate  maps  of  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  with  but  meagre  information  of  his  defenses  and 
military  resources.* 

"  In  addition  to  handling  the  immense  correspondence  incident  to  the 
organization,  mobilization,  muster-in,  and  concentration  of  a  vast  vol- 
unteer army,  the  adjutant-general's  office  at  Washington  was  called 
upon  to  assist  in  the  preparation  of  plans  of  campaign,  and  subse- 
quently to  prepare  the  necessary  orders  for  carrying  these  plans  into 
effect.  Again,  the  large  amount  of  sickness  in  the  volunteer  camps 
entailed  in  itself  a  vast  correspondence,  while  the  personal  impor- 
tunities of  politicians,  friends  and  relatives  of  officers  or  men,  strained 
the  system  to  the  breaking  point.  Finally,  came  the  muster-out  of 
the  volunteer  forces,  and  the  reduction  of  the  army  to  a  peace  footing. 

"  Too  little  credit  has  ever  been  given  this  department  for  its  work 
during  the  Spanish  War  —  and  even  later,  during  the  Philippine  insur- 
rection and  China  Relief  Expedition.  The  fact  has  frequently  been  lost 
sight  of  that  the  mistakes  of  omission  and  commission  were  rather  due 
to  the  system  in  vogue  than  to  any  neglect  or  inefficiency  of  the  de- 
partment itself.  Practically  half  a  dozen  officers  performed  duties 
which  in  most  foreign  armies  would  have  been  developed  and  executed 
by  half  a  hundred  trained  officers  of  the  General  Staff. 

"  Looking  back  on  the  siiccesses  and  failures  of  the  various  staff  de- 
partments of  the  army,  an  impartial  mind  must  conclude  that  the  clog- 
ging of  the  wheels  of  administration  was  principally  due  to  the  accumu- 
lations of  rust  during  many  years  of  peace.  Generally  speaking,  the 
methods  of  requisition,  supply  and  accountability  were  excellent  ones 
for  a  small  army  engaged  in  nothing  more  serious  than  an  Indian  cam- 
paign or  a  labor  riot;  but  for  the  needs  of  a  quarter  to  half  a  million 
men,  with  dependence  on  untried  and  inexperienced  staff  officers,  it  was 
inadequate." —  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay,  entitled  "  The  experiences  of 
our  Army  since  the  outbreak  of  the  War  tvith  Spain:  What  practical 
use  has  been  made  of  th&m  and  how  may  they  be  further  utilized  to 
improve  its  fighting  efftciency,"  by  Captain  Charles  D.  Rhodes,  General 
Staff.  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March- April, 
1905,  pp.  196-200. 

18.  See  pages  15,  41,  165,  205  and  271. 

19.  Ex-Secretary  Alger  relates,  pp.  30  and  33,  that  "  Great  and  con- 
stant was  the  pressure  for  appointments.  Applicants,  by  mail  and  in 
person,  would  beg,  appeal,  and  demand  commissions.  Before  breakfast, 
and  even  after  midnight,  they  besieged  the  Secretary's  residence  with  a 

*  Due  credit  should  be  given  Lieuts.  Andrew  S.  Rowan  and  Henry  H. 
Whitney,  who  went  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  respectively,  to  obtain 
military  information. 


672     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

determination  superb  in  its  inflexibility.  .  .  .  The  officers  of  the  volun- 
teer army  appointed  by  the  President  numbered,  all  told,  1,032.  Of 
these  441  were  taken  from  the  regular  army.  .  .  . 

"  For  a  little  over  a  thousand  appointments  made  by  the  President, 
as  above  stated,  the  number  of  applicants  exceeded  25,000." 

20.  See  pages  161-162. 

21.  Alger,  p.  33. 

22.  Thiers,  Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  V Empire,  tome  XX,  p.  234. 

23.  Alger,  p.  33. 

24.  Rhodes,  p.  200. 

25.  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay,  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institu- 
tion for  March-April,  1905,  pp.  210-211.     The  italics  are  his. 

26.  Section  4  of  the  Act  of  April  22,  1898.     Pages  160-161. 

27.  Eeport  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1898,  p.  7. 

28.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1899,  p.  5. 

29.  Page  197. 

30.  Report  of  Major  General  E.  S.  Otis,  U.  S.  V.,  dated  August  31, 
1899,  pp.  4-12,  54-55;  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  7; 
W.  B.  Wilcox,  Through  Luzon  on  Highicays  and  By-icays,  preface; 
Blount,  pp.   107-108. 

31.  Major  J.  Franklin  Bell's  report  to  General  Merritt,  August  29, 
1898    (Senate  Document  No.  62,  1898,  p.  379)  ;  Blount,  pp.  71,  140-142. 

32.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899,  pp.  15-21  and  93;  General  Ander- 
son's article  in  the  North  American  Review,  February,  1900;  Blount, 
p.   79. 

33.  According  to  the  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1899,  p.  27, 
detachments  numbering  232  officers  and  6,339  men  reached  Manila  be- 
tween November  21  and  December  6,  1898.  The  next  troops  did  not  ar- 
rive until  February  23,  1899. 

34.  The  returns  for  January  31,  1899,  gave  the  strength  of  the  army 
in  the  Philippines  at  819  officers  and  20,032  enlisted  men,  "  The  effec- 
tive men  of  the  line,  officers  and  soldiers,  were  about  14,000.  Of  these, 
3,000  belonged  to  the  provost  guard." —  Otis'  report,  pp.  92-93. 

35.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  5;  Blount,  p.  141. 

36.  Aguinaldo's  General  Order  to  his  army  on  February  4,  1899,  and 
his  proclamation  "  to  the  Philippine  People "  next  day  are  given  in 
General  Otis'  report  on  pp.  95-96. 

37.  See  above,  pages  160-161. 

38.  The  2nd  Oregon  on  June  14,  1899,  although  by  special  dispensa- 
tion the  Astor  battery  and  part  of  the  1st  Nebraska  were  sent  home 
on  December  13  and  16,  .1898. —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for 
1898,  p.  29,  and  General  Otis'report  for  1899,  pp.  43-44  and  83. 

39.  On  October  11,  1899,  five  companies  of  the  34th  Volunteer  In- 
fantry reached  Manila.  Other  detachments  and  regiments  followed. — 
Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1899,  p.  28. 

40.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1900,  p.  8. 

41.  General  Otis,  in  alluding  to  the  events  during  December,  1898, 
says  in  his  report,  p.  43,  that  "  The  volunteers,  however,  had  grown 
weary  of  their  service  and  many  applied  for  their  discharge  on  the  plea 
that  the  Spanish  war  had  terminated.  They  were  firmly  impressed 
with  the  belief  that  the  future  occupation  of  the  United  States  Army 
in  the  islands  would   be  confined  to  garrison  duty,  a  belief  that  was 


Notes  673 

shared  by  the  older  European  residents  and  the  abler  natives  of  Manila, 
and  they  considered  that  such  duty  should  be  performed  by  regulars." 

42.  Compare  Johnson,  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  pp. 
11-12. 

43.  See  footnote  54,  page  641. 

44.  Johnson,  The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  pp.  11-13. 

45.  Miles,  p.  274. 

46.  Compare  Rhodes,  pp.  200-201. 

47.  Page  655,  footnote  179. 

48.  See  page  667,  footnote  11. 

49.  Miles'  report,  p.  17;  Lieut.  Miley's  Notes  on  Conference  between 
General  Shafter  and  General  Garcia,  June  20,  1898,  quoted  by  Alger, 
pp.  90-91. 

50.  Notes  on  Spanish  Affairs,  August  30,  1898.  Correspondence  de 
Napoleon,  No.  14,283,  tome  XVII,  p.  480. 

51.  See  pages  188-189. 

52.  Shafter  to  the  Adjutant-General,  July  7  and  17,  1898;  Miles  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  July  13th. —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1898,  pp.  110,  124  and  118. 

53.  Enlisted  Men  of 

Volunteer  Officers         Volunteers 

Killed  in   action    18  190 

Died  of  wounds   3  78 

Total     21  268 

Died  of  disease   119  3,729 

Statistical  Exhibit  of  the  Strength  of  the  Volunteer  Forces  called 
into  service  during  the  War  with  Spain,  issued  by  the  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral on  December  13,  1899.     Also  Strait,  pp.  208-209. 

54.  Annual  Eeport  of  the  Major-General  commanding  the  Army, 
1898,  pp.  7-8. 

55.  Report.  Senate  Document  No.  221,  56th  Congress,  first  session, 
vol.  I,  p.   119. 

56.  See  page  166. 

57.  Report  of  the  Commission  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War 
Department  during  the  War  with  Spain,  I,  p.  132. 

58.  Revised  Statutes,  Sections  3679,  3732  and  3709. 

59.  Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain,  I,  p. 
126. 

60.  Ibid.,  1,  pp.  148-149. 

61.  Ibid.,  I,  p.  173. 

62.  Ibid,,  1,  pp.  188-189. 

63.  Ibid.,  1,  p.  189. 

64.  Ibid.,  I,  pp.  209,  204,  211  and  210. 

65.  Ibid.,  1,  p.  113. 

66.  Ibid.,  I,  pp.  128-131,  147,  197-200,  275-277,  281-282,  297-311. 

67.  Ibid.,  I,  pp.  198-199. 

68.  Ibid.,  I,  p.  207. 

69.  Compare  Harry  E.  Webber,  Twelve  Months  with  the  Eighth  Mas- 


i 


674     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

sachusetts   Infantry   in   the   service   of   the   United   States,   pp.    17-19, 
21-26,    79-93. 

70.  Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain,  I,  p. 
178. 

71.  lUd.,  I,  pp.  221-222. 

72.  Richard  Harding  Davis,  The  Cuban  and  Porto  Rican  Campaigns, 
p.  241. 

73.  General  James  Harrison  Wilson,  Under  the  Old  Flag,  II,  p.  429. 

74.  Bonsai,  The  Fight  for  Santiago,  p.  63. 

75.  Report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain,  I,  p. 
114. 

76.  Huidekoper,  7s  the  United  States  Prepared  for  War?  p.  30. 

77.  Testimony  of  General  Joseph  P.  Sanger,  November  2,  1898.  Re- 
port of  the  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investigate  the 
conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain,  IV,  p.  1115. 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

1.  Report  of  the  War  Department  for  1899,  Part  IV,  pp.  355-356; 
Senate  Document  Xo.  208,  56th  Congress,  1st  Session  (1900),  pp.  82-83; 
Blount,  pp.   147-150. 

2.  Blount,  p.  147. 

3.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899,  pp.  68-92;  Dean  C.  Worcester,  The 
Philippines  Past  and  Present,  I,  p.  267. 

4.  This  first  battle  of  the  Philippine  War  began  on  February  4,  1899, 
about  8.30  P.  M.  and  lasted  until  about  5  p.  m.  next  day.  The  American 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  some  250;  that  of  the  insurgents  was 
estimated  at  3,000,  in  addition  to  a  lot  of  prisoners  and  two  Krupp 
guns. —  General  Otis'  report,  pp.  99-100. 

5.  This  order  is  quoted  in  General  Otis'  report  for  1899,  p.  109. 

6.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  5. 

7.  Ibid.,  pp.  5-6. 

8.  Blount,  pp.  187-188. 

9.  The  Act  of  January  12,  1899,  provided  "  That  in  lieu  of  granting 
leaves  of  absence  and  furloughs  to  officers  and  enlisted  men  belonging  to 
companies  and  regiments  of  the  United  States  Volunteers  prior  to 
muster  out  of  the  service,  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  belonging  to 
volunteer  organizations  hereafter  mustered  out  of  the  service  who  have 
served  honestly  and  faithfully  beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  paid  two  months'  extra  pay  on  muster  out  and  discharge  from 
the  service,  and  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  belonging  to  organizations 
hereafter  mustered  out  of  the  service  who  have  served  honestly  and 
faithfully  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States  shall  be  paid  one 
month's  extra  pay  on  muster  out  and  discharge  from  the  service,  from 
any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated.  .  .  ." — 30 
United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  784. 

The  Act  of  February  25,  1899,  stipulated  "That  the  Secretary  of 
War  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  to  permit  volunteer  regiments, 
on  being  mustered  out  of  service  of  the  United  States,  to  retain  all  of 
their  regimental  colors.  .  .  ." — 30  Stat.,  p.  890. 


Notes  675 

10.  so  Stat.,  pp.  977-981. 

11.  Section  one  provided  that  "the  Army  of  the  United  States  shall 
consist  of  three  major  generals,  six  brigadier  generals,  ten  regiments 
of  cavalry,  seven  regiments  of  artillery,  twenty-five  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, an  Adjutant-General's  Department,"  etc.,  etc.  It  also  stipulated 
that  the  offices  of  store-keeper  in  the  Quartermaster's  and  Ordnance 
departments  were  to  cease  with  the  present  incumbents. 

Section  two  prescribed  the  organization  of  the  cavalry;  Section  3  that 
of  the  artillery;  and  Section  4  that  of  the  infantry,  as  well  as  provid-' 
ing  "  That  the  limits  of  age  for  original  enlistments  in  the  Arjny  shall 
be  eighteen  and  thirty-five  years." 

Section  5  directed  "  that  all  vacancies  above  the  grade  of  second  lieu- 
tenant in  the  line  of  the  Army  shall  be  filled  by  promotion  according 
to  seniority  in  the  several  arms,  subject  to  the  examinations  now  pre- 
scribed by  law,"  but  that  "  no  person  shall  be  appointed  from  civil  life 
before  he  shall  have  reached  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  nor  after  he 
shall  have  reached  the  age  of  twenty-seven  years,  nor  until  he  shall 
have  passed  a  satisfactory  examination  as  to  his  moral,  physical,  and 
educational  qualifications." 

Section  6  retained  the  existing  organization  of  the  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral's and  Inspector-General's  departments,  but  entitled  captains  "  who 
have  evinced  marked  aptitude  in  the  command  of  troops  "  to  compete 
for  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  major  in  those  departments,  subject  to 
examination. 

Section  7  made  no  change  in  the  other  staff  departments,  but  incor- 
porated the  battalion  of  engineers  into  the  line,  permitted  retired  Army 
officers  to  "be  employed  on  active  duty,  other  than  in  the  command  of 
troops,"  required  examinations  of  all  persons  appointed  from  civil  life 
to  the  positions  of  judge-advocate,  paymaster  or  chaplain,  and  restricted 
their  age  to  forty-four  years,  but  exempted  from  such  examination  all 
officers  who  had  served  in  the  Spanish  War  in  such  capacity  and  who 
had  demonstrated  their  qualifications  therefor. 

Section  8  gave  the  Chief  of  the  Record  and  Pension  Office  of  the  War 
Department  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances  of  a  Brigadier  General,  and 
Section  9  prescribed  "  that  the  cooks  authorized  by  this  Act  shall  have 
the  pay  and  allowances  of  sergeants  of  infantry." 

12.  Section  11  repealed  those  parts  of  the  Acts  of  July  7,  1898,  which 
authorized  "  the  assignment  of  certain  officers  of  the  Quartermaster's 
and  Subsistence  departments  with  increased  rank,  and  the  continuance 
in  service  of  certain  volunteer  officers  of  those  departments  for  a  period 
of  one  year  after  the  close  of  the  present  war." 

13.  This  section  gave  further  extension  to  that  part  of  the  Act  of 
June  13,  1890,  which  provided  "  That  no  alcoholic  liquors,  beer  or  wine 
shall  be  sold  or  supplied  to  the  enlisted  men  in  any  canteen  or  post- 
trader's  store  or  in  any  room  or  building  at  any  garrison  or  military 
post  in  any  State  or  Territory  in  which  the  sale  of  alcoholic  liquors, 
beer,  or  wine  is  prohibited  by  law." 

14.  See  above,  footnote  9. 

15.  30  Stat.,  pp.  1073-1074. 

16.  See  page  156. 

17.  30  Stat.,  pp.  1350-1351. 

18.  See  pages  164-165. 


676     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

19.  See  ibid. 

20.  30  Stat.,  pp.  1356-1358. 

21.  See  page  222. 

22.  The  Act  of  December  20,  1899  {31  Stat.,  p.  1),  merely  extended 
for  one  year  thereafter  the  time  for  examining  the  monthly  accounts 
of  the  War  Department  prescribed  by  Section  12  of  the  Act  of  July  31, 
1894. 

23.  Heitman,  II,   620-621. 

24.  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March-April, 
1905,  p.   192. 

25.  See  page  208.  This  force  was  the  2nd  Oregon  under  Colonel 
Owen  Summers. 

26.  The  1st  Tennessee  under  Colonel  Gracey  Childers. 

27.  Including  the  34th  Volunteer  Infantry. 

28.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  in  the  Report  of  the  War  De- 
partment for  1899,  Vol.  I,  Part  2,  pp.  27-29. 

29.  Heitman,   II,  p.  294. 

30.  General  Otis'  report,  pp.  96-103. 

31.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  pp.  6-7. 

32.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  7. 

33.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899,  p.  111. 

34.  Ibid.,  pp.  112-113. 

35.  At  this  time  the  available  fighting  force  in  the  island  of  Luzon, 
with  the  exception  of  the  troops  at  Cavite,  numbered  *'  about  16,500 
men." — Ibid.,  p.  114. 

36.  Report  of  General  Otis  for  1899,  pp.  114-116. 

37.  Ibid.,  pp.   118-119. 

38.  Ibid.,  pp.  118,  122-134.  On  February  26th  orders  were  issued 
to  the  23rd  Infantry  to  proceed  to  Cebu;  on  March  2nd  General  Smith 
and  the  3rd  battalion  of  the  1st  California  started  for  Bacolod,  island 
of  Negros,  and  was  re-enforced  on  the  22nd  by  another  battalion  of  the 
same  regiment;  and  on  May  19th  Jolo  was  occupied  by  755  officers  and 
men  of  the  23rd  Infantry. 

On  April  16th,  Lieut.-Colonel  Harmer,  commanding  at  Cebu,  requested 
re-enforcements  but,  as  General  Otis  declared  (p.  129),  "there  were  no 
troops  available,  for  Luzon  demanded  every  armed  man.  We  per- 
mitted Cebu  to  drift  and  foment  opposition,  careful  to  hold  securely 
its  principal  city,  an  important  trading  point  and  one  of  the  open  ports 
of  the  Philippines.  The  insurgent  leaders  organized  their  forces  as 
best  they  could,  without  much  interruption  on  our  part.  .  .  ." 

39.  Ibid.,  pp.  118-121. 

40.  On  May  22nd  and  June  5th,   1899.— Ibid.,  p.  121. 

41.  The  insurgents  had  concentrated  about  6,000  troops  to  the  south 
and  2,500  under  Pilar  to  the  east  of  Manila. —  Ibid.,  pp.  134  and 
136. 

42.  Ibid.,  pp.  136-138;  General  Lawton's  report  of  October  9,  1899, 
in  the  report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding,  1900,  Part  3, 
pp.  274-283. 

43.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899,  pp.  139-142;  General  Lawton's 
report,  p.  284. 

44.  On  August   12,   1899,  a  force  of  530  troops  under  the  command 


Notes  677 

of  Brigadier  General  S.  B.  M.  Young  occupied  San  Mateo  after  a  spirited 
engagement  in  which  four  Americans  were  killed  and  fourteen  wounded. 
—  Report  of  General  Young,  August  14,  1899,  in  the  report  of  the 
Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1901,  Part  3,  pp.  220- 
223;   Strait,  p.   179. 

On  August  16th,  the  Americans  also  captured  Angeles,  which  is 
about  ten  miles  north  of  San  Fernando. 

45.  For  1899,  pp.  141-142. 

46.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  pp.  8-9. 

47.  On  October  1st  the  insurgents  had  planned  to  attack  the  arsenal 
at  Manila  with  700  men,  to  burn  it  and  to  destroy  such  other  property 
and  American  lives  as  they  could,  but  their  plot  was  frustrated  by  the 
vigilance  of  the  provost  guard,  police  and  troops. —  Otis'  report  for 
1899-1900,  p.  16. 

48.  "  Summary  of  the  principal  events  connected  with  military  oper- 
ations in  the  Philippine  Islands.  September  1,  1899,  to  August  31, 
1900."  Part  3  of  the  report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding 
the  Army,  1900,  pp.  7-11. 

49.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  9;  Report  of  Gen- 
eral Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp.  21-42,  66-70;  Report  of  Major  J.  M.  Lee 
for  the  operations  of  General  Lawton's  command,  dated  April  5,  1900, 
in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant-General  commanding  the  army,  1900, 
Part  4,  pp.  8-13;  Report  of  Brigadier  General  S.  B.  M.  Young,  Janu- 
ary 6,  1900,  ibid.,  pp.  262-279. 

On  November  17,  1899,  General  Young  telegraphed  from  Pozorrubio 
to  General  Otis  that  "  Aguinaldo  is  now  a  fugitive  and  an  outlaw,  seek- 
ing security  in  escape  to  the  mountains  or  by  sea."  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
*'  Aguinaldo  was  seventy-two  hoiirs  in  the  lead  "  of  Young's  troops. 

50.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  10;  General  Otis' 
report  for  1899-1900,  p.  64;  Report  of  Brigadier  General  Loyd  Wheaton, 
dated  November  30,  1899,  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant-General  for 
1900,  Part  4,  pp.  528-530. 

General  Wheaton  says  (p.  530)  that  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  was 
134,  and  his  own  casualties  were  "  Officers  killed  1,  wounded  1 ;  men 
killed  6,  wounded  14. 

"  The  officer  killed  was  Maj.  John  A.  Logan,  Thirty-third  Infantry, 
U.  S.  V.  .  .  .  The  conduct  of  Major  Logan  was  most  gallant  and 
greatly  worthy  of  his  name." 

51.  On  November  16,  1899,  the  1st  battalion  of  the  33rd  Volunteer 
Infantry  under  Major  M.  D.  Cronin  captured  in  the  vicinity  of  San 
Fabian,  Luzon,  Buencamino,  one  of  the  principal  leaders  in  the  insur- 
rection, an  adjutant,  Aguinaldo's  mother,  son  and  one  of  his  secre- 
taries, $1,998  in  gold  and  $1,191.10  in  silver. —  Summary  of  the  princi- 
pal events  connected  loith  military  operations  in  the  Philippine  Islands. 
p.  14. 

52.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  10;  report  of  Gen- 
eral Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp.  43-65;  report  of  General  Wheaton  in  the 
report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1900, 
Part  4,  p.  531;  Summary  of  the  principal  events  connected  with  mili- 
tary operations  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  ibid..  Part  3,  pp.  12-14. 

53.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  pp.  9  and  11. 


678     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

54.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  10;  Report  of  Gen- 
eral Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp.  68-74,  115-116;  Report  of  General  Young, 
January  6,  1900,  pp.  279-281  and  346. 

55.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  10. 

56.  General  Young  to  General  Lawton,  telegram  dated  Aringay,  No- 
vember 19,  1899,  10.30  P.  M.,  quoted  in  Otis'  report  for  1899-1900,  p.  73. 

57.  Major  Peyton  C.  March's  report,  dated  December  8,  1899,  in  the 
Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding,  for  1900,  Part  4,  pp. 
330-332. 

58.  Reports  of  General  Y^oimg,  December  6,  1899,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Parker,  December  7th,  and  congratulatory  telegram  to  Parker, 
dated  December  8th,  in  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding, 
for  1900,  Part  4,  pp.  229-230,  239  and  240. 

Lieut.-Colonel  Parker's  force  consisted  of  84  men  and  153  sick  —  the 
enemy's  of  800.  The  fighting,  which  began  at  3.45  a.  m.,  lasted  for  four 
hours,  the  American  loss  being  8  killed  and  3  wounded.  The  insurgents 
lost  40  men  and  86  guns.  Riclily  merited  was  the  Medal  of  Honor  con- 
ferred on  Lieut.-Colonel  Parker  for  his  gallantry. 

59.  The  majority  of  these  movements  are  chronicled  in  the  ''  Summary 
of  the  principal  events  connected  with  military  operations  in  the  Philip- 
pine Islands.  September  1,  1899,  to  August  31,  1900,"  in  the  Report  of 
the  Lieutenant  General  for  1900,  Part  3,  pp.  16-18. 

60.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899-1900,  pp.  120-128,  138-139;  General 
Young's  report,  January  6,  1900,  pp.  281-288;  Reports  of  Colonel  L.  R. 
Hare  and  Lieut.-Colonel  Robert  L.  Howze  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieu- 
tenant General  commanding,  for  1900,  Part  4,  pp.  322-325,  326-328  and 
341;   Blount,  pp.  237,  246-249. 

61.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  p.  8;  General  Otis' 
report  of  May  14,  1900,  pp.  17-19;  General  Schwan's  report,  Novem- 
ber 1,  1899,  in  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding,  for  1900, 
Part  4,  pp.  465-479. 

62.  His  death  was  made  known  by  General  Orders  No.  209,  Head- 
quarters  of   the   Army,    Adjutant-General's   Office,   dated   December   21, 

1899,  which  was  published  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 

1900,  pp.  7-8. 

63.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899-1900,  pp.  170-172. 

64.  Ibid.,  p.  14.  The  sick  amounted  to  8.7  per  cent,  of  the  total 
forces. 

65.  31  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  32. 

66.  See  page  225. 

67.  31  Stat.,  p.  59. 

68.  31  Stat.,  p.  183. 

69.  31  Stat.,  p.  205. 

70.  See  page  674,  footnote  9. 

71.  31  Stat.,  p.  217. 

72.  31  Stat.,  pp.  280  and  588. 

73.  31  Stat.,  p.  645. 

74.  Ibid.,  pp.  655-656. 

75.  31  Stat.,  p.  671. 

76.  31  Stat.,  p.  708. 

77.  31  Stat.,  p.  710. 


Notes  679 

78.  31  Stat.,  p.  719. 

79.  "I  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
Special  Order   I  Adjutant-General's   Office, 

No.  42.        J  Washington,  February  19,  1900. 

"31.  By  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  a  board  of  officers  to 
consist  of  Brig.  Gen.  William  Ludlow,  United  States  Army;  Col.  Henry 
C.  Hasbrouck,  Seventh  United  States  Artillery;  Lieut.  Col.  William 
H.  Carter,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  United  States  Army,  is  ap- 
pointed to  meet  at  the  War  Department,  in  this  city,  on  Monday, 
February  26,  1900,  at  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  for  the  purpose  of  considering 
regulations  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  of  a  War  College  for  the 
Army.     The  travel  enjoined  is  necessary  for  the  public  service. 

"By  command  of  Major  General  Miles: 

H.    C.    CORBIN, 

Adjutant-General. 
"  Lieut.  Col.  Jos.  P.  Sanger,  Inspector  General,  was  subsequently  de- 
tailed as  a  member  of  the  board." —  General  Staff  Corps.  Laws,  Regu- 
lations, Orders  and  Memoranda  relating  to  the  orga/nization  and  duties 
of  the  General  Staff  Corps,  issued  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  on  January  1, 
1912,  p.  3. 

80.  31   Statutes  at  Large,  p.  209. 

81.  Blount,  pp.  250-251. 

82.  Reports  of  Colonel  Hare,  June  6,  1900,  Major  March,  and 
Captain  Rucker,  in  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the 
Army,  for  1900,  Part  4,  pp.  706^07,  710,  718-720. 

83.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  8-9;  Report  of  Gen- 
eral Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp.  173-199;  Report  of  General  Bates,  March  19, 
1900,  in  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for 
1900,  Part  4,  pp.  640-659;  Report  of  General  Wheaton,  January  31, 
1900,  ihid.,  pp.  625-628. 

84.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  9;  Report  of  General 
Otis  for   1899-1900,  pp.   199-204. 

85.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  9-10;  Report  of 
General  Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp.  204-206;  Report  of  General  Bates, 
March  1,  1899,  in  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the 
Army,  for  1900,  Part  4,  pp.  660-665. 

86.  By  General  Orders  Nos.  22  and  36,  dated  Manila,  March  20,  1900, 
and  quoted  in  General  Otis'  report  for  1899-1900,  pp.  206-207. 

87.  Report  of  General  Bates,  dated  April  2,  1900,  in  the  Report  of 
the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1900,  Part  4,  pp. 
691-697. 

88.  Report  of  General  Otis  for  1899-1900,  pp,  224-225. 

89.  Ihid.,  pp.  208-224. 

90.  The  details  of  these  operations  will  be  found  in  the  Summary  of 
the  principal  events  connected  tvith  military/  operations  in  the  Philip- 
pine Islands.  September  1,  1899,  to  August  31,  1900,  which  is  con- 
tained in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army, 
for  1900,  Part  3,  pp.  27-43;  and  in  a  similar  summary  covering  the 
period  from  September  1,  1900,  to  June  30,  1901,  in  the  Report  of  the 
Lieutenant  General  for  1901,  Part  2,  pp.  5-41. 


680     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

91.  General  Otis'  report  for  1899-1900,  pp.  246-248. 

92.  Report  of  General  MacArthur,  dated  October  1,  1900,  in  the  Re- 
port of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1900, 
Part  3,  p.  59. 

93.  Report  of  Assistant  Adjutant-General  Barber,  June  30,  1900,  in 
ibid.,  Part  3,  p.  82. 

94.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  4. 

95.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  11. 

96.  "  The  force  which  left  on  the  morning  of  the  10th  was  composed 
of  30  British,  112  Americans,  40  Italians,  and  25  Austrians.  The  train 
proceeded  to  Yang  Ts'un  where  it  had  to  stop  for  repairs.  There  it  re- 
mained for  the  night,  and  there  two  more  trains  joined  the  expedition, 
making  a  total  number  of  112  Americans,  25  Austrians,  915  British, 
100  French,  40  Italians,  54  Japanese,  and  112  Russians.  This  was  in- 
creased the  next  day  by  the  addition  of  200  Russians  and  58  French, 
to  a  total  of  2,066  men." — Arthur  H.  Smith,  China  in  Convulsion^ 
II,  p.  439. 

97.  In  this  engagement  over  100  Europeans  were  killed  or  wounded, 
w^hile  the  Chinese  are  estimated  to  have  lost  700  men. 

98.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  11  and  14. 

99.  Wilson,  Under  the  Old  Flag,  II,  517-521. 

100.  Smith,  II,  pp.  439-443. 

101.  Report  of  General  Chaffee,  commanding  China  Relief  Expedi- 
tion, dated  September  1,  1900,  in  Appendix  A  of  the  Report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  61 ;  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for 
1900,  p.   12. 

102.  "By  all  or  portions  of  the  First,  Second,  Fifth,  Eighth,  Fif- 
teenth, Twenty-fourth,  and  Twenty-fifth  Infantry;  First,  Third,  and 
Ninth  Cavalry;  Third  and  Seventh  Artillery,  withdrawn  from  various 
stations  in  the  United  States,  together  with  portions  of  the  Engineer 
Battalion,  Signal  Corps,  Medical  and  Hospital  Corps,  and  officers  and 
men  of  the  staff  and  supply  departments." —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  for  1900,  p.  12. 

103.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  11-12. 

The  following  schedule  of  the  departure  of  American  troops  from 
the  United  States  or  the  Philippines  and  their  arrival  in  China  is  taken 
from  the  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1900,  pp.  12-13: 

"  July  3. —  Headquarters  and  eight  troops  of  the  Sixth  Cavalry 
sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  the  Grant  for  China. 

"  July  6. —  Ninth  Infantry  landed  at  Taku. 

"July  15. —  Light  Battery  F,  Fifth  Artillery,  and  two  battalions 
fourteenth   Infantry   sailed   from  Manila  for   China. 

"July  17. —  Headquarters  and  four  companies,  Fifteenth  Infantry, 
sailed  from  San  Francisco  on  the  Sumner  for  China. 

"July  27. —  Light  Battery  F,  Fifth  Artillery,  on  the  Flintshire, 
arrived  at  Taku. 

"  July  28. — General  Chaffee,  with  headquarters  and  eight  troops 
Sixth  Cavalry,  arrived  at  Taku. 

"  July  29. —  Four  batteries  Third  Artillery  sailed  from  San  Fran- 
cisco on  the  Hancock  for  China. 

"August  16. —  Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  H.  Barry,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  and 
four  companies  Fifteenth  Infantry  arrived  at  Taku. 


Notes  681 

"August  21. —  Four  batteries.  Third  Artillery,  on  the  Hancock, 
arrived  at  Taku." 

104.  Annual  report,  dated  November  30,  1900,  pp.  12-13. 

105.  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  61.  The  orders  regulating  his  con- 
duet  of  the  American  forces,  issued  on  June  30th  and  July  19th,  are 
set  forth  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  14-16. 

The  orders  of  July  19th  informed  him  that  the  President  had  that 
day  appointed  him  Major  General  of  volunteers. 

106.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  16;  Report  of  the 
Adjutant-General  for  1900,  p.   12. 

General  Dorward,  in  writing  on  July  15,  1900,  to  the  ranking  officer 
of  the  American  forces,   said: 

"  I  desire  to  express  the  high  appreciation  of  the  British  troops  of 
the  honor  done  them  in  serving  alongside  their  comrades  of  the  Ameri- 
can Army  during  the  long  and  hard  fighting  of  the  13th  instant  and 
the  subsequent  capture  of  Tientsin  city,  and  of  my  own  appreciation 
of  the  high  honor  accorded  to  me  by  having  them  under  my  command. 

"  The  American  troops  formed  part  of  the  front  line  of  the  British 
attacks  and  so  had  more  than  their  share  of  the  fighting  that  took 
place.  The  ready  and  willing  spirit  of  the  officers  and  men  will  always 
make  their  command  easy  and  pleasant,  and  when  one  adds  to  that 
the  steady  gallantry  and  power  of  holding  on  to  exposed  positions 
which  they  displayed  on  the  13th  instant,  the  result  is  soldiers  of  the 
highest  class." — Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  16-17. 

107.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  18-19. 

108.  Lieutenant  General  Linievitch  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Major 
General  Vasilewski,  of  the  Russian  forces;  Lieutenant  General  Yama- 
gutchi  and  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Major  General  Fukushima,  of  the  Japa- 
nese; Lieutenant  General  Gaselee  and  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Major  Gen- 
eral Barrow,  of  the  British;  General  Frey  of  the  French;  Major-Gen- 
eral  Chaffee,  accompanied  by  Major  Jesse  M.  Lee  of  the  9th  Infantry 
and  Lieut.  Louis  M.  Little  of  the  Marines,  representing  the  Americans; 
and  a  German  naval  officer. 

General  Chaffee  "arrived  at  Tientsin  at  11.40  o'clock  a.m.,  July  30, 
1900.  At  Tientsin  at  this  time  were  the  Ninth  Infantry  (Lieut.  Col. 
Charles  A.  Coolidge  commanding),  which  had  a  sick  list  of  something 
like  200  men,  and  the  physical  condition  of  the  regiment  generally  bad, 
and  six  companies  of  the  Fourteenth  Infantry  (Col.  A.  S.  Daggett 
commanding).  The  latter  regiment  was  in  good  condition,  with  a  small 
sick  list." —  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  62. 

109.  General  Chaffee  to  the  Adjutant-General,  cable  dated  Tientsin, 
August  3,  1900,  quoted  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1900,  p.  19. 

In  his  report,  p.  62,  Chaffee  erroneously  gives  the  date  of  this  con- 
ference as  Aug-ust  1,  1900. 

110.  Smith,  II,  p.  453. 

111.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  19;  General  Chaffee's 
report,  p.   63. 

112.  Officers  Enlisted  Men  Total 

General  Officer  and  Staff 17                      . .  17 

Troop  M,  6th  Cavalry 2                     66  68 

Detachment  from  Troop  L,  6th  Cavalry     . .                        8  8 


682     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Officers  Enlisted 

Total  Men 

Battery  F,  5th  Field  Artillery 4                    154  158 

9th  Infantry   (12  companies)    21                    694  715 

14th  Infantry    (8   companies) 22                   918  940 

Staff    departments    30                   114  144 

Total     96  1,954  2,050 

Records  of  the  Adjutant- General's  Office,  transmitted  to  the  author 
of  this  book  on  April  21,  1915. 

113.  Report  of  Major  W.  P.  Biddle,  commanding  the  marines,  dated 
August  20,  1900,  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding 
the  Army,  for  1900,  Part  7,  pp.  80-81. 

114.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  p.  19. 

115.  Who  were  variously  estimated,  from  Chinese  reports,  to  number 
from  10,000  to  12,000.— General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  63. 

116.  General  Chaffee's  report,  pp.  63-66;  Reports  of  Colonel  Daggett, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Coolidge  and  other  American  officers  in  the  Report 
of  the  Lieutenant  General  for  1900,  Part  7,  pp.  43-59. 

117.  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  66. 

118.  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  66. 

119.  General  Chaffee  says,  p.  66,  that  "The  time  of  starting  of  the 
Japanese  forces,  4  o'clock  in  the  morning,  followed  by  the  Russians, 
threw  the  hour  of  marching  of  the  American  troops  back  to  about  7 
a.  m.,  and  the  march  being  slow  and  the  heat  very  great  many  of  our 
troops  were  prostrated  and  left  by  the  roadside  to  usually  regain  camp 
during  the  night.  During  the  five  days'  marching  from  Pei-tsang  to 
Tong-Chow  our  forces  were  woefully  distressed  physically." 

120.  Arthur  H.  Smith,  China  in  Convulsion,  II,  pp.  457-458. 

121.  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  66,  which  relates  that  "that  day 
being  cloudy  and  cool  enabled  the  troops  to  march  without  much  dis- 
tress the  early  part  of  ^  the  forenoon." 

122.  "  The  Japanese  when  taking  possession  of  Tong-Chow  in  the 
morning  [of  the  12th]  advanced  troops  toward  Pekin  for  a  distance  of 
61^  miles.  It  was  finally  agreed  that  the  next  day,  the  13th,  should  be 
devoted  to  reconnaissance;  the  Japanese  should  reconnoiter  on  the  two 
roads  to  the  right  or  north  of  the  paved  road  which  is  just  north  of 
the  canal;  the  Russians  on  the  paved  road,  if  at  all;  the  Americans 
to  reconnoiter  on  the  road  just  south  of  the  canal ;  the  British  a  parallel 
road  11/2  miles  to  the  left  of  the  road  occupied  by  the  Americans.  On 
the  14th  the  armies  should  be  concentrated  on  the  advance  line  held  by 
the  Japanese,  and  that  that  evening  a  conference  should  be  held  to 
determine  what  the  method  of  attack  on  Peking  should  be." —  General 
Chaffee's  report,  p.  67. 

123.  Near  a  point  where  the  wall  enclosing  the  Chinese  city  joins  the 
wall  guarding  the  Tartar  city. 

124.  General  Chaffee's  report,  p.  67. 

125.  General  Chaffee  states,  p.  68,  that  "  About  noon  it  was  reported 
to  me  that  the  Russians  had  battered  open  "  Tung-pien-men  gate  "  dur- 
inof  the  night  and  had  effected  an  entrance  there.  I  arrived  at  the  gate 
shortly  afterwards  and  found  in  the  gate  some  of  the  Fourteenth  In- 
fantry, followed  by  Reilly's  battery.  The  Russian  artillery  and  troops 
were  in  great  confusion  in  the  passage,  their  artillery  facing  in  both 


Notes  '    683 

directions,  and  I  could  see  no  effort  being  maxie  to  extricate  themselves 
and  give  passage  into  the  city." 

126.  General  ChaflFee's  report,  p.  68. 

127.  lUd. 

128.  Situated  in  the  southern  wall  of  the  Tartar  city  midway  be- 
tween the  Ha  Ta  Men  and  Ch'ien  Men  gates. 

129.  A  census  taken  during  the  siege  showed  473  foreigners  in  Peking, 
of  whom  414  were  in  the  compound  of  the  British  Legation. —  Smith,  I, 
p.  298. 

Of  those  who  volunteered  for  the  defense,  12  were  killed  and  23 
wounded,  while  the  various  Legation  guards  suffered  a  loss  of  4  officers 
and  49  men  killed,  and  9  officers  and  136  men  wounded.  Two  men  also 
died  from  disease. —  Table  No.  69  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral commanding  the  Army,  for  1900,  Part  7,  p.  86. 

130.  Accounts  of  the  operations  of  the  United  States  troops  on  Au- 
gust 14,  1900  —  the  day^  on  which  the  Legations  were  relieved  —  are 
given  in  the  Report  of  General  ChaflFee,  pp.  67-68,  and  in  those  of  other 
American  officers  on  pages  59  to  79  of  Part  7  of  the  Report  of  the  Lieu- 
tenant General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1900. 

The  reports  of  Major  W.  P.  Biddle  and  other  Marine  officers  will  be 
found  in  ibid.,  pp.  79-86, 

131.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1900,  pp.  12-13. 

The  American  losses  on  August  14th  were  one  officer  and  11  men 
wounded. 

132.  General  ChaflFee's  report  of  September  1,  1900,  pp.  68-69. 

133.  Ibid.,  p.  69. 

The  American  losses  that  day  were  one  officer  and  five  men  killed, 
and  19  men  wounded. —  Ibid. 

134.  General  ChaflFee's  report,  pp.  69-70. 

135.  "  At  Pei-tsang  about  400  men,  of  which  the  American  forces 
supplied  one  company  (G)  from  the  Ninth  Infantry;  at  Yang-tsun  800 
men,  all  the  French  force;  at  Ho-shi-wu  100  Japanese,  50  English,  50 
Americans.  Company  C,  Ninth  Infantry,  was  left  at  this  point,  the 
station  being  commanded  by  an  English  officer.  At  Matow  the  strength 
of  the  post  was  fixed  at  100  men  —  50  Americans  and  50  English  —  to 
be  commanded  by  an  American  officer.  I  had  150  men  in  the  command 
who  were  reported  as  being  physically  unable  to  continue  the  march  to 
Pekin.  These  men  were  left,  and  Capt.  Alfred  Hasbrouck,  Fourteenth 
Infantry,  detailed  to  the  command  of  the  post.  At  Tong-Chow  one 
battalion  Japanese  (800),  half  battalion  Russian  (400),  50  English, 
and  50  American  troops  were  left.  For  this  service  I  detailed  50  ma- 
rines. I  also  detailed  50  marines  as  guard  for  depot  at  the  river  in 
conjunction  with  100  English  troops  detailed  for  like  service." —  General 
Chaffee's  report,  p.  70. 

136.  "  Aug.  28,  1900. —  The  allied  forces,  including  as  a  representa- 
tion of  the  United  States,  a  detachment  of  350  men,  made  up  of  the 
representatives  of  each  United  States  organization  present,  formally 
enter  the  palace  grounds  (Forbidden  City)  at  Pekin." — Summary  of 
leading  events  connected  with  military  operations  in  China  in  ichich 
the  United  States  took  part. —  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  Com- 
manding the  Army,  for  1900,  Part  7,  p.  16. 

137.  On  August  19th  an  action  took  place  near  Tientsin  in  which  the 


684     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

6th  Cavalry  had  six  men  wounded. —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General 
for  1900,  p.  13. 

138.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1900,  pp.  21-22. 

139.  On  August  10th  Field  Marshal  Count  Waldersee  was  selected 
as  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Allied  forces,  but  he  did  not  reach 
Shanghai   until   September   21st. 

140.  The  most  important  of  these  took  place  on  September  17th  and 
18th  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  General  James  H.  \Yilson  who 
had  reached  Peking  on  the  6th  of  that  month.  See  his  report  of  Sep- 
tember 20,  1900,  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding 
the  Army,  for  1900,  Part  7,  pp.  120-123.  Also  Under  the  Old  Flag,  II, 
pp.   521-531. 

141.  30  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  748. 

142.  Section  one. 

143.  Heitman,  II,  pp.  622-623. 

144.  Section  two  prescribed  the  organization  of  the  Cavalry;  Sec- 
tions 3,  4,  6,  7,  8  and  9  that  of  the  Artillery.  Section  10  fixed  the 
composition  of  each  regiment  of  infantry;  Section  11  the  organization 
of  the  enlisted  personnel  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers.  Section  12  stipu- 
lated that  the  President  could  appoint  one  chaplain  for  each  regiment 
of  cavalry  and  infantry  and  twelve  for  the  corps  of  artillery.  Section 
13  fixed  the  organization  of  the  Adjutant-General's  department;  Sec- 
tion 14  that  of  the  Inspector-General's  department;  Section  15  that  of 
the  Judge  Advocate's  department;  Section  16  dealt  with  the  Quarter- 
master's department;  Section  17  with  the  Subsistence  department; 
Section  18  with  the  Medical  department;  Section  19  organized  the 
Nurse  Corps  (female)  ;  Section  20  abolished  the  grade  of  veterinarian 
of  the  second  class  and  substituted  two  veterinarians  in  each  cavalry 
and  one  in  each  artillery  regiment;  Section  22  prescribed  the  number 
and  rank  of  the  officers  in  the  Engineer  Corps;  Section  23  the  same  in 
the  Ordnance  department;  Section  24  those  in  the  Signal  Corps,  and 
Section  25  the  composition  of  the  Record  and  Pension  Office  of  the 
War  Department. 

145.  By  Section  5,  13,  14,  15,  16,  17,  18,  21,  23,  24,  26,  27,  28,  29 
and  32. 

146.  Section  28. 

147.  Section  29. 

148.  Section  30. 

149.  Section  31. 

150.  Section  33. 

151.  Section  34. 

152.  Section  41.  ' 

153.  Section  36. 

154.  Section  37. 

155.  Section  40. 

156.  Section  38. 

Section  39  provided  "  That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  held  or  con- 
strued so  as  to  discharge  any  officer  from  the  Regular  Army  or  to  de- 
prive him  of  the  commission  which  he  now  holds  therein." 

157.  Acts  of  March  first,  second  and  third.  31  Statutes  at  Large, 
pp.  873,  895,  910,  1010  and  1133. 

158.  31  Stat.,  p.  810. 


Notes  685 

159.  31  Stat.,  p.  950. 

The  Act  of  March  1,  1901  (31  Stat.,  p.  847)  permitted  certain  de- 
duction in  service  from  the  time  required  to  perfect  title  to  homestead 
lands  in  case  the  entry  man  had  served  in  the  Army,  Navy  or  Marine 
Corps  during  the  Spanish-American  War  or  in  the  Philippine  insur- 
rection. 

160.  Section  one. 

161.  Section  5  amending  Article  60,  Section  1342  of  the  Revised 
Statutes. 

162.  Section  3  amending  Section  183  of  the  Revised  Statutes. 

163.  Section  4  amending  Article  83,  Section  1342  of  the  Revised 
Statutes. 

164.  Effected  by  Section  three. 

165.  Article  94  of  Section  1342  of  the  Revised  Statutes  provided  that 
"  Proceedings  of  trials  shall  be  carried  on  only  between  the  hours  of 
eight  in  the  morning  and  three  in  the  afternoon,  excepting  in  cases 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  officer  appointing  the  court,  require  im- 
mediate example." 

166.  General  Orders  and  Circulars,  Adjutant  General's  Office,  1901. 
General  Orders  No.  155,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Adjutant  General's 

•  Office,  Washington,  November  27,  1901,  pp.  5-6. 

167.  (1)  The  Artillery  School  at  Fort  Monroe,  Virginia;  (2)  the 
Engineer  School  of  Application  at  the  Washington  Barracks,  D.  C. ; 
(3)  the  School  of  Submarine  Defense  at  Fort  Totten,  N.  Y. ;  (4)  the 
School  of  Application  for  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery  at  Fort  Riley, 
Kansas;  and   (5)   the  Army  Medical  School  at  Washington,  D.  C. 

168.  A  memorandum  of  this  General  Order  is  contained  in  Appen- 
dix A  of  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  pp.  93-98. 

169.  31  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  903. 

170.  Page  242. 

171.  The  maximum  number  of  stations  —  502  —  was  reached  on 
March  1,  1901. —  Report  of  General  MacArthur,  July  4>  1901,  in  the 
Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1901, 
Part  2,  p.  97. 

172.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  31;  Report  of  Gen- 
eral MacArthur,  July  4,  1901,  pp.  88-91. 

173.  General  MacArthur's  report  for  1901,  pp.  91-92. 

174.  Ihid.,  pp.  93-94. 

175.  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

176.  Ibid.,  p.  95. 

177.  Ibid.,  pp.  94-96;  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  31. 

178.  A  complete  list  of  these  operations  terminating  with  June  29, 
1901,  is  given  in  the  "  Summary  of  the  principal  events  connected  with 
military  operations  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  September  1,  1900,  to 
June  30,  1901,"  contained  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  com- 
manding the  Army,  for  1901,  Part  2,  pp.  41-72. 

The  various  reports  of  General  MacArthur,  the  department  com- 
manders and  other  American  officers  will  be  found  in  Parts  2,  3,  4 
and  5  of  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  for  1901. 

179.  Report  of  Brigadier  General  J.  F.  Bell,  commanding  the  First 
District  of  the  Department  of  Northern  Luzon,  dated  April  30,  1901, 
in  ibid..  Part  3,  p.  31. 


686     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

180.  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for 
1901,  Part  2,  pp.  59-60. 

181.  Ibid.,  Part  3,  pp.  122-130. 

182.  This  proclamation  is  given  in  extenso  by  Worcester,  The  Philip- 
pines  Past  and  Present,  I,  pp.  287-288. 

183.  Ihid.,  I,  p.  288. 

184.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  32. 

185.  Malvar  surrendered  on  April  19,  1902,  and  Lukban  was  cap- 
tured on  April  27th  of  that  year. —  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
for  1902,  p.  11. 

186.  Correspondence  relating  to  the  War  with  Spain,  II,  p.  1286. 

187.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  63. 

188.  Ihid.,  p.  32;  Report  of  General  MacArthur  for  1901,  in  the  Re- 
port of  the  Lieutenant  General  commanding  the  Army,  for  1901,  Part  2, 
pp.   98-99. 

Blount  declares,  p.  241,  that  the  ratio  of  insurgent  "  casualties  to 
ours  was  about  16  to  1,"  "  a  statistical  fact,  figured  out  from  one  of 
the  War  Department  Reports." 

189.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  pp.  31-32. 

190.  Correspondence  relating  to  the  War  with  Spain,  II,  p.  1249. 

191.  Report  of  Brigadier  General  Barry,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Adju- 
tant-General, June  30,  1901,  in  Report  of  Lieutenant  General  command- 
ing the  Army,  for  1901,  Part  2,  p.  131. 

192.  Exhibit  A  in  ihid.,  p.  134.  This  was  exclusive  of  5,572  scouts, 
1,282  native  police  and  696  metropolitan  police. 

193.  See  page  242. 

194.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  33. 

195.  Letter  of  The  Adjutant-General,  dated  April  21,  1915,  to  the 
author  of  this  book,  in  which  reference  was  made  to  Heitman,  II, 
table  on  page  293  as  containing  the  latest  data  on  the  subject  of  the 
American  losses  in  the  Philippine  War.  In  the  above  numbers  the 
necessary  deductions  have  been  made  from  Heitman's  table  for  the 
officers  and  men  killed,  wounded  or  died  between  August  13,  1898,  and 
February  4,  1899. 

According  to  The  Adjutant-General's  letter  just  mentioned,  the  Philip- 
pine insurgents  had  15,365  officers  and  men  killed,  and  3,401  officers 
and  men  wounded  during  the  insurrection, 

196.  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  office;  Heitman,  Historical 
Register  and  Dictionary  of  the  United  States  Army,  II,  p.  293. 

197.  Ihid. 

198.  From  May  1,  1898,.  to  June  19,  1902,  according  to  the  state- 
ment sent  to  the  Senate  by  the  Secretary  of  War  on  June  19,  1902. 
See  Senate  Document  No.  J^16,  57th  Congress,  first  session,  p.  2. 

199.  Annual  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  June  30,  1913, 
p.  10,  and  June  30,  1914,  p.  33. 

CHAPTER  XIX 

1.  The  Philippine  census  taken  in  1903  gave  the  number  of  inhabitants 
of  the  archipelago  as  7,635,426. 

2.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1901,  p.  32. 

3.  See    pages     207-208.     Tlie     headquarters,     band,     and     companies 


Notes  687 

E,  F,  G,  H  and  L  of  the  34th  Volunteer  Infantry  did  not  arrive  at 
Manila  until  October  11,  1899. —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for 
1899,  p.  28. 

4.  Fifty-one  officers  and  1,314  men  of  the  48th  Volunteer  Infantry 
and  Hospital  corps. —  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General  for  1900,  p.  32. 
Also  House  of  Representatives  Document  No.  2,  56th  Congress,  second 
session,  p.  32. 

5.  General  MacArthur's  report,  July  4,  1901,  p.  104. 

6.  Adjutant-General  Corbin  to  General  MacArthur,  December  11, 
1900. —  Correspondence  relating  to  the  War  with  Spain,  II,  p.   1234. 

7.  Corbin  to  MacArthur,  December  27,  1900.— Ibid.,  II,  p.  1239. 

8.  General  MacArthur's  cables  to  the  Adjutant-General  received  at 
Washington  on  January  11,  1901,  January  29th  and  February  2nd. — 
Ibid.,  II,  pp.  1244,  1249  and  1250. 

9.  MacArthur  to  the  Adjutant-General,  received  January  9,  1901. — 
Ibid.,  II,  p.  1244. 

10.  Report  of  Brigadier  General  Barry,  Chief  of  Staff  and  Adjutant- 
General,  dated  June  39>,  1901,  in  the  Report  of  the  Lieutenant  General 
commanding  the  Army,  for  1901,  Part  2,  p.  131. 

11.  Correspondence  relating  to  the  War  with  Spain,  II,  p.  1244. 

12.  Ibid.,  II,  p.  1249. 

13.  MacArthur  to  the  Adjutant-General,  received  December  21,  1900. 
—  Ibid.,  II,  p.  1237. 

14.  Compare  extracts  from  the  report  of  Colonel  Joseph  H.  Sanger, 
quoted  in  the  Report  of  the  Inspector-General  for  1902.  Annual  Re- 
port of  the  War  Department  for  1902,  vol.  I,  pp.  431-432.  Also  pp. 
426  and  429. 


CHAPTER  XX 

1.  Original  letter  in  the  possession  of  W.  H.  Whyte  of  West  Chester, 
Pa.,  by  whose  kind  permission  it  is  here  published  for  the  first  time. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

1.  32  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  419. 

2.  32  Stat.,  p.   512. 

3.  32  Stat.,  p.  629. 

4.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1902,  pp.  11-16,  137-138. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.   16-19. 

6.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1902,  pp.  40-42. 

7.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1902,  pp.  29-30. 

8.  32  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  775. 

9.  Section  one. 

10.  Sections,   one  two  and  three. 

11.  Section  three. 

12.  Sections  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10,  11,  12  and  14. 

13.  Sections  13,  14,  17  and  21. 

14.  Section    14. 

15.  Section    15. 

16.  Sections   15   and   16. 


688     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

17.  Section   18. 

18.  Sections   19  and  20. 

19.  Section  22  provided  that  any  militiaman  disabled  by  wounds  re- 
ceived in  the  United  States  service  or  dying  as  a  result  of  such  wounds 
or  disability  shall  have  the  benefit  of  the  pension  laws  either  for 
himself  or  in  behalf  of  his  widow  and  children. 

20.  Section  23. 

21.  Section  3. 

22.  Sections  7  and  8. 

23.  Sections  4,  5  and  7. 

24.  Section  3. 

25.  Section  23. 

26.  Section  24. 

27.  The  above  summaries  of  the  merits  and  defects  of  the  Dick  bill 
may  be  compared  with  those  given  in  the  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 
for  1910,  pp.  23-24;  Rhodes,  Gold  Medal  Prize  Essay  in  the  Journal  of 
the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March-April,  1905,  pp.  192-195; 
Huidekoper,  Is  the  United  States  Prepared  for  War?  pp.  39-40;  Huide- 
koper,  The  United  States  Army  and  Organized  Militia  To-day,  pp.  11-12. 

28.  32   Statutes   at  Large,   p.   783. 

29.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1899,  pp.  44-54,  and  for  1901, 
pp.   42-49. 

30.  32  Stat.,  p.  830. 

31.  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for  March-April,  1905, 
pp.  201-202. 

32.  The  organization  of  the  General  Staff  is  discussed  at  some  length 
in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1903,  pp.  3-8,  10,  Appendix  B, 
pp.  61-62,  Appendix  C,  pp.  63-68,  and  Appendix  D  containing  a  table 
showing  the  organization  of  the  General  Corps,  opposite  p.   68. 

33.  Report   of   the   Secretary   of  War   for    1902,   pp.   44-46. 

34.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1902,  p.  47. 

35.  32  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  927. 

36.  Ibid.,  p.  932. 

37.  Ibid.,  p.  933. 

38.  Ibid.,  pp.  941-942.  This  is  contained  under  the  heading  of  Ord- 
nance Department. 

39.  Ibid.,   p.   942. 

40.  Ibid.,   p.    1011. 

41.  See  page  294. 

42.  32   Statutes  at  Large,  pp.    1021-1022. 

43.  Ibid.,  p.   1024. 

44.  Ibid.,  p.  1027. 

45.  Ibid.,   p.    1229. 

46.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1903,  pp.  32-34. 

47.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1904,  p.  34;  Report  of  the 
President,  National  Rifle  Association  of  America,  covering  period  from 
1871  to  1906,  p.  59. 

48.  The  Army  officers  selected  to  serve  on  the  Joint  Army  and  Navy 
Board  were  Major  General  S.  B.  M.  Young,  Major  General  Henry  C. 
Corbin,  Brigadier  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss  and  Brigadier  General  Wal- 
lace F.  Randolph. 

The  Naxj  officers  were  The  Admiral  of  the  Navy  George  Dewey,  Rear 


Notes  689 

Admiral  Henry  C.  Taylor,  Captain  John  E.  Pillsbury  and  Commander 
William  J.   Barnette. 

49.  This  agreement  was  promulgated  by  General  Orders  No.  107,  dated 
Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July 
20,  1903,  and  is  given  in  full  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
for  1903,   p.   9. 

50.  Ihid.,   p.  10-11. 

51.  GENERAL  ORDERS,  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

No.  2.  Washington,  August  15,  1903. 

The  War  College  Board  appointed  by  paragraph  2  of  General  Or- 
ders, No.  64,  Adjutant  General's  Office,  1902,  is  hereby  dissolved,  and 
hereafter  the  duties  assigned  to  said  board  by  paragraph  4  of  General 
Orders,  No.  155,  Adjutant  General's  Office,  1901,  will  be  performed 
by  such  section  of  the  War  Department  General  Staff  as  may  be 
designated  for  the  purpose  by  the  Chief  of  Staff. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

S.  B.  M.  YOUNG, 
Lieutenant  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 

52.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1903,  p.  36. 

53.  Ibid.,  p..  58. 

54.  33   Statutes  at  Large,  p.  226. 

55.  Ihid.,    p.    234. 

56.  Ihid.,  pp.  236-237. 

57.  Ihid.,  p.   259. 

58.  33  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  264. 

59.  Ihid.,  p.  274. 

60.  33   Stat.,   p.   312. 

61.  See  page  226. 

62.  33  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  496. 

63.  Ihid.,  p.  580. 

64.  Ihid.,  p.  595. 

65.  33  Stat.,  p.  588. 

66.  Ihid.,  p.  591. 

67.  Report  of  Major  General  Leonard  Wood,  commanding  the  Philip- 
pines  Division,   dated  November    14,    1905. 

68.  The  militia  participating  in  the  manoeuvres  at  Manassas  in  Sep- 
tember, 1904,  comprised  troops  of  the  three  arms  of  the  service  from  New 
York,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Connecticut,  Vermont,  Massachu- 
setts, Maine,  Virginia,  W^est  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,    Alabama,    Florida,    Tennessee   and   Texas. 

69.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1904,  pp.  36-37. 

70.  Ihid.,  p.  35. 

71.  Ihid.,  pp.   19-20. 

72.  Ihid.,   p.   20. 

73.  Ihid.,  pp.  2,  3,  25  and  26. 

74.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1904,  p.  18. 

75.  Ihid.,  p.  19. 

76.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1904,  pp.  8,   14-16. 

77.  Ihid.,  p.  17. 

78.  Ihid.,  pp.  5-6,  28-34,  and  38. 


690     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

79.  See  pages  301-302. 

80.  33   Statutes  at  Large,  p.  827. 

81.  Ihid.,  p.  830. 

82.  Ibid.,  p.  831. 

83.  Ihid.,  p.  840. 

84.  33  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  845. 

85.  Ibid.,  p.  847. 

86.  Ihid.,  pp.  986-987. 

87.  Ihid.,  p.   1156. 

88.  Ihid.,  p.  1197. 

89.  33    Statutes   at   Large,   p.    1284. 

90.  Report  of  Captain  Frank  R.  McCoy,  3rd  Cavalry,  A.  D.  C,  com- 
manding expedition,  dated  October  31,  1905. — Records  of  The  Adjutant- 
GeneraVs  Office. 

91.  "  From  Camp  Keithley,  Provisional  Company,  Twenty-second  In- 
fantry, October  11,  1905,  Lieut.  S.  B.  West,  Twenty-second  Infantry, 
commanding;  sailed  from  Camp  Overton,  October  13;  touched  at  Zam- 
boango,  October  14,  for  Capt.  F.  R.  McCoy,  aid-de-camp,  who  assumed 
command  by  direction  of  the  department  commander.  Chartered  ship 
Borneo,  left  Zamboango  October  14,  for  Digos,  via  Margosatubig,  with 
cargadores,  and  picked  up  Lieut.  Henrj^  Rodgers  and  a  detachment  of 
Philippine  Scouts  at  Margosatubig.  Expedition  left  Digos  October 
16  and  marched  to  the  Malala  River,  arriving  October  22,  1905,  en- 
countering and  killing  Datu  Ali  at  his  rancheria  on  the  Malala  River. 
American  casualties,  2  killed,  1  wounded.  Command  resumed  March 
October  22,  reaching  Buluan  October  23,  1905.  Provisional  Company 
returned  to  Camp  Keithley  November  3,  1905.  As  a  result  of  this 
expedition  all  the  American  arms  and  many  others  in  the  possession 
of  hostile  Moros  were  either  captured  or  surrendered,  and  the  Cotabato 
Valley  was  pacified." —  Report  of  Major-General  Leonard  Wood,  com- 
manding the  Department  of  Mindanao,  dated  April  12,  1906,  in  the 
Report  of  the  War  Department  for  1906,  vol.  Ill,  p.  296. 

92.  Report  of  Brigadier  General  James  A.  Buchanan,  temporarily  com- 
manding the  Department  of  Mindanao,  dated  November  2,  1905,  and 
the  endorsement  thereon  by  Major  General  Leonard  Wood,  dated  No- 
vember 14,  1905. —  Record  of  The  Adjutant-General's  Office. 

Also  report  of  General  Wood,  dated  April  12,  1906,  in  the  Annual 
Reports  of  the  War  Department  for  1906,  vol.  Ill,  p.  277. 

93.  Exclusive  of  3,167  men  of  the  Hospital  Corps,  who  are  prohibited 
by  the  Act  of  March  1,  1887,  from  being  included  in  the  enlisted  force 
of  the  Army. 

94.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1905,  pp.  1,  7  and  32. 

95.  Ihid.,  pp.  9-10. 

96.  Ihid.,  pp.  24-25,  28-30. 

97.  Ihid.,    pp.    34-36. 

98.  Ihid.,  pp.  20-21,  26-27. 

99.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1905,  pp.  21-23. 

100.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  245. 

101.  Ihid.,  p.  249. 

102.  Ihid.,  p.  257. 

103.  34  Stat.,  p.  449. 

104.  34  Stat.,  p.  455. 


Notes  691 

105.  lUd.,  p.  456. 

106.  Ihid.,  p.  457. 

107.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  458. 

108.  Ihid.,  p.  464. 

109.  Ihid.,  p.  531.     Act  of  June  28,  1906. 

110.  34  Stat.,  p.  817. 

111.  Joint  Resolution  No.  3,  approved  January  25,  1906,  authorized 
the  use  of  the  Army  transport  Sumner  to  convey  the  Santiago  Battlefield 
Commission  and  the  representatives  of  the  President  and  of  the  State 
and  War  Departments  from  New  York  to  Santiago  de  Cuba  "  to  enable 
them  to  attend  the  ceremonies  to  be  held  at  the  dedication  of  the 
battle  monuments  at  El  Caney,  Fort  San  Juan,  San  Juan  Ridge  and 
San  Juan  de  Mayaras  Hill." 

Joint  Resolutions  Nos.  16,  17  and  19,  approved  respectively  on  April 
19th,  21st  and  24th,  directed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  utilize  or  purchase 
the  necessary  supplies  and  to  co-operate  with  the  State  and  local  au- 
thorities in  assisting  persons  rendered  destitute^  by  the  earthquake  on 
April  eighteenth  and  the  conflagration  at  San  Francisco  and  elsewhere 
in  California. 

Joint  Resolution  No  34,  approved  June  25th,  instructed  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  donate  to  Vincennes  University,  Indiana,  "  such  obsolete 
arms  and  other  military  equipments  now  in  possession  of  said  uni- 
versity, to  be  used  for  military  instruction." 

Joint  Resolution  No.  43,  approved  June  29th,  authorized  the  Secretary 
of  War  "  to  deliver  to  the  Confederate  Memorial  Literary  Society  of 
Richmond,  Virginia,  all  of  the  Confederate  battle  flags  now  in  the  cus- 
tody of  the  War  Department  which  it  has  been  found  impossible,  after 
thorough  investigation,  to  trace  to  the  former  ownership  or  custody  of 
the  troops  of  any  particular  State." 

See  34  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  821,  827,  828,  834  and  837. 

112.  Report  of  Colonel  Joseph  W.  Duncan,  commanding  the  expedi- 
tionary forces,  dated  March  10,  1906,  and  report  of  Major  General 
Wood,  commanding  the  Philippines  Division,  April  22,  1906. —  Records 
of  The  Adjutant-GeneraVs  Office. 

Both  of  these  oflficers  recommended  Lieutenant  Gordon  Johnston  for 
the  Medal  of  Honor  "  for  most  distinguished  gallantry  in  leading  as- 
sault on  the  main  defence  of  the  crater,"  and  this  coveted  decoration 
was  conferred  upon  him  by  President  Taft  in  person  in  1913. 

113.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1906,  pp.  18-29,  and  34. 

114.  Ihid.,  pp.  40-41. 

115.  Ihid.,  pp.  41-42. 

116.  Ihid.,  pp.  32-34,  42-45. 

117.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  W^ar  for  1906,  p.  55. 

118.  The  Report  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board,  dated  February 
first,  1906,  was  published  in  Senate  Document  No.  248,  Fifty-ninth  Con- 
gress, first  session. 

119.  Report  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board,  p.  15. 

120.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1906,  p.  35. 

121.  Report  of  the  National  Coast-Defense  Board,  pp.  11,  12  and  25. 

122.  Ihid.,  pp.  7,  23  and  24.  Also  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1906,  pp.   36-37. 

123.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1906,  p.  39. 


692     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

124.  34  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  861. 

125.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1060. 

126.  34  Stat.,  p.   1158. 

127.  34  Stat.,  p.   1160. 

128.  34  Stat.,  p.   1162. 

129.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1907,  p.  24. 

130.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1169. 

"  Pursuant  to  this  provision  of  law  the  military  prison  at  Alcatraz 
Island,  Cal.,  the  maximum  capacity  of  which  is  319  prisoners,  was  thus 
designated  on  March  21,  1907,  and  a  prison  guard  was  established  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  guard  at  the  Leavenworth  military  prison; 
the  military  reservation  of  Alcatraz  Island  and  the  prison  being  desig- 
nated as  the  '  Pacific  Branch  of  the  United  States  military  prison.' 

"  On  June  30,  1907,  there  were  1,668  militarj^  convicts  in  custody. 
Of  this  number  611  were  in  confinement  at  military  posts;  38  at  the 
United  States  penitentiary  at  Leavenworth,  Kans. ;  700  at  the  United 
States  military  prison.  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kans.;  285  at  the  Pacific 
branch  of  the  United  States  military  prison  at  Alcatraz  Island,  Cali- 
fornia; 16  at  the  Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane,  Washington, 
D.  C. ;  1  at  the  General  Hospital,  Fort  Bayard,  N.  Mex.,  and  17  in 
transit  from  one  place  of  confinement  to  another." —  Report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  1907,  pp.  24-25. 

131.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1217. 

132.  An  act  approved  March  2,  1907,  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  donate  certain  condemned  ordnance  to  the  Monument  Association 
of  Athens,  Ohio;  two  acts  approved  March  4th  directed  the  loan  of  brass 
field  pieces  to  Petoskey,  Michigan,  and  to  the  Valley  Forge  Park  Com- 
mission. Another  act  approved  March  4,  1907,  appropriated  $25,000 
for  the  completion  of  a  monument  to  be  erected  at  Chalmette,  Louisiana, 
to  the  memory  of  the  American  soldiers  who  fell  at  the  battle  of  New 
Orleans.     See  34  Stat.,  pp.   1233,  1293,  1415  and  1411. 

133.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1381. 

134.  Ibid. 

135.  34  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1422. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  8,  approved  January  25,  1907,  authorized  the 
awarding  of  a  Medal  of  Honor  to  J.  Monroe  Reisinger,  corporal  in 
Company  H  of  the  150th  Pennsylvania  Volunteer  Infantry  "  for  specially 
brave  and  meritorious  conduct  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  at  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  July  first,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-three." — Ibid.,  p. 
1420. 

136.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1907,  pp.  26-27. 

137.  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

138.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

139.  Ibid.,  pp.   15-16. 

140.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1907,  pp.  27-29,  17,  9-11. 

141.  Ibid.,  p.  17. 

142.  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

143.  Ibid.,  pp.   11-12. 

144.  Ibid.,  pp.    18-19. 

145.  Ibid.,  pp.   25-26. 

146.  Ibid.,  pp.   31-32. 


Notes  693 

147.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  for  1907,  quoted  in  ihid., 
p.   33. 

148.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1907,  pp.  34-35. 

149.  Ihid.,  pp.  29-31. 

150.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1908,  p.  75. 

151.  35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  66. 

This  law  was  preceded  by  the  Urgency  Deficiency  Appropriation  Act 
of  February  15,  1908  (35  Stat.,  pp.  8  and  14);  the  Act  of  February 
26th  authorizing  the  deeding  of  one  acre  of  the  military  reservation  at 
Fort  Riley  to  the  State  of  Kansas;  the  Act  of  March  28th  directing 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  donate  50  obsolete  Springfield  rifles  to  the 
Albert  Sidney  Camp,  Confederate  Veterans,  of  San  Antonio,  Texas;  the 
Act  of  April  2nd  authorizing  the  furnishing  of  condemned  brass  can- 
non and  cannon  balls  to  the  Confederate  Monument  Association  at 
Franklin,  Tennessee;  the  Additional  Urgent  Deficiency  Act  of  April 
7th  (35  Stat.,  p.  59)  ;  the  Act  of  April  10th,  directing  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  furnish  two  condemned  cannon  to  Winchester,  Virginia; 
and  the  Act  of  April  11th  directing  him  to  donate  100  obsolete  Spring- 
field rifles,  bayonets  and  bayonet  scabbards  to  "  The  Old  Guard,  an 
independent  military  organization  of  Columbus,  Ohio,  whose  member- 
ship is  composed  entirely  of  Union  soldiers  of  the  war  of  the  rebel- 
lion." 

152.  35  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  108. 

153.  Ihid. 

154.  Ihid.,  pp.   109-110. 

155.  Ihid.,  p.   114. 

156.  35  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  163. 

157.  Ihid.,  p.  392. 

158.  "  Be  it  enacted  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  on  and 
after  the  thirtieth  day  of  June,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  the  Porto 
Rico  Provisional  Regiment  of  Infantry  shall  be  designated  the  Porto 
Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry  of  the  United  States  Army.  It  shall  be 
composed  of  the  two  existing  battalions  of  the  Porto  Rico  Provisional 
Regiment  of  Infantry. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  the  field  officers  of  said  regiment  shall  be  one  lieu- 
tenant-colonel and  two  majors,  who  shall  be  detailed  for  four  years 
by  the  President  from  officers  not  below  the  rank  of  captain  of  the 
Army. 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  present  captains  and  lieutenants  of  the  Porto 
Rico  Provisional  Regiment  of  Infantry  appointed  or  who  were  reap- 
pointed after  a  mental,  physical,  and  professional  examination,  may 
be  re-commissioned  as  officers  of  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

"  Sec.  4.  That  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  second  lieutenant  may 
be  filled  by  the  President  in  his  discretion  by  the  appointment  of 
citizens  of  Porto  Rico  whose  qualifications  for  commissions  shall  be 
established  by  examination. 

"  Sec.  5.  That  promotions  to  the  grade  of  first  lieutenant  and 
captain  shall  be  according  to  seniority  within  the  regiment,  subject 
to  the  examination  provided  by  law.  All  appointments  and  promo- 
tions herein  provided  for   shall  be  made  with  the  advice  and  consent 


694     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

of  the  Senate.  Officers  of  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry  shall 
have  the  same  rank,  pay,  rights,  and  allowances  provided  by  law  for 
officers  of  similar  rank  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  except  as 
herein  provided  with  regard  to  promotion.  Any  of  the  officers  pro- 
vided for  by  section  three  who  may  have  become  incapacitated  for  active 
service  by  reason  of  disability  incident  to  the  service  shall  be  placed 
upon  the  retired  list  with  the  rank  to  which  they  would  otherwise 
be  entitled. 

"  Sec.  6.  That  all  laws  or  parts  of  laws  inconsistent  with  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  are  hereby  repealed." 

159.  35  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  392. 

160.  35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.   399. 

161.  "  An  Act  To  further  amend  the  Act  entitled  '  An  Act  to  promote 
the  efficiency  of  the  militia,  and  for  other  purposes,'  approved  Jan- 
uary twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three. 

"  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  section  one  of 
said  Act  be,  and  is  hereby  amended  and  reenacted  to  read  as  follows: 

"'Section  1.  That  the  militia  shall  consist  of  every  able-bodied 
male  citizen  of  the  respective  States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of 
Columbia,  and  every  able-bodied  male  of  foreign  birth  who  has  declared 
his  intention  to  become  a  citizen,  who  is  more  than  eighteen  and  less 
than  forty-five  years  of  age,  and  shall  be  divided  into  two  classes: 
The  organized  militia,  to  be  known  as  the  National  Guard  of  the 
State,  Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia,  or  by  such  other  designations 
as  may  be  given  them  by  the  laws  of  their  respective  States  or  Ter- 
ritories; the  remainder  to  be  known  as  the  Reserve  Militia:  Provided, 
That  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  of  section  sixteen  hundred  and 
sixty-one,  Revised  Statutes,  as  amended,  shall  apply  only  to  the  militia 
organized  as  a  land  force.' 

"  Sec.  2.  That  section  three  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

" '  Sec.  3.  That  the  regularly  enlisted,  organized,  and  uniformed 
active  militia  in  the  several  States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of 
Columbia  who  have  heretofore  participated  or  shall  hereafter  partici- 
pate in  the  apportionment  of  the  annual  appropriation  provided  by  sec- 
tion sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the 
United  States,  as  amended,  whether  known  and  designated  as  National 
Guard,  militia,  or  otherwise,  shall  constitute  the  organized  militia. 
On  and  after  January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  ten,  the  organi- 
zation, armament,  and  discipline  of  the  organized  militia  in  the  several 
States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be  the  same 
as  that  which  is  now  and  may  hereafter  be  prescribed  for  the  Regular 
Army  of  the  United  States,  subject  in  time  of  peace  to  such  general 
exceptions  as  may  be  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War:  Provided, 
That  in  peace  and  war  each  organized  division  of  militia  may  have 
one  inspector  of  small-arms  practice  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
colonel;  each  organized  brigade  of  militia  one  inspector  of  small-arms 
practice  with  the  rank  of  major ;  each  regiment  of  infantry  or  cavalry 
of  organized  militia,  one  assistant  inspector  of  small-arms  practice  with 
the  rank  of  captain,  and  each  separate  or  unassigned  battalion  of  infan- 
try or  engineer's  or  squadron  of  cavalry  of  organized  militia,  one  assis- 


Notes  695 

tant  inspector  of  small-arms  j^ractice  with  the  rank  of  first-lieutenant: 
Provided  also,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  time  of 
peace  may,  bj'  order,  fix  the  minimum  number  of  enlisted  men  in  each 
company,  troop,  battery,  signal  corps,  engineer  corps,  and  hospital 
corps:  And  provided  further,  That  any  corps  of  artillery,  cavalry,  and 
infantry  existing  in  any  of  the  States  at  the  passage  of  the  Act  of 
May  eighth,  seventeen  hundred  and  ninety-two,  which,  by  the  laws, 
customs,  or  usages  of  the  said  States,  have  been  in  continuous  existence 
since  the  passage  of  said  Act,  under  its  provisions  and  under  the  provi- 
sions of  section  two  hundred  and  thirty-two  and  sections  sixteen  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  to  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty  —  both  inclusive,  of 
title  sixteen  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States,  relating  to 
the  militia,  shall  be  allowed  to  retain  their  accustomed  privileges, 
subject,  nevertheless,  to  all  other  duties  required  by  law,  in  like  man- 
ner as  the  other  militia.' 

"  Sec.  3.  That  section  four  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  4.  That  whenever  the  United  States  is  invaded  or  in  danger 
of  invasion  from  any  foreign  nation,  or  of  rebellion  against  the  au- 
thority of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  or  the  President  is 
unable  with  the  regular  forces  at  his  command  to  execute  the  laws 
of  the  Union,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  President  to  call  forth  such 
number  of  the  militia  of  the  State  or  of  the  States  or  Territories  or 
of  the  District  of  Columbia  as  he  may  deem  necessary  to  repel  such 
invasion,  suppress  such  rebellion,  or  to  enable  him  to  execute  such 
laws,  and  to  issue  his  orders  for  that  purpose,  through  the  governor 
of  the  respective  State  or  Territory,  or  through  the  commanding 
general  of  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  from  which  State, 
Territory,  or  District  such  troops  may  be  called,  to  such  officers  of  the 
militia  as  he  may  think  proper.' 

"  Sec.  4.  That  section  five  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the  same 
is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

" '  Sec.  5.  That  whenever  the  President  calls  forth  the  organized 
militia  of  any  State,  Territory,  or  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  be 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  he  may  specify  in  his  call 
the  period  for  which  such  service  is  required,  and  the  militia  so  called 
shall  continue  to  serve  during  the  term  so  specified,  either  within  or 
without  the  terrritory  of  the  United  States,  unless  sooner  relieved  by 
order  of  the  President:  Provided,  That  no  commissioned  officer  or 
enlisted  man  of  the  organized  militia  shall  be  held  to  service  beyond  the 
term  of  his  existing  commission  or  enlistment:  Provided  further, 
That  when  the  military  needs  of  the  Federal  Government  arising  from 
the  necessity  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrection, 
or  repel  invasion,  can  not  be  met  by  the  regular  forces,  the  organized 
militia  shall  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  in  advance 
of  any  volunteer  force  which  it  may  be  determined  to  raise.' 

"  Sec.  5.  That  section  seven  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  7.  That  every  officer  and  enlisted  man  of  the  militia  who 
shall  be  called  forth  in  the  manner  hereinbefore  prescribed,  shall  be 
mustered  for  service  without  further  enlistment,  and  without  further 
medical  examination  previous  to  such  muster,  except  for  those  States 


696     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

and  Territories  which  have  not  adopted  the  standard  of  medical  exami- 
nation prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army:  Provided,  however,  That  any 
officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the  militia  who  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to 
present  himself  for  such  muster,  upon  being  called  forth  as  herein 
prescribed,  shall  be  subject  to  trial  by  court-martial  and  shall  be 
punished   as    such    court-martial   may   direct.' 

"  Sec.  6.  That  section  eight  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  8.  That  the  majority  membership  of  courts-martial  for  the 
trial  of  officers  or  men  of  the  militia  when  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  composed  of  militia  officers.' 

"  Sec.  7.  That  section  eleven  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"'Sec.  11.  That  when  the  militia  is  called  into  the  actual  service 
of  the  United  States,  or  any  portion  of  the  militia  is  called  forth 
under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  their  pay  shall  commence  from  the 
day  of  their  appearing  at  the  place  of  company  rendezvous,  but  this 
provision  shall  not  be  construed  to  authorize  any  species  of  expenditure 
previous  to  arriving  at  such  places  of  rendezvous  which  is  provided  by 
existing  laws  to  be  paid  after  their  arrival  at  such  places  of  rendezvous.' 

"  Sec.  8.  That  section  thirteen  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"'Sec.  13.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  pro- 
cure by  purchase  or  manufacture,  and  issue  from  time  to  time  to  the 
organized  militia,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may  prescribe,  such 
number  of  the  United  States  service  arms,  together  with  all  accessories 
and  such  other  accouterments,  equipments,  uniforms,  clothing,  equipage, 
and  military  stores  of  all  kinds  required  for  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  as  are  necessary  to  arm,  uniform,  and  equip  all  of  the  organized 
militia  in  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia, 
in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  this  Act,  without  charging 
the  cost  or  value  thereof,  or  any  expense  connected  therewith,  against 
the  allotment  of  said  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia, 
out  of  the  annual  appropriation  provided  by  section  sixteen  hundred 
and  sixty-one  of  the  Revised  Statutes  as  amended,  or  requiring  pay- 
ment therefor,  and  to  exchange,  without  receiving  any  money  credit 
therefor,  ammunition  or  parts  thereof  suitable  for  the  new  arms,  round 
for  round,  for  corresponding  ammunition  suitable  to  the  old  arms  here- 
tofore issued  to  said  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  by 
the  United  States:  Provided,  That  said  property  shall  remain  the 
property  of  the  United  States,  except  as  hereinafter  provided,  and  be 
annually  accounted  for  bj'^  the  governors  of  the  States  and  Territories 
as  required  by  law,  and  that  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District  of 
Columbia  shall,  on  receipt  of  new  arms  or  equipments,  turn  in  to  the 
War  Department,  or  otherwise  dispose  of  in  accordance  with  the  direc- 
tions of  the  Secretary  of  War,  without  receiving  any  money  credit 
therefor  and  without  expense  for  transportation,  all  United  States 
property  so  replaced  or  condemned.  When  the  organized  militia  is 
uniformed  as  above  required,  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  to  fix 
an  annual  clothing  allowance  to  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District 
of  Columbia  for  each  enlisted  man  of  the  organized  militia  thereof, 
and  thereafter   issues  of  clothing  to   such   States,   Territories,  and  the 


Notes  697 

District  of  Columbia  shall  be  in  accordance  with  such  allowance,  and 
the  governors  of  the  States  and  Territories  and  the  commanding  general 
of  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be  authorized  to  drop 
from  their  returns  each  year  as  expended  clothing  corresponding  in 
value  to  such  allowance.  The  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  further 
authorized  to  issue  from  time  to  time  to  the  organized  militia,  under 
such  regulations  as  he  may  prescribe,  small  arms  and  artillery  ammu- 
nition upon  the  requisition  of  the  governor,  in  the  proportion  of  fifty 
per  centum  of  the  corresponding  Regular  Army  allowance,  without 
charge  to  the  State's  allotment  from  the  appropriation  under  section 
sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one.  Revised  Statutes,  as  amended.  To  pro- 
vide means  to  carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  this  section,  the  neces- 
sary money  to  cover  the  cost  of  procuring,  exchanging,  or  issuing  of 
arms,  accouterments,  equipments,  uniforms,  clothing,  equipage,  ammu- 
nition, and  military  stores  to  be  exchanged  or  issued  hereunder  is 
hereby  appropriated  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise 
appropriated:  Provided,  That  the  sum  expended  in  the  execution  of 
the  purchases  and  issued  provided  for  in  this  section  shall  not  exceed 
the  sum  of  two  million  dollars  in  any  fiscal  year:  Provided  also, 
That  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  annually  submit  to  Congress  a  report 
of  expenditures  made  by  him  in  the  execution  of  the  requirements 
of  this  section.' 

"  Sec  9.  That  section  fifteen  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  *  Sec.  15.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  to  provide  for 
participation  by  any  part  of  the  organized  militia  of  any  State  or 
Territory  on  the  request  of  the  governor  thereof  in  the  encampment, 
maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  of  any  part  of  the  Regular  Army 
at  or  near  any  military  post  or  camp  or  lake  or  seacoast  defenses  of 
the  United  States.  In  such  case  the  organized  militia  so  participating 
shall  receive  the  same  paj%  subsistence,  and  transportation  as  is  pro- 
vided by  law  for  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Regular  Army,  and  no 
part  of  the  sums  appropriated  for  the  support  of  the  Regular  Army 
shall  be  used  to  pay  any  part  of  the  expenses  of  the  organized  militia 
of  any  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  while  engaged 
in  joint  encampments,  maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  militia,  but  all  payments  to  the  militia  under  the  provisions 
of  this  section  and  all  allowances  for  mileage  shall  be  made  solely 
from  the  sums  appropriated  for  such  purposes:  Provided,  That  the 
command  of  such  military  post  or  camp  and  the  officers  and  troops 
of  the  United  States  there  stationed  shall  remain  Avith  the  regular 
commander  of  the  post  without  regard  to  the  rank  of  the  commanding 
or  other  officers  of  the  militia  temporarily  so  encamped  within  its  limits 
or  in  its  vicinity:  Provided  further.  That  except  as  herein  specified  the 
right  to  command  during  such  joint  encampments,  maneuvers,  and  field 
instruction  shall  be  governed  by  the  rules  set  out  in  articles  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-two  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  of  the  rules 
and  articles  for  the  government  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
The  sums  appropriated  for  the  organized  militia  for  such  joint  encamp- 
ment, maneuvers,  and  field  instruction  shall  be  disbursed  as,  and  for 
that  purpose  shall  constitute,  one  fund;  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
shall  forward  to  Congress,  at  each  session  next  after  said  encampment, 


698     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

a  detailed  statement  of  the  expenses  of  such  encampments  and  ma- 
neuvers.' 

"  Sec.  10.  That  section  sixteen  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  16.  That  whenever  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the  organ- 
ized militia  shall  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  governor  of  any 
State,  Territory,  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  District  of  Columbia 
militia,  and  when  authorized  by  the  President,  attend  and  pursue  a 
regular  course  of  study  at  any  military  school  or  college  of  the  United 
States,  such  officer  or  enlisted  man  shall  receive  from  the  annual  appro- 
priation for  the  support  of  the  Army,  the  same  travel  allowances  and 
quarters  or  commutation  of  quarters  to  which  an  officer  or  enlisted  man 
of  the  Regular  Armj^  would  be  entitled  for  attending  such  school  or 
college  under  orders  from  proper  military  authority;  such  officer  shall 
also  receive  commutation  and  subsistence  at  the  rate  of  one  dollar  per 
day  and  each  enlisted  man  such  subsistence  as  is  furnished  to  an 
enlisted  man  of  the  Regular  Army  while  in  actual  attendance  upon  a 
course  of  instruction.' 

"Sec.  11.  That  section  twenty  of  said  Act  as  amended  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  amended  and  reenacted  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  20.  That  upon  the  application  of  the  governor  of  any  State 
or  Territory  furnished  with  material  of  war  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  or  former  laws  of  Congress,  the  Secretary  of  War  may,  in 
his  discretion,  detail  one  or  more  officers  or  enlisted  men  of  the  Army 
to  report  to  the  governor  of  such  State  or  Territory  for  duty  in  con- 
nection with  the  organized  militia.  All  such  assignments  may  be 
revoked  at  the  request  of  the  governor  of  such  State  or  Territory  or  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby 
authorized  to  appoint  a  board  of  five  officers  on  the  active  list  of  the 
organized  militia  so  selected  as  to  secure,  as  far  as  practicable,  equi- 
table representation  to  all  sections  of  the  United  States,  and  which  shall 
from  time  to  time,  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  direct,  proceed  to 
Washington,  District  of  Columbia,  for  consultation  with  the  Secretary 
of  War  respecting  the  condition,  status,  and  needs  of  the  whole  body 
of  the  organized  militia.  Such  officers  shall  be  appointed  for  the  term 
of  four  years  unless  sooner  relieved  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

" '  The  actual  and  necessary  travelling  expenses  of  the  members  of 
the  board,  together  with  a  per  diem  to  be  established  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  shall  be  paid  to  the  members  of  the  board.  The  expenses 
herein  authorized,  together  with  the  necessary  clerical  and  office  expenses 
of  the  division  of  militia  affairs  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
shall  constitute  a  charge  against  the  whole  sum  annually  appropriated 
under  section  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one,  Revised  Statutes,  as 
amended,  and  shall  be  paid  therefrom,  and  not  from  the  allotment  duly 
apportioned  to  any  particular  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of 
Columbia;  and  a  list  of  such  expenses  shall  be  submitted  to  Congress 
annually  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  connection  with  his  annual  report.'  " 

Approved,  May  27,   1908. 

35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  399-403. 

162.  The  time  limit  within  which  the  organized  militia  was  required 
to  conform  to  the  standard  of  the  Regular  Army  was  extended  from 


Notes  699 

January  21,  1908,  to  January  21,  1910,  by  a  Joint  Resolution  of  Con- 
gress approved  on  January  16,   1908. —  See  35  Stat.  L.,  p.  566. 

163.  Compare  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1908,  pp.  33-35. 

164.  Opinion  of  the  Attorney-General,  Hon.  George  W.  Wiekersham, 
contained  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson, 
dated  February  17,  1912,  and  quoted  in  the  Report  on  the  Organiza- 
tion of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States,  pp.  83-86. 

165.  Compare  the  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  for  1910,  pp.  23-24. 

166.  35  Stat.  L.,  p.  441. 

167.  35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  443. 

168.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  for  1908,  pp.  5,  6,  7  and  18. 

169.  Ibid.,  pp.  24,  36,  37,  42,  43  and  45. 

170.  Ibid,  pp.  25-33. 

171. 

r^«5           ,        J.  Officers  absent  from 

Officers  absent  on  ,    ,                      ,     ^ 

detached  duty  duty  on  account  of 

sickness  or  leave 

1905    517  317 

1906    627  266 

1907     682  186 

1908    691  157 

172.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  W^ar  for  1908,  pp.  12-17,  38-41,  45-46. 

173.  Ibid.,  pp.  37,  75-77. 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 

Washington,  June  27,  1908. 

MEMORANDUM 

I.  The  following  organization  and  distribution  of  business  of  the 
War  Department  General  Staff  is  announced  and  will  be  in  force  until 
further  orders: 

FIRST    SECTION 

Organization,  administration,  and  distribution  of  the  militia  forces; 
details  and  assignments;  examinations  for  the  appointment  and  pro- 
motion of  officers;  administrative  matters  pertaining  to  field  maneuvers 
and  to  combined  exercises  of  the  Army  and  Navy;  discipline  and  train- 
ing; drill  and  firing  regulations  of  Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field  Artil- 
lery, mobile  armament  and  equipment;  subsistence  and  clothing;  loca- 
tion, design,  and  construction  of  posts,  camps,  hospitals,  and  quarters; 
water  supply;  sanitation,  and  all  related  matters;  special  military 
rewards;   estimates  for  support  of  the  Army. 

SECOND  SECTION 

Military  information;  collection,  arrangement,  and  publication  of 
historical,  statistical,  and  geographic  information;  War  Department 
library ;  system  of  war  maps,  American  and  foreign ;  general  information 
regarding  foreign  armies  and  fortresses;  preparation  from  official 
records  of  analytical  and  critical  histories  of  important   catnpaigns. 

Military  attaches. 

Photographic  gallery. 

Preparation  of  nontechnical  manuals. 


700     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

Issue  of  military  publications,   maps,   and  documents. 

Collation  and  discussion  of  all  obtainable  data  relaing  to  strategical, 
tactical,  and  logistic  features  of  future  military  operations,  and  for- 
mation of  complete  working  plans  for  passing  from  a  state  of  peace 
to  a  state  of  war  under  such  conditions  as  can  be  foreseen  or  may  be 
assumed. 

Direction  and  coordination  of  military  education  in  the  Army,  the 
Militia,  and  in  civil  schools  and  colleges  at  which  "officers  of  the  Army 
are  detailed. 

Plans  for  field  maneuvers. 

Permanent  fortifications. 

Submarine  defense. 

Field  engineering. 

Signaling,  technical  manuals,  and  logistics. 

Military  resources  of  the  country. 

II.  Business  of  the  following  classes  to  be  referred  to  the  section 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter,  in  conference  with  the  Chief 
of  Artillery,  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  Seacoast  Artillery: 

Combined  exercises  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Allowances  of  all  items  of  equipment,  armament,  and  supplies  for  the 
military  service. 

Determination  of  types,  designs,  and  specifications  for  such  as  are 
required  to  be  standardized. 

Regulations   and   orders. 

Proposed  legislation  to  be  presented  to  Congress  or  legislation  pending 
in  Congress  referred  to  War  Department  for  report. 

By  direction  of  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

FRED  W.  SLADEN, 
Captain,  General  Staff  Corps,  Secretary." 

175.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1908,  p.  35. 

176.  Ihid.,  pp.  35-36. 

177.  Ihid.,  p.  43. 

178.  Acts  of  February  11th,  17th  and  23rd,  and  March  3rd  and  4th, 
and  the  Joint  Resolutions  of  February  18th,  23rd  and  26th,  1909. — 
35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  618,  625,  643,  845,  1062,  1069, 
1165,  and  1166. 

179.  Acts  of  February  9th,  March  3rd  and  4th.— 55  Stat.  L.,  pp.  615, 
728,  732,  877,  919,  993  and   1028.  m 

180.  35  Stat.  L.,  p.  629.  ^ 

181.  "  Provided  further,  That  the  Act  approved  May  eleventh,  nine- 
teen hundred  and  eight,  for  the  support  of  the  army  for  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  nine,  in  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  the  payment  of  six  months'  pay  to  the  widow  of  an  officer 
or  enlisted  man,  and  so  forth,  be  amended  as  follows: 

"  Strike  out  the  words  '  contracted  in  the  line  of  duty  '  and  insert 
in  lieu  thereof  the  words,  '  not  the  result  of  his  own  misconduct.'  " —  35 
Stat.  L.,  p.  735. 

182.  "Provided,  That  the  Act  approved  November  third,  eighteen 
hundred  and  ninety-three,  authorizing  the  detail  of  officers  of  the 
army  and  navy  to  educational  institutions,  be  amended  so  as  to 
provide  that  retired  officers,  when  so  detailed,  shall  receive  the  full  pay 

I 


Notes  701 

and  allowance  of  their  rank,  except  that  the  limitations  on  the  pay 
of  officers  of  the  Army  above  the  grade  of  major  as  provided  in  the  Acts 
of  March  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  five,  and  June  twelfth,  nineteen 
hundred  and  six,  shall  remain  in  force." —  S5  Stat.  L.,  p.  738. 

183.  35  Stat.  L.,  p.  737. 

184.  Ibid.,  pp.  750-751. 

•    185.  35  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  836. 

180.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  pp.  21-22,  54-57,  62-63. 

187.  Ibid.,  p.  63. 

188.  ]bid.,-p^.  42-48. 

189.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  pp.  16,  9  and  17. 

190.  Report  of  the  Adjutant-General,  October  30,  1909,  in  the  Report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  p.  246. 

191.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  pp.  57-58. 

192.  Ibid.,  p.  38. 

193.  Ibid.,  pp.  40-42. 

194.  Ibid.,  pp.  10-13,  21,  25-27,  49-50,  22-25,  36-38. 

The  bill  covering  the  organization  of  the  volunteer  forces  in  time 
of  war  afforded  another  instance  of  Congressional  lethargy.  It  had  been 
introduced  by  the  Chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs 
during  the  second  session  of  the  59th  Congress  as  House  of  Represen- 
tatives bill  No.  25712;  was  again  introduced  in  the  second  session  of 
the  60th  Congress  as  House  bill  23862;  and  was  published  during  the 
same  session  in  House  Document  No.  1105,  together  with  a  letter  from 
President  Roosevelt,  dated  December  8,  1908,  explaining  the  salient 
points  of  the  bill. —  Ibid.,  p.  37. 

195.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  pp.  27-28,  50-54. 

196.  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

197.  Ibid.,  pp.  61-62. 

198.  Ibid.,  pp.  63-64. 

199.  Ibid.,  pp.   64-67. 

200.  Ibid.,  p.  64. 

201.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1909,  pp.  28-31. 

202.  Ibid.,  pp.  32-34. 

203.  The  Act  of  February  24,  1910  {36  United  States  Statutes  at 
Large,  p.  202)  corrected  the  lineal  and  relative  rank  of  certain  Army 
officers. 

The  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  March  23rd  changed  the  titles  and 
fixed  the  pay  of  the  blacksmiths  and  farriers  in  the  cavalry  and  the  me- 
chanics in  the  field  artillery  ,{36  Stat.  L.,  p.  245).  It  also  authorized 
the  detail  of  one  additional  Army  officer  "  as  assistant  to  the  Chief  of 
the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  "  with  "  the  rank,  pay  and  allowances 
of  colonel." 

The  Act  of  April  8th  {36  Stat.  L.,  p.  293)  amended  that  of  August 
19,  1899,  relative  to  the  establishment  of  a  National  Military  Park  at 
the  battlefield  of  Chickamauga. 

The  Act  of  April  15th  {36  Stat.  L.,  p.  311)  provided  for  the  erection 
of  a  monument  at  Fort  Recovery,  Ohio,  in  memory  of  the  officers  and 
men  killed  by  the  Indians  in  1791  and  1794. 

The  Act  of  April  19th  {36  Stat.  I/.,  p.  312)  made  appropriations  for 
the  support  of  the  Military  Academy  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30, 
1911. 


702     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

The  Act  of  June  23rd  {36  Stat.  L.,  p.  596)  made  appropriations  for 
fortifications  and  other  works  of  defense. 

The  Act  of  June  25th  {36  Stat.  L.,  p.  703)  made  appropriations  for 
sundry  civil  expenses  and  allotted  $43,000  to  the  Chickamauga  and 
Chattanooga  National  Park    (p.  724). 

The  Deficiency  Appropriation  Bill,  approved  June  25,  1910,  also  made 
certain  allotments  for  the  War  Department   (p.  788). 

204.  36  United  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  234. 

205.  This  article  of  war  No.  123  related  to  limited  service  rank. 

206.  36  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  323. 

This  same  act  also  directed  the  Superintendent  of  the  Military 
Academy  to  make  appropriate  regulations  for  the  punishment  of  hazing, 
and  specified  that  no  cadet  dismissed  for  hazing  could  be  appointed 
"  as  a  commissioned  officer  in  the  Army  or  Navy  or  Marine  Corps  until 
two  years  after  the  graduation  of  the  class  of  which  he  was  a  mem- 
ber."— Ibid.,  pp.  323-324. 

207.  Ibid.,  p.  329. 

208.  Ibid.,  p.  347. 

209.  Ibid.,  p.  580. 

210.  36  United  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  721. 

211.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1910,  pp.  7-10,  15,  21-23. 

212.  Ibid.,  pp.  18,  26-29. 

213.  Ibid.,  pp.  30-32. 

214.  Ibid.,  pp.  32-35. 

215.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1910,  pp.  48-49. 

216.  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

217.  Ibid.,  pp.  50-51. 

218.  Ibid.,  p.  37. 

219.  The  Army  Remount  Problem,  by  George  M.  Rommel,  Chief  of 
the  Animal  Husbandry  Division,  p.  119.  This  valuable  pamphlet  was 
reprinted  from  the  27th  annual  report  of  the  Bureau  of  Animal  In- 
dustry, 1910,  and  issued  by  the  Department  of  Agriculture  on  December 
15,   1911,  as  Circular  No  186  of  that  bureau. 

220.  Department  of  Agriculture,  Bureau  of  Animal  Industry,  Circular 
No.   178    (issued  April   19,   1911),  p.   13. 

221.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1910,  pp.  23-26,  30-35,  51-52. 

222.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

223.  Ibid.,  pp.   52-53. 

224.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

225.  The  Russian  Army  and  the  Japanese  War,  by  General  Kuropatkin 
—  translated  by  Captain  A.  B.  Lindsay  and  edited  by  Major  E.  D. 
Swinton,  D.  S.  O.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  149-150. 

226.  During  September,  October  and  November,   1914. 

227.  36  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  894. 

228.  The  Act  of  February  13,  1911  {36  Stat.  L.,  p.  898),  amended 
Section  183  of  the  Revised  Statutes  so  as  to  permit  officials  or  clerks 
of  any  department,  officers  of  the  Army,  Navy,  Marine  and  Revenue- 
Cutter  Service,  and  the  recorder  or  president  of  boards  composed  of 
such  officers,  when  detailed  to  investigate  frauds  against  the  Govern- 
ment, irregularity  or  misconduct,  to  administer  oaths  to  witnesses  in 
such  investigations. 


Notes  703 

The  Act  of  February  15,  1911  {S6  Stat.  L.,  p.  906),  directed  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  to  transfer  the  military  reservation  at  Fort  Trumbull,  New 
London,  Conn,,  to  the  Treasury  Department. 

229.  36  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  957. 

230.  Ihid.,  p.  963. 

231.  "  That  hereafter  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  acting  first 
sergeant  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  detachment  of  engi- 
neers shall  be  the  same  as  the  pay  and  allowances  of  a  first  sergeant 
of  a  company  of  engineers :  And  provided  further,  That  when  an  acting 
first  sergeant  of  the  detachment  of  engineers  may  hereafter  be  retired, 
his  retired  pay  and  allowances  shall  be  the  same  as  the  pay  and  allow- 
ances of  a  retired  first  sergeant  of  a  company  of  engineers." —  36  Stat. 
L.,  p.  1019. 

232.  36  Statutes  at  Large,  p.   1041. 

233.  "  Porvided  [sic],  That  hereafter  so  much  of  section  twenty  of 
the  Act  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  as  pro- 
vides that  veterinarians  shall  receive  the  pay  and  allowances  of  second 
lieutenants,  mounted,  shall  be  interpreted  to  authorize  their  retirement 
under  the  laws  governing  the  retirement  of  second  lieutenants." —  36 
Stat.  L.,  p.  1042. 

234.  36  Stat.  L.,  p.  1045. 

235.  lUd.,   p.  1049. 

236.  lUd.,   p.  1054. 

237.  Ibid.,  p.  1058. 

238.  36  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  1084. 

239.  36  Stat.  L.,  p.  1240. 

240.  Ihid.,  pp.  1170,  1289  and  1341. 

241.  Ihid.,   p.  1348. 

242.  Ihid.,   p.  1451. 

243.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  the  War  Department  Annual 
Reports  for  1911,  pp.  7-9. 

244.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1911,  pp.  12-13;  Report  of 
The  Adjutant-General,  October  25,  1911,  in  the  War  Department  Annual 
Reports  for  1911,  p.  239. 

245.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  December  2,  1911,  in  the  War  De- 
partment Annual  Reports  for   1911,  p.   156. 

246.  Report  of  The  Adjutant-General  for  1911,  pp.  239-242. 

247.  Ihid.,  p.  242. 

248.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  for  1911,  pp.  156-157. 

249.  An  extremely  interesting  article  entitled  "Some  Lessons  of  the 
Concentration  "  will  be  found  in  the  Infantry  Journal  for  May-June, 
1911,  pp.  932-936. 

250.  Infantry  Journal   for  May- June,   1911,   pp.   918-919. 

251.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1911,  pp.  24-25,  32-33. 

252.  Equipment  requisite  for  Army  in  time  of  War.  Senate  Docu- 
ment No.  718,  63d  Congress,  third  session,  p.  3. 

253.  General  Orders,  War  Department,  1911,  index  p.  38. 

254.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1911,  p.  16. 

255.  Ihid.,   pp.   16-20,   28-29,  30-31. 

256.  Ihid.,  pp.  8-9,  13-15,  20-24,  26-29,  31-32. 

257.  Ihid.,  pp.  25-26,  61-69. 


704     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

258.  On  May  25,  1911,  Colonel  du  Pont  introduced  in  the  Senate  "A 
Bill  To  provide  for  raising  the  volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States  in 
time  of  actual  or  threatened  war"  (Senate  No.  2518,  62d  Congress, 
first  session ) ,  which  was  referred  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  ]Military 
Affairs. 

On  July  6,  1911,  Colonel  du  Pont,  as  Chairman  of  that  committee, 
reported  the  bill  back  to  the  Senate  favorably  with  amendments. 

On  August  25,  1911,  upon  motion  of  Senator  du  Pont,  the  bill  was 
re-committed  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs. 

259.  The  Act  of  March  4,  1912,  provided  "  That  the  superintendent 
and  members  of  the  Female  Nurse  Corps  when  serving  in  Alaska  or  at 
places  without  the  limits  of  the  United  States  may  be  allowed  the 
same  privileges  in  regard  to  cumulative  leaves  of  absence  and  method 
of  computation  of  same  as  are  now  allowed  to  Army  officers  so  serving." 
—  37  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  72. 

The  Act  of  April  3,  1912,  appropriated  $300,000  to  maintain  and  pro- 
tect, under  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  levees  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi River  against  impending  floods. —  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  78. 

The  Act  of  April  18,  1912,  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  to  donate 
three  pieces  of  ordnance  to  the  city  of  Jackson,  Miss. —  J7  Stat.  L.,  p. 
86. 

The  Act  of  April  24,  1912,  provided  "That  whenever  in  time  of  war, 
or  when  war  is  imminent,  the  President  may  deem  the  cooperation  and 
use  of  the  American  Red  Cross  with  the  sanitary  services  of  tlie  land 
and  naval  forces  to  be  necessary,  he  is  authorized  to  accept  the  assist- 
ance tendered  by  the  said  Red  Cross  and  to  employ  the  same  under  the 
sanitary  services  of  the  Army  and  Navy  in  conformity  with  such  rules 
and  regulations  as  he  may  prescribe. 

"  Sec.  2.  That  when  the  Red  Cross  cooperation  and  assistance  with 
the  land  and  naval  forces  in  time  of  war  or  threatened  hostilities  shall 
have  been  accepted  by  the  President,  the  personnel  entering  upon  the 
duty  specified  in  section  one  of  this  Act  shall,  Avhile  proceeding  to 
their  place  of  duty,  while  serving  thereat,  and  while  returning  there- 
from, be  transported  and  subsisted  at  the  cost  and  charge  of  the 
United  States  as  civilian  employees  employed  with  the  said  forces,  and 
the  Red  Cross  supplies  that  may  be  tendered  as  a  gift  and  accepted  for 
use  in  the  sanitary  service  shall  be  transported  at  the  cost  and  charge 
of  the  United  States."— ,97  Stat.  L.,  pp.  90-91. 

An  Act  of  June  6,  1912,  made  appropriations  for  fortifications  and 
other  works  of  defense. —  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  125. 

260.  An  Act  approved  July  17,  1912,  provided  "That  the  Secretary 
of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  offer  periodically  at  such  of  the  estab- 
lisliments  of  the  Ordnance  Department  as  he  may  select  a  cash  reward 
for  the  suggestion,  or  series  of  suggestions,  for  an  improvement  of 
economy  in  manufacturing  processes  or  plant,  submitted  within  the 
period  by  one  or  more  employees  of  the  establishment  which  shall  be 
deemed  the  most  valuable  of  those  submitted  and  adopted  for  use: 
Provided,  That  to  obtain  this  reward  the  winning  suggestion  must  be 
one  that  will  clearly  effect  a  material  economy  in  production  or  increase 
efficiency  or  enhance  the  quality  of  the  product  in  comparison  with  its 
cost  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  Secretary  shall  be  so  worthy  as  to  entitle 
the  employee  making  the  same  to  receive  the  reward:     Provided  further, 


} 


Notes  705 

That  the  sums  awarded  to  employees  in  accordance  with  this  Act  shall 
be  paid  them  in  addition  to  their  visual  compensation  and  shall  consti- 
tute part  of  the  general  or  shop  expense  of  the  establishment:  Pro- 
vided further,  That  the  total  amount  paid  under  the  provisions  of  this 
Act  shall  not  exceed  one  thousand  dollars  for  any  one  month:  And 
provided  further,  That  no  employee  shall  be  paid  a  reward  under  this 
Act  until  he  has  properly  executed  an  agreement  to  the  effect  that  the 
use  by  the  United  States  of  the  suggestion,  or  series  of  suggestions, 
made  by  him  shall  not  form  the  basis  of  a  further  claim  of  any  nature 
upon  the  United  States  by  him,  his  heirs,  or  assigns,  and  that  applica- 
tion for  patent  has  not  been  made  for  the  invention." — 37  Stat.  L.,  p. 
193. 

261.  The  Act  of  August  9,  1912,  provided  that  enlisted  men  of  the 
engineer  detachment  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy  should  have  the 
same  pay  and  allowances  as  those  in  "  corresponding  grades  in  the  bat- 
talions of  engineers"  {31  Stat.  L.,  p.  254);  and  "That  any  officer  of 
the  United  States  Army  now  holding  the  position  of  permanent  professor 
at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  who  on  July  first,  nineteen  hun- 
dred and  fourteen,  should  have  served  not  less  than  thirty-three  years 
in  the  Army,  one-third  of  which  service  shall  have  been  as  professor 
and  instructor  at  the  Military  Academy,  shall  on  that  date  have  the 
rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  a  colonel  in  the  Army." —  37  Stat.  L.,  p. 
264. 

262.  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  274. 

263.  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  311. 

264.  An  Act  approved  on  August  22,  1912  (37  Stat.  L.,  p.  356),  pro- 
vided 

"  That  section  nineteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  amended  to 
read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec.  1998.  That  every  person  who  hereafter  deserts  the  military 
or  naval  service  of  the  United  States,  or  who,  being  duly  enrolled,  de- 
parts the  jurisdiction  of  the  district  in  which  he  is  enrolled,  or  goes 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  with  intent  to  avoid  any  draft 
into  the  military  or  naval  service,  lawfully  ordered,  shall  be  liable  to 
all  the  penalties  and  forfeitures  of  section  nineteen  hundred  and  ninety- 
six  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States:  Provided,  That  the 
provisions  of  this  section  and  said  section  nineteen  hundred  and 
ninety-six  shall  not  apply  to  any  person  hereafter  deserting  the  mili- 
tary or  naval  service  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace:  And  pro- 
vided further,  That  the  loss  of  rights  of  citizenship  heretofore  imposed 
by  law  upon  deserters  from  the  military  or  naval  service  may  be  miti- 
gated or  remitted  by  the  President  where  the  offense  was  committed 
in  time  of  peace  and  where  the  exercise  of  such  clemency  will  not  be> 
prejudicial  to  the  public  interests:  And  provided  further,  That  the 
provisions  of  section  eleven  hundred  and  eighteen  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  the  United  States  that  no  deserter  from  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  enlisted  or  mustered  into  the  military  service, 
and  the  provisions  of  section  two  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved 
August  first,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninet3^-four,  entitled  '  An  Act  to 
regulate  enlistments  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States,'  shall  not  be 
construed   to   preclude  the  reenlistment   or   muster   into   the   Army   of 


706     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

any  person  who  has  deserted,  or  may  hereafter  desert,  from  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace,  or  of  any  soldier  whose 
service  during  his  last  preceding  term  of  enlistment  has  not  been 
honest  and  faithful,  whenever  the  reenlistment  or  muster  into  the  mili- 
tary service  of  such  person  or  soldier  shall,  in  view  of  the  good  con- 
duct of  such  person  or  soldier  subsequent  to  such  desertion  or  service,  be 
authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War.' 

"  '  Sec.  2.  That  section  fourteen  hundred  and  twenty  of  the  Revised 
Statutes,  as  amended  by  the  Acts  of  Congress  approved  May  twelfth, 
eighteen  hundred  and  seventy-nine,  and  February  twenty-third,  eighteen 
hundred  and  eighty-one,  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  amended  to  read 
as    follows : 

"  '  Sec.  1420.  No  minor  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  no  insane 
or  intoxicated  person,  and  no  person  who  has  deserted  in  time  of  war 
from  the  naval  or  military  service  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  en- 
listed in  the  naval  service.' 

"  That  section  sixteen  hundred  and  twenty-four,  article  nineteen  of 
the  Revised  Statutes,  as  amended  by  the  Act  of  Congress  approved 
May  twelfth,  eighteen  hundred  and  seventy-nine,  be,  and  the  same  is 
hereby,  amended  to  read  as  follows: 

"  '  Sec,  1624.  Article  19.  Any  officer  who  knowingly  enlists  into  the 
naval  service  any  person  who  has  deserted  in  time  of  war  from  the 
naval  or  military  service  of  the  United  States,  or  any  insane  or  in- 
toxicated person,  or  any  minor  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and  eighteen 
years,  without  the  consent  of  his  parents  or  guardian,  or  any  minor 
under  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  shall  be  punished  as  a  court-martial 
may  direct.'  " 

265.  37   Statutes  at  Large,  p.  486. 

266.  Ibid.,  p.  508. 

267.  Ihid.,    p.    569. 

268.  Ihid.,  p.  571. 

269.  37    Statutes   at   Large,   pp.   571-572. 

270.  Ibid.,    p.    572. 

271.  "That  so  much  of  section  twelve  hundred  and  sixty-one  of  the 
Revised  Statutes  as  pertains  to  additional  pay  for  acting  commissaries 
be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  repealed." —  37  i^tat.  L.,  p.  574. 

"  That  hereafter  the  provisions  of  section  five  of  the  Act  of  June 
thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  six  (Thirty-four  Statutes,  page  seven 
hundred  and  sixty-three),  shall  not  be  construed  to  apply  to  the  Sub- 
sistence Department." —  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  579. 

272.  37  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  575,  581,  582,  586  and  588. 

273.  37    United   States   Statutes    at   Large,   pp.    590-594. 

274.  "  An  Act  Making  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the  Army 
for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  thir- 
teen, and  for  other  purposes,"  approved  August  24,  1912. 

"  Sec,  2.  That,  for  the  purpose  of  utilizing  as  an  auxiliary  to 
the  Army  Reserve  hereinafter  provided  for  the  services  of  men  who 
have  had  experience  and  training  in  the  Regular  Army,  in  time  of  war 
or  when  war  is  imminent,  and  after  the  President  shall,  by  proclama- 
tion, have  called  upon  honorably  discharged  soldiers  of  the  Regular 
Army  to  present  themselves  for  reenlistment  therein  within  a  specified 
period,   subject  to  such  conditions  as  may  be  prescribed  in   said  proc- 


Notes  707 

lamation,  any  person  who  shall  have  been  discharged  honorably  from 
said  Army,  with  character  reported  as  at  least  good,  and  who  having 
been  found  physically  qualified  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  if  not  over 
fortj^-five  years  of  age,  shall  reenlist  in  the  line  of  said  Army  or  in 
the  Signal  or  Hospital  Corps  thereof  within  the  period  that  shall  be 
specified  in  said  proclamation,  shall  receive  on  so  reenlisting  a  bounty 
which  shall  be  computed  at  the  rate  of  eight  dollars  for  each  month 
for  the  first  year  of  the  period  that  shall  have  elapsed  since  his  last 
discharge  from  the  Regular  Army  and  the  date  of  his  reenlistment 
therein  under  the  terms  of  said  proclamation ;  at  the  rate  of  six  dol- 
lars per  month  for  the  second  year  of  such  period;  at  the  rate  of  four 
dollars  per  month  for  the  third  year  of  such  period;  and  at  the  rate  of 
two  dollars  per  month  for  any  subsequent  year  o/  such  period,  but  no 
bounty  in  excess  of  three  hundred  dollars  shall  be  paid  to  any  person 
under   the  terms  of  this   Act. 

"  And  that  on  and  after  November  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  twelve, 
all  enlistments  in  the  Regular  Army  shall  be  for  the  term  of  seven 
years,  the  first  four  years  in  the  service  with  the  organizations  of 
which  those  enlisting  shall  form  a  part,  and,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided herein,  the  last  three  years  on  furlough  and  attached  to  the 
Army  Reserve  hereinafter  provided  for:  Provided,  That  at  the  ex- 
piration of  four  years'  continuous  service  with  such  organizations,  either 
under  a  first  or  any  subsequent  enlistment,  any  soldier  may  be  reenlisted 
for  another  period  of  seven  years,  as  above  provided  for,  in  which 
event  he  shall  receive  his  final  discharge  from  his  prior  enlistment: 
Provided  further,  That  any  enlisted  men,  at  the  expiration  of  three 
years'  continuous  service  with  such  organizations,  either  under  a  first 
or  any  subsequent  enlistment,  upon  his  written  application,  may  be 
furloughed  and  transferred  to  the  Army  Reserve,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  event  he  shall  not  be  entitled  to 
reenlist  in  the  service  until  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  seven  years: 
Provided  further,  That  for  all  enlistments  hereafter  accomplished  under 
the  provisions  of  this  Act,  four  years  shall  be  counted  as  an  enlistment 
period  in  computing  continuous-service  pay :  Provided  further.  That 
hereafter  the  Army  Reserve  shall  consist  of  all  enlisted  men  who,  after 
having  served  not  less  than  four  years  with  the  organizations  of  which 
they  form  a  part,  shall  receive  furloughs  without  pay  or  allowances 
until  the  expiration  of  their  terms  of  enlistment,  together  with  trans- 
portation in  kind  and  subsistence  as  provided  for  by  this  Act  in  the 
case  of  discharged  soldiers,  but  when  any  soldier  is  furloughed  to  the 
Reserve  his  accounts  shall  be  closed  and  he  shall  be  paid  in  full  to  the 
date  such  furlough  becomes  effective:  Provided  further.  That  any  en- 
listed man,  subject  to  good  conduct  and  physical  fitness  for  duty,  upon 
his  written  application  to  that  effect,  shall  have  the  right  of  remain- 
ing with  the  organization  to  which  he  belongs  until  the  completion  of 
his  whole  enlistment,  without  passing  into  the  Reserve:  Provided 
further,  That  except  upon  reenlistment  after  four  years'  service  or  as 
now  otherwise  provided  for  by  law,  no  enlisted  man  shall  receive  a 
final  discharge  until  the  expiration  of  his  seven-year  term  of  enlistment, 
including  his  term  of  service  in  the  Army  Reserve,  but  any  such  enlisted 
man  may  be  reenlisted  for  a  further  term  of  seven  years  under  the  same 
conditions  in  the  Army  at  large,  or,  in  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary 


708     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

of  War,  for  a  term  of  three  years  in  the  Army  Reserve;  and  any  person 
who  may  have  been  discharged  honorably  from  the  Regular  Army,  with 
character  reported  as  at  least  good,  and  who  has  been  found  physically 
qualified  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  if  not  over  forty-five  years  of  age, 
may  be  enlisted  in  the  Army  Reserve  for  a  similar  term  of  three  years: 
And  provided  further,  That  in  the  event  of  actual  or  threatened  hos- 
tilities the  President,  when  so  authorized  by  Congress,  may  summon  all 
furloughed  soldiers  who  belong  to  the  Army  Reserve  to  rejoin  their 
respective  organizations,  and  during  the  continuance  of  their  service 
with  such  organizations  they  shall  receive  the  pay  and  allowances 
authorized  by  law  for  soldiers  serving  therein,  and  any  enlisted  man 
who,  shall  have  reenlisted  in  the  Army  Reserve  shall  receive  during 
such  service  the  additional  pay  now  provided  by  law  for  the  soldiers 
of  his  arm  of  the  service  in  their  second  enlistment  period.  Upon 
reporting  for  duty,  and  being  found  physically  fit  for  service,  they 
shall  receive  a  sum  equal  to  five  dollars  per  month  for  each  month 
during  which  they  shall  have  belonged  to  the  Reserve,  as  well  as  the 
actual  cost  of  transportation  and  subsistence  from  their  homes  to  the 
places  at  which  they  may  be  ordered  to  report  for  duty  under  such  sum- 
mons. 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  office  establishments  of  the  Quartermaster  Gen- 
eral, the  Commissary  General,  and  the  Paymaster  General  of  the  Army 
are  hereby  consolidated  and  shall  hereafter  constitute  a  single  bureau 
of  the  War  Department,  which  shall  be  known  as  the  Quartermaster 
Corps,  and  of  which  the  Chief  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  created  by 
this  Act  shall  be  the  head.  The  Quartermaster's,  Subsistence,  and  Pay 
Departments  of  the  Army  are  hereby  consolidated  into  and  shall  here- 
after be  known  as  the  Quartermaster  Corps  of  the  Army.  The  officers 
of  said  departments  shall  hereafter  be  known  as  officers  of  said  corps  and 
by  the  titles  of  the  rank  held  by  them  therein,  and,  except  as  herein- 
after specifically  provided  to  the  contrary,  the  provisions  of  sections 
twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  of  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  February 
second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  entitled  "  An  Act  to  increase  the 
efficiency  of  the  permanent  military  establishment  of  the  United  States," 
are  hereby  extended  so  as  to  apply  to  the  Quartermaster  Corps  in  the 
manner  and  to  the  extent  to  which  they  now  apply  to  the  Quarter- 
master's, Subsistence,  and  Pay  Departments,  and  the  provision  of  said 
sections  of  said  Act  relative  to  chiefs  of  staff  corps  and  departments 
shall,  so  far  as  they  are  applicable,  apply  to  all  offices  and  officers  of 
the  Quartermaster  Corps  with  rank  above  that  of  colonel.  The  officers 
now  holding  commissions  as  officers  of  the  said  departments  shall  here- 
after have  the  same  tenure  of  commission  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps, 
and  as  officers  of  said  corps  shall  have  rank  of  the  same  grades  and 
dates  as  that  now  held  by  them,  and,  for  the  purpose  of  filling  vacancies 
among  them,  shall  constitute  one  list,  on  which  they  shall  be  arranged 
according  to  rank.  So  long  as  any  officers  shall  remain  on  said  list 
any  vacancy  occurring  therein  shall  be  filled,  if  possible,  from  among 
such  officers,  by  selection  if  the  vacaney  occurs  in  a  grade  above  that 
of  colonel,  and,  if  the  vacancy  occurs  in  a  grade  not  above  that  of 
colonel,  by  the  promotion  of  an  officer  who  would  have  been  entitled  to 
promotion  to  that  particular  vacancy  if  the  consolidation  of  depart- 
ments hereby  prescribed  had  never   occurred:     Provided,  That  on   and 


1 


Notes  709 

after  the  first  day  of  January,  nineteen  hundred  and  seventeen,  any 
vacancies  occurring  among  officers  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  with  rank 
above  that  of  colonel  may,  in  the  discretion  of  the  President,  be  filled 
by  selection  from  among  officers  who  shall  have  served  by  detail  in 
said  corps  for  not  less  than  four  years:  Provided  further,  That  not 
to  exceed  six  officers  holding  commissions  with  the  rank  of  captain  in 
the  Quartermaster  Corps  and  who  have  lost  in  relative  rank  through 
irregularities  of  promotion  and  the  operation  of  separate  promotion 
within  the  three  departments  hereby  consolidated,  may,  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  President  and  subject  to  examination  for  promotion  as  pre- 
scribed by  law,  be  advanced  to  the  grade  of  major  in  the  Quartermaster 
Corps,  and  any  officer  who  shall  be  advanced  to  said  grade  under  the 
terms  of  this  proviso  shall  be  temporarily  an  additional  officer  of  said 
grade  but  only  until  a  vacancy  shall  occur  for  him  on  the  list  of 
officers  of  said  grades  as  hereafter  limited;  and  no  officer  shall  be 
detailed  to  fill  any  vacancy  on  the  list  of  majors  of  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  until  after  all  additional  officers  authorized  by  the  proviso  shall 
have  been  absorbed.  The  noncommissioned  officers  now  known  as  post 
quartermaster  sergeants  and  post  commissary  sergeants  shall  hereafter 
be  known  as  quartermaster  sergeants;  the  Army  paymaster's  clerks 
shall  be  known  as  pay  clerks,  and  each  of  said  noncommissioned  officers 
and  pay  clerks  shall  continue  to  have  the  pay,  allowances,  rights,  and 
privileges  now  allowed  him  by  law:  Provided  further,  That  no  details 
to  fill  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  colonel  in  the  Quartermaster's  Corps 
shall  be  made  until  the  number  of  officers  of  that  grade  shall  have 
been  reduced  by  three,  and  thereafter  the  number  of  officers  in  that 
grade  shall  not  exceed  twelve;  and  no  details  to  fill  vacancies  in  the 
grade  of  lieutenant-colonel  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps  shall  be  made 
until  the  number  of  officers  of  that  grade  shall  have  been  reduced  by 
three,  and  thereafter  the  number  of  officers  of  that  grade  shall  not 
exceed  eighteen;  and  no  details  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  major 
in  the  Quartermaster  Corps  shall  be  made  until  the  number  of  officers 
of  that  grade  shall  have  been  reduced  by  nine,  and  thereafter  the 
number  of  officers  in  said  grade  shall  not  exceed  forty-eight;  and  no 
details  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  captain  in  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  shall  be  made  until  after  the  number  of  officers  of  that  grade 
shall  be  reduced  by  twenty-nine,  and  thereafter  the  number  of  officers 
of  said  grade  shall  not  exceed  one  hundred  and  two;  and  whenever  the 
separation  of  a  line  officer  of  any  grade  and  arm  from  the  Quartermas- 
ter Corps  shall  create  therein  a  vacancy  that,  under  the  terms  of  this 
proviso,  can  not  be  filfed  by  detail  such  separation  shall  operate  to 
make  a  permanent  reduction  of  one  in  the  total  number  of  officers  of 
said  grade  and  arm  in  the  line  of  the  Army  as  soon  as  such  reduction 
can  be  made  without  depriving  any  officer  of  his  commission:  Provided 
further,  That  whenever  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  decide  that  it  is 
necessary  and  practicable,  regimental,  battalion,  and  squadron  quarter- 
masters and  commissaries  shall  be  required  to  perform  any  duties  that 
junior  officers  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  may  properly  be  required  to- 
perform,  and  regimental  and  battalion  quartermaster  and  commissary 
sergeants  shall  be  required  to  perform  any  duties  that  noncommissioned 
officers  or  pay  clerks  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  may  properly  be  re- 
quired to  perform,  but  such  regimental,  battalion  and  squadron  quarter- 


710     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

masters  and  commissaries  shall  not  be  required  to  receipt  for  any  money 
or  property  which  does  not  pertain  to  their  respective  regiments,  bat- 
talions, or  squadrons,  and  they  shall  not  be  separated  from  the  organi- 
zation to  which  they  belong:  Provided  further,  That  such  duty  or 
duties  as  are  now  required  by  law  to  be  performed  by  any  officer  or 
officers  of  the  Quartermaster's,  Subsistence,  or  Pay  Departments  shall 
hereafter  be  performed  by  such  officer  or  officers  of  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  designate  for  the  purpose:  Pro- 
vided further,  That  there  shall  be  a  Chief  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps, 
who  shall  have  the  rank  of  major  general  while  so  serving,  and  who 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  from  among  the  officers  of  said  corps  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  section  twenty-six  of  the  Act  of 
Congress  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  herein- 
before cited:  Provided  further.  That  when  the  first  vacancy  in  the 
grade  of  brigadier  general  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  except  a 
vacancy  caused  by  the  expiration  of  a  limited  term  of  appointment, 
shall  hereafter  occur  that  vacancy  shall  not  be  filled,  but  the  office 
in  which  the  vacancy  occurs  shall  immediately  cease  and  determine: 
Provided  further,  That  the  Quartermaster  Corps  shall  be  subject  to 
the  supervision  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  extent  the  departments 
hereby  consolidated  into  said  corps  have  heretofore  been  subject  to 
such  supervision  under  the  terms  of  the  existing  law:  And  provided 
further,  That  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the  provisions  of 
this  section  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  the  Chief  of  the  Quartermaster 
Corps  herein  provided  for  immediately  upon  the  passage  of  this  Act,  and 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  said  chief,  under  the  direction  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  put  into  effect  the  provisions 
of  this  section  not  less  than  sixty  days  after  the  passage  of  this  Act. 
"  Sec.  4.  That  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  creation  of  a  Quar- 
termaster Corps  in  the  Army  not  to  exceed  four  thousand  civilian  em- 
ployees of  that  corps,  receiving  a  monthly  compensation  of  not  less 
than  thirty  dollars  nor  more  than  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  dollars 
each,  not  including  civil  engineers,  superintendents  of  construction, 
inspectors  of  clothing,  clothing  examiners,  inspectors  of  supplies,  in- 
spectors of  animals,  chemists,  veterinarians,  freight  and  passenger 
rate  clerks,  civil  service  employees,  and  employees  of  the  classified 
service,  employees  of  the  Army  transport  service  and  harbor-boat 
service,  and  such  other  employees  as  may  be  required  for  technical 
work,  shall  be  replaced  permanently  by  not  to  exceed  an  equal  number 
of  enlisted  men  of  said  corps,  and  all  enlisted  men  of  the  line  of  the 
Army  detailed  on  extra  duty  in  the  Quartermaster  Corps  or  as  bakers 
or  assistant  bakers  shall  be  replaced  permanently  by  not  to  exceed 
two  thousand  enlisted  men  of  said  corps;  and  for  the  purposes  of 
this  Act  the  enlistment  in  the  military  service  of  not  to  exceed  six 
thousand  men,  who  shall  be  attached  permanently  to  the  Quarter- 
master Corps  and  who  shall  not  be  counted  as  a  part  of  the  enlisted 
force  provided  by  law,  is  hereby  authorized:  Provided,  That  the  en- 
listed force  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps  shall  consist  of  not  to  exceed 
fifteen  master  electricians,  six  hundred  sergeants  (first  class),  one 
thousand    and    five    sergeants,    six    hundred    and    fifty    corporals,    two 


Notes  711 

thousand  five  hundred  privates  (first  class),  one  thousand  one  hundred 
and  ninety  privates,  and  forty-five  cooks,  all  of  whom  shall  receive 
the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades 
in  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  and  shall  be  assigned  to  such  duties 
pertaining  to  the  Quartermaster  Corps  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may 
prescribe:  Provided  further,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  may  fix  the 
limits  of  age  within  which  civilian  employees  who  are  actually  em- 
ployed by  the  Government  when  this  Act  takes  effect  and  who  are 
to  be  replaced  by  enlisted  men  under  the  terms  of  this  Act  may  enlist 
in  the  Quartermaster  Corps:  Provided  further,  That  nothing  in  this 
section  shall  be  held  or  construed  so  as  to  prevent  the  employment  of 
the  class  of  civilian  employees  excepted  from  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
or  continued  employment  of  civilians  included  in  the  Act  until  such 
latter  employees  have  been  replaced  by  enlisted  men  of  the  Quarter- 
master   Corps." 

275.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1912,  pp.   16-17. 

276.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  W^ar  for   1914,  p.  8. 

277.  37  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  594. 

278.  Ihid.,  p.   594. 

279.  Ihid.,  pp.  630  and  639. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  40,  approved  August  9,  1912,  directed  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  investigate  the  claims  of  Americans  for  damages 
suffered  within  American  territory  and  growing  out  of  the  late  in- 
surrection in  Mexico. 

Joint  Resolution  No.  52,  approved  August  24,  1912,  authorized  the 
erection  of  a  joint  memorial  to  Major  Archibald  W.  Butt,  U.  S.  A., 
aide-de-camp  to  President  Taft,  and  Mr.  Francis  D.  Millet,  both 
of  whom  were  lost  in  the  sinking  of  the  Titanic. —  SI  Stat.  L.,  pp.  641 
and   644. 

280.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1912,  pp.  3-5. 

281.  Ibid.,  pp.  7-!8. 

282.  In  accordance  with  War  Department  General  Orders  No.  17, 
dated  May  31,  1912. —  General  Orders  and  Bulletins,  War  Department, 
1912.     See   index  p.   44. 

283.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1912,  pp.  8-9. 

284.  Ibid.,  pp.  9-10. 

285.  Ibid.,  pp.  22-23. 

286.  Ibid.,   pp.    10,    12-15. 

287.  Ibid.,   pp.   24-26. 

288.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1912,  p.  11. 

289.  Ibid.,  pp.  11-12. 

290.  Report  on  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces  of  the  United 
States,  pp.  62-63;  and  ibid.,  in  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1912,  pp.   122-123. 

291.  Such  a  bill  (Senate  No.  2518,  62nd  Congress,  first  session)  had 
been  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  Colonel  du  Pont,  Chairman  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs,  on  May  25,  1911  (see  footnote  258,  p.  704). 
On  July  16,  1912,  it  was  again  favorably  reported  to  the  Senate  with 
further  amendments  by  that  committee,  went  to  the  Senate  calendar 
and  was  debated  on  various  occasions.  Owing  to  the  persistent  oppo- 
sition of  the  late  Senator  Bacon  of  Georgia,  it  failed  to  pass  the 
Senate  and  died  a  natural  death  with  the  close  of  the  62nd  Congress. 


712     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

It  was,  however,  re-introduced  in  the  Senate  on  April  9,  1913,  by  Colonel    ' 
du  Pont  as  Senate  bill  No.  542,  63rd  Congress,  first  session. 

292.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1912,  pp.  15,  20-25. 

293.  The  first  officers  of  the  Washington  Branch  of  the  National 
Cavalry  and  Artillery  Remount  Association  of  the  United  States  were: 
President,  Lieutenant  General  S.  B.  M.  Young,  retired;  Treasurer, 
Colonel  Alexander  Rodgers,  retired;  Secretary,  Mr.  Frederic  L.  Huide- 
koper. 

294.  The  patrol  judges,  who  accompanied  the  contestants  in  the 
first  "  Service  Test,"  were  Hon.  Henry  L.  Stimson,  Secretary  of  War ; 
Captain  John  R.  Lindsey;  Mr.  Redmond  Stewart,  M.  F.  H.  of  the 
Green  Spring  Valley  Hunt;  and  Mr.  Frederic  L.  Huidekoper. 

295.  General  Orders  and  Bulletins,  War  Department,   1912. 

296.  Report  of  the  President  of  the  Washington  Branch  of  the  Na- 
tional Cavalry  and  Artillery  Remount  Association  of  the  United  States, 
dated  January  23,   1913,  pp.  2-3. 

297.  37  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  p.  671. 

298.  Ibid.,  p.  704. 

299.  37  Stat.  L.,  pp.  704-706,  708,  710-711,  714-715,  717,  720-723. 

300.  The  concluding  part  of  Army  Appropriation  Act  approved  March 
2,  1913,  provided  {37  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  721-723) 
that 

"  On  and  after  July  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  thirteen,  courts-mar- 
tial shall  be  of  three  kinds,  namely:  First,  general  courts-martial; 
second,   special  courts-martial;    and  third,   summary  courts-martial. 

"  General  courts-martial  may  consist  of  any  number  of  officers  from 
five  to  thirteen,   inclusive. 

"  Special  courts-martial  may  consist  of  any  number  of  officers  from 
three  to  five,  inclusive. 

"  A  summary  court-martial  shall  consist  of  one  officer. 

"  The  President  of  the  United  States,  the  commanding  officer  of  a 
territorial  division  or  department,  the  Superintendent  of  the  Military 
Academy,  the  commanding  officer  of  an  army,  a  field  army,  an  army 
corps,  a  division,  or  a  separate  brigade,  and  when  empowered  by  the 
President,  the  commanding  officer  of  any  district  or  of  any  force  or 
body  of  troops,  may  appoint  general  courts-martial  whenever  neces- 
sary; but  when  any  such  commander  is  the  accuser  or  the  prosecutor 
of  the  person  or  persons  to  be  tried  the  court  shall  be  appointed 
by  superior  competent  authority,  and  no  officer  shall  be  eligible  to  sit 
as  a  member  of  such  court  when  he  is  the  accuser,  or  a  witness  for 
the  prosecution. 

"  The  commanding  officer  of  a  district,  garrison,  fort,  camp  or  other 
place  where  troops  are  on  duty,  and  the  commanding  officer  of  a  brigade, 
regiment,  detached  battalion,  or  other  detached  command,  may  appoint 
special  courts-martial  for  his  command;  but  such  special  courts-martial 
may  in  any  case  be  appointed  by  superior  authority  when  by  the  latter 
deemed  desirable,  and  no  officer  shall  be  eligible  to  sit  as  a  member  of 
such  court  when  he  is  the  accuser  or  a  witness  for  the  prosecution. 

"  The  commanding  officer  of  a  district  garrison,  fort,  camp,  or  other 
place  where  troops  are  on  duty,  and  the  commanding  officer  of  a  brigade, 
regiment,  detached  battalion,  detached  company,  or  other  detachment 
may  appoint  summary  courts-martial  for  his  command;   but  such  sum- 


^ 


Notes  713 

mary  courts-martial  may  in  any  case  be  appointed  by  superior  au- 
thority when  by  the  latter  deemed  desirable:  Promded,  That  when  but 
one  officer  is  present  with  a  command  he  shall  be  the  summary  court- 
martial  of  that  command  and  shall  hear  and  determine  cases  brought 
before   him. 

"  General  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  try  any  person  subject 
to  military  law  for  any  crime  or  offense  made  punishable  by  the 
Articles  of  War  and  any  other  person  who  by  statute  or  by  the  law 
of  war  is  subject  to  trial  by  military  tribunals:  Provided,  That  no 
officer  shall  be  brought  to  trial  before  a  general  court-martial  appointed 
by  the  Superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy. 

"  Special  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  try  any  person  subject 
to  military  law,  except  an  officer,  for  any  crime  or  offense  not  capital 
made  punishable  by  the  Articles  of  War:  Provided,  That  the  President 
may  by  regulations,  which  he  may  modify  from  time  to  time,  except 
from  the  jurisdiction  of  special  courts-martial  any  class  or  classes  of 
persons  subject  to  military  law. 

"  Special  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  adjudge  punishment 
not  to  exceed  confinement  at  hard  labor  for  six  months  or  forfeiture  of 
six  months'  pay,  or  both,  and  in  addition  thereto  reduction  to  the 
ranks  in  the  cases  of  noncommissioned  officers,  and  reduction  in  classi- 
fication in  the  cases  of  first-class  privates. 

"  Summary  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  try  any  soldier,  except 
one  who  is  holding  the  privileges  of  a  certificate  of  eligibility  to  pro- 
motion, for  any  crime  or  offense  not  capital  made  punishable  by  the 
Articles  of  War :  Provided,  That  noncommissioned  officers  shall  not, 
if  they  object  thereto,  be  brought  to  trial  before  a  summary  court- 
martial  without  the  authority  of  the  officer  competent  to  bring  them 
to  trial  before  a  general  court-martial. 

"  Summary  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  adjudge  punishment 
not  to  exceed  confinement  at  hard  labor  for  three  months  or  forfeiture 
of  three  months'  pay,  or  both,  and  in  addition  thereto  reduction  to 
the  ranks  in  the  case  of  noncommissioned  officers  and  reduction  in 
classification  in  the  cases  of  first-class  privates:  Provided,  That  when 
the  summary  court  officer  is  also  the  commanding  officer  no  sentence 
of  such  summary  court-martial  adjudging  confinement  at  hard  labor 
or  forfeiture  of  pay,  or  both,  for  a  period  in  excess  of  one  month  shall 
be  carried  into  execution  until  the  same  shall  have  been  approved  by 
superior    authority. 

"  Articles  seventy-two,  seventy-three,  seventy-five,  eighty-one,  eighty- 
two,  and  eighty-three  of  section  thirteen  hundred  and  forty-two  of  the 
Revised  Statutes ;  the  first  section  of  an  Act  entitled  "  An  Act  to  pro- 
mote the  administration  of  justice  in  the  Army,"  approved  October 
first,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety,  as  amended  by  the  first  section  of 
an  Act  approved  June  eighteenth,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight 
(Thirtieth  Statutes,  four  hundred  and  eighty-three,  four  hundred  and 
eighty-four ) ,  ^re  hereby  repealed,  but  courts-martial  regularly  con- 
vened in  orders  issued  prior  to  the  date  when  this  Act  takes  effect  and 
in  existence  on  that  date,  under  Articles  of  War  hereby  repealed, 
may  continue  as  legal  courts  for  the  trial  of  cases  referred  to  them 
prior  to  that  date  with  the  same  effect  as  if  this  Act  has  not  been 
passed:     Provided,    That    prior    to    July    first,    nineteen    hundred    and 


714      Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

thirteen,  the  President  may,  when  deemed  by  him  necessary,  empower 
any  officer  competent  under  the  terms  of  this  Act  to  appoint  the 
general  courts-martial  which  it  authorizes,  to  appoint  general  courts- 
martial  authorized  by  existing  law." 

301.  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  723. 

Another  act  approved  on  March  2,  1913,  authorized  the  granting  of 
two  condemned  cannon  to  the  Wallkill  Valley  Cemetery  Association  of 
Orange  County,  N.  Y.—  37  Stat.  L.,  p.  725. 

302.  The  General  appropriation  act,  the  Agricultural  appropriation 
act,  the  Military  Academy  appropriation  act  and  an  act  authorizing 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  make  certain  donations  of  condemned  cannon 
and  cannon  balls,  all  approved  March  4,  1913. —  31  Stat.  L.,  pp.  739,  828, 
856  and   1009. 

303.  37  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  pp.  834  and  856. 

304.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America  passed  at  the  first 
session  of  the  Sixty-Third  Congress,   1913,   pp.  29,  74,  215-216. 

305.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  3-7. 

306.  Report  of  Major  General  William  H.  Carter,  commanding  the 
Second  Division,  dated  June  30,  1913,  in  the  War  Department  Annual 
Reports  for  1913,  Vol.  3,  pp.   115-116. 

307.  lUd.,  p.  116. 

308.  The  list  of  the  organizations  comprising  the  Second  Division  is 
given  in  ihid.,  p.   116. 

309.  Major  Evan  M.  Johnson,  Jr.,  in  the  Infantry  Journal  for  May- 
June,    1913,   p.   862. 

The  Infantry  Journal  for  July- August,  1913,  contained  several  in- 
teresting articles  devoted  to  the  2nd  division  on  the  Mexican  border. 

310.  General  Carter's  report,  pp.   119-120. 

311.  Report  of  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  for  1913,  p.  41. 

312.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  14-19. 

313.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  p.  27;  General  Orders 
and  Bulletins,  War  Department,  1913,  index  p.  29. 

314.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  for   1913,  pp.  54-55. 

315.  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  Office. 

316.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  for   1913,  p.  55. 

317.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  20-21. 

318.  /6id.,  pp.  25-26,  28. 

319.  General  Orders  and  Bulletins,  W^ar  Department,    1913. 

320.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  p.  8. 

321.  Ihid.,  p.  26. 

322.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  30-31;  Report  of 
the  Chief  of  Staff  for   1913,  pp.  30-31. 

323.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  31-32. 

324.  Bulletin  No.  18,  June  7,  1913,  p.  12.— General  Orders  and  Bulle- 
tins,  War  Department,  1913. 

325.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1913,  pp.  12-14,  20-24,  27, 
30-31. 

326.  On  January  23,  1913,  the  name  of  the  Washington  Branch  of 
the  National  Cavalry  and  Artillery  Remount  Association  of  the  United 
States  was  changed  to  The  Washington  Branch  of  the  National  Remount 
Association,  in  order  to  conform  to  the  new  name  of  the  parent  asso- 
ciation, and  on  April  23,  1913,  the  two  organizations  were  merged  and 
the  title  of  The  National  Remount  Association  taken. 


f 


Notes  715 

327.  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  for  1914,  pp. 
12-13. 

328.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America  passed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  Sixty-second  Congress,   1913-1914,  Part  I,  p.  329. 

329.  Ihid.,  p.  336. 

330.  The  history  of  this  measure  for  raising  the  volunteer  forces  of 
the  United  States  in  time  of  actual  or  threatened  war,  down  to  the  time 
when  Colonel  du  Pont,  the  senior  Senator  from  Delaware,  re-intro- 
duced it  in  the  Senate  on  April  9,  1913,  has  already  been  traced  on 
footnotes  258  and  291  of  this  chapter.  It  was  thereupon  re- 
ferred to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  but  no  further 
action  was  taken.  On  July  28,  1913,  Mr,  James  Hay,  Chairman 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  introduced  a  similar 
bill  (H.  R.  7138)  which  was  referred  to  that  committee,  was  amended 
and  passed  the  House  on  December  3,  1913.  On  February  20,  1914, 
Senator  Chamberlain,  the  new  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs,  reported  the  bill  favorably  from  that  committee  with 
amendments;  on  April  20,  1914,  it  passed  the  Senate;  and  on  April  23rd 
it  was  reported  out  of  conference  between  the  two  houses,  after  slight 
modifications.  The  difference  between  the  Senate  and  House  bills  in 
their  original  form  was  largely  one  of  phraseology,  and  the  measure 
as  finally  passed  more  closely  resembled  the  du  Pont  bill  than  the  one 
introduced  by  Mr.  Hay.  The  term  "  the  Hay  bill,"  so  frequently  ap- 
plied to  this  measure,  conveys  an  impression  totally  unwarranted  by 
the  facts.  Whatever  credit  is  deserved  by  any  single  individual  for 
this  notable  law  belongs  entirely  to  Colonel  du  Pont. 

331.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America,  passed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress,  1913-1914,  p.  347. 

332.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America,  passed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress,  1913-1914,  p.  351. 

333.  Ihid.,  pp.  390-392. 

334.  Ihid.,  p.  420. 

335.  "  That,  under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  pre- 
scribe, educational  institutions  to  which  an  officer  of  the  Army  is  de- 
tailed as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  may  purchase  from 
the  War  Department  for  cash,  for  the  use  of  their  military  students, 
such  stores,  supplies,  material  of  war,  and  military  publications  as 
are  furnished  to  the  Army,  such  sales  to  be  at  the  price  listed  to  the 
Army  with  the  cost  of  transportation  added:  Provided,  That  all 
moneys  received  from  the  sale  of  stores,  supplies,  material  of  war,  and 
military  publications  to  educational  institutions  to  which  an  officer  of 
the  Army  is  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  shall 
respectively  revert  to  that  appropriation  out  of  which  they  were  orig- 
inally expended  and  shall  be  applied  to  the  purpose  for  which  they 
were  appropriated  by  law." — Ihid.,  p.  512. 

336.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America,  passed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress,  1913-1914,  p.  514. 

337.  "  An  Act  To  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  aviation  service  of  the 
Army,  and  for  other  purposes."  Approved,  July  18,  1914.  {Statutes 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  passed  at  the  second  session  of  the 
Sixty-third  Congress,  1913-1914,  p.  514.) 

"  Be  it  enacted  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 


716     Military  Unpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

United  States  of  America  in  Congress  a^semhled,  That  there  shall  here- 
after be,  and  there  is  hereby  created,  an  aviation  section,  which  shall 
be  a  part  of  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army,  and  which  shall  be,  and  is 
hereby,  charged  with  the  duty  of  operating  or  supervising  the  oper- 
ation of  all  military  air  craft,  including  balloons  and  aeroplanes,  all 
appliances  pertaining  to  said  craft,  and  signaling  apparatus  of  any 
kind  when  installed  on  said  craft ;  also  with  the  duty  of  training  officers 
and  enlisted  men  in  matters  pertaining  to  military  aviation. 

"  Sec.  2.  That,  in  addition  to  such  officers  and  enlisted  men  as  shall 
be  assigned  from  the  Signal  Corps  at  large  to  executive,  administrative, 
scientific,  or  other  duty  in  or  for  the  aviation  section,  there  shall  be  in 
said  section  aviation  officers  not  to  exceed  sixty  in  number,  and  two 
hundred  and  sixty  aviation  enlisted  men  of  all  grades ;  and  said  avi- 
ation officers  and  aviation  enlisted  men,  all  of  whom  shall  be  engaged 
on  duties  pertaining  to  said  aviation  section,  shall  be  additional  to  the 
officers  and  enlisted  men  now  allotted  by  law  to  the  Signal  Corps,  the 
commissioned  and  enlisted  strengths  of  which  are  hereby  increased 
accordingly. 

The  aviation  officers  provided  for  in  this  section  shall,  except  as 
hereinafter  prescribed  specifically  to  the  contrary,  be  selected  from 
among  officers  holding  commissions  in  the  line  of  the  Army  with  rank 
below  that  of  captain,  and  shall  be  detailed  to  serve  as  such  aviation 
officers  for  periods  of  four  years,  unless  sooner  relieved,  and  the  pro- 
visions of  section  twenty-seven  of  the  Act  of  Congi'ess  approved  Feb- 
ruary second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one  (Thirty-first  Statutes,  page 
seven  hundred  and  fifty-five)  are  hereby  extended  so  as  to  apply  to 
said  aviation  officers  and  to  the  vacancies  created  in  the  line  of  the 
Army  by  the  detail  of  said  officers  therefrom,  but  nothing  in  said  Act 
or  in  any  other  law  now  in  force  shall  be  held  to  prevent  the  detail  or 
redetail  at  any  time  to  fill  a  vacancy  among  the  aviation  officers 
authorized  by  this  Act,  of  any  officer  holding  a  commission  in  the  line 
of  the  Army  with  rank  below  that  of  captain,  and  who,  during  prior 
service  as  an  aviation  officer  in  the  aviation  section,  shall  have  become 
especially  proficient  in  military  aviation. 

"  There  shall  also  be  constantly  attached  to  the  aviation  section  a 
sufficient  number  of  aviation  students  to  make,  with  the  aviation  officers 
actually  detailed  in  said  section  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  a 
total  number  of  sixty  aviation  officers  and  aviation  students  constantly 
under  assignment  to,  or  detail  in,  said  section.  Said  aviation  stu- 
dents, all  of  whom  shall  be  selected  on  the  recommendation  of  the  chief 
signal  officer  from  among  unmarried  lieutenants  of  the  line  of  the  Army 
not  over  thirty  years  of  age,  shall  remain  attached  to  the  aviation  sec- 
tion for  a  sufficient  time,  but  in  no  case  to  exceed  one  year,  to  determine 
their  fitness  or  unfitness  for  detail  as  aviation  officers  in  said  section, 
and  their  detachment  from  their  respective  arms  of  service  which  under 
assignment  to  said  section  shall  not  be  held  to  create  in  said  arms 
vacancies  that  may  be  filled  by  promotions  or  original  appointments: 
Provided,  Tliat  no  person,  except  in  time  of  war,  shall  be  assigned  or 
detailed  against  his  will  to  duty  as  an  aviation  student  or  an  aviation 
officer:  Provided  further,  That  whenever,  under  such  regulations  as 
the  Secretary  of  War  shall  prescribe  and  publish  to  the  Army,  an  officer 
assigned  or  detailed  to  duty  of  any  kind  in  or  with  the  aviation  sec- 


Notes  111 

tion  shall  have  been  found  to  be  inattentive  to  his  duties,  inefficient, 
or  incapacitated  from  any  cause  whatever  for  the  full  and  efficient  dis- 
charge of  all  duties  that  might  properly  be  imposed  upon  him  if  he 
should  be  continued  on  duty  in  or  with  said  section,  said  officer  shall 
be  returned  forthwith  to  the  branch  of  the  service  in  which  he  shall 
hold  a  commission. 

"  Sec.  3.  That  the  aviation  officers  hereinbefore  provided  for  shall 
be  rated  in  two  classes,  to  wit,  as  junior  military  aviators  and  as  mili- 
tary aviators.  Within  sixty  days  after  this  Act  shall  take  effect  the 
Secretary  of  War  may,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Chief  Signal 
Officer,  rate  as  junior  military  aviators  any  officers  with  rank  below 
that  of  captain,  who  are  now  on  aviation  duty  and  who  have,  or  shall 
have  before  the  date  of  rating  so  authorized,  shown  by  practical  tests, 
including  aerial  flights,  that  they  are  especially  well  qualified  for  mili- 
tary aviation  service;  and  after  said  rating  shall  have  been  made  the 
rating  of  junior  military  aviator  shall  not  be  conferred  upon  any  person 
except  as  hereinafter  provided, 

"  Each  aviation  student  authorized  by  this  Act  shall,  while  on  duty 
that  requires  him  to  participate  regularly  and  frequently  in  aerial 
flights,  receive  an  increase  of  25  per  centum  in  the  pay  of  his  grade 
and  length  of  service  under  his  line  commission.  Each  duly  qualified 
junior  military  aviator  shall,  while  so  serving,  have  the  rank,  pay,  and 
allowances  of  one  grade  higher  than  that  held  by  him  under  his  line 
commission,  provided  that  his  rank  under  said  commission  be  not  higher 
than  that  of  first  lieutenant,  and,  while  on  duty,  requiring  him  to  par- 
ticipate regularly  and  frequently  in  aerial  flights,  he  shall  receive  in 
addition  an  increase  of  50  per  centum  in  the  pay  of  his  grade  and 
length  of  service  under  his  line  commission.  The  rating  of  military 
aviator  shall  not  be  hereafter  conferred  upon  or  held  by  any  person 
except  as  hereinafter  provided,  and  the  number  of  officers  with  that 
rating  shall  at  no  time  exceed  fifteen.  Each  military  aviator  who  shall 
hereafter  have  duly  qualified  as  such  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
shall,  while  so  serving,  have  the  rank,  pay,  and  allowances  of  one  grade 
higher  than  that  held  by  him  under  his  line  commission,  provided  that 
his  rank  under  said  commission  be  not  higher  than  that  of  first  lieu- 
tenant, and,  while  on  duty  requiring  him  to  participate  regularly  and 
frequently  in  aerial  flights,  he  shall  receive  in  addition  an  increase  of 
75  per  centum  of  the  pay  of  his  grade  and  length  of  service  under  his 
line  commission. 

"  The  aviation  enlisted  men  hereinbefore  provided  for  shall  consist 
of  twelve  master  signal  electricians,  twelve  first-class  sergeants,  twenty- 
four  sergeants,  seventy-eight  corporals,  eight  cooks,  eighty-two  first- 
class  privates,  and  forty-four  privates.  Not  to  exceed  forty  of  said 
enlisted  men  shall  at  any  one  time  have  the  rating  of  aviation  mecha- 
nician, which  rating  is  hereby  established,  and  said  rating  shall  not  be 
conferred  upon  any  person  except  as  hereinafter  provided:  Provided, 
That  twelve  enlisted  men  at  a  time  shall,  in  the  discretion  of  the  officer 
in  command  of  the  aviation  section,  be  instructed  in  the  art  of  flving, 
and  no  enlisted  man  shall  be  assigned  to  duty  as  an  aerial  flyer  against 
his  will  except  in  time  of  war.  Each  aviation  enlisted  man,  while  on 
duty  that  requires  him  to  participate  regularly  and  frequently  in  aerial 
flights,  or  while  holding  the  rating  of  aviation  mechanician,  shall  re- 


718      Military  JJnpreparedness  of  the  United  States 

ceive  an  increase  of  fifty  per  centum  in  his  pay:  Provided  further, 
That,  except  as  hereinafter  provided  in  the  cases  of  officers  now  on 
aviation  duty,  no  person  shall  be  detailed  as  an  aviation  officer,  or 
rated  as  a  junior  military  aviator,  or  as  a  military  aviator,  or  as  an 
aviation  mechanician,  until  there  shall  have  been  issued  to  him  a  cer- 
tificate to  the  eff'ect  that  he  is  qualified  for  the  detail  or  rating,  or  for 
both  the  detail  and  the  rating,  sought  or  proposed  in  his  case,  and  no 
such  certificate  shall  be  issued  to  any  person  until  an  aviation  examin- 
ing board,  which  shall  be  composed  of  three  officers  of  experience  in  the 
aviation  service  and  two  medical  officers,  shall  have  examined  him, 
under  general  regulations  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
published  to  the  Army  by  the  War  Department,  and  shall  have  reported 
him  to  be  qualified  for  the  detail  or  rating,  or  for  both  the  detail  and 
the  rating,  sought  or  proposed  in  his  case:  Provided  further,  That 
the  Secretary  of  War  shall  cause  appropriate  certificates  of  qualifica- 
tion to  be  issued  by  the  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  to  all  officers 
and  enlisted  men  who  shall  have  been  found  and  reported  by  aviation 
examining  boards  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this  Act,  to  be  quali- 
fied for  the  details  and  ratings  for  which  said  officers  and  enlisted  men 
shall  have  been  examined:  Provided  further,  That  except  as  herein- 
before provided  in  the  cases  of  officers  who  are  now  on  aviation  duty 
and  vi^ho  shall  be  rated  as  junior  military  aviators  as  hereinbefore  au- 
thorized, no  person  shall  be  detailed  for  service  as  an  aviation  officer 
in  the  aviation  section  until  he  shall  have  served  creditably  as  an  avi- 
ation student  for  a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  Secretary  of  War;  and  no 
person  shall  receive  the  rating  of  military  aviator  until  he  shall  have 
served  creditably  for  at  least  three  years  as  an  aviation  officer  with 
the  rating  of  junior  military  aviator :  Provided  further.  That  there 
shall  be  paid  to  the  w  idow  of  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  who  shall  die 
as  the  result  of  an  aviation  accident,  not  the  result  of  his  own  mis- 
conduct, or  to  any  other  person  designated  by  him  in  writing,  an 
amount  equal  to  one  year's  pay  at  the  rate  to  which  such  officer  or 
enlisted  man  was  entitled  at  the  time  of  the  accident  resulting  in  his 
death,  but  any  payment  made  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this 
proviso  on  account  of  the  death  of  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  shall  be 
in  lieu  of  and  a  bar  to  any  payment  under  the  Acts  of  Congress  ap- 
proved May  eleventh,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  and  March  third, 
nineteen  hundred  and  nine  (Thirty-fifth  Statutes,  pages  one  hundred 
and  eight  and  seven  hundred  and  fifty-five ) ,  on  account  of  death  of 
said  officer  or  enlisted  man." 

338.  Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America,  passed  at  the  second 
session  of  the  Sixty-third  Congress,  1913-1914,  p.  5G8. 

339.  Ibid.,  pp.  677-678. 

340.  Ibid.,  p.  770. 

341.  Ibid.,  p.  776. 

342.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for   1914,  p.   1. 

343.  Report  of  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  for  1914,  p.  44. 

344.  Composed  of  four  regiments  of  infantry,  of  the  5th  Brigade, 
Company  E  of  2nd  battalion  of  Engineers  and  field  hospital  No.  3, 
which  sailed  in  the  transports  Sumner,  McClellan,  Kilpatrick,  and 
Meade. —  Report  of  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  for  1914,  p.  43. 

345.  On  April  29,  1914,  the  headquarters,  band,  a  detachment  of  the 


Notes  719 

1st  battalion  of  the  4th  Field  Artillery,  and  Troops  I  and  K  of  the 
6th  Cavalry  sailed  from  Galveston  in  the  chartered  transport  San 
Marcos,  followed  next  day  by  Company  D  of  the  Signal  Corps  in  the 
naval  transport  Esperanza. —  Ibid.,  p.  43. 

346.  Reports  for  1914  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  pp.  1-2;  of  the  Chief 
of  Staff  (Major  General  W.  W.  Wotherspoon ) ,  p.  13;  and  of  The  Adju- 
tant General  of  the  Army,  p.  43. 

347.  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (General  Wotherspoon)  for  1913, 
p.  13. 

348.  Hearing  before  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  United  States 
Senate,  Sixty-third  Congress,  third  session,  on  National  Defense  Bills> 
p.   22. 

349.  Ibid,,  pp.  14-15. 

350.  Regulations  and  information  relating  to  Students'  Military  In- 
struction Camps  were  published  by  the  War  Department  in  Bulletin 
No.  1,  dated  October  17,  1913,  and  in  Bulletin  No.  1,  dated  March  25, 
1914. 

351.  Records  of  The  Adjutant-General's  Office  transmitted  to  the 
author  on  January  4,   1915. 

352.  War  Department  Bulletin  No.  48,  dated  November  4,  1914. 

353.  Report  of  The  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  for  1914,  pp.  40-41. 

354.  Report  of  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  for  1914,  pp. 
7,  8  and   10. 

355.  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  1914,  p.  2. 

356.  Hearings  before  Subcommittee  of  House  Committee  on  Appro- 
priations in  charge  of  the  Fortifications  Appropriation  Bill  for  1916, 
pp.  28-29. 

357.  The  first  measure  embodying  appropriations  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  the  Army  and  its  supplies  was  the  Urgent  Deficiencies  Act, 
approved  January  25,  1915. —  Public  —  No.  236  —  63d  Congress  (H.  R. 
20241),  p.  2. 

358.  Public  — No.  251  — 63d  Congress    (H.  R.  17765). 

359.  Public  — No.  263  —  63d  Congress  (H.  R.  21318),  pp.  22-36, 
72-73. 

360.  Public  — No.  264  — 63d  Congress    (H.  R.  21491),  pp.  1-6. 

361.  Public  — No.  290  — 63d  Congress   (H.  R.  19909),  pp.  28-31. 

362.  Public  — No.  292  —  63d  Congress   (H.  R.  20347). 

363.  Ibid.,  pp.  1-8,  10,  11,  14,  15,  17,  18,  22,  24-27. 

364.  Under  this  heading  the  President  was  authorized  to  retain 
Major  General  Arthur  Murray  on  the  active  list  and  as  commander 
of  the  Western  Department  from  April  29,  1915,  to  the  close  of  the 
Panama-Pacific  International  Exposition  on  December  4,  1915,  when 
he  was  to  be  retired.  Moreover,  the  number  of  Major  Generals  of  the 
line  of  the  Army  was  increased  by  one  for  that  period  "  and  for  that 
period  only."— Public  — No.  292  — 63d  Congress    (H.  R.  20347),  p.  4. 

365.  Public  — No.  293  —  63d  Congress   (H.  R.  20415),  p.  5. 

366.  Public  — No.  295  —  63d  Congress    (H.  R.  21328). 

367.  Public  — No.  296  —  63d  Congress    (H.   R.   21546),  pp.   7-8. 

368.  Public  — No.  316  — 63d  Congress    (H.  R.  16510),  pp.   1-2. 

369.  Public  — No.  327  —  63d  Congress    (S.  5495),  p.  16. 

370.  Congressional  Record  for  Friday,  January  22,  1915,  vol.  52, 
No.  37,  pp.  2248-2282. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Absenteeism,  of  officers  on  detached 
service,  337,  338,  353,  361,  537- 
538;  legislation  of  1912  ("Manchu 
law")  concerning,  398—399;  law 
concerning,  on  part  of  officers  and 
enlisted  men,  when  caused  by  dis- 
ease,   399-400,   437. 

Adams,  John,  on  national  defence  as 
the  cardinal  duty  of  a  statesman, 
576, 

Adjutants-General,  two  additional  As- 
sistant, provided  by  legislation  of 
1898,    163. 

Aeronautics,  Congressional  appropria- 
tions for,  contrasted  with  those  of 
other    countries,    423—424. 

Aeroplanes,  first  experiments  with, 
352—353;  appropriation  for,  recom- 
mended, 361;  appropriations  for 
airships  and,  398,  415,  437,  454; 
smallness  of  appropriations  for, 
423;  number  of,  in  United  States 
military  service  and  in  other  coun- 
tries,   472. 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio,  Philippine  insur- 
gent force  commanded  by,  197; 
military  dictatorship  of,  in  Luzon, 
233;  hunting  down  of,  234,  239; 
capture  of,  by  General  Funston's 
force,     261-262, 

Alaska,  seacoast  defences  needed  in, 
326,  410 ;  inadequacy  of  garrison 
in,   529. 

Allen,  Ethan,  Ticonderoga  captured  by 
force  under,   8. 

Ambulance  companies  in  Organized 
Militia,    507,    508. 

Ambulances,  slim  provision  of,  at  bat- 
tle of  San  Juan  Hill,  185 ;  shortage 
of    motor,    in    1914,    495. 

American  Lake,  Washington,  school 
of  instruction  at,    323. 

Ammunition,  conditions  concerning,  in 
Spanish-American  War,  154,  183; 
sale  of,  to  State  rifle  clubs,  .311; 
Government  manufacture  of,  352; 
shortage  of  supply  for  small-arms, 
378,  478—479;  inadequacy  of  reserve 
supply  for  field  artillery,  379,  394, 
474—478;  deficiencv  of,  for  seacoast 
defences,  380,  488-489;  failure  to 
secure  increase  in  allotment  for 
small-arms  and  field  artillery  in 
1915,  464;  capacity  of  United 
States  for  manufacture  of,  479—480; 
significance  of  fact  that  imported 
materials  are  necessary  to  manu- 
facture   of,    520-521. 

Amusement  resorts,  admission  of  men 
in  uniform   to,    384. 

Anderson,  General  T.  M.,  commands 
expedition  in  Philippine  campaign, 
196. 

Andre,  Major,  capture  and  execution 
of,   33. 

Antietam,    battle   of,    112. 

Aquia    Creek,    battle   of,    111. 


723 


Arkansas  coal  regions,  constabulary 
duty  by  Regulars  in,   in  1914,  448. 

Armouries,   inadequacy  of  militia,   509. 

Arms,  export  of,   406. 

Armstrong,  John,  inefficiency  as  Sec- 
retary of  War,    64,    588. 

Army,  conditions  concerning,  in  Co- 
lonial period,  3-6 ;  at  beginning  of 
Revolutionary  period,  7—9 ;  General 
Greene's  recommendations  concern- 
ing, 9n.;  views  of  Revolutionary 
generals  on  necessity  of  a  standing, 
17—18;  Washington's  views  con- 
cerning a  standing,  28—30;  jealousy 
against,  results  in  reduction  of  Con- 
tinental forces  by  Congress  in  1781, 
33 ;  summary  of  lessons  of  the  Revo- 
lution concerning,  40-42 ;  meagre 
provisions  for,  immediately  following 
Revolution,  44 ;  provisions  of  fed- 
eral Constitution  regarding,  44—46 ; 
strength  of,  as  authorized  by  Con- 
gress from  1792  to  1812,  47;  influ- 
ence of  Jefferson  against,  50-51; 
reorganization  of  1821,  71-73; 
strength  of,  under  act  of  1838,  76; 
reason  for  American  successes  in 
Mexican  War  found  in  quality  of, 
79 ;  statistics  of  forces  employed 
during  Mexican  War,  89 ;  reduc- 
tion in  strength,  after  Mexican  War, 
92  ;  condition  of,  at  opening  of  War 
of  the  Rebellion,  94;  increase  of 
Regular,  authorized  in  1861,  98; 
short-sighted  policy  of  United  States 
in  not  maintaining  a  sufficient, 
shown  by  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
145 ;  strength  in  years  following 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  down  to  1898, 
151;  size  at  opening  of  Spanish- 
American  War,  153;  tardy  increase 
of,  upon  opening  of  Spanish-Amer- 
ican War,  162;  number  of  troops 
employed  in  Spanish-American  War, 
201 ;  credit  due  Regulars,  for  Amer- 
ican victory  in  war  with  Spain, 
202;  lessons  of  Spanish-American 
War  relative  to  the,  202—219;  neces- 
sity for  a  larger,  the  most  important 
lesson  of  the  Spanish-American 
War,  217-218;  enlargement  of,  by 
legislation  of  1899,  222-223; 
strength  of,  as  fixed  by  legislation 
of  1901,  253;  actual  strength  of.  by 
decades,  278;  strength  in  1905,  313; 
strength  and  distribution  in  1907, 
335;  difficulty  in  obtaining  recruits, 
335—337;  increase  in  strength  in 
1908,  351-352;  strength  in  1909, 
359—360;  measures  for  cooperation 
of  militia  and,  364—366:  question 
of  distribution  and  shelter  of  the 
Mobile   Army,    366-369;    strength   in 

1910,  372;     strength    and    distribu- 
tion   in    1910.    377-378;    strength    in 

1911,  389;    strength    in    1912,    406; 
scheme  of  reorganization  worked  out 


724 


Index 


by  War  College  Division  of  General 
Staff  in  1912,  410-411;  strength  in 
1913,  418;  assembling  of  generals 
to  discuss  reorganization  of,  421 ; 
strength  in  1914,  444;  strength  and 
distribution  in  1915,  466-467;  de- 
fects in  legislation  providing  for  in- 
crease of,  516;  excessive  cost  of 
maintenance  of,  as  compared  with 
European  armies,  518—519;  cost 
compared  with  that  of  police  forces, 
519—520;  war  strength  of,  as  com- 
pared Avith  that  of  other  nations, 
522-523 ;  land  forces  of  United 
States  as  they  ought  to  be  organ- 
ized, 524  ff . ;  necessary  division  of, 
into  force  stationed  in  overseas  pos- 
sessions and  force  within  territorial 
limits  of  continental  United  States, 
528;  inadequacy  of  garrisons  in  for- 
eign possessions,  529—531;  should 
number  250,000  on  a  peace  footing, 
533;  maintenance  of  six  divisions 
at  war  strength  in  continental 
United  States  recommended,  535 ; 
strategic  points  where  troops  should 
be  stationed,  539—540;  strength  of, 
under  suggested  organization  of 
land  forces,  548;  President  Wilson's 
views    upon,    557. 

Army  League  of  the  United  States, 
founding   of,    414. 

Army  poSts,  abolition  of  the  smaller, 
324,  382,  396,  412;  desire  of  com- 
munities to  retain,  367;  projected 
legislation  relative  to  abolition  of 
useless,  518;  abolition  of  four-fifths 
of  present  number  advised,  538—539. 

Army  School  of  the  Line,  at  Port 
Leavenworth,    152. 

Army  War  College,  establishment  of, 
238;  legislation  in  1901  concerning, 
258-259;  appropriation  in  1902  for 
continuance  of,  and  for  erection  of 
buildings,  286;  simpler  organization 
for,  due  to  creation  of  General  Staff, 
301;  course  of  study  at,  306-307; 
estimate  by,  as  to  saving  to  be 
effected  by  abolition  of  scattered 
posts,    539. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  invasion  of  Canada 
by  force  under,  12—13 ;  attempted 
betrayal  of  West  Point  by,  33 ;  ex- 
pedition into  Virginia  led  by,  35; 
credit  due,  for  victory  at  Saratoga, 
563, 

Arsenals,  scientific  management  in, 
395,    397,    424,    458-459. 

Articles  of  Confederation,  weak  mili- 
tary policy   contained   in,    20—21. 

Artillery,  reorganization  of,  in  1907, 
328-331.  See  Coast  artillery  and 
Field   artillery. 

Artillery  Corps,  legislation  concern- 
ing, in  1901,  253—254;  increase  in, 
324. 

Australia,  proportion  of  population  in 
militia  of,  542 ;  system  of  compul- 
sory military  service  in,    547. 

Aviation  school,  work  of,  in  1913,  423. 

Aviation  service,  assignment  of  offi- 
cers to  the,  415  ;  legislation  of  1914 
concerning,  441-443,  715-718;  fail- 
ure to  secure  appropriation  for,  in 
1915,  464;  ridiculous  equipment  of, 
as  compared  with  that  of  foreign  na- 
tions, 472. 


Bad  Ax  River,  engagement  on,  in 
Black   Hawk   War,    73. 

Baltimore,  British  attack  on,  in  1814, 
64. 

Battle  flags,  return  of,  to  different 
States,    312. 

Benevolent  assimilation,  mistaken 
theory  of,  applied  to  Filipinos,  220, 
221. 

Big  Bethel,  battle  of,   100. 

Bills  of  credit,  emission  of,  by  Second 
Continental  Congress,  and  effect  on 
military    system,    9. 

Black  Hawk  War,  73 ;  statistics  of, 
275. 

Bladensburg,  rout  of  Americans  by 
British   at,    64. 

Boston,    evacuation  of,   by  British,    15. 

Boston  harbour,  purchase  of  laud  in, 
for    fortification    purposes,    319. 

Bounty-jumping,  in  War  of  the  Re- 
bellion,   119,    148-149. 

Bounty  system,  evils  of,  in  War  of 
Revolution,  11—12;  inaugurated  by 
Congress  in  1776,  18;  efforts  of 
Congress  to  conceal,  23;  increase  in 
bounties  in  1779,  24—25;  bounties 
offered  by  New  Jersey  and  Vir- 
ginia, 25 ;  increase  in  size  of  boun- 
ties in  1780,  27;  bounty  offered  by 
Congress  in  1813,  56;  increase  in 
bounties  in  1814,  62;  provisions  of 
act  of  1838,  75—76;  bounties  offered 
in  Mexican  War,  84;  bounties  of- 
fered in  1862,  107;  size  of  bounties 
in  1863,  117;  legislation  in  1865 
regarding,  139;  expensiveness  of 
plan  of  recruitment  based  on,  147- 
148  ;  method  of  obviating  use  of,  in 
Spanish-American  War,  by  increas- 
ing pay  of  enlisted  men  in  war 
time,  163;  recommended  by  General 
MacArthur  as  an  inducement  to 
Philippine   service,    267. 

Boxer  uprising  in   1900,   242  ff. 

Brandywine,  defeat  of  Americans  at 
battle   of    the,    20. 

Brigadier  Generals,  act  of  1862  rela- 
tive to  appointment  of,  106;  appoint- 
ment of  additional,  in  1863,  115; 
legislation  concerning,   in  1899,   223. 

Brownsville,  Texas,  shooting  affair, 
322 ;  Congressional  action  concern- 
ing, 357—358;  court  of  inquiry  ap- 
pointed,   360. 

Buena   Vista,    battle   of,    85. 

Buffalo,  burned  by  British  in  War  of 
1812,    58. 

Bull   Run,   first  battle   of,    101;    causes 
of    Union    defeat,     101-102;     second 
battle    of.    111. 
Bunker  Hill,  battle  of,   7-8. 
Butte,    Montana,    constabulary  work  of 
Regulars   at,    in   1914,    448. 

Calhoun,  John  C,  plan  of  military  re- 
organization recommended  by,  in 
1821,     71-72. 

Caloocan,    battle  of,    229. 

Camden,  defeat  of  Americans  at,  in 
1780,    31. 

Camps  for  mobilizing  and  instructing 
soldiers,  at  opening  of  Spanish- 
American  War,  166;  desirability  of 
State,  instead  of  central,  212-213; 
undesirable  conditions  in  Camp 
Thomas    and    Camp    Alger    owing    to 


Index 


725 


overcrowding,  215-217:  legislation 
looking  to  establishment  of  per- 
manent  grounds   for,    256. 

Camps  of  instruction,  first  joint  en- 
campment of  ArniA-  and  militia  in, 
323;  held  in  1908,  352;  in  1911, 
393 ;  for  Regular  Cavalry,  at  Win- 
chester, Va.,  421;  for  Field  Ar- 
tillery, 421;  for  college  undergrad- 
uates, 422,  448—449 ;  for  business 
and    professional    men,    465. 

Canada,  invasion  of,  by  American 
forces  in  War  of  Revolution.  12 ; 
failure  of  invasion  of,  13 ;  Ameri- 
can attempts  to  conquer,  in  War  of 
1812,    54-55,    58,    59,    62-64. 

Cannon,  donation  of  condemned,  to 
towns  and  cities,    398,   464. 

Canteens,  prohibition  of  sale  of  in- 
toxicants in,  225;  bad  effects  of 
measure,   257,   407. 

Carrick's  Ford,  Union  victory  at,  in 
1861,    100. 

Cavalry,  shortage  of,  in  1915,  471— 
472 ;  organization  of,  of  Organized 
Militia,    504. 

Cavalrv  and  Light  Artillerv,  School 
of,   at  Fort  Riley,    152. 

Cedar  Mountain,   battle  of.   111. 

Cerro  Gordo,  Mexicans  defeated  at, 
86. 

Certificates  issued  in  lieu  of  lost  or 
destroyed    discharges,    286. 

Cervera, '  Admiral,  fleet  of,  destroved 
by    American    fleet,    187-188. 

Chaffee,  General,  commands  American 
troops  in  joint  expedition  to  Peking. 
243-252;  succeeds  MacArthur  as 
Military  Governor  of  Philippines, 
263. 

Chancellorsville,  Southern  victorv  at, 
121. 

Chaplains,  legislation  concerning,  in 
1904,    302-303;    in   1907,    331. 

Chapultepec,  taken  by  Americans  in 
Mexican   War,.  89. 

Charleston,  capture  of,  by  British  dur- 
ing Revolution,    31. 

ChateauguaA^  Americans  repulsed  at. 
in  War  of  1812,   59. 

Chattanooga,  victors'^  won  bv  Grant  at, 
127. 

Cherokee  War,  number  of  officers  and 
men  in,    594. 

Chesapeake  Bay,  militarv  operations 
on,  in  War  of  1812,  60;  need  of 
fortifications  for,  327,  489-490;  ab- 
sence of  appropriations  for  fortify- 
ing,   373,   414,   425. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of.   127. 

Chickamauga  Park,  school  of  instruc- 
tion at,   323. 

Chief  of  Staff,  duties  of,  293-294: 
what  is  denoted  bv  title,  according 
to   Secretary  Root,  "297-298. 

Churubusco,    American    victory    at,    88. 

Citizen-soldiery,  George  Washington 
quoted  on  disadvantages  and  de- 
fects of  militia  system,  16-17.  28-30: 
folly  of  dependence  on  militia,  for 
national  defence,  273—285 ;  unco- 
ordinated army  that  would  result  from 
the  mobilization  of,  527—528;  negligi- 
ble value  of.  until  after  a  period  of 
training,  531—532:  favoured  by 
President  Wilson,    557. 

Coast    artillery,    lack    of    recruits    for, 


308-309;  development  of  adequate 
force  of,  363;  provision  made  by 
coast  States  for  militia  reserves, 
374-375;  shortage  in,  in  1910,  381- 
382 ;  shortage  of  ammunition  for, 
488-489 ;  conditions  as  to,  of  Or- 
ganized Militia  at  end  of  1914,  512- 
515. 

Coast  Artillery  Corps,  failure  to  se- 
cure increase  in  appropriation  in 
1915,  464;  shortage  in  strength,  in 
1915,  480-484;  projected  legisla- 
tion for  increase  in  authorized 
strength  of,  517;  increase  of,  under 
suggested  organization  of  land 
forces,     536-537. 

Coast  batteries,  for  insular  posses- 
sions,  311. 

Coast  defence,  inauguration  of  scheme 
of,  152;  inadequacy  of,  at  opening 
of  Spanish-American  War,  153; 
working  out  of  scheme  of,  308—309; 
distinction  made  between  harbour 
defence   and,    316. 

Coast  defences,  points  selected  for,  by 
Endicott  Board  and  by  Taft  Board, 
326—327:  progress  in  respect  to, 
353,  360-361,  373,  379-380,  393, 
424—425;  recommendations  as  to 
guns  for,  by  board  of  experts  in 
1914,  451—452;  troops  needed  for, 
481,  483;  condition  of  fortifications 
in  1915,  484-487;  need  of  addi- 
tional,   489-490. 

Cold   Harbor,   battle   of,    135. 

College  undergraduates,  camps  of  in- 
struction for,   422,    448-449. 

Colonial  period,  military  conditions  in 
America  during,    3—6. 

Colorado,  constabularv  work  of  Regu- 
lars  in,    in    1914,    448. 

Commission  to  investigate  conduct  of 
War  Department  in  war  with  Spain, 
213. 

Compulsory  service,  not  a  violation  of 
American  policy  and  traditions,   526. 

Concentration  of  army  in  eight  posts, 
539. 

Concord,    engagement   at,   6,    7. 

Conferences  on  reorganization  of  army, 
410,   421. 

Congress,  military  powers  vested  in, 
by  federal  Constitution,  45 ;  held  re- 
sponsible for  bad  administration  of 
the   army   and   its   organization,    219. 

Connecticut,  decamping  of  troops  of, 
upon  expiration  of  term  of  enlist- 
ment, during  Revolution,  11;  sack- 
ing of  towns  in,  26  ;  mutiny  of  regi- 
ments from,  33 ;  independence 
claimed  by,  for  State  militia,  in  War 
of  1812,  53;  number  of  soldiers  fur- 
nished Continental  Army  by,  574; 
desertions  among  troops  from,  in 
War  of  Rebellion,    631. 

Conscription,  introduction  of,  in  War 
of    Rebellion    (1863),    115-117. 

Constabularv  duty  performed  by  Army, 
151,    448,"  635.' 

Constitution,  signing  of  the,  44;  mili- 
tary provisions  contained  in,  45— 
46 ;  first  general  organization  of  the 
Army  under,   46. 

Continental  Armj'-,  raising  of  the,  9— 
10:  increase  in  size  of,  10;  Wash- 
ington's troubles  with,  11-12;  total 
number    of    troops    in,    during    cam- 


726 


Index 


paign  of  1775,  13;  sufferings  of,  at 
Valley  Forge,  21;  size  of,  in  spring 
of  1778,  21;  bad  condition  of,  in 
1780,  27-28;  Washington's  letter 
to  President  of  Congress  concerning, 
28—30;  reduction  of,  by  Congress 
in  1781,  33;  mutiny  of  troops,  33— 
34;  disbandment  of,  at  close  of 
Revolution,  43  ;  number  of  soldiers 
furnished,  by  different  colonies, 
574. 

Continental  Congress,  meeting  of  and 
measures  passed  by  First,  5 ;  meet- 
ing of  Second,  8;  effect  of  financial 
system  inaugurated  by,  on  power 
to  create  and  support  armies,  9 ; 
lack  of  military  knowledge  among 
members  of,  9 ;  reduced  to  position 
of  an  advisory  body,  9 ;  measures 
taken  by,  relative  to  longer  periods 
of  enlistment,  18;  futility  of  sys- 
tem persisted  in  by,   26. 

Contreras,  battle  of,  in  Mexican  War, 
88 

Corinth,   battle  of,   112, 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  defeat  of  Gates  by, 
at  Camden,  31;  further  activities  in 
South,  34—35 ;  costly  victory  over 
American  force  at  Guilford  Court 
House,  36;  invasion  of  Virginia, 
37;  surrender  of,  at  Yorktown,  38; 
bearing  of  surrender  of,  upon  ex- 
pulsion of  British  from  America, 
40. 

Cost,  of  wars  in  men  and  money,  tab- 
ular presentation  of,  275;  of  War 
Department  by  periods,  276;  ex- 
cessive, of  maintenance  of  United 
States  Army,    518-520. 

Council  of  National  Defense,  need  of 
a,  397,  412,  552-553;  introduction 
of   bill   for,    515-516. 

Courts-martial,  legislation  regarding, 
257-258,    416,    712-714. 

Cowpens,  defeat  of  British  at,  in  1781, 
35. 

Creek  War  in  1813,  60-61;  end  of,  in 
defeat  of  Indians  by  Andrew  Jack- 
son,   65;    statistics   of,    275,    594. 

Cuba,  preparations  for  invasion  of,  in 
Spanish- American  War,  166—169; 
the  campaign  in,-  169—190;  first  elec- 
tion in,  and  withdrawal  of  American 
forces,  287;  force  sent  in  1906,  to 
intervene  in  insurrection  in,  321— 
322;  reimbursement  of  United 
States  by,  for  expenditures  on  ac- 
count  of   intervention,   333. 

Daiquiri,  landing  of  Americans  at,  in 
Spanish-American    War,     176—178. 

Damages  from  gun  fire  and  target 
practice,  settlement  of  claims  for, 
400. 

Datu  Ali,   Moro  outlaw,   305,   312. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  inaugurated  Presi- 
dent of  Confederacy,  95 ;  captured 
by   General   J.   H.   Wilson,    144. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  adoption 
of,    16. 

Dental  corps  attached  to  Medical  De- 
partment,   386. 

Departments,  military,  of  United 
States  and  its  possessions,  340,  395, 
421-422,    467-468. 

Deserters,  restoration  of  rights  of  citi- 
zens  to,    398. 


Desertions  from  Army,  22,  360,  389, 
631;  inseparable  from  bounty  sys- 
tem, 11,  149;  provisions  of  Act  of 
August  22,  1912,  concerning,  705- 
706. 

D'Estaing,  Comte,  arrival  of  fleet  of, 
23  ;  operations  of  fleet  of,  in  1778, 
23—24;  operations  off  Savannah  in 
1779,    26-27. 

Detached  service  by  officers,  detri- 
mental effects  of,  337,  338,  353, 
361;  legislation  of  1912  concerning, 
398-399. 

Detention  barracks,  system  of,  410,  424. 

Detroit,  Hull's  surrender  at,  in  War 
of    1812,    54. 

Dewey,  Commodore,  Spanish  fleet  an- 
nihilated at  Manila  by,  167;  co- 
operates with  American  land  force 
in   Philippine    campaign,    198-199. 

Dick  bill,  merits  of,  289-291;  defects 
of,  291-292 ;  amendments  to,  by 
Act  of  May  27,  1908,  348-351,  370, 
694-698. 

Disease,  significance  of  losses  from,  in 
War  of  Rebellion,   630. 

Disembarkation  of  troops  in  Cuba  in 
Spanish-American    War,    176—178. 

District  of  Columbia,  organization  of 
militia    in,    357. 

Divisional  organization  of  land  forces, 
according  to  order  of  1913,    501, 

Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  creation  of, 
354. 

Drafting  of  troops,  during  Revolution, 
20,  21;  in  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
109,  117-119;  riots  connected  with, 
119;  legislation  relative  to,  in  1864, 
128-130. 

Du  Pont  bill,  for  raising  volunteers,  in 
1914,   429-437. 

Economv  and  Efficiency  Commission, 
work 'of,    395. 

El  Caney,  action  of,  in  battle  of  San- 
tiago,   181-184. 

Election  of  Volunteer  officers  in  War 
of  Rebellion,  99. 

Embarkation  of  troops  at  Tampa,  in 
Spanish-American  War,  169—174; 
contrasted  with  Napoleon's  feat  at 
Boulogne,    175. 

Endicott  Board,  creation  of  the,  152; 
new  board  appointed  for  revision 
of  report  of,    314-316. 

Engineer  Corps,  increase  in  number  of 
officers,  in  1910,  383;  appointment 
of  officers  from  civilian  ranks,  384; 
strength  of,  in  1915,  471;  of  Or- 
ganized Militia,   507. 

Engineers,  organization  of  volunteer 
brigade,  authorized  by  legislation  of 
1898,    163. 

Enlisted    men,    retirement    of,    333. 

Enlistment  period,  folly  of  short,  12— 
13,  14-15,  86-87,  96-97,  146-147, 
206-209,  220-221,  269-270;  wrong 
policy  followed  in  Spanish-American 
War,  160—161;  should  be  seven 
years,    533. 

Enlistments,  preference  in,  for  Volun- 
teer companies  to  Regular  troops, 
15,   41,    165,   205,   271. 

Enrolment  Act  of  1863.  117;  amend- 
ments to,   in   1864,    128-129. 

Equipment,  general  conditions  as  to, 
at   end  of   1914,   495-498. 


Index 


727 


Espionage,        legislation        concerning, 

387-388. 
Europe,   aid   given   Americans   stranded 

in,   upon  outbreak  of  war,   444,   451. 
Eutaw    Springs,     defeat    of    Americans 

at,    in   1781,    36. 

Farragut,  Admiral,  services  on  Missis- 
sippi in  1862,   110. 

Field  artillery,  appropriation  for  ma- 
terial for,  "in  1905,  310;  school  of 
instruction  for,  363;  need  of  in-, 
creased  provision  for,  364;  inade- 
quacy of,  for  war,  379;  shortage  in, 
in  1910.  381;  School  of  Fire  for, 
established  at  Fort  Sill,  394;  fail- 
ure to  secure  appropriation  for,  in 
1915,  464;  conditions  as  to,  in  1915, 
473-474;  shortage  of,  in  1914,  496- 
497;  conditions  as  to,  of  Organized 
Militia  in    1914,    504-507. 

Field-glasses,  dependence  of  United 
States  on  Germany  for  lenses  for, 
521-522. 

Field  Service  Regulations,  General 
Wood's  introductory  notice  to, 
450-451. 

Financial  aspect  of  military  unpre- 
paredness,    58,    274—277. 

Financial  system  inaugurated  by  Sec- 
ond Continental  Congress,  and  ef- 
fect   on    military    system,    9. 

Fire-control  apparatus,  installation  of, 
in  fortifications,  380;  deficiency  as 
to,  in  fortifications,   487,   488. 

Fishing  Creek,  Sumter's  force  crushed 
by  Tarleton  at,    31. 

Five  Forks,  Sheridan's  victory  at,  142. 

Floods,  service  rendered  by  Army  in, 
409,    421. 

Florida   War,    73-77,    275,    594. 

Fort  Benjamin  Harrison,  school  of  in- 
struction at,    323. 

Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  appropriation  for 
barracks  at,    304. 

Fort  Donelson,  surrender  of,  to  Grant. 
110. 

Fort  Erie,  captured  and  destroyed  by 
Americans   in    1814,    63. 

Fort  Henry,  surrender  of,  to  Grant, 
110. 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Infantry  and  Cav- 
alry School  at,  152 ;  modern  mili- 
tarv  post  hospital  at,  238;  militarv 
prison  at,  332-333,  457. 

Fort  Lee,  evacuation  of,  by  Americans. 
18-19. 

Fort  Meigs,  siege  of,  bv  British  in 
War  of  1812,   57. 

Fort   Mims,    massacre   of,    60. 

Fort  Moultrie,  repulse  of  British  at, 
19. 

Fort  Niagara,  taken  by  British  in  War 
of   1812,    58. 

Fort  Riley,  Mounted  Service  School  at, 
152;  National  Rifle  contest  at,  306; 
school   of  instruction  at,   323. 

Fort  Sill,  School  of  Fire  for  Field 
Artillery  at,  394;  School  of  Mus- 
ketry at,   423. 

Fort    Sumter,    bombardment   of,    95. 

Fort  Washington,  capture  of,  by  Brit- 
ish.  18. 

Fortifications,  report  of  Endicott  Board 
with  respect  to,  152 ;  appropriations 
for,  in  1904,  303;  construction  of.  in 
insular    possessions,    309,    311,    314, 


320,  341,  360-361,  373-374,  410, 
425,  490-495;  report  of  National 
Coast  Defense  Board  ( '  'Taf t 
Board"),  314-316,  325-328;  points 
where  needed,  according  to  Endicott 
Board  and  Taft  Board,  326-327; 
condition  of,  in  1915,  484-487;  de- 
ficiency of  search-lights,  fire  control 
and  submarine  mines,  487—488.  See 
also  Coast  defences. 

Fortifications  and  Other  Defenses, 
creation  of  Board  on,    152. 

France,  treaty  of  alliance  with,  in 
1778,  21-22;  achievement  of  inde- 
pendence by  American  colonies 
doubtful  without  aid  of,  38;  com- 
plications with,    in    1798,    49. 

Funston,  General,  capture  of  Agui- 
naldo  by,  261—262;  commands  force 
sent  to   Mexico  in   1914,   446-447. 

Gage,  General,  costly  victory  of,  at 
Bunker  Hill,   8. 

Garcia,  General,  credit  due,  for  im- 
portant services  in  Santiago  cam- 
paign,   202,    203. 

Gardner,  Representative,  rejection  of 
amendments  to  Armv  Appropriation 
Bill  offered  by,   464.' 

Garrisons.      See  Army  posts. 

Gates,  General,  victory  of,  over  Bur- 
goyne  at  Saratoga,  20;  defeat  of, 
at  Camden,   S.  C,   31. 

General,  grade  of,  bestowed  on  Grant, 
and   later   abolished,    151. 

General  Service  Corps,  need  of  a,  337, 
376;  functions  of,  337-338;  organ- 
ization of,  in  1912,  401,  403-404, 
710-711. 

General  Staff,  no  provision  for,  under 
Act  of  1790,  46;  necessity  for,  dem- 
onstrated by  Spanish-American  War, 
209-210;  creation  of,  in  1903,  292- 
294;  significance  of  the  new  body, 
294-295;  functions  of,  295-297; 
greater  efficiency  of  German  Gen- 
eral Staff,  298;  legislation  in  1903 
regarding,  299-300;  comes  into  ex- 
istence August  15th,  1903,  301;  un- 
questioned utility  of,  demonstrated, 
307—308;  value  of,  shown  at  time 
of  Cuban  insurrection  in  1906,  322; 
retrogressive  legislation  concerning, 
in    1912,    404-405. 

Geographical  divisions  for  purposes  of 
militarv  administration,  340,  395, 
421-422,    467-468. 

Germany,  military  efficiency  of,  con- 
trasted with  American  inefficiency, 
527,  528;  object  lessons  in  prepared- 
ness offered  by,   541,    555. 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  123 ;  extent  of 
losses  at,   123  n. 

Gettysburg,  camp  for  military  instruc- 
tion of  college  undergraduates  at, 
in    1913,    422. 

Ghent,   peace   of,    65,   68. 

Government,  responsibility  of,  for  the 
public   weal,    526. 

Governors  of  States,  appointment  of 
Volunteer  officers  by,  98,  99,  107, 
115. 

Grant,  General  U.  S.,  capture  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  by,  109—110; 
Yicksburg  campaign  of,  113,  124— 
125;  in  command  of  Military  Divi- 
sion   of    the    Mississippi,     127;     ap- 


728 


Index 


pointment  to  supreme  command  of 
Union  armies,  133;  plan  of  cam- 
paign for  1864.  133-134;  Sher- 
man's views  of,  138  n.;  receives  sur- 
render of  Lee,  143 ;  grade  of  Gen- 
eral bestowed  on,  151  ;  correspond- 
ence with  Lee,  concerning  surren- 
der,   628. 

Great  Britain,  lesson  learned  by,  in 
Crimean  War,  534;  inefficiency  of, 
as  compared  with  Germany,  552, 
555. 

Greene,  General  Francis  V.,  commands 
expedition  in  Philippine  campaign, 
196. 

Greene.  General  Nathanael.  recom- 
mendations of,  concerning  Continen- 
tal Army,  9  n.;  quoted  on  a  standing 
army,   17  n. 

Guadaiupe-Hidalgo,  Treaty  of,  89 ; 
terms  of,   601. 

Guam.  Filipinos  deported  to,  261.  See 
Insular   possessions. 

Guanica,  American  landing  at,  in  Porto 
Rico  campaign,   191.   192. 

Guantanamo  Bay,  fortification  of.  314. 
327,  341,  410;  need  of  garrison  at, 
531. 

Guilford  Court  House,  British  victorv 
at,  in  1781,   36. 

Guns,  range  of,  in  fortifications,  485— 
486. 

Habeas  corpus,  suspension  of  writ  of, 
during  War  of  Rebellion.   120. 

Hanover  Court  House,  battle  of,  110. 

Harbour  defence,  coast  defence  distin- 
guished from,   316. 

Harlem  Heights,   occupation  of,    18. 

Harmar.  General,  expedition  of,  against 
Miamis,   46. 

Hawaiian  Islands,  conditions  of  forti- 
fications in.  in  1914,  492-493;  in- 
adequacy of  garrison  in,  529:  force 
needed  in,  530.  See  also  Insular 
possessions. 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  in  command 
of  Union  army  in  1863,  121;  super- 
seded by  Meade,   123. 

Horses,  breeding  of.  for  military  pur- 
poses, 375,  388,  397-398.  413'  417; 
success  of,  hampered  by  limited  ap- 
propriations.   499. 

Horse  Shoe  Bend,  defeat  of  Creek  war- 
riors   at,    65. 

Huidekoper.  General  Henrv  S..  quoted 
on  percentage  of  losses  of  Union  regi- 
ments  at   Gettysburg,    123-124. 

Hiill,  Isaac,  surrender  of,  at  Detroit. 
54. 

Indians,  wars  with,  between  1849  and 
1858,  93.  603;  campaigns  against, 
from  1862  t(vl895,  634-635. 

Infantry,  efforts  to  seciire  proper 
equipment  for  the.  360;  great  short- 
age of,  in  1910.  381;  organization  of, 
of    Organized    Militia,    503. 

Infantry  and  Cavalry  School  estab- 
lished at  Fort  Leavenworth.   152. 

InstructioTi  camps.  See  Camps  of  in- 
struction. 

Insular  possessions,  defences  of.  309, 
311,  314,  320,  327,  341.  360-361. 
373-374,  410,  425;  troons  stationed 
in,  484;  summary  of  conditions  as  to 
fortifications,   in   1915,    490—494;    in- 


adequacy of  garrisons  in,  529—531; 
forces  required  for  proper  garrison- 
ing of,  530-531. 

Intensive  training  of  volunteer  forces, 
544,    545,    547. 

Intoxicants,  measure  prohibiting  sale 
of,  at  army  posts,  225;. ill  effects  of 
prohibition,  257,   407. 

Invasion,  openness  of  United  States  to, 
532. 

Investigating  Commission  appointed  to 
inquire  into  conduct  of  War  Depart- 
ment in  war  with  Spain,   213. 

Island  No.  10,  capture  of,  110. 

luka.  Union  victory  at,   112. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  commands  force 
against  Creek  Indians,  61,  65;  wins 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  67-68; 
crushes  Indians  in  Seminole  War  of 
1817,    70-71. 

Jackson,    "Stonewall,"   death  of,   121. 

Japanese,  skill  in  disembarkation 
shown  by,  at  Chemulpo,  178,  649— 
652  ;  superior  organization  and 
equipment  of,  shown  in  Peking  Re- 
lief   Expedition,    248. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  influence  of,  in  op- 
position to  standing  army,  50-51; 
in  1814.  favours  military  training  of 
whole  body  of  male   citizens,   66. 

Johnston,  Lieut.  Gordon,  gallantrj^  of, 
321. 

Joint  manoeuvres.     See  Manoeuvres. 

Kansas,   desertions  among  troops  from, 

in  War  of  Rebellion.  631. 
Kenesaw   IMountain.    battle   of.    136. 
King's  Mountain,   defeat  of  British  at, 

in   1780,    32. 
Knox.    General,    quoted    on    a    standing 

army,    17   n. 

Lafavette.  Marquis  de.  services  of,  in 
Revolution,  20,  26,  32,  37. 

Las  Guasimas.   battle  of.    179. 

Lawton,  General,  in  Santiago  cam- 
paign, 178,  179,  180;  in  command  at 
El  Caney.  181-182;  left  in  command 
of  Province  of  Santiago,  190;  in 
Philippine  War,  230,  234;  death  of, 
236. 

Lee.  Robert  E..  in  command  of  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  111;  defeat  of 
General  Hooker  by,  121;  invasion  of 
Pennsylvania  by,  122;  defeat  of,  at 
Gettysburg,  123;  defence  offered  by, 
in  campaign  of  1864,  133-138;  ef- 
forts of.  in  1865,  to  overwhelm 
Grant.  141-143;  surrender  of.  143; 
correspondence  with  Grant  concern- 
ing surrender.    628. 

Lessons  of  past  wars,  summary  of, 
269-272. 

Lewistown,  burned  bv  British  in  War 
of   1812,    58. 

Lexington,  engagement  at,  6.  7. 

Lieutenant-General,  end  of  office  of, 
332. 

Lieutenants,  law  permitting  appoint- 
ment of.   from  civil  life.  288. 

Lincoln.  President,  justifiable  assump- 
tion by,  of  war  powers  belonging  to 
Congress,  97;  enrolment  and  draft 
enforced   by.    118-120. 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  quoted  in  connec- 
tion   with*  Santiago    campaign,    180— 


Index 


729 


181,  183-184;  on  the  Porto  Rico 
campaign,  196. 

Logan,  Maj.  James  A.,  Jr.,  efficiency  in 
relieving  sufferers  from  floods,  in 
1913,  421;  contribution  to  Field  Serv- 
ice Regulations,  in  1914,  450. 

Long  Island,  defeat  of  Americans  at 
battle  of,    16. 

Long  Island  Sound,  need  of  fortifica- 
tions at  entrance  to,  327,  373. 

Louisburg,  siege  of,  participated  in  by 
Colonial  militia,  3,  4;  moral  effect 
of,  on  colonists,  4. 

Lundy's  Lane,  battle  of,  63. 


MacArthur,  General,  commands  expe- 
dition in  Philippine  campaign,  197; 
activities  in  Philippine  War,  229— 
236;  succeeds  General  Otis  in  com- 
mand, 242 :  succeeded  by  General 
Chaffee  as  Military  Governor,  263; 
efficiency   of,   263. 

McCoy,  Captain  Frank  R.,  leads  suc- 
cessful expedition  against  Moro  out- 
laws, 312-313. 

Machine-guns,  supply  of,  in  1915,  477— 
478. 

McKinley,  President,  calls  for  volun- 
teers issued  by,  in  Spanish-American 
War,  162,  163;  mistaken  "benevo- 
lent assimilation''  theory  of,  regard- 
ing Filipinos,  220,  221. 

Maine,  blowing  up  of  the,  in  Havana 
harbour,    156. 

Major  General,  question  of  abolishing 
grade  of,  during  1828  and  1829,  72. 

Major  Generals,  act  of  1862  providing 
for  appointment  of,  106;  appoint- 
ment of  additional,  in  1863,  115; 
legislation  concerning,   in   1899,   223. 

Malvern  Hill,   battle  of.   111. 

Manassas,  military  manoeuvres  at,  in 
1904,    305-306. 

"Manchu    law,"    the,    398-399. 

Manila,  Spanish  fleet  annihilated  at, 
167;  surrender  of  walled  portion  of 
city,  to  American  army,   199. 

Manoeuvre  division,  organization  of,  in 
Texas  in  1911,  390-393. 

Manoeuvres,  joint,  of  land  and  naval 
forces,  in  1902,  288;  military,  at 
Manassas,  in  1904,  305-306;  appro- 
priation for,  in  1906,  316;  of  Regu- 
lars and  militia,  in  1906,  323;  in 
1908,  352;  in  1909,  359;  joint  coast 
defence    exercises    in    1910,    375;    in 

1911,  393;     appropriation     for,     in 

1912,  406;    five   held   in    1912,    408- 
409;  appropriation  for,  in  1913,  415. 

Marion,  Francis.  partisan  warfare 
waged  by,   in  Revolution,    31,   32. 

Maryland,  number  of  soldiers  furnished 
Continental   Army  by,    574. 

Massachusetts,  military  measures  of 
Colonial  Assembly  of,  5 ;  force  raised 
by,  against  England,  5—6;  force 
raised  in  1775,  7;  drafting  of  troops 
by,  20;  independence  claimed  by, 
for  state  militia,  in  War  of  1812,  53; 
National  Guard  manoeuvres  in,  393 ; 
number  of  soldiers  furnished  Conti- 
nental Army  by,  574. 

Meade,  General,  commands  Union  army 
at  Gettysburg,  123—124;  command's 
Armv  of  Potomac  in  campaign  of 
1864,    133-135. 


Medals,  appropriation  for  awarding 
annual,  299. 

Medals  of  honor  for  non-commissioned 
officers  and  privates,  appropriation 
for,  107;  the  "American  Victoria 
Cross,"  107—108;  legislation  in 
1904  and  1907  concerning,  303-304, 
334. 

Medical  Department,  law  providing  for 
appointment  of  officers  in  1862,  105; 
legislation  of  1898  regarding,  163; 
increase  in,  324;  reorganization  in 
1908,  343-^46;  field  schools  of  in- 
struction for  officers,  363;  retire- 
ment of  officers,  371;  dental  corps 
attached  to,  386;  conditions  as  to, 
in   1914,   494-495. 

Medical  Reserve  Corps,  creation  of, 
344—345;  regulations  concerning, 
345—346;  retirement  of  officers  of, 
388. 

Merrimac  defeated  by  Monitor,  110. 

Merritt,  Wesley,  commands  American 
forces  in  Philippine  campaign,  167, 
197-201. 

Mexican  War,  reasons  for  American 
successes  in,  79 ;  militarv  policy 
during  1845  and  1846,  79-84;  mili- 
tary legislation  during  1847,  84; 
campaign  of  1847,  84—89;  troops  em- 
ployed during  war,  89 ;  cost  of  war, 
89—90;  criticism  of  Government's 
management  of,  90—91;  statistics  of, 
for  purposes  of  comparison,  275, 
602,    603. 

Mexico,  despatch  of  troops  to  protect 
border,  in  1911,  390-393;  patrol  of 
frontier,  necessary  in  1912,  408; 
military  operations  on  frontier  of. 
In  1913,  418;  legislation  in  1914' re- 
garding use  of  armed  force  against, 
444;  patrolling  of  frontier  in  1914, 
445 ;  naval  and  military  forces  sent 
to,  445—446 ;  withdrawal  of  Ameri- 
can forces,  447;  attempt  by  Napo- 
leon III  to  establish  a  monarchv  in 
(1861-1867),   633. 

Mexico,  City  of,  captured  bv  General 
Scott,  89. 

Miles,  General,  quoted  in  connection 
with  despatch  of  American  force  to 
take  Havana,  168—169;  request  of, 
to  accompany  Shaffer's  expedition  in 
Santiago  campaign  ignored,  176;  ar- 
rives at  Siboney  with  transports  and 
shares  in.  negotiations  for  surrender 
of  Santiago,  188;  moves  trans'iorts 
to  Guantanamo,  188:  commands  ex- 
pedition to  Porto  Rico,  191—196; 
origin  of  plan  of  Santiago  campaign 
with,  210;  efficiency  of  work  in 
Porto  Rico,    663. 

Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  cre- 
ation of,  50;  enlargement  of,  by  leg- 
islation of  1899,  222:  appropriation 
for  enlargement  of  buildings  at,  286; 
centennial  celebration  at,  287; 
change  in  schedule  of  studies  at, 
341;  pay  of  cadets  at,  346;  instruc- 
tion of  Filipinos  at,  351:  increase  in 
frequency  of  appointment  of  candi- 
dates for,  recommended,  361;  legis- 
lation providing  for  increase  in  num- 
ber of  cadets,  369—370;  importance 
of  enlarging,  to  its  maximum  capac- 
ity, 554;  number  of  graduates  avail- 


730 


Index 


able  foi  service  at  opening  of  War  of 
the  Rebellion,   608. 

Military  prisons,  legislation  concern- 
ing, 332-333;  reforms  in  adminis- 
tration of,    410,   424,    457-458. 

Military  records,  collection  of,  416— 
417. 

Military  schools,  origin  of  system  of, 
in  Morrill  act  of  1862,  105-106;  de- 
tail of  officers  as  instructors  in,  257. 

Military  Secretary,  creation  of  office 
of,  309,  310;  abolition  of  office  of, 
332. 

Military  service,  owed  by  every  able- 
bodied  male  citizen,  526. 

Military  strength  of  United  States  and 
other  nations,  522—523. 

Militia,  the  Colonial,  3—4;  force  of, 
raised  by  Massachusetts  Assembly  in 
1775,  7;  reason  for  success  of,  at 
Bunker  Hill,  8 ;  raising  of,  author- 
ized by  Continental  Congress,  to  be 
called  the  American  Continental 
Army,  9—10;  evils  of  short  enlist- 
ment periods  for,  12-13,  14-15,  86- 
87,  96-97,  146-147,  206-209,  220- 
221,  269-270;  Washington  quoted 
on  disadvantages  attached  to,  16—17; 
Washington's  views  on,  in  letter  to 
President  of  Congress,  28—30 ;  Wash- 
ington's  views  on  proper  establish- 
ment of,  in  time  of  peace,  43 ;  pow- 
ers of  President  as  to,  under  Act  of 
1789,  45—46;  law  passed  by  Con- 
gress in  1792  regarding,  47—48; 
State  control  over,  claimed  by  Mas- 
sachusetts and  Connecticut  at  open- 
ing of  War  of  1812,  53;  attitude  of 
Governor  Chittenden  of  Vermont  re- 
garding, 59-60;  number  called  out 
in  1813,  61;  ignominious  conduct  of, 
at  Bladensburg,  in  1814,  64;  num- 
ber employed  in  1814,  65:  total  num- 
ber under  arms  during  War  of  1812, 
69;  number  employed  during  Mexi- 
can War,  89 ;  condition  of,  at  open- 
ing of  War  of  the  Rebellion,  94; 
number  employed  in  1861,  104; 
measure  relative  to,  passed  by  Con- 
gress in  1862,  107;  inefficiency  of. 
at  opening  of  Spanish-American 
War,  158;  numbers  employed  in  dif- 
ferent wars,  275;  folly  of  placing 
dependence  on,  in  preference  to  Reg- 
ular Army,  2  78;  battles  in  which 
militia  ran  away  or  deserted,  279; 
battles  in  which  militia  mutinied, 
280 ;  States  which  have  defied  the 
Government  by  refusing  to  furnish, 
281;  merits  and  defects  of  provi- 
sions of  Dick  bill  relative  to,  289— 
292;  progress  made  in  bringing 
armament  and  equipment  up  to 
standard  of  Regular  Army,  309; 
joint  manceuvres  of  Regular  Army 
and,  323,  352,  359;  organization  of, 
according  to  Act  of  May  27,  1908, 
348-351,  694-698;  creation  of  a 
Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  354;  first 
meeting  of  National  Militia  Board, 
355;  strength  in  1909,  362;  matter 
of  practical  instruction  of,  362—363; 
measures  for  cooperation  between 
Army  and,  364—366;  participation 
of,  in  encampments,  manceuvres,  and 
field  instruction  of  Regular  Army, 
370-371;  strength  in  1910,  374;  as- 


signment of  Regular  officers  to  duty 
with,  385,  393-394;  strength  in 
1913,  425;  strength  of  Organized 
Militia,  and  general  conditions  as  to, 
at  end  of  1914,  499-515;  reserve  of, 
lacking,  515;  necessity  for  reserve, 
515;  projected  legislation  concern- 
ing reserve,  517;  deficiency  as  a 
military  asset,  541—542;  comparison 
of,  with  analogous  forces  of  other 
English-speaking  countries,  542— 
543 ;  reasons  for  poor  showing  made 
by  United  States,  543  ;  remedies  for 
present  conditions,  543—548;  plan 
for  force  of  United  States  Volun- 
teers to  take  place  of,  as  second  line 
of  defence,  544—545;  should  consti- 
tute third  line  of  defence  so  long  as 
it  remains  a  State  force,  545—547; 
doubling  of  efficiency  of,  by  placing 
under  exclusivelj'^  Federal  control, 
547 ;  seven-5'ear  term  of  enlistment 
under  proposed  Federal  Militia  plan, 
547;  proposed  plan  for  ascertaining 
worth  of  Organized  Militia  as  at 
present  constituted,   548. 

Militia  Pay  bill,  517. 

Minute-men,  members  of  Massachusetts 
militia  classed  as,  6;  losses  among, 
at  Concord  and  Lexington,  7 ;  meas- 
ure regarding,  passed  by  Continental 
Congress,   10. 

Mississippi,  opening  of  the,  by  Union 
fleet  in  1862,   110. 

Mobile  Army,  distribution  and  shelter 
of  the,   366-369. 

Mobilization,  first  American  scheme  of, 
10;  of  manojuvre  division  in  Texas 
in  1911,    391-393. 

Molino  del  Rey,  battle  of,  88-89. 

Monmouth,  American  victory  at  battle 
of,  23. 

Monocacy,  battle  of,   135. 

Monroe,  James,  succeeds  Armstrong  as 
Secretary  of  War  in  1814,  65. 

Montauk  Point,  transference  of  troops 
to,    from   Cuba,    190. 

Monterey,  battle  of,  in  Mexican  War, 
83. 

Monterey,  Cal.,  camp  for  military  in- 
struction of  college  undergraduates 
at,  in  1913,   422. 

Morgan,  General,  defeats  Tarleton  at 
Cowpens,    35. 

Moro  outlaws,  expeditions  against, 
287,  300,  305,  312,  321,  352,  359, 
389.    407-408,    445. 

Morrill  act,  system  of  military  schools 
starting  with  passage  of,   105—106. 

Mount  Gretna,  Pa.,  school  of  instruc- 
tion at,   323. 

Munitions  of  war,  export  of,  406. 

Mutinies,  of  troops  in  War  of  1812, 
54-55,  58,  61;  tabular  record  of, 
on  part  of  militia,  280. 

Mutiny  of  Continental  troops  in  1781, 
33-34. 

Napoleon,  practice  by,  in  embarkation 
of  troops,  175 :  three  fundamental 
rules  of  war  laid  down  by,  183 ;  on 
value  of  the  individual  rather  than 
individuals  in  war,  211;  on  value  of 
time,  556;  on  necessity  of  unity  in 
command,   600. 

National  Coast  Defense  Board  ("Taft 
Board"),   appointment  of,   314—315; 


Index 


731 


report  of,  314-315,  325-328;  pre- 
liminary work  of,  315—316;  deduc- 
tions from  report  of,  328. 

National  defence,  a  cardinal  duty  of 
every  statesman,  525,  576;  question 
of  whether  people  want,  526. 

National  Guard  Association,  opposition 
to  policy  of  War  Department  ex- 
pressed at  Chicago  convention  of, 
428. 

National  Militia  Board,  355. 

National  Remount  Association,  428, 
714. 

National  Security  League,  organization 
of,   452-453. 

Naval  victories  won  by  Americans  in 
War  of   1812,   65-66. 

Navy,  efficiency  of  American,  in  war 
with  Spain,  167;  record  of  land 
forces  contrasted  with  that  of  the, 
283,    527. 

Negroes  in  military  service,  provisions 
of  1864  regarding,   131. 

New  England,  forces  of,  at  battle  of 
Bunker  Hill,   7-8. 

New  Hampshire,  number  of  soldiers 
furnished  Continental  Army  by,  574; 
desertions  among  troops  from,  in 
War  of  Rebellion,   631. 

New  Haven,  sacking  of,  during  War 
of  Revolution,    26. 

New  Hope  Church,  battle  of,   136. 

New  Jersev,  militarv  operations  in,  in 
1776  and  1777,  19-20;  bounties  of- 
fered by,  in  1779,  25;  number  of 
soldiers  furnished  Continental  Army 
by,   574. 

New  Orleans,  defeat  of  British  at,  in 
1815,  67-68,  589,  590;  surrender  of, 
to  Farragut  in  1862,  110. 

Newport,  operations  bv  land  and  sea 
about,  in  1778,  23-24. 

New  York,  number  of  soldiers  fur- 
nished Continental  Army  by,   574. 

New  York  City,  draft  riot  in,   119. 

Non-commissioned  officers,  value  of, 
338,    533. 

North  Carolina,  invasion  of,  by  British 
in  1780,  31-32;  in  1781,  34-36. 

Officers,  appointment  of,  as  reward  for 
ability    to    enroll    men,    in    War    of 
Revolution,     7 ;     resignation     of,     in 
1778,   22;    system  of  electing  Volun 
teer,  in  War  of  Rebellion,   abolished 
99;    acts    relating    to    retirement    of 
106,    371;    establishment   of   principle 
of    selection,    by    act    of    1862,    107 
Sherman's     criticism     of     system     o 
promotion,   146  n.;   schools  for,   152 
handicap    from    lack    of    trained,    in 
Spanish-American      War,      205—206 
legislation  of  1899  concerning  Regu 
lar  and  Volunteer,  223-224;   legisla 
tion    of    1901    concerning,    254—256 
law  permitting  appointment  of,   from 
civil   life,    255,    288;    detrimental    ef- 
fect of  detachment  of,  337,  353,  361 
phvsical     tests    for,     342-343,     354- 
355,    361;   pay   of,    346;    ranking   of 
on  marches,  guards,  and  in  quarters 
369;    ranking    of,    of    organized    mi 
litia,    369;    limitations  on   appropria 
tions    for    constructing   quarters    for 
372,    416;    modification    of    physical 
tests   for,    373;    to   be   dropped   from 
rolls   for   absence   from   duty   or   im- 


prisonment, 383;  promotion  of,  386— 
387;  assigned  to  duty  with  militia, 
393-394;  legislation  of  1912  con- 
cerning detached  service  and  ab- 
senteeism of,  398—399;  Service  Tests 
for,  413,  428;  provisions  regarding 
Presidential  appointment  of  Volun- 
teer, contained  in  Act  of  1914,  432; 
shortness  of  supply  of,  in  1915,  470— 
471;  failure  of  bills  providing  for 
increase  in  number  of,  516;  pro- 
jected legislation  concerning  cre- 
ation of  a  reserve  of,  517;  necessity 
for  extra,  under  suggested  organiza- 
tion of  land  forces,  537—538;  system 
of  elimination  and  selection  an  im- 
perative need,  538;  importance  of 
reserve  force  of,   550—551. 

Okeechobee,  Lake,  fight  with  Indians 
at,   75. 

Ordnance,  donation  of  condemned,  to 
States,  towns,  and  organizations, 
356—357;  recommendations  concern- 
ing coast  defence  guns,  in  1914, 
451-452. 

Ordnance  Department,  application  of 
scientific  management  principles  to, 
397. 

Ordnance  stores,  sale  of,  to  State  rifle 
clubs,    311. 

Otis,  General,  given  chief  command  in 
Philippines,  201;  Military  Governor 
of  Philippines,   208,  220,  242. 

Pakenham,  General,  in  command  of 
British  at  New  Orleans,   67-68,   590. 

Palo  Alto,  defeat  of  Mexicans  at,  81.* 

Panama  Canal,  fortification  of,  327, 
389,  398,  417,  453;  recognition  of 
services  of  officers  in  connection  with 
construction  of,  462—463 ;  conditions 
as  to  fortifications  in  1914,  490-492; 
inadequacy  of  present  protection  of, 
529;  force  really  required  in,  530. 

Paper  money,  evils  of,  experienced  by 
Continental  Army,    22,    27. 

Paris,  Comte  de,  quoted  on  results  of 
battle  of  Bull  Run,   102-103. 

Paris,   Peace  of,   39. 

Patriotism,  what  constitutes  true,   524. 

Pay,  of  enlisted  men,  163,  331,  336, 
347;  of  officers,  346;  of  officers  and 
enlisted  men  in  case  of  absence  from 
duty,  398-400;  of  soldiers  in  the 
proposed  reserve,    536. 

Peking  Relief  Expedition,   242^252. 

Pennsylvania,  number  of  soldiers  fur- 
nished Continental  Army  by,   574. 

Pensions,  institution  of  system,  in  War 
of  Revolution,  25,  565;  amount  paid 
in,  as  result  of  War  of  Revolution, 
40;  acts  of  Congress  dealing  with, 
106;  amount  paid  out  as  result  of 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  150;  paid  out 
on  account  of  Spanish-American  War 
and  Philippine  insurrection,  201, 
264;  total  cost  of,  since  1790,   276. 

Perryville,   battle  of,   113. 

Philippine  Commission,  members  of, 
230. 

Philippine  Constabulary,  legislation  re- 
garding the,  292. 

Philippine  Islands,  campaign  in  the, 
in  Spanish-American  War,  196—201; 
beginning  of  troubles  with  natives 
of,  208 ;  military  events  in,  from 
1902    to    1914,    287,    300,    305,    312, 


732 


Index 


321,  334,  352,  359,  389,  407,  445; 
changes  and  improvements  in  garri- 
son in,  made  in  1912,  409;  condi- 
tions as  to  fortifications  in,  in  1914, 
493—494;  inadequacy  of  garrisons  in, 
529;  force  needed  in,  530.  See  also 
Insular  possessions. 

Philippine  Scouts,  enlistment  of  body 
of,  256;  legislation  regarding  the, 
292;  number  of,  in  1907,  335;  office 
of  captain  in,  347;  education  of  offi- 
cers for,  a%  West  Point,  351; 
strength  in   1915,   466. 

Philippine  War,  breaking  out  of,  208; 
causes  of,  220;  number  of  troops 
employed,  228,  263-264;  important 
operations  of  1899,  229-236;  oper- 
ations during  1900,  239-242;  end 
of,  in  1901,  260-262;  capture  of 
Aguinaldo,  261—262;  cost  of  war, 
264;  lessons  of  war,  265-268;  sta- 
tistics of,  for  purposes  of  compari- 
son, 275;  final  termination  of,  in 
1902,    287. 

Physical  tests  for  officers,  342-343, 
354-355;  modification  of,  361,  373. 

Physical  training,  value  of  military 
drill  for,   551-552. 

Pistols,  supply  of,  for  Army,  in  1915, 
480. 

Plattsburg,  Military  Instruction  Camp 
at,   465. 

Police  forces,  cost  of,  compared  with 
cost  of  maintenance  of  United  States 
Army,  519-520. 

Ponce,  landing  of  American  force  at, 
in  Porto  Rico  campaign,   192—193. 

Porto  Rico,  campaign  of,  in  Spanish- 
American  War,  191—196;  efficiency 
of  Regular  officers  who  conducted, 
663. 

Porto  Rico  Regiment,  organization  of, 
256-257;  legislation  in  1908  con- 
cerning, 347—348;  provisions  con- 
cerning officers  of,    456. 

Powder,  lack  of  smokeless,  in  American 
Army  in  Spanish-American  War, 
154,  183;  first  step  toward  Govern- 
ment manufacture  of,  320 ;  capacity 
for  manufacture  of,  in  United  States, 
479;  imported  ingredients  necessary 
to  manufacture  of,  520—521. 

President  of  United  States,  military 
powers  vested  in,  by  Constitution, 
45. 

Princeton,  battle  of,  19 ;  strength  of 
Washington's  army  at,    40. 

Prizes,   awarding  of  annual,   299. 

Promotions,  legislation  concerning, 
254-255,    386. 

Prussians,  Americans  contrasted  with, 
as  to  length  of  time  taken  for  cre- 
ating a  military  system,  99—100. 

Quartermaster  Corps,  consolidation  of 
supply  departments  into  a,  401,  403; 
provisions  as  to  strength  of  enlisted 
force  of,  438;  legislation  of  1915 
concerning,  454—455 ;  text  of  pro- 
visions of  Act  of  August  24,  1912, 
concerning,   708—710. 

Quartermaster's  Department,  increase 
in,  in  1911,   385-386. 

Quebec,  American  expedition  against, 
in   War   of  Revolution,    13. 

Queenstown,  defeat  of  American  force 
at,   in  War  of   1812,   55. 


Railways,  assumption  of  control  of,  by 
Government  in  1862,   105. 

Range-finders,  lack  of,  in  Army,  474; 
American  dependence  upon  Germany 
for  lenses  for,  521-522. 

Rangers,  total  number  under  arms  in 
War  of  1812,  69;  number  employed 
during  Mexican  War,    89. 

Rebellion,  War  of,  condition  of  military 
forces  at  beginning  of,  94;  policy  of 
United  States  in  creating  a  military 
system,  94—100;  campaign  of  1861, 
100-103;  results  of  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  102—103;  troops  employed  in 
1861,  103-104;  military  legislation 
in  1862,  105-108;  calls  for  troops 
in  1862,  108-109;  campaign  of  1862, 
109—114;  military  situation  favour- 
able to  South  at  close  of  1862,  114; 
military  legislation  during  1863, 
115—121;  enforcement  of  the  draft, 
117-120;  campaign  of  1863,  121- 
127;  military  legislation  in  1864, 
128-132;     calls     for     troops     during 

1864,  132-133;  campaign  of  1864, 
133-138;      military      legislation      in 

1865,  139-141;  campaign  of  1865, 
141—143;  Lee's  surrender  and  end 
of  war,  143—144;  lessons  of  war, 
145-150;  cost  of,  150;  statistics  of, 
for  purposes  of  comparison,  275. 

Recruitment,  Sherman's  criticism  of 
mode  of,  in  Union  army,  146  n.;  re- 
form needed  in  system  of,  549—550. 

Recruits,  difficulty  in  obtaining,  and 
reasons,  335-337. 

Re-enlistment,  bonuses  for,  347. 

Regular  Army,  Washington's  views 
concerning,  28—30;  increase  of,  au- 
thorized in  1861,  98.  See  under 
Army. 

Regular  soldiers,  total  number  under 
arms  in  War  of  1812,  69;  employed 
during  Mexican  War,  89  ;  number  in 
field  at  beginning  of  1862,  104;  effi- 
ciency of  American  forces  in  Philip- 
pine War  due  to  employment  of,  265; 
numbers  employed  in  different  wars, 
275. 

Remains  of  army  men,  appropriation 
for  return  of,   to  homes,    311-312. 

Remount  depots,   conditions  as  to,  499. 

Resaca,  Johnston  defeated  by  Sherman 
at,  136. 

Resaca  de  la  Palma,  defeat  of  Mexicans 
at,  81. 

Reserve,  results  of  lack  of  a  proper, 
269 ;  absence  of,  a  defect  in  Ameri- 
can military  system,  382 ;  need  of, 
emphasized  by  experience  in  mobil- 
ization in  Texas  in  1911,  392;  cre- 
ation of  a,  in  1912,  401-402,  706- 
708 ;  defects  of  measure  creating, 
402-403  ;  ineffectiveness  of  plan  for, 
to  date,  515;  projected  legislation 
concerning,  516,  517;  maintenance 
of,  under  suggested  organization  of 
land  forces,  533;  reasons  for  laying 
stress  upon,  534:  pay  of,  536. 

Reserve  corps  of  officers,  538,  550-551. 

Reserve  supplv  depots,  380;  supplies 
at,  at  end  of  1914,  495-498. 

Reserve  system  for  Organized^  Militia, 
426. 

Retired  officers,  assignment  to  service 
in  connection  with  militia,  298 ;  legis- 


Index 


733 


lation  in  1904  regarding,  303 ;  pay 
of,  310;  legislation  in  1906,  316. 

Retirement  of  enlisted  men,  400. 

Revolution,  War  of  the,  military  condi- 
tions at  period  of,  7  ff.;  fights  at 
Concord  and  Lexington  and  retreat 
of  British,  7 ;  meeting  of  Second 
Continental  Congress  and  creation  of 
Continental  Army,  7—10;  Washing- 
ton appointed  Commander-in-Chief, 
10;  invasion  of  Canada,  12-13;  cam- 
paign of  1776,  14-19;  campaign  of 
1777,  19-21;  campaign  of  1778,  21- 
24;  campaign  of  1779,  24-27;  cam- 
paign of  1780,  27-33;  campaign  of 
1781,  33-38;  surrender  of  Cornwal- 
lis  and  close  of  war,  38—39;  cost  of, 
40 ;  lessons  of  the  war,  40—42 ;  sta- 
tistics of,   275. 

Richmond,  burning  of,  by  Benedict 
Arnold,  35;  Lee's  army  besieged  by 
Grant  in,    135,    138. 

Rich    Mountain,    Union    victory    at,    in 

1861,  100. 

Rifle  clubs,  formation  of  civilian  and 
school  boy,  359. 

Rifle  contest,  first  national,  300—301; 
second,  306. 

Rifle  practice,  appropriation  made  in 
1906  to  encourage,  317;  progress  in, 
359,  363;  defects  of,  in  Organized 
Militia,  510. 

Rifles,  sale  of  Army,  to  State  rifle 
clubs,  311;  change  in  Army,  in  1908, 
352;  appropriations  for,  and  number 
needed  as  a  reserve,  378;  supply  of 
infantry,  in  1915,  478. 

River  and  harbour  work,  detachment  of 
officers  for,  353,  537;  should  be  in 
Interior  rather  than  War  Depart- 
ment,  553. 

Roanoke  Island,  taken  by  Burnside,  in 

1862,  110. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  quoted  on  condi- 
tions at  Tampa  before  embarkation 
of  army  for  Cuba,  172—174;  on  con- 
ditions on  troop-ships  while  at  an- 
chor in  Tampa  harbour,  175—176; 
as  President,  advocates  increase  in 
Medical  and  Ordnance  departments, 
314;  physical  tests  of  officers  di- 
rected by,    342-343. 

Rough  Riders,  experiences  of,  in  Span- 
ish-American  War,    170-174,    179. 

"Round  robin"  episode  in  Spanish- 
American  War,   190,  659. 

Sackett's  Harbor,  defeat  of  British  at, 
in  War  of  1812,   58. 

Sailor's  Creek,  battle  of,   142. 

St.  Clair,  General,  disastrous  rout  of 
expedition  of,  46—47. 

Salaries  of  officers,  346. 

San  Francisco  earthquake  and  fire, 
service  rendered  by  Regular  troops 
at  time  of,  321. 

Sanitary  troops  of  the  Organized  Mi- 
litia,  507-508. 

San  Juan  Hill,  action  of,  in  battle  of 
Santiago,   184-185. 

Santa  Anna,  General,  defeated  by  Tay- 
lor at  Buena  Vista,  85 ;  defeated  by 
Scott  at  Cerro  Gordo,   86. 

Santiago,  campaign  of,  in  Spanish- 
American  AVar,  169  ff . ;  battle  of, 
181—187:  bombardment  and  surren- 
der of  city,  188. 


Saratoga,  American  victory  at,  20,  40, 
563. 

Savannah,  occupation  of,  by  British 
during  Revolution,   26—27. 

Schooling  of  troops,  account  of  innova- 
tions in,  322-323. 

School  of  Musketry,  establishment  of, 
at  Fort  Sill,  423. 

Schools,  founding  of  system  of  mili- 
tary, 105-106;  officers  detailed  as 
instructors  in  military,  257;  military 
training  in,  551. 

Schools  of  instruction,  for  Organized 
Militia,  362-363;  for  field  artillery, 
363;  among  the  Swiss,  544—545. 
See  Camps  of  instruction. 

Scientific  management,  introduction  of, 
in  arsenals,  395,  397,  424;  modifica- 
tion  of.   by    legislation   of    1915,    458. 

Scott,  Winfield,  in  command  against 
Florida  Indians,  74-75;  in  Mexican 
War,  85-89. 

Seacoast  fortification.  See  Coast  de- 
fence. 

Seagirt,  first  national  rifle  contest  at, 
300-301. 

Searchlights,  installation  of,  in  fortifi- 
cations,  380,   487,  488. 

Second-Line  Army,  creation  of,  sug- 
gested,  544. 

Selection,  principle  of,  applied  to  pro- 
motions,  361. 

Seminole  War,  of  1817,  70-71;  second, 
from  1835  to  1842,  73-77;  statistics 
of,  275. 

Service  tests  for  officers,  413—414,  428. 

Seven  Days'   Campaign,  in  1862,   111. 

Seven  Pines  (Fair  Oaks),  battle  of, 
110. 

Shafter,  General,  commands  American, 
force  in  Santiago  campaign,  168— 
190:  opinion  of  fitness  for  command 
in  Cuba,  204. 

Shays'  Rebellion,  44, '575-576. 

Sheridan,  General,  placed  in  command 
of  Union  cavalry,  133;  raids  by,  134, 
135;  in  command  of  Middle  Military 
Division,  136;  wins  battle  of  Win- 
chester, 136;  important  services  in 
campaign  of  1865,  141,   142,   143. 

Sherman,  General,  in  command  of  Mili- 
tary Division  of  the  Mississippi,  133; 
''march  to  the  sea"  of,  137. 

Shiloh,   battle  of,    110. 

Shirley,  Representative,  statement  of, 
as  to  fortifications,   482  n.,   490. 

Short  enlistments,  disadvantages  of, 
12-13,  14-15,  86-87,  269-270; 
blunder  of,  repeated  in  War  of  the 
Rebellion,  96—97;  folly  of,  shown  in 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  146-147;  in 
Spanish-American  War,  206-209; 
predicament  caused  by,  in  Philippine 
War,   220-221. 

Siboney,  landing  of  American  troops  at, 
in   Spanish-American  War,    178. 

Signal  corps,  law  prescribing  organiza- 
tion of,  in  1863,  115;  organization 
of  a  Volunteer,  authorized  bv  legis- 
lation of  1898,  163;  of  Organized 
Militia,  507;  legislation  for  increase 
in  number  of  officers,  518. 

Slaves,  enlistment  of,  proposed  in  War 
of  Revolution,    22. 

Small-arms,  conditions  as  to,  in  1915, 
478 ;  shortage  of  ammunition  for,, 
478-480. 


734 


Index 


Smokeless  powder,  lack  of,  in  American 
Army  in  Spanish-American  War,  154, 
183 ;  manufacture  of,  by  Govern- 
ment, 352. 
Society  of  the  National  Reserve  Corps 
of  the  United  States,  formation  of, 
422-423. 
South  Carolina,  military  operations  in, 
during  1780,  31;  number  of  soldiers 
furnished  Continental  Army  by,  574. 
Spanish-American  War,  small  size  of 
Army  at  opening  of,  153;  other  con- 
ditions of  unpreparedness,  153—155; 
steps  leading  up  to,  155—156;  mili- 
tary preparations  upon  threat  of  war, 
156—158;  declaration  of  war,  159; 
merits  and  demerits  of  military  leg- 
islation of  1898,  165-166;  prepara- 
tions for  invasion  of  Cuba,  166—169; 
campaign  of  Santiago,  169—190; 
signing  of  peace  protocol,  190;  cam- 
paign of  Porto  Rico,  191—196;  cam- 
paign in  the  Philippines,  196—201; 
signing  of  Peace  of  Paris  and  end  of 
war,  201;  forces  employed  and  cost, 
201;  lessons  of  the  war,  202-219; 
statistics  of,  for  purposes  of  com- 
parison,  275. 

Spies,  punishment  of,   387—388. 

Spottsylvania,    battle  of,    134. 

Staff  departments,  achievements  of,  in 
Spanish-American  War,   668-671. 

Standing  army.      See  Army. 

State  Maneuver  Camp,  Austin,  Texas, 
323. 

States,  control  of  militia  forces  by,  a 
preposterous   condition,    545—547. 

Steel,  manufacture  of,  dependent  on 
imported   material,    520—521. 

Steuben,  Baron  von,  reforms  intro- 
duced by,  in  Continental  Army,  21. 

Stimson,  Secretary,  recommendations 
concerning  needs  of  the  military 
service  in  1911,  396-397;  on  the 
purpose  of  a  reserve  for  the  Regu- 
lar Army,  401-402;  on  bad  effects 
of  anticanteen  legislation,  406—407 ; 
on  value  of  cavalry  as  shown  by  pa- 
trol of  Mexican  border,  408;  pre- 
sides at  conferences  for  discussing 
complete  reorganization  of  Army, 
410;  quoted  on  conferences,  411;  im- 
portant recommendations  for  1912, 
412-413. 

Stony  Point,  storming  of,  by  Anthony 
Wayne,   26. 

Students'  Military  Instruction  camps, 
422,  448-449;  legislation  relative 
to.  518;  dire  need  of,  in  United 
States,   552. 

Submarine  mines,  equipment  of  United 
States  in,    487,    493-494. 

Submarines,  fleet  of,  as  a  protection  for 
unfortified  coasts,   553. 

Sumter,  Thomas,  partisan  warfare 
waged  by,  in  Revolution,  31,  32. 

Supply  department,  a  general,  needed 
for  American   Army,   204—205. 

Supply  depots,  lack  of,  380. 

Swiss,  military  training  of  the,  544— 
545. 


Tables  of  Organization  prepared  by 
General  Staff,  publication  of,   450. 

Taft,  William  H.,  appointed  Civil  Gov- 
ernor of  Philippines,    262-263. 


Taft    Board.      See    National    Coast    De- 
fense  Board. 
Tampa,   chaotic   conditions  at,    showing 
military    unpreparedness    at    opening 
of   Spanish-American  War,    170—174, 

Target  and  Maneuver  Reservation, 
Wyoming,    323. 

Tarleton,  General,  defeat  of,  by  Mor- 
gan at  Cowpens,  34—35, 

Taylor,  Zachary,  entrusted  with  de- 
fence of  Texas  in  1844,  79;  com- 
mands American  army  against  Mex- 
ico,   80-85. 

Telegraph,  assumption  of  control  of,  by 
Government  in  1862,  105. 

Telescopes,  dependence  of  United 
States  on  Germany  for  lenses  for, 
521-522. 

Texas,  mobilization  of  troops  on  Mexi- 
can border,  in  1911,  390-393; 
troops  sent  to,  in  1912,  on  account 
of  Mexican  disturbances,  408 ;  con- 
centration of  troops  in,  in  1913,  419— 
420. 

Thames,  battle  of  the,  in  War  of  1812, 
57. 

Theatres,  admission  of  men  in  United 
States  uniform   to,    384. 

Ticonderoga,  capture  of,  by  Ethan 
Allen's  force,  8. 

Time,  value  of,  in  preparing  for  war, 
554-556. 

Tournaments,  military,  in  1910,  372— 
373. 

Training,  importance  of  matter  of,  551; 
value  to  the  individual  in  his  every- 
day life,   551-552. 

Transportation  Reserve  Corps,  bill  for 
creation  of,    518. 

Travelling  allowances  for  enlisted  men, 
238. 

Trenton,  victory  won  by  American 
army  at,  19 ;  strength  of  Washing- 
ton's   army   at,    40. 

Trophies,  national,  to  be  awarded  an- 
nually,  299. 

Typhoid  fever,  inoculation  of  soldiers 
against,  373, 

United  States  Volunteers,  creation  of 
force  of,  suggested  to  supplant  Or- 
ganized Militia  as  second  line  of 
defence,  544;  intensive  training  sim- 
ilar to  that  of  the  Swiss  advised  for, 
544-545;  wide  appeal  of  such  an 
organization,  545. 

Upton,  General  Emory,  cited  and 
quoted,  3,  5,  6,  7,  8,  13,  15  ff.,  45, 
50-112;  on  lessons  to  be  learned 
from  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  8;  on 
comparative  strength  of  American 
and  British  force  about  Boston  in 
1775,  12;  analysis  by,  of  law  of 
1792,  regarding  militia,  48-49;  on 
the  cost,  in  time  of  war,  of  a  non- 
expansive  military  establishment,  58. 

Utah  expedition  of   1858,   93. 

Ute  Indian  outbreak  in  1906,   322. 

Valley  Forge,  sufferings  of  American 
army  at,  21. 

Venereal  diseases,  percentage  of,  in 
Army,  406;  effect  of  anticanteen  leg- 
islation on,  407. 

Vera  Cruz,  capture  of,  by  Scott  in 
Mexican  War,  86;  landing  of  Ameri- 
can force  and  fight  at,  in  1914,  446; 


Index 


735 


occupation  of,  by  General  Funston, 
446. 

Vermont,  militia  of,  recalled  by  gov- 
ernor in  War  of  1812,  59-60;  refusal 
of  governor  to  send  out  militia  in 
1814,    63-64. 

Veteran  volunteers,  scheme  of,  em- 
ployed in  War  of  the  Rebellion,  149— 
150. 

Veterinarians,  retirement  of,  384. 

Vicksburg  campaign.  Grant's,  113, 
124-126. 

Virginia,  drafting  of  troops  by,  during 
Revolution,  20 ;  bounties  offered  by, 
in  1779,  25;  number  of  soldiers  fur- 
nished Continental  Army  by,   574. 

Volunteer  military  system,  laying  of 
foundations  of,  by  Act  of  1790,  46. 

Volunteers,  preference  of  recruits  for 
service  with,  15,  41,  165,  205,  271; 
total  number  under  arms  during  War 
of  1812,  69;  enlistment  of,  for  Mexi- 
can War,  82  ;  number  employed  dur- 
ing Mexican  War,  89 ;  call  for,  and 
equipment  of,  at  opening  of  War  of 
the  Rebellion,  96—98 ;  calls  for,  in 
1862,  108-109;  folly  of  dependence 
on,  shown  by  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
145—146:  comparatively  small  value 
of,  in  Spanish-American  War,  205; 
legislation  of  1899  concerning,  224— 
225,  227-228;  numbers  employed  in 
different  wars,  275;  Act  of  1914 
concerning  raising  of,  in  time  of 
war,  429—436;  conditions  as  to 
equipment  for,  in  1914,  498.  See 
Militia. 

War    College.      See   Armv   War   College. 

War  College  Board,  238-239;  extent 
of  powers  and  duties,  259;  relieved 
of  many  duties  by  the  General  Staff, 
301. 

War  Department,  cost  of,  by  periods, 
276 ;  necessity  for  complete  reorgan- 
ization of,   553—554. 

War  games.      See  Manoeuvres. 

War  materiel,  dependence  of  manufac- 
ture of,  upon  imported  ingredients, 
520-521. 

War    of    the    Rebellion.     See    Rebellion. 

War  of  the  Revolution.  See  Revolu- 
tion. 

War  of  1812,  adjustment  of  conflicting 
military  organizations  at  opening  of, 
53 ;  failures  and  disasters  of  cam- 
paign of  1812,  54—55;  campaign  of 
1813,  56—61;  troops  employed  in 
1813,  61;  campaign  of  1814,  62-67; 
troops  employed  in  1814,  65;  cam- 
paign of  1815,  67—69;  total  number 
of  troops  employed  in  war,  69,  275, 
602. 

War  strength  of  United  States  com- 
pared with  that  of  other  nations, 
522-523. 


Ward,  General  Artemas,  in  command  at 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill,   8. 

Washington,  George,  made  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  Continental  Army,  10; 
additional  militia  and  minute-men 
called  for  by,  11;  comments  of,  upon 
vicious  military  policy  during  Revo- 
lution, 13—14;  on  evils  of  short  en- 
listments, 14-15,  16-17,  18  n.;  dic- 
tatorial powers  granted  to,  by  Con- 
gress, 19,  20;  on  patriotism  and  in- 
terest in  time  of  war,  23  n. ;  on  evil& 
of  military  policy  pursued  by  Con- 
gress, 28-30;  surrender  of  Cornwal- 
lis  to,  38;  delivers  farewell  address 
and  resigns  commission,  39;  letter 
by,  concerning  folly  of  short  enlist- 
ments, 270. 

Washington,  D.  C,  capture  of,  by 
British    in    1814,    64. 

Washington  Branch  of  National  Cavalry 
and  Artillery  Remount  Association, 
413. 

West  Point,  Va.,  battle  of,  110. 

West  Point  Military  Academy.  See 
Military   Academy. 

White  Plains,  battle  of,   18. 

Wilderness  campaign  in  1864,  134—135. 

Williamsburg,  battle  of,   110. 

Wilson,  General  James  Harrison,  cam- 
paign of,  in  1865,  144,  629-630;  de- 
scription of  landing  at  Ponce  by, 
192—193;  second  in  command  of 
American  force  in  Peking  Relief  Ex- 
pedition, 243. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  quoted  on  citizen- 
soldiery,   557. 

Wilson's  Creek,  battle  of,  102. 

Winchester,  Shields  victorious  at,  in 
1862,  110;  Sheridan's  victory  at, 
136. 

Wireless  telegraphy,  regulations  gov- 
erning control  of,  361. 

Wisconsin  River,  engagement  on,  in 
Black    Hawk   War,    73. 

Wood,  Leonard,  in  Santiago  campaign, 
173,  179,  185;  placed  in  command 
of  city  of  Santiago,  190;  in  com- 
mand of  American  forces  when  with- 
drawn from  Cuba  in   1902,   287. 

World   power,    responsibilities   of,    528. 


Yauco,   defeat  of   Spanish  at,   in  Porto 

Rico  campaign,   192. 
Yellow  fever,   American  army  attacked 

by,  in  Cuba,  189-190. 
Yorktown,     Cornwallis's    surrender    at, 

38;    siege   of,    by   Northern   army   in 

1862,    110. 
Young,   General   S.   B.   M.,   activities  of, 

in  Philippine  War,  233,  234,  235  ff. ; 

efficiency    of,    in    pacifying    Northern 

Luzon,  239;  selected  as  first  Chief  of 

Staff,  in  1903,  300. 


T 


HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of 
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describes,  more  forcibly  and  clearly  than  any  other  account  so  far 
published,  the  meaning,  to  America,  of  the  tragic  changes  which 
are  taking  place  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  German  people. 

Written  with  ease  and  charm  of  style,  it  is  prose  that  holds 
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front  and  gives  a  mechanistic  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of 
this  war  and  of  war  in  general,  interprets  German  Kultur,  and  in- 
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unusual  and  at  the  same  time  valuable  features  of  the  work  lies 
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nations.  Elbert  Francis  Baldwin  has  here,  however,  brought  to- 
gether within  the  compass  of  a  single  volume  a  survey  of  the  en- 
tire field. 

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consequence  the  descriptions  which  he  gives  of  the  German,  or 
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been  given  to  no  other  man  during  the  present  engage- 
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actually  in  the  trenches.  One  of  the  most  interesting 
chapters  of  the  volume  is  the  concluding  one  dealing 
with  great  personalities  of  the  war  from  first-hand 
acquaintance. 

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Russia  and  the  World 


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At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war  Mr.  Graham  was  in  Russia^ 
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war  was  received  on  the  Chinese  frontier,  one  thousand  miles  from  a  rail- 
way station,  where  he  happened  to  be  when  the  Tsar's  summons  came. 
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nomic Isolation  of  Russia,  An  Aeroplane  Hunt  at  Warsaw,  Sufferings 
Poland  :  A  Belgium  of  the  East,  and  The  Soldier  and  the  Cross. 

"  It  shows  the  author  creeping  as  near  as  he  was  allowed  to  the  firing 
line.  It  gives  broad  views  of  difficult  questions,  like  the  future  of  the 
Poles  and  the  Jews,  It  rises  into  high  politics,  forecasts  the  terms  of  peace 
and  the  rearrangement  of  the  world,  east  and  west,  that  may  follow.  But 
the  salient  thing  in  it  is  its  interpretation  for  Western  minds  of  the  spirit 
of  Russia."  —  London  Times. 

German  World  Policies 

(Der  Deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt) 
By  PAUL   ROHRBACH 

Translated  by  Dr.  Edmund  von  Mach 

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translator  as  a  "  constructive  optimist,"  one  who,  at  the  same  time,  is  an 
incisive  critic  of  those  shortcomings  which  have  kept  Germany,  as  he  thinks, 
from  playing  the  great  part  to  which  she  is  called.  In  this  volume  Dr. 
Rohrbach  gives  a  true  insight  into  the  character  of  the  German  people^ 
their  aims,  fears,  and  aspirations. 

"  Dr.  von  Mach  renders  an  extraordinary  service  to  his  country  in  making 
known  to  English  readers  at  this  time  a  book  like  Rohrbach's." 

—  New  York  Globe. 

"  A  clear  insight  into  Prussian  ideals."  —  Boston  Transcript. 

"  A  valuable,  significant,  and  most  informing  book." 

—  New  York  Tribune.. 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

6738-6 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


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BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  HEIGHTS 
CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 


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